Chaos at Capitol Hill: what went wrong? - Start Insight
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Chaos at Capitol Hill: what went wrong?
by Luca Tenzi, Security and Resilience Strategist and Andrea Molle, START InSight
To cite this article: Luca Tenzi, Andrea Molle (2021): Chaos at Capitol Hill: what went wrong,
START InSight
Abstract
The assault of January 6th, 2021, on Capitol Hill dealt a severe blow to the image of American democracy.
In this article, we analyze some of the security apparatus’ physical and organizational issues that led, first
of all, to underestimate the threat posed by the demonstrators and the incorrect response to the assault.
Our analysis is based on reconstructions in the public domain, carried out after the events, and does not
contain confidential material.
Keywords: Capitol Hill; Capitol Police; Congress; Trump; Mob assault; Security; Washing-
ton
History teaches us that the assault on the Cap- Nor had the Black Lives Matter (BLM) move-
itol building, which took place on Wednesday, ment ever crossed the line between civil diso-
January 6th, 2021, was anything but unpredict- bedience and an act of insurrection towards a
able. Although unfamiliar to most people, Con- legitimate and democratically elected govern-
gress has been the target of several attacks in ment.
the past. In 1954, for instance, a group of sep-
However, in this case, everything suggested
aratists from the US Territory of Puerto Rico
that January 6th would not be just a simple pro-
opened fire inside the building, wounding five
test. In the days leading up to it, many signs
Congress members. In 1998, an armed individ-
should have alarmed the American intelligence
ual managed to get through the security check-
community. Open-source intelligence had sig-
point, ultimately killing two police officers be-
naled that Donald Trump’s supporters were
fore being stopped. Lastly, the building was
making plans for the day and were sharing in-
likely a target of the 9/11 attacks. Ever since,
formation in plain sight on social media. Among
the possibility of a terrorist attack at Capitol Hill
some of the monitored conversations, there
has been taken very seriously, or at least it
should have been. were suspicious threads, including, for exam-
ple, an extensive discussion concerning the
We can say that the threat of a mob-style as- best ways to smuggle weapons into DC. In
sault was underestimated. One of the reasons cases like this, when there is a clear potential
is that, in recent American history, there had for violence to erupt, the twelve local and fed-
never been such a display of collective vio- eral law enforcement agencies that operate in
lence directed towards a government site. Not DC engage in planning coordinate operations.
even the Vietnam war demonstrators stormed Intel gathering and planning for preventive se-
iconic seats of power like the Capitol building. curity measures is usually undertaken with the
©Copyright START InSight 2021www.startinsight.eu – info@startinsight.eu
FBI or the NSA (National Security Agency) tak- Moreover, it is not clear why would the Mayor
ing a leading role. However, it is not clear if that oversee such request rather than the Chief of
was the case on January 6th. Capitol Police, who serves on-site and cer-
tainly had a better understanding of the situa-
It should be noted that a plethora of local, state,
tion. The Capitol’s blurred chain of command
and federal security and law enforcement
aggravated the confusion. The interim Secre-
agencies operate simultaneously in Washing-
tary of Defense, Chris Miller, deployed the Na-
ton DC. All of them are tasked with protecting
tional Guard only about 30 minutes after re-
representatives and iconic sites of the federal
ceiving the Mayor’s request. The National
government. Following protocol, security plan-
Guard was then joined by few neighboring
ning was handled by the United States Capitol
states police departments tactical teams
Police (USCP), a law enforcement agency of
(SWAT). At that point, however, Capitol Hill
about 2,000 members under the direct control
was already lost as the mob had already en-
of Congress and uniquely tasked with protect-
tered the building. Despite a thin external se-
ing the Capitol building. The Head of Capitol
curity perimeter, no security perimeter was set
Police, who recently resigned due to the politi-
inside the building, except for some agents
cal backlash, stated that he had requested re-
tasked with defending the most sensible
inforcements two days ahead. He had received
rooms. Since no physical barriers were used to
credible and actionable intel that suggested the
block corridors and force an internal route,
protests would be much more extensive and
once inside, the assailants were able to roam
potentially more violent than anticipated. For
freely while being chased by a now disoriented
reasons still unclear, the other actors of the US
Police.
federal government’s vast security apparatus
ignored the request and did not grant support. In the Rotunda, the iconic circular hall located
under the Capitol building’s dome, gas masks
The transition between the outgoing and the in-
were rapidly distributed. The outnumbered
coming administrations certainly explains
Capitol Police were by then using pepper spray
some confusion in the decision-making pro-
and tear gas to slow down the mob. Simultane-
cess. Some key positions were occupied ad in-
ously, the Secret Service proceeded to extract
terim by outgoing officials and have certainly
Vice-president Mike Pence, while Police offic-
weakened operational and tactical decisions.
ers extracted several other key members of
The analysis of the decision-making timeline
Congress, including Speaker Nancy Pelosi.
comforts this view. The events’ timeline is be-
Security forces then used improvised barri-
coming more evident, suggesting that there
cades to block the doors accessing the Cham-
have been many mistakes along the line. For
ber of the House of Representatives. For ex-
example, a Department of Defense official
ample, a cabinet was pushed in front of the
stated that, at around 2:00 pm, the Mayor of
Chamber’s doors while senators and repre-
Washington DC, Muriel Bowser, requested the
sentatives were hiding under the desks waiting
National Guard to be dispatched on-site. That to be extracted.
was about 45 minutes after the protestors had
broken the barricade on the building’s external Twenty years after 9/11, the Capitol Security
security perimeter. Department’s annual budget is now set to
around $450 million. If it is not for lack of re-
sources, what did go wrong in defending the
©Copyright START InSight 2021www.startinsight.eu – info@startinsight.eu
Capitol building? Among the many factors into their agencies’ shortcoming at the time of
which played a role, two can be deemed es- the assault.
sential to mention: First, the Capitol Police lack
All that happened points out that what took
of preparation to manage a situation amenable
place in front of our eyes on January 6th was
to guerrilla warfare. Second, the structural
never really considered a possibility. Setting
weakness of the building itself. Capitol police
aside an analysis of the crowd dynamics, what
officers are mainly tasked with and trained to
was extremely surprising is the building’s phys-
keep protestors away from the Capitol building
ical fragility and the lack of planning. Simple
and the outside monumental staircase, thus
physical countermeasures, including architec-
securing the structure like a citadel. The rea-
tural elements designed to prevent an assault,
son for that is that the nineteenth century Cap-
limit or delay access to the building by the most
itol building has many doors and windows.
violent protesters, were missing. Physical
Therefore, it is quite challenging for a security
measures in the world of security experts are
force, although large, to simultaneously defend
summarized in the 5D paradigm (deter, detect,
all these access points. Once the steps were
deny, delay, defend). This model is now con-
lost, the mob could -quite predictably- quickly
sidered a best practice by all public and private
find a way into the building. The second oper-
security agencies. Their lack thereof is trou-
ational weakness is that the Capitol Police has
bling. Even more so, because the United
contingency plans only for cases of what is le-
States is considered top of the game concern-
gally defined as “planned activities of the First
ing security measures designed to protect gov-
Amendment.” This means against moderately
ernment’s sites. Those have increased consid-
violent demonstrations that are not considered
erably after the events of 9/11. In the aftermath
either a terrorist attack or guerrilla warfare.
of 9/11, all sensitive targets, both on American
While the risk of active protests and civil diso- soil and abroad, such as diplomatic offices,
bedience on the part of Trump supporters were went through a complete security overhaul,
certainly considered plausible, and in some and dedicated budgets grew exponentially. To-
way even expected, giving the tones of the out- day, all the American embassies are consid-
going President, the violent outburst came as ered the golden standards of security
a surprise to national and foreign experts. This measures, which are draconian in some cases.
physical violence was shocking because a Architectural measures, urban restyling, new
place that was always regarded as one technical solutions, and armed personnel’s
amongst the safest on earth was easily vio- constant presence have now become the norm
lated, revealing an unforgivable level of opera- thanks to the US. The use of the concepts of
tional weakness by the US security and intelli- crime prevention through environmental de-
gence community. sign (CPTED) is among the critical elements of
this paradigm change in security planning and
Despite the alleged existence of several con-
sees its best application so far with the new
tingency plans, security was poorly designed,
American Embassy design in London. The
insufficient, and entrusted to an inadequate po-
multi-disciplinary approach to deterring crimi-
lice force. The response looked wholly impro-
nal behavior has reached its apex, turning the
vised to the point that the heads of the Depart- Embassy into an almost impenetrable fortress.
ments of Justice, Defense, and Homeland Se-
curity have launched a rigorous investigation
©Copyright START InSight 2021www.startinsight.eu – info@startinsight.eu
Unfortunately, we cannot say the same for the people can exercise their constitutional
many critical sites of American politics in right to protest.
Washington DC. Like many other government
A final surprising element was the presence of
sites on American soil, the Capitol building re-
poorly protected and easily accessible entry
mains easily accessible to the public, which
points. For example, the windows on the lower
turns it into a soft target. Visitors can collect in-
floors were neither manned nor equipped with
tel during either guided tours or meetings with
shatterproof glass. In much of the footage, we
their government representatives while roam-
can see that only the main entry doors were ar-
ing almost freely inside the building. Moreover,
mored. By contrast, others were quickly forced
the internet provides further chances to collect
by means of elementary objects found on-site
information about the building as several web-
(e.g., metal chairs or bars), allowing the mob’s
sites offer incredibly detailed maps of the Cap-
avant-garde to access the building and open
itol building available to the public. These maps
other doors from the inside. The inside doors,
are even updated whenever changes or reno-
for example, were not reinforced, nor were the
vations are made. Following the events of Jan-
windows bulletproof. The images of armed
uary 6th, the security measures and the Vice
agents defending the chambers behind what
President’s movements have been studied, an-
appears to be a wardrobe placed against the
alyzed, and reported by the mass media, ex-
main access door, and the death of a protester
posing a lack of discretion in handling confi-
dential information. hit by a bullet fired through a French window by
a police officer, confirm our suspicion. Moreo-
Another element of weakness is that of a lack ver, the Capitol building was partially covered
of threat perception due to cultural biases. De- in scaffoldings due to some of its facades’ ren-
spite having provided a complete first line of ovation. Those unprotected scaffolding served
defense, including anti-climb fences, during the as a made-up assault tower, allowing access
Black Lives Matter movement’s protests, the to the upper floors and the roof and providing
same preventive measures were not deployed melee weapons to the attackers.
against Trump supporters. The physical barri-
In conclusion, if democracy has shown remark-
ers used on January 6th were the same as
able resilience, security has failed spectacu-
those customarily used to direct crowds, for ex-
larly. The lack of operational and physical plan-
ample, during a concert. Certainly not the
ning and systemic issues in the Capitol Hill se-
same type of fences which were seen de-
curity apparatus chain suggest that the United
ployed, along with the National Guard, in de-
States is utterly unprepared to face a domestic
fense of the Capitol building and the White
threat perpetrated by lower-middle-class Cau-
House on the occasion of the George Floyd
casian citizens.
protests. The reaction of the security apparatus
was at that time probably exaggerated. It The prejudice is not only due to the intelligence
should also be mentioned that President community’s unwillingness to adapt its threat
Trump had demanded a very tall fence to be perception to a target other than the stereotyp-
built around the White House. Paradoxically, ical jihadist from overseas, but also and per-
this request was considered despicable by haps above all, to its very own Constitution.
many observers precisely because the outside The first and second amendments do guaran-
of the White House is seen as a place where tee the right to express opinions even in an
©Copyright START InSight 2021www.startinsight.eu – info@startinsight.eu aggressive fashion, and to own and carry weapons or organize militias to respond to ex- ternal and internal threats, including those that -in the collective imagination- might originate from the government. This flammable mixture helped create the conditions conducive to Jan- uary 6th and today contributes to making high profile sites, such as the Capitol Hill and the White House itself, soft targets. As there has been a before and an after to 9/11, there will be a before and an after to 1/06. Whereas the rights enshrined in the US Con- stitution will not be changed, we can fore- shadow and hope that domestic terrorism will be monitored closely. We will also have discus- sions, difficult ones, on security measures in government buildings open to the public, first and foremost the Capitol. Discussions that al- ready began in the days following the assault, when Democratic Speaker Nancy Pelosi or- dered that Capitol Police introduce airport level checkpoints to access Congress. A measure that did not go uncontested. ©Copyright START InSight 2021
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