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\ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2021
Engaging refugees and migrants as
peace advocates
How Germany can contribute to Peace in Syria and Afghanistan
Katja Mielke, Esther Meininghaus\ BICC
Policy recommendations
\ Engage refugees and migrants as \ Launch new funding formats
peace advocates to support self-determined civic
German policymakers—especially of the German Fed- engagement for peace
eral Foreign Office (GFFO), the Federal Ministries of GFFO, BMZ, MoI and state governments should pro-
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and of vide decentralised funding through civic education in-
the Interior (MoI), and federal states—and educational stitutions (political foundations, bpb, lpbs, ifa) for two
organisations should draw upon the engagement of types of addressees conducting civic education for
refugees and migrants from Afghanistan and Syria as peace programmes: Civic and peace education organi-
agents of change who have a positive influence on sations and direct funding for Syrian- and Afghan-led
peace processes. initiatives. They should provide longer-term project
funding, funding for independent initiatives, funding to
\ Create civic engagement for peace rent meeting spaces and support unbureaucratic and
programmes that offer refugees and transparent funding application processes. The GFFO
migrants in Germany opportunities to should consider providing funding in addition to exist-
ing funding lines by the MoI to join expertise on civic
engage themselves in peace for their
education (MoI) and peace support (GFFO).
countries of origin
Civic and peace education organisations (such as adult
education centres, Civil Peace Service—Ziviler Friedens-
\ Link Afghan and Syrian civic
dienst) should jointly develop new civic engagement education for peace initiatives in
for peace programmes that refugees and migrants Germany to peace processes
themselves can join to engage for peace for their coun- The GFFO should act as a facilitator in linking Afghan-
try of origin. These programmes should build on refu- and Syrian-led peacemaking initiatives in Germany
gees’ and migrants’ past experiences of war, politics with official track 1, 2 and 3 peace processes mediated
and future visions specific to their respective country by bodies like the United Nations (participation,
of origin so that they are meaningful for those advisory roles).
engaged and the population groups they represent.
supported by
\ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2021ENGAGING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS AS PEACE ADVOCATES \ K. MIELKE & E. MEININGHAUS
Engaging refugees and migrants as peace advocates:
How Germany can contribute to Peace in Syria and
Afghanistan
Introduction funding line that would allow persons of Afghan
and Syrian descent to initiate peace initiatives for
In this Policy Brief, we argue that the significant po- Afghanistan and Syria in Germany. This is why, in
tential of Afghan and Syrian refugees and migrants contrast to current practice, there is an urgent
in Germany and beyond as peace advocates and need to alter German policies to allow for the poli-
change agents in contributing to peace processes in tical participation of immigrants in peace efforts
Afghanistan and Syria must be recognised. Today, Af- for their country of origin.
ghans and Syrians constitute the highest numbers of
immigrants in Germany and Europe. As of 31 March Scholars and practitioners agree that refugees’ and
2020, Germany’s population included 798,999 individ- migrants’ involvement in peace processes renders
uals with Syrian and 265,192 with Afghan citizenship these processes more sustainable. They further recog-
(BAMF, 2020, p. 120). Furthermore, because the Afghan nise that exile populations should be involved in con-
conflict has been ongoing for 40 years, the share of fronting the past to increase long-term prospects for
persons with German citizenship is comparatively peace. Peace processes are inherently political. Inte-
high among persons of descent from Afghanistan. grating refugees, migrants and naturalised citizens
By persons of descent from Afghanistan and Syria, into peace processes opens a new political field that
we mean individuals with refugee status, those who civic engagement for peace needs to address. To not
have been naturalised as German citizens and per- leave this field to political or religious extremist
sons who migrated to Germany for reasons unrelated groups, German policymakers need to strengthen in-
to conflict (such as work, education). centives that enable adults in Germany to participate
in civic engagement for peace for their countries of
Until now, German policymakers have largely re- origin in a self-determined manner and, eventually, to
frained from tapping their potential to act for peace facilitate translating these into participation in more
for at least three reasons: formal peace processes. Until now, in contrast, the
1\ Afghans and Syrians are often still perceived as lack of tailored support for comparable civic engage-
refugees and migrants who are recipients of be- ment for peace initiatives inside Afghanistan and Syria
nefits (protection, aid, services) rather than indi- as well as among Afghans and Syrians living abroad
viduals with agency. Also, they are largely depri- has catalysed political fragmentation and led to the
ved of their agency to be politically engaged. For widespread lack of concrete, broad-based political pro-
example, in national elections, foreign nationals grammes and long-term visions for reform in the
cannot vote, and they are not allowed to form po- Afghan and Syrian peace processes. In the following,
litical parties in Germany. ( we show how these groups’ support of civic engage-
2\ When German policymakers consult them or ment for peace in their origin countries can contrib-
support them in their commitment to their ute to peace processes in Syria and Afghanistan.
country of origin, they are narrowly ascribed the
role of contributing to humanitarian and de- Peacemaking in displacement:
velopment aims (editorial, FMR 60, 2019)—igno-
Mitigating risks and strengthening
ring political aspirations.
peace advocates
3\ Afghans and Syrians are assumed to seek local in-
tegration in Germany, which civic education pro-
grammes and funding lines aim to support (that Immigrants from conflict countries often remain en-
is civic participation, language proficiency, voca- gaged in political processes in their countries of ori-
tional training, social engagement). There is no gin. Exile populations can act as both peace wreckers
2\ \ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2021ENGAGING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS AS PEACE ADVOCATES \ K. MIELKE & E. MEININGHAUS
and peacemakers. How their relations with the coun- emboldened the Islamist factions who started a
try of origin plays out often depends on the nature of civil war after the fall of the Soviet-backed regime
conflict “at home”, the international political “cli- in 1992 and determine Afghan politics and the
mate” and national policies in the country of resi- forty-year conflict until today. Such one-sided
dence that limit or support political activities of for- support missed the opportunity for inclusive dia-
eign nationals. logue with Afghan groups of all political spec-
trums, and it demonstrates how the consequenc-
In Germany, policymakers often fear that any form of es of such policies created conflict trajectories
politicisation among foreign nationals might em- which remain problematic until today.
bolden political conflict in their country of origin or
in Germany, or may lead to the emergence of extrem- Against this backdrop, we argue for a policy change
ist groups. We, however, argue that inaction risks giv- that supports self-determined civic engagement for
ing space to radicalisation and the lack of commit- peace programmes and the emergence of peace advo-
ment for promoting inclusive dialogue and broader cates. Individuals often remain part of networks, also
processes of national reconciliation. Two examples in their country of descent, for instance through so-
illustrate the complex relationship between sup- cial media or personal contacts, and possess in-depth
pressed versus encouraged political (non)engagement knowledge of that country’s needs and interests. This
and conflict versus peace(building): knowledge would make them ideal bridge-builders.
1\ The situation among individuals of Turkish ori- However, in Germany, such peace initiatives are rare
gin in Germany demonstrates how a lack of sup- because their engagement is hampered by a lack of
port for political dialogue has led to political seg- funding and support. For persons from conflict coun-
regation and conflict between a) supporters of tries interested in joining such initiatives, civic en-
Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) gagement for peace initiatives in Germany could po-
and political refugees who fled persecution by the tentially serve to:
Turkish government to seek refuge in Germany; \ share experiences of conflict and war (con-
and b) conflict between persons of Turkish and fronting the past);
Kurdish descent. Kurds belong to an ethnic mi- \ jointly develop peace narratives (e.g. peaceful
nority who have been discriminated against and visions for the future, building bridges across
persecuted by the Turkish government, which different political currents, discuss under-
sees them as affiliated with the Kurdistan Work- standings of justice);
ers’ Party (PKK) that it has outlawed as a ‘terrorist \ learn mediation and conflict management
group’. The close relationship between the AKP skills which they can apply at the neighbour-
and some Turkish institutions and between the hood, municipality, state and national level, but
PKK and Kurdish institutions in Germany has led also in peace processes (pro inclusiveness, dia-
to a hardening of positions, which highlights the logue, reconciliation).
risk of ignoring ‘foreign’ politics in Germany.
2\ During the Cold War, German authorities, the In this manner, civic engagement for peace initia-
media and the public supported Islamist Afghan tives can serve as spaces where inclusive dialogue
exile groups, especially those who represented can be held (including different age groups, women,
the fundamentalist Afghan resistance (mujahe- persons of different religious and political affilia-
din) in the conflict with the Afghan government tions) and confidence among participants be built.
and the Soviet intervention forces until 1989. This
\ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2021 3\ENGAGING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS AS PEACE ADVOCATES \ K. MIELKE & E. MEININGHAUS
While it is crucial that these fora represent safe spac- non-violent conflict resolution and concentrates on
es1 , they can offer valuable opportunities for discuss- developing practical skills for a peaceful transforma-
ing politicisation and divergent political interests tion of conflicts at the individual and group level.
constructively. They may also be a starting point for Peace education offered to immigrants from conflict
developing concrete suggestions on including settings to date mainly consists of programmes that
peace-focused civil society groups into existing peace foster individual peace skills for the integration in
processes. While we find that refugees’ needs, knowl- Germany or an individual’s reintegration into their
edge and interests are often rarely represented in offi- country of origin after their return. What is missing
cial talks, these initiatives open up an avenue for in project work, programming and conceptually, how-
broader political participation. This is not limited to, ever, is a collaboration of civic and peace education
but can also include, building knowledge of transi- actors that allows immigrants to engage in peace in
tional justice formats that have proven successful in their country of origin while they live, and often have
other contexts and developing ideas of how these to or intend to remain, in Germany. This is what we
might be applicable to similar processes at communi- term “civic engagement for peace for immigrants
ty or national level in Afghanistan and Syria. from conflict settings for their origin countries”.
German policymakers—especially of the GFFO, the Civic engagement for peace wants individuals to be-
BMZ and the MoI—and educational organisations ur- come change-makers in conflict transformation by
gently need to acknowledge and subsequently sup- allowing them to develop knowledge and skills for
port the potential role of persons of Afghan and Syri- conflict resolution and decision-making. Funding
an descent as agents of change, who can foster broad-based grassroots initiatives for dialogue and
constructive dialogue processes and act as important exchange across social class, different age groups, po-
bridge-builders for constituencies in their country of litical convictions, interests and “generations of im-
origin. Peace is not only crafted through interven- migration” (cf. Meininghaus & Mielke, 2019) could
tions and programmes in (post-)conflict countries achieve this. Among persons of Afghan and Syrian de-
but also through interventions and programmes that scent in Germany, we find that different generations
may start in Germany. of immigrants since the 1960s remain largely discon-
nected from one another, thus limiting the prospects
Civic engagement for peace in countries of origin: of mutual support and dialogue. By supporting differ-
A critical gap ent formats for exchange, Afghan- and Syrian-led ini-
tiatives can begin to bridge these gaps. Ideally, the de-
A review of civic and peace education programmes sign of these initiatives should allow for exploring
and measures in Germany shows a critical gap. On different political systems without prejudices, for
the one hand, civic education for refugees has fo- critical reflection of past experiences, developing fu-
cused on providing support for integration into Ger- ture visions and joint learning. It should be up to par-
man society, through language courses, vocational ticipants from Afghan and Syrian descent within
skills-building, social engagement for civic participa- these initiatives to decide where their needs and top-
tion and democracy-learning/ citizenship education. ics for civic engagement for peace programmes are,
On the other hand, peace education (in Germany: not least to ensure that they are historically ground-
“peace pedagogy”) points out ways of constructive, ed in their own experiences. Such programmes must
not seek to reproduce German politics but be open
1 \ In the Syrian case, for persons critical of the regime, this entails the
risk of intimidation of participants through the Syrian regime and
their family members who live inside Syria (cf. (Amnesty Internation-
al, 2011). Initiatives should receive support to establish their own rules
and mechanisms to mitigate such risks.
4\ \ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2021ENGAGING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS AS PEACE ADVOCATES \ K. MIELKE & E. MEININGHAUS
towards new ideas of civic education for peace mean- New funding formats supporting self-determined
ingful to Afghans and Syrians to also attract interest civic engagement for peace
among others from Afghan and Syrian descent to
join. This is especially important for persons who ar- To implement civic engagement for peace pro-
rived in Germany as adults without access to the Ger- grammes and projects, the GFFO, BMZ, MoI and feder-
man education system. For many individuals born in al states should also create new funding formats for
Afghanistan and Syria, respectively, who went to such initiatives in Germany. This involves:
school there, school curricula did not include critical 1\ Decentralised funding through institutions for
learning about different forms of political systems civic education (political foundations, bpb, lpbs,
(e.g. different forms of democracies, electoral sys- ifa) for two funding lines: a) funding for civic and
tems). In Afghanistan, we find no coherent histo- peace education organisations and b) direct fund-
ry-writing from within Afghanistan for more than 40 ing for Syrian- and Afghan-led initiatives. Our re-
years of war. In Syria, school curricula in this field search shows that in earlier state-funded human-
consist of state propaganda in line with Ba’th party itarian and development initiatives initiated by
ideology (with the short-lived exception of areas con- Afghans and Syrians, for instance, members of
trolled by other military and civilian groups since such associations have felt forced to adapt their
2011). projects and programmes to available funding
lines. This is problematic because donor priorities
Thus, newly designed civic engagement for peace have determined their contents, even when it
programmes should entail a high degree of self-deter- was apparent to applicants that funding targets
mination. They can also provide fora for a critical en- did not address actual needs. This problem is also
gagement with their own histories of war and devel- reflected in measures inside Germany that largely
op political visions for a more peaceful future, aim for so-called systemic integration such as
including ideas for transitional justice processes. His- schooling, vocational training, etc., but which ne-
torical literacy, the development of willingness and glect significant needs for psycho-social support
skills to confront the home country’s and one’s own and political engagement for peace. Therefore, it
individual conflictive past constitutes a crucial learn- is important that new funding lines should pro-
ing challenge, which could be supported by voluntary vide structural and financial support, but leave
conflict-sensitive moderation (as practised by the Fo- space for the contents of these initiatives to be
rum Civil Peace Service–forumZFD, for instance). We developed by participants themselves in line with
argue that civic education projects for adults are cru- their own perceived priorities. Initiatives of this
cial as they provide a forum for confronting the past sort require places to meet and long time frames
and can form a critical, independent political mind- to work towards the skills required and while
set. They can also encourage dialogue among persons conflict remains ongoing. Reducing the bureau-
of Afghan and Syrian descent, respectively. Given that cratic requirements and procedures when apply-
many have made Germany their home and are here ing for funding to form associations in Germany
to stay, this is all the more important. Therefore, Ger- would also help to ensure equal access to funding
man policymakers—the BMI, GFFO and BMZ—should across social and intellectual divides. For Syrian-
set incentives for education organisations and civic and Afghan-led initiatives, civic peace service
conflict transformation organisations to reconceptu- personnel (Forum Civil Peace Service, forumZFD)
alise civic peace engagement programmes among with significant expertise in peace initiative sup-
immigrants of Afghan and Syrian descent in port in conflict countries could offer support as
Germany. consultants and provide mediation—however,
\ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2021 5\ENGAGING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS AS PEACE ADVOCATES \ K. MIELKE & E. MEININGHAUS
only when expressly called for by these initia- Peace processes themselves are in urgent need of
tives. The BMZ should examine under which con- reform and of becoming more sustainable. Consider
ditions this is possible. these facts:
2\ The GFFO should also consider providing funds, \ Official peace processes were only set up in less
adding to existing funding lines for civic educa- than half of all wars and conflicts globally be-
tion by the MoI, both of which should liaise. The tween 1946 and 2003 (most others are military
MoI is experienced in supporting civic education victories or unresolved) (Bercovitch & Fretter,
programmes in Germany, while the GFFO has ex- 2004, p. 29)
pertise in providing peace support in conflict \ Only about one-quarter of these cases end with
countries. They should join their fields of exper- a peace agreement (1946–2015) (Kreutz, 2010,
tise to provide funding for civic engagement for p. 246)
peace initiatives which can, eventually, inform \ Half of all peace agreements collapse within the
the peace processes for these origin countries. For first five years (Convergne, 2016, pp. 144–145).
this purpose, GFFO and the BMZ might need to
adopt new types of funding lines without replac- Despite differences of the Afghan/Syrian peace pro-
ing existing ones (like BENGO, CIM). All funding cesses and the new emphasis on “inclusive” peace
allocations should be based on clear funding cri- processes with civil society, these figures point to se-
teria, make decisions on allocation or refusal of vere flaws. Among these, the influence of patron
funding transparent and support a self-deter- states (that finance armed groups, for instance) and
mined, autonomous conduct of broad-based peace spoilers are well-known hindrances to longer-
grassroots initiatives. term peace. Another flaw is that both peace processes
are characterised by a widespread lack of a) political
Link Afghan and Syrian civic engagement for peace groups/movements that have emerged organically
initiatives in Germany to peace processes and enjoy broad-based grassroots support and b) con-
crete, publicly known and feasible proposals by pro-
Civic engagement for peace initiatives could be tagonistsfor reform in different sectors of govern-
linked to peace processes in the long-term. By build- ment (e.g. security sector, education, economics,
ing upon individuals’ knowledge of politics and life agriculture).2 Civic engagement for peace pro-
in Afghanistan and Syria and combining these with grammes represent a crucial step towards reforming
new ideas, civic education for peace initiatives can peace processes by addressing these highly critical
become fora for developing long-term political vi- gaps: To contribute to the formulation of concrete
sions and ideas for feasible reforms with which Af- ideas from a broad, bottom-up flow of informed de-
ghans and Syrians can identify. So far, our research bates originating in self-determined agenda setting.
shows that such visions—and support for developing In cases where these initiatives wish to be included
these—have been noticeably scarce in both peace into official peace processes (e.g. tracks 2 and 3), the
processes. The fact that significant numbers of per- GFFO and the United Nations, for instance, should de-
sons of Afghan descent have lived in Germany for up velop transparent criteria for such initiatives to par-
to 40 years without having had a chance to engage in ticipate in official negotiations and/or to act as advi-
such initiatives, while the peace process has not sory bodies to these.
yielded sustainable results, demonstrates how this
opportunity has been missed so far for two
generations. 2 \ Both processes have in common that in Germany and
elsewhere, entire privately initiated peace processes creat-
ed by Afghans and Syrians have emerged, which usually
reject foreign presence and interference (cf. Meininghaus
& Mielke, 2019).
6\ \ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2021ENGAGING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS AS PEACE ADVOCATES \ K. MIELKE & E. MEININGHAUS
Introducing civic engagement for peace initiatives
for persons of Afghan and Syrian descent, and possi-
bly for those from other conflict settings, requires
long-term support. Given the failures of peace pro-
cesses around the world, we argue that such support
for self-determined, bottom-up and critically in-
formed visions for peace in peaceful environments
can represent a significant step towards positive
change.
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING
Amnesty International (2011). The Long Reach of the Mukhabaraat: Violence and
Harassment against Syrians Abroad and Their Relatives Back Home. London:
Amnesty International.
Bercovitch, J., & Fretter, J. (2004). Regional Guide to International Conflict and
Management from 1945 to 2003. CQPress.
Borg, C., & Grech, M. (2017). Pedagogy, politics and philosophy. Interrogating peace
and peacemaking. London, New York, Oxford, New Delhi, Sydney:
Bloomsbury.
ABOUT THIS POLICY BRIEF
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF). (2020). Das Bundesamt in
Zahlen 2019. Asyl, Migration und Integration. Nuremberg: BAMF.
Convergne, E. (2016). UN Mediators’ Collaboration with Scholars and Expert
We would like to express our gratitude to all individ-
NGOs: Explaining the Need for Knowledge-Based Communities in
Today’s Conflicts. International Negotiation, 21, 135–64, uals who have supported our research in their will-
DOI: 10.1163/15718069-12341327 ingness to dedicate time to our interviews and share
van Houte, M. (2014). Returnees for change? Afghan return migrants’ iden-
tification with the conflict and their potential to be agents of change.
their experiences. Since we assured all participants
Conflict, Security & Development, 14(5), 565-591. that they will remain anonymous, we cannot name
DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2014.963392
them, but it is them who made the findings possible.
Kreutz, J. (2010). How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the
UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 47(2), The policy implications presented here are based on
243–50. DOI: 10.1177/0022343309353108 research conducted for the project “Between Civil
Meininghaus, E., & Mielke, K. (2019). Beyond Doha and Geneva. Peace Engage-
ment of Afghans and Syrians in North Rhine-Westphalia and Germany
War and Integration – Refugees and the Challenges
(BICC Working Paper Series, No. 11/ 2019). Bonn: BICC. and Opportunities of Societal Change in North
Sharpe, T., & Cordova, S. (2009). Peacebuilding in displacement. Forced
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW).” The project has been
Migration Review, 33, 46-47.
based at BICC and funded by the Ministry of Culture
and Research of NRW (2016-2020). The project is inde-
pendent, and all interview and fieldwork notes remain
solely with the authors. Findings are grounded in an
accumulated 16 months of archival work and ethno-
graphic fieldwork among participants in Afghan
(pre-2018ff) and Syrian peace processes, respectively,
in Afghanistan, France, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. Based on informed and vol-
untary consent, ethnographic fieldwork has included
repeated life history interviews, semi-structured
interviews, and observation. All research participants
remain anonymised.
\ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2021 7\bicc \
Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn
Bonn International Center for Conversion GmbH
Pfarrer-Byns-Straße 1, 53121 Bonn, Germany
+49 (0)228 911 96-0, Fax -22, bicc@bicc.de
www.bicc.de
www.facebook.com/bicc.de
Director
Professor Dr Conrad Schetter
AUTHORS
Dr Katja Mielke, Senior Researcher \ BICC
Dr Esther Meininghaus, Senior Researcher \ BICC
CONTENT EDITOR
Elvan Isikozlu
COPYEDITING & L AYOUT
Heike Webb
EDITORIAL DESIGN
Diesseits – Kommunikationsdesign, Düsseldorf
DATE OF PUBLICATION
28 February 2021
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under: ISSN (Print) 2522-2031
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