Combating the Islamic State's Spread in Africa - ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOZAMBIQUE - Critical Threats

Combating the Islamic State's Spread in Africa - ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOZAMBIQUE - Critical Threats
Combating the Islamic
State’s Spread in Africa

Emily Estelle and Jessica Trisko Darden

A M E R I C A N   E N T E R P R I S E   I N S T I T U T E


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 3

I. ASSESSING THE NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE INSURGENCY.................................. 5

II. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................... 17

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................... 24

ABOUT THE AUTHORS.................................................................................... 24

NOTES......................................................................................................... 25

ABOUT OUR TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS............................................................. 34

A M E R I C A N                      E N T E Ri P R I S E                       I N S T I T U T E
Executive Summary

T    he global Salafi-jihadi movement, which includes
     al Qaeda and the Islamic State, is spreading in
Africa. An Islamic State–linked group in northern
                                                                    simmering conflict among rival factions from
                                                                    the country’s 15-year civil war. Failure to deal
                                                                    with the IS-M problem will also cripple the
Mozambique is the latest case of a Salafi-jihadi group              Mozambican economy in the future.
co-opting and expanding a local conflict. This insur-
gency, like those in Mali and Somalia, promises to               • IS-M May Target Other Countries in East-
spread into neighboring countries and deliver an endur-            ern and Southern Africa. Terrorist attacks in
ing haven to extremist militants with regional and glo-            South Africa or deeper in Tanzanian territory
bal ambitions while exacting a steep humanitarian toll.            could further internationalize what is now a geo-
   Salafi-jihadi threats embedded in local conflicts               graphically contained insurgency.
are already plaguing several of Africa’s largest popula-
tions and economies. Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, and Nige-            • How the Worsening Humanitarian and
ria face insurgencies within or across their borders.              Displacement Crisis Is Handled Matters
The Salafi-jihadi insurgency in northern Mozambique                for Preventing Further Radicalization.
risks adding two significant economies—South Africa                Internally displaced persons (IDPs) who face
and Tanzania—to this list of vulnerable countries.                 violence or discrimination could opt to return
   This report identifies several implications should              under IS-M control, which will further entrench
the Islamic State in Mozambique (IS-M) continue its                the insurgency and risk greater retaliatory vio-
current trajectory.                                                lence against vulnerable IDP populations.

   • IS-M Will Establish a Lasting Foothold                       Preventing the formation of a permanent Salafi-
     in Cabo Delgado Province. The Mozambi-                    jihadi enclave on the Mozambican coast requires an
     can government is unlikely to sustain a military          international effort. The Mozambican government
     presence in Cabo Delgado due to security-sector           lacks the resources and capability to address the
     deficiencies and competing priorities. Cabo Del-          immediate security and humanitarian challenges. It
     gado will likely become a no-man’s-land with              must also pursue a long-term resolution to the under-
     some pockets of IS-M control over populations.            lying grievances in the remote northern province
                                                               where Salafi-jihadi militants are active. Solving these
   • Poor Responses to the IS-M Insurgency                     challenges requires international support beyond the
     Will Make It Worse. Reports of Mozambi-                   government’s current reliance on private military
     can soldiers engaged in human rights abuses               contractors and armed vigilante groups.
     demonstrate the risk that an extended military               The IS-M insurgency is a solvable problem for the
     response will add fuel to the fire by generating          international community. It will become more diffi-
     legitimate grievances against the government.             cult and more expensive, however, if IS-M becomes
                                                               deeply entrenched and this conflict draws in external
   • The IS-M Insurgency Will Worsen Politi-                   players pursuing their own interests. This report pro-
     cal Instability in Mozambique. The interplay              poses steps that a range of international actors can
     between the IS-M insurgency and the country’s             take to help the Mozambican government effectively
     political and security dynamics could reignite            resolve the Cabo Delgado crisis.


  • Security Response. Multilateral or bilateral                     broader security objectives, including mitigating
    security-sector support is needed to recap-                      IS-M radicalization and recruitment. The human
    ture and hold terrain from IS-M and ensure the                   toll of the current conflict greatly exceeds the
    accountability of security personnel. The inter-                 Mozambican government’s ability to respond.
    national response should include limited mili-                   International actors, ranging from UN agencies
    tary support for naval, counterinsurgency, and                   to donor governments to nongovernmental orga-
    border security operations, focusing on ensuring                 nizations, are needed to fill the gap by providing
    the accountability of security personnel. The key                humanitarian relief to the hundreds of thousands
    challenge for the Mozambican government and its                  of individuals displaced by IS-M’s attacks. The
    partners is defeating the IS-M insurgency without                humanitarian response must identify and meet
    creating the conditions for renewed violence in                  both individual and community needs, to facili-
    the future. Any lasting solution will require effec-             tate IDPs’ return to their homes and productive
    tively transitioning insurgents back to civilian life            economic activity as soon as the security situa-
    by providing exit pathways for reconcilable IS-M                 tion permits.
    combatants and affiliated individuals.
                                                                   The security and humanitarian responses will
  • Diplomatic Response. International organiza-                require challenging the extremist ideology that has
    tions and foreign governments with an interest              been grafted onto local grievances in Cabo Delgado
    in Mozambique’s stability should focus on man-              province. This will require building support for locally
    aging the regional tensions exacerbated by the              recognized and valued religious leadership in the
    IS-M insurgency, to prevent the conflict from               Muslim and Christian communities. A disarmament,
    becoming transnational.                                     demobilization, and reintegration program should
                                                                include a countering violent extremism component
  • Humanitarian Response. A strong and effec-                  and be embedded in a broader strategy dealing with
    tive humanitarian response is crucial to support            Cabo Delgado’s IDPs.


T     he rapid growth of an Islamic State
      affiliate in northern Mozambique
is the latest iteration of a frightening
                                              Figure 1. Map of Mozambique

trend. Salafi-jihadi insurgencies, led
by groups affiliated with al Qaeda and
the Islamic State, are maturing across
much of Africa. Several of Africa’s larg-
est populations and economies face a
Salafi-jihadi threat, either in their own
territory or across borders in unstable
neighbors’ territory. In North Africa,
Egypt is fighting an Islamic State insur-
gency in its Sinai Peninsula, and Algeria
is managing terrorism threats across its
borders with Libya, Mali, and Tunisia.
In West Africa, Nigeria faces an increas-
ingly lethal insurgency in the northeast
and a growing threat from the Sahel
region to the northwest.
    East Africa is destabilizing on sev-
eral fronts, placing key states at great
risk. Somalia is a chronically failed
state whose own Salafi-jihadi insur-
gency has spilled into Kenya and now
poses a growing threat to Ethiopia,
which recently descended into internal
conflict.1 A burgeoning insurgency in
                                              Source: Authors.
Mozambique risks creating a new per-
manent Salafi-jihadi foothold on the
East African coast and generating new threats to two           the insurgent group—referred to here as the Islamic
more African economic powerhouses: South Africa                State in Mozambique (IS-M)—formed and expanded
and Tanzania.                                                  due to more direct drivers, including recent economic
    The Salafi-jihadi insurgency in Mozambique, like           changes, the Mozambican state’s handling of gover-
others in Africa, is co-opting and stoking local con-          nance challenges, and the influence of regional and
flicts by translating historical narratives of grievance       global Salafi-jihadi organizations.
into extremist ideological terms. This insurgency,                The effects of the IS-M insurgency are serious and
located in the remote province of Cabo Delgado in              growing. The group is challenging the Mozambican
northern Mozambique (see Figure 1), is rooted in               government’s control over Cabo Delgado and threat-
long-standing social and economic conditions. But              ening liquefied natural gas (LNG) production that is


the cornerstone of Mozambique’s future economic             which increasingly relies on its African affiliates to
growth.2 IS-M has also created a humanitarian crisis,       demonstrate success. The Mozambican government’s
displacing more than 424,000 people and undermin-           current response will not defeat IS-M and may make
ing the country’s COVID-19 response. The insurgency         the insurgency worse.
risks worsening political instability in Mozambique            Part I of this report provides an assessment of
and neighboring countries.                                  the IS-M insurgency, including its development and
   IS-M is on track to establish a permanent base for       capabilities. Part II provides policy implications and
future attacks inside Mozambique and beyond. IS-M           recommendations.
also benefits the global Islamic State organization,

I. Assessing the Northern
Mozambique Insurgency

T     he IS-M insurgency emerged from the conver-
      gence of multiple trends, including deterio-
rating social and economic conditions and active
                                                                       A Note on Naming
regional and global Salafi-jihadi networks. Cabo Del-        This insurgent group goes by many names,
gado’s historically marginalized inhabitants consti-         and the group itself has not declared one.
tute the bulk of Mozambique’s Muslim population.             We refer to the group as the Islamic State in
Unmet economic expectations linked to LNG dis-               Mozambique (IS-M) throughout this report.
coveries combined with disruptions to traditional            This choice is for ease of reading and should
livelihoods and recent natural disasters to amplify          not be taken as an overstatement of the
existing frustrations. These trends intersected with         group’s relationship to Islamic State leader-
a religious splinter group rooted in local and inter-        ship. Alternate names include:
national Salafi movements that developed into an
armed movement with ties to regional Salafi-jihadi           • Al Shabaab (“the Youth”). The group
networks by 2015. The combination of this multi-               has become known as al Shabaab locally.
faceted challenge with a botched security response             It should not be confused with al Shabaab
expanded the armed insurgency into a conflict with             in Soma­  lia (Harakat al Shabaab al
national and regional implications. The Islamic                Mujahideen).
State’s leadership took notice and recognized the
Mozambican group as part of its network in June              • Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (“the People of
2019. The insurgency’s rate of attacks and brutality           the Sunnah and the Community”). The
has continued to increase. It has begun to hold terri-         armed insurgency and a predecessor sect
tory in Cabo Delgado and has displaced hundreds of             used this term, which can refer to Sunni
thousands of people.                                           Muslims broadly and is used by many other
                                                               organizations, including a paramilitary
                                                               group in Somalia.
                                                             • Islamic State Central Africa Province
Mozambique borders eSwatini (formerly Swaziland),              (ISCA or ISCAP). This is the Islamic
Malawi, Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimba-             State’s official designation for its affiliates
bwe to the west. Mozambique’s eastern border fea-              in Mozambique and the Democratic Repub-
tures a 2,500-kilometer Indian Ocean coastline. The            lic of the Congo (DRC). IS-M and ISCA’s
country gained independence from Portuguese colo-              Mozambique branch are considered syn-
nial control in 1975 following an armed insurgency             onymous in this report, but IS-M is used
by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO).                  to avoid confusion with the ISCA’s DRC
FRELIMO, now a political party, has maintained                 branch.
political dominance since independence. It fought


a 15-year civil war against the Mozam-           Figure 2. Percentage of Population Identifying as Muslim
bican National Resistance (RENAMO)               in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
until 1992.

Religious and Ethnic Dynamics.
                                                  Cabo Delgado
Mozambique is a majority Christian                                                                       Palma
                                                  Percentage of Population
country with a one-fifth Muslim minor-            Identifying as Muslim
ity. Most Mozambican Muslims live in                  5
the country’s north. Cabo Delgado prov-
ince’s population is 52.5 percent Muslim                                                            da Praia
and 36 percent Catholic according to the               95                       Mueda
2017 census. Muslims constitute more                                                        Muidumbe
than 75 percent of the population in six of
the province’s 17 districts. (See Figure 2.)
    The confessional divides in Cabo Del-
gado overlay ethno-linguistic differences.                        Montepuez              Meluco
Ethnic groups in Mozambique closely                                                                    Quissanga
align with local Bantu languages, which                                                           Pemba-Metuge
include Makonde, Makuhwa (Macua or                                                                                  Cidade
Makua), and Mwani. Most people speak                                                                                de
Makonde in Nagade, Mueda, and Mui-                                                                        Mecufi
dumbe districts near the Tanzanian bor-
                                                            Balama                        Chiure
der, which are Christian-majority areas.
Makuhwa is most common in Palma in                                        Namuno
the north and in southern Cabo Delgado.    3

Coastal Mocímboa da Praia and Ibo dis-
tricts have large Mwani-speaking popula-                                     0   12.5 25    50      75      100
tions. Makuhwa and Mwani overlap with
Muslim-majority areas.                         Source: The 2017 census data are from the Instituto Nacional de Estatística de
    Insurgent recruitment appears to tar-      Moçambique. The map was created by Cole Rosner, “Mozambique Cabo Del-
get the Mwani population, which has been       gado,” American University, Geospatial Research Lab.
marginalized since Mozambique’s inde-
pendence. The Mwani community was historically                    Economic Conditions. Cabo Delgado’s residents
part of the coastal Swahili economic network and is               have historically been marginalized, creating griev-
perceived locally as a protector of Islamic traditions.   4       ances against the national government in the capital,
LNG-related relocations and conflict-related displace-            Maputo, more than 1,000 miles away. Only an esti-
ment have severely affected the Mwani. In-migration               mated 12.5 percent of Cabo Delgado households have
and the political influence of the Makonde population             electricity.6 Internet and media penetration remain
also contribute to Mwani marginalization.    5                    extremely low.7 Other indicators suggest the extent
    The linguistic and religious diversity of northern            of state neglect: Only 17.5 percent of women in Cabo
Mozambique suggests that any effort to understand                 Delgado province are literate, compared with 85 per-
the conflict through an exclusively ethnic or reli-               cent of women in Maputo province. Cabo Delgado
gious frame neglects the complexity of the human                  similarly ranks lowest in the country for women with
terrain.                                                          secondary or higher education at 7.9 percent.8


Table 1. Conditions and Catalysts of the Cabo Delgado Insurgency

 Conditions                                                      Catalysts

 Poor Governance                                                 Poor Governance
  • Political marginalization                                     • Armed crackdown on religious splinter group
  • Lingering effects of prior conflicts                          • Mishandling of initial insurgency
  • Security-sector vulnerabilities

 Economic Marginalization                                        Economic Marginalization
  • Corruption or cronyism                                        • Simultaneous disruption of multiple local industries
  • Lack of jobs leading to delayed social advancement              due to natural disasters and industrial consolidation
  • Underinvestment in service provision                          • High expectations for local benefits from LNG devel-

 Ethnic, Class, and Religious Tensions                           Ethnic, Class, and Religious Tensions
  • Generational divide in Muslim population                      • Inputs from Tanzanian Salafi-jihadi network
  • Influence of foreign-funded Wahhabi education
  • Prior connection to East African Islamist networks
  • Fragmentation of Makonde, Makuhwa, and Mwani

Source: Authors.

    Extractive foreign economic projects raised the                  Government and corporate responses to local
population’s expectations for economic development                backlash have likely fueled grievances and set condi-
in northern Mozambique but have not met them, and                 tions for an insurgency. Tighter controls by the state
some situations have escalated to violence.9 Frustra-             and private businesses have contributed to loss of rev-
tions over unmet economic expectations have been                  enue from artisanal mining and illegal logging. Dispro-
heightened by the perception and reality that “for-               portionate use of force by police and private security
eigners”—from either other regions of Mozambique                  to enforce these controls contributes to popular dis-
or abroad—are benefiting instead.10 Low educational               satisfaction.13 Excessive fees have also harmed local
attainment in Cabo Delgado means foreign compa-                   informal vendors.14 A UK-based mining company has
nies that have declared their intent to hire local labor          been accused of human rights abuses and land expro-
still need to hire from elsewhere in Mozambique or                priation that have fueled violence and contributed to
from other countries, notably neighboring Zimba-                  the arming of the population.15 A Mozambican gov-
bwe11 and the Philippines, to perform required duties.            ernment crackdown on domestic and foreign artis-
    Disruptions to multiple local industries also threaten        anal miners in early 2017 displaced local people and
traditional livelihoods. International conglomerates’             contributed to the circulation of weapons in the illicit
activities have “squeezed out” Muslim populations                 economy.16 International companies have reportedly
from their ancestral lands.12 Natural disasters have also         expropriated land without proper compensation.17
contributed to displacement, which deeply affects indi-              Cabo Delgado is a thoroughfare for major smug-
viduals whose livelihoods rely on agricultural produc-            gling networks, including a human trafficking route
tion or fishing. The ongoing armed conflict has tripled           southward to South Africa, a southern route for the
down on this displacement, impeding civilians’ ability            transport of opium originating in Afghanistan, and
to return to regular economic activity.                           the illegal trade and transport of drugs, gemstones,


timber, and ivory.18 The illicit flows through this           authorities,24 further fragmenting religious authority
region also likely facilitate the movement of militants       in Cabo Delgado.
and extremists from the Horn of Africa and Great                  A separatist Salafi movement formed in Cabo Del-
Lakes region into northern Mozambique.                        gado in response to these dynamics, possibly in 2007
   Economic dislocation driven by these changes               though estimates vary.25 Its members kept their chil-
disrupts societal functioning and contributes to a            dren out of school and challenged local imams.26 This
preexisting “sense of ‘political exclusion’” in Cabo          movement intersected with the rising influence of East
Delgado.19 Particularly important is the expectation          African Salafi-jihadi networks in northern Mozam-
that young men must have the resources and ability to         bique. Followers of the extremist Kenyan cleric Aboud
establish their own household before marriage. This           Rogo Mohammed, who was killed in Mombasa, Kenya,
norm makes young men approaching marriageable                 in 2012, moved southward into Tanzania before cross-
age particularly vulnerable to recruitment by armed           ing into Cabo Delgado by 2015.27 This cross-border
groups that can offer the prospect of an income or            relationship reflects long-standing religious, social, and
other economic opportunities. Similar dynamics have           economic connections among mostly Mwani popula-
been observed in the context of other insurgencies,           tions on either side of the Tanzanian-Mozambican bor-
including in Burkina Faso and Uganda.20                       der, including the in-migration of young men seeking
                                                              work in Cabo Delgado.28
                                                                  Cabo Delgado’s Salafi movement was initially
Development of the Insurgency                                 peaceful but laid the groundwork for future mili-
                                                              tarization. It ran mosques in the Mocímboa da Praia
The IS-M insurgency is rooted in long-standing social         area whose students now participate in militias.29 The
and economic conditions but has expanded due                  group also sent young men to the Democratic Repub-
to more direct drivers, including recent economic             lic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Somalia, and Tanza-
changes, the Mozambican state’s handling of gover-            nia for military training; brought radical clerics to
nance challenges, and the influence of regional and           Mozambique; and paid former policemen and border
global Salafi-jihadi organizations.                           guards for military training.30
                                                                  The transformation into an armed movement esca-
Religious Splinter Group Turns Violent. Ideolog-              lated by 2015, when members of the Salafi movement
ical and generational schisms among Muslim leaders            ran afoul of religious authorities and were expelled
in northern Mozambique set the conditions for today’s         from mosques.31 The situation tipped into violence in
Salafi-jihadi insurgency. (See Table 1.) One contribut-       2016 as the movement engaged in increasingly violent
ing factor is Wahhabi religious education, introduced         interactions with the state.32 A harsh police crack-
in the early 1990s, including nongovernmental orga-           down catalyzed the movement’s transformation into
nization–funded local programs and foreign travel to          an insurgent group. It conducted its first recognized
North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.21 For-         attack in October 2017,33 targeting a police station to
eign religious study created an expectation mismatch          free jailed members.34
in which students, particularly those returning from
Saudi Arabia, were unable to find jobs in Mozambique          Early Stages: 2017–18. The insurgency was nar-
and found fault with indigenous Sufi traditions.22            row in scope at the time of the initial October 2017
The issue of religious authority also became fraught          attack.35 The group recruited through preexisting
because the official Islamic Council of Mozambique            social ties, including familial and friendship-based
is perceived as being too closely connected to the            relationships, predominantly attracting young men
state at the expense of conservative Muslims, who             from Cabo Delgado and neighboring provinces.36 Its
are prevented from holding political office.23 Tanza-         goal was to institute its interpretation of Islamic prac-
nian sheikhs traditionally were accepted as religious         tice and governance locally. An early video from the


      How Islamic State in Mozambique (IS-M) Benefits the Islamic State

  The Islamic State increasingly relies on its African            claims by the Islamic State also overstate the degree
  affiliates to demonstrate its continued existence and           to which IS-M targets security forces over civilians.
  expansion as it suffers losses in the Middle East.51            Islamic State media has also sought to ward off for-
  Islamic State media outlets announced the formation             eign intervention in northern Mozambique, nota-
  of the Islamic State’s Central African Province (ISCA)          bly threatening attacks against South Africa should
  during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, when the               it intervene and framing Mozambique as another
  organization typically increases attacks to demon-              quagmire for the West.53
  strate its global reach. The Islamic State’s claiming               IS-M may more concretely benefit the Islamic
  of attacks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo              State if it becomes more embedded in Cabo Del-
  and Mozambique under ISCA in June 2019 was likely               gado. The illicit economy makes Cabo Delgado a
  intended as counter messaging to the Islamic State’s            potential revenue-generation node. A beachhead
  loss of its final territorial stronghold in Syria earlier       in Mozambique could also allow the Islamic State
  that year. The Islamic State may have relaxed its cri-          to project threats into more powerful states that
  teria for granting province status for IS-M, which was          Salafi-jihadis have had limited ability to target, nota-
  not controlling territory when it was accepted.52               bly South Africa and Tanzania. Remote Cabo Del-
      ISCA media covering IS-M’s activities emphasizes            gado is unlikely to become a recruitment hub, but a
  several main themes that are common throughout                  long-term IS-M haven there may provide a fallback
  Islamic State media: targeting “crusader” Chris-                option for the Islamic State’s organization in East
  tians including Russians, breaking “artificial” bor-            Africa, particularly as the Somali branch remains
  ders, demonstrating the Islamic State’s persistence             under pressure. A larger, internationalized conflict
  and expansion, and threatening Western natural gas              in Mozambique could mobilize fighters across east-
  projects. The Islamic State’s emphasis on target-               ern and southern Africa to join. Finally, IS-M rep-
  ing Christians in Mozambique likely overempha-                  resents an Islamic State foothold where its rival al
  sizes IS-M’s actual focus on these attacks. Attack              Qaeda is not present.54

group in January 2018 featured a militant calling for             some women and children—by mid-2018. The vio-
the overthrow of the Mozambican government.37                     lence shifted from Mocímboa da Praia district to six
    The government’s response to this initial attack              other areas in Cabo Delgado, indicating that multiple
failed on two counts. First, the approach was                     cells were active simultaneously.41 Displacement also
extremely harsh and included mass arrests and                     increased,42 and limited cases of armed civilian resis-
mosque closures38 that deepened the population’s                  tance did not stymie the insurgency’s expansion.43
grievances. In other countries, security force abuses             Militants also began to target Christian homes and
have been identified as a driver of radicalization.39             churches more overtly in mid-2018.44
Second, the response failed to crush the insurgency                  Events in Tanzania likely contributed to the group’s
militarily despite security officials’ claims to have             growth. State pressure following a wave of killings
restored order.40                                                 in the country in 2017–18 forced Tanzanian-based
                                                                  Salafi-jihadi militants to shift to northern Mozam-
Expansion and the Islamic State’s Entry:                          bique.45 There are also unconfirmed reports that a
2018–19. The Cabo Delgado insurgency took a bru-                  group of al Shabaab defectors from Somalia pledged
tal turn in 2018. The group introduced beheadings                 to the Islamic State and infiltrated northern Mozam-
and started targeting civilians—mostly men, but                   bique through Tanzania in April 2018.46


   The group continued to develop in 2019. It                    as militants have begun showing their unmasked
expanded to new areas, with Macomia district                     faces in videos.57
becoming a center of violence, and began regularly                  IS-M’s increase in capabilities in the months fol-
targeting civilian vehicles in a bid to increase its con-        lowing its official incorporation into the Islamic State
trol over roads.47                                               may reflect strategic or tactical guidance from the
   The group formally affiliated with the Islamic State          parent organization, but this expertise is also pres-
in 2019. Islamic State media outlets began claim-                ent in the East African Salafi-jihadi networks to which
ing attacks in Mozambique under the newly formed                 IS-M is connected.58
Islamic State’s Central African Province (ISCA) in                  IS-M hit another milestone in August 2020 by
June 2019 alongside attacks by another branch in the             seizing and holding a population center in Cabo Del-
DRC.48 ISCA released its first video showing fight-              gado. The group returned to the town of Mocímboa
ers in Mozambique in July 2019.49 IS-M had adopted               da Praia and still hold it as of February 2021. The
many characteristics often associated with the                   group has used Mocímboa da Praia as a base for mar-
Islamic State—beheadings and the targeting of Chris-             itime attacks targeting vessels and nearby islands.59
tians—a year before Islamic State media began claim-             IS-M seized another district, Muidumbe, to expand
ing attacks in Mozambique, indicating the group may              its territorial control in Cabo Delgado in late Octo-
have been bidding for inclusion.                                 ber, and fighting continued throughout December.60
   IS-M’s affiliation with the Islamic State has likely             IS-M made a notable incursion into neighboring
helped it attract foreign fighters. The Islamic State            Tanzania in October 2020 that continued a trend
likely drove some foreign fighter movement to                    of attacking militarized security targets. This was
Mozambique, particularly during and after the deploy-            the first attack claimed by the Islamic State and the
ment of Russian mercenaries in September 2019.50                 most substantial IS-M attack thus far in Tanzania. A
                                                                 video message purportedly from the attack included
Tactical Evolution and New Fronts: 2020. IS-M                    a threat to Tanzania’s president in the week leading
notably improved its attack capability in early 2019,            up to a fraught election.61 A subsequent postelec-
enabling attacks on strategic targets, notably the               tion crackdown on the country’s political opposition
Mocímboa da Praia port. In March 2020, the group                 suggests that Tanzanian President John Magufuli
conducted a coordinated attack on the town of                    remains concerned about his hold on power despite
Mocímboa da Praia that included controlling access               his increasing control over public life. Magufuli, a
roads and attacking from speedboats.55 The militants             devout Catholic who has claimed that Christ pro-
warned civilians to evacuate the site before targeting           tects against COVID-19,62 is an ideal target for
security forces, many of which had begun withdraw-               Islamic State–driven narratives aimed at Tanzania’s
ing days before. The militants also targeted economic,           Muslim population. IS-M may also seek to target
governmental, and security infrastructure, including             a major gas pipeline, which runs from Tanzania’s
the garrison, administrative buildings, banks, and gas           Mtwara region through Tanzania’s capital.63
stations, before leaving the town.                                  Mozambican forces resumed counter-IS-M oper-
   This tactical evolution comes alongside a dou-                ations in late October, but the government’s reports
bling of IS-M’s attack rate in 2020. The bulk of the             of its successes thus far are likely exaggerated. Offi-
group’s attacks target civilians and directly and                cial sources emphasized targeting foreign leaders and
indirectly cause massive population displacement.                stated the military was targeting a main IS-M base
The share of attacks targeting security forces has               that the militants named “Syria” in Mocímboa da
increased slightly, though this may be because so                Praia district in late October.64 Mozambican forces
many civilians have abandoned their homes.56 The                 claimed to recapture Quissanga, a coastal town that
group’s limited media also displays more confidence              IS-M has held since April, on December 8.65


The IS-M Organization. IS-M’s structure resem-                       IS-M is part of a larger Islamic State structure in
bles that of other Salafi-jihadi groups, even as details         East Africa but likely retains significant autonomy. It
of its leadership remain unknown. IS-M’s top leader              is independent from the DRC branch of ISCA, though
has not been publicly identified. It has a “supreme              some movement of personnel, expertise, or resources
council.”66 At least some of the group’s key leaders,            among these branches is possible. A May 2020 UN
including on this council, come from abroad and have             Security Council report suggested that the Islamic
ties to religious and military circles in Kenya, Somalia,        State’s branch in northern Somalia serves as the com-
Tanzania, and the Great Lakes region.67 One leader               mand node for the branches in the DRC and Mozam-
is from Gambia in West Africa.68 Some leaders have               bique.75 The Somalia branch is small and under
indirect ties to spiritual leaders from Algeria, Libya,          significant pressure, however, so decision-making
Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.69                                       authority would have to be decentralized.
    IS-M’s fighting force similarly has a major for-                 The Islamic State’s media on Mozambique targets
eign presence. Many of IS-M’s core fighters may be               an external audience rather than local Mozambican
Tanzanian nationals.70 IS-M also has members from                dynamics, which IS-M can reach instead with direct
South Africa and possibly farther afield from North              communication or its own locally produced media.
Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia.71 Mozambican             A small dip in Islamic State media on Mozambique
President Filipe Nyusi has accused foreign fighters of           coincided with IS-M’s circulation of independent
recruiting and training local young people.72                    videos in Swahili in May–June 2020, which is possi-
    An accurate estimate of IS-M’s size is not publicly          bly a sign of tension between IS-M and Islamic State
available. Various outlets and analysts have estimated           leadership.76
the group has between 100 and 1,000 members since
2018, with the 1,000 figure increasingly common.73
The broad geographic distribution of IS-M’s activi-              IS-M Activities
ties across Cabo Delgado indicate that an estimate
of 1,000 members, if accurate, likely refers to a core           IS-M’s activities combine attacks on security and gov-
group of leadership and fighters. A larger logistical            ernmental targets, money-making activities including
network that includes forcibly recruited women and               supply raids, voluntary and forced recruitment, and
children surrounds this core group.                              the mass displacement of civilians.
    IS-M operates in cells, which have coordinated in
some cases.74 Islamic State media patterns support               Military Campaign. IS-M’s military capabilities
a low-confidence assessment that the cells active                are limited but increasing. It has primarily relied on
throughout Cabo Delgado are tied, at least loosely,              small arms and bladed weapons but has added rocket-
to a shared command structure. Islamic State media               propelled grenades and drones used for surveillance.77
claims attacks throughout IS-M’s area of operation in            The group has not yet fielded improvised explosive
Cabo Delgado. This broad distribution of claims indi-            devices but likely has access to the materials and exper-
cates the Islamic State media apparatus communi-                 tise required to do so. IS-M has shown a notable degree
cates with a central IS-M leadership structure rather            of strategy and restraint78 and benefits from the weak-
than a single IS-M faction. If the Islamic State claimed         nesses of the Mozambican security response.
attacks in only one area, this pattern would indicate                IS-M is working to control land and sea routes,
that only a faction of IS-M was communicating with               including the main north-south road in Cabo Del-
the Islamic State. This dynamic is visible in the case           gado.79 The group’s control of the Mocímboa da Praia
of the Islamic State’s West Africa Province, which               port allows it to conduct a small-boat naval campaign
splintered with the part of the organization retain-             to disrupt military and civilian movement between
ing its line of communication to and recognition from            islands and the coast while moving its own fighters
Islamic State leadership.                                        and looting resources.80


    IS-M has developed intelligence capabilities to              private security forces,93 positioning as defenders of
support its military efforts. Small groups of young              the Muslim poor beyond ethnic and regional lines,94
people functioning as lookouts provide logistical                and possibly appealing to a sense of the lost Muslim
support and spy on security forces.81 IS-M has likely            rule on the Swahili coast.95 IS-M members have crit-
recruited informants in the security forces who report           icized corruption and claimed to not be fighting for
on troop movements and allow IS-M to conduct raids               wealth themselves.96 They have castigated the gov-
shortly after resupplies.82 IS-M also threatens and              ernment for humiliating poor people and committing
intimidates civilians to prevent them from reporting             human rights abuses, positing fair Islamic governance
its movements to security forces.83                              as the solution.97 IS-M messaging has also pushed
    IS-M’s military campaign, including its control of           back on the government’s accusation that it is a for-
the Mocímboa da Praia port and airstrip, has hindered            eign organization.98
the Mozambican government’s military response by                     IS-M’s control of terrain may also draw recruits,
making access and resupply more difficult.84 IS-M’s              mirroring the effect of the Islamic State’s caliphate in
large area of operations also challenges Mozambican              other theaters. There are reports of people traveling
security forces by requiring them to operate in mul-             to Mocímboa da Praia in September 2020,99 and some
tiple areas in vast and difficult terrain. IS-M’s target-        recruits traveled from Nampula province by sea.
ing of cell towers and local radio stations may also be              IS-M also engages in large-scale forced recruit-
intended to disrupt coordination against it.85                   ment, including group kidnappings of women and
                                                                 children. This practice increased notably in 2020.
Making Money. A majority of IS-M attacks has tar-                Children—male and female—are especially at risk in
geted villages. One likely reason for these attacks is           the wake of IS-M attacks as families separate while
to raid supplies, including food. IS-M’s access to sea           fleeing.100 In late October 2020, insurgents detained
routes also allows it to receive supplies, likely from           over 200 people in Pangane in Macomia district,
Tanzania.86 It receives some donations from abroad               before separating children from their parents and
through electronic money transfers.87 Existing illicit           forcibly taking them.101
flows and raids on security forces provide matériel.                 Women and girls’ role in harvesting and securing
   IS-M is forming a potentially lucrative nexus for             food can lead them to become easy targets for vio-
criminal activity in Cabo Delgado. Instability can cre-          lence and make them essential in ensuring IS-M’s
ate more space for illegal business, encouraging part-           food supply.102 Recent IS-M attacks have involved
nerships between militants and criminals.88                      small-scale kidnappings of several women and girls
                                                                 at a time.103 One unconfirmed estimate numbers
Recruiting. IS-M conducts both voluntary and coer-               700 forcibly recruited women as of October 2020.104
cive recruitment. It relies on family, marriage, and             This pattern of forced recruitment in addition to
friendship ties; madrasas and mosques; youth associ-             potential voluntary participation aligns with other
ations; and businesses.89 Word of mouth is important             insurgencies in the region in which forced “marriage”
given limited electricity and media penetration. The             to fighters is prevalent and women and girls play key
group also provides economic incentives—including                support roles by performing agricultural and house-
salaries, scholarships, and startup funding for small            hold duties.
businesses90—and promises gains in social status and                 The group has also targeted men who refuse to join
community belonging.91 It has attracted defectors                its ranks, notably beheading more than 50 young men
from the military and police by providing better pay.92          for this reason in April 2020.105
    IS-M’s limited propaganda appeals to popular
grievances and a desire among many young people                  Mass Displacement. An unusual feature of the
to upend the existing order. Themes include enacting             IS-M insurgency is its high level of civilian displace-
revenge against local police and mining companies’               ment. More than 424,000 people are estimated to


be internally displaced in Cabo Delgado, Nampula,                 some populations are more likely to return and tol-
and Niassa provinces, the majority of whom were                   erate IS-M by necessity. Returning IDPs and civil-
displaced in 2020.106 In Cabo Delgado, internally                 ians who stay in IS-M-controlled areas are at risk of
displaced persons (IDPs) are concentrated in the                  being deemed “guilty by location” and further alien-
southern districts where humanitarian organizations               ated from the Mozambican state.108 This dynamic
are still operating, following significant withdrawals            has hampered social cohesion in post–Islamic State
in the wake of attacks on district capitals.                      Mosul, Iraq, for example.109
    This population displacement could serve multiple                Alternatively, mass displacement may be a product
purposes. IS-M may be displacing civilians to make it             of poor command and control and general chaos rather
easier to hold territory. The group lacks strong social           than IS-M’s strategic choice. Raids targeting civilians
support and may see people as security risks who might            may indicate IS-M members or other armed cells and
organize among themselves or serve as government                  mobs are seizing food supplies that villagers cannot
informants. Alternately, should IS-M seek to govern,              survive without. In some cases, militants are likely
mass displacement may be intended to limit the num-               using villages as bases, removing the option for villag-
ber of people under its control. In either case, mass dis-        ers to return. Reports of extreme violence, including
placement shifts the burden for maintaining popular               beheadings and kidnappings, may have also heightened
support and basic services to the national government             the sensitivity of local populations to the risk IS-M
(and its international humanitarian partners) and may             poses and prompted relocations in advance of attacks.
be intended to disrupt the government’s ability to
counter IS-M directly. Reports of IS-M paying civilians           Governance. IS-M members have expressed a desire
to leave in limited cases support a hypothesis that mass          in propaganda videos to overthrow the Mozambican
displacement is a strategic choice.107                            state.110 IS-M has not yet taken significant action to
    Holding territory can be valuable for its own sake.           establish governance in the territory it controls, but
IS-M can control access in and out of that territory              its attacks on humanitarian and governmental infra-
while accessing important resources and infrastruc-               structure signal an effort to delegitimize national and
ture left behind, such as homes and boats. Mari-                  local authorities by undermining the provision of
time access and the illicit networks that run through             already limited services.
Cabo Delgado may make holding terrain sustainable                     Targets have included humanitarian agencies’
and sufficiently lucrative to be an end in itself.                medical facilities.111 The group has also destroyed
    IS-M’s displacement strategy may be intended to               homes—demonstrating security forces’ inability to
change the population’s composition in Cabo Del-                  protect civilians—and targeted administrative build-
gado and increase IS-M’s control over the people                  ings, commercial property, and transportation infra-
who remain or return. Attacks on Christians indicate              structure. IS-M has targeted schools and teachers,
IS-M may seek to sort the population along confes-                possibly indicating its intent to replace local educa-
sional lines. The IDPs’ composition is unclear, but               tion and indoctrinate a next generation of members.
the concentration of IS-M attacks along the coast                 IS-M also targets rival religious authorities112 and
may indicate the Muslim-majority Mwani community                  local traditions it deems un-Islamic, notably a male
is targeted disproportionally even as IS-M seeks to               initiation ceremony in early November 2020.113
recruit from them.                                                    IS-M has taken limited steps to win popular sup-
    Some IDPs will return to Cabo Delgado eventually.             port and mitigate backlash. It has warned civilians
IS-M may try to set conditions to control the return-             before attacks in some cases.114 IS-M could scale
ing population. Muslim civilians may be more likely               up an effort to win popular support in the future by
to return, particularly if they face discrimination               increasing its handouts and programming for local
or repression from Mozambican security forces or                  populations and possibly co-opting humanitarian aid
local communities while displaced. In this scenario,              flows into the region. (Tanzania’s government has


cited IS-M’s ability to divert resources as the rationale         response to IS-M. IS-M may co-opt both current and
for the government’s restriction on food exports to               demobilized RENAMO fighters, given their com-
Cabo Delgado.)115                                                 plaints about the paucity of the government’s disar-
   The group may be setting conditions for a                      mament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)
longer-term project of governance. In this light, dis-            program. This recruitment is most likely to
placement may serve an important sorting func-                    happen in Nampula, Niassa, and Zambézia prov-
tion by allowing the group to screen individuals                  inces, which border Cabo Delgado and are where
for reentry.                                                      RENAMO has fought. RENAMO political leader-
   It is also possible that IS-M has not delayed its plans        ship will also attempt to use the government’s weak-
for governance, but simply lacks them. The group’s                nesses in Cabo Delgado as a political cudgel and
overarching strategy may not match its operational and            has been vocal in publicizing the military’s human
tactical military skill. The group’s leaders may simply           rights violations during counter-IS-M operations.118
have not put any thought into what it means to govern             Alternately, RENAMO combatants could be mobi-
and whether this is necessary to its objectives.                  lized by the government to protect the communi-
                                                                  ties where they operate. Some reporting suggests
                                                                  government-backed militias may be forming in
The Mozambican Government’s                                       response to the threat IS-M poses.119
Challenges and Response
                                                                  Government Response to IS-M. The Mozambican
The Mozambican government faces several diffi-                    government’s response to IS-M reflects its limited
culties in mounting a response to the IS-M insur-                 resources and capabilities, competing priorities, and
gency, including overlapping security and political               governance challenges.
challenges, institutional limitations, and resource                  A fundamental weakness is the relative size of the
constraints.                                                      Mozambican armed forces. Counterinsurgency doc-
                                                                  trine indicates that a counterinsurgent force needs
Intersecting National Dynamics. Political                         to establish a ratio of one counterinsurgent per
power in Mozambique remains divided between the                   50 inhabitants to be effective.120 The population
FRELIMO government, which has been in power                       of Cabo Delgado is around 2.3 million, whereas the
since independence, and the RENAMO opposition.                    Mozambican military has about only 11,200 active
Contention between the two parties is strongly tied               personnel, a ratio of one to 205.
to failures in integrating RENAMO fighters into the                  Setting aside the manpower challenge, the security
Mozambican military, as stipulated in the agreement               force response to IS-M has failed to achieve enduring
that ended the country’s civil war (1977–92). Conflict            effects. Official reports of police and military actions
reemerged from April 2013 to August 2019, requiring               tend to inflate their achievements. Security forces,
another peace agreement and causing a splinter in                 including the national police force’s Rapid Interven-
RENAMO. The splinter group attacks economic and                   tion Unit, responded to IS-M’s first attacks in fall 2017
civilian targets in central Mozambique.116                        with a disarmament ultimatum in December 2017.
   Clashes with RENAMO have overlapped with the                   Security forces also launched an air-sea raid on an
IS-M insurgency and hindered the Mozambican gov-                  insurgent stronghold in Mocímboa da Praia district
ernment’s response in Cabo Delgado. President Nyusi               later that month, after which officials claimed to inflict
struck a truce with the RENAMO splinter group in                  high casualties and restore order.121 The Mozambican
late October 2020 to allow government forces to con-              army appears to have deployed a sustained presence
centrate their effort against IS-M in the north.117               to Cabo Delgado by June 2019.
   The RENAMO challenge presents both risks and                      The Mozambican security forces have preexist-
opportunities for the Mozambican government’s                     ing weaknesses that limit their effectiveness in the


             The Mozambican Government’s Response to the Islamic State

  Strengths                                                    Weaknesses

     • Prior counterinsurgency and disarmament,                  • Limited capabilities
       demobilization, and reintegration experience
                                                                 • Security-sector abuses and government
     • Willingness to request assistance                           corruption

     • Ownership of response                                     • Political cleavages

country’s north. Political factions exist in the armed         Mueda district, further limiting Mozambican-DAG
forces and its senior leadership.122 Security person-          operations.
nel are also largely recruited from other parts of the            Mozambican forces have been credibly accused
country and sent to the remote north, which is the             of human rights violations against civilians in Cabo
least desired posting for security personnel and civil-        Delgado.130 Reports of IS-M members wearing mili-
ian officials alike. Morale issues and defections have         tary uniforms complicate reporting on military and
disrupted the response to IS-M.123 IS-M’s basic naval          police violations, but they are likely to have occurred.
capability also poses a problem for the Mozambi-               Security force abuses have pushed civilians toward
can navy, which has only 200 members and 11 patrol             supporting insurgents in other conflicts131 and will
boats.124 Lastly, the Mozambican government and its            undermine a counterinsurgency response to IS-M.
security forces suffer from contested legitimacy given             The EU granted Mozambique’s request for security
the conflict with RENAMO.                                      assistance in October 2020. The assistance will cover
   The Mozambican government is attempting to                  training logistics, technical training, and help address-
compensate for its military weaknesses by hiring               ing humanitarian and medical challenges. The assis-
private security companies to provide unique capa-             tance also stipulates that Mozambican forces make
bilities. Russia’s Wagner Group deployed in fall               “verifiable commitments” to respect human rights
2019 but quickly withdrew, having underestimated               and provide accountability.132 The risk of corruption
the difficulty of the terrain and IS-M’s capability.125        from the influx of EU financial support133 is high, and
Moscow has been building ties to Maputo and may                the opacity of a security pact with the energy com-
try again to trade counterterrorism services for               pany Total134 suggests the government’s accountabil-
economic access.126 The Mozambican government                  ity remains limited.
has forged a more enduring partnership with Dyck                   In a move away from accountability, the govern-
Advisory Group (DAG), a South African private mil-             ment plans to arm civilian vigilantes.135 This strategy
itary contractor that provides air support in Cabo             will likely encourage extrajudicial killings and attract
Delgado. DAG’s air support has prevented some                  retaliation against communities (as seen in Burkina
IS-M advances127 but has not been decisive, partic-            Faso).136 This strategy may already be rolling out: The
ularly when Mozambican ground forces have been                 military conducted a joint operation with a local mili-
lacking. DAG has also been accused of firing on civil-         tia comprised of FRELIMO veterans from President
ians.128 IS-M attacks in November 2020 in Muidumbe             Nyusi’s hometown.137 Official sources have reported
and the fight for control of the Palma-Mueda                   the killing of 270 IS-M members on October 16–18,
road129 may ultimately threaten the military base in           but this figure is likely exaggerated.138


Intersecting Regional Dynamics. Strong politi-                   legal and illegal economic migrants. The South Afri-
cal linkages developed among Mozambique, Tanza-                  can company Sasol has invested in Mozambique’s
nia, and Zimbabwe during their respective struggles              LNG sector.142
for independence and persist today. These countries                 South Africa has been noncommittal regarding
could become active in the IS-M conflict and related             potential military involvement in Mozambique. The
instability in Mozambique. Mozambique’s southern                 country has sent a small group of special operations
neighbor—South Africa—and regional political orga-               forces to Mozambique and appointed the former chief
nizations may also become involved.                              of the South African military as the country’s ambas-
                                                                 sador.143 South African officials have expressed con-
Tanzania. Tanzania served as the base for FRELIMO                cern over DAG’s current role in Cabo Delgado.
fighters during Mozambique’s war of independence.                   The Islamic State’s threat to attack South Africa
Tanzania’s ruling party has held power since its own             should it intervene militarily in Mozambique may be
independence in 1961. Magufuli, the incumbent, was               contributing to the country’s hesitancy. South Africa’s
declared the winner of the October 2020 presidential             role as a hub for terrorist financing on the continent
election two weeks after an IS-M cross-border attack             also complicates its potential involvement.
on the village of Kitaya in Tanzania’s Mtwara region.139
Magufuli’s postelection crackdown, which included                Zimbabwe. Ties between Zimbabwe’s ruling Zim-
the arrest of opposition leaders, reflects the govern-           babwe African National Union and Mozambique’s
ment’s preoccupation with maintaining its tight polit-           FRELIMO date to efforts led by Robert Mugabe to
ical grip. Tanzania’s potential response to the IS-M             overthrow Rhodesia’s white-ruled government. Zim-
conflict should therefore be understood in light of an           babwe has responded to IS-M by deploying more
emerging political opposition in the country.                    troops to its border. Zimbabwe has publicly called
    The porousness of the 800-kilometer Tanzanian-               for regional support for Mozambique’s counterin-
Mozambican border and the long history of trans-                 surgency efforts,144 allegedly in the hope that the
national insurgency along that border also inform                United States would lift its sanctions on Zimbabwe.
responses to the current conflict, including deploying           The country’s economic crisis and recent political
additional troops, evacuating civilians,140 and ban-             upheaval, however, make it ill positioned to lend
ning food exports to Cabo Delgado.141 Further attacks            more than rhetorical support.
in Tanzania will likely focus Magufuli’s attention on
internal opponents. Magufuli is an outspoken Catho-              African Union and Southern African Development Com-
lic and likely to play into Islamic State “crusader” nar-        munity. Regional institutions, including the African
ratives. Nevertheless, the Tanzanian military is better          Union (AU) and the Southern African Development
trained and equipped and, should violence escalate               Community (SADC), have raised the possibility of
significantly along the border, could play an import-            military involvement in Cabo Delgado, with no firm
ant role in supporting Mozambique’s counterinsur-                commitments. Mozambique holds the presidency of
gency efforts.                                                   the SADC and stands on the AU’s Peace and Secu-
                                                                 rity Council. The AU’s past counterterrorism efforts
South Africa. Apartheid-era South Africa positioned              in Nigeria, Somalia, and the Sahel are not consid-
itself in opposition to FRELIMO, Mozambique’s rul-               ered successful. Zimbabwe has called on the SADC
ing party, and, along with minority-ruled Rhodesia,              to invoke its mutual defense pact and mobilize for a
provided military support to the RENAMO insur-                   joint SADC-AU mission,145 but the SADC has no legal
gency. Relations have improved considerably in recent            basis—short of UN Security Council authorization—
decades. Mozambique is economically dependent on                 on which to undertake operations without Mozam-
South Africa, which serves as a major destination for            bique’s consent.146

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