Animal Biosecurity RD&E Strategy - National Primary Industries Research, Development and Extension Framework
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Animal Biosecurity
RD&E Strategy
National Primary Industries Research, Development and Extension Framework
‘Working together for animal health’
Published by Animal Health Australia Any reproduction permitted in accordance with the Copyright
‘Working together for animal health’ Act 1968 must acknowledge Animal Health Australia as the
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June 2014 information. Any reproduction must also include a copy of
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ISBN 978-1-921958-20-5 Copyright and Trademarks
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Authors Further information
Mr Duncan Rowland, Executive Manager Biosecurity For further information, please contact:
Services, Animal Health Australia
National Animal Biosecurity Research, Development and
Dr Lisa Adams, Director, Lisa Adams and Associates Extension Coordinator
Animal Health Australia
The authors acknowledge the significant contribution of
Suite 15, 26–28 Napier Close
other members of the National Animal Biosecurity Research,
DEAKIN ACT 2600
Development and Extension Strategy Steering Committee in
Tel: 02 6232 5522
drafting the strategy:
Further information on the National Primary Industries
• Dr Martin Barlass—Victorian Department of Environment
Research, Development and Extension Framework and
and Primary Industries
underpinning strategies can also be found at
• Dr Patricia Mitchell, Dr Darryl D’Souza—Australian Pork www.npirdef.org/home
Limited
• Dr Philip Wright, Dr Bronwyn Hailstones—NSW
Department of Primary Industries
• Dr John Boulton, Dr Marta Hernandez-Jover—Charles
Sturt University
• Mr James Kellaway—Australian Egg Corporation Limited
• Dr Michael Ward—University of Sydney
ii ANIMAL BIOSECURITY NATIONAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND EXTENSION STRATEGY 2014
Contents
Acknowledgments iv
Acronyms iv
Executive summary vi
1 Background 1
1.1 Goals of the framework 1
1.2 Biosecurity 1
1.3 Goals of the strategy 2
1.4 Development of the strategy 2
2 Vision, high-level outcomes and critical success factors 3
2.1 Vision 3
2.2 High-level outcomes 3
2.3 Critical success factors 3
3 Scope 4
4 Situation analysis 5
4.1 Key components of Australia’s biosecurity system 5
4.2 Trends in animal biosecurity risk management and biosecurity RD&E 7
4.3 Overview of industry in the context of biosecurity RD&E 9
5 National biosecurity research and development capability audit 10
5.1 Background 10
5.2 Key findings 13
5.3 Audit limitations 13
6 Framework for national animal biosecurity RD&E priorities 14
6.1 R&D priorities, objectives and benefits 14
6.2 Assessment of current and future capability needs against RD&E priorities and objectives 16
7 Implementation of the strategy 20
7.1 Model 20
7.2 National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Steering Group 21
7.3 National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Implementation Committee 21
7.4 National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Coordinator 22
7.5 Annual National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Forum 22
7.6 Strategy administration 22
7.7 Risks 22
7.8 Funding 22
8 Consultation and approvals 23
9 Commencement and work plan 23
Appendix 1 Record of stakeholder engagement to develop the strategy 24
Appendix 2 Key definitions 25
Appendix 3 Other key initiatives and linkages affecting animal biosecurity RD&E 26
Tables
Table 1 Respondents to the National Biosecurity Research and Development Capability Audit 12
Table 2 Framework for national animal biosecurity R&D priorities 15
Table 3 National animal biosecurity RD&E capabilities and activities, mapped to the strategy objectives 17
Table 4 Template for reviewing biosecurity activities as a basis for planning animal biosecurity RD&E 19
Table 5 Organisations and key contacts who contributed to the biosecurity capability audit 24
Figures
Figure 1 How the strategies and frameworks interact 6
Figure 2 Location of existing and planned research, development & extension facilities 11
Figure 3 Model for implementation of the National Animal Biosecurity Research, Development and Extension Strategy 20
iii
Acknowledgments AHA acknowledges the guidance, direction and
strategic oversight provided by the Steering Committee.
This strategy was prepared by the National Animal
AHA also thanks and acknowledges the contribution of
Biosecurity Research, Development and Extension
the research and development corporations (RDCs), the
Strategy Steering Committee. The committee was
Australian Government, state and territory governments,
chaired by Animal Health Australia (AHA), and comprised
universities and other RD&E providers for their input,
representatives from all the major investors and
including data, information and advice, all of which was
providers of animal biosecurity research, development
vital in developing this strategy.
and extension (RD&E), including research and
development corporations, the Australian Government, Furthermore, AHA wishes to thank Dr Lisa Adams
state and territory governments, and universities. and the funding agencies for their contribution to this
AHA provided secretariat services for the strategy strategy.
development process, as well as project support—
The complete record of stakeholder engagement used
investigation, analysis, administration, communication
to develop the capability audit is in Appendix 1.
and drafting input to the strategy.
Acronyms
AGMIN Agricultural Ministers’ Forum
AGSOC Agriculture Senior Officials Council
AHA Animal Health Australia
AusBIOSEC Australian Biosecurity System for Primary Production and the Environment
CRC Cooperative Research Centre
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
DoA Australian Government Department of Agriculture
EAD Emergency Animal Disease
EADRA Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement
EID Emerging Infectious Disease
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
HPAI Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
IGAB Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity
NBC National Biosecurity Committee
OIE World Organisation for Animal Health
PISC Primary Industries Standing Committee
R&D Research and Development
RD&E Research, Development and Extension
SCoPI Standing Council on Primary Industries
WHO World Health Organisation
iv ANIMAL BIOSECURITY NATIONAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND EXTENSION STRATEGY 2014
Members of the National Animal Biosecurity Research,
Development and Extension Strategy Steering Committee
Kym Abbot The University of Adelaide
Dave Alden Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation
Malcolm Anderson Primary Industries and Regions South Australia
Felicity Andriunas Plant Health Australia
Crispian Ashby Fisheries Research and Development Corporation
Joanne Banyer ConnectingSpaces
Martin Barlass Victorian Department of Environment & Primary Industries
Bob Biddle Australian Government Department of Agriculture
Julie Bird Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation
John Boulton Charles Sturt University
Tony Britt Victorian Department of Environment & Primary Industries
Sam Brown LiveCorp
Glen Browning The University of Melbourne
Roland Cobbold The University of Queensland
Robin Condron Dairy Australia
Mark Crane Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
Michelle Edge Australian Meat Processor Corporation
Jenny Firman Australian Government Department of Health
Gary Fitt Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
Wayne Hein James Cook University
Michael Holland The University of Queensland
Brian Jones Department of Fisheries Western Australia
James Kellaway Australian Egg Corporation Limited
Vivian Kite Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation
Lloyd Klump Tasmanian Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment
Sam McCullough Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
Patricia Mitchell Australian Pork Limited
Mike Nunn Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research
Ian Robertson Murdoch University
Michelle Rodan Department of Agriculture and Food Western Australia
Johann Schroder Meat & Livestock Australia
John Seaman New South Wales Department of Primary Industries
Paul Swan Australian Wool Innovation
Jim Thompson Queensland Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Andrew Tomkins Northern Territory Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries
Rodney Turner Plant Health Australia
Peter Vaughn Meat & Livestock Australia
Michael Ward The University of Sydney
Lisa Adams Lisa Adams and Associates—Facilitator
Duncan Rowland Animal Health Australia—Chair
Louise Irwin Animal Health Australia—Secretariat
v
Executive summary The strategy will be progressively implemented through
the National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Implementation
The National Animal Biosecurity Research, Development Committee. Emphasis will be on implementing a process
and Extension Strategy is a component of the National for:
Primary Industries Research, Development and
• enacting the strategy
Extension Framework, an initiative of the Standing
Committee on Primary Industries (previously the • holding the annual National Animal Biosecurity RD&E
Primary Industries Ministerial Council). The aims of the Forum
framework are to: • undertaking a capability audit for extension services
• ensure that Australia’s research, development and • determining the major, support and link roles for
extension (RD&E) capacities are aligned nationally animal biosecurity RD&E stakeholders
with future industry and community needs
The Australian animal biosecurity system is complex.
• initiate collaboration that strengthens Australia’s It involves coordinated action by industry at all stages
position internationally of the animal production chain, and by governments,
• ensure that RD&E delivery is efficient and effective researchers, communities and citizens.
The strategy establishes the future direction for System components and responsibilities are defined in
improving the focus, efficiency and effectiveness of the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB),
RD&E in supporting biosecurity in Australia’s animal an agreement between the Australian, and state and
industries and wildlife and recreational sectors, during territory governments (except Tasmania) to strengthen
the next five years. the national biosecurity system. The IGAB includes a
comprehensive national diagnostic and surveillance
The scope of this strategy is limited to:
system, national emergency preparedness and response
• pests and diseases that pose a significant risk to the arrangements, and science-based improvement of the
livestock (including horse), fisheries and aquaculture biosecurity system.
industries, and affect trade or public health
Industries implement biosecurity measures across the
• pests and diseases of companion animals and food animal production chain—for example, managing
wildlife; if they affect trade or public health on-farm disease risks, implementing animal tracing
systems and managing food safety issues.
However the strategy provides a flexible framework
to enable RD&E interests and objectives for other In 2011, Animal Health Australia (AHA) and Plant Health
biosecurity areas to be incorporated in the future. Australia (PHA), with financial support from the National
Biosecurity Committee (NBC), developed an audit tool to
The vision of the National Animal Biosecurity RD&E
gather information on national biosecurity research and
Strategy Steering Committee is:
development (R&D) capability across biosecurity sectors
Australia has world-leading science-based systems (plant, animal and invasive species). The audit was to
and capability for managing animal biosecurity risks inform the development of a national biosecurity RD&E
to promote and protect our livestock, fisheries and framework (Schedule 8 of the IGAB); the National Plant
aquaculture industries; public health; and national Biosecurity RD&E Strategy; and the National Animal
economic, social and environmental prosperity. Biosecurity RD&E Strategy.
The strategy aims to achieve this vision by facilitating an The audit collected:
RD&E model that will result in the biosecurity sector:
• information on human capability against the
• developing, implementing and evaluating Australia’s nationally agreed animal biosecurity R&D priorities
long-term strategic RD&E needs and priorities • information on the location and value of infrastructure
• promoting and facilitating collaboration investments (existing and planned)
• monitoring Australia’s RD&E capability • information on levels and sources of external
• evaluating, reviewing and reporting on the investment (as at 2011), according to biosecurity
implementation of the strategy R&D sector and national biosecurity R&D priority
area
• expert opinion and other relevant data from
researchers and policy makers on capability needs,
including for diagnostic capability
vi ANIMAL BIOSECURITY NATIONAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND EXTENSION STRATEGY 2014
The scope of the audit included biosecurity R&D and them. A future challenge is to balance RD&E investment
explicitly excluded the ‘E’ (extension) and service among the identified priority areas. ‘Before’ and ‘after’
delivery activities. analysis of the flow of benefits from research will be
important for deciding RD&E investments.
Historically, Australia has had a significant distributed
national capability for animal biosecurity RD&E, provided Priorities for extension and its integration with R&D
mainly through the Commonwealth Scientific and need to be developed—for example, planning and
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), governments implementation of on-farm biosecurity risk management.
of larger states (New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria
Although the audit results indicate a ‘healthy’ biosecurity
and Western Australia) and the more established
workforce age profile, some state and territory
university veterinary faculties.
government agencies report an ageing workforce. A
In the past five years, major investment in biosecurity future challenge is to support a more flexible workforce
infrastructure has occurred. Future challenges are to: capability, extending across sites, organisations and
disciplines, while maintaining a cadre of specialist
• maintain the biosecurity infrastructure
expertise.
• maintain the human capital that underpins scientific
capacity and capability in biosecurity The general consensus is that Australia needs a flexible,
adaptable national system for animal biosecurity RD&E,
• enable efficient access to biosecurity infrastructure
with good information flow and recognition of priority
and human capital, as part of an effective national
areas of expertise and capability.
animal biosecurity RD&E system
When the strategy is fully implemented, industries
The audit findings need to be interpreted cautiously associated with animal biosecurity will be strengthened
because the audit had a number of limitations. However, by a national system in which end users of the RD&E
the findings are broadly consistent with the identified can take a leading role in determining and reviewing the
nationally agreed biosecurity R&D priorities: they RD&E priorities.
indicate research funding gaps in sociological research
to support risk management, and a need to improve
understanding of the triple-bottom-line impacts of
diseases and the management activities to control
Animal Health Australia
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vii
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
1 Background comprehensively and holistically the strategic needs
of stakeholders nationally
• for the national research capability to be an integral
component of a wider innovation agenda, supporting
The National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Strategy is part of
development and extension
the National Primary Industries Research, Development
and Extension Framework, which was initiated by the The framework is being implemented through 14
Standing Council on Primary Industries - SCoPI (now sectoral and 7 cross-sectoral strategies. The sectoral
known as the Agricultural Ministers Forum - AGMIN). strategies relate to beef, cotton, dairy, fisheries and
aquaculture, forests, grains, horticulture, pork, poultry,
1.1 GOALS OF THE FRAMEWORK sheepmeat, sugar, wine, wool, and new and emerging
The framework aims to promote greater collaboration industries.
and continuous improvement in the investment spent on
Cross-sectoral strategies are animal biosecurity, plant
research, development and extension (RD&E) resources
biosecurity, animal welfare, biofuels and bioenergy,
nationally.
climate change and variability, food and nutrition, and
The goals of the framework are: water use in agriculture.
• to provide shared strategic directions and
priorities for RD&E to increase the productivity and
1.2 BIOSECURITY
sustainability of Australia’s primary industries The IGAB1 provides the following definition for
biosecurity:
• for public research capability to become more
integrated, with larger critical mass and less The management of risks2 to the economy, the
fragmentation across the nation—although environment and the community from pests and
specialisation is also needed diseases entering, emerging, establishing or
• to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of RD&E, spreading.
and thereby increase the returns on investment Australia’s livestock, fisheries and aquaculture
• for RD&E investment to improve the capability sectors—as well as its wildlife, environment and human
of national systems in priority areas and ensure population—remain free from many of the diseases
effective and efficient use of resources, including and pests (weeds and invasive animals) that can affect
infrastructure agriculture, natural environments and people. Australia
• to retain and build capability in fields strategically has a favourable biosecurity status that enables it to
important to governments and industries produce agricultural goods cheaply, efficiently and
sustainably, and maintaining this status relies heavily on
• for research undertaken in one location to be
developed regionally and extended nationally
1 www.coag.gov.au/node/47
• for research capability to cover more 2 Risks include those that are established, exotic and emerging.
1 ANIMAL BIOSECURITY NATIONAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND EXTENSION STRATEGY 2014
being protected from pests and diseases. A favourable
biosecurity status results in Australia’s access to
numerous international and domestic markets, providing
significant economic, environmental and community
benefits.
Maintaining and improving Australia’s biosecurity status
is the responsibility of all Australians. Each member
of the community has a role to play in the biosecurity
continuum—before the border, at the border and within
Australia—to prevent, prepare for, detect and mitigate
biosecurity risks, and respond to, manage and recover
from any biosecurity incidents that occur. Australia
benefits from investment in a strong, multilayered system
to maintain a favourable biosecurity status.
Biosecurity management is a complex task. Australia’s
biosecurity system will need to respond to challenges
that are increasing the risk to biosecurity, including:
• globalisation, which is increasing the volume and
range of products traded internationally, passenger
movements, and the subsequent risk of pests and Animal Health Australia
diseases entering and establishing in Australia
• spreading population, shifting demographics and
Australia’s national biosecurity system, taking into
changing land uses, which are increasing the
account the current and future capability needs of the
interface between urban and rural areas and the
system.
natural environment; this makes pest and disease
management more complicated and increases the
1.4 DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY
risk of zoonoses affecting human health
The strategy has been developed with the guidance of
• increasing demand for animal-sourced protein
the National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Strategy Steering
• intensification of livestock production Committee, with executive and administrative support
• a changing climate, which might alter the range, from AHA. Consultation included a national audit of
habitat and spread of pests and diseases, as well as government and university biosecurity capabilities, a
increase the potential for severe weather events to survey of biosecurity RD&E income and expenditure,
assist spread targeted interviews and meetings, and two national
• erosion of human resources at all levels of workshops.
government, affecting the ability to respond to Strategy development has been informed by the
incursions of pests and diseases following lessons learned from the implementation of
• increasing demands on the already limited resources other strategies under the framework:
of peak industry councils and state farming
• ‘One size does not fit all.’
organisations, thereby reducing the ability of these
• Stakeholder engagement is critical.
bodies to contribute to policy development and
review • It is important to be clear about what constitutes
success for the strategy.
1.3 GOALS OF THE STRATEGY • An empowered implementation committee or
governance group should be established, with a fully
This strategy aims to provide the Australian livestock
resourced executive officer reporting to the chair.
industries with innovative and integrated ways of
preparing for, responding to and recovering from • Progress should be demonstrated to all
disease, pest and weed incursions. stakeholders.
It maps the broad cross-sectoral RD&E priorities for
BACKGROUND 2
Australian Government Department of Agriculture
2 Vision, high-level outcomes • Risks at farm level, along supply chains, and among
trade partners and the Australian community are
and critical success factors managed better.
• The strategy is subject to ongoing development
and support. The strategy is envisaged as a living
document that will develop over time through the joint
2.1 VISION
input of the forum members.
The vision of the National Animal Biosecurity RD&E
Strategy Steering Committee is: It is envisaged that forum members will manage the
implementation of RD&E resulting from agreement on the
Australia has world-leading science-based systems
specific priorities and actions. Reporting arrangements
and capability for managing animal biosecurity risks
will be developed to assess achievements against
to promote and protect our livestock, fisheries and
the high-level outcomes (and any other intermediate
aquaculture industries; public health; and national
outcomes determined by the forum).
economic, social and environmental prosperity.
The National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Strategy will 2.3 CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS
support this vision through efficient and effective national
Factors indicating success of the strategy are:
cooperative arrangements and action for cross-sectoral
biosecurity RD&E among industry, government, and • shared ownership and engagement by all
academic and community organisations. stakeholders, with a common goal of improved animal
biosecurity RD&E
2.2 HIGH-LEVEL OUTCOMES • demonstrated leadership through the National
Arrangements and actions will be directed to achieving Animal Biosecurity RD&E Implementation Committee
three high-level outcomes: members, and via the implementation process
• harnessing and leveraging of knowledge, skills and
• Australia has a national system for coordinating
resources within and across all sectors
decision making and investment in animal biosecurity
RD&E that is valued by the key stakeholders. An • reduction in duplication in RD&E effort and a greater
annual National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Forum of collaborative approach across all funding bodies and
industry representatives, government representatives, organisations undertaking RD&E
academic leaders, practitioners and other • integration and recognition of other RD&E strategies
stakeholders, including RDCs, will be established covered by the processes of the SCoPI (now known
as the basis for national cooperative arrangements as the Agricultural Ministers Forum – AGMIN), and
and action. The forum will determine specific cross- other national initiatives and reforms (e.g. IGAB,
sectoral RD&E priorities and associated actions under National Plant Biosecurity Strategy)
the broad strategy. • high-quality and high-impact RD&E outcomes delivered
as a result of the implementation of the strategy
3 ANIMAL BIOSECURITY NATIONAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND EXTENSION STRATEGY 2014Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
3 Scope Excluded from the scope are:
• invasive marine species and invasive animal species,
except for species that contribute to biosecurity risks
The scope of the strategy is: that affect trade
• foodborne pathogens and their direct health effects
• pests and diseases that pose a significant risk to the
on people
livestock (including horse), fisheries and aquaculture
industries, and affect trade or public health • chemical contamination and residue issues4
• pests and diseases of companion animals3 and • genetically modified organisms
wildlife, if they affect trade or public health • animal welfare issues
Plant pests and diseases that affect animal production,
trade or public health will be covered in the National
Plant Health Biosecurity RD&E Strategy, which is
currently under development.
Key terms that clarify the scope of the strategy are
defined in Appendix 2.
3 No specific diseases or issues in companion animals have been 4 Chemicals must be used appropriately to avoid chemical
identified to date. contamination and the development of resistance.
SCOPE 4Animal Health Australia
4 Situation analysis • reduce the likelihood of exotic pests and diseases
that have the potential to cause significant harm to
the economy, the environment or the community
(including people, animals and plants) from entering,
4.1 KEY COMPONENTS OF AUSTRALIA’S becoming established in or spreading within Australia
BIOSECURITY SYSTEM • prepare and allow for effective responses to, and
Biosecurity involves managing exotic, emerging and management of, exotic and emerging pests and
established pest and disease risks, through prevention, diseases that enter, establish in or spread within
early warning, detection, and eradication and control Australia
measures. • ensure that, where appropriate, significant pests
and diseases already in Australia are contained,
The Australian animal biosecurity system is complex;
suppressed or otherwise managed
it involves coordinated action by industry at all stages
of the animal production chain, and by governments, Industries implement biosecurity measures across the
researchers, communities and citizens. System food animal production chain—for example, managing
components and responsibilities are defined in the IGAB, on-farm disease risks, implementing animal tracing
an agreement between the Australian, and state and systems and managing food safety issues. They
territory governments (except Tasmania) to strengthen are proactive in raising awareness and the level of
the national biosecurity system. Components of the adoption of cost-effective biosecurity measures among
IGAB include a comprehensive national diagnostic and their members. Industries are also responsible for
surveillance system, national emergency preparedness incorporating regulated and non-regulated biosecurity
and response arrangements, and science-based measures in their food safety, quality assurance and
improvement of the biosecurity system.5 market assurance programs.
The goal of a national biosecurity system is to minimise The National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Strategy
the impact of pests and diseases on Australia’s has an important role in increasing the integration
economy, environment and community, while of government and industry decision making and
facilitating trade and the movement—to, from and investments in animal biosecurity RD&E. The Strategy
within Australia—of animals, plants, people, goods will be incorporated into Schedule 8 of the IGAB.
and vessels. Resources are targeted to manage risk Linkages with industry RD&E plans will also need to be
effectively across the biosecurity continuum, and to established and maintained.
provide arrangements, structures and frameworks that:
Figure 1 shows the relationships between the biosecurity
strategies and the National Primary Industries Research,
Development and Extension Framework.
5 The IGAB and its schedules can be viewed at www.coag.gov.au/
node/47. The National Biosecurity Research, Development and
Extension Framework is Schedule 8.
5 ANIMAL BIOSECURITY NATIONAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND EXTENSION STRATEGY 2014Figure 1 How the strategies and frameworks interact
National Biosecuity Research, National Primary Industries Research, Development
Development and Extension and Extension Framework
Framework (IGAB Schedule 8)
Beef
Dairy F
A O
N O
Fishing & I D
Aquaculture M
A &
L
National Animal Biosecurity
Pork N W
RD&E Strategy
W U A
E T T
L R E
Poultry
F I R
A T
R I U
Sheepmeat E O S
N E
Wool I S
Environmental N O
Biosecurity I
RD&E Strategy New & A L
Emerging G S
R
I
Grains C
U
L
T
Horticulture
U
R
E
National Plant Biosecurity
Sugar Cane
RD&E Strategy
Wine
Cotton
Forrest Products
& Wood
RD&E = research, development and extension
SITUATION ANALYSIS 6and multidisciplinary and cross-sectoral approaches to
managing biosecurity risks.
Australian industry, government and academia are
monitoring developments in, and the implications for
biosecurity RD&E of innovative molecular diagnostics,
remote detection systems, e-research, data mining,
modelling, citizen science, and trans-disciplinary
ecosystem and One Health approaches.
Other initiatives and linkages affecting animal biosecurity
RD&E are in Appendix 3.
Examples of diseases that are transmitted between
livestock and humans, wildlife, invasive species and/
or companion animals
Important diseases that can be transmitted from
livestock to humans (i.e. zoonoses), wildlife or
companion animals include H5N1 influenza, pandemic
H1N1 influenza, rabies, transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies, Hendra virus and Nipah virus, Rift
Valley fever, West Nile virus and Japanese encephalitis.
Victorian Department of Environment and Primary Industries Other infectious diseases are likely to emerge in the
future.
Invasive species can carry, or be the reservoir for, a
range of diseases, including rabies, classical swine fever,
4.2 TRENDS IN ANIMAL BIOSECURITY foot-and-mouth disease, avian influenza, Newcastle
RISK MANAGEMENT AND disease, bee diseases and aquatic animal diseases.
BIOSECURITY RD&E
Industry biosecurity RD&E
Cross-sectoral biosecurity RD&E
Livestock producers, and research and development
Biosecurity risks that affect more than one livestock corporations invest in biosecurity RD&E as part of
industry, or public health, the economy or the industry development plans. Investment principles
environment, generally require cross-sectoral generally target high-priority disease risks and costs that
approaches to risk management. Cross-sectoral can be mitigated through RD&E.
RD&E is important for assessing existing and emerging
biosecurity risks, and for developing and evaluating There is growing opinion that biosecurity RD&E should
alternative risk management policies and practices be better integrated with animal health, welfare,
that are not necessarily industry specific. For example, production, quality assurance and market access
a vaccine for an established sheep disease would be programs. Accordingly, investment goals at the
developed through existing market channels, whereas commodity level include reducing risks to trade and
a rapid, field-based diagnostic technology platform market access; improving animal health, welfare and
that could benefit various livestock commodities and/ production; and being more responsive to emerging
or aquaculture could potentially be developed in a more biosecurity issues.
efficient and cost-effective way through a cross-sectoral Primary industries and governments are looking
RD&E strategy. to establish more cost-effective coordination and
International agencies such as the World Organisation partnership arrangements for delivering RD&E. The
for Animal Health (OIE), the Food and Agriculture National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Steering Committee
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and the World recognises the importance of maintaining a critical mass
Health Organization (WHO) are promoting ‘One Health’ of technical and operational expertise to meet industry
approaches to biosecurity, recognising that animal and government needs, and are looking for flexible,
and human health are connected. These approaches responsive arrangements for accessing and maintaining
call for increased stakeholder engagement in RD&E; the key expertise.
better understanding of the social, ecological and Industry-specific RD&E strategies developed under the
economic factors in disease prevention and control; National Primary Industries RD&E Framework for beef,
7 ANIMAL BIOSECURITY NATIONAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND EXTENSION STRATEGY 2014dairy, sheepmeat, wool, poultry, pork, and the fisheries through innovation, and delivering effective emergency
and aquaculture industries address specific aspects preparedness and response capability. They are also
of biosecurity that are relevant to these industries. The seeking to make their business systems more efficient,
National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Strategy needs to effective and flexible by reducing the regulatory
complement the sectoral plans. burden and making better use of information and
communication technologies.
Changing biosecurity risks
Governments have invested in infrastructure to more
The risks to Australia of pest and disease incursions are effectively conduct the research and diagnostic
increasing because of social and ecosystem changes activities that underpin biosecurity. However, they are
(see Section 1.2). These changes are increasing the now faced with the challenges of maintaining both that
interaction between diseases of wildlife, domestic infrastructure and the significant human capabilities
animals and humans—more than 70% of emerging required to operate it, in an environment of declining
infectious diseases in humans during the past 30 years government investment for the short to medium term.
have been zoonoses (diseases transmitted between
animals and humans). Industry trends
From an industry perspective, changes affecting
Community trends
biosecurity risk management include:
Community interest in biosecurity is increasing—for
example, the community is concerned about animal • changing demographics, from family-owned farms to
welfare (e.g. live exports) and large-scale slaughter multisite company structures
as a means to eradicate emergency animal diseases. • increasing herd sizes and decreasing numbers
Communities in Australia and globally are also of producers, offset by larger numbers of hobby
concerned about the risks of disease emergence, farmers (particularly in peri-urban areas)
particularly associated with epidemics and pandemics • larger distances over which livestock are being
(e.g. highly pathogenic avian influenza—HPAI), and transported for sale and slaughter, as a result of
other major public health risks (e.g. Hendra virus). changing markets
There is growing awareness that the risks originate from
• increasing numbers of animals per labour unit,
complex interactions between humans, animals and
resulting in less capacity to respond to emergency
environments.
disease events
Communities expect to see holistic approaches to • the establishment of animal tracing systems such
managing risks to human and animal health, social and as the National Livestock Identification System and
economic prosperity, and environmental health and Physi-Trace
biodiversity. For example, HPAI became widespread
globally as a result of the inability of the animal health The benefits of biosecurity are recognised at an
sector alone to manage risks, and failure of the industry level, but less so at a producer level. Some
animal and human health sectors to work together to producers and large companies understand and support
minimise risks to both sectors. The need to develop comprehensive food safety and quality assurance
knowledge and systems that account for human– programs, and the potential for integration of biosecurity
animal–environment interactions from the local to the measures in these programs. However, many producers
global level are being picked up through an expanding, are unaware of, or unfamiliar with, quality assurance
international One Health movement. as a national process, or see it as a bureaucratic
requirement.
Government trends Established diseases continue to cause significant
The Australian, state and territory governments are productivity losses for the livestock industries.
focusing on developing contemporary regulatory Government investment in monitoring established
and compliance systems to strengthen biosecurity diseases is declining, with the expectation that industry
partnerships with industry through co-regulation, co- will cover the full costs. The costs associated with
investment and full-fee services, and using government disease are a driver for strengthening biosecurity
investment principles to target areas of market failure. measures to improve industry profitability.
They are interested in supporting proactive industry and
community groups to manage established pests and
diseases by developing regulatory and non-regulatory
tools and policies, and providing technical expertise.
Governments are committed to improving surveillance
SITUATION ANALYSIS 84.3 OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY IN THE Disease preparedness
CONTEXT OF BIOSECURITY RD&E Biosecurity RD&E contributes to Australia’s
preparedness plans for emergency animal diseases,
Livestock trade and the capability for rapid detection and effective
Animal production in Australia is based largely on responses. For example, the development of vaccines
extensive grazing, dominated by beef, wool, sheepmeat that allow vaccinated animals to be distinguished from
and dairy production, with smaller specialist goat, deer infected animals may avoid large-scale animal slaughter
and game meat industries. There are significant intensive for eradicating disease, enabling the establishment of
pig and poultry industries, mainly targeting domestic disease-free zones and restoration of markets sooner
markets, and a honey bee industry that provides than would otherwise have been possible.
valuable pollination services to crops and horticulture,
as well as producing honey and package bees. Biosecurity challenges
The aquaculture sector is highly diverse and rapidly Complex livestock ownership patterns, and animal
expanding, with a gross value of production of $0.950 movements around the country due to seasonal
billion in 2009–10. This complements the commercial conditions and for marketing, create challenges for
and recreational fisheries sectors, which operate across delivering efficient quality assurance, surveillance,
a wide range of marine and riverine environments prevention and control measures. Well-targeted RD&E
around the continent. enables continuous improvement in surveillance and
The gross value of Australia’s livestock, livestock diagnostic technologies in response to changing risk
products and genetic material is estimated to be almost profiles and production systems.
$21.2 billion, with exports worth more than $14.7 The highly intensive nature of pig, poultry and cattle
billion.6 These values fluctuate each year with changes in feedlot production may increase the risk of the
stock numbers according to seasonal conditions; longer emergence of some viral and bacterial diseases, some
term trends reflect international market and exchange of which might be zoonoses. Apart from causing
rate variations. significant on-farm production losses, such diseases
Australia is one of the world’s largest exporters of beef, could pose risks to workers or potentially to consumers
veal, sheepmeat and goat meat, with approximately 100 or large urban populations. Major zoonotic diseases
beef markets and 50 sheep markets.7 Smaller quantities such as HPAI remain a global risk.
of meat from kangaroos, emus, ostriches, deer, buffalo, Biosecurity challenges for the aquaculture sector are
wild boar, possums, crocodiles and camels are also many and varied because of the variety of species
exported, as well as substantial quantities of animal involved and a relative lack of surveillance information.
products such as wool, hides, skins, rendered meals, There is also a serious shortage of expertise in aquatic
pet food and stock feeds. Australia’s fisheries production animal health in Australia. Two large risks for this sector
in 2010–11 was 234 164 tonnes, worth $2.23 billion.8 are ballast water and bio-fouling, and the importation of
Biosecurity RD&E contributes to market access, trade, feed containing contaminated aquatic products.
Australia’s commitment to international treaty obligations Experience shows that new and emerging industries
and consumer confidence. have a higher risk of exposure to biosecurity incidents in
Freedom from trans-boundary diseases is a critical the early years of their establishment.
success factor for continued access to the premium Industry-specific biosecurity plans have been developed
markets, and maintaining consumer confidence and under the requirements of the Emergency Animal
the ability to attract price premiums. Loss of trade for Disease Response Agreement9 (EADRA) to manage
Australia’s red meat industries would lead to estimated risks. These plans have been developed using sound
losses of $0.6 billion each week. Disease freedom also technical advice. Take-up of the plans by different
underpins domestic market access and productivity. industry sectors has been variable, which poses a risk
across the whole sector.
6 Animal Health Australia (2013). Animal Health in Australia 2012,
Animal Health Australia, Canberra. www.animalhealthaustralia.com.
au/programs/adsp/nahis/ahia.cfm
7 www.mla.com.au/Cattle-sheep-and-goat-industries/Industry-
overview
8 www.daff.gov.au/abares/publications_remote_content/
publication_series/australian_fisheries_statistics?sq_content_
src= %2BdXJsPWh0dHAlM0ElMkYlMkYxNDMuMTg4LjE3Lj 9 Government and Livestock Industry Cost Sharing Deed in
IwJTJGYW5yZGwlMkZEQUZGU2VydmljZSUyRmRpc Respect of Emergency Animal Disease Responses (www.
3BsYXkucGhwJTNGZmlkJTNEcGJfYWZzdGFkOWFhb WQwMDMy animalhealthaustralia.com.au/programs/emergency-animal-disease-
MDExXzE0YS54bWwmYWxsPTE%3D preparedness/ead-response-agreement)
9 ANIMAL BIOSECURITY NATIONAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND EXTENSION STRATEGY 2014Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
5 National biosecurity The scope of the audit included biosecurity R&D but
explicitly excluded the ‘E’ (extension) and service
research and development delivery activities. Guidelines were developed to assist
capability audit the participating organisations.
Respondents are shown in Table 1. The tool was piloted
by the CSIRO before it was sent to the Australian,
state and territory departments of primary industries.
5.1 BACKGROUND Universities were invited to contribute; however, their
In 2011, AHA and PHA, with financial support from the response rate was low. The audit tool was updated and
NBC, developed an audit tool to gather information then sent to veterinary schools for input, specifically on
on national biosecurity research and development animal10 biosecurity R&D, to develop the National Animal
(R&D) capability across biosecurity sectors (plant, Biosecurity RD&E Strategy. All Australian veterinary
animal, invasive species). The audit was to inform schools responded. Some animal biosecurity R&D
the development of a national biosecurity research, (particularly in aquatic animal health and non-traditional
development and extension framework (Schedule 8 of animal biosecurity disciplines) might occur outside these
the IGAB); the National Plant Biosecurity RD&E Strategy; institutions.
and the National Animal Biosecurity RD&E Strategy.
The audit results and information from a 2010 capability
The audit collected: audit and survey of animal biosecurity research,
• information on human capability against the development and extension (RD&E) projects and
nationally agreed R&D priorities project budgets were reviewed by the National Animal
Biosecurity RD&E Strategy Steering Committee. The
• information on the location and value of existing and
committee developed and endorsed the key findings in
planned infrastructure investments (Figure 2)
Section 5.2. The final audit report is available online.11
• information on levels and sources of external
investment (as at 2011), according to biosecurity
R&D sector and national biosecurity R&D priority
area
• expert opinion and other relevant data from
researchers and policy makers on capability needs,
including for diagnostic capability.
10 The term ‘animal’ includes aquatic and terrestrial animals.
11 www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/2292414/
Biosecurity_R,D_and_E_Capability_Audit.pdf
NATIONAL BIOSECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITY AUDIT 1011
BERRIMAH – Northern Territory Government:
Berrimah Veterinary Laboratory
16
TOWNSVILLE – James Cook University
GATTON – University of Queensland: Centre of
Advanced Animal Science
INGLEWOOD – Queensland Government:
Robert Wicks Pest Animal Research Station
18
WAKOL – Queensland Government:
Tick Fever Centre
COOPERS PLAINS, BRISBANE – Queensland
Government: Health and Food Sciences Precinct
DUTTON PARK, BRISBANE – CSIRO &
Queensland Government: EcoSciences Precinct
COFFS HARBOUR – New South Wales
Government: Fisheries Conservation Technology Unit
20 7 ORANGE – New South Wales Government:
6 Australian Scientific Collections Unit
5
NELSON BAY – New South Wales
Government: Fisheries Institute
11
GOSFORD – New South Wales Government:
12 Central Coast Primary Industries Centre
8
10
15 SYDNEY – Australian Government: Australian Museum
9 2
19 17 CAMPERDOWN – University of Sydney
13 1
ROSEWORTHY – South Australian NARELLAN – New South Wales Government:
PERTH – Murdoch University Government: South Australia Aquatic Elizabeth Macarthur Agriculture Institute
SOUTH PERTH – Western Australian Biosecurity Centre.
Government: Animal Health Laboratory 4 3
University of Adelaide CAMDEN – University of Sydney
URRBRAE – South Australian Government:
Waite Insect and Nematode Collection CANBERRA – Australian Government: Australian
National Insect Collection, Centre for Australian
14 National Biodiversity Research.
Australian National University: Australian Centre
ANIMAL BIOSECURITY NATIONAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND EXTENSION STRATEGY 2014
for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics.
GEELONG – CSRIO: Australian Animal Health
Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre
Laboratory including the “National Biosecurity”
Figure 2 Location of existing and planned research, development & extension facilities
Aquatic Animal Health Laboratory.
WAGGA WAGGA – Charles Sturt University
The City of Greater Geelong, Barwon Health,
CSIRO and Deakin University: Geelong Centre LAUNCESTON – Tasmanian Government: MELBOURNE – Australian Government,
for Emerging Infectious Diseases Animal Health Laboratory University of Melbourne, NZ Ministry for
Agriculture: Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity
Risk Analysis (CEBRA)
QUEENSCLIFF – Victorian Government: Fisheries
Research Centre
BUNDOORA – Victorian Government and
LaTrobe University: AgriBio
WERRIBEE – University of MelbourneShutterstock: MaJaPa
Table 1 Respondents to the National Biosecurity Research and Development Capability Audit
Organisation Sent Returned
Australian Government
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation a
Department of Agriculture
Department of Environment ×b
State and territory governments
Victorian Department of Environment & Primary Industries
Arthur Rylah Institute for Environmental Research (Victoria)
New South Wales Department of Primary Industries
Queensland Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Department of Agriculture and Food Western Australia
Department of Fisheries Western Australia
Northern Territory Department of Resources
Primary Industries and Regions South Australia (including the South Australian Research and Development Institute)
Tasmanian Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment
Universities
The University of Adelaide
Murdoch University
Charles Sturt University
James Cook University
The University of Queensland
The University of Melbourne
The University of Sydney
a
Pilot
b
No animal biosecurity research, development and extension identified
NATIONAL BIOSECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITY AUDIT 125.2 KEY FINDINGS 5.3 AUDIT LIMITATIONS
The Steering Committee endorsed the following findings Steering committee members noted that the audit had a
of the audit: number of limitations:
• In the past five years, there has been major • Respondents used different approaches and
investment in biosecurity infrastructure. An ongoing interpretations of questions, scope and definitions.13
challenge for this strategy will be to maintain the • Some data was missing.
infrastructure and enable efficient access to it as part
• Capability may be found in organisations that were
of a coordinated national biosecurity system.
not audited, including government departments and
• Although the audit results suggest a ‘healthy’ research organisations other than departments of
biosecurity workforce age profile (and noting the primary industries and the CSIRO Australian Animal
limitation in the audit relating to age categories—see Health Laboratory, universities other than those
Section 5.3), some state and territory government with veterinary schools, zoos and private research
agencies report an ageing workforce. A key challenge providers.
is to create a more flexible workforce, with flexibility
• Human capability commonly extends across
extending across sites, organisations and disciplines,
disciplines, species and/or diseases, and the audit
while also maintaining specialist expertise.
may not have captured this.
• Despite the audit limitations (see Section 5.3),
• The age categories used limit interpretation of the
the results suggest research investment gaps in
extent to which an ageing workforce is an issue.
sociological research to support risk management,
and a need to improve understanding of the ‘triple- • There is the potential to interpret a large number
bottom-line’ impacts of diseases. of full-time equivalent employees or dollars with
a demand being met (or the reverse—to interpret
• A future challenge is to balance RD&E investment
low numbers as indicating unmet demand). For
among the identified priority areas and to use
example, the data show a relatively large number of
appropriate methodology to allocate resources.
pathologists; however, data from the Sub-Committee
Analysis of the flow of benefits from RD&E will be
on Animal Health Laboratory Standards show that
important to assist with investment decisions.
laboratories struggle to find personnel to fill vacancies
• Priorities for extension and its integration with R&D
for pathologists.
need to be developed. An audit of extension capability
• ‘Extension’ was excluded from the scope of the audit.
should be undertaken during strategy implementation.
• Future government investment in biosecurity RD&E is • The survey did not canvass input from the R&D
likely to be lower than 2010 levels.12 corporations.
• Consideration of capability should focus on • Questions were raised about whether students should
biosecurity regions (e.g. north and south) in addition be considered as part of a stable biosecurity R&D
to jurisdictions. base.
• Historically, Australia has had a significant distributed • The audit is a snapshot in time; it does not show
national capability for animal biosecurity RD&E, trends and will become out of date. For example,
provided mainly through CSIRO, governments of since the audit, budget cuts have affected
larger states (New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria departments of primary industries, with significant
and Western Australia) and the more established downsizing in Queensland and New South Wales, and
university veterinary faculties. the closure of Queensland’s two regional laboratories.
• For the future, Australia needs a flexible, adaptable
national system for animal biosecurity RD&E, with
good information flow and recognition of the priority
areas of expertise and capability. 13 Steering committee members highlighted numerous anomalies.
For example, a number of staff in the Australian Government
• It is expected that a change in capability will be Department of Agriculture (AGDA) conduct original biosecurity
research that is not reflected in the data from AGDA. The amount
observed with time as personnel are redeployed, of ‘external funding for animal biosecurity R&D’ reported by the
trained and educated in areas that require further University of Melbourne ($7.54 million) seems extraordinarily high
compared with other organisations (e.g. the CSIRO Australian
attention. Animal Health Laboratory at $5.4 million, the University of
Sydney at $1.3 million and the University of Queensland at $1.2
12 Since the 2010 survey of biosecurity RD&E investment, significant million). Similarly, a figure of zero for the Queensland Department
sources of government investment have ceased (e.g. the Australian of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the Department of
Biosecurity Cooperative Research Centre), have declined (e.g. Agriculture and Food Western Australia seems anomalous
ConnectingSpaces) and/or are at risk (e.g. ConnectingSpaces, the (considering the Tasmanian Department of Primary Industries,
Australian Centre of Excellence for Risk Analysis, and the Wildlife Parks, Water and Environment at $1.2 million and the New South
Exotic Disease Preparedness Program). Wales Department of Primary Industries at $1.4 million).
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