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EDHEC RESEARCH INSIGHTS - Institute - EDHEC Risk Institute
SPRING
                         2021

            Institute

RESEARCH INSIGHTS

EDHEC
EDHEC RESEARCH INSIGHTS - Institute - EDHEC Risk Institute
EDHEC RESEARCH INSIGHTS - Institute - EDHEC Risk Institute
EDHEC Research Insights 1

Contents
Climate change risk and
                                                           Introduction
  corporate bonds������������������������ 2
Gianfranco Gianfrate
A holistic goals-based investing

                                                           I
                                                              am delighted to introduce the latest EDHEC-Risk Institute special issue
  framework for analysing efficient                           of the EDHEC Research Insights supplement to Investment & Pensions
                                                              Europe, which aims to provide European institutional investors with an
  retirement investment decisions
                                                           academic research perspective on the most relevant issues in the industry
  in the presence of long-term care                        today.
  risk���������������������������������������������� 5        We first look at the relationship between exposure to climate change and
                                                           a firm’s credit risk. Companies with a high carbon footprint are more likely
Jean-Michel Maeso, Lionel Martellini,                      to default, hence the exposure to climate risks affects the creditworthiness
  Vincent Milhau, Anil Suri, Nevenka                       of loans and bonds issued by corporates.
                                                               In research supported by Bank of America, we then present a goals-based
  Vrdoljak
                                                           investing framework for analysing retirement investment decisions in the
Measuring and managing ESG                                 presence of long-term care risk. This is a flexible framework developed to
                                                           provide personalised advice on retirement investment decisions in the
 risks in sovereign bond                                   presence of life event risk.
 portfolios��������������������������������� 11               As part of the Amundi ETF, Indexing and Smart Beta Investment
Lou-Salomé Vallée                                          Strategies research chair at EDHEC-Risk Institute, we explore the impact of
                                                           ESG factors on the risk and return of sovereign bonds from an investor
From climate change to asset                               perspective, in particular investigating how to measure and manage ESG
                                                           risks in sovereign bond portfolios and their implications for sovereign bond
  prices���������������������������������������� 18
                                                           portfolio strategies.
Riccardo Rebonato                                              We consider the impact of climate change, and of the seriousness of our
                                                           abatement effort, on asset prices. How will investors fare under different
Introducing ESG with ETFs and in                           scenarios of climate change abatement and climate outcomes?
  factor investing������������������������ 21                 The results of the annual EDHEC European ETF, Smart Beta and Factor
Véronique Le Sourd, Lionel Martellini                      Investing Survey, which EDHEC-Risk Institute has been running since 2006
                                                           with the support of Amundi ETF, Indexing & Smart Beta, show a slowdown
Diversification and insurance:                             in the use of smart beta and factor investing strategies, and a growing
  which should come first?���������� 25                   interest in the integration of an SRI/ESG component into investment.
                                                               We then ask the following question as part of the EDHEC-Risk Institute/
Nicole Beevers, Hannes Du Plessis,                         FirstRand research chair on Designing and Implementing Welfare-Improv-
  Lionel Martellini, Vincent Milhau                        ing Investment Solutions for Institutions and Individuals: if diversification
                                                           and insurance (ie, dynamic hedging) are not mutually exclusive techniques,
Benefits of selection and allocation                       is there an optimal order for them to be performed? Our results show that it
 decisions in the French non-listed                        matters whether insurance or diversification comes first.
                                                               Finally, as part of the Swiss Life Asset Managers France research chair
 real estate investment fund                               on Real Estate in Modern Investment Solutions, we examine the risk and
 market �������������������������������������������� 32   return characteristics of French non-listed real estate funds to assess
                                                           whether traditional investment management techniques can be applied to
Béatrice Guedj, Lionel Martellini,
                                                           this growing universe of investment vehicles. We find supporting evidence
 Shahyar Safaee                                            that investors would indeed benefit from the implementation of selection
                                                           and allocation decisions.
                                                               We hope that the articles in the supplement will prove useful, informa-
                                                           tive and insightful. We wish you an enjoyable read and extend our warmest
© EDHEC-Risk Institute 2021. Research                      thanks to IPE for their collaboration on the supplement.
Insights is distributed with Investment &
Pensions Europe. No part of this publication               Lionel Martellini, Professor of Finance, EDHEC Business School,
may be reproduced in any form without the                  Director, EDHEC-Risk Institute
prior permission of the publishers. Printed by
Pensord, Tram Road, Pontllanfraith, Black-
wood, Gwent NP12 2YA, UK.
The articles in this supplement have been
written by researchers at EDHEC-Risk Institute.
IPE’s association with the supplement should not
be taken as an endorsement of its contents. All
errors and omissions are the responsibility of
EDHEC-Risk Institute.

                                                                                                                           SPRING 2021
EDHEC RESEARCH INSIGHTS - Institute - EDHEC Risk Institute
2 EDHEC Research Insights

                 Climate change risk
                 and corporate bonds
               Gianfranco Gianfrate, Professor of Finance, EDHEC Business
              School, Sustainable Finance Lead Expert, EDHEC-Risk Institute

Is there a relationship between exposure       worthiness widely used by rating agencies     absolute level but also in terms of carbon
to climate change and a firm’s credit risk?    and investors. Several papers have            intensity. The latter measure, obtained by
The distance to default, a widely used         analysed the influence of sustainability      scaling total emissions by firm revenue,
market-based measure of corporate              factors either on a firm’s value or on the    captures the operational configuration of
default risk, is actually negatively           cost of its debt, while this study focuses    companies and therefore their ability to
associated with the amount of a firm’s         on the default probability in terms of        switch to less polluting technology.
carbon emissions and carbon intensity.         distance to default.                             Credit risk is defined as the risk that a
Therefore, companies with a high carbon            Using a panel least squares regression,   borrower will not be able to meet its
footprint are more likely to default, hence    it is observed that there is a significant    financial obligations on time. The Basel
the exposure to climate risks affects the      and negative relationship between             Committee defines it as the risk that a
creditworthiness of loans and bonds            distance to default and the natural           borrower will default on debt by failing to
issued by corporates.                          logarithm of CO2 emissions, ceteris           make the required payments. Among the
                                               paribus. We find that this result is robust   approaches used in practice to estimate
                                               also when carbon intensity, which is the      the probability of corporate default, the

A
         s climate change and global           ratio between carbon emissions and sales,     structural approach – which calculates the
         warming are being addressed by        is used. Several robustness checks are        default probability on the basis of the
         tougher regulations, new emerging     performed and the results confirm a           firm’s capital structure – is widely used.
technologies, and shifts in consumer           significant and negative relationship            In particular, the distance to default is
behaviours, global investors are increas-      between distance to default and CO2           the number of standard deviations that
ingly treating climate risks as a key aspect   footprint.                                    the firm’s asset value is away from the
when pricing financial assets and deciding         In order to investigate causality         default and can be defined as:
on the allocation of their investment          between climate risk exposure and
                                                                                                               V           σ2 
portfolios. Recent estimates are shedding      creditworthiness, we investigate the                        ln  0  + µ −  t 
light on the broader indirect impact of        impact of the 2015 Paris Agreement as an                         F       2 
                                                                                                      DD =         t
                                                                                                                                         (1)
climate change on the value of assets held     exogenous policy shock. After the Paris                                 σ T
by banks and financial companies.              Agreement, high-emitting companies            where
Battiston et al (2017) find that, while        significantly shorten their distance to       V0 is the firm’s asset value at time 0,
direct exposures to the fossil fuel sector     default in comparison with low emitters.      m, sT are the firm’s value drift rate and
are small, the combined exposures to           This finding supports the view that           volatility,
climate policy-relevant sectors are large,     financial markets are increasingly pricing    Ft is the book value of the firm’s liabilities
heterogeneous, and amplified by large          the climate risk exposure of listed           to be paid by time t.
indirect exposures via financial counter-      companies – especially because of growing         For the empirical analysis, we calculate
parties. Thus, the exposure to climate risk    commitment among institutional                the one-year probability of default for our
could potentially pose systemic threats to     investors (Dyck et al [2019]; Krueger et al   sample in the period from 2008 to 2018.
global financial stability.                    [2020]).                                      In particular, the value of asset V is
   While the relationship between climate          All the above-mentioned results not       calculated for each trading day, approxi-
risk exposure and share prices is receiving    only underline the importance of carbon       mating it as the sum of the market value
growing attention from scholars and            awareness as a business strategy for          of equity and book value of liabilities for
investors, the impact on corporate bonds       polluting firms, but also show the key role   the same date. Using the obtained series
and loans appears relatively underex-          it plays with respect to those lenders that   of asset value estimates, log asset returns
plored. We contribute to filling this gap in   are exposed to their clients’ default and     are calculated and their volatility is then
the literature by investigating whether a      reputational risk. However, whether           computed. The newly calculated volatility
firm’s exposure to climate risks, measured     investors consider the level of CO2           of asset value sV is introduced to the
as its level of CO2 emissions and carbon       emissions in their corporate fixed income     inverted Black-Scholes formula to obtain
intensity, is associated with Merton’s         investments remains underexplored.            a new series of market values of assets,
distance to default, a measure of credit-      Carbon footprint can be measured at           and a new value for sV is then computed.

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EDHEC RESEARCH INSIGHTS - Institute - EDHEC Risk Institute
EDHEC Research Insights 3

This process is repeated iteratively until     opportunities and shocks. The ratio
the difference between two adjacent asset      between retained earnings and total assets
                                                                                                  1. Average distance to default
value estimates (calculated as the sum of      is used.                                           per quintile
squared differences) is lower than a small     l Industry and country effects. Each
measure, chosen arbitrarily as 10–5. Once      sector and country has different structural
the asset values are obtained, the next        characteristics and cyclical sensitivities
step is the calculation of distance to         that could impact firms’ creditworthiness.
default and corresponding probability of           The baseline tests examine the
default. The missing value is m, which is      relationship between a firm’s carbon
calculated as the natural logarithm of the     footprint and its distance to default using
expected returns obtained using the            the following specification:
Capital Asset Pricing Model.
   Our sample consists of the companies              DD = α + β X it + γ ′Yit + ∆ + εit (2)
included in the Bloomberg Barclays Agg
Corporate index. Out of the index              where the dependent variable is the
constituents, only companies that issued       distance to default of firm i in year t, Xit is
investment-grade fixed-rate corporate          the carbon footprint measured either as
bonds are included: the final sample           the amount of CO2 emissions or as carbon            Quintile 1 Quintile 2   Quintile 3   Quintile 4 Quintile 5
comprises 458 companies observed from          intensity obtained as CO2 emissions scaled
December 2006 to December 2017.                by firm revenue, Yit are a set of firm-level,
   For the calculation of annual distance      industry and country controls in year t,          R-squared of 30.9%. It can be noted that
to default, daily data for market value of     and D are year fixed effects.                     the natural logarithm of carbon emissions
equity, index returns and risk-free returns        An initial investigation of the data is       has a highly significant negative relation-
are employed. For liabilities, book values     obtained by partitioning the sample by            ship with distance to default. Therefore,
are used, meaning only annual observa-         CO2 emission levels. The pooled data are          we can expect companies that produce
tions were available in most cases. All data   divided into quintiles, each containing           more CO2 emissions to face higher risks in
are collected from Thomson Reuters             about 453 observations. Quintile 1                terms of activity disruptions or payments
DataStream, and expressed in US dollars.       contains the top 20% of companies with            of fines and, hence, a smaller distance to
All data on emissions are from Asset4.         the lowest level of carbon emissions, and         default. Emissions are a part of non-
   To test the relationship between            the fifth quintile contains the bottom 20%.       financial data that is clearly considered by
distance to default and climate risk               Figure 1 demonstrates that the average        investors when making decisions. In
exposure, we quantify the carbon               annual distance to default decreases as the       terms of economic significance, an
footprint – measured as the amount of          level of carbon emissions increases. It can       increase by 1% in carbon emissions
CO2 emitted – and carbon intensity,            be observed that the negative correlation         reduces the firm’s distance to default by
measured as the ratio between CO2              between CO2 emissions and Merton’s                about 28.6% on average, all other variables
emissions and firm revenue.                    distance to default is consistent and is          remaining constant. The fact that the
   The control variables are identified in     approximately linear.                             adjusted R-squared can be improved leads
the existing literature as corporate               As a further step, panel least squares        to the idea that other non-financial
characteristics that appear to influence       regressions are run between distance to           variables should be considered in the
the distance to default. In particular,        default and the natural logarithm of              investment analysis.
these are:                                     emissions. These regressions allow us to              All the control variables used are
l Firm size, measured as the natural           establish if the relationship analysed in         indicators of a company’s high probabil-
logarithm of total assets. Larger firms are    the descriptive statistics section is             ity of bankruptcy from a financial point
expected to have a lower probability of        significant.                                      of view. The relationship between the
default than smaller firms.                        First, a regression is run with only one      distance to default and the debt ratio is
l Firm profitability, which provides           explanatory variable, the natural loga-           negative and significant: the lower the
important information on the probability       rithm of total emissions. Even though the         debt ratio, the higher the likehood that a
of a firm going bankrupt. Less profitable      adjusted R-squared of the first regression        firm can survive in the future, and so an
firms are assumed to be more likely to be      is very low (0.026), the independent              increase in that ratio tends to be
acquired or go bankrupt. We use the            variable appears to be significantly and          associated with a decrease in the distance
operating margin as the metric to account      negatively correlated with Merton’s               to default. The operating margin gives an
for profitability.                             distance to default.                              indication of a company’s profitability
l Financial leverage, which is associated          A second regression is then performed         and, therefore, it is appropriate to
with the probability of a firm going           mantaining Merton’s distance to default           positively link it with distance to default,
bankrupt. Firms with lower equity are          as a dependent variable and the natural           based on the following observation: the
said to face more difficulties during          logarithm of total emissions as an                higher a company’s profitability, the
periods of liquidity shortage, when it         independent variable, but also including          lower the probability of default. Indeed,
becomes tougher to renew debt.                 all the control variables described in the        operating margin appears to be signifi-
l Asset value volatility: firms with higher    section above.                                    cantly and positively related to distance
asset volatility are expected to be more           From figure 2, it can be observed that        to default. The retained earnings to total
vulnerable than others.                        all the variables used are significant at         assets ratio helps to measure the extent
l Short-term liquidity needs, namely the       10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, with          to which a company relies on leverage.
ratio between working capital and total        the exeption of retained earnings/total           The lower this ratio, the higher its
assets.                                        assets and working capital/total assets.          leverage, which again increases the risk
l Retained earnings as an equity buffer to     This second regression has a good                 of bankruptcy where the firm cannot
deal with potential unexpected growth          explanatory power, with an adjusted               timely fulfil its debt obligations. How-

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4 EDHEC Research Insights

                                                                                                                                          An additional robustness check is
 2. Results of the multivariate analysis with pooled cross sections                                                                   carried out, as shown in model 5 in figure
 OLS of the calculated Merton distance to default, 2008–18                                                                            2. Instead of using total disclosed
                                                                                                                                      emissions, only direct emissions are used.
  Dependent variable: Merton’s distance to default                                                                                    Since this level of detail is available only
    1 2 3 4                                                                                                               5           for a limited number of companies, the
  					                                                                                                            (Fixed effects)    sample is reduced to 120 with 1,320 year
  Emissions							                                                                                                                    observations. Therefore, a panel least
  Emissions (ln)                          –0.186***         –0.244***			                                                –0.241***     squares regression is run using the same
                                          (0.056)            (0.049) 			                                                (0.045)       control variables and replacing the natural
  Carbon intensity			                                                               –0.171***         –0.216***                       logarithm of total emissions with the
  			                                                                               (0.057)           (0.052)                         natural logarithm of direct emissions.
  Firm characteristics							                                                                                                             The level of direct emissions continues
  Debt ratio		                                              –0.174***		                               –0.184***         –0.196***     to be significantly and negatively related
  		                                                         (0.047)		                                (0.047)           (0.042)       to Merton’s distance to default but only at
  Operating margin		                                          0.430***		                               0.591***          0.409***     a 10% significance level. These weaker
  		                                                         (0.165)		                                (0.176)           (0.149)       results could be due to the smaller size of
  Retained earnings ratio		                                 –0.067		                                  –0.079            –0.011        the sample. In addition, in this case
  		                                                         (0.070) 		                               (0.070)           (0.063)       retained earnings/total assets is signfi-
  Size 		                                                   –0.386***		                               –0.462***         –0.259***     cantly and positively related to distance to
  		                                                         (0.074)		                                (0.073)           (0.068)       default, and working capital/total assets is
  Volatility		                                             –24.579***		                             –24.523***        –21.084***
                                                                                                                                      significantly but negatively related.
  		                                                         (0.877)		                                (0.878)           (1.023)
                                                                                                                                      Surprisingly, the size variable is not
  Working capital ratio		                                     0.021		                                  0.033             0.004
                                                                                                                                      significant.
                                                                                                                                          Model 5 in figure 2 shows a regression
  		                                                         (0.056)		                                (0.056)           (0.051)
                                                                                                                                      with time fixed effects.The adjusted
  Constant                                10.160***         23.126***                7.407***         20.820***         20.094**
                                                                                                                                      R-squared improves and our previous
                                          (0.912)            (1.443)                (0.224)           (1.365)           (1.316)
                                                                                                                                      results hold: the relationship between the
  Industry controls                         Yes                Yes                     Yes               Yes               Yes
                                                                                                                                      natural logarithm of emissions and
  Country controls                          Yes                Yes                     Yes               Yes               Yes
                                                                                                                                      distance to default continues to be
  Observations                            2,222              2,222                  2,222              2,222             2,222
                                                                                                                                      negative and significant.
  Adjusted R²                              0.026              0.309                  0.025             0.306             0.441
                                                                                                                                          The Paris Agreement and the increased
  F statistic                             20.82***         111.14***                20.13***         110.026***         93.11**
                                                                                                                                      attention of investors to climate change
                                     (df = 2; 2,219)   (df = 8; 2,213)         (df = 2; 2,219)   (df = 8; 2,213)    (df = 8; 2,213)
                                                                                                                                      issues imposes risks on companies with
 Source: Capassso et al (2020)
                                                                                                                                      high CO2 emissions. Rigorous enforce-
 ** = Statistically significant at 5%;
                                                                                                                                      ment of existing environmental laws and
 *** = Statistically significant at 1%.
                                                                                                                                      the introduction of stricter criminal and
                                                                                                                                      civil penalties for polluters are expected
                                                                                                                                      for the future. This could result in a spike
                                                                                                                                      in costs and in impacts on issuers’
ever, in our model, the relationship is                                  default. In line with this, the association                  creditworthiness.
negative rather than positive and is not                                 observed is positive but not significant.                        This paper investigated whether a
significant. The results are probably                                        In order to evaluate the robustness of                   firm’s CO2 emissions affect Merton’s
biased by the presence of the debt ratio,                                the results, two more panel least square                     distance to default. The results show that
which is another indicator of leverage.                                  regressions are run. This time, instead of                   a higher level of emissions actually leads
Larger companies can be expected to be                                   using the natural logarithm of carbon                        to a lower distance to default. Descriptive
evaluated by the market as safer than                                    emissions, carbon intensity is employed.                     statistics already reveal the influence of
smaller companies; surprisingly the                                      Carbon intensity is the ratio between the                    CO2 emissions on the probability of
association found is negative, suggesting                                level of emissions and total sales. This ratio               default. The sample is divided into
that the market considers bigger compa-                                  is particularly used in the energy sector,                   quintiles (and deciles) according to each
nies riskier. Volatility is another funda-                               where carbon emissions are compared                          firm’s level of emissions: we show that
mental indicator of creditworthiness.                                    against the megajoule of energy produced.                    companies in the first decile or quintile
Merton’s structural credit risk model                                    Given the many different industries                          (less polluting firms) have a higher
(1974) was the first to indicate that                                    involved in the sample analysed, here                        distance to default compared to the most
reduced firm value volatility also leads to                              carbon emissions are divided by sales. As                    polluting firms. We find strong evidence
lower risk premiums, and in the regres-                                  before, first only carbon intensity is used as               that emissions are negatively associated
sion this relationship is indeed significant                             an independent variable, and then all the                    with distance to default. These findings
and negative. Lower volatility increases                                 control variables are added.                                 are confirmed using both the natural
the value of the assets and leads to a rise                                  The results are not different from the                   logarithm of emissions and carbon
in the distance to default. Finally,                                     previous analysis. Carbon intensity is                       intensity. The baseline results hold, even
working capital to total assets indicates a                              significantly and negatively associated                      excluding the energy and extractive
company’s ability to pay back creditors in                               with Merton’s distance to default. In                        industries. In unreported results, we
the short term. Those with a healthy and                                 addition, retained earnings/total assets                     additionally find that the carbon footprint
positive working capital should not have                                 and working capital/total assets are once                    decreases the distance to default following
problems paying their bills, and should                                  again not significant, and size remains                      regulatory shocks such as the Paris
therefore have a larger distance to                                      negatively related to distance to default.                   Agreement, which reveal policymakers’

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EDHEC Research Insights 5

intention to implement stricter climate                     financial risk disclosures for use by       References
policies.                                                   companies in providing information to       Battiston, S., A. Mandel, I. Monasterolo, F. Schütze and
   Given the outlook of increasing global                   investors, lenders, insurers, and other     G. Visentin (2017). A climate stress test of the financial
temperatures, it is important to assess                     stakeholders. Our findings prove that the   system. Nature Climate Change 7(4): 283–288.
the impact of this on the macro-economy                     work and recommendations of the task        Capasso, G., G. Gianfrate and M. Spinelli (2020). Climate
and financial markets. Rising tempera-                      force are justified as the amount of        change and credit risk. Journal of Cleaner Production 266:
tures may disrupt financial markets and                     carbon emitted by companies provides        1–10.
the banking system. Our results show                        investors with relevant information.        Dyck, I.J., K. Lins, L. Roth and H. Wagner (2019).
that firm creditworthiness is already                       However, transparency is only the first     Do Institutional Investors Drive Corporate Social
affected by exposure to climate risks.                      step. As carbon risks appear more           Responsibility? International Evidence. Journal of Financial
Policymakers should carefully consider                      pervasive and material for the global       Economics 131(3): 693–714.
the impact of climate change risks on the                   financial system than previously thought,   Krueger, P., Z. Sautner and L. Starks (2020). The
stability of both lending intermediaries                    the compelling issue for investors and      Importance of Climate Risks for Institutional Investors. The
and corporate bond markets. The Task                        financial regulators is how to manage or    Review of Financial Studies 33(3): 1067–1111.
Force on Climate-related Financial                          neutralise such risks once they have been   Merton, R. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk
Disclosures (TCFD) has developed                            identified and quantified.                  structure of interest rates. The Journal of Finance 28(2):
voluntary, consistent climate-related                                                                   449–470.

       A holistic goals-based
        investing framework
       for analysing efficient
       retirement investment
      decisions in the presence
       of long-term care risk
Jean-Michel Maeso, Senior Quantitative                                                                  The annuity puzzle
                                                                                                        A major crisis is threatening the sustain-
Researcher, EDHEC-Risk Institute; Lionel                                                                ability of pension systems across the
Martellini, Professor of Finance, EDHEC                                                                 globe. The first pillar of pension systems,
                                                                                                        which is made up of public social security
Business School, Director, EDHEC-Risk Institute;                                                        benefits and aims to provide a universal
Vincent Milhau, Research Director, EDHEC-Risk                                                           core of pension coverage to address basic
                                                                                                        consumption needs in retirement, is
Institute; Anil Suri, Head of Investment Analytics,                                                     strongly impacted by rising demographic
Merrill Lynch Global Wealth Management                                                                  imbalances. Life expectancy at age 65 in
                                                                                                        OECD countries is expected to grow by
Group, Bank of America; Nevenka Vrdoljak,                                                               4.2 years for women and 4.6 years for men
Director of Retirement Strategies, Merrill                                                              between 2020 and 2065. As a result, the
                                                                                                        number of individuals aged 65 and over
Lynch Wealth Management, Bank of America                                                                for every 100 individuals aged between 20
                                                                                                        and 64 rose from 13.9 in 1950 to 27.9 in
                                                                                                        2015, and is expected to grow to 58.6 by
                                                                                                        2075.1 In parallel a massive shift from
1 Figures cited here are from the OECD report, Pensions at a Glance 2017.                               defined benefit pension schemes to

                                                                                                                                                     SPRING 2021
6 EDHEC Research Insights

defined contribution pension schemes is                    changing locations to lower or higher cost    will be measured with a number of key
taking place across the world, implying a                  cities or countries, decisions about          indicators, which can be broadly sorted
transfer of retirement risks from corpora-                 retirement dates, and also, perhaps most      into figures of merit (to be maximised) and
tions to individuals.                                      notably, long-term care needs driven by       figures of risk (to be minimised). In terms
    As an almost universal rule, pillar I and              health-related issues in the later stage of   of figures of merit, we first report the
pillar II pension arrangements deliver                     retirement. These uncertainties require       median discounted income shortfall, which
replacement income that is inferior to the                 changes to retirement plans on a regular      is defined for a given scenario as the
needs of individuals in retirement, and                    basis, annually or when life events occur,    discounted sum of the differences between
the resulting inadequacy risk is sometimes                 which is simply not possible with             actual withdrawals and target withdrawals
severe. According to the aforementioned                    annuities.                                    (which are defined as 3%, 4% or 5% of initial
OECD report, an individual earning the                         In Maeso et al (2020) we propose a        wealth subject to a 2% cost-of-living
average income in the US can expect to                     comprehensive simulation framework            adjustment (COLA), plus cost of long-term
enjoy a mere 49.1% replacement rate upon                   that contains notably:                        care needs, if and when they are incurred).
retirement, a number that falls to 29.0% in                l A market simulation engine, incorpo-        By definition, this quantity is equal to zero
the UK. With the need to supplement                        rating Monte Carlo simulations coupled        at best, when the individual has enough
public and private retirement benefits via                 with flexible long-term Capital Market        wealth to finance all target withdrawals. As
voluntary contributions, the so-called                     Assumptions (CMAs);                           a related indicator we also report the
third pillar of pension systems, individuals               l A product simulation engine, incorpo-       median discounted percentage of lifetime
are becoming increasingly responsible for                  rating scenarios for stocks and bonds,        income (PLI) achieved, which is defined as
their own retirement savings and invest-                   balanced funds and target date funds, as      the median value across all scenarios of the
ment decisions. This global trend poses                    well as a rather exhaustive range of          ratio between the sum of the individual’s
substantial challenges, as people often                    annuity products;                             discounted actual withdrawals and the sum
lack the expertise required to make such                   l A client simulation engine, incorporat-     of the discounted target withdrawals until
complex financial decisions.                               ing mortality risk scenarios, as well as      death. We finally report the median
    In principle, annuity products,                        target levels of replacement income cash      discounted bequest value, which is
designed as contracts by which the                         flows, including random shocks to cash        unbounded. In terms of figures of risk, we
beneficiary pays a premium today in                        flows due to life events such as long-term    first report a short-term risk indicator
exchange for receiving lifetime income,                    care needs; and                               defined as the median (over the scenarios)
can be used to generate a target level of                  l A comprehensive goals-based retire-         maximum (over time) annual loss (MAL)
replacement income throughout                              ment investing solution evaluation            on the liquid portion of the portfolio
retirement.                                                system, which defines and develops            (invested in the balanced fund). We also
    In practice, however, the demand for                   metrics that can be used to determine the     report several long-term risk indicators,
such products is extremely low, despite                    relative value and trade-off of various       including:
their risk-free nature in a retirement                     options with a focus on assessing client-     l The shortfall probability, defined as the
investment context. Using the RAND                         centric outcomes. We report in this paper     percentage of scenarios where the
Health and Retirement Study dataset for                    some of our main findings in a simple         individual outlives her assets;
the cohort aged 65–75 in 1998, Pash-                       setting with two assets.                      l The median and extreme shortfall
chenko (2013), for example, reports that                                                                 durations, defined respectively as the
only 5% of individuals receive income from                 Framework overview                            median and the 95% percentile of the
annuities, with a peak at 12.2% among the                  We consider the framework developed in        number of years when the actual with-
highest income quintile and a low at 0.4%                  Maeso et al (2020) applied to a 65-year-      drawal is lower than the target with-
for the lowest quintile. Common explana-                   old woman who is already retired (and         drawal; and
tions of this so-called ‘annuity puzzle’ are               assumed to have just retired) in a            l The extreme discounted shortfall
related to the fact that annuities involve                 two-asset base case universe, where           defined as the 5% percentile of the
counterparty risk and high levels of fees,                 retirement wealth is allocated to a           discounted differences between actual and
and also that they do not contribute to                    50%/50% stock/bond balanced fund and a        target withdrawals (not including the
bequest objectives. One additional key                     single premium immediate annuity (SPIA)       bequest).
drawback of annuity products is their                      with a 2% cost-of-living adjustment and a         An optimisation exercise requires the
severe lack of flexibility. Indeed, annuiti-               death benefit.2 In terms of retirement        identification of a proper optimisation
sation is an almost irreversible decision,                 needs, we test withdrawal rates of 3%, 4%     objective (and possibly some constraints).
unless one is willing to bear the costs of                 and 5% of the initial wealth, and a 2%        This raises two main questions: the
extremely high surrender charges, which                    annual cost-of-living adjustment.             integration of potentially conflicting goals
can amount to several percentage points                        We systematically report the results      and aggregation of risk and return
of the invested capital. This lack of                      obtained in both the absence and presence     dimensions for a given goal. Meaningful
flexibility is a major shortcoming in the                  of life events to check for the impact of     goals include expected lifetime income
presence of life event uncertainties such                  long-term care needs on the optimal           needs, unexpected lifetime income needs
as marriage and children, changing jobs,                   demand for annuities. We assume that if       (long-term care), a bequest and capital
                                                           and when the individual experiences           preservation. The first challenge is to
                                                           long-term care needs, she will need           aggregate these four goals, which can
2 The death benefit is defined as follows: if the total    additional retirement income to secure a      conflict with each other in the framework
income paid by the annuity to the individual until her     semi-private room at a cost of $90,155 per    developed above. Expected and unex-
death is lower than the premium she paid, then her heirs   year, and an annual cost increase of          pected lifetime income needs can
will receive the difference between the premium paid       3.10%.3                                       naturally be aggregated so that when the
and the income collected.                                      The performance and risks associated      probability of a shortfall or expected
3 These figures are borrowed from the Genworth Cost of     with any given allocation between the two     shortfall is reported, it includes both the
Care Survey 2019.                                          available assets (SPIA and balanced fund)     expected and unexpected components as

SPRING 2021
EDHEC Research Insights 7

part of the target. The bequest objective                       Base case analysis                                              percentage of her replacement income
must then be aggregated with the total                          We now define and analyse a base case                           needs that she can secure with certainty
(expected plus unexpected) income                               situation, where we assume that the                             (and in the absence of a life event) by
objective. We propose an integrated                             individual (a 65-year-old female) is                            investing her assets in an SPIA-COLA
approach where we treat the bequest as a                        endowed with a $500,000 initial wealth                          annuity. These funding ratios for initial
final income cash flow, which is equivalent                     level at retirement date. As indicated                          target withdrawals of 3%, 4% and 5% are
to treating it as a residual quantity.                          before, we assume that she has access to a                      respectively 3.79/3 = 126.3%, 3.79/4 =
    Formally we define the discounted                           simple investment universe that contains                        94.8% and 3.79/5 = 75.8%. These results
surplus on a given scenario as the                              a balanced fund (BF) with an annually                           suggest that someone with an aggressive
discounted bequest plus the sum of                              rebalanced 50%/50% stock/bond mix, and                          target withdrawal rate (5%) is initially
discounted income shortfalls (note that                         an immediate annuity with a 2% cost-of-                         underfunded (by a bit less than 25%, with
this quantity can be positive or negative,                      living adjustment and a death benefit                           a funding ratio at 75.8%) while someone
and it is a deficit and not a surplus when it                   (SPIA-COLA). In this base case analysis,                        with a conservative target withdrawal rate
is negative). We then use the average                           we systematically test three levels of                          (3%) is initially overfunded (by a bit more
(across scenarios) discounted surplus (AS)                      initial target withdrawal rates, namely 3%,                     than 25%, with a funding ratio at 126.3%).
as a performance indicator in the                               4% and 5%, and we let target withdrawals                           Figure 2 displays selected charts
optimisation objective, and the 5% VaR, or                      grow by 2% per year to account for                              representing the various indicators
5% percentile (VS) as a risk indicator in                       expected growth in the cost of living.4                         introduced in the previous section as a
the optimisation objective. Defining l as a                     Reading in figure 1 that the initial pay-out                    function of the initial percentage alloca-
risk-aversion parameter that characterises                      rate of the SPIA-COLA annuity for a                             tion to the SPIA-COLA, with values
the risk appetite of the individual, we can                     65-year-old female is 3.79%, we can define                      ranging from 0% to 100%, with a grid step
finally write the objective function as:                        the individual funding ratio as the                             of 1%. We observe that for a given initial

   arg max  AS ( w1 ,..., wn ) + l VS ( w1 ,..., wn )
     w1 ,..., wn
                                                                 1. Payout rate for the SPIA with a 2% COLA and Capital Market
where w1, ..., wn represents the percentage                      Assumptions
of initial wealth invested in each asset,
encompassing financial liquid assets,                             Age                               Male               Female
annuities and insurance. In the analysis                          60                                3.49%               3.33%
that follows, as indicated before, we                             61                                3.60%               3.42%
consider only two assets (n = 2), namely                          62                                3.72%               3.52%
the balanced fund and an SPIA, and we                             63                                3.83%               3.62%
take five values for l (l = 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 6),                     64                                3.91%               3.69%
which we interpret as defining the                                65                                4.02%               3.79%
aggressive, moderately aggressive,                                66                                4.14%               3.90%
moderate, moderately conservative and                             67                                4.26%               4.01%
conservative investor, respectively. We                           68                                4.39%               4.12%
also report results for two limit cases,                          69                                4.53%               4.24%
namely l = 0, which captures a pure focus                         70                                4.61%               4.37%
on performance, and l = 1,000, which                              71                                4.75%               4.48%
represents a strong focus on risk.                                72                                4.91%               4.63%
    Overall the main inputs of our                                73                                5.07%               4.78%
framework are:                                                    74                                5.16%               4.87%
l Age
                                                                  75                                5.32%               5.02%
l Sex
                                                                  76                                5.49%               5.17%
l Initial wealth
                                                                  77                                5.66%               5.33%
l Initial target withdrawal rate
                                                                  78                                5.85%               5.49%
l Withdrawal COLA-indexation
                                                                  79                                6.00%               5.66%
l Universe
                                                                  80                                6.09%               5.77%
l Number of Monte Carlo simulations
l Grid weight step                                                Asset classes Arithmetic return (%) Volatility (%) Fees (%)                           Geometric return
l Optimisation problem: AS +l × VS                                				                                                                                   after fees (%)
where:                                                            US equity                         9.90               18.18                0.50             8.25
   • AS is the average discounted surplus                         US fixed income                   3.89                5.17                0.45             3.76
     which aggregates discounted income                           Cash                              2.83                1.69                0.18             2.82
     shortfall (a series of zero or negative                      Correlation                   US equity (%)    US fixed income (%)     Cash (%)
     values) and bequest surplus (a zero or
                                                                  US equity                         1                  -0.09                0.26
     positive terminal value);
                                                                  US fixed income                  –0.09                1                   0.19
   • VS is the 5% VaR of the discounted
                                                                  Cash                              0.26                0.19                1
     surplus distribution;
                                                                 This figure gives the initial payout rate (as a percentage) of a single premium immediate annuity indexed by a
   • l is the risk-aversion parameter that
                                                                 2% COLA (SPIA-COLA) as a function of the individual’s sex and age. Quotes are obtained as of 10 July 2020 from
     characterises the risk appetite of the
                                                                 CANNEX, a data provider that compiles information and calculations about a variety of financial products, including
     individual.
                                                                 annuity products, and makes that information available to financial service providers through a central exchange. It
                                                                 also reports the capital market assumptions used for the Monte Carlo market simulations.
4 The initial withdrawal rate is expressed as a percentage
of the initial wealth.

                                                                                                                                                                           SPRING 2021
8 EDHEC Research Insights

                                               2. Reporting for the two-asset universe comprising an SPIA-COLA
target withdrawal rate, short-term risk
                                               and a balanced fund
decreases as a function of the allocation to                     ITW = 3% – no LE                ITW = 3% – with LE                           ITW = 3% – no LE                ITW = 3% – with LE
                                                                 ITW = 4% – no LE                ITW = 4% – with LE                           ITW = 4% – no LE                ITW = 4% – with LE
annuities, as expected. We also note that                        ITW = 5% – no LE                ITW = 5% – with LE                           ITW = 5% – no LE                ITW = 5% – with LE
for initial target withdrawal rates of 4%
and 5%, the shortfall probability increases                Short-term risk (%) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)                                   Shortfall probability (%) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)
with the allocation to the SPIA. This is              3                                                                           100

because investing a large fraction of the             0                                                                            80
portfolio in annuities does not generate              -3
the amount of upside potential needed to                                                                                           60
                                                      -6
finance a higher target level of consump-                                                                                          40
tion in retirement. On the other hand, in             -9

the case of a 3% withdrawal rate, the               -12                                                                            20
individual is sufficiently funded (with a
                                                    -15                                                                             0
funding ratio at 126.3%) to be able to meet            0%           20%         40%        60%        80%         100%               0%          20%         40%        60%        80%         100%
target levels of withdrawals without
substantial upside potential, that is                      Median bequest value ($) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)                              Median percentage of LI (%) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)
without a significant investment in the         500,000                                                                           100

balanced fund. Similarly, we find that the      400,000
extreme shortfall durations increase with
the allocation to the SPIA-COLA, except         300,000
in the case where the initial target                                                                                               80
                                                200,000
withdrawal rate is equal to 3%. The
median percentage of lifetime income            100,000
decreases as the allocation to annuities
                                                      0                                                                            60
increases when the initial withdrawal                  0%           20%         40%        60%        80%         100%               0%          20%         40%        60%        80%         100%
rates are 4% or 5% and when life events are
not taken into account. When accounting                     Median discounted shortfall ($) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)                       Extreme discounted shortfall ($) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)
for life events and when the initial                   0                                                                             0
withdrawal rates are 4% or 5% respectively,       -50,000                                                                     -200,000
the median percentage of lifetime income
                                                -100,000
first decreases as the allocation to                                                                                          -400,000
annuities increases, then it reaches a          -150,000
                                                                                                                              -600,000
minimum for annuity allocations of 92%          -200,000
and 84% respectively, and finally starts to     -250,000                                                                      -800,000
slightly increase for even higher annuity
allocations. We also note that the median       -300,000
                                                        0%           20%            40%    60%         80%            100%
                                                                                                                             -1,000,000
                                                                                                                                       0%         20%            40%    60%         80%            100%
discounted bequest is a decreasing
function of the allocation to annuities, as                Median shortfall duration (years) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)                     Extreme shortfall duration (years) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)
expected. In the same spirit, we find that           30                                                                            50
in most cases (except for a 3% initial
                                                     25
withdrawal rate case in the presence of                                                                                            40

life events), the extreme discounted                 20
                                                                                                                                   30
shortfall, which is measured as the fifth            15
percentile of the shortfall, decreases in            10
                                                                                                                                   20

absolute value when the SPIA allocation                                                                                            10
                                                      5
increases, again in line with the intuition
that the SPIA is the natural safe asset in a          0                                                                             0
                                                       0%           20%         40%        60%        80%         100%               0%          20%         40%        60%        80%         100%
retirement context. On the other hand,
the median discounted shortfall is not a
                                                           AS ($) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)                                                VS ($) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)
monotonous function of the allocation to        600,000                                                                       200,000
annuities. We confirm in particular that        500,000                                                                       100,000
the presence of long-term care needs has        400,000                                                                             0
                                                                                                                             -100,000
a strong impact on the distribution of          300,000
                                                                                                                             -200,000
discounted shortfall with a median value        200,000
                                                                                                                             -300,000
                                                100,000
that is significantly lower (more negative),                                                                                 -400,000
                                                      0
especially in the case of a 3% withdrawal       -100,000
                                                                                                                             -500,000
                                                                                                                             -600,000
rate, which is the situation where the          -200,000                                                                     -700,000
unexpected component of replacement             -300,000                                                                     -800,000
income needs is particularly sizable with               0%          20%         40%        60%        80%         100%               0%          20%         40%        60%        80%         100%

respect to the expected component.
                                               This figure graphs the main statistics described in the Framework overview section for a 65-year-old female with
    Turning to the two key ingredients in
                                               initial wealth of $500,000 and a two-asset universe made up of a single premium immediate annuity with a 2%
the optimisation problem, namely the
                                               COLA and a 50%/50% stock/bond balanced fund. We consider three initial target withdrawal rates: 3%, 4% and 5%.
average discounted surplus AS and the
                                               We apply a grid weight step of 1% to compute the 101 corresponding strategies. We report the results in both the
value-at-risk of the discounted surplus VS,
                                               absence and presence of life events.
we confirm from figure 2 the presence of a
typical risk-return trade-off. On the one

SPRING 2021
EDHEC Research Insights 9

hand, an increase in the allocation to
annuities leads to a decrease in AS, which        3. Optimal strategies for the two-asset universe comprising an
is not desirable since AS is a measure of         SPIA-COLA and a balanced fund
merit. We also confirm that the surplus
decreases with the target withdrawal rate,         Initial target                                                          Optimal allocation = (% SPIA, % BF)
as expected since it is more difficult to          withdrawal
maintain a surplus starting from a given                            Risk aversion level     0               0.5               1                   2                  4               6                 1,000
wealth level (here $500,000) when                  3%               Without life events   (0, 1)           (0, 1)           (0, 1)           (0.62, 0.38)       (0.78, 0.22)   (0.88, 0.12)          (0.92, 0.08)
replacement income needs are higher. We                             With life events      (0, 1)           (0, 1)           (0, 1)           (0.04, 0.96)       (0.18, 0.82)   (0.18, 0.82)          (0.22, 0.78)
also confirm, as expected, that the                4%               Without life events   (0, 1)           (0, 1)           (0, 1)              (1, 0)             (1, 0)         (1, 0)                (1, 0)
presence of the life event (solid lines)                            With life events      (0, 1)           (0, 1)           (0, 1)           (0.11, 0.89)       (0.19, 0.81)   (0.19, 0.81)          (0.30, 0.70)
leads to a smaller surplus compared to a           5%               Without life events   (0, 1)           (0, 1)           (0, 1)              (1, 0)             (1, 0)         (1, 0)                (1, 0)
situation without the life event (dotted                            With life events      (0, 1)           (0, 1)           (0, 1)           (0.18, 0.82)       (0.33, 0.67)   (0.43, 0.57)          (0.49, 0.51)
lines), and this is true for all values of the
                                                  This figure displays the optimal allocation in single premium immediate annuities (SPIA) and a balanced fund (BF)
initial withdrawal rate. On the other hand,
                                                  for different levels of risk aversion and initial target withdrawal rates. The target withdrawal rates are indexed to a
an increase in the allocation to annuities
                                                  2% COLA. We report the results in both the absence and presence of life events.
tends to lead to a higher (less negative)
value for VS, which is desirable since VS is
a measure of risk. This is actually always
the case in the absence of the life event        conservative individual (l = 4) decreases                                           cally, we test two additional initial wealth
(dotted lines), for all values of the initial    from 78% to 18% when long-term care                                                 values, namely $250,000 and $1m. For
withdrawal rate. When life events are            needs are accounted for. This impact is                                             given values of the initial target with-
introduced, the monotonic relationship           even more dramatic for the conservative                                             drawal rate and the risk aversion param-
between VS and the allocation to annui-          investor (l = 6), for whom we find that the                                         eter, in the absence of life events, the
ties no longer holds. In particular, the         introduction of long-term care needs                                                optimal allocation is independent of initial
fifth percentile of the discounted surplus       reduces the demand for annuities from                                               wealth since the replacement income
distribution ceases to increase beyond a         88% to 18%. Overall, these results suggest                                          needs of the individual represents the
certain allocation to annuities.                 that the costly reversibility of annuitisa-                                         same deterministic percentage of her
    In other words, an allocation to             tion decisions can help explain the                                                 initial wealth. However, when life events
annuities beyond the 22%, 30% and 49%            annuity puzzle for individuals facing life                                          are taken into account, their relative costs
levels in the 3%, 4% and 5% withdrawal rate      event uncertainty.                                                                  have a stronger impact on individuals with
cases, respectively, not only implies a                                                                                              a lower initial wealth. The charts in figure
decrease in performance (measured by             Robustness check with respect to                                                    4 confirm this intuition. In particular, we
AS) but also an increase in risk. Intui-         initial wealth                                                                      find that the location and shape of the risk
tively, this is because a minimum amount         In this section we conduct the following                                            indicator (VS) are strongly impacted by
of upside potential, which is generated by       robustness check for a base case with a 4%                                          changes in the individual’s initial wealth,
a non-zero allocation to the balanced            initial target withdrawal rate: we test for                                         with a maximum value corresponding to
fund, is needed in the 5% worst scenarios        the impact of changes in initial wealth on                                          SPIA-COLA allocations of 1%, 30% and 67%
to ensure that replacement income needs          risk and return indicators and on the                                               for initial wealth levels of $250,000,
(including both the expected and unex-           optimal demand for annuities. Specifi-                                              $500,000 and $1m, respectively.
pected components) are met.
    Figure 3 shows the optimal strategies
for the base case universe in both the
absence and presence of life events for           4. Reporting for the two-asset universe comprising an SPIA-COLA
various risk aversion levels. As expected         and a balanced fund with different values of initial wealth
given the analysis of the risk-return
                                                                    IW = $250k – no LE             IW = $250k – with LE                               IW = $250k – no LE             IW = $250k – with LE
trade-offs involved in an increase in the                           IW = $500k – no LE             IW = $500k – with LE                               IW = $500k – no LE             IW = $500k – with LE
allocation to annuities, we find that                               IW = $1m – no LE               IW = $1m – with LE                                 IW = $1m – no LE               IW = $1m – with LE
investors with low risk aversion (l = 0,
                                                              AS ($) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)                                                  VS ($) = f (SPIA-COLA weight)
0.5, 1) will find it optimal not to purchase
                                                    800,000                                                                             0
annuities, and this is true for all initial         700,000                                                                       -100,000
withdrawal rates and in both the absence            600,000                                                                       -200,000
and presence of life events. As risk                500,000
                                                                                                                                  -300,000
aversion increases, the optimal demand              400,000
                                                                                                                                  -400,000
for annuities increases when risk aversion          300,000
                                                                                                                                  -500,000
                                                    200,000
becomes higher than 1. One important                                                                                              -600,000
                                                    100,000
finding in this analysis, which is robust to              0                                                                       -700,000
changes in withdrawal rates, is that the           -100,000                                                                       -800,000
presence of long-term care risk strongly                   0%          20%         40%      60%         80%         100%                  0%             20%         40%       60%            80%         100%
reduces the optimal demand for annuities
for most individuals, at least those that         This figure graphs the main statistics described for the first robustness check, ie, for a 65-year-old female with
are sufficiently risk-averse to show some         three different levels of initial wealth ($250,000, $500,000 and $1m) and a two-asset universe made up of a single
appetite for annuities in the first place.        premium immediate annuity with a 2% COLA and a 50%/50% stock/bond balanced fund. We consider an initial
Focusing for example on the case of a 3%          target withdrawal rate of 4%. We apply a grid weight step of 1% to compute the 101 corresponding strategies. We
withdrawal rate, we find that the demand          report the results in both the absence and presence of life events.
for annuities from the moderately

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EDHEC Research Insights 11

    Figure 5 shows the weight for the
optimal strategies in the base case              5. Optimal strategies for the two-asset universe comprising an
universe in the absence and presence of          SPIA-COLA and a BF with different values of initial wealth
life events for these three different initial
wealth levels. We again find that the             Initial wealth                                  Optimal allocation = (% SPIA, % BF) – initial target withdrawal = 4%
introduction of long-term care needs has                           Risk aversion level     0          0.5            1               2              4              6            1,000
a strong impact on the demand for                 $250,000         Without life events   (0, 1)      (0, 1)        (0, 1)          (1, 0)         (1, 0)         (1, 0)          (1, 0)
annuities for sufficiently risk-averse                             With life events      (0, 1)      (0, 1)        (0, 1)          (0, 1)      (0.01, 0.99)   (0.01, 0.99)    (0.01, 0.99)
individuals (l = 6), an impact that               $500,000         Without life events   (0, 1)      (0, 1)        (0, 1)          (1, 0)         (1, 0)         (1, 0)          (1, 0)
decreases in the initial wealth level. For                         With life events      (0, 1)      (0, 1)        (0, 1)       (0.11, 0.89)   (0.19, 0.81)   (0.19, 0.81)    (0.30, 0.70)
example, when the initial wealth is               $1m              Without life events   (0, 1)      (0, 1)        (0, 1)          (1, 0)         (1, 0)         (1, 0)          (1, 0)
$250,000, the optimal demand for                                   With life events      (0, 1)      (0, 1)        (0, 1)       (0.34, 0.66)   (0.58, 0.42)   (0.65, 0.35)   (0.67, 0.33))
annuities decreases from 100% to 1% when         This figure displays the optimal allocation in single premium immediate annuities (SPIA) and a balanced fund (BF)
the life event is introduced for the             for different levels of risk aversion, an initial target withdrawal rate of 4% and three different levels of initial wealth:
moderately conservative investor (l = 4),        $250,000, $500,000 and $1m. The target withdrawal rates are indexed to a 2% COLA. We report the results in both
while it decreases from 100% to 19% when         the absence and presence of life events.
initial wealth is $500,000 (our base case
value) and only from 100% to 58% for
initial wealth of $1m. Overall these results
suggest that the impact of life events          fund and an immediate annuity with a 2%                                     References
should be stronger for individuals with         COLA indexation. The analysis presented                                     Maeso, J.M., and L. Martellini (2020). A Holistic Goals-
lower initial endowment, as expected.           here can be extended in a number of                                         Based Investing Framework for Analyzing Efficient
                                                directions involving the use of alternative                                 Retirement Investment Decisions in the Presence of Long-
Conclusion                                      welfare functions or the introduction of                                    Term Care Risk. Working Paper.
Maeso et al (2020) present a flexible           additional assets such as target date funds                                 Pashchenko, S. (2013). Accounting for Non-Annuitization.
framework developed to provide personal-        or variable annuities. We refer the                                         Journal of Public Economics 98: 53–67.
ised advice on retirement investment            interested reader to Maeso et al (2020) for
decisions in the presence of life event risk.   more details on these extensions.
This article shows an application of this
framework in a simple setting with two          The research from which this article was
assets, a 50%/50% stock/bond balanced           drawn was supported by Bank of America.

     Measuring and managing
      ESG risks in sovereign
         bond portfolios
        Lou-Salomé Vallée, PhD in Finance Student, EDHEC Business School

Sustainable investing in sovereign              investor demands, fiduciary duty, climate                                   ESG indicators into sovereign bond
bond markets                                    change and the development of new                                           investments is consistent with the relative
Over the past decade, sustainable and           regulations and values. Sustainability in                                   scarcity of available academic research on
responsible investing have gained               the financial sector is becoming main-                                      the subject, which has focused more on
momentum and continue to grow in                stream and is reshaping global markets.                                     ESG investing in equity markets.
popularity among investors, and it is               Nevertheless, the integration of ESG                                       In a recent paper (Martellini and Vallée
increasingly recognised that the financial      factors into sovereign bond investment                                      [2021]1), we explore the impact of ESG
system has a particularly important role        analysis and investment decision making                                     factors on the risk and return of sovereign
to play in the transition towards a             is not systematic due to a lack of under-                                   bonds from an investor perspective, in
low-carbon and climate-resilient econ-          standing among investors of how to                                          particular investigating how to measure
omy. The integration of sustainability          integrate ESG issues into sovereign debt
considerations into the decision-making         analysis and a lack of consistency in                                       1 Martellini, L., and L.-S. Vallée (2021). Measuring and
process for investments, as measured by         defining and measuring material ESG                                         Managing ESG Risks in Sovereign Bond Portfolios and
environmental, social and governance            factors. The absence of a coherent                                          Implications for Sovereign Debt Investing. EDHEC-Risk
(ESG) indicators, has been driven by            investment framework for integrating                                        Publication.

                                                                                                                                                                             SPRING 2021
12 EDHEC Research Insights

and manage ESG risks in sovereign bond
portfolios and their implications for                         1. Estimation results for developed and emerging countries of the
sovereign bond portfolio strategies.                          impact of E, S and G scores of sovereign bond yield spreads
Impact of ESG criteria on risk and                             Developed countries                                           Emerging countries
return characteristics of sovereign                                                         Bond yield spreads                                               Bond yield spreads
bonds                                                                                          Spread _ (i,T)                                                   Spread _ (i,T)
We first provide an assessment of the                                                1Y            5Y             10Y                             1Y                 5Y            10Y
materiality and impact of ESG scores2                          Spread_(i,t–1)    0.713***         0.686***        0.661***   Spread_(i,t–1)       0.710***          0.852***       0.604***
taken individually on key risk and return                                       (0.065)          (0.066)         (0.067)		                    (0.073)              (0.079)        (0.090)
indicators of relevance to asset owners in                     Eco_(i,t–1)      –0.003           –0.002          –0.003      Eco_(i,t–1)      –0.003              –0.003          –0.005**
both developed and emerging markets.3                                           (0.003)          (0.004)         (0.003)		                    (0.004)              (0.003)        (0.003)
Our main goal is to analyse whether                            Env_(i,t–1)      –0.013**         –0.025***       –0.023***   Env_(i,t–1)          0.001             0.002          0.002
cross-sectional differences in the risk and                                     (0.005)          (0.006)         (0.004)		                    (0.006)              (0.005)        (0.004)
return of sovereign bonds from various                         Soc_(i,t–1)       0.003            0.005*          0.003*     Soc_(i,t–1)      –0.007***           –0.004**        –0.001
developed or emerging issuing countries                                         (0.003)          (0.004)         (0.003)		                    (0.002)              (0.002)        (0.001)
can be explained partly by cross-sectional                     Gov_(i,t–1)       0.013**          0.013*          0.009*     Gov_(i,t–1)          0.004             0.004          0.002
differences in E, S or G scores.                                                (0.005)          (0.006)         (0.005)		                    (0.003)              (0.002)        (0.002)
   We draw an important distinction                            Observations      190              190             190        Observations         150                150           150
between the perspective of long-term                           Countries             19            19              19        Countries             15                 15            15
buy-and-hold investors, for whom                               Fixed effects     Yes               Yes             Yes       Fixed effects        Yes                Yes            Yes
performance can be captured by bond yield                      R-sq              0.651            0.629           0.633      R-sq                 0.676             0.602          0.419
spreads, and the perspective of shorter-
                                                              Standard deviation in parentheses. Level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
term investors, who will not hold the bond
until maturity, and as such cannot use
bond yield as a measure of expected
performance because of the uncertainty                        2. Estimation results for developed and emerging countries of the
regarding the selling price of the sovereign
                                                              impact of E, S and G scores of sovereign bond returns
bonds held in their portfolios. In the latter
case, we will instead use average annual-                      Developed countries                                           Emerging countries
ised return as a measure of performance.                                                      Bond returns                                                     Bond returns
In both cases, we conduct univariate and                                                        Ret _ (i,T)                                                      Ret _ (i,T)
multivariate regression analyses4 to explore                                         1Y            5Y             10Y                             1Y                 5Y            10Y
to what extent ESG dimensions influence                        Eco_(i,t–1)      –4.22E-06        –0.045          –0.030      Eco_(i,t–1)      –0.061              –0.052          –0.046
sovereign bond yield spreads in addition to                                     (0.021)          (0.033)         (0.048)		                    (0.041)              (0.038)        (0.049)
information already contained in the                           Env_(i,t–1)      –0.110***        –0.082          –0.051      Env_(i,t–1)      –0.012              –0.081          –0.125*
economic fundamentals, as suggested by                                          (0.037)          (0.058)         (0.083)		                    (0.061)              (0.057)        (0.075)
the literature on the determinants of                          Soc_(i,t–1)      –0.017           –0.049          –0.078      Soc_(i,t–1)      –0.082***           –0.047**        –0.017
sovereign bond yield spreads.                                                   (0.0245)         (0.038)         (0.055)		                    (0.023)              (0.021)        (0.028)
   Regarding the impact of cross-sectional                     Gov_(i,t–1)      –0.096**         –0.139**        –0.201**    Gov_(i,t–1)          0.011           –0.022          –0.044
differences in each score (E, S and G) on                                       (0.038)          (0.060)         (0.086)		                    (0.035)              (0.033)        (0.044)
sovereign bond yield spreads, our                              b_0               2.683***         3.378***        3.822***   b_0                  1.835***          2.222***       2.439***
estimation results allow us to extract two                                      (0.370)          (0.577)         (0.827)		                    (0.434)              (0.403)        (0.530)
key conclusions (see figure 1). First, we                      Observations      200              200             200        Observations         150                150           150
find that for developed countries, after                       Countries             20            20              20        Countries             15                 15            15
controlling for economic5 scores and other                     Fixed effects     Yes               Yes             Yes       Fixed effects        Yes                Yes            Yes
fixed effects, the E dimension has a                           R-sq              0.118            0.102           0.074      R-sq                 0.144             0.112          0.056
significant and negative impact on bond
                                                              Standard deviation in parentheses. Level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
yield spread. These results mean that a
higher E score is associated with a lower
spread for one-year, five-year and 10-year
                                                             bond maturity, and this impact is more                                 impact on bond yield spread, meaning
2 We use the Verisk Maplecroft database for ESG              pronounced in the medium run. From an                                  that a higher S score is associated with a
indicators.                                                  issuer standpoint, better E scores can                                 lower spread for five-year and 10-year
3 Our sample comprises annual observations for 20            therefore lead to reduced borrowing costs,                             bond maturity, and this impact is more
developed countries, of which the US will be used as the     everything else being equal. From the                                  pronounced in the short run. Hence, from
reference country when a risk-free rate is needed, as well   investor standpoint, this result suggests                              an investor standpoint, a lower yield is to
as 15 emerging countries from 2010 to 2020, resulting        that a lower yield is to be expected when                              be expected when investing in countries
respectively in 200 observations for developed countries     investing in countries with higher                                     with higher social performance, suggest-
and 150 observations for emerging countries.                 environmental performance, which tells                                 ing that a negative premium is associated
4 More information on the panel regression models and        us that a negative premium is associated                               with this reduction in social risk.
estimation methods used are available in the paper.          with this reduction in environmental risk.                                We then turn to the impact of cross-
5 We prefer to use the Verisk Maplecroft Economics           On the other hand, for emerging coun-                                  sectional differences in E, S and G on the
index rather than credit ratings, since credit rating        tries, after controlling for economic scores                           performance characteristics of short-term
agencies might already incorporate ESG criteria into         and other fixed effects, we find that the S                            sovereign bond returns (see figure 2). We
their analyses.                                              dimension has a significant and negative                               find that for developed countries, after

SPRING 2021
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