The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail: Wal-Mart Target, Costco, and Political Efficacy
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Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail: Wal-Mart
Target, Costco, and Political Efficacy
David S. Brown
Associate Professor
Institute of Behavioral Science and
Department of Political Science
University of Colorado at Boulder
dsbrown@colorado.edu
Duncan Lawrence
PhD Candidate
Department of Political Science
University of Colorado at Boulder
Duncan.Lawrence@colorado.edu
Anand Sokhey
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Colorado at Boulder
Anand.Sokhey@colorado.edu
Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San
Antonio, TX, April 21-23, 2011.
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 1Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, big-box retail has become the dominant form of
economic activity in the United States, and in a number of countries throughout the
world. In the US, the retail sector employs approximately 15.5 million workers, more
than in all of manufacturing (Lichenstein 2009; L. 202). Wal-Mart itself regularly tops
the Forbes Fortune 500 list in terms of total revenue, beating out Exxon Mobile
depending on the price of oil. As the country‘s largest retailer and revenue generating
concern, Wal-Mart has over 6,000 stores in the US, employing approximately 20 times
the number of workers as the biggest oil company (Lichenstein 2009; L. 202). Target--
number 33 on the Fortune 500 in 2007--has over 1,753 stores in the US (through 2007),
with Costco coming in at 414 warehouses (through 2010). In short, the way we buy
things today differs markedly from how business was conducted 30-40 years ago.
Regular interaction with proprietors is for many a thing of the past. Instead, purchases
are made during all hours of the day and night in large, sprawling warehouses located
miles from the city‘s center. Transactions in this new world are impersonal and rarely
involve any meaningful communication between buyer and seller.
At the same time, the local business class has experienced strain in many
communities. For example, during Wal-Mart‘s first decade, the state of Iowa alone lost
555 groceries, 298 hardware stores, 293 building supply stores, 158 women‘s apparel
shops, 116 drugstores, and 153 shoe stores (Stone 1995; cited in Lichenstein 2009).
Whether going out of business, experiencing a serious decline in revenue, or having to
work the extra hours to compete in the new 24 hour-day associated with big-box retail,
small businessmen and women are increasingly unable to participate in social, civic, or
philanthropic organizations. As their numbers dwindle or their time devoted to civic
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 2Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
matters declines, many of the organizations and services communities took for granted
several decades ago are disappearing (Putnam 2000).
Previous work establishes an empirical connection between the presence of big-
box retail – as operationalized by Wal-Mart stores – and participation in civic
organizations and voter turnout. Specifically, research by Goetz et al. establishes a
significant negative correlation between Wal-Mart stores and political participation
(Goetz and Rupasingha 2006). Yet others remain skeptical that big-box retail has a
salient influence on politics. Examining Wal-Mart store locations and membership in
civic an social organizations, Carden et al. (2009) find little evidence of a relationship.
Although they find Wal-Mart stores are correlated with declining voter turnout, they
find no evidence that Wal-mart has a negative or positive effect on membership in civic
organizations. Consequently, the current state of the empirical work can best be
described as inconclusive.
To move the debate forward, we broaden the examination to other retail outlets
(Target and Costco), while sharpening the focus on a key facet of membership in
associational activity and political participation: political efficacy. And, given the usual
narrative of big-box retail battles and the contemporary political climate, we also
examine the correlation between big-box retail and attitudes toward labor unions. In
the analysis that follows, we merge an expanded data set tracking the existence of Wal-
Mart, Target, and Costco stores at the county level to an ANES panel study that tracks
political efficacy and attitudes toward labor unions between 2000 and 2004. We then
estimate whether the presence of a new store influences survey responses to questions
about political efficacy and attitudes towards unions, utilizing a clean, individual-level,
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 3Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
―before and after‖ design. To anticipate our results, we find big-box retail has real effects
on efficacy and affect toward labor, but that not all big-box retail is the same.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section I, we review both the theoretical and
empirical literature on big-box retail and political participation, and in section II we
present the data and models. Section III reports our results and provides several
robustness checks. Finally, sections IV and V discuss the implications of the results and
end with some concluding remarks.
PREVIOUS WORK
Theory
The standard story emerging from the popular press is as follows: when a big-box
retailer comes to town, normal patterns of contact between individuals are disrupted.
Consequently, lines of communication among peers can be disrupted, reducing the
ability for individuals to coordinate and exchange information. Ultimately, these
developments degrade both civic engagement and political activity. For those who argue
that political participation is based on some form of rational calculation made by
individuals, that lack of coordination and communication makes it difficult to sanction
individuals who fail to contribute to the collective good. Big-box retail‘s disruptive
presence reduces participation in civic and social groups: groups that can encourage
individuals to vote—either through selective benefits or sanctions. In communities
where citizens no longer interact on the city sidewalks or in public halls, the fabric of
society is torn, producing a more disaffected and disempowered electorate.
The story above connects directly to two prominent literatures in political science
and sociology. The first seeks to understand the impact increasing economic scale in
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 4Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey retail establishments—or capitalism more generally—has on social activity and political participation. The second directly addresses the relationship between civic engagement and voter turnout. Boiled down to its essence, the literature on capitalism‘s impact seeks to understand how an evolving consumer behavior affects social interaction. In turn, political scientists and sociologists have been interested in how those changes affect politics. The argument is fairly straight forward: as retail enterprise moves away from more centralized business districts, opportunities to interact with others diminish, disrupting established forms of communication. Stan Humphries refers to a literature called ―New Urbanism‖ that warns against the loss of community inherent in the move towards big box retailers (Humphries 2001). Although not always referring to big-box retailers specifically, much of the New Urbanism literature emphasizes suburban sprawl and how it influences social life and political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Berger, Berger et al. 1973). As commercial activity becomes geographically dispersed, social networks are interrupted or broken altogether, leaving individuals increasingly isolated. Without central gathering places or community ‗focal‘ points, the social life of a community is forever changed. Derivatives of the argument are found in accounts of Wal-Mart‘s impact on communities (Dicker 2005; Mitchell 2006). Still, connecting the dots between big-box retail, its economic impact, and the political health of a community is incomplete. There are, however, more concrete reasons to believe big-box retail has an impact. We argue that an important connection tying big-box retail to political participation involves its impact on the local business class. Put simply, when a local business class is under siege, philanthropy, political organization, and a range of public goods are put at risk. Under these conditions lower political participation (lower The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 5
Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
voter turnout) and civic engagement (decreasing participation in civic and social
organizations) are the consequence.
The other prominent stream of previous work involves civic and social
organizations and their relationship to political participation (Almond and Verba 1963;
Scoble 1968; Olsen 1972; Buchanan 1978; Denney 1979; Uhlaner 1986; Uhlaner 1989;
Coleman 1990; Knack 1992; Verba et al. 1995; Burns et al. 2001). For these scholars,
membership in civic and social organizations teaches individuals how to be effective
advocates for a range of important causes. As their experience grows, their self-
confidence (what is often referred to as internal political efficacy) increases, raising
their expectations that their actions in the community matter. Perhaps the most well-
known passage comes from Almond and Verba‘s classic A Civic Culture:
―The belief in one‘s competence is a key political attitude. The self-confident
citizen appears to be the democratic citizen. Not only does he think he can
participate, he thinks others ought to participate as well. Furthermore, he does
not merely think he can take part in politics; he is likely to be more active‖
(Almond and Verba 1963; p. 257 quoted in Kahne 2006).
In addition to an individual‘s level of internal political efficacy, attitudes towards
political participation are influenced by views citizens have on the responsiveness of
their representatives or government bureaucrats. Do individuals feel as though they
have a voice in government or do their political representatives care about their views?
Although the empirical relationship between external efficacy and political participation
is not as well established (Kahne 2006), there are good theoretical reasons to expect the
connection between big-box retail and external efficacy could be strong. Store openings
usually are well-advertised and discussed in all communities. Central to those
discussions are the exact location of the store, whether the city has granted the store any
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 6Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
tax breaks or provided subsidies, and whether the store is needed or wanted by the
community in the first place. Decisions by local officials to encourage or prohibit entry
of big-box retail can dominate the pages of the local paper and often lead to standing-
room-only city council meetings (Ortega 1998). Whether a local community‘s interests
are reflected in the final outcome--either a new store comes to town or is forced to look
elsewhere--has the potential to figure prominently in an individual‘s overall assessment
of ―whether politicians care about people like themselves.‖
Some scholars marry rational choice theory to the importance of social and civic
organizations, arguing that smaller groups (local party affiliates, the PTA, Rotary Club,
etc.) can level sanctions on members who do not tow the party line or support
candidates that benefit the group. As Stephen Knack (1992) argues, declines in voter
turnout are not necessarily due to changing characteristics of individuals in the
population. Rather, as society changes—more mobility, declining face-to-face contact—
the sanctions and incentives that once were in place to generate higher levels of turnout
are no longer present.
We argue that Big-box retail‘s influence on political participation can be linked to
its impact on the business class. Big-box retailers centralize entrepreneurial activity. In
effect, they take advantage of scale economies: once the infrastructure is developed for
general merchandise (clothing, sports equipment, etc.,), the knowledge acquired in
those enterprises is used to develop expertise in pharmaceuticals and groceries.
Entrepreneurial opportunities in regions dominated by big-box merchandisers, as a
result, become relatively limited. Consequently, young entrepreneurial talent either
leaves the area or is reluctant to set up shop. To the extent that big-box retailers
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 7Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
accelerate an entrepreneurial brain drain, individuals who would otherwise play an
important role in political activity are absent.
In addition to an entrepreneurial brain drain, big box retailing can have a very
subtle but no less important impact on the ability for store owners and others to
participate in politics. Although big-box stores can often lead to the very rapid demise
of many smaller retailers, they can have a more subtle yet equally profound impact.
Most big-box store‘s ability to keep store hours that generally extend past 10:00pm puts
increasing pressure on smaller establishments to keep longer hours. This means
proprietors must either extend the number of hours they work, or find qualified help.
Suddenly, the available time to attend a Rotary Club function or school board meeting
decreases, robbing those organizations of important voices that would have otherwise
played an important role—both financially and otherwise—in their activities.
Finally, there is an additional mechanism tying big-box retail to less political
participation in terms of associational activity and voter turnout. A common theme
running throughout commentary on Wal-Mart is its stance on union activity. Wal-
Mart‘s aggressive tactics towards unions can have an important effect on all union
activity. According to a figure quoted by Lichenstein, Wal-Mart was responsible in some
way for the closure of 13,000 traditional supermarkets and the bankruptcy of 25
regional grocery chains between 1992 and 2003 (Lichtenstein 2009; L. 2945). Given
that one of the most powerful unions in the country is the United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union (UFCW), many potential sites to organize were in effect
taken away. In addition, the UFCWs power to bargain on behalf of its workers is
circumscribed when other employers avoid paying union wages and benefits.
Companies that do employ union workers and compete with Wal-Mart are increasingly
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 8Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
forced to ask for concessions that erode union wages and benefits. The grocery clerk
strike of 2003 in Southern California was in part a failure because of the pressure big-
box grocery chains were placing on regular supermarket chains and their workers
(Lichtenstein 2009). In starker terms, the inability to organize in the largest retailer has
severely circumscribed UFCW activity which, in turn, can stunt the development of
associational activity.
To summarize, there are a number of mechanisms that link big-box retail to
declining associational activity and political participation. From more sociological
theories that posit a disruption in communications and associational linkages, to voting
turnout models based on individuals‘ political efficacy, to elite models that suggest the
glue that holds local communities together through organizational and philanthropic
work, to the direct impact of Wal-Mart‘s anti-labor policy, there are reasons to think
that the big-box revolution has produced declines turnout, decreases in political efficacy,
and declines in political participation more generally. Over the last ten years, empirical
work has begun to test whether big-box retail influences the theoretical mechanisms
described above.
Empirical Work
Despite the large amount of press coverage and attention in popular media, a
relatively small amount of work has appeared in the scholarly press and journals. Voter
turnout has received extensive attention over the last few decades primarily for two
reasons, one theoretical the other empirical. Theoretically, political scientists wonder
why people vote. This is a paradoxical question since some argue it is not ‗rational‘ for
people to do so. Empirically, the United States has witnessed a secular decline in voter
turnout, causing concern among those who argue an active and engaged citizenry forms
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 9Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
the bedrock of a country‘s democracy. From the classic 1980 book ―Who Votes?‖ by
Raymond E. Wolfinger and Stephen J. Rosenstone to others that followed (Nagler 1991;
Nagler 1992; Burden 2000; Highton 2000; Gimpel, Morris et al. 2004; Nardulli 2005;
Geys 2006; Highton 2008), a substantial empirical effort seeks to explain why
individuals participate in elections. The universe of explanations ranges from
socioeconomic characteristics of the individual (e.g., race, sex, income, education, age),
to characteristics of the individual‘s environment (e.g., stability of the population
(transient/stable), social networks, social capital). Mechanics of voting have also
received attention – i.e., the degree to which registration laws make voting easy. In a
recent review of the literature, 83 empirical studies were surveyed in an attempt to
identify a set of causes upon which most can agree (Geys 2006). In that study, three
classes of explanations form the basis of what Benny Geys calls a ‗core‘ model of voting
turnout: the stability of the population (transient/stable); whether the election is close;
and finally, the pre-existing voting habits of the population.
Work that directly examines big-box retail‘s impact on political participation is in
its infancy. Although Kenneth Stone (Stone 1995) conducted some of the first work on
Wal-Mart in the mid-1990s, it has only been in the last 10 years that a growing number
of statistical studies have begun to appear. Emek Basker has been responsible for kick-
starting much of the empirical work by authoring a number of studies using a data set
she had constructed that recorded where and when Wal-Mart stores were opened in the
United States (1972-2001). With that data, economists have tried to understand the
impact Wal-Mart has on wages, unemployment, prices, and social capital (Basker 2005;
Basker 2005; Neumark, Zhang et al. 2005; Goetz and Rupasingha 2006; Goetz and
Swaminathan 2006; Basker 2007; Carden, Courtemanche et al. 2009).
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 10Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
Although still in its infancy, the empirical literature on Wal-Mart and its
influence on politics (usually in terms of social capital and voter turnout), stands at an
important cross-roads. Some work finds a negative relationship between Wal-Mart and
social capital while there is evidence that no empirical relationship exists between the
big-box behemoth and membership in civic and social organizations. Goetz et al. have
shown in a collection of studies on the subject that there is a negative relationship
between the presence of Wal-Mart and political participation (measured by voter
turnout and membership in civic organizations). In a 2006 study, they find a negative
relationship between Wal-Mart presence and the number of civic associations, voter
turnout in the 2000 presidential election, number of tax-exempt organizations, and
participation in the 2000 Census. Carden et al. employ similar data to show there is no
relationship between Wal-Mart and the accumulation of social capital. Combining US
Census data on civic organizations with the DDB Needham Survey and the Saguaro
Survey on Social Capital, the authors conclude there is no systematic effect. Subjecting
the Goetz and Rupasingha findings to a rigorous test, they find that once a slightly
different independent variable is used (the log of Wal-Mart years per 10,000
population) and state fixed-effects are introduced into the regression, Goetz and
Rupasingha‘s results go away. It is important to note, however, that although there is no
relationship between Wal-Mart and membership in civic and social organizations, they
do find there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between their
measure of Wal-Mart and voter turnout. Hopkins (2004), using zip-code level retail
data, finds that the presence of large retailers diminishes the likelihood of various forms
of political participation. As work progresses along these lines it is becoming
increasingly clear that one‘s conclusions depend fundamentally on the econometric
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 11Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
technique used and the specification of the model. Consequently, the empirical
literature risks devolving into a debate about econometric techniques where often the
latest estimator determines the outcome.
To move the debate forward, we focus our attention on two causal mechanisms
for which the ANES panel from 2000-2004 has useful data: two measures of external
political efficacy, and an affective thermometer measuring feelings toward labor unions.
Importantly, we also expand the investigation of big-box retail beyond what has been
the only subject of empirical scrutiny to day – i.e., Wal-Mart.
Hypothesis 1: in counties where either a Wal-Mart, Costco, or Target open a
store in 2002, 2003, or 2004, an individual’s sense of political efficacy will
decline.
Hypothesis 2: in counties where either a Wal-Mart, Costco, or Target open a
store in 2002, 2003, or 2004, individuals will lower their evaluation of labor
unions.
MODEL AND DATA
We merged data on Wal-Mart, Costco, and Target stores with an American
National Election Survey (ANES) panel study conducted in 2000 and 2004. Our aim is
to examine whether individual responses to a battery of questions on political efficacy
and labor unions (from 2000 to 2004) depend on receiving a ― treatment‖ – that is, on
having a Wal-Mart, Target, or Costco open in the (survey respondent‘s) county during
the intervening time period.
The research design is as follows:
Pre Big-Box Retail Exposure
Measures on panelists Big-Box retail exposure Post Big-Box Retail
Measures on panelists.
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 12Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
Because Wal-Mart does not choose its locations randomly, we adopted
instrumental variables estimation when examining Wal-Mart‘s impact on individual
attitudes. Economists have relied on a variable that records the distance from
Bentonville as an instrument to obtain unbiased estimates (Neumark, Zhang et al. 2005;
Goetz and Rupasingha 2006; Goetz and Swaminathan 2006). We follow that practice
in equations including Wal-Mart store openings as a regressor. We also use matching to
test the robustness of our Wal-Mart estimates, as well as to estimate the impact Target
and Costco stores have on political efficacy and attitudes towards unions.
Instrument
Since big-box stores do not locate in random fashion, endogeneity is a concern: if Wal-
Mart stores appear primarily where political activity is low, any correlation between
Wal-Mart and political efficacy would be spurious in the sense that Wal-Mart would not
be the cause, it would merely be the symptom. Since the mid to late-1980s when local
challenges to Wal-Mart first materialized, high levels of social capital may have enabled
some cities to keep Wal-Mart out. Under that scenario, we would observe Wal-Marts
only in counties with low levels of social capital, generating biased OLS estimates. In
order to obtain unbiased estimates of big-box retail‘s impact on a variety of
phenomenon, scholars have established a number of different ways to account for the
selection criteria Wal-Mart uses to locate a store. In a recently published paper in Social
Science Quarterly, Stephan J. Goetz and Hema Swaminathan use a number of
socioeconomic variables in a selection equation to predict the probability that Wal-Mart
will locate in a given county. Using population density, average commute time, number
of female-headed households, and the percentage of the population with only high
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 13Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
school degrees, the two scholars attempt to account for the endogeneity between store
location decisions and county poverty rates (Goetz and Swaminathan 2006).
Questioning the assumptions that allow Goetz and Swaminathan to identify their
system of equations, Neumark et al. offer an alternative (Neumark, Zhang et al. 2005).
By all accounts (even that of Sam Walton himself), Wal-Mart expanded during the 70s,
80s, and 90s by building stores in close proximity to already existing Wal-Marts,
saturating areas before moving on to outlying areas. Using that information, Neumark
and associates propose interacting time with distance from Bentonville, Arkansas to
identify the system of equations they use to generate instrumental variable estimates.
The Neumark study, in turn, has been criticized by Emek Basker who argues that the
instrument used (distance from Bentonville) can be correlated with many of the
dependent variables economists are interested in: prices, employment, and income.
Carden et al. note that some previous empirical findings are not stable with respect to
different specifications of the instrumental variable models: introducing a non-linear
term (distance squared) reduces the magnitudes of the coefficient and the statistical
significance (below all acceptable levels) of the Wal-Mart variable. Consequently, we
evaluate the stability of the results with respect to distance as the instrument. In
addition to demonstrating the stability of the results with respect to the instrument, we
use matching to show the results are not dependent on our choice of instrument and
specification of the model.
For most of the analysis, we use the distance of the county‘s geographic centroid
from Bentonville as the instrument. A good instrument for the location of Wal-Mart
stores must meet the following two criteria: 1) it is a variable correlated with the location
decision of Wal-Mart executives; 2) it is not correlated with the errors when regressing
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 14Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
the dependent variable on Wal-Mart. The distance from Bentonville describes the basic
pattern of diffusion that characterizes Wal-Mart‘s early growth in the 70s and 80s. The
first store was established in Rogers, Arkansas in 1962. From there, Sam Walton
managed his empire by frequent visits to each store by car. Eventually, Walton obtained
his pilot‘s license, allowing him to extend the empire into Texas, Oklahoma, Missouri,
and Kansas (Ortega 1998). Thereafter, expansion evolved in close proximity to large
distribution centers. Walton attempted to postpone establishing large distribution
centers to the fullest extent possible, keeping a larger percentage of the merchandise in
the store or in route (Ortega 1998). To follow that strategy, stores were established in
locations that were adjacent to already existing stores, cutting down transportation and
warehousing costs. Consequently, the growth of the Wal-Mart empire started in the
middle of the country and spread outward in all directions.
Therefore, the distance from Bentonville serves as a good predictor of both the
timing and location of a new store. The distance from Bentonville is also uncorrelated
with social capital and political participation – there is no reason to suspect that voter
turnout is distributed in concentric circles drawn around Bentonville: it is unlikely that a
county 200 miles East of Bentonville will have equal levels of turnout to a county 200
miles to the West. The correlation between distance and voter turnout in the 2004
elections is low (0.14). To estimate the association between Wal-Mart‘s presence in a
county with voter turnout and a number of different proxies that capture various forms
of social capital, we use the following system of equations:
(1) Efficacy2004 = a + b1(Wal-Mart2002-2004) + b2(Individual and Contextual
Controls) + e1
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 15Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
(2) Wal-Mart2002-2004 = a + b1(Distance from Bentonville) + b2(Individual and
Contextual Controls) + e2
Although we understand Costco and Target do not randomly assign stores, there
is less concern that their decisions to locate are related to the dependent variable.
However, we use matching to account for any endogeneity that might exist between
political efficacy, attitudes towards unions, and the location of Target and Costco stores. 1
RESULTS
In Table 1, we report the probability of agreeing with the following two statements: 1)
―Public officials don't care much what people like me think‖; and 2) ―People like me
don‘t have any say about what the government does.‖ Given the way both statements
are framed, a positive response is indicative of less (external) political efficacy.
Estimates reflect the effect of being ―exposed‖ to a new Wal-Mart(s) in 2002, 2003, and
2004, controlling for the placement of Wal-Mart (via the instrument of distance from
Bentonville), pre-treatment values on the dependent variable (i.e., agreeing with this
item in 2000), and a host of individual and contextual characteristics (including the
number of ―superstores‖ in a respondent‘s county before 2001). We find that the results
do not depend on the use of instrumental variables. A simple probit model without the
use of a second equation indicates the result is stable to the specification of the model.
When Wal-Mart comes to town, we see a systematic shift of political attitudes: the
probability of agreeing with the above two statement increases, even after having
1
Hopkins (2004) uses a similar matching procedure to evaluate the robustness of results indicating that large retailer
presence decreases political participation.
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 16Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
controlled for how that question was answered in the 2000 survey. The probit results
for the ―People like me don‘t have any say...‖ question is significant at the .10 level.
-Table 1 about here-
The same results hold when using matching instead of the instrumental variables
framework. In Table 2, we present the results from pre-processing the data using
matching. We first matched five versions of the data based on the following
characteristics thought to be related to big box store placement: income per capita 2000,
population (logged)2000, number of superstores2000, and the number of universities2000. We
then took the matched data , and ran a full logit regression on the weighted data
(weights are derived from the matching procedure). The full specification includes a
host of individual controls that shouldn‘t be related to store placement, but that need to
be controlled in modeling individual-level opinion.2
The results from Table 2 correspond with the findings reported in Table 1: Wal-
Mart has a significant impact on efficacy. A Wal-Mart store opening increases the
probability that respondents will agree with the statement ―Public officials don‘t care
much what people like me think.‖ In table 2a, the estimates indicate the same is true for
Target. The results are both substantive and statistically significant. For the Wal-Mart
equation, the first differences in expected values for a Wal-Mart opening is
approximately 17 percent. Opening a new Wal-Mart increases the likelihood that a
respondent will agree that ―public officials don‘t care much what people like me think‖
2
Matching was done in R using MatchIt (Ho et al. 2009). Imputation (which must precede matching) was done
using Amelia II (Honaker et al. 2009).
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 17Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
by 17 percent. The first differences in expected values for a Target opening is
approximately 29 percent; the coefficient for the Costco variable was negative and
insignificant (not reported).
-Table 2 and 2a about here-
As we noted in the theory section, another possible mechanism that ties big-box
retail to declining political participation involves the sector‘s impact on unions.
Included in the ANES survey is a question that asks respondents ―how would you rate
labor unions?‖ The thermometer rates from zero (low) to one hundred (high). In tables
3 and 3a we present the estimates from the same matching methods used in Tables 2
and 2a. As tables 3 and 3a indicate, both Wal-Mart and Target store openings have a
dampening impact on people‘s views towards labor unions. The results are both
statistically and substantively significant. When a Target opens a store, the labor union
thermometer drops a full 4 percentage points; when Wal-Mart comes to town, the labor
union thermometer drops over 7 percentage points. Costco‘s impact on the labor union
thermometer was indistinguishable from zero (not reported).
-Tables 3 and 3a about here-
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper moves beyond previous work by examining how big-box retail
influences attitudinal changes within a panel survey conducted by the ANES in 2000
and 2004. Examining the relationship in a before-and-after framework (where there is
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 18Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
a clear treatment between the two surveys) represents a rigorous test. In this paper, we
identified two possible causal connections that link big-box retail to declining political
participation. First, the arrival of a big-box store may signal to individuals important
changes in their community will take place regardless of their opinions. Second, big-box
retail has an important impact on how individuals rate labor unions.
Our results suggest that the opening of Wal-Mart and Target stores produce
drops in rates of individual political efficacy. We also find that Wal-Mart and Target
store openings are associated with declining views towards labor unions. As discussed
previously, these developments are likely to hold negative consequences for political
participation in communities dominated by big-box retail.
Although we have moved closer to connecting big-box retail to important trends
in political participation, there is an important limit to our study. Missing from our
analysis is the direct link from a respondent‘s awareness of big-box retail presence to
their political attitudes. Until surveys are conducted that explicitly link big-box stores to
people‘s attitudes, we must remain cautious with respect to our results and what they
say. Nevertheless, there is evidence that previous results – mostly focused on Wal-Mart
and its impact on political participation and civil society – are founded on some
important micro-foundations. Even after having taken steps to deal with selection
problems, and after having controlled for an individual‘s response to the same question
in 2000 along with a number of individual characteristics and contextual factors
(income per capita, population, number of superstores), Wal-Mart and Target store
openings are associated with important attitudinal changes. Though we can only
speculate at this point, declining views of union activity could hold negative implications
for other kinds of associational activity. Understanding that big-box retail certainly
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 19Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey represents numerous benefits for society, we have potentially identified some concrete costs for democratic functioning. The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 20
Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
Table 1. IV and Probit Regressions of External Efficacy on Wal-Mart Treatment
People like me don’t have any say Public officials don't care about
in what government does (Yes=1) what people like me think
(Yes=1)
IV Regression Probit IV Regression Probit
2nd Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Wal-Mart 1.9416*** 0.2172 2.6642*** 0.6789***
(0.5496) (0.1326) (0.0629) (0.1037)
Respondent's Age 0.0508*** -0.0019** 0.0657*** -0.0026*** 0.0148*** 0.0247***
(0.0131) (0.0009) (0.0055) (0.0009) (0.0033) (0.0043)
Male = 1 0.9287*** -0.0113 1.2442*** -0.1234*** 0.7768*** 1.3087***
(0.2864) (0.0262) (0.1756) (0.0243) (0.1198) (0.1232)
White = 1 -2.0999*** 0.8085*** -0.9343*** 0.7084*** -2.4072*** -1.9201***
(0.3513) (0.0434) (0.2685) (0.0459) (0.1703) (0.2071)
Church Attendance -0.0993 0.0700*** 0.0716 0.0674*** -0.2083*** -0.0852**
(0.0771) (0.0083) (0.0583) (0.0085) (0.0248) (0.0368)
Respondent's Education 0.2187*** -0.0251*** 0.2336*** 0.0098 0.0302 0.1668***
(0.0479) (0.0078) (0.0434) (0.0069) (0.0260) (0.0361)
Respondent's Income -0.0241 0.0387*** 0.0613*** 0.0437*** -0.0804*** 0.0757***
(0.0379) (0.0029) (0.0188) (0.0030) (0.0134) (0.0159)
Respondent's commute -0.1678** -0.0168 -0.2422*** 0.0065 -0.0257 0.0319
(0.0838) (0.0130) (0.0808) (0.0131) (0.0387) (0.0596)
Superstores in County 0.0358 -0.0003 0.0296 0.0390*** 0.0114 0.2212***
(0.0667) (0.0148) (0.0823) (0.0145) (0.0481) (0.0690)
No Say (2000) 0.8658*** -0.3069*** 0.3673
(0.2148) (0.0351) (0.2289)
County Population
0.3475*** -0.1104*** 0.1857 -0.1324*** 0.5129*** 0.5489***
(logged)
(0.0969) (0.0181) (0.1152) (0.0206) (0.0710) (0.1002)
Universities in County -0.0737*** 0.0297*** -0.0302*** 0.0304*** -0.0940*** -0.0670***
(0.0139) (0.0021) (0.0109) (0.0021) (0.0069) (0.0088)
2000 superstore -0.3308*** 0.1843*** -0.0020 0.1833*** -0.4579*** -0.0327
(0.1169) (0.0101) (0.0565) (0.0106) (0.0346) (0.0461)
Income per capita (logged) 0.5757 -0.3139*** -0.1788 -0.3770*** 1.2115*** 0.4896
(0.4367) (0.0751) (0.4264) (0.0789) (0.2363) (0.3453)
Party Identification -0.0184 -0.0348*** -0.0961* -0.0265*** -0.0206 -0.2408***
(0.0553) (0.0091) (0.0497) (0.0096) (0.0348) (0.0403)
Distance from Bentonville -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Politicians Care (2000) -0.0147 -0.0640 -0.0874
(0.0364) (0.1071) (0.1611)
Constant -16.1768*** 4.7933*** -8.5362** 5.2339*** -18.7955*** -15.2937***
(3.5435) (0.6776) (3.9914) (0.6964) (2.2781) (3.2480)
/athrho -0.8215** -1.7140***
(0.4068) (0.2350)
/lnsigma -0.9816*** -0.9634***
(0.0176) (0.0176)
Number of observations 1,610 1,610 1,609 1,609
Adjusted R2 0.795 0.574
note: *** pBrown, Lawrence, Sokhey Table 2. Logit Regression on Matched Data: Wal-Mart Treatment (“Public officials don’t care about what people like me think”; Yes = 1) Variable Coeff. Std. Error t ratio (Intercept) -82.44 10.26 -8.04 Wal-Mart (2002, 2003, 2004) 4.88 0.66 7.42 Party ID -0.26 0.10 -2.67 White -2.07 0.55 -3.74 Income (2000) 0.20 0.07 2.80 Education (2000) 0.15 0.10 1.49 Age (2000) 0.01 0.02 0.83 Church Attendance (2000) 0.16 0.09 1.79 Male 2.65 0.40 6.65 Attention to Local News (2000) 4.12 0.32 13.01 Efficacy (2000) 0.73 0.52 1.41 Political Knowledge (2000) -0.38 0.28 -1.35 Commute (2000) 0.37 0.14 2.62 # of Superstores (2000) -0.13 0.11 -1.17 # of Universities (2000) -0.05 0.02 -2.42 Pop. (logged) 1.87 0.30 6.26 Income per cap. (2000) 3.92 1.01 3.87 *Estimates are averaged across five, matched data sets. Data was matched on population in 2000, income per capita in 2000, the number of superstores, and the number of universities. The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 22
Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
Table 2a. Logit Regression on Matched Data: Target Treatment
(“Public officials don’t care about what people like me think”; Yes = 1)
Variable Coeff. Std. Error t ratio
(Intercept) -15.41 15.23 -1.01
Target (2002, 2003, 2004) 6.66 0.74 9.02
Party ID -0.31 0.11 -2.83
White -1.88 0.63 -2.98
Income (2000) 0.17 0.09 1.85
Education (2000) 0.02 0.11 0.21
Age (2000) 0.01 0.02 0.81
Church Attendance (2000) 0.02 0.12 0.17
Male 2.68 0.49 5.50
Attention to Local News (2000) 4.82 0.39 12.50
Efficacy (2000) 0.63 0.62 1.02
Political Knowledge (2000) -0.60 0.33 -1.84
Commute (2000) 0.21 0.17 1.28
# of Superstores (2000) 0.23 0.16 1.42
# of Universities (2000) -0.03 0.03 -1.07
Population in 2000 (logged) -2.88 0.76 -3.81
Income per capita in 2000 (logged) 3.40 1.13 3.00
*Estimates are averaged across five, matched data sets. Data was matched on population
in 2000, income per capita in 2000, the number of superstores, and the number of
universities.
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 23Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey Table 3: Logit Regression on Matched Data: Wal-Mart Treatment (Union Thermometer 2004) Variable Coeff. Std. Error t ratio (Intercept) -76.44837 26.70309 -2.8629 Wal-Mart (2002, 2003, 2004) -7.35963 2.51761 -2.92326 Party ID 1.25248 0.3289 3.80811 White 8.67992 3.09709 2.8026 Income (2000) 0.25601 0.16677 1.53504 Education (2000) 2.36379 0.81759 2.89116 Age (2000) -0.04208 0.05244 -0.80251 Church Attendance (2000) -1.43423 0.19073 -7.51986 Male 4.38802 1.2767 3.43701 Attention to Local News (2000) -4.58274 0.75329 -6.08364 Union Thermometer (2000) 0.60179 0.0535 11.24894 Political Knowledge (2000) -4.00491 0.67683 -5.91714 Commute (2000) -5.65579 0.73048 -7.74252 # of Superstores (2000) -0.138 0.36641 -0.37664 # of Universities (2000) 0.08683 0.06768 1.28284 Population in 2000 (logged) 0.02114 1.12931 0.01872 Income per capita in 2000 (logged) 7.48678 2.95622 2.53255 *Estimates are averaged across five, matched data sets. Data was matched on population in 2000, income per capita in 2000, the number of superstores, and the number of universities. The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 24
Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
Table 3a. Logit Regression on Matched Data: Target Treatment
(Union Thermometer 2004)
Variable Coeff. Std. Error t ratio
(Intercept) -93.585 42.8328 -2.1849
Target (2002, 2003, 2004) -4.33186 1.61878 -2.676
Party ID 1.3997 0.32541 4.3013
White 7.91717 2.57936 3.0694
Income (2000) 0.25268 0.15492 1.6311
Education (2000) 2.33309 0.7292 3.1995
Age (2000) -0.05912 0.04006 -1.476
Church Attendance (2000) -1.75241 0.26756 -6.5496
Male 3.19674 1.60496 1.9918
Attention to Local News (2000) -3.24325 0.78161 -4.1495
Union Thermometer (2000) 0.63402 0.0492 12.8861
Political Knowledge (2000) -4.14462 0.71495 -5.7971
Commute (2000) -6.3674 0.6892 -9.2388
# of Superstores (2000) 0.17302 0.60187 0.2875
# of Universities (2000) 0.03453 0.08613 0.401
Pop. (logged) -0.75696 2.92351 -0.2589
Income per cap. in 2000 (logged) 9.75381 3.1676 3.0792
*Estimates are averaged across five, matched data sets. Data was matched on
population in 2000, income per capita in 2000, the number of superstores, and the
number of universities.
The Political Consequences of Big-Box Retail - 25Brown, Lawrence, Sokhey
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