COALITION BARGAINING IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: THE NEW YORK CITY EXPERIENCE
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COALITION BARGAINING IN MUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENT: THE NEW YORK CITY EXPERIENCE
DAVID LEWIN and MARY McCORMICK
This paper analyzes the emergence and development of two-tier coalition
bargaining in the municipal government of New York City from the late
19605 through the 1980 negotiations. The reduction of interunion rivalries.
growth of pattern bargaining, and enactment of the city's Collective Bargain-
ing Law in 1967 were important precedents to formal coalition bargaining,
but it was the fiscal crisis of the mid 19705 that p:""/ideda major thrust to the
adoption of this type of bargaining structure. Through it, management and
union officials were able not only to' reach master and subsidiary agreements
covering wages and conditions of employment, but to bargain. broader fiscal
rescue agreements with representatives of the federal and state governments
who, in the wake of the fiscal crisis, acquired greater political control over the
nation's largest city. The empirical findings are linked to theories of bargain-
ing structure and provide the basis for predicting the continuance of coalition
bargaining in New York City during the 1980s but only limited adoption of
this bargaining format elsewhere in the American public sector.
Nboth 1978 and 1980, the nation',largest tions about the structure and future direc-
I municipal government and its public tion of public sector bargaining. It is clear
employee unions used a formal coalition that generalizations about coalition bar-
bargaining structure to negotiate basic wage gaining, or, more broadly, bargainingstruc-
agreements that covered- more than a quar-- ture in the public sector, cannot rest on the
ter-million workers. These negoti~tions experience of a single government or a
were preceded by others in the mid 1970s group of labor organizations in a single city;
that featured informal coalition bargaining yet New York City's experience should not
on a smaller scale. The emergence and devel- be overlooked, especially since in many
opment of coalition bargaining in New respects over the past two decades this city
York City, particularly during a period of has been a trendsetter in the development of
sustained fiscal crisis, raise several ques- public sector labor relations in the United
States,l
-The authors are an associate professor and an ad-
junct assistant professor, respectively, in the Graduate ISpecific examples include the rapid growth of pub-
School of Business at Columbia University. They lic employee unionism, use of militant union tactics,
would like to express their appreciation for helpful negotiation of written labor agreements, and legal
comments to John C. Anderson, Peter Feuille, Dale L. sanctioning and third-party regulation of public
Hiestand, Raymond D. Horton, James W. Kuhn, employee bargaining. These developments spread
members of the Columbia University Labor Seminar, widely throughout the public sector during the late
and students in the PubIicSector Lal?or Seminarat Cor- 1960s and the 1970s, but occurred earlier in the City of
nell University_ New York.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 34, No_ 2 (January 1981). © 1981 by Cornell UniversilY.
0019-7939/81/3402-0175$01.00176 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW COALIT10N BARGAINING IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 177
Why. in view of the aversion to coalition 1960s by a coalition of thirteen unions unions and employers. 6
ditions, ability to pay, union leaders, man-
bargaining of most unions and manage- countering the company's final-offer-first Considerabl y mor~ research attention agement structures, and decision processes
ments in both the public and private sectors, approach to collective bargaining (known has been devoted to erpployer than to union
and·(2) the desire to preserve their decision~
has such a structural arrangement emerged as Boulwarism). Rulings by the National coalitions in the private sector, perhaps making autonomy.9
in New York City's municipal government? Labor Relations Board and the courts that because as many as ~O percent of all labor Most, if not all, public sector labor or-
What historical, environmental. and in- supported coordinated bargaining at Gen- agreements in this, sector are reached
ganizations also have opposed coalition
stitutional factors have contributed to this eral Electric helped focus attention on this through multiemployer bargaining. Most 1
bargaining, especiall y on a formal basis
development? Will municipal coalition case. 4 of the research is adclfessed' to the question
Unions suchr--
COALITiON BARGAINING IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 179
178 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
fostered coalition-type activity among mu- of all municipal employees were repre-
Developments Prior to the Fiscal Crisis municipal labor relations process during nicipal employees,14 i sented in coliective bargaining; interunion
the 1960s and 1970s, the city's 250,000 em- One provision of the law mandated, for relationships were relatively stable and
The City of New York is ?ot only ,the ployees were represented by as many ,as. 85
largest municipal government m the Untted example, the creatio'n of a citywide bar- peaceful; the turnover of union leadership
separate unions and 405 seI;larate bar&"ammg gaining unit to negotiate terms and condi- was infrequent; and, under the auspices of
States, but for a quarter-century it ha~ alS? units and were employed m approxImately
been a leader in the development and u~stl tions of employment, 'such as time and leave OCB, the number of bargaining units de-
2500 different job titles, Some unions hadas benefits and health !insurance, that were clined from more than 400 in 1968 to ap-
tutionalization of collective bargaining in ~any as 60 separate locals; in some cases, a required to be uniform for approximately proximately 100 in 1975,16This reduction of
the public sector. A review of th~s labor.re- single bargaining unit enc~m~assed several
lations history suggests that mterulllon 120,000 employees in" the city's Career and units permitted some municipal labor or·
local unions. This orgamzauonal format Salary Plan,I5 Beca~se its members con~ ganizations-District Council 37, for ex-
relationships, negotiating practices,. and resulted in an intricate ~eb of horizontal
regulatory procedures that ~volve~ pnor to stituted over 60 perce~t of the total, District ample-to coordinate better their bargain-
and vertical parity relationshi~s a~ong Council 37 was designated the exclusive ing activity on behalf of constituent locals,
the fiscal crisis of1975 conmbutedm funda- unions, bargaining units, and. Job tItles.
mental respects to the development of for- bargaining representative for this unit, and it also facilitated the coordination of
Pattern bargaining was also remf?rced by but the unit also encompassed employee- management's position in negotiations
mal coalition bargaining. 1o the rulings of impasse panels, ~~Ich were
First, by 1975, interunion relations~i'ps members of more than 30 separate munici- with municipal unioI"!s. Thus, prior to the
often appointed to resolve mumcipallabor pal labor organizations. emergence of the fiscal crisis in 1975, the
had matured to the point of relative stabIlIty disputes,12 Although in earlier years ,?-O
and were marked by a lack of jurisdictional Another provision ':of the law mandated structure of municipal collective bargain-
single bargained wage settlement .consIs- the creation of the Municipal Labor Com- ing in New York City had shifted consider-
rivalry. This maturity was related to New tently served as the relevant companson for
York City's long tradition of supportfor t?e mittee (MLC), an organization that was to ably away from strict unit-by-unit and
all others in the city, .the 1974 agreement be responsible for coordinating union par~ union-by-union negotiations,
union movement and to the fact thatmU~l1c between the Transit Workers U!lion (TW~)
ipal unions had been formal~y :ecogmzed ticipation in the tripartite Office of Collec-
and the Metropolitan Translt Author~ty tive Bargaining (OCB), which was charged
for almost twenty years, A maJonty of these (MTA) set the wage pattern for the entIre The Fiscal Crisis and Bargaining
municipal labor organiiations represented with administering' the statute. Subse-
municipal work force. IS quently, the MLC became the vehicle for The fiscal crisis set the stage for further re-
single occupational gr~ups, .such as teach- A third factor that contributed to the structuring of the collective bargaining
ers sanitationmen, pohce, £Ire and correc- developing common :bargaining (and po-
emergence of coalition bargaining in N ~w litical) policies among city labor organiza- process in New York City's municipal gov-
tio~s officers, but by 1967, District Council York City was the codification o,f themumc- ernment. The new economic climate pro-
37 of AFSCME and its several locals had tions, both before and during the period of
ipallabor relations process, WhICh occurred fiscal crisis, : vided direct impetus toward a more formal
won the right to represent more than two- in 1967 when the New York City Collective union coalition and also spurred changes in
thirds of the city's non-uniformed, non- By the early 1970s,1 then, the municipal
Bargaining Law took effect. The law in- labor relations process in New York City the city's management structure for collec-
pedagogical employees. Thu~, by the late stitutionalized and extended many of the tive bargaining. l ? The overriding character-
1960s the municipal unions m New York was well established. ~ore than 95 percent
practices and relationships that develo~ed istic of municipal labor relations during the
City ~enerally were, secur~ with respect to in the previous decade, several of WhICh ------ , 1975 - 76 period was that the actions the
their separate consUtuenCles• and •
faced
11
few ltThis law also created s6me institutional barriers direct participants in the bargainingprocess
challenges from rival orgamzauons. . 'among city labor organizations, though mese tended
12S Mary McCormick "A Functional Analysis to reflect a traditional division in cily government -city management and city unions-could
Second, pattern bargain~ng acco~~am:d [I ~ t Arbitration in New York City's Municipal between mayoral and nomnayoral agencies. In par- take were severely constrained. Underlying
the development of collective bargru.mng m °Govemmen,
n eres t 1=0:!uo- 1975"
, in Industrial Relations :ticular,
. employees of mayoral agencies-those under all decision making in New York City mu-
New York's municipal governr:nent a~d Research Association, Proceedings Of the Twenty- duect budgetary and £?al}ag~~ent contro,l ?f the nicipal government during this period, in-
contributed to inter- and intra-umon stabll- Ninth Annual Winter Meeting, September 16 - 18,1976, ma~or-cam~ ~nder the JU'1~dlCtlo~ ~f the. City s Col- cluding collective bargaining decisions,
ity, In many ways, pattern bargaining was a Ati t' City (Madison Wis.: IRRA, 1977), pp,249- lecuve Bargammg Law and,lts admlUlstratIve agency,
57 an I C , the Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB), while was the goal of fiscal solvency,
precursor of the formal coalition barg~ining ;3TWU members are employed by the MTA, a state employees of virtually all n~nmayoral agencies came
that emerged in the_late 1970s. ~eSPlte the agency responsible for the subway and c~mmuter ~ai1 under the aegis of the state':s Publi,c Empl~y~es' F~ir 16We have neither sufficient information nor space
fact that six major unions dommated the I' . New York City and its surrounding counties, Employment (Taylor) Act and Its admlfllstrauve to discuss more fully this remarkable reduction in bar-
;~es ClI,~ provides an annual operating subsidY to the fl-gency, me Public Empl~yment Relations Board gaining units except to underscore me point made
M';A ~ t the Mayor has no formal role in negotia- (PERB). The latter group of employees, numbering immediately below in the text that municipal labor,
IOThe history of municipal conectiv~ bargaining 'b U _ the TWU and MTA. Municipal union ?ver 100,000, work principally in the Board of Educa-
° management, and OCB officials all judged the reo
in New York City prior to the 19705 IS well docu- Itionsd etwe..... . .. . th e Board 0 f H 19h er ;Ed °
th e H ousmg
°
O
' New York City have sought to mstltutiOn- pon, I ue,auon, duction to serve their particular interests.
mented. See, for example, Raymond ~, Horton, a~~zeer~l: pattern-setting role o[ TWU-MTA agr~e- -!\.uthority, and the Off-Trac~ Betting Corpora,tion. I7For other perspectives on the effects of the fiscal
Municipal LAbor Rewtions in New York CIty: Lessons because (I) wages for TWU members are tied ISCareer and Salary Plan ~mployees are deSignated crisis on New York's municipal labor relations, see
of the Lindsay-Wagner Years (New York: Praeger, r;-e~s tate's rather than the city's fiscal condition; as such by a 1954 Civil Service classification. Major Mary Md:;ormick, Management of Retrenchment:
1973), chapters 2- 4, ,
UNote also that most muniClpalunion leaders had
(~) t~e sTWU has greater bargai;ling leverage than~x~lusions from this categ?ry a~e peda~og~cal and The City of New York in the 1970s (Ph,D, dissertation,
most city labor organizations, glVe? tha~ there are':lfllfon:ned employees (pohce, r~r~, sanHatton and Columbia University, 1978), and Joan P. Weitzman,
long tenures in office. As an example, John !Jelury, e few substitutes for subway andrad seTVlceand that~orrectiOns personnel) and prevailmg wage workers "The Effect of Economic Restraints on Public-Sector
who retired in 1978, headed the Umformed v ry bway strike in panicular can impose substantialT"certain blue-collar worker~ whose compensation is Collective Bargaining: The Lessons of New York
Sanitationmen'5 Association for more than 40 years and
was a key figure in the negotiation of (info~l) la?or
:c~~omic hardship on the city; and (S). t?e TWU (un-~et ~ccording to the prevaili~g wage provisions under City," Employee Relations LAw Journal, Vol. 2, No.3
like most municipal unions) has a tradition o( no con- ;ecuon 220 of .New York State Labor Law, (Winter 1977), pp, 286-312,
agreements during the three-term admlfllStration
(1953 -1965) of Mayor Robert F. Wagner, tract, no work,180 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW COALITION BARGAINING IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 181
When the public credit markets closed to ever, it was apparent that the city was able of the situation increased, it also became apparent to political officials that a stronger
the city in the spring of 1975, the municipal neither to manage the crisis by itself nor to evident t9 most municipal union leaders control mechanism with' broader financial
government had an operating deficit of $2 meet the financing requirements necessary that no one of them, alone could count on and managerial oversight responsibilities
billion and faced the task of refinancing $6 to avoid bankruptcy. managing the fiscal crisis to his own or his than MAC was required for the City of New
billion of outstanding short-term debt. Joint pressures from the city and the state members' advantage; Thus, responding to York to avoid insolvency. In early Sep-
From the perspective of the unions, bank- spurred New York's municipal labor or- these new economic pressures, the major tember, the state legislature passed the
ruptcy would have reduced employee bene- ganizations to engage in coalition bargain- municipal unions (with the exception of the Financial Emergency Act and created the
fits, jeopardized pension contributions of ing. On July I, 1975, a previously negoti- teachers and police); acting in coalition, Emergency Financial Control Board
member-employees and pension benefits of ated 6 percent wage increase was scheduled negotiated a Wage Deferral Agreement with (EFCB) ..The board was given the authority
retirees, further decreased the work force, to go into effect for almost 200,000 of New city, state, and MAC 'officials. 19
to ~xer?se br.oad powers over municipal
and significantly diminished the role of York's municipal employees. At thatjunc- This agreement accomplished several affaIrs, Including labor relations. Although
municipal union leaders in the labor rela- ture, however, the city was on the verge of objectives for the labor organizations that the hope was that through the EFCB's man-
I tions and political processes. For the city's
management, bankruptcy implied a dra-
default and lacked the funds to pay the
approximately $300 million of prospective
made up the coalition: (1) the wage freeze
became a wage deferral to be in effect for
agement of municipal budgetary affairs the
city would be able to return to the public
Ii,. matic and perhaps permanent curtailment
of the power of elected officials. Thus, the
salary increases. In June, the State had cre-
ated the Municipal Assistance Corpora-
one year only and was tapered to protect
the earnings of low-paid employeesi20 (2) a
credit markets within a few months, its need
to finance .$5.7 billion of debt between No-
threat of bankruptcy and the financing re- tion (MAC), a public benefit corpqration cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) that had
II
11
quirements necessary to avoid it made even with limited oversight responsibilities that been agreed to in 1974 and that was sched-
vember 1975 and June 1976 overwhelmed
the attempts of the state to restore investor
\1 more salient the interdependent relation- was empowered to help the City of New uled to go into effect in fiscal year 1976 was confidence in the city.21
I'.. ship between the city and its organized York restructure its debt, thereby, it was preseIVed; (3) individual unions within the During this period the city'S five major
workers. Furthermore, the willingness of hoped, restoring the city's fiscal credibility. , coalition could negotiate s~parate agree- employees' pension systems, with assets of
municipal union leaders and the city's of- However, the task of financial resuscitation ments provided that ;these met the condi-
II
.1 ficials to bargain on a coalition basis was was more difficult than anticipated. To en- : tions of the Wage Deferral Agreement; and
more than .$7 billion, emerged as major
sources of loans to the city. Controlled by
: (4) a claim was established by employees to
il strengthened by the shifting of responsi-
bility for managing the fiscal crisis from the
hance the city's standing with investors,
MAC sought proof that the budgetary re- receive the deferred wages at a future date.
union officials, the pension funds had pur-
chased city and MAC securities in the spring
II., local to the state and federal governments as
well as some private actors and ins~itutions
ductions necessitated by the fiscal emer-
gency were being made. Specifically, MAC
The provision for separate agreements as-
sured each member union of the coalition a
and summer of 1975 onanad hoc, uncoordi-
Ii na~ed basis. By November, however, the
(such as several of the city's largest banks). called for a wage freeze on the slated 6 per- measure. of autonomy while, more gen- umons became the city's major financiers
II These were the principal factors underlying
centralization of the municipal bargaining
cent increase.
At this point, organized municipal em·
. erally, the coalition structure assured each
member union that no other labor organiza-
on a systematic, integrated, long-term basis.
I
Specifically, they agreed to invest $2.5 bil-
structure during the mid-1970s. ployees faced a hostile political climate as : tion would do better..:-or worse-concern- lion of pension funds in city paper and to
II Brought about by financing needs re- well as an unfavorable economic environ· : ing the wage deferral proyisions. "roll over" their earlier $1.2 billion invest-
I, quired to avoid insolvep.cy, three specific ment. The public generally perceived the ment as part of a complex $6. 6 billion, three-
I developments served as key precedents for municipal unions as major contributors to Municipal Unions As Financiers year financing plan that also involved the
the formal coalition wage bargaining that the city's fiscal problems. Furthermore, as city's major banks, the state government,
the crisis deepened, it appeared likely that Soon after the Wage Deferral Agreement
was to occur in 1978 and 1980. These were and the federal government. As part of this
the wage-deferral agreement of 1975, the the mayor would be sustained by the courts :the fiscal crisis forced the municipal unions
:to assume the even more critical role of financing arrangement, the federal govern-
emergence of the municipal unions as the if he invoked his emergency power to invoke ment guaranteed $2.3 billion in seasonal
!financier. By late summer of 1975, it was
major financiers of the city, and the 1976 a unilateral wage freeze. Such a ruling loans to New York City.
contract negotiations. would have established a precedent for uni- The development of a coordinated policy
lateral managerial actions in the area of : 19Tbe teachers were on a different bargaining cycle
The 1975 Wage Deferral Agreement Ithan otber municipal labor groups in 1975 and their
to manage their pension fund investments
labor relations that could well have isolated ;contract witb the Board of Education was scbeduled in city and MAC securities contributed to
In the spring of 1975, the City of New the municipal labor union leaders from the ,~o expir~ on ~eptember 9th:of tbat year. In addition, the further development of a strong union
York's fiscal crisis was initially perceived decision-making process. As the complexity lntra·umon nvalries, wbich featured major cballenges coalition and formal coalition bargaining.
as a local problem that, it was believed, to tbe leadership of tbe Patrolmen's Benevolent
IAssociation (PBA) in panicular, prevented tbis The fact of this major financing role not
could be managed at the local level. The about 38,000 full·time personnel during calendar prganization from becoming a party to the 1975 Wage only expanded the municipal unions' par-
mayor laid off municipal employees and year 1975, thougb it is not possible to distinguish Deferral Agreement. ' ticipation in the decision-making processes
reduced nonpayroll expenditures, while preci~ely among layoffs, ret~rements, and qui~ .. The ; zOSpecifically, tbe entire 6 percent increase was de- .of the city government, but also placed
leaders of the municipal labor unions in- benefus refkerredktdo ~ere mcluded thth' tlr;:ditlOnal ferred for municipal employees earning $15,000 or
shorter wor wee unng summer mon s summer more annually' 4 nP"cent d f ed d 2
dicated their "willingness" to forgo certain h" ed' If .. )! ,,..._. was e err an
ours ), gl.larante. . overtIme or samtauonmen, was granted to employees 'earnin between $10,000
percent ZIIn November 1975, the state declared a moratorium
negotiated benefits. 18 By June 1975, how- and payment (to fIrefIghters) for one day per year for ~nd "15000 annuaII' d" 2 g d f d on the repayment of all outstanding New York City
.
d onatmg bI00.d These b ene I'us were not actua II y and
I y, an t' percent
4.." percent was granted I was . e erre
1 notes, an action tbat eliminated any short-term restor-
18According to tbe city's Office of Management and forgone in 1975, but tbey were eliminated in subse- tban $10,000 annuall . 0 emp oyees earnmg ess ation of investor confidence in tbe municipal gov-
Budget, New York's municipal work force declined by quent rounds. y ernment.)82 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
COALIl'ION BARGAINING IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
)83
them in a more collaborative relationship Given the large number of muni?pal In summary, the 19.75- 76 period of fiscal
with city oHicials. This collaborative rela- unions and bargaining units, a coahtIon crisis featured two major instances of coali- Koch, assumed office on January 1, 1978.
tionship and the strengthened sense of ,:n- bargaining structure pr•
184 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW COALITION BARGAINING IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 185
city to a second round of bargaining in tion bargaining, and other issues, including' employee in 1979 and 1980 in lieu of pro- It also may have continued, however, be-
which it could only lose ground. A few un- most "noneconomic" ones, treated in sepa- ductivity COLAs. The provision of a gen- cause the parties anticipated serious finan-
ion leade.rs also favored comprehensive (or rate unit negotiations. There is no evidence! eral wage increase, the first in three years, cial problems resulting from a projected
one-tier) coalition bargaining. believing that, in any of these negotiations, some ': contrasted sharply with the terms of the 1975 budgetary deficit of approximately $1.2
that they could gain little from separate municipal unions did ~pprecia?ly "better" ' and 1976 coalition bargainingagreements. 24 billion in fiscal 1982.
negotiations. or "worse" than others In reachmg separate ,: Furthermore, the city abandoned its demand Many of the issues concerning coalition
In contrast, management supporters d£ unit agreements, a fact that unde~s~ores the i for contractual "givebacks," and $48 mil- bargaining that were raised in 1978 surfaced
two-tier bargaining argued that such bar-' notion that such two-tier bargammg p~r- i lion in fringe and pension reductions, again in the 1980 negotiations but were dis-
gaining would help achieve the overriding mits, ~nd is in part m~tiva.ted by the deslte j whiCh had b~en required by the Treasury posed of with greater dispatch than before.
goal of securing new federal aid, even if this of, umon leaders to mamtam some measure! Department and agreed to in the 1976 bar- For example, the mayor repeated his re-
arrangement helped one or another union of autonomy and in~el?endence. . . ,I gaining round, were cancelled. luctance to bargain within a coalition struc-
to "do better" than it would have otherwise. Parties to the Coalztton. The CIty did n~t 1, By fall 1978, the only major unions that ture, but quickly acceded to this format.
If the bargaining experiences of 1975 and require the unions to declare formally ~elt j had not signed the CEA-but which never- Some city officials preferred that economic
1976 held, the signing of a coalition agree- membership in the coalition. Each u~lO~ ,I theless incorporated its terms and provi- and noneconomic issues be considered to-
ment would satisfy federal authorities. The retained the right to autonomy even If It:i sions into their separate unit agreements- gether in single-tier bargaining, but the
union leaders who favored a two-tier bar- chose not to exercise that right. In fact, only 'j were the Patrolmen's Benevolent Associa- negotiations were conducted within a two-
gaining structure believed that the coalition those unions that did no~ :vish to associ.a~e;1 tion and the' Uniformed Firefighters Asso- tier framework.
arrangement would help reduce interunion themselves with the coahtlOn were explIcIt! ciation. In 1978, therefore, coalition bar- The major difference between the 1978
rivalries, while unit bargaining would af- regarding their .mem?ership status. N?ne-i gaining in New York's municipal govern~ and 1980 negotiations was the emergence in
ford each of their organizations some meas- theless, all major Clty .employee umo?s i ment directly and indirectly involved virtu- 1980 of a second union coalition made up
ure of independence and autonomy, if not except those represent;ng. rank-and-~l1e! ally all municipal labor organizations and principally of the labor organizations that
necessarily a "second bite of the apple." uniformed personnel (fIre£Ighters, pohce, j covered most key economic items, while did not formally join the coalition in 1978-
That the unions were more united than and corrections offic~r~) event':l~lly par-I leaving some economic and noneconomic unions of rank-and-fiie police, firefighters,
management in their position on this issue ticipated in the bargammg co.a~ItlOn. The 'I issues to be resolved in individual unit and corrections officers. These unions
was reflected' in the 12 demands the union official leadership of the ~oa~ltlon rot~ted ,I bargaining. formed the nucleus of this 43,000 member
coalition submitted, all of which dealt with among five labor orgamzauons: Umted.: Uniformed Coalition. The coalition of 1978
wage increases or cost-of-living allowances Federation of Te~ch.ers, . U~iformed:! Coalition Bargaining in 1980 25 (known as the Municipal Coalition in 1980)
common to coalition members. By contrast, Sanitationmen's AssoClauon Dlstnct Coun- ! continued largely in place, representing
the city's opening bargaining position re· cit' 37, Local 237 of International l' . Given that New .York City was not seek- about 200,000 city employees in coalition
flected the lack of managerial consensus; it Brotherhood of Teamsters, and United Fire, mg federal loans m 1980 and t.hat a bal- bargaining, including all but one group of
included 62 demands or items, ranging from Officers Association. The presence of the'l anced budget was forecast for £Iscal 1981, uniformed superior officers. The only de-
broad wage provisions that affected all em- 60,000 member teachers' union in the 1978 Ithere se~~ed to be. fe:-ver. exter~al pressures fections from the Municipal Coalition to the
ployees to very detailed provisions that in- coalition was particularly notable, for itfor-:I f?r co~IHlOn bargammg 111 ~980 th~~ at any Uniformed Coalition were the Uniformed
volved one or another small bargaining mally broadened the basis for the coalition IHme smce the onset of th: fI~cal cnSlS. Nev- Fire Officers' Association (UF A) and the
beyond that which had existed previously. Jertheles.s, the 1~8~ negotIatIonS wer~ con- Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association
unit. .j ducted m a coa11tlOn framework. ThIS may
As each self-imposed negotiating dead- (USA).
have occurred because, by that time, coali-
, line approached, the unions and manage· Negotiations with both coalitions pro-
The Negotiations '[ tion bargaining had taken firm hold in New ceeded smoothly, especially by historical
ment agreed that there was not sufficient
time to' bargain to agreement on both eco- The union coalition and the city did not - York City .and ~as therefor~ l~ss sensitive to standards. The Municipal Coalition
nomic and noneconomic items. As the vari- reach agreement simultaneously with the:1 external fmanClal and pohtical pressures. reached overall agreement with the city
0us deadlines passed and agreement was not contract settlement on March 31st between:i--:----- in early June 1980, three weeks prior to the
achieved, the scope-of-bargaining issue the TWU and the MTA. Over the next two "I 24The 19?6agreements: which we~ein effeclfor t;;o expiration of the master and individual
lor a settle 'I years, prOVided (or no direct wage mcreases. The m·
surfaced again and again, but with less and mon ths, h 0:vever, th e p~essure s - ;,creases scheduled for 1975 (based on 1974 labor agree- unit agreements. The Uniformed Coalition
less force as the ultimate deadline of June ment were mtense, partlc~larly those from ijments) were deferred i!1 the ?Ianner described in foot- and the city reached agreement simultane-
30th drew nearer. No one can say with cer- the federal government. Fmally, on June 5,! note 20 above. As an mcenuve for union members to ously with the expiration of the uniformed
tainty that, had there been a management 1978, the city and the municipal unions 1ratify the CEA, the agreement provided ~~~ im~;diate forces contracts. Members of the Municipal
consensus one way or another on this issue, r ched a Coalition Economic Agreement i payment of the 1978 COLA ($567) an,d u~~ly pay- Coalition received annual 8 percent wage
ea . _ ntract' ment of the 1979 cash bonus ($750). Mumclpal em-
the scope of bargaining or ~he' outcomes of (CEA) .. The cost of t~IS. two. year ~o ; ployees could not be eligible for wage increases, increases and adjustments in other benefits
the 1978 negotiations would have been dif- was estImated at $1.2 bilhon; It proVIded for, however, until individual bargaining unit agreements for a total two-year settlement of about 17
ferent. What is certain is that in 1978, as in a total wage increase of 8 percent, payment' were concluded. percent. The uniformed employees received
1975 and 1976, the negotiations took place of the unpaid portion ($567 per employee) -.: 1 ult i~ too early now(ea~lr 1981) to provid: a. detailed wage increases of9 percent the first year and
on a two-tier basis, with wages and some ad'- f th 1978 roductivity-based COLA, and '. analysts. of the 1980 ~u.mapallabor ne~ot.latlOnS, b~t 8 percent the second year; the total settle-
o e p f $750 :Jthe leading charactenstlcs of these negotiatIOns aredls,
ditional economic items subjected to coali- an annual cash bonus payment 0 per '!cussed in this section. ment, including fringe benefit adjustments,COALITION BARGAINING IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 187
186 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
Even with severe external economic and
over the terms and cdnditions of the fiscal
was approximately 19 percent. The terms of tions and represented all 243,000 municipal rescue of the City of New York. . political pressures, however. i,ndividual
these new coalition agreements reflected the employees covered by collective bargain. Is coalition bargaining likely t~ ~ersIst, unit and union bargaining is unlIkely to be
pattern established by the TWU-MTA ing. The coalition bargaining agenda in., expand, or decline in New York. CIty s .mu- entirely eliminated from New York's mu-
agreement, concluded in the spring of 1980, eluded wages, cost-of-living allowances, nicipal government? In analyzmg pnvate nicipal government. With respect to bar-
which provided for annual wage increases and some fringe and pension benefits. sector labor relations, Weber comments ~at gaining structure in the private sector.
of 9 percent and adj ustments to fringe bene- Precedents for formal coalition bargain- "bargaining structure: will be strongly I?- Weber observes that
fits over the two-year period, 1980- 82. Un- ing were established by the reduction of; fluenced by the market context wIthm the formation of a common front ine~i~b~y in-
like the 1978 negotiations, however, when interunion rivalries, the development of which negotiations take place."26. The no- volves a partial relinquis~ing of mdlvldual
individual bargaining unit (second-tier) widespread pattern bargaining. and the en.': lion of markets is not'!easily applIed to the group goals, Each grII
i !
188 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW COALITION BARGAINING IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 189
two-tier coalition bargaining structure closely resemble the labor relations process to rely on the federal government to bail ment and collective bargaining in the
th~t p:rmits common as well as separate elsewhere in government.30 United States are characterized by decentral-
them out.
umon mterests to be addressed. Proceeding from this conceptualization, Nonetheless, market forces are dynamic, ization and autonomy; public sector labor
two-tier coalition bargaining of the type not static, and the rapid growth of state and organizations are particularly heterogen-
Generalizing from New York City that exists in New York's municipal govern- local governments in the United States, eous. Like the employers with whom they
ment might be replicated in some other gov- which marked the third quarter of the twen- negotiate. public sector union leaders share
What are the prospects for coalition bar- bargaining information with each other,
ernments. Even if this occurs, however, tieth century and stimulated the rapid ex-
gaining elsewhere in municipal govern- but. also like public employers, they are
single-tier coalition bargaining, coalitions pansion o[ public sector unionism and
ment or in the public sector more broadly? bargaining, has ended. Substantial evidence chary of structural realignments that
limited to unions in single services or agen- "'
The prospects appear limited. Coalition exists of a fundamental reappraisal by citi- threaten their autonomy and livelihood..!Is
cies, conventional union-by-union bargain- '
~argain~ng has emerged in parts of the pub- Thus, to temper union rivalries is not to
ing, or various combinations thereof will zens and elected officials of the size, scope,
lIc hospItal sector, especially in large urban and performance of public institutions. eliminate them, especially in much of the
likely exist in the public sector. The analyt-
hospitals; in negotiations with publicly This appraisal impl~es that the trend to- public sector where (unlike New York City)
ical task thus becomes one of identifying'
employed craft workers at local, state, and ward'slower growth, stabilization, and even substantial proportions of employees are
the "historical, legal, functional and po-
federal levels; in some public school dis- unorganized, and to coordinate bargaining
litical features of government" that give decline of the revenues made available to
tricts, such as the City of Chicago; and in governments, which first began to be no- is not to engage in coalition bargaining.
rise to a particular form of bargaining struc- ,
some governments that have only recently ture. S1 ticed in the mid-1970s, will continue and Furthermore, the fact that a public employer
begun to engage in collective bargaining, perhaps quicken in the 1980s. A more strin- rarely merges with another government
Taking particular account of the eco-
such as the City of Los Angeles. However, gent economic climate for government means that, unlike their private sector coun-
.nomic-political forces that have affected
some of these arrangements represent carry- provides less political support for or even terparts' leaders of public sector labor or-
the development of coalition bargaining in
overs of bargaining structures from the outright opposition: to public employee ganizations do not face the prospect of bar-
New York City, it appears that this form of
private sector; others are limited to unions unionism and bargaining as well as the gaining with a conglomerate and, conse-
bargaining structure is not likely to spread
that enroll only members of similar skills reappraisal of management strategies for quently, are not pressed to form unioncoali-
throughout the public sector, though itmay
or whose members are employed in but one dealing with labor relations. 52 These devel- tions [or the purpose of countering that
emerge in some governments. It appears
service or one unit of a government; and still opments suggest that, ,in some instances, the form of employer organization. Indeed. by
from the New York experience that coali-
others represent a one-time rather than a economic and political climates of the pub- bargaining as a single labor organization
tion bargaining is most likely to develop
sustained bargaining tactic. 29 lic sector may be such as to favor the develop- with one employer, individual public em-
under conditions of intense budgetary and
These developments point up the need ment of coalition :bargaining through ployee unions have been found to bring
fiscal pressure, which not only heighten
for a more theoretical perspective on bar- which some union leaders and local public about a reallocation of budgetary resources
the common interests of union organiza-
gaining structure in the public sector. .officials will seek greater protection of their toward the services in which their members
tions but of labor-and management vis-a.-vis
Labor relations in the public sector, as in interests and powers than is afforded them are employed and away from other less well
other fiscal and political authorities. Few
the private, may be conceptualized as diverse by conventional negotiating structures. organized services. H
rather than uniform. . governments in the United States at present
face the degree of fiscal stringency found But for reasons identified in the analysis In conclusion, the New York City experi-
This diversity, which is roOted in historical, in New York City; few have had to cede gov- of coalition bargaining in New York City ence suggests more generally that the dim-
legal, functional and political featuresofgovern- erning powers and managerial control to and suggested by bargaining structure and inution of interunion rivalries. the spread of
ment, contains several implications for public other public authorities; and few have had labor relations theory, this prognosis must pattern bargaining, and the reduction-
sector labor relations, but, in particular, it consolidation of bargaining units are neces-
suggests that there is no a priori reason to assume
not be carried too far.·Both the labor move-
that the labor relations process in a (particular) sary but not sufficient conditions for the
state, county or municipality necessarily will 321n San Francisco, for :example, where organized development of coalition bargaining in the
'OOavid Lewin, Raymond D. Horton, andJamesW. labor in the public and private sectors is particularly
Kuhn, Collective Bargaining and Manpower Utiliza- strong, voters passed several referrenda in the late "On information sharing for bargaining purposes
29Perhaps the dearest example other than New tion in Big City Governments (Montclair, N.J.: Allan- 1970s revising generous city pay formulas and cutting among public employers, see Feuille, et aI., "Multi-
York City of sustained coalition bargaining in the held Osmun, 1979), p. 9. . the salaries of city workers by as much as $4,500 an- employer Negotiations Among Local Governments,"
public seclor-bargaining that has not been trans- 'lThis task was partially undertaken by Weber nually. See Harry C. Kat~, "Municipal Pay Deter- pp. 131- 38. On employer coalitions in the hospital
ported from the private sector and that involves several "Stability and Change in the Structure of Collectiv; mination: The Case of San Francisco," Industrial sector, see Peter Feuille, Charles Maxey, HelVey Juris,
unions whose members represent various skill levels Bargaining," pp. 15-22, who identified market Relalions, Vol. 18, No. I (Wimer 1979), pp. 44-58, and Margaret Levi, "Detemlinants of Multi-Employer
occupations, and selVice categories-is in the locai forces, the nature of bar?,!ining issues, representation I especially pp. 55-57. Another example is the recent Bargaining in Metropolitan Hospitals," Employee
government sector of British Columbia. See Shirley B. factors, government poliaes, and power tactics in the I adoption of laws by some state and local govern- Relations Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. I (Summer 1978),
Goldenberg, "Public·Sector Labor Relations in bargainin;S" proce~s as determinants of bargaining ments that permit selected groups of public employees pp~ 98-115.
Canada," in Benjamin Aaron,' Joseph R. Grodin, structure 10 the pnvate sector, but who did not specify to strike following the exhaustion of one or another 3iSee, for example, Stanley Benecki, "Municipal
and James L. Stem, eds., Public-Sector Bargaining (or test) how the interaction of these variables leads impass procedure. See David Lewin, "Public Sector Expenditure Levels and Collective Bargaining,"
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1979), to a particular structural form. See, more recently, Collective Bargaining and the Right to Strike," in Industrial Relations, Vol. 17, No.2 (May 1978), pp.
pp. 254- 91, especially pp. 272- 74, and David Lewin D. R. Deaton andP. B. Beaumont, "The Determinants A. Lawrence Chickering, ed, Public Employee Un- 216- 30, and Harry C. Katz, "The Municipal Budget-
and Shirley B. Goldenberg, "Public Sector Unionism of .Bargaining Structure: Some Large Scale SUlVey ions: A Study Of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor ary Response to Changing Labor Costs: The Case of
in the United States and Canada," Industrial Relations, EVidence for Britain," British Jou.rnal of Industrial Relations (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary San Francisco," Industrial and Labor Relations Re-
Vol. 19, No.3 (Fall 1980), pp. 239-56. Relations, Vol. 18, No.2 (July 1980). pp. 199 - 2-16. Studies, 1976), pp. 145-63. view, Vol. 32, No.4 (July 1979). pp. 506-19.190 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
public sector. It is when fiscal crisis threat~ pressures on a particular government ease
ens the politic;:al viability of a government and local political control and autonomy
entity that public sector labor organizations are less threatened, the perceived rate of
will be motivated to pursue coalition bar- substitution may become negative and ten-
. gaining and that a public employer will be sions may develop "for the fragmentation of
wi1ling to negotiate with a union coali- the alliance" -especially if the public em-
tion. 35 In such circumstances, an alliance ployer judges his interests to be harmed
is struck among the ,unions and between the rather than served by continu~nce of the
u'nions and a government employer. not union coalition.37 The validity of these ob-
only as a way of containing internal rival- servations as generalizations about the pub-
ries but as a mechanism by which these lic sector awa~ts cross-sectional research into
normally risk-averse parties may negotiate the' determinants of public sector bargain-
with other political authorities in the hope ing structures. At present, however, these
of achieving a positive "rate of substitution observations s~ggest that while coalition
between the gains derived from the incre- bargaining in: the City of New York during
ment to bargaining power and the losses the 1970s is an important development
associated with the denial of autonomy in worthy of close scrutiny, this structural ar-
decision-making."36 If and when economic rangement is unlikely to be widely repli-
cated in municipal government or in the
HThat ecohomi.c adversity in the private sector public sector more broadly during the 1980s.
stimulates coalition bargaining is suggested by Alan
M. Gustman and Martin Segal, "The Skilled-Un-
skilled Wage Differential in Construction," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27, No.2 (january "Interest Arbitration, Outcomes and the Incentive to
1974}, pp. 261- 75. Bargain," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
'6Weber, "Stability and Change in the Strl.Jcture of Vol. 33, NQ. 1 (October 1979), pp. 55- 63.
Collective Bargaining," p. 18. The notion of risk 31The quoted phrase is from Weber, "Stability and
aversion among public employers and public union· Change in the Structure of Collective Bargaining," .
ists is deveidped in HenryS. Farber and Harry C. Katz, p.18.
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