COMMERCE & CONFLICT Angola & DiamondWorks
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Conflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
COMMERCE & CONFLICT
Angola & DiamondWorks
FINAL REPORT
June 2005
Report Prepared by:
Aleisha Stevens, Project Analyst
David Carment, Principal Investigator
Feedback is welcome, and may be sent to cifp@carleton.ca
David Carment, Principal Investigator
http://www.carleton.ca/cifp
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 1
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY……………………………………………………………………………………4
NOTE……………………………………………………………………………………………………………5
OVERVIEW – PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY…………………………………………7
SECTION I
ANGOLA IN THE 1990s
I. History of Armed Conflict………………………………………………………………………..9
A. Armed conflict presence
B. Armed conflict intensity
C. Number of refugees produced by Angola
D. Number of IDPs produced in Angola
II. Governance and Political Instability……………………………………………………….11
A. Geographic Impact of the Conflict
i. Geographic area under control by opposition groups (%)
ii. Regime durability
iii. Domestic terrorist incidents (1998)
iv. Terrorist acts targeted at businesses (1998)
B. Attitudes and Policies of Government and Opposition
i. Level of democracy
ii. Restrictions on civil and political rights
iii. Restrictions on Press Freedom
C. Level of Corruption
i. Corruption Perceptions Index
ii. Bribe Payers Index
D. Human Rights
i. Physical Quality of Life Index
ii. Number of core human rights treaties signed and ratified by
host country
III. Militarization and Security ……………………………………………………………………19
A. Military expenditures (% of GDP)
B. Total imports of small arms
C. Total active troops for each opposition group
D. Total number of active landmines
IV. Demographic Stress……………………………………………………………………………..21
A. Regional population in the Lundas
V. Economic Performance………………………………………………………………………….23
A. GDP growth rate
B. GDP per capita
C. Foreign direct investment (FDI)
D. GINI coefficient
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 2
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
E. Unemployment rate proxy: Poverty rate
VI. Human Development…………………………………………………………………………….25
A. Human Development Index
B. Gender Development Index
C. Access to improved water source and adequate sanitation
Conclusions ……………………………………………………………………………………………….26
SECTION II
ANGOLA’S MINING INDUSTRY IN THE 1990s
I. Corruption and Violence.………………………………………………………………………27
II. Employment ……………………………………………………………………………………….28
III. Human Development ……………………………………………………………………………29
Conclusions ……………………………………………………………………………………………….29
SECTION III
DIAMONDWORKS IN ANGOLA IN THE 1990s
I. DiamondWorks and Armed Conflict.…………………………………………………..…32
A. DiamondWorks’ militarized commerce
B. DiamondWorks’ perceived role in the civil war
C. Number of MNC employees injured by violence related to MNC operations
II. Corporate Activity and Political Instability ……………………………………………34
A. Location of DiamondWorks’ infrastructure in relation to terrorist incident
sites
B. Cost of damage to DiamondWorks as a result of terrorist incidents
C. Infrastructural instability
III. Economic Performance ………………………………………………………………………36
A. Percent of GDP contribution by DiamondWorks
B. Number of Angolan’s employed
IV. Human Development …………………………………………………………………………37
Conclusions ………………………………………………………………………………………….……37
SECTION IV
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Summary, Evaluation, & Looking Ahead…………………………………………….……….….40
Appendix #1 – Dates of Importance…………………………………………………….………..42
Appendix #2 – Acronyms…………………………………………………………….………….……43
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 3
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Through the application of CIFP Country Risk Indicators, this report
analyzes the interplay of Angolan country and industry dynamics with the
corporate activity of DiamondWorks, a Canadian-owned diamond mining
company that held operations in the province of Lunda Norte during the year
1998. This analysis is used to identify volatile country and company
characteristics that together led to the forced closure of some of
DiamondWorks’ most promising business ventures in 1998-99. Important
high risk factors identified include:
• Rentier/corrupt government: Resulting in weak social and
economic infrastructure and a lack of accountability and
representation, all of which limited the avenues through which
grievances could be peacefully aired.
• Militarization of the diamond industry: Resulting in habitual
human rights violations and consistent, low intensity conflict
punctuated by high intensity periods of war.
• High number of refugees and IDPs: Destabilizing the country and
negatively impacting already deplorable living standards and human
development.
• Unequal distribution of resources: Encouraged through corruption
of the elite; aggravated by domestic legislation favoring the economic
endeavors of corporations over those of Angola’s citizens. Unequal
distribution of resources was especially conducive to conflict because
of the unmet expectation on the part of Angolan citizens that the
diamond industry would act as an equalizing force, promoting social
infrastructure and providing employment.
• Corporate participation in violence through use of private
security organizations: Contributed to violent repression and forced
displacement, causing tension and conflict.
Although Angola’s civil war officially ended in 2002, many of these
high-risk indicators persist today. It is therefore imperative that
corporations returning to business investments in Angola acknowledge
the delicate nature of the peace process through conflict-sensitive
corporate strategies, both for the economic security of the business, and
the social and economic security of Angola.
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 4
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
NOTE University, which she completed through
credits earned while studying in Kenya.
About this Report About CIFP
This country report has been CIFP has its origins in a prototype
produced by Country Indicators for geopolitical database developed by the
Foreign Policy (CIFP) for use by non- Canadian Department of National Defence
governmental organizations, businesses, in 1991. The prototype project called
academics, Canadian policy-makers, and GEOPOL covered a wide range of political,
other parties concerned with the impact economic, social, military, and
multinational corporate activity has on environmental indicators through the
countries in conflict. The study applies medium of a rating system. In 1997,
the CIFP Risk Assessment Template to the under the guidance of Andre Ouellete,
operations of DiamondWorks in Angola John Patterson, Tony Kellett and Paul
during the 1990’s to highlight the complex Sutherland, the Canadian Department of
and dynamic interplay of commerce and Foreign Affairs and International Trade
conflict. Conclusions and observations decided to adopt some elements of
arising form the analysis are designed to GEOPOL to meet the needs of policy
aid businesses returning to Angola in the makers, the academic community and the
creation of corporate strategies designed private sector. The CIFP project as it
to avoid disrupting the peace process became known has since then operated
currently underway in Angola. Premised under the guidance of principal
on the established need to mainstream investigator David Carment of Carleton
conflict prevention in the private sector, University and has received funding from
this report provides businesses and DFAIT, IDRC, PetroCanada, the EU and
concerned stakeholders with the means to CIDA. The project represents an on-going
evaluate the impact of business effort to identify and assemble statistical
operations on Angola’s conflict, and to information conveying the key features of
subsequently effect necessary change in the political, economic, social and cultural
corporate strategy to avoid exacerbating environments of countries around the
violence in vulnerable countries. world.
The cross-national data generated
About the Author through CIFP was intended to have a
variety of applications in government
Aleisha Stevens is entering her departments, NGOs, and by users in the
third year of a four-year combined private sector. The data set provides at-a-
LL.B./M.A. of International Affairs program glance global overviews, issue-based
offered by Carleton University in perspectives and country performance
conjunction with the University of Ottawa. measures. Currently, the data set includes
She focuses her studies on the areas of measures of domestic armed conflict,
multinational corporate governance and governance and political instability,
human rights in conflict zones, and is militarisation, religious and ethnic
currently undertaking a study of legal diversity, demographic stress, economic
mechanisms designed to regulate the performance, human development,
behaviour of international private security environmental stress, and international
organizations. Aleisha holds an Honors linkages.
Bachelor of Arts degree in Archeology and
Anthropology from Wilfrid Laurier The CIFP database currently
includes statistical data in the above issue
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 5
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
areas, in the form of over one hundred United Nations High Commissioner for
performance indicators for 196 countries Refugees, the Stockholm International
for most indicators. These indicators are Peace Research Institute, and the
drawn from a variety of open sources, Minorities at Risk and POLITY IV data sets
including the World Bank, the United from the University of Maryland.
Nations Development Programme, the
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 6
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
OVERVIEW November 8 1998, approximately 100
Purpose, Scope and Methodology UNITA troops raided the mine, killing 8
___________________ employees and kidnapping 10.3 By early
the next year, DiamondWorks had ceased
In June 1998, the Canadian-owned all operations in Angola, citing force
company DiamondWorks1 opened the majeur and unacceptable commercial
Yetwene mining operation in Angola’s terms as the cause.4 The Luo and
northeastern province of Lunda Norte. Yetwene mines had been the company’s
The company was already active in Angola key exploration and development projects
with its Luo mine, which had been opened at the time, and placing them on
in 1996 some 100 kilometers north of maintenance status was a serious
Yetwene; both mines were located on the economic set-back for the junior mining
Chicapa River. 2 company.
Areas Of Highest Diamond The targeting of business ventures
Concentration in Angola by rebel groups suggests a link between
corporate activity and conflict. The
purpose of this report is to conduct an
indicators-based conflict risk analysis in
order to determine the nature of the link
between DiamondWorks’ operations and
the civil war in Angola in the late 1990’s.
The template generated can be used by
Luo &
businesses to establish whether current
Yetwene
country and company dynamics have the
potential to interact in a similar
destructive manner. This comparative
approach encourages the application of
conclusions to current business strategies,
which would lead to the sustainable re-
integration of diamond mining companies
into the Angolan diamond economy.
Conclusions are generated based
on a three stage analytical process
outlined below. The analysis employs
Map from: Christian Dietrich. “Inventory of
Formal Diamond Mining in Angola” Pp. 143
CIFP Risk Assessment Indicators
throughout. Unless otherwise specified,
The Luo mine escaped attack CIFP risk indices are measured on a scale
during Angola’s civil war thanks in part to of 0 to 9, with higher risk indices
the use of private security forces, but the indicating a greater assessed risk of
Yetwene project was not so fortunate conflict development, escalation, or
despite similar protective measures. On
3
Embassy of Angola. “UNITA Attacks Diamond
1
Prior to October 1996, DiamondWorks was known Mine, Killing Eight, Kidnapping Ten” in Pensador .
as Carson Gold Inc. In 2004, DiamondWorks was http://www.angola.org/news/pensador/december98/y
renamed Energem. etwene.html.
2 4
See map of Angola showing DiamondWorks Energem Resources Inc. website. Path: Energem Æ
concessions: at Business Units Æ Mineral Projects. Accessed May
http://www.sedar.com/csfsprod/data9/filings/000845 9, 2005.
84/00000001/a%3A%5Cdmndwrks.pdf p.16. http://www.DiamondWorks.com/?&act=1&loc=mine
Source: DiamondWorks 1997 Annual Report. proj
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 7
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
continuation within the country in Together, Sections I, II and III
question. Where not available, index serve to highlight the dynamic nature of
measures are supplemented with other country conflict and multinational
internationally recognized risk indicators corporate activity by illustrating the
that correspond to the CIFP Risk cataclysmic effect of certain coinciding
Assessment Template. The results from variables.
the indicator-based analysis focuses
analytical attention on high-risk issues, Section IV constitutes a
which are subsequently supplemented by concluding section that highlights
qualitative elaboration. moderate to high-risk indicators present
throughout the 1990s that persist today.
Section I of the analysis applies These observations are significant because
country risk indicators to analyze the they identify continuing high-risk variables
socio-political conflict situation in Angola that can be exacerbated by reckless
in the 1990s. This section illustrates the business practices.
volatile context within which
DiamondWorks chose to operate in the Conclusions and recommendations
late 1990’s, and provides valuable generated through the application of the
contextual information that aids in the CIFP risk assessment template have
later analysis of DiamondWorks’ impact on widespread applicability in terms of
country violence. investment re-integration issues. The
study specifically has potential relevance
Section II applies CIFP business for other DiamondWorks business
risk indicators to Angola’s diamond operations, as the company today (under
industry. This analysis facilitates greater the name Energem) largely focuses its
understanding of the connection between investment endeavors in conflict zones of
conflict and commerce by providing Africa.
contextual considerations of the corporate
environment within which DiamondWorks NOTE: This information in this
was operating during the 1990’s. report represents a synthesis of reliable
source documents. Risk indicator
Section III applies business information that was not available, or
practice risk indicators to DiamondWorks available only from unreliable sources, has
operations for the purpose of determining been replaced with a suitable proxy
the impact of company behaviour on indicator and duly noted as such. The
Angola’s civil war. 2005 analysis contains the most recent
data available at the time of publication.
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 8
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
SECTION I: I. HISTORY OF ARMED CONFLICT
CIFP RISK ASSESSMENT OF
History of Armed Conflict - 1998 Rating Source
ANGOLA IN THE 1990’s
Armed Conflict Presence 8 CIFP
Conflict Intensity 3 (War) CIFP
Angola’s civil war began three - Number of deaths > 1000 SIPRI
months after independence from
Number of Refugees 8 CIFP
Portuguese rule in 1975, and lasted until
the death of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in Number of IDP's Produced 810,000 UNCAH
2002. Main parties in contention for
power at the time of independence A country’s historical experience with
included the National Liberation Front of conflict is a potent indicator of its
Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for susceptibility to the continuation or
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the outbreak of violence, especially in the
National Union for the Total Independence context of irresponsible business
of Angola (UNITA). The agreed-upon practices. Not only does a history of
transitional government incorporating the armed conflict indicate an ability and
three parties quickly crumbled due to willingness to resort to violence, it also
widely different political ideologies, points towards divisions within society
leaving the MPLA in control of the capital that have been created or exacerbated by
and relegating the FNLA and UNITA to the violence. The creation of refugees and the
status of rebel insurgents in the internally displaced through violent
hinterlands. This political structure was conflict has a large impact not only on the
maintained throughout the ensuing 27- country in conflict, but often on
year civil war, with the MPLA and UNITA neighboring countries as well.
acting as key opposition groups.
A. Armed Conflict Presence
CIVIL WAR QUICK FACTS The CIFP armed conflict index is a
• Up to 500,000 people died and significant measure of conflict severity
15 million landmines were because it integrates conflict intensity
planted during the 27-year levels with annual conflict related deaths,
conflict and presents this indicator as a
• Agreements between the MPLA quantifiable measure. Throughout the
and UNITA in 1991 and 1994 1990’s, CIFP indices never fell below 8,
failed to bring lasting peace indicating that armed conflict was a
• Savimbi's death in 2002 ubiquitous presence in Angola throughout
brought the collapse of UNITA the decade.
and the start of a delicate peace
process. The geographical make-up of Angola
exacerbated the continuation of conflict.
The following analysis applies country risk Its vast and sparsely populated
indicators to analyze the conflict situation northeastern bushland, where the two
in Angola in the decade of the 1990s. This DiamondWorks mines were located, made
section illustrates the volatile context government control of the territory
within which DiamondWorks chose to difficult while providing ideal terrain for
open its Yetwene mine in the northeastern the guerrilla-style warfare of UNITA.5 As
province of Lunda Norte in 1998, and an unfortunate coincidence, this hard to
provides contextual information that aids
in the analysis of the company’s impact on 5
Shackson, Nick. Fueling the War: Diamonds and
the civil war. Oil. (BBC News Online: January 28, 1999)
http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1999/
01/99/angola/264228.stm
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The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
control area held the majority of Angola’s C. Number of Refugees Produced by
widely-scattered alluvial diamonds, which Angola
provided UNITA rebels with approximately
two thirds of Angola's estimated 700 to The number of refugees and internally
800 million dollar diamond production in displaced persons in a region are two
1997.6 These yields constituted rebel factors that have a significant impact on
funding for the purchase of military arms, regional potential for conflict. The flow of
maintaining the high measure of armed these populations has a destabilizing
conflict presence. effect on countries by negatively affecting
adequate living standards, human
B. Armed Conflict Intensity development, and the environment.
Frightened people fleeing their homes
Armed Conflict Intensity quantifies the tend to lose the few assets they possess,
frequency and intensity of conflict in a and displacement severs family and
given country on a scale of 1 to 3; “Minor community links destroying human social
Armed Conflicts” score as “1”, capital.7 IDPs crowd into protected
“Intermediate Armed Conflicts” score as residential areas, increasing the risk of
“2”, and “Wars” score as “3”. The measure health epidemics and causing food
totals the scores in each conflict in a given shortages as they compete with the
country in a given year, so for example a resident population for limited resources.
country that has one Intermediate Armed
Conflict and one War, as was the case
Angolan Refugees
with Angola in 1992 and 1994, would
score a total of “4”. 400000
350000
Although the presence of armed 300000
250000
conflict in Angola was pervasive 200000
throughout the 1990’s, the intensity of the 150000
100000
conflict varied in accordance with political 50000
strife and peace agreements. This cyclical 0
nature of conflict intensity is reflected in 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
the graph below; note that DiamondWorks
Source: UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
chose to open its Yetwene mine during the bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=41d2c1
year 1998, a time that marks the 532&page=statistics
beginning of Angola’s last intense period
of violence. An estimated 426,000 Angolans fled
their country during the years of war
Total Conflict Intensity Level
leading up to 1992.8 The declining
presence of armed conflict in 1995 to
CIFP Conflict Intensity Scale
4
1997 following the signing of the Lusaka
3 Peace Protocol in 1994 permitted
international organizations such as the
(1-4)
2
7
1 Collier, Paul & L. Elliott & H. Hegre & A. Hoeffler
& M. Reynal-Querol, M. & N. Sambanis. Breaking
0 the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Policy. (Washington DC: The World Bank/Oxford
University Press, 2003) Pp. 15
Source: CIFP Database, “Data Query” 8
Boucher, Richard. Aid for Repatriation of Angolan
Refugees. Diplomatic statement. (Dispatch, Vol 3,
No 34, August 24, 1992).
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1992/
6
ibid html/Dispatchv3no34.html
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 10
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
UNHCR to begin repatriation programs to The heightened intensity of the civil
bring back those driven out a few years war in 1992 drove between 1.3 and 2
prior. The organization successfully million Angolans from their homes; most
brought home 145,000 refugees before a made their way to provincial centers and
subsequent and rapid breakdown in to Lunda.12 Only limited resettlement
political negotiations not only disrupted followed, and renewed conflict resulted in
repatriation programs, but also led to a further displacement with the result that
further exodus of 30,000 Angolans.9 In 810,000 Angolans were classified as IDPs
June 1998, the UNHCR was forced to in 1998.13 Military actions launched by
suspend its repatriation program in the UNITA late in 1998 triggered further
face of escalating violence. displacement, raising the IDP population
to over 1 million people as of May 1999.14
A UNHCR report released in 1998 IDPs were widespread throughout all 18
estimated Angola’s refugee number to be provinces during this round of
315,900,10 with the majority fleeing to displacement, with the largest
Zambia, Democratic Republic of Congo, concentrations in the provinces of
Namibia, and South Africa. The CIFP risk Malanje, Huambo, Huila and Beneguela.
index for Angola’s refugee status in the
1990’s never dropped below 7, and was
Confirm ed New IDPs by Most Affected
most frequently at level 8, indicating that
Provinces, February 1999
refugees constituted a considerable risk to
Angola’s social stability throughout the 28,611
decade.
32,419 Huambo
128,202 Huila
24,873
D. Number of Internally Displaced M alange
Peoples (IDPs) in Angola 41,199 Beneguela
Bie
36,877
M oxico
The ubiquity of Angola’s civil war 74,492
Uige
resulted in a near constant movement of 46,653
Bengo
people in cyclical waves of displacement 130,077 Kwanza Norte
throughout the 1990’s. While some
displacement was “voluntary” in the sense
that it was undertaken by citizens Source: CIDI http://www.cidi.org/humanitarian/hsr/99a/0003.html
themselves in order to avoid violence in
home regions, many individuals were also II. GOVERNANCE & POLITICAL
physically moved from their home INSTABILITY
territory through forced displacement
tactics undertaken by UNITA and the The indicators in this issue area are
MPLA.11 designed to reflect the influence of the
political system and stability on the
outbreak or continuation of conflict. A
9
UNHCR, Global Appeal 1999: Angola. lack of accountability and representation
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
12
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=MEDIA&id=3e ibid
13
aff43d12&page=home Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance. Angola
10
UNHCR. Refugees and Others of Concern to – Complex Emergency Situation Report. (Situation
UNHCR – 1998 Statistical Overview. Pp.7 Report #1, August 31 1998)
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi- http://www.angola.org/referenc/reports/usaid0898.ht
bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS ml
14
&id=3bfa31ac1#zoom=100 World Food Program. Protracted Relief and
11
Institute for Security Studies. Angola: Recovery Operation – Angola: Assistance to War-
Population. Affected People (9 September 1999) Pp. 4.
http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Angola/Population. http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/projects/615900.p
html df
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 11
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
on the part of the government limits the a given region. It is a valuable indicator
avenues through which grievances can be for the degree of control a government
constructively and peacefully aired, has over rebel forces and the extent of the
aggravating the risk of violence. This government's ability to quell violent
situation in particular arises in the case of conflict. In general, throughout the
government deals with multinational 1990’s, UNITA controlled much of the
corporations that exclude citizens from plateau and hinterland area. This
either a voice in the process or the provided them with access to between
beneficial economic results. sixty and seventy percent of diamond
production, which funded their military
The government of Angola endeavors.16 The MPLA held constant
routinely engaged in such activity control over the capital region for the
throughout the 1990’s, garnering mass entire duration of the civil war, securing
quantities of unearned income through access to remuneration from the deep-sea
profit-sharing oil agreements with oil fields.
multinational corporations. As the
following data will demonstrate, this did Control over specific geographic
not lead to a higher quality of life for areas of Angola varied from one year to
Angola’s citizens. Instead, funding was the next, depending on the military
usurped by corrupt high-level officials or success of the various warring factions.
channeled into military undertakings.15 In 1992, due to aggressive military action
The ensuing denial of basic civil and triggered by the loss of the 1992
political rights can exacerbate conflict by elections, UNITA forces controlled a full
limiting the options available for two-thirds of the country.17 This territorial
expressing dissent. Such endemic control was weakened in 1994 when the
corruption often leads to a loss of MPLA secured power over UNITA’s main
confidence in the state and its institutions, stronghold of Huambo, located in the
freeing the individual from the notion of central highlands.18 The signing of the
obligatory peaceful approaches to change Lusaka Peace Protocol prompted the
in favour of violent activities that fall reluctant return of further territory to the
outside of the political process. MPLA, so that in October of 1997, 108
UNITA controlled localities out of 337
A. Geographic Impact of the Conflict detailed for relinquishment to state control
had been handed over.19 As of June of
Geographic Impact of the Conflict - 1998 Rating Source 1998, however UNITA had still not set
Geographic area controlled by UNITA Variable HRW specific dates for the extension of State
administration to its four strongholds of
Regime Durability 9 CIFP
Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo and N'harea. 20
Domestic terrorist incidents per year 11 USSD/MIPT
Terrorist acts targeted at businesses 4+ USSD/MIPT
16
Spears, Ian. “Newsflashes Angola: Notes from the
i. Geographic Area under Control by Angolan Development Network”. Pp. 26-30 in
Opposition Groups (%) Southern Africa Report Archive. (August 1999, Vol.
14 , No. 4).
The percentage of the geographic http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=3736
area under control by opposition groups 17
Polity IV Country Report 2003: Angola
refers to how widespread the conflict is in http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Ang1.htm
18
ibid
15 19
Gamba, Virginia and Richard Cornwell. “Arms, Human Rights Watch Report, 1998: Angola.
Elites, and Resources in the Angolan Civil War” in Human Rights Developments.
Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), Greed and http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Africa-01.htm
20
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. UN. Angola: MONUA - background
(Ottawa: International Development Research Center, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Monua/mo
2000) Pp. 165 nuab.htm
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The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
After the death of UN special envoy of the prevailing insecurity, the free
Maître Alioune Blondin Beye in late June of circulation of people and goods was
1998, the tentative peace process impeded in many areas of Angola, and the
crumbled. UNITA had not demobilized to costs of security measures increased
the extent it claimed, and it’s remaining greatly.
forces proved effective as the rebel group
re-captured territory it had previously ii. Regime Durability
returned to the government. On 13
August 1998, the Security Council A durable regime reflects the
demanded by its resolution 1190 that government’s capacity to contain violence
UNITA cease its reoccupation of localities and to engage in conflict settlement.
where State administration had been During the 1990’s, Angola’s regime
established.21 Early 1999, however, saw durability was frequently at the worst
Savimbi loyalists back in control of large measure possible according to CIFP index
tracts of Angolan territory.22 In February measures. The country was classified by
1999, the UN peacekeeping mission to other sources as one engaged in “adverse
Angola (MONUA) was terminated, with the regime change” between 1992 and
explanation that conditions for a 1997.26 Polity IV ratings, graphed below,
meaningful United Nations peacekeeping illustrate the absence of regime durability
role had ceased to exist.23 during the 1990s as compared to the
1980s.
State Localities Under UNITA Control
Angola's Regime Durability
400
337
350
# of localities /337
16
300 14
250 229
12
Polity IV Scale
200 155 10
150 8
88
100 65 6
50 4
0 2
1996 Oct-97 Jan-98 Jun-98 Sep-98 0
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
Sources: HRW (June, Sept ’98), IRIN (Jan ’98), UNCHR
Source: CIFP database, “Issues Query”
This uncontained violence posed a
major hazard to DiamondWorks’ business iii. Domestic Terrorist Incidents
operations in 1998; both the Yetwene and 1998
Luo mines were located in Lunda Norte, a
province noted for its “persistent The number of terrorist attacks by
tensions”.24 The UN Secretary-General country is indicative of the extent and
reported in August of 1998 that UNITA prevalence of terrorism in a given country.
rebels continued to threaten government The term “terrorism” as applied by the
forces located in the region.25 As a result United States Federal Government means
premeditated, politically motivated
21
ibid violence perpetrated against non-
22
Polity IV Country Report 2003: Angola combatant targets by sub-national groups
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Ang1.htm
23
Supra note 19
24 26
Global Dialogue. The Rise and Fall of Angola's State Failure Task Force. “Adverse Regime
Lusaka Peace Process. (Volume 4.1 April 1999). Change” in Internal Wars and Failure of Governance
http://www.igd.org.za/pub/g- 1955-2002.
dialogue/africa/angola.html http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/sfcodebk.htm
25
Supra note 19 #top
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 13
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
or clandestine agents, usually intended to Significant Terrorist Incidents in Angola
influence and audience.27 1998
Date Terrorist Kille Missin Wounde
Under the definition of terrorism
(1998) Group/inciden d g d
used here, there were in fact countless t
terrorist incidences in the year 1998 March FLEC-FAC / 2 – both
alone, without accounting for the years 23 abduction later
returne
leading up to it. Throughout the 1990’s, d
both UNITA and Government forces April 22 FLEC-FAC / 10 -
engaged in forced displacement, abduction 1 later
returne
systematic rape, illegal conscription, d
village burning, and indiscriminate civilian April 30UNITA / 2
killings.28 abduction
May 19 Possibly UNITA 1 3
/ UN car attack
This widespread and uncontrolled Nov. 8 UNITA / 8 10 16
violence against civilian populations poses DiamondWorks
a serious threat to the integrity of attack
business operations through the creation Dec. 26 Undetermined / 14
UN aircraft
of unstable social and economic attack
circumstances. It also provides an Dec. 26 Undetermined/
environment within which unscrupulous News agency
corporations might benefit from poor attack
Dec. 31 Possibly UNITA 2 1
treatment of the population; for example, / Assassination
through forced displacement in its favour. Genera 3 mining business attacks reported by Endiama;
l No details available
To produce a quantifiable measure, all Total 25 24 20
terrorist incidents that were “significant”
in 1998 are outlined below. The criterion iv. Terrorist Acts Targeted at
of significance is met if a major terrorist Businesses, 1998
monitoring organization reported the
incident.29,30 There were six major terrorist
incidents targeted at international
businesses operating in Angola in 1998.
Two occurred in the province of Cabinda,
where rebels from the Front for the
Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave –
Cabinda Armed Forces (FLEC-FAC)
27
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Conflict abducted employees of Mota & Company
(MIPT). 2002. MIPT Terrorism Database System. on two separate occasions. Twelve
http://db.mipt.org/mipt_rand.cfm employees were kidnapped in total; two
28
Supra note 18, and Human Rights Watch. on March 23 and 10 on April 22. Three
Unfinished Democracy: Media and Political were reported returned, all of whom were
Freedoms in Angola. Portuguese; no information was provided
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/angola/2004/1.ht regarding the outstanding nine abductees,
m#_Toc77413305 all of whom were Angolan.31
29
United States of America Department of State.
“Appendix A: Chronology of Significant Terrorist
The Yetwene mine attack was the
Incidents” in Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998.
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_98/appa.htm last of four mining projects destroyed by
30
MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. “Angola”. UNITA forces during the 1998 year.
http://www.tkb.org/Category.jsp?catID=8206&conte Additional scattered hit-and-run attacks
ntType=0&sortBy=3&sortOrder=0&pageIndex=0 forced foreign mining companies to
Path: Knowledge Base Directory > Incidents >
31
Geographical Location > Africa > Angola Supra note 28
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 14
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
consolidate their personnel in core mining and procedural fairness in the political
areas.32 process. A rating of –88 indicates a
transition period, and –77 indicates a
Prior to 1998, UNITA already had a period of “interregnum” where there is a
history of targeting mines as a strategy complete collapse of central political
for limiting government access to authority. The index ratings below
revenues generated by foreign represent Angola’s failed struggle to
investment.33 For example, in 1984, establish a democracy during the 1990s.
UNITA took hostages from diamond
operations in the Cuango area; the CIFP Democracy/Autocracy Index,
following year the rebel outfit attacked a Angola, 1990's
diamond sorting center in Nzaji.34 This 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
strategy continued after the Yetwene 8 -88 -77 -88 -88 -88 -88 7 7 7
attack; for example, early in 1999, thirty
UNITA rebels attacked a Land Rover In a promising move, Angola shifted
carrying employees from an Australian- from a one-party Marxist-Leninist system
owned mining company, killing all four on ruled by the MPLA to a nominal multiparty
board.35 democracy following the 1992 elections.
MPLA President dos Santos retained his
B. Attitudes and Policies of title with more than 49% of the vote
Government and Opposition compared to that of UNITA leader Jonas
Savimbi, who received only 40%.36
Attitude and Policies of Savimbi rejected the results, claiming a
Government and Opposition Rating Source rigged election, and a second round
Democracy/Autocracy Index 7 CIFP balloting was postponed because the
Civil and Political Rights index 8 CIFP
Civil liberties score 6 CIFP
country disintegrated into civil war.
Political Rights score 6 CIFP
Press Freedom score 74 FH Angola made a second attempt at
Press Freedom index 8 CIFP democracy in April 1997 when the multi-
party Government of National Unity and
i. Level of Democracy Reconciliation (GURN) was established.
The National Assembly reconvened, and
The level of a country’s democracy is a seventy UNITA deputies, elected in 1992,
significant measure of the attitude and took their seats in this legislative body.
policies of the government with regards to However, despite the establishment of the
tolerance of opposition and freedom of GURN and the reinstatement of the
expression permitted in society. In the National Assembly, the MPLA continued to
CIFP database, a perfectly democratic dominate policy formulation and
society (index rating of “1”) would have implementation in Angola.37 In June 1999
established institutions for citizen the National Assembly voted to postpone
expression and executive constraints, as new presidential elections indefinitely due
well as a guarantee of civil liberties to all to the renewal of conflict with Savimbi's
citizens. Autocratic scores (index rating of UNITA forces. The failed attempts at
”9”) indicate an absence of effective democracy explain Angola’s routine
institutions to ensure political competition classification as a transitional or autocratic
state throughout the 1990’s.
32
Supra note 2
33
Supra note 29.
34
Justin Pearce, War, Peace, and Diamonds in
Angola: Popular Perceptions of the Diamond
36
Industry in the Lundas. (Institute for Security US Department of State. Background Note –
Studies, Situation Report. June 25, 2004). P.3 Angola. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm
35 37
Supra note 29 Supra note 21
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 15
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
ii. Restrictions on Civil Liberties and suppression that might justify or provoke
Political Rights violence on the part of either a
government or it’s citizens. In addition,
Restrictions on civil and political rights press freedom can gauge if international
are included as a conflict risk indicator businesses are receiving the flow of
because the measure reflects the level of information necessary to properly assess
government tolerance and respect for the degree of risk in an investment.
human rights. It can therefore highlight Freedom House assesses the degree to
situations in which a government might be which a country permits the free flow of
more willing to engage in violence in order information on a 1-100 point scale, where
to quash rebellion. The indicator can also countries scoring 61-100 are regarded as
identify situations in which citizens feel having a restricted press. Freedom House
the need to resort to violence, as when gave Angola a rating of 74 out of 100 for
there are few institutionalized means to both 1998 and 1999, classifying the press
air grievances or participate in the political as “not free”.40 These figures translate
process. into a CIFP press freedom index rating of
8 out of 9.
Political rights are those rights that
enable citizens to participate freely in the Restrictions on press freedom were
political process, which includes activities generally severe in Angola during the
such as the right to vote and run for 1990’s; these years saw a reversing of the
public office. Civil liberties include the partial liberalization that had occurred in
freedoms to develop views, institutions, the run-up to the 1992 election. The
and personal autonomy apart from the private media and the civic and political
state. Freedom House uses a 1-7 scale to groups that had appeared with the
measure both civil liberties and political adoption of a multiparty constitution in
rights where 1 indicates high degrees of 1992 were afterwards confronted by
civil and political freedoms and 7 indicates serious and often violent denial of those
a very low measure. In 1998, Angola freedoms. The MPLA frequently detained
scored a “6” for both civil liberties and journalists without trial, and only pro-
political rights, and was classified as “not government groups were permitted to
free” by Freedom House.38 The CIFP civil demonstrate. Throughout the 1990s,
and political rights index, which are based journalists operating in government areas
on a 1-9 scale, where 1 is “free” and 9 is were murdered, assaulted, and received
“not free”, likewise indicate low levels of threats to their physical safety. UNITA
civil liberties and political rights for the similarly monopolized the media and
country. The best rating Angola received allowed no dissent in the areas under its
in the 1990s was in 1991, when pending military control.41 Journalists who worked
elections allowed for a rating of “7”. In for the Voice of the Resistance of the
years that followed, Angola scored either Black Cockerel (VORGAN), UNITA’s radio
8 or 9.39 station, were threatened with physical
aggression and imprisonment if suspected
iii. Restrictions on Press Freedom of passing information to government
forces.
Like civil liberties and political rights,
press freedom is a useful indicator of
38 40
Freedom House. Freedom in the World: Country Freedom House. Freedom of the Press - Angola
Ratings 1972 through 2003. http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pfsratings.xls
41
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/allscore04.xls Human Rights Watch. Unfinished Democracy:
39
CIFP. http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/ Path: Data Media and Political Freedoms in Angola.
query and mapping > Angola/civil and political rights http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/angola/2004/1.ht
index/1990-99. m#_Toc77413305
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 16
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
C. Level of Corruption grounds for the violent mobilization of
popular grievances.44
Level of Corruption Rating Source
Corruption Perceptions Index 1.7 ICCR i. Corruption Perceptions Index
Bribe Payers Index (Canada) 8.4 TI
The CPI is designed to measure the
As the following analysis of Angola degree to which corruption is perceived to
illustrates, corruption is one of the factors exist among public officials and politicians
that helps to sustain situations of poor in a given society. Angola did not receive
governance, state failure, and violent a CPI rating during the 1990’s. It was
conflict. Angola has been classified as a first rated in 2000, when it received a
“rentier state”42 meaning its officials rely score of 1.7 out of 10, 10 being highly
on unearned income from oil and diamond “clean” and 0 being highly corrupt. It
revenues and have weak ties to the placed 85th out of 90 countries scored that
citizens of the country. The result is that year.45
foreign investment revenues are used to
fund their own personal expenses rather ii. Bribe Payers Index
than investing in social welfare plans.
The Transparency International Bribe
Global Witness supported this Payers Index was developed as a
classification with the finding that over $1 complement to the CPI, and addresses the
billion US – approximately ¼ of the supply side of bribery by ranking leading
annual budget - disappeared from state exporting countries in terms of the degree
revenues on an annual basis between to which international companies with
1996 and 200143 indicating an extremely their headquarters in those countries are
poor transparency level. Much of the likely to pay bribes to senior public
profit remaining funded military officials in key emerging market
endeavors. By devoting public resources economies. A perfect score, indicating
to the personal ambitions and needs of zero perceived propensity to pay bribes, is
government officials, the basic needs of 10.0, and thus the ranking below starts
civil society were ignored and Angola’s with companies from countries that are
social development suffered as a result. seen to have a low propensity for foreign
This rentier activity provided fertile bribe paying.
The earliest measure for Canada was
taken between 1998 and 2002, and places
the country 5th out of 21 countries on the
42
See for example Looney, R. “The Broader Middle BPI with a score of 8.1.46 This positive
East Initiative: Requirements for Success in the Gulf” rating comes with the caveat that junior
in Strategic Insights, (Volume III, Issue 8 August mining companies, as DiamondWorks was
2004) Pp.1 in 1998, are capable of “flying below the
www.ccc.nps.navy.mil\si\2004\aug\looneyaug04.asp
and
Isham, Johnathan, Michael Woodcock, Lant Prichett,
44
Gwen Busby. “The Varieties of the Rentier Seymour, Lee J.M.. “It’s About Diamonds and
Experience: How Natural Resource Endowments Oil! Angola’s Political Economy of Violence” in
Affect the Political Economy of Economic Growth”. Review. (North South Institute, Summer 2001)
45
(World Bank: Working Paper 2002) Pp.18 Transparency International. The Corruption
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/voddocs/171/35 Perception Index 2000..
2/rentier.pdf http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2000/cpi2000.html
43 46
Global Witness, Time for Transparency 2004. Transparency International. Bribe Payers Index
Pp.4 2002.
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/gw- http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2
transparency-24mar.pdf 002/2002.05.14.bpi.en.html
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 17
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton UniversityConflict Risk Assessment Report: Angola and DiamondWorks
radar” in the legal and moral sense.47 ii. Number of core human rights
This caveat has significant implications for treaties signed and ratified by host
DiamondWorks’ home country of Canada, country
which has a reputation as a source of easy
venture capital for small mining and The number of core human rights
exploration companies.48 treaties signed and ratified by a given
country has been used in the past as a
D. Human Rights significant measure of human rights
because it suggests a nation’s
Human Rights Rating Source commitment to the welfare of it’s citizens
Physical Quality of Life Index 43 Lijn through consent to an internationally
Number of core human rights treaties ratified 4 UN
recognized agreement. By 1998, Angola
had ratified 4 of the 7 core human rights
i. Physical Quality of Life Index treaties. Ratified were: The International
(PQLI) Convention on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (1992), the International
The PQLI is a measure that Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
combines the measures of literacy, infant (1992) and its Optional Protocol (1992),
mortality rate, and life expectancy to the Rights of the Woman (1986), the
measure human rights. It reflects the Rights of the Child (1990). As of 1998,
level of socio-economic rights and ranks Angola had yet to ratify the Convention on
countries in terms of changes in real life Torture, the Genocide Convention, and the
chances, rather than focusing on income. Convention for the Elimination of all Forms
Angola’s rating of 43 out of 100 in 1992 of Racial Discrimination.50
was low compared to Canada’s measure of
94, indicating poor social conditions in the In addition to ratification,
home and the external environment, and adherence to these human rights treaties
an inability of Angolan citizens to must be monitored and noted. In this
participate in shaping their environment.49 regard, Angola’s evaluation is poor.
Reports required to indicate compliance
with the 4 ratified treaties were all
outstanding in 1998.51 In addition,
human rights abuses were widespread
throughout the 1990’s, with both the
47
Danielson, Luke. Striving, Surviving, and MPLA and UNITA restricting freedom of
Thriving: Sustainable Development and Junior movement, arbitrarily abducting or
Mining and Exploration Companies. Pp. 4 detaining civilians, denying fair trial,
http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:rmJKKREAa_ censoring information, and conscripting
EJ:www.minersmanual.com/news/LD_StrivingSurvi child soldiers.52 These actions violate
vingThriving.pdf+Striving,+Surviving,+and+Thrivin every one of the four ratified treaties.
g:+Sustainable+Development+and+Junior+Mining+a
nd+Exploration+Companies&hl=en
48
Smillie, Ian Lansana Gberie, and Ralph Hazelton..
The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds,
and Human Security. (Partnership Africa Canada
January 2000) http://www.sierra-
50
leone.org/heartmatter.html UN. For the Record 1998: The UN Human Rights
49
van der Lijn, Nick. Measuring Well-Being With System Path: For the Record > Volume 2: Africa>
Social Indicators: HDI, PQLI, and BWI for 133 Angola.
countries for 1975, 1980, 1985, 1998, and 1992. http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/vol2/angolarr.ht
(Tilburg University, Research Memorandum No. 704 m
51
1995) Pp. 7, 8 ibid
52
http://greywww.kub.nl:2080/greyfiles/few/1995/doc/ Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999: Angola
704.pdf http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/africa/angola.html
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, June 2005 18
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