Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific - A Potential Change for the Army and Joint Force - National Defense ...

 
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Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific - A Potential Change for the Army and Joint Force - National Defense ...
Combat controller watches as C-17 Globemaster III,
assigned to 17th Weapons Squadron, Nellis Air Force
Base, Nevada, lands on airstrip in Nevada Test and
Training Range during joint forcible entry exercise,
June 16, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kevin Tanenbaum)

                                                                                   he nature of troop dispositions

Countering A2/AD in T                                                              coupled with the expanse of
                                                                                   ocean and numerous islands
                                                                           scattered in the Indo-Pacific region

the Indo-Pacific                                                           compels the redevelopment of con-
                                                                           ventional forcible-entry amphibious
                                                                           capability in the U.S. Army for deploy-
A Potential Change for the                                                 ment and maneuver. As Commander-
                                                                           in-Chief Far East, General Douglas

Army and Joint Force                                                       MacArthur made this assessment over
                                                                           half a century ago, but it deserves intel-
                                                                           lectual inquiry and dialogue in the con-
                                                                           temporary period based on the growing
By Hassan M. Kamara
                                                                           strategic competition and potential for
                                                                           conflict between the United States and
                                                                           its allies and China in the Indo-Pacific.
              The Commander-in-Chief, Far East, considers amphibious       Furthermore, this assessment deserves
                                                                           contemplation based on the Army’s
          training to have unusual significance and importance in the
                                                                           ongoing conceptualization of multido-
          Far East Command since the nature of troop dispositions and      main formations to help future joint
                                                                           force commanders apply the Service’s
         geography in the theater are such that a continuous requirement
                                                                           capabilities across all domains, thereby
              exists for the training of troops in over-water movement.
     —Letter from General HQ, Far East Command to ACofS G3 Operations,
                      Headquarters Department of the Army, April 3, 1950   Major Hassan M. Kamara, USA, is an Officer in
                                                                           the U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center. He
                                                                           recently served on the Army Future Studies
                                                                           Group.

JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020                                                                                     Kamara        97
Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific - A Potential Change for the Army and Joint Force - National Defense ...
Paratroopers of 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, conduct joint forcible entry operation during brigade’s Mungadai event, on Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, April 5, 2016 (U.S. Army/Jason Hull)

presenting multiple and compounding                 maneuver the U.S. military’s decisive                and fight as landing forces in joint forc-
dilemmas for an adversary.1                         ground force (the Army) through the                  ible entry amphibious operations.
    A conflict with China in the Indo-              maritime domain.3 This proposed change                   Landing forces are central to amphibi-
Pacific region will most likely involve             is congruent with the mission of the                 ous operations. In fact, Joint Publication
regional access-denial efforts by China,            Army as a component of the joint force.              (JP) 3-02, Amphibious Operations,
resulting in a counter-antiaccess/area              According to Army Doctrinal Publication              defines an amphibious operation as “a
denial (A2/AD) campaign by the United               1, the Army’s mission is “to fight and win           military operation launched from the sea
States and its allies. U.S. joint doctrine          the Nation’s wars through prompt and                 by an amphibious force (AF) embarked in
anticipates the possibility of engaging in a        sustained land combat, as part of the joint          ships or craft with the primary purpose of
counter-A2/AD campaign and mandates                 force.”4 Strategic and tactical mobility             introducing a landing force (LF) ashore
that “the Armed Forces of the United                are inherent to the Army’s mission, and              to accomplish the assigned mission.”5
States must be capable of deploying and             amphibious operation—as a basic means                Also, a landing force can be comprised of
fighting to gain access to geographical             of deploying and maneuvering Army                    either Army or Marine units.6
areas controlled by forces hostile to U.S.          forces—is vital to the accomplishment
interest.”2 U.S. forces conduct joint forc-         of the Army’s mission and its role in the            Justification for Studying
ible entry operations to gain and maintain          joint force.                                         Redevelopment
access to areas against armed opposition.               It bears emphasizing that the Army               Contemporary advancements in military
    The redevelopment of conventional               has amphibious-capable logistics forces              A2/AD capabilities and regional eco-
forcible-entry Army amphibious forces               that support joint operations (for ex-               nomic and security trends underscore
will enhance the joint forcible entry               ample, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore).              the need to study this topic and foster
capability and capacity of U.S. forces in           However, the Service lacks conventional              dialogue. First, the sophistication of
a potential counter-A2/AD campaign                  (regular Army, non–special operations)               the integrated air defenses of America’s
against China in the Indo-Pacific by                combat arms formations that are orga-                potential near-peer adversaries makes the
enabling commanders to deploy and                   nized, trained, and equipped to deploy               contemporary construct of air superiority

98   Features / Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific                                                                          JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020
Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific - A Potential Change for the Army and Joint Force - National Defense ...
as a condition for deploying and maneu-              A2/AD. Antiaccess is described in the      rubric to highlight how the redevelop-
vering ground forces unrealistic in future      2012 JOAC as “those actions and capa-           ment of forcible-entry Army amphibious
counter-A2/AD operations. The U.S.              bilities, usually long range, designed to       forces would enhance the joint forcible
Army Training and Doctrine Command              prevent an opposing force from entering         entry capability and capacity of U.S.
(TRADOC) acknowledges the challenge             an operational area.” The JOAC differen-        forces in a possible counter-A2/AD cam-
posed by modern A2/AD capabilities              tiates antiaccess from area denial. It states   paign against China in the Indo-Pacific.
and argues that “integrated air defense         that “area denial refers to those actions           Since these precepts are inherently
networks complicate joint operations            and capabilities, usually of shorter range,     oriented toward meeting the challenges
because hidden, lethal, and dispersed air       designed not to keep an opposing force          that will be presented to U.S. joint
defenses can allow the enemy to establish       out, but to limit its freedom of action         forces by the A2 campaign of a potential
air superiority from the ground and take        within the operational area.”10                 peer adversary like China, their use as
away an essential condition for effective            The JOAC expects U.S. adversaries          units of analysis is appropriate. In other
joint force operations.”7 This anticipated      will use A2/AD strategies to offset U.S.        words, these precepts are an excellent
contest in the air domain, and the poten-       strategic superiority in multiple domains,      lens to highlight and appreciate the po-
tial that the United States could lose its      and it presents conceptual alternatives         tential utility of the Army redeveloping
forward bases early in a Chinese A2 cam-        to counter them. In the Indo-Pacific,           conventional forcible-entry amphibious
paign, precipitate the need to find ways        the joint force should expect China to          forces to enhance the joint force. The
and means of deploying and maneuver-            employ an A2/AD strategy that will              following are the selected precepts of
ing decisive ground forces through              challenge theater access and freedom of         operational access—highlighted in the
potential corridors of opportunity in the       maneuver in a potential conflict. Based on      2012 JOAC—that comprise the units of
maritime domain.                                the ability of U.S. adversaries to challenge    analysis for this study:
     Contemporary economic and security         the joint force’s legacy counter-A2/AD
                                                                                                ••   Seize the initiative by deploying and
affairs in the region further underscore        capabilities, TRADOC writes that “the
                                                                                                     operating on multiple, independent
the need to study this topic and foster         joint force should anticipate disrupted
                                                                                                     lines of operations.
dialogue. Armed conflict between the            deployment and sustainment operations
                                                                                                ••   Exploit advantages in one or more
United States and its allies and China in       and degraded effectiveness of the standoff
                                                                                                     domains to disrupt enemy A2/AD
the Indo-Pacific is likely because China        targeting and strikes currently required to
                                                                                                     capabilities in others.
views the South China Sea as a long-term        gain access and seize the initiative.”11
                                                                                                ••   Maneuver directly against key
resource vital to meeting its needs and              The 2012 JOAC. The 2012 JOAC
                                                                                                     operational objectives from strategic
so seeks to control it. This is evident in      describes how the U.S. military envisions
                                                                                                     distance.14
China’s ongoing construction and force          its response to emerging A2/AD capabil-
buildup on artificial islands and its armed     ities of potential adversaries, who seem to
maritime confrontation with other na-           view the latter as a preferred method to
                                                                                                The Precepts
                                                                                                Through the lens of the following
tions over its appropriation of islands.        counter U.S. strategic superiority across
                                                                                                precepts of operational access, it is
Geoffrey Till concurs and writes that the       domains. Through its central thesis of
                                                                                                conceivable that the redevelopment
South China Sea is a “stock resource”           cross-domain synergy and its principles or
                                                                                                of conventional forcible-entry Army
that China sees “as an economic resource        precepts, “the JOAC describes how the
                                                                                                amphibious forces will enhance the joint
vital to its future prosperity” because of      future joint forces will achieve operational
                                                                                                forcible entry capability and capacity of
the oil, gas, and fish that will support        access in the face of such strategies [anti-
                                                                                                U.S. forces in a potential counter-A2/
its growing energy and human needs.8            access and area denial].”12
                                                                                                AD campaign against China in the
Robert Kaplan writes that “at some                   Cross-Domain Synergy. The concept
                                                                                                Indo-Pacific.
point, China is likely to, in effect, be able   of cross-domain synergy outlined in the
                                                                                                    Seize the Initiative by Deploying and
to deny the U.S. Navy unimpeded access          2012 JOAC advocates the “comple-
                                                                                                Operating on Multiple, Independent
to parts of the South China Sea.”9 This         mentary” versus the merely “additive”
                                                                                                Lines of Operations. The redevelopment
will precipitate conflict with the United       employment of joint force capabilities to
                                                                                                of conventional forcible-entry Army
States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.      optimize exploitation of the asymmetric
                                                                                                amphibious forces will enhance the
                                                advantages inherent in each Service’s
                                                                                                joint force’s capability and capacity to
Concepts and Framework                          capabilities.13
                                                                                                mount multiple lines of operations across
of Analysis                                          The Analytical Framework. The
                                                                                                domains. The latter can compound the
Articulating the concepts and the               concept of cross-domain synergy as pre-
                                                                                                number of avenues of approach an enemy
framework used for the ensuing analysis         sented in the 2012 JOAC rests on certain
                                                                                                has to defend in its A2 campaign. The
is necessary to foster understanding.           precepts intended to help guide think-
                                                                                                JOAC concurs and posits that “operating
The concepts discussed include A2/AD,           ing and planning for future counter-A2
                                                                                                on multiple lines in multiple domains
the Joint Operational Access Concept            campaigns. The following analysis uses
                                                                                                simultaneously can help joint forces to
(JOAC), and cross-domain synergy.               a selection of these precepts as a lens or

JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020                                                                                                       Kamara   99
seize the initiative by overloading the       surface-to-air missile unit, and several      a unique role as America’s elite light ex-
enemy’s ability to cope.”15                   units of the Shorts Blowpipe and SA-7         peditionary ground combat force, a role
    During his 1944 World War II Pacific      Grail man-portable air-defense systems.17     for which the Army, with its greater mass
campaign, General MacArthur success-              British military planners were            for sustained ground combat operations,
fully seized Saidor, New Guinea, from the     compelled to exploit the Royal Navy’s         is ill suited. The transformation proposed
Japanese by deploying Army, joint, and al-    capabilities in the maritime domain           in this article is not targeted at having
lied forces on multiple lines of operations   for deployment and decisive ground            the Army usurp the role of the Marine
across domains. His combat report fol-        maneuver because the Argentine air            Corps but rather at giving future U.S.
lowing the seizure of Saidor proves this:     defense threat precluded airborne             joint force commanders and planners the
                                              forcible-entry operations. Additionally,      ability to deploy and maneuver the Army
We have seized Saidor on the north coast      there was no host nation bordering the        through temporary maritime corridors
of New Guinea. Lit a combined operation       Falkland Islands that could be used for       of opportunity provided by the Navy to
of ground, sea and air forces, elements of    forward staging and maneuver. Michael         apply its unrivaled capacity for sustained
the Sixth Army landed at three beaches        Clapp, the commander of the British           ground combat in the Indo-Pacific.
under cover of heavy air and naval            Amphibious Task Group at the time,                  The counterargument that the am-
bombardment. The enemy was surprised          writes that quite early in their prepara-     phibious capability of the Marine Corps is
both strategically and tactically and the     tion, British military planners appreciated   prodigious enough to preclude the need
landings were accomplished without loss.      the disconcerting fact that “there would      for complementary amphibious capability
The harbor and airfields are in our firm      be no ‘host-nation’ and we would there-       in the Army also fails to take into account
grasp. Enemy forces on the north coast        fore have to offload (possibly during the     the potential for China, like Argentina
between the Sixth Army and the advancing      opposed landing always considered so          in the Falklands War, to field forces with
Australians are trapped with no source        unlikely by the Government), protect          capabilities and such mass that it becomes
of supply and face disintegration and         ourselves and deploy forward using our        necessary to employ the Army for its
destruction.16                                own assets and fuel.”18                       mass and endurance in ground combat.
                                                  Given the mass or troop strength of       This counterargument also neglects the
     Exploit Advantages in One or             Argentinian forces on the Falkland Islands,   possibility that an adversary may widely
More Domains to Disrupt Enemy A2/             retaking them required the decisive           distribute its forces among the many dis-
AD Capabilities in Others. Growing            ground forces of the British army in addi-    connected land masses in the Indo-Pacific
conventional forcible-entry amphibi-          tion to Royal Marine commando forces.         (consider Japan in the World War II Pacific
ous capability in the Army will enable        This understanding required deploying         campaign) to necessitate employing the
joint force commanders to deploy and          both Royal Marine commando forces             Army’s decisive ground forces as part of a
maneuver the Service’s decisive ground        and the non-amphibious, decisive ground       joint and allied effort to dislodge them.
forces through the maritime domain,           forces of the British army into a maritime-         The British experience in the
not just the air domain, which creates        centric theater where the enemy was           Falklands campaign shows that in a
a dilemma for an adversary’s A2/AD            contesting access by air and sea. Michael     counter-A2/AD campaign, particularly
campaign planning. This transformation        Clapp writes that “it was clear . . . that    in a maritime-centric region like the
will provide an asymmetrical advantage        merchant ships would be required and          Indo-Pacific, the complementary versus
critical for maneuvering against enemy        that the 3rd Commando Brigade, Royal          the merely additive employment of joint
positions on the many disconnected land       Marines, would be enhanced by further         force capabilities is critical to optimal
masses that will constitute objectives in     Army forces.”19                               exploitation of the asymmetric advantages
a potential counter-A2/AD campaign                Clapp’s statement compels conten-         inherent in each Service’s capabilities. The
against China. The British experience in      tion with a major counterargument to          British complemented the amphibious
the 1982 Falkland Islands campaign is         redeveloping forcible-entry amphibious        commando forces of the Royal Marines
instructive in this regard.                   capability in the U.S. Army for employ-       with shipborne army paratroopers to fully
     Following its full occupation of the     ment in the Indo-Pacific, which is that       exploit the Royal Navy’s sea control for
Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982, the        the amphibious capability of the U.S.         deployment and decisive ground maneu-
Argentinian military developed an inte-       Marine Corps is prodigious enough to          ver against Argentine forces.
grated air defense system in and around       preclude the need for complementary                 Maneuver Directly Against Key
Port Stanley with the aid of an AN/TPS-       amphibious capability in the Army. This       Operational Objectives from Strategic
43 Search radar and a command, control,       counterargument indirectly suggests that      Distance. Redeveloping forcible-entry
and communications center (Centro             redeveloping forcible-entry amphibious        amphibious capability in the Army will
de Información y Control). According          capability in the Army can make it dupli-     afford joint force commanders the flex-
to Rodney Burden and his co-authors,          cative and therefore capable of replacing     ibility of deploying America’s decisive
Argentinian forces deployed several           the Marine Corps. This suggestion is          ground forces directly into combat from
batteries of antiaircraft guns, a Roland      groundless because the Marine Corps has       the U.S. mainland and other overseas

100   Features / Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific                                                         JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020
Marines take new Amphibious Combat Vehicle out for open-ocean low-light testing at Del Mar Beach on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California,
December 17, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Andrew Cortez)

bases—thereby complicating enemy                  airpower against critical U.S. forward             corridors facilitated by the Royal Navy’s
defensive preparations by wielding an             bases like Kadena Air Force Base, Japan,           control of the sea. Subsequently, the
Army that is not tied to fixed forward            and Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The             British military hastily requisitioned sev-
bases or restricted solely to deployment          study’s “analysis shows that China’s con-          eral merchant ships taken up from trade
and maneuver through the air domain               ventional missile forces have expanded             (STUFTs) to transport ground forces
(for example, airborne forced entry).             their capabilities over the past 15 years          to the Falkland Islands. Many STUFTs
According to the 2012 JOAC, “some                 to the point that the PLA [People’s                were hurriedly retrofitted for transporting
elements of the joint force will oper-            Liberation Army] can now contest U.S.              Army and Marine commando troops.
ate directly against key objectives from          air base operations within roughly 1,500           Among the STUFTs was the North Sea
points of origin or other points outside          km of Chinese territory. This capability           ferry MV Norland, which transported
the theater without the need for forward          will indirectly impinge on a much larger           840 paratroopers from the British army’s
staging.”20 The JOAC cautions that the            range of U.S. capabilities, complicating           Second Battalion, Parachute Regiment.23
assured regional access afforded by U.S.          the air superiority battle.”22                     Another STUFT used to move troops
forward bases can be degraded by attacks              The British army’s experience in the           in the counter-A2 campaign was the SS
on those bases and consequently “calls            1982 Falklands War offers insight on the           Canberra, a cruise ship.
for some elements of a joint force to ma-         subject of maneuvering directly against
neuver against key operational objectives         key operational objectives from a strategic        The Way Ahead:
directly from ports of embarkation.”21            distance. Given that the airspace over             Recommendation
    According to a 2015 RAND study                the South Atlantic was contested by the            There are many considerations inherent
of U.S.-China military capabilities and           Argentine air force, and the objective was         in redeveloping conventional forcible-
capacity in simulated Taiwan and Spratly          an island without a land-bordering “host-          entry amphibious capability in the
Islands campaign scenarios, the Chinese           nation,” the British army had to deploy            Army. Two broad yet critical consider-
military will be able to contest U.S. air         and maneuver directly against operational          ations are examined herein. First, as part
superiority through the use of conven-            objectives in the Falkland Islands from            of any effort to redevelop conventional
tional precision standoff weapons and             the United Kingdom using maritime                  forcible-entry amphibious capability

JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020                                                                                                             Kamara     101
in the Army, this Service and the joint       force’s ability to deploy and maneuver              .
force as a whole should develop an            America’s decisive ground force against an               5
                                                                                                         JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations (Wash-
intellectual foundation in the form of an     adversary like China in a contested mari-           ington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 10, 2009),
operational concept that will facilitate      time-centric region like the Indo-Pacific           xi, available at .
overall force management decisions.           air domains. Redeveloping forcible-entry
                                                                                                       6
                                                                                                         Ibid., II-7.
                                                                                                       7
                                                                                                         Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Com-
As part of this effort, the Army should       amphibious capability in the Army will
                                                                                                  bined Arms for the 21st Century, 2025–2040,
review and update its legacy doctrine for     afford future joint force commanders the            version 1.0 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC,
amphibious operations in coordination         flexibility of deploying and maneuvering            December 2017), available at .
                                                                                                       8
                                                                                                         Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the
Field Manual 31-12, Army Forces in            temporary corridors of sea control af-
                                                                                                  Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge,
Amphibious Operations (The Army               forded by the Navy. This will increase              2013), 319.
Landing Force), provided Army com-            the overall cross-domain synergy of U.S.                 9
                                                                                                         Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The
manders and planners “the fundamental         forces in a potential counter-A2/AD cam-            South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific
principles, doctrine, and procedures          paign against China in the Indo-Pacific. In         (New York: Random House, 2015), 15.
                                                                                                       10
                                                                                                          Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC),
relative to the U.S. Army component of        his work on A2/AD, Sam Tangredi high-
                                                                                                  version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department
an amphibious task force.”24 Obsolete         lights the value of cross-domain synergy            of Defense, January 17, 2012), available at
doctrinal documents like this are worth       and writes that “militaries that can obtain         .
foundation of Army amphibious opera-          more capable [ones].”26 JFQ
                                                                                                       11
                                                                                                          Multi-Domain Battle.
                                                                                                       12
                                                                                                          JOAC.
tions as part of the joint force.                                                                      13
                                                                                                          Ibid.
    Working in concert with the Navy and                                                               14
                                                                                                          Ibid., 17.
Marine Corps, the Army should consider        Notes                                                    15
                                                                                                          Ibid., 20.
identifying, training, and qualifying two                                                              16
                                                                                                          Reports of General MacArthur, The
brigade combat teams (BCTs) to operate
                                                   1
                                                     U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-         Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, vol. 1
                                              mand (TRADOC), Pamphlet 525-3-1, The                (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Mili-
as landing forces in an amphibious task       U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028           tary History, 1994), 132, available at . The Army’s evolving con-          Air War (London: British Aviation Group,
                                              cept of multidomain operations is congruent         1986), 17–18.
landing force. For operational flexibility,   with the joint force’s efforts to integrate U.S.         18
                                                                                                          Michael Clapp and Ewen Southby-Taily-
one of the BCTs should be capable of          capabilities to fight in “all domains.” Speak-      our, Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle
conducting ship-to-shore movement by          ing on changes in the character of war and the      of San Carlos Water (Annapolis, MD: Naval
helicopter (air assault) and the other by     global strategic landscape, General Joseph F.       Institute Press, 1996), 35.
surface (landing craft).                      Dunford, Jr., emphasized that the “future force          19
                                                                                                          Ibid., 25.
                                              must remain competitive in ‘all domains,’ deny           20
                                                                                                          JOAC, 23.
    Additionally, selecting a BCT to          adversaries’ ability to counter our strengths            21
                                                                                                          Ibid., 19.
serve as a landing force in joint forcible    asymmetrically, and retain the ability to project        22
                                                                                                          Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China
entry amphibious operations will ensure       power at a time and place of our choosing.”         Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the
the Army provides the joint task force        See “Gen. Dunford: The Character of War &           Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa
commander the doctrinally prescribed          Strategic Landscape Have Changed,” DOD              Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 45, available at
                                              Live, April 30, 2018, available at .
Operations, mandates that “the Army                2
                                                     Joint Publication (JP) 3-18, Joint                23
                                                                                                          Ibid., 64–65.
maneuver battalion, brigade, division,        Forcible Entry Operations (Washington,                   24
                                                                                                          Field Manual 31-12, Army Forces in Am-
or corps . . . be task-organized with ap-     DC: The Joint Staff, 2018), vii, avail-             phibious Operations (The Army Landing Force)
                                              able at .                               25
                                                                                                          JP 3-02, II-7.
                                                   3
                                                     Decisive ground force refers to the Army’s        26
                                                                                                          Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare:
    The redevelopment of conventional         unrivaled capacity (the combination of its supe-    Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD:
forcible-entry Army amphibious forces in      rior mass, lethality, and sustainment infrastruc-   Naval Institute Press, 2013), 157.
                                              ture) for sustained (long-term) ground combat
the contemporary period could benefit         operations.
the Army and the joint force in a potential        4
                                                     Army Doctrinal Publication 1, The Army
counter-A2/AD campaign against China          (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department
in the Indo-Pacific. Currently, the joint     of the Army, September 2012), 1–8, available at

102   Features / Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific                                                                 JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020
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