Afghanistan 2012 Looking to The Future - A Report
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A f g hanis tan 2012
Looking to The Future
A Report
Radh a Kuma r & Ka ila sh K. Pra sa d
A Del h i P ol ic y Gro up P ubl ic at ion
Afghanistan 2012
Looking to The Future
A Regional Report
ISBN: 978-81-87206-27-9
Published by the Delhi Policy Group © 2012
Peace and Conflict Program
Delhi Policy Group
Core 5-A, 1st Floor, India Habitat Centre,
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Website: http://www.delhipolicygroup.com/
All rights reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, without the prior permission of the authors and the publisher.
This report is printed on CyclusPrint based on 100% recycled fibres
“As Afghanistan continues its transition to full sovereignty, we need regional support more than ever. Track II will help build that support.” H.E. Rangin Dadfar Spanta National Security Advisor of Afghanistan, Herat, October 2012 “The Government of Afghanistan supports the Delhi Policy Group’s regional initiative. We believe these meetings build confidence and trust. It is heartening to hear that India, Iran, Turkey and Tajikistan are receptive to the proposals made at these meetings. We hope the recommendations will translate into policy.” H.E. Ghulam Jelani Popal Minister of State for Governance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Delhi, December 2012 “Afghanistan and our neighbors are bound together by many commonalities, be they challenges or opportunities, both of which call for sincere results-oriented cooperation.” H.E. Shaida Abdali Ambassador of Afghanistan to India, Delhi, July 2012
Table of
Contents
Acknowledgements
Preface
Executive Summary i
I. The Current State of Play 1
Strand One: Strategic (Security and Trade) 4
Security 4
Reconciliation 9
Trade 13
Strand Two: Regional Cooperation 15
Strand Three: Aid and Investment 18
II. Regional Views 21
Security 22
Recommendations 27
Regional Dialogue and Cooperation 29
Recommendations 32
The Heart of Asia and New Silk Road 34
Recommendations 37
Regional Compact 39
Recommendations 42
III. Afghanistan, India, Pakistan 44
Recommendations 49
IV. Conclusions 51
List of Abbreviations 53
Annex A 55
Annex B 60Acknowledgements The Delhi Policy Group is grateful to the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, especially Director-General, Dr. Davood Moradian and Human Resources Manager Omid Salman, for co-hosting the second conference in Herat at the magnificent Citadel. We also wish to thank the Government of Afghanistan for their help in making all three conferences substantive. We are also grateful to the foreign ministries of Afghanistan, India, Iran, Germany, Italy, Japan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and the U.S. for briefing conference participants. Finally, we would like to thank Delhi Policy Group Research Associate Eshita Paul for her successful organization of the conference series.
Preface
This report is the product of three regional conferences held over 2012,
attended by policymakers and/or analysts from eleven Heart of Asia
countries: Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
The Delhi Policy Group’s conference series was launched on the
understanding that as Afghanistan transits to full sovereignty in 2014, the
role of regional countries will become critical to the success or failure of
the transition. As a Track II initiative, Track I.5 as far as participation was
concerned, the conferences sought to bolster, and where possible feed into,
existing Track I efforts such as the Istanbul and Kabul processes.
As is customary with all Delhi Policy Group conference reports, this Report
is not a consensus document. Instead, it seeks to reflect the divergent views
that were expressed at the conferences, while sketching possible areas for
consensus. In this context, the bulk of the recommendations included here
are non-controversial; those that reflected an individual opinion, or divided
conference participants, have not been included, on the premise that most
regional governments would not consider them.
The Delhi Policy Group would welcome feedback on this Report, either by
email or mail, at the address given on the inside cover.
Radha Kumar
Director-General
Delhi Policy GroupAFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Executive
Summary
As anticipated, 2012 was a turning year in the sense that key peace and
stabilization initiatives, which had been worked quietly for several years,
made their first breakthroughs. The most dramatic turn was towards the
end of the year, when the Chantilly meeting in December and the High Peace
Council’s leaked Roadmap for Peace in November indicated progress in the
reconciliation policy of talks with the Taliban. Both have had an immediate
impact in Afghanistan and on its neighborhood. In Afghanistan, they have
sharpened or mitigated internal and external security dilemmas, depending
on the affiliation and/or location of domestic constituencies. In Pakistan,
there are doubts about the Chantilly talks but varying degrees of welcome
for the Roadmap. In the neighborhood at large, the response has been one
of doubt at new uncertainties. Indeed, with most countries facing security
concerns akin to the prisoner’s dilemma, the current breakthroughs run
the risk of exacerbating regional tensions and/or rivalries. Much depends
therefore on how the initial forays into peacemaking with the Taliban
play out, and what steps are taken to minimize misperceptions and create
confidence.
The developments on reconciliation have overshadowed substantial
progress made in two other parallel areas, for regional integration and
international commitment to Afghanistan’s “Decade of Transformation”
(2015-24) announced at Bonn in December 2011. In fact, 2012 opened with
three clear policy tracks for international action: strategic (security and
reconciliation), regional integration, and aid and investment.
Initiated in Istanbul in November 2011 and developed in Kabul in May
2012, the regional integration process framed seven major CBMs that would
make the countries of Afghanistan’s wider neighborhood stakeholders in
its stabilization. Imaginatively named the “Heart of Asia”, this process was
intended to minimize regional security dilemmas and was seen as having
ithe potential to become an important guarantor for peace in Afghanistan
and across its borders.
The third track, of a ten-year international commitment to aid and
investment in Afghanistan, is vital to ensuring the country survives
economically once the massive military expenditure of ISAF draws down.
It could also, in its turn, inject confidence for regional integration and keep
the Heart of Asia countries engaged, but its best chance is if international
attention remains consistently high throughout the period.
Initially, it was hoped that the three tracks would be interlocking, and each
would feed into the other. This was tentatively agreed in London in 2010,
and several red lines were set for reconciliation in the hope that they would
prevent any sharpening of security dilemmas in the region.
Clearly all three tracks are essential for the 2014 transition. The challenge
now is to see whether the reconciliation breakthroughs can be shaped in such
a way as to mitigate security dilemmas; whether the regional integration
process can move at a fast enough pace to anchor CBMs and include
discussions towards a regional compact; and whether the international
community can keep attention on the region till 2024.
What follows is a list of recommendations addressing all three tracks,
developed in a series of regional conferences for peace and stability in
Afghanistan organized by the Delhi Policy Group. They are not consensus
recommendations, but are broadly supported by participants.
I. Security and Reconciliation
1. Several of the security dilemmas of neighboring countries regarding
talks with the Taliban could be accommodated through the inclusion
of guarantees that would satisfy opposition and neighbor concerns.
For example, provisional agreements reached in talks with the Taliban
could be put to Parliament or a specially convened Loya Jirga, as was
earlier done. The Taliban could simultaneously pledge that they would
iiAFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
not allow attacks on a third country from Afghanistan or give sanctuary
to groups committing such attacks.
2. Furthermore, the monitoring group that is proposed under the
Roadmap could be expanded to include concerned neighbors and
Heart of Asia countries. An alternative would be to set up a second tier
group comprising these countries, for regular briefings by the Afghan
government on progress and/or decisions arrived at during the talks.
This would enable the Afghan government to garner regional support
for the reconciliation process, as called for in the Roadmap, as well as
clarify any doubts that neighbors and allies might have.
3. The SCO, in which more of the Central Asian countries are likely to
become partners by 2013, is one appropriate forum for promoting
dialogue on critical areas of regional security concern, such as narcotics
and extremism, though the UN and Kabul Working Groups provide more
inclusive forums. The SCO has already set up an Afghanistan Contact
Group. However, it needs to accelerate trust-building measures within
the organization and fast-track decisions on admitting Afghanistan,
India and Pakistan as members,1 especially if the SCO is to assume a
larger role regarding Afghanistan post-2014.
4. The Kabul Working Groups also provide opportunity to coordinate
cooperation between several processes and organizations. For example,
counter-terrorism and narcotics are identified as issues for joint action
by SAARC as well; regional infrastructure is the core focus of RECCA.
Signatory countries of SCO, SAARC and the Istanbul Declaration could
start working jointly on concrete measures to prevent sanctuaries and/
or support for terrorist groups.
5. Given the need for the Afghan, regional and international tracks to
bolster each other, regional countries and key international actors
could simultaneously begin a dialogue on mutual security concerns and
principles. Such a dialogue is a natural corollary to the Istanbul Process
(see V, below)
1 Iran’s case is complicated by UN sanctions, but it will be impossible to sustain peace
and stabilization without Iran, which has a relatively good trilateral cooperation with
Afghanistan and Pakistan against narcotics, and is the lead country for the Kabul Working
Group on Education.
iiiII. Regional Dialogue
1. The core of the regional integration processes initiated at Istanbul and
Kabul is a vision of Asia as it once was: a prosperous and adventurous
continent loosely united by a web of routes that enabled the exchange
of goods, people and ideas. This vision is embodied by the Heart of Asia
and New Silk Road concepts, but is suspect because it is erroneously
attributed to outsiders.
2. Despite their suspicions, however, all the regional countries share this
vision. Moreover, most agree that it needs to be propelled through
culture and backed by infrastructure. The regional countries’ Ministries
of Culture, museums/galleries, institutes for cultural relations, to
mention but a few, could form a network of activities, beginning with
a festival combining the classical high culture of the Central-South
Asia region, including Bedil and other shared Farsi and Urdu-Hindvi
literature going back to Amir Khusrau, Pashto literature and historical
documents, classical music from Iran (Dastgah) and India-Pakistan,
authors like Tagore, Iqbal, Faiz and many more who are familiar across
the region; calligraphy, which is a fine art in the countries of Central and
South Asia; and semi-classical genres of music like Qawwali and Ghazal
as well as theatre like the Dastangoi. If successful, it could also add new
elements of fusion, such as the work being done by groups like Coke
Studio and Noori in Pakistan, or the rap experiments in Afghanistan,
along the lines of the SAARC festival held recently in Delhi.
The festival could be accompanied by an inter-faith dialogue, drawing
on the traditional religious and philosophical exchanges that left a rich
legacy of pluralism and creativity between the countries of the region.
Such a dialogue could also connect to the Alliance of Civilizations
initiative.
Ideally the festival would be an annual or two-yearly event that would
rotate between participating countries.
3. The regional countries’ Tourism Ministries could highlight the living
and to be revived sites of the ancient trade and cultural exchange routes
ivthat were connected through the Silk Road, in tandem with UNESCO
and other relevant institutions in the Heart of Asia countries. Herat
was a flourishing Silk Road city for both trade and cultural exchange.
Ghazni has recently been declared a UNESCO heritage city; Mashhad
in Iran is both a key junction on the Silk route and was renowned for its
intellectual and religious debate during the ancient period. It would be
a fitting host for interfaith religious and philosophical exchanges.
4. Looking to the longer term, regional educationists and/or publishers
could produce a textbook that will revive the shared cultural and
intellectual space of Central and South Asia (and their immediate
neighbors in West Asia and Eurasia), through a selection of writings
by poets, storytellers, philosophers, religious scholars and political
thinkers such as Rumi, Khusrau, Ghalib, Iqbal, Faiz, Manto, Tagore,
Kabir, the Buddha and Gandhi, to mention but a few. It could be
titled The Heart of Asia: A Compendium of Writings and should be
translated into the different languages through collaboration between
national publishing houses. If possible, it could be adopted as part of
school or college curricula. Ideally, such a textbook would be produced
and/or disseminated under the Education CBM led by Iran.
5. At the institutional level, it would be helpful to create a think tanks’
network and a civil society forum as parallels to the Track I regional
dialogue of the Istanbul Process. Think tanks in the region could be
encouraged to undertake joint research papers on regional cooperation
for peace and stabilization in Afghanistan and its wider neighborhood.
6. The University of Central Asia has expressed interest in developing
an institutional relationship with the SAARC University, which the
Education Ministries of the relevant countries could explore. The two
universities could together initiate joint research, development and
publications, for example on the Silk Road.
vIII. Trade, Aid and Investment
1. As pointed out above, trade, aid and investment are critical for
Afghanistan’s stabilization. While the three entail international
commitment, regional countries could take more initiative. For best
results, it would help to coordinate the Regional Infrastructure and
Commercial CBMs created at the Kabul Ministerial Meeting, and link
both with RECCA. The three are overlapping and interdependent, and
in-tandem progress on all three will boost regional economies, most
of all in Afghanistan. The CBMs on Commercial Opportunities and
Chambers of Commerce are to be combined; coordination with the
Infrastructure CBM and RECCA will eliminate duplication and further
streamline implementation.
2. Upgrading and further development of the Chabahar route, which
offers the opportunity to connect India with Afghanistan and Central
Asia via Iran, needs to be fast-tracked. This entails both improvement
and/or expansion of the port and of the roads and eventually rail lines.
An Afghanistan, India and Iran trilateral will discuss the issues; it is
important that they set an early deadline for the works to begin and be
completed.
Similarly, a north-south energy corridor, long contemplated through
projects such as TAPI, needs to be fast-tracked, and all possible options
for creating such a corridor should be explored.
3. The Heart of Asia countries could consider adopting zero tariff regimes
for Afghan goods, along the lines of the SAARC provision for Least
Developed Countries (LDCs). Afghanistan has been given LDC status
in SAARC, but is as yet unable to utilize it because of lack of access from
Pakistan through India.
4. The Heart of Asia countries could also consider setting up a Bank for
Reconstruction and Development for Afghanistan. India could take a
lead on this issue.
viAFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
IV. Regional Compact
1. The idea of a Regional Compact was implicit in both the Istanbul Process
of November and the Bonn Conference of December 2011. Given that
regional dialogue had just begun, it was decided to work on CBMs
first, to pave the way. In Track II, the discussion of such a compact
has already begun, taking the Istanbul principles as a base. A draft
framework for a Regional Compact would focus on non-intervention
and mechanisms for security cooperation, along with monitoring and
penalties for violation. It would need to be prepared within the coming
year; if discussions towards such a framework do not take place before
the 2014 transition, the idea is unlikely to achieve traction after 2014.
2. The Geneva Accords and the Bonn Agreement include pledges of
non-intervention and respect for Afghan sovereignty. The Afghan
government could make a request to the UN Secretary General to
pursue those pledges, giving him the authority to implement the
relevant provisions of the Geneva Accords and the Bonn Agreement. A
UN role in brokering a regional agreement for Afghanistan is already
provided for in these agreements and has wide regional consent. Ideally
the more active and/or powerful regional countries should take the lead
in identifying the elements of a non-interference framework.
V. Afghanistan, India and Pakistan
1. The Delhi Policy Group initiated a trilateral dialogue between
Afghanistan, India and Pakistan in 2009, on the understanding that
India and Pakistan needed to insulate Afghanistan from their bilateral
tensions. (This is a goal that the regional countries also support). The
Trilaterals achieved some success, to the extent that there is greater
recognition of each one’s security concerns in all three countries.
However, many of the Trilaterals’ recommendations have been
overtaken by events; for example, the idea of setting up mechanisms for
trilateral security cooperation has been replaced by bilateral security
discussions.
vii2. The best potential for the three countries to work together lies in the
areas of trade and social reform. The speedy coming into force of SAFTA
could contribute to economic revival in Afghanistan and should be
pushed by SAARC member-states; SAFTA should be implemented by
2015. In the meantime, India and Pakistan could fast-track discussion
on an India-Pakistan transit trade agreement as counterpart of APTTA,
and start work on the physical infrastructure that will be required.
RECCA V also offers scope for easing trade between the three countries,
as does promotion of the Silk Road. That the three countries formed
an important tributary of the Silk Route in its heyday is noteworthy.
All three should look more closely at enhancing connectivity via the
Silk Road concept, in the expanded form suggested by the regional
conference (above).
If feasible, the three countries could establish a joint chamber of commerce
to work on ways in which trade and connectivity could be operationalized
through SAFTA, RECCA, the Kabul CBMs and the Silk Road.
3. Afghanistan, India and Pakistan could encourage cooperation between
the India and Pakistan National Commissions on Women and the
Afghan Ministry for Women’s Affairs (pending the setting up of an
Afghan Women’s Commission). Each country has very strong women’s
groups that are already working together. However, each country faces
severe human security threats to women, and each could do more to
promote reforms offering women better opportunities, as enshrined in
the SAARC Social Charter and the UNSCRs 1325 et al.
4. Similarly, the three countries could encourage cooperation between
their National Human Rights Commissions. All three are autonomous
bodies and the Pakistan Human Rights Commission is soon to acquire
the statutory authority that its Indian counterpart has. It is hoped that
the Afghan Human Rights Commission is also given statutory authority.
5. The next SAARC Summit could consider including a pledge of non-
interference, as proposed in the Heart of Asia forum and with the same
interpretation.
6. Finally, however difficult it is, India and Pakistan need to find better
ways to work together on counter-terrorism. Existing mechanisms
have failed. A bilateral dialogue focused solely on this issue is required,
especially at the Track II level.
viiiAFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
The Current
State of Play
“Afghanistan is in the midst of a critical phase of transition wherein it
assumes responsibility for security and governance as the NATO/ISAF
drawdown with the aim of withdrawing from a combat role by 2014…
The first requirement is that neighbors must stay engaged.
We believe that assisting Afghanistan cannot be reduced to a zero sum
game and cooperation should replace conflict and competition.”
H.E. RANJAN MATHAI
FOREIGN SECRETARY OF INDIA
Over the past decade, Afghanistan has seen an exponential
change. GDP has grown from just over USD 2 billion in
2000 to USD 19 billion in 2011, school enrollment has gone “I am optimistic.
up eight times and girls now form 40% of school goers. The population
Economic growth is around 5%; estimates put its potential of Afghanistan
at 6.9%. Afghanistan has an active and vigilant Parliament is young and not
and has developed a number of accountability institutions. familiar with war.”
It has created an army and police force. It has Human Rights
ABBAS NOYAN
and Elections Commissions, a free media with thirty-five SECRETARY GENERAL,
television and two hundred radio stations, and a lively civil RIGHTS AND JUSTICE
PARTY
society, including a powerful women’s movement. Twelve
million Afghans have mobile phones. Demographically it is,
1like India, a country with a predominantly young population,
who look outward rather than inwards.
Figure 1:
Afghanistan GDP
1960-2011
Source: World Bank, http://tinyurl.com/abl4w2b, accessed on
December 30, 2012
Figure 2:
Afghanistan Growth
Rates, 2003-20132
Source: Brookings Institution, http://tinyurl.com/6o8b652, accessed
on December 30, 2012
2
2 Most of the spikes are probably artificially driven, for example by
troops and/or aid flows.
2AFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
These achievements form the backdrop to the major shifts
in Afghan policy that took place in 2012. First, in contrast to
previous years, Afghan leadership of peace and stabilization
initiatives achieved wide recognition and international
support. Second, key members of the international
community pledged to aid Afghanistan through a “Decade of
Transformation” (2015-2024). And third, the international
community began to coordinate more closely than ever
before, on both a roadmap and a timetable.
Considering it took over a decade, accomplishing these
shifts was a feat. Clearly they have been propelled by the
2014 handover deadline and can be seen as among its more
positive outcomes. Clearly too, their success and/or failure “President
will be gauged in the years following the drawdown, especially Obama has said
2015-18. From the adoption of a policy to its implementation, repeatedly, ‘As
from its implementation to its impact, and from its impact to Afghans stand
a desired outcome is a process that generally takes a decade up, they will not
or two. But it most often falters between the first two stages, stand alone.’ ”
of policy adoption and implementation, and 2015-18 will
H.E. NANCY POWELL
test whether the transition can sustain. Steps taken today to AMBASSADOR OF THE
U.S. TO INDIA
fulfill or influence the shifts above will, in their turn, shape
the trends in 2015-18.
In the past fifteen months, three major strands of policy
action have emerged:
■ Strategic (security and trade), led by the U.S.;
■ Regional, initiated by Turkey with multiple engagement
of Central Asian states, India and Pakistan; and
■ Aid, led by Japan, with a sub-strand on investment,
led by India (though China is the largest investor thus
far). The flow of aid is a 10-year commitment, made by
leading international economic and strategic actors.
3All initiatives are, naturally, coordinated by and with the
Afghan government.
Strand One: Strategic
(Security and Trade)
By its very nature, this strand is the least coordinated. It
is at the core of peace and stabilization in Afghanistan and
has remained unresolved since the failed Geneva Accords
of the early 1990s, largely because of the complex relations
between Afghanistan and some of its neighbors, especially
Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Iran.
“There are
glimmers of a The Strategic Strand comprises three key elements:
peace process. Security, Reconciliation and Trade. Each has been hotly
What direction it contested over the past decade. While 2012 began with
will move in, how significant progress in trade talks, and the Heart of Asia
deeply rooted countries made a series of commitments to infrastructure
development and working groups, the focus shifted to
it will be, is not
security and reconciliation as the year progressed. Two
certain. But it is
issues dominated the security debate inside Afghanistan and
there.”
with its neighbors in 2012: immunity for U.S. troops under
a Status of Forces Agreement (required for U.S. troops to
remain post-transition), and talks with the Taliban. Both
have a direct bearing on whether the transition will go
smoothly.
Security
By summer 2012 the transition process had already advanced
to the point that 75% of Afghans were under the protection of
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The handover
is expected to complete by mid to late 2013, after which ISAF
4AFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
forces will shift to a support role of training, advising and
assisting the ANSF. The ISAF assistance role will come to
an end in late 2014, but training by the U.S. and NATO (and
perhaps other security-focused organizations) will continue
after 2014. In any case, US troops now comprise around
80% of ISAF; a number of the European contributors have
withdrawn their troops entirely, while others have drawn
down to a few thousand and even a few hundreds.
Bilateral programs such as the Indian, Pakistani and
Turkish military and police training for Afghan officers
Australia Figure 3:
Romania ISAF Composition as
Spain of February 2013
ISAF Troops
Poland
Italy
Germany
UK
USA
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000
Source: http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contribu-
tions/index.php
will also continue, with new ones being added, for example
with China. Thus far, these training programs have been
limited in both intake and scope; whether they will grow in
importance following 2014, and how they will coordinate
with the U.S. training program remains an open question.
Afghanistan aims to acquire a further degree of security
through Strategic Partnership Agreements with India,
5China, France, Germany, the UK and the U.S.,3 as well as
through its recently acquired status as a major non-NATO
ally, both of which Iran, a key neighbor, has reservations
about. Most Afghans consider Iran’s reservations to be
unfounded, pointing out that in eleven years of ISAF
presence Afghan soil was not used for attacks on Iran or
Iranian national interest. However, there is considerable
debate inside Afghanistan on what the Strategic Partnership
with the U.S. should comprise. Moreover, there are concerns
over the relationship to be established between the ANSF
and the critical infrastructure protection forces that may
remain after 2014.
The Afghan debate over which relationship is best with the
“The test is
U.S. has coalesced around the issue of immunity for U.S.
dismantling of personnel. President Karzai plans to put the issue before
safe havens and a Loya Jirga, though many feel it should be decided by
sanctuaries.” the Afghan parliament. One way out, discussed between
Presidents Obama and Karzai, is to restrict counter-terrorist
practices such as air and/or drone strikes, which have killed
more civilians than alleged militants (bearing in mind that
“anti-government forces”, as the UN puts it, have killed a
far greater number of civilians than have “pro-government
forces” combined).4
The Afghan government is also examining different
military models, to evaluate which configuration of troops,
equipment, doctrine and training would be most appropriate
3 The Strategic Partnership Agreements vary considerably; some are
comprehensive, others are pegged to bilateral concerns. For a summary
of the “Agreement on Strategic Partnership between The Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan and The Republic Of India,” see http://delhipolicygroup.
com/pdf/Afghan-India-Strategic.pdf
4 United Nations General Assembly Security Council, “The situation in
Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security”,
December 10, 2012, p 13. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=A/61/326&Lang=E
6AFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
to the country’s condition. In contrast to training, there
are few commitments on equipment for the ANSF, and
weaponry is an issue of growing concern, especially the lack
of air defense. It can be assumed that the Afghan army will
turn to neighbors in its search for arms supplies post-2014,
if only for cost reasons. Given the several strategic rivalries
in the region, the issue will be a minefield for any Afghan
government.
The security situation remains vulnerable on the ground,
with continuing Taliban and allied militant attacks that
display a rising and worrying trend of green on blue
attacks. Opium cultivation has returned, and drugs provide
a mainstay of the black economy. In this context, it is
“Terrorism,
noteworthy that the Bonn Conference of December 2011,
extremism and
at which the commitment to the Decade of Transformation
organized crime
was announced, recognized the need to tackle the demand
constitute the
side of the drugs trade along with the supply side, which will
main threats
involve a concerted international effort.
to peace in
Afghanistan and
Moreover, the prospects for de-escalation of violence are
stability in the
still weak, though less so than at the beginning of 2012.
region.”
Deadly attacks on Afghanistan from the Taliban continue,
and on Pakistan from the Tehrik-e-Taliban and other H.E. SHAIDA ABDALI
AMBASSADOR OF
militant groups, especially in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and AFGHANISTAN TO INDIA
Balochistan provinces. Notably, the Afghanistan attacks
have increasingly targeted government installations and
the ANSF, whereas the attacks in Pakistan target citizens as
much as government.
Releases of Taliban before and after the Chantilly talks
(discussed below) indicate that the policy of distinguishing
between Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, supported by the
Afghan Government and concerned international actors,
7is on the ascendant; the Pakistan Government may push
the former to engage with the Afghan government, while
offering the latter peace talks. The situation is delicately
poised at the moment.
Progress in the core trilaterals between Afghanistan,
Pakistan and the U.S. and between Afghanistan, Pakistan
and Turkey is, therefore, vital; the latter’s importance can be
gauged from the fact that the Afghan government attended
the December trilateral in Istanbul even though the Afghan
intelligence chief had suffered a suicide attack. Meantime,
other complementary avenues for security guarantees
through international and regional organizations have
Afghanistan
been set up, as well as an interlocking grid of bilateral
should not
agreements. As mentioned above, Afghanistan has already
be an area of
signed partnership agreements with India, China, the U.S.,
influence for any
France, Germany, the U.K. and Australia, has a privileged
one or group of
partnership with Russia, and is currently negotiating
countries.”
bilateral strategic partnerships with the EU and Pakistan.
H.E. RANJAN MATHAI
FOREIGN SECRETARY
OF INDIA Whether any of these partnerships will be implemented in
such a way as to shape the trends post-2014, or whether
they will take shape on the ground only after 2014, is an
open question. Clearly, the former is preferable; in the latter
case, the partnerships run the risk of being contingent on
developments post-2014, rather than helping to shape them.
Reconciliation
The issue of security is closely tied to that of reconciliation.
Though the U.S. administration spearheaded efforts to bring
the Taliban to the table, the U.S. sees its role as facilitating
the Afghan government’s leadership, and is coordinating its
8AFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
efforts with other countries in the wider region as well as
international actors that recently held informal discussions
with Taliban members.
How high the stakes are was evidenced by the assassination
of Mr. Rabbani, the Chair of the High Peace Council, the
suicide attack on intelligence chief Amanullah Khan, and the
measures taken by militant hardliners and their supporters
to disrupt progress with the Taliban. Nevertheless, hard
negotiations are ongoing to implement the Qatar initiative’s
goal of providing safe harbor for those Taliban that are
willing to negotiate. Moreover, despite setbacks, the
High Peace Council has assumed a more central role in
“The Taliban
reconciliation negotiations than before, with Mr. Rabbani’s
cannot control
successor, son Salahuddin, visiting Pakistan in late 2012 and
Afghanistan.
the Council’s recently leaked draft Roadmap to 2015. The
Afghan institutions
Roadmap appears to have been produced in consultation
are much stronger
with Pakistan and facilitated by mutual allies.
today. The main
reason the Taliban
The Chantilly talks of December 2012 indicated a slight
rose was chaos in
softening of the Taliban’s position insofar as they were willing
Afghanistan.”
to meet with Afghan representatives around a table, even
though their public posture was that they had only attended
to apprise the international community of their views. The
Afghan government paved the way by releasing close to
150 Taliban prisoners and allowing them freedom of travel,
and the Afghan delegation to the talks was carefully put
together: it comprised members of the Afghan government
and the leading opposition parties and constituencies,
including women. The Taliban delegation was mostly from
the Qatar office. Some analysts point out the delegation did
not include Pakistan-based Taliban; however, two former
aides to Mullah Omar participated. Apparently they were
9not officially designated representatives, but it was assumed
they would be messengers.
Seen as a preliminary ground-breaker, the Chantilly talks
were significant both for their timing – indicating a last-
ditch effort to get some sort of agreement with the Taliban
by 2014 – and for the level of international consensus
that has been reached. They would not have been possible
without cooperation between regional governments and the
international community, and the silence with which they
were greeted indicates broad international support for talks
with the Taliban, including from India (though with the
“India will support corollary that they should be Afghan led and shaped).5
a reconciliation
process that is According to members of the Afghan government’s
accepted by all delegation to Chantilly, the base principles for negotiation
the important with the Taliban and allied mujahedeen remain the ones
constituencies in outlined by the Afghan Loya Jirga and Parliament, to: (a)
Afghanistan.” break ties with Al Qaeda; (b) renounce violence; and (c)
H.E. SATINDER LAMBAH
abide by the Afghan constitution, including its protections
SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE for women and minorities. Apparently Hizb-e-Islami
PRIME MINISTER OF
INDIA ON AFGHANISTAN members that participated in the delegation also support
AND PAKISTAN these principles.
Despite broad support, talks are debated in both Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Some question the credibility of the Taliban
who participated in Chantilly, pointing out that the group
continues to publicly reject Afghanistan’s achievements
over the past decade. Others assess their participation
as indicating that they feel they are now in a position of
5 As earlier Delhi Policy Group Reports indicate, for example the
Trialogue Report of 2010, p. 13, the Indian Government’s position on
talks with the Taliban is based on its own experience of talks with militant
groups, which have in several cases resulted in laying down arms and
joining the electoral process.
10AFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
strength to talk on their own terms. While the atmosphere
is certainly more conducive for them, it is equally evident
that there will be no military victory. The question therefore
is whether the Chantilly talks indicate that the Taliban is
now beginning to strike out on its own, or re-“Afghanize” as
Afghans hope, or whether the talks represent the beginning
of an uneasy compromise whereby neighborhood spheres
of influence reinsert themselves, triggering further security
dilemmas.
These doubts have been exacerbated by the High Peace
Council’s Roadmap, which does not appear to have the same
measure of backing as the Chantilly talks. The document “We still don’t
makes clear that the talks were embedded in background have an address
negotiations and were the outcome of at least a year of for the Taliban or
efforts. It sets out a 5-step process, in which the first set of their agenda for
steps is an end to cross-border shelling of villages, release talks.”
of designated Taliban from Pakistani prisons, a Taliban
announcement of severing ties with Al Qaeda, and renewal
of negotiations for safe passage, some of which are already
underway.
The bulk of the Roadmap proposals concern agreements that
are geared towards an end to violence and reintegration of
ex-combatants; they are imperative and non-controversial.
But it includes provisions that go beyond these imperatives
and could be a cause for concern to neighbors, as well as to
opposition groups in Afghanistan.
First, it suggests a form of power sharing through which
the Taliban get positions “in the power structure of the
state”, such as ministerial berths and/or governorships,
which other parties have to win through elections or at the
President’s pleasure. Many speculate that this could mean
11handing over the southern and
High Peace Council Roadmap
eastern provinces of Afghanistan
to 2015 Step Three (second
to the Taliban in a de facto but
half of 2013) Extracts
not de jure partition. Whether the
The negotiating parties to agree on modalities latter is feasible or not (most likely
of co-operation on transformation of the
not), this proposal could alienate
Taliban and other armed groups from
political parties and sections of
militant groups to political movements.
civil society in Afghanistan. They
The negotiating parties to agree on modalities could also accept the proposal as a
for the inclusion of Taliban and other armed necessary evil, which it probably is;
opposition leaders in the power structure of much depends on whether the rest
the state, to include non-elected positions
of the steps in the Roadmap are
at different levels with due consideration of
implemented.
legal and governance principles.
The negotiating parties to agree on a vision Similarly, under the plan the
for strengthening the ANSF and other key Afghan government and the
government institutions to remain non-
Taliban will agree “a vision on
political and enjoy full public support.
strengthening the ANSF and other
key government institutions to
remain non-political and enjoy full public support”. This
proposal, if it does actually become a focus of negotiations,
may be aimed at reintegration of surrendered fighters but
it runs the risk of polarizing the polity on ethnic grounds.
Moreover, the task of creating a vision for security forces,
“The Roadmap
along with rules and regulations, belongs to Parliament,
will be debated
not to the Afghan government and the Taliban, on the
in the Afghan
fundamental principle that elected legislators are the best
Parliament.”
expression of the will of the people.
NOOR AKBARY, CHAIR
WOLESI JIRGA FOREIGN Unsurprisingly, Pakistan is to implement a range of
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
commitments under the Roadmap. The quid pro quo is
a close strategic partnership between the two countries,
something that the Afghan government has been divided
12AFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
on thus far.6 Interestingly, Iran does not feature in the
document, though Afghans frequently discuss the need for
Iran to play a role in the peace process.
Finally, there is one larger problem that needs addressing
by all the negotiators. The Roadmap proposes regular
monitoring and consultation with countries that have
influence over the Taliban directly or through Pakistan,
such as the U.S., Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which is useful
coordination. But it entirely omits consultations with
neighbors who will be directly impacted by the outcome of
its proposals. “The TAPI
quadrilateral gas
pipeline (is)… the
Trade main factor in
ensuring regional
Trade is an overlapping issue, which intersects with the security and
strategic, regional and aid strands. Both the RECCA, whose cooperation in
fifth conference was hosted by Tajikistan in March 2012, and Central and South
the U.S. are focused on connectivity between Afghanistan, Asia.”
Central and South Asia through road and rail, as well as H.E. PARAKHAT
providing energy corridors. A north-south energy corridor, H DURDYEV
AMBASSADOR OF
connecting the east-west corridors that have already been TURKMENISTAN TO
created, will benefit the entire region and could be a game INDIA
changer for growth. TAPI is one such project; additional
ones should be explored. The U.S. is also promoting the
“New Silk Road” (see Section II: Regional Views for further
discussion).
Moreover, Afghanistan has signed a slew of bilateral,
trilateral and quadrilateral trade and transit agreements
6 Significantly, military training in Pakistan is one of the first elements
of the proposal to be implemented, with Afghan Defense Minister
Bismillah Kahn visiting Pakistan in early January 2013 to select training
institutions and courses.
13with its neighbors, with Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan
(APTTA, ATTTA, AKPTTTA), the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline and the CAREC
customs and trade agreements between Afghanistan,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
While the push for Afghanistan to become an Asian hub has
begun to yield some results in Central Asia, with access via
rail connection to Uzbekistan, Europe and China, the South
Asian access remains blocked, due to the failure to extend
the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement to
“Afghanistan is a
India. The Pakistani position is that India should negotiate
country of transit.
a separate transit trade agreement with them, while Afghans
Pakistan too is a
see two-way transit as part of APTTA (this point is further
natural country
discussed in Section III). Meantime, alternative routes are
of transit. Many
being developed via Iran,7 and Tajikistan has offered a trade
will suffer if both
and transit agreement to India. As the newest member of
nations fail to
SAARC, Afghanistan looks to SAFTA’s coming into force as
fulfil this role.”
another means of opening South Asian markets to Afghan
MANI SHANKAR AIYAR goods.
MEMBER,
RAJYA SABHA OF INDIA
The Kabul Ministerial Meeting of June 2012 also developed
a set of Seven Priority CBMs, several of which complement
the RECCA economic and infrastructural initiatives (see
below).
7 One of the recommendations from the Delhi Policy Group’s first
regional conference in July 2012, at Delhi and Jaipur, was to develop the
Chabahar route. The conference also proposed an Afghanistan-India-
Iran trilateral to work on the issue. Both recommendations were adopted
by the three governments.
14AFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Strand Two:
Regional Cooperation
The Istanbul Conference of November 2011, held just one
month before the Bonn Conference of December 2011,
launched a fresh attempt at coordinated cooperation for
peace and stabilization between Afghanistan’s first and
second tier neighbors, titled the “Heart of Asia” countries.
Its declaration listed common guiding principles as well as
mutually agreed CBMs.
“Ties between
Key principles included: Turkey, Central and
South Asia go back
■ Respect for Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial
centuries. The poet
integrity;
Rumi was born in
■ Non-intervention in internal affairs; Afghanistan and
■ Countering terrorism and extremism; wrote in Turkey.
■ Supporting Afghan-led reconciliation, reintegration and It was Allama
reconstruction; and Iqbal who named
Afghanistan the
■ Committing to the return of refugees.
Heart of Asia.”
Additionally, the Conference recognized the central role H.E. BURAK AKÇAPAR
AMBASSADOR OF
that the UN could play in regional processes, emphasizing TURKEY TO INDIA
that security for the region was equal and indivisible.
There was some debate on whether the focus of regional
initiatives should be on producing international treaties
for peace and stabilization of Afghanistan or on CBMs
that would knit the countries together in such a way that
incentives for peace would over time outweigh security
dilemmas. Eventually the Conference opted for CBMs,
adopting a limited combination of the EU and ASEAN
models.
15The Kabul Heart of Asia Ministerial Meeting in June 2012
took the Istanbul Process a step further, defining the
region as comprising a much larger number of countries
than Afghanistan and its immediate neighbors (1+6).
Instead, the base for regional cooperation comprised all the
countries with traditional geographic, economic, cultural
and historical ties to Afghanistan, which remain in hearts
and minds and are embodied in the New Silk Road and
Heart of Asia concepts. The former has now been broadened
to include all historic routes, and is discussed further in
Section II of this report.
“The Istanbul
Critically, the Kabul Ministerial Meeting also worked out
Process is the
operational commitments for CBMs, including lead actors,
main forum for
modalities and timelines.
strengthening
regional Priority CBMs included:
cooperation for
Afghanistan.” Disaster Management. Lead: Pakistan and Kazakhstan;
Members: Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Turkey; Support: Denmark, the
EU, France, Japan, the Royal Kingdom of Norway, the U.K.
and the U.S.;
Counter Terrorism. Lead: Afghanistan, Turkey, and the
U.A.E.; Members: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India,
Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and
the U.A.E.; Support: France, the U.K. and the U.S.;
Counter Narcotics. Lead: Russia and Azerbaijan;
Members: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkey, and the U.A.E.; Support: Canada, Denmark, the
EU, France, the U.K. and the U.S.;
16AFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Chambers of Commerce. Lead: India; Members:
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, India, Iran, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey and
Turkmenistan; Support: Germany, the U.K. and the U.S.;
Commercial Opportunities. Lead: India; Members:
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan,
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey and U.A.E.; Support: Australia,
Canada, the EU and the U.S.;
Regional Infrastructure. Lead: Turkmenistan and
Azerbaijan; Members: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, India, Iran, “Iran’s actions
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey come from Islamic
and Turkmenistan; Support: Germany and the U.S.; and moral principles.
We insisted that
Education. Lead: Iran; Members: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, (millions of)
India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, migrant Afghans
Tajikistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan; Support: Australia in Iran become
and the U.S. legal… We have
provided them
In sum, India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the U.S. are with medical
committed to all seven CBMs, China is committed to the services and
first three, and Russia and Tajikistan are committed to all education.”
but the first. Some of the CBMs overlap with RECCA, which HOSSEIN SHEIKH UL
is also a regional process, but limited primarily to economic ESLAM
SENIOR ADVISOR TO
and infrastructural connectivity. Additional members are THE IRANIAN MAJLIS
free to join at any stage of the process; members are also
entitled to withdraw.
Finally, the Kabul Ministerial Meeting stressed gratitude to
Iran and Pakistan for hosting Afghan refugees over three
decades, and recommended that the CBM on refugees,
mentioned at Istanbul and Bonn, and honed into a Solutions
Strategy by the three countries in May 2012 at Geneva under
17the aegis of the UNHCR, be prioritized for implementation
in the next phase of the Heart of Asia conferences.
Strand Three:
Aid and Investment
Following within two weeks of the Kabul Ministerial Meeting,
the Delhi Investment Summit of end June 2012 was a first
step towards implementation of its decisions, as well as of
the policies laid out in the Afghan Finance Ministry’s 2012
document, Towards Self-Reliance.
The Delhi investment summit proved a new marker
for Afghanistan, indicating that during 2012 the focus
shifted from humanitarian and development aid to trade
and investment. Companies from over forty countries
participated in it, and key areas for aid and investment
Figure 4: $10
Afghanistan: Imports $9
and Exports (2001-10) $8
Figures in Billion US Dollars
$7
$6
$5
$4
$3
$2
$1
$0
2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010
Exports 0.08 1.2 0.45 0.47 0.33 0.27 2.63
Imports 1.3 1.01 3.87 3.82 4.85 5.3 9.15
Source: Indexmundi.com (Imports: http://www.indexmundi.
com/g/g.aspx?c=af&v=89.
Exports: http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.
aspx?v=85&c=af&l=en, accessed on December 31, 2012
18AFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
were identified as minerals, agriculture, small and medium
industries, education and health. Mineral extraction by
China, Canada and India has begun, and India has formed
the Hajikak consortium to raise investment in steel mines.
The Investment Summit’s deliberations fed into the July
2012 Tokyo Conference, which brought together all the major
donors to Afghanistan. Highlighting mutual accountability,
the Conference underlined that the relationship between
Afghanistan and its donors was transforming from one of
recipient to one of owner and partners.
Key pledges included:
■ Providing over USD16 billion through 2015; “The narrative
■ Sustaining support through 2017 at or near the levels of is now one of
the past decade; opportunity and
■ Responding to the fiscal gap that will be created by the hope.”
withdrawal of ISAF and the bulk of international NGOs; GAUTAM
MUKHOPADHAYA
■ Ensuring 80% of aid is spent on the 22 National Priority AMBASSADOR
OF INDIA TO
Programs (NPPs) identified by the Afghan Government; AFGHANISTAN
and
■ Channeling 50% of the aid through the Afghan
Government.
The core focus of the Tokyo Conference was agreement on a
Mutual Accountability Framework between the Government
of Afghanistan and the donors, under which progress
would be measured on five thrust areas: Representational
Democracy and Equitable Elections; Governance, Rule of
Law and Human Rights; Integrity of Public Finance and
Commercial Banking; Government Revenues, Budget
19Execution and Sub-National Governance; and Inclusive and
“We Afghans
Sustained Growth and Development.8
need to tackle
corruption
The Afghan Government and the international community
and terrorism
are to establish a transparent monitoring process, building
together.”
on a reinvigorated Kabul Process and Joint Coordination
LT. GENERAL ABDUL
HADI KHALID and Monitoring Board (JCMB). The Standing Committees
HAMBASTAGI and JCMB will regularly review progress; Senior Officials
CONSULTING GROUP
will meet in 2013 and every second year subsequently
to update indicators where needed; and a Ministerial-
level Meeting will be held in 2014 and every second year
subsequently to review progress, assess requirements and
renew commitments.
8 For details of the goals and indicators of progress in each, see pp.11-
13 of ‘Afghanistan Update: Recent Policy Developments’, at http://www.
delhipolicygroup.com/pdf/AfghanistanUpdateRecentPolicyDevelop-
ments.pdf
20AFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
REGIONAL
VIEWS
“Afghanistan can play a role in bringing the region together.
Afghanistan will also serve as a bulwark to the common security
of the region. For years we have been at the forefront of the
fight against terrorism and the global narcotics trade, and we
are determined to continue to play this role.”
H.E. GHULAM JELANI POPAL
MINISTER OF STATE FOR GOVERNANCE, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
A point worth stressing is that most of the regional countries
“Tajikistan
have contributed in myriad ways to Afghan reconstruction,
supports Afghan
and will continue to do so. The assistance that was listed
from each country is too long to include here, but it ranges stability as an
from humanitarian aid to infrastructure building to important part
subsidized energy supply to transit access to debt waiver. of Tajik national
Goodwill to intensify such aid and develop connecting interests.”
infrastructure is expressed by most neighbors and the Heart
of Asia countries, but their role in the peace and political
process is marginal (with the exception of Pakistan).
21Security
As the foregoing indicates, there is a broad consensus
within the region on several critical points, especially
respect for Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity, countering terrorism and extremism, and regional
connectivity and cooperation. These are, however, listed as
principles rather than policies in the Istanbul Declaration of
November 2011. Indeed, the same principles were iterated
in the Declaration of Good Neighborly Relations, which
was signed in 2002 by Afghanistan and its six immediate
neighbors and endorsed by the UNSC. The 2002 Declaration,
in fact, went further than the Istanbul Declaration, in that
it committed the signatories to non-interference in each
“Iran, as a good other’s internal affairs, presumably covering a broader set
neighbor, is of actions than non-intervention.
ready to assist
in whatever The hurdles to joint policy formulation are many; and
way necessary multiply even further when it comes to implementation.
for a peaceful Several of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors have concerns
that create a security dilemma. Iran, for example, is locked
Afghanistan.”
in confrontation with the U.S. over its nuclear program,
and fears that a U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership
may be used against it, especially if U.S. bases remain in
Afghanistan. Iran’s objections are also ideological: the
Iranian Government believes that the U.S. can only do harm
in its engagement with Islamic countries. However, on the
ground in Afghanistan this position runs the risk of playing
into Taliban and insurgent hands.
Similarly, the Government of Uzbekistan fears that Uzbek
extremist groups may get support from Afghan extremist
groups, and believes its best protection lies in northern
22AFGHANISTAN 2012 | LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Afghanistan acting as a hedge against the insurgency in
southern Afghanistan. However, though the Government of
Uzbekistan has no intention of supporting fissiparous ethnic
tendencies and has repeatedly stressed its support for a
united and indivisible Afghanistan, this position runs the risk
of playing into divisive trends on the ground in Afghanistan
and makes the integrative aspect of reconciliation more
difficult to undertake.
Some hurdles can be worked on (slightly) more easily
than others. Iranian policymakers respect Afghanistan’s
sovereign decisions on partnerships, and are willing to
compartmentalize their fears, as they did with Iraq, if their
cooperation will help promote peace and stabilization in
Afghanistan. For its part, the Afghan Government is seeking “Uzbekistan has a
to promote a trilateral between Afghanistan, Iran and the new foreign policy
U.S.
on Afghanistan
based on good
In the same way, Uzbekistan was the first country to host,
and thereby initiate, a regional dialogue for peace and neighborliness and
stability in Afghanistan, and would therefore be anxious to non-interference.”
resolve bilateral security concerns. Post-Cold War great and
regional power rivalries in the Central Asian region have
complicated the situation. In this context, Uzbekistan’s
wider security concerns led its government to temporarily
suspend its membership of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO); it also opted out of the first two Heart
of Asia conferences, on the grounds that the 6+3 formula is
the best for regional dialogue. In fact, 6+3 and the broader
regional dialogue could co-exist if so required; clearly the
Afghan Government would be the best judge of that. In any
case, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan have begun to rebuild
their bridges; in 2003, Afghan trade with Uzbekistan was
worth around 60 million USD; in 2011 it was worth USD
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