Euro-optimism, Euro-pessimism and Democratic Deficit. An Analysis of Pro-European Attitudes - East and West.
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Euro-optimism, Euro-pessimism and Democratic Deficit.
An Analysis of Pro-European Attitudes - East and West.
Bogdan M Radu (ABD)
Babes-Bolyai University, Romania
University of California, Irvine
bogdanradu2000@yahoo.com
I. Introduction
The European Union is a rather new form of polity. It transcends the boundaries of the
nation state, to structure supranational governance. It is among the first supranational
authorities constituted on non-imperialistic and voluntaristic bases. However, its well being
depends on the satisfaction and willingness of the multi-national people to preserve it, and
to deepen it even further.
A democratic deficit is increasingly mentioned, as a label for "all-purpose"
dissatisfaction with the functioning of the EU. The complaints about the EU's performance
increase as the favorable attitudes decrease. Therefore, a "miracle solution" might be the
import of "Euro-optimism" from the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
Moreover, EU enlargement has precedents, but the Central and Eastern European candidate
countries have unique characteristics, that make the envisaged enlargement an equation
with more variables than it was the case with previous enlargements. On the one hand, the
countries in the region are in transition to democracy, adopting free market economies,
bearing the totalitarian inheritance and considering joining the EU, all in the same time. On
the other hand, the chance of starting afresh, for the CEE makes the temptation for building
"perfect democracies" higher. Democratic deficit could be avoided in CEE, assuming the
"democracy free" status of these countries in the past.
The role of public opinion in internationalized governance will be extensively
discussed below, but it is the aim of any introduction to explain the choice of the subject.
Therefore, Slater notes that "one of the central issues in integration theory is that of the
popular legitimacy of political institutions" (Slater, 1982, 70). And he continues "the
founders of the European community were far-sighted enough to see that the long-term
survival of the community in a democratic age would depend on its finding legitimacy with
the general public" (Slater, 1982, 72).
1There are different levels of identifying the democratic deficit, and a rough bi-partite
taxonomy would refer to the distinction between élites and the European citizens. This
paper looks at the values and attitudes of the European citizens. Furthermore, we are
interested in building a general model describing what makes a European citizen be
favorable towards the newly created polity. We are concerned with the individual level
where favorable attitudes develop. We test those attitudes, which are related to the
democratic deficit, either directly, by using questions about the democratic level of the
union, or implicitly, by using questions testing the approval of an individual for his/her
country to remain in the European structures. The more generous goal of this paper is to
find out whether the Eastward enlargement of the European Union could reduce the
democratic deficit.
There are several expectations regarding this idea. The first one is that countries in
Eastern Europe may develop totally different patterns of forming Euro-attitudes. In this
case, depending also on what these patterns are, bringing the CEE in could be a successful
strategy, as long as there is no danger of contamination, from the Western pessimism.
The second expectation relates to the possibility of finding the same patterns of
forming favorable attitudes in both East and West. If this is the case, one needs to refer to
Klingemmann's concept of "the dissatisfied democrat". This concept defines the people's
sophistication in political terms: one can be dissatisfied with a particular democratic
government, while still thinking high of democracy as a long lasting goal. Therefore, it
seems a good idea to accept CEE, as they have higher rates of favorable attitudes; besides
the general enthusiasm about democracy, citizens in these countries are also more
motivated to get into the European Union, due to other instrumental reasons. If however the
patterns of forming Euro-attitudes are similar, and in Central and Eastern Europe there is no
important rate of enthusiasm regarding the accession to the European Union, then bringing
these people in is not useful from the democratic deficit perspective, as the same problems
of dissatisfaction would persist.
The reason why we are including both questions of democratic satisfaction and of
general attitudes towards the EU relate to the fact that for the CEE countries it is virtually
impossible to test those two things separately, as they do not have a sophisticated command
of the "democratic vocabulary", neither are they members of the European people (by
virtue of their countries not being integrated into the EU).
The structure of the paper will thus follow the next steps: first, we will define and
discuss democratic deficit, focusing on the use of the term in this analysis. Second, we will
offer an extensive presentation of the literature on political attitudes, especially for the case
of the EU. In this section we will also illustrate the models of attitudes formation, and the
potential determinants. In the third section we will conduct our analysis, testing the models
available for the Western European attitude formation against the data available in CEE.
We will complement a comparative study with a longitudinal case study analysis on
Romania. The justification for this case study resides in Romania's non-integrated position.
Finally, we will draw conclusions and discuss the following research agenda. This paper is
work in progress and all results are intermediary.
2II. Defining, operationalising and assessing the democratic deficit
Democratic deficit emerged recently as a concept in the broad context of assessing
European Union's performance. However, it has a meaning in and of itself, and can thus be
understood even without reference to the EU. Therefore, in this part we will define
democratic deficit per se, then we will relate it with the EU, and explain its use for the
purposes of this paper. In doing so, we will also refer to the Euro-skeptics and Euro-
optimists, as the two extreme positions on the democratic deficit continuum.
II. 1. Democratic deficit - an intuitive definition
Any polity can suffer of a democratic deficit. It is precisely this truism that
transformed democratic deficit in "a mere catchphrase" (Coultrap, 1999, 107). The same
author uses a step-by-step process in defining democratic deficit. He starts by offering a
procedural definition of democracy: “a method by which society exercises influence on the
process of governmental decision making” (Coultrap, 1999, 108). The second step towards
the definition of democratic deficit refers to the definition of a democratic model, a
particular institutionalization of the democratic method” (Coultrap, 1999, 108). The third
and final step is to emphasize the relationship between democratic deficit and a specific
democratic model; democratic deficit thus occurs when "the flow of influence from the
people to government is impeded in some way"(Coultrap, 1999, 108). The link between
democratic deficit and democratic model is absolutely necessary, as democratic deficit can
be assessed only in a given democratic context. By doing so, one avoids the danger of
operating an illicit generalization: it is inappropriate to define democratic deficit according
to some general standards, because democratic models could carry large differences
between them. This observation is particularly important when referring to the European
Union's democratic deficit.
II. 2. Democratic deficit - two methods of assessing
Majone (1998) theorizes on the issue of standards. He distinguishes between standard
setting and standard using. The first process refers to "the technical task of measuring
various dimensions of performance against given benchmarks" (Majone, 1998, 5). The
latter encompasses a process of deliberation, resulting in the creation of new standards. He
concludes that democratic deficit's assessment within the European Union needs new
standards, because the ones used until now have been exclusively inspired from the case of
the nation-state (and he considers that there is little resemblance between the nation state
and the European Union).
We will offer two examples of assessing European Union's democratic deficit using
the nation-state standards. Our motivation resides in the fact that much literature is still
using the nation state standards. Moreover, it will serve as a good basis for introducing the
alternative theory of the new standards, which is also the theoretical framework we
embrace in this paper.
Katz notes that the democratic deficit of the European Union refers "to the weakness
of the European Parliament(EP) as the only directly elected EU institution, and even more
to the inability of the EP to hold European executive accountable in a manner comparable
3to the way in which national governments are thought to be accountable in a manner
comparable to the way in which national governments are thought to be accountable to
their own parliaments" (Katz, 2001, 54-55).
Additionally, he considers two other elements important in producing democratic
deficit, namely the majority/qualified majority voting in the Council, and the non-public
character of the executive sessions.
Katz observes that this view of the system is based on a conception of democracy,
resulting from a conjunction between two ideas, namely the popular sovereignty and party
government (Katz, 2001). After developing these ideas, the author concludes that the shift
of loyalties towards an international arena may cause a large part of the democratic deficit
resented by the citizens in the member states: "the shift of powers to the relatively
undemocratic EU undermines the quality of democracy at the national level as well,
because many areas of policy are no longer under direct national, and therefore national
democratic control" (Katz, 2001, 56).
Katz's approach emphasizes the shift of loyalty from the national to the international
authority. However, when he discusses democratic deficit he merely assumes people will
preserve their "assessment-methods" for democratic deficit, and apply them when
evaluating the EU. The alternative approach would consider "more knowledgeable" people,
who do not blindly apply their national evaluation standards to the supra national authority.
This would not necessarily be a result of their increased information and political
sophistication, but could also come from a downplay of the supranational arena as opposed
to the national arena, and therefore lesser expectations.
Van der Eijk and Franklin bring another dimension to democratic deficit, as it is
perceived by members of the European Parliament ("the elite"). They introduce the issue of
European debates being fought on a ground of national problems and issues, and being thus
related to the Reifian concept of second order elections.
These examples make clear that citizens as well as elites resent democratic deficit. In
this approach democratic deficit's measurement illustrates the use of the nation-state
standards. Whoever the individual resenting and thus reporting a democratic deficit in
his/her polity might be, he/she is assumed to act similarly in both national and international
assessments. He or she uses tools to identify a problem, and then translates his or her
expertise in a different arena.
These two examples actually group together the four sub-approaches Majone
identifies within the old-standards assessing frame: "standards based on the analogy with
national institutions; majoritarian standards; standards derived from the democratic deficit
of the Member States; social standards" (Majone, 1998, 6). He analyzes these standards,
shows their inappropriateness and thus concludes "that there is a need to re-set the
standards by which we assess the legitimacy of European integration and of the institutions
that guide the process" (Majone, 1998, 6).
This inappropriateness comes from the fact that the EU might not resemble the nation
state, but rather a federal system. Consequently, assessments of its democratic performance
should be done by comparing it with with the more similar system (i.e. the federal system).
In this respect Coultrap goes further. He argues that the European Union is more like a
4pluralist than a parliamentary system (as it has long been considered). He parallels the EU
with the North American "pluralist-democracy". It seems that the EU has all the traits of the
American system has: weak parties, a lack of strong government, "relatively autonomous
yet interrelated decision-making institutions", and autonomous subsystem governments
(Coultrap, 117).
II. 3. Euro-skeptics and Euro-optimists
If one measures democratic deficit in terms of public opinion and this is our approach
here, one notices that there is a continuum, which has as its ends Euro-skeptics and Euro-
optimists. We will discuss both the categories at this stage of the study.
One may talk about Euro-optimists and Euro-skeptics. The euro-philes are those who
endorse a favorable view of the union itself, and thus they "share explicit rejection of the
idea that there is no meaningful European culture upon which a supra-national identity
might be based" (Haesly, 2001, 82).
The same author draws a distinction between euro-philes and instrumental Europeans:
the first group "enthusiastically endorse all aspects of European integration", while the
second "support only specific aspects of European integration" (Haesly, 2001, 82).
While it is banal to coin this term as public approval of the EU, and general support
for it, it is efficient to characterize it in opposition to its antonym, Euro-pessimism. Taggart
(1998) offers a clear account of what Euro-skepticism is: "Euro-skepticism expresses the
idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified
opposition to the process of European integration" (Taggart, 1998, 366).
He further mention three types of opposition towards the European Union: the anti-
integration position of those being against the "very idea of EU" "those that are not in
principle opposed to European integration but are skeptical that the EU is the best form of
integration because it is too inclusive", and finally those that do not generally oppose the
EU "but are skeptical that the EU is the best form of integration because it is too exclusive"
(Taggart, 1998, 365-366). While the first category consists of people who are generally
opposing the EU as a form of polity, and thus do not recognize any of it merits, the second
category refers to those opposing enlargement towards the East. The third category would
group together those, which are generally favorable towards the enlargement. The levels of
popularity of these types of support within the European Union are the ones for our
research. If we find a significant share of those who oppose the European Union because it
is too exclusive, than this is a group which may be favorable to the enlargement; thus, if
this group is significant, even the idea of enlarging the union would be considered as a
potential reducer of democratic deficit.
III. Attitude formation and attitude preservation.
The aim of this section is to define, characterize and operationalise attitudes towards
the European Union as a particular form of international regime. Additionally, consistent
space will be allocated to determinants of these attitudes, a quasi-exhaustive attempt to
identify causal factors in determining favorable attitudes towards the European Union. In
5the end, we hope to be able to offer a clear account of the most important and generally
applicable determinants of Euro-attitudes (hereafter defined as favorable attitudes towards
the European Union).
While the emphasis has been traditionally on analyzing public opinion and national
political regimes, there is an increasing trend of emphasizing people's view of a polity in
the international realm as well. Consequently, the structure of the chapter will be threefold:
the first section will establish a liaison between public opinion and internationalized
governance, thus presenting different theoretical frameworks, focusing on the case of the
European Union. The second section will offer a taxonomy of attitudes, in the EU case.
Finally, the third section will consider different causal factors in developing Euro-attitudes
(as they were defined in the previous chapter).
III. 1. Public opinion and internationalized governance - the theory behind them
In order to analyze the role of public opinion in the international arena, one needs to
define the international arena. In a more systematic way, the international regime refers to
different aspects of the international arenas. Therefore, we will start by presenting a
definition of international regimes: "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area on
international relations" (Krasner in Sinnott, 1995, 25).
At a first glance it seems that international regimes and individual attitudes are fairly
remote from one another. However this may not be the case for two reasons. First,
international regimes are drafted and endorsed by significant segments of the national and
international elite, and therefore encompass attitudes. This being the case, elite's opinions
are taken into account, even if they do not structure the regime per se. Second, the
principles and norms held by the elite are not necessarily impermeable or opposed to trends
in public opinion. In this respect, we could point to the channels people may use in order to
influence elite's attitudes. An international regime is subject to the variation of cultural
trends and of the changing place of the individual in the contemporary society.
Rosenau makes a valid point emphasizing the role of individuals in the field of
international relations "the micro level of individuals has to be integrated into the analysis
[of the emerging global order] because structures at the macro level seem increasingly
vulnerable to shifts in the skills and orientations of the publics they encompass" (Rosenau
in Sinnott, 1995, 27).
Furthermore, he notes people's increased awareness and analytical skills, as well as the
highly interdependent character of the world. Sinnott develops the last argument, and thus
asserts that this enhanced awareness and increasing interference of individuals in the
international sphere might actually result in a public "demand for international regimes"
(Sinnott, 1995, 28). Finally, Robert Putnam also includes public opinion in presenting "a
more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and international
relations"(Putnam in Sinnott, 1995, 29).
To conclude, there is a convergent point of all the authors mentioned, namely that
"domestic public opinion may impel or constrain moves towards internationalized
governance, whether these moves are comprehensive and robust, s in the case of European
6integration, or partial and tentative, as in the case with most international regimes" (Sinnott,
1995, 29).
Although public opinion is relevant in the realm of internationalized governance, more
via the milieu of the domestic arena, people's attitudes towards international issues is
beyond question. Furthermore, the role played by the domestic arena, as a filter/recipient of
public attitudes resulted in valuable research mentioned in the following sections.
The role played by the public opinion in the evolution of the European Union resulted
in a three-phase evolution. The first is located in the early '60s, and refers to initial efforts
of building a European polity. This phase is thus related to theories such as transactionalism,
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. The second stage refers to the revisionist
trend of the late '60s and the Euro-stagnation of the '70s (caused among others by the empty
chair crisis and the French refusal of the British accession into the EU). Finally, the third
evolutionary level is the current resurrection of the role of public opinion.
III. 1.1. The initial phase of the 1960s
Richard Sinnott (1995) refers to two theories of integration (transactionalism and neo-
functionalism) and two theories of disintegration (core vs. periphery and the obstinate
nation state). Transactionalism and neo-functionalism can be looked at as being
complementary. The first theory finds echo in the works of Karl Deutsch. The emphasis is
on the role played by the sense of community, and the acquisition of a "we" feeling, which
is "a matter of mutual sympathies and loyalty; of 'we feeling', trust and mutual
consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually
successful predictions of behavior, and of co-operative action in accordance with it..."
(Deutsch et al in Sinnott, 1995, 13).
However, as Sinnott notes, the failure of this theoretical approach lies in its
impossibility to explain integration itself. The neo-functionalist attempt to explain
integration and, in the same time, to encompass public opinion fails, but for a rather
different reason. Haas and Schmitter defines of political integration is as: "the process
whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift loyalties,
expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas in Sinnott, 1995, 14).
Without going into further detail, one has to acknowledge the fact that neofunctionalist
theory refers to elite and leading groups initiatives in causing one integrated sector to spill
over into other sectors, and thus precludes any possible action by mass public. Therefore
one can say that neo-functionalist theories deliberately minimize the role of public opinion.
In opposition to the integration theories, there are examples of theories predicting
rather disintegration of the European polity, as a result of shifting loyalties or globalization
and modernization of communicational channels. As an example, the conflict core vs.
periphery could result in disintegrating the EU polity, if one considers the increasing
differences between geographic regions, overlapping existing cultural differences. AS
Sinnott notes, there is rather a tendency towards secessionism than towards integration: "In
the case of core-periphery conflict theory, then, there is just one key proposition: uneven
industrialization produces core-periphery inequalities, which, if allied to significant cultural
7differences, produces secessionist tendencies" (Sinnott, 1995, 16).
Additionally, Hoffman's theory of the obstinate nation-state (1965) accentuates the
role of cultural variables and of the public opinion in determining integration processes.
Summarizing this first stage of integration development, the theories acknowledge the
importance of the public opinion, but as the initial project of building a European Union
was led by elites interested in promoting peace within Europe, the influence of mass public
attitudes to the core of the system was weak.
III. 1.2. The revisionist phase
In the second, i.e. revisionist phase authors promoting the elite action in the early '60s
start to acknowledge the importance of mass attitudes. It is the case of both Haas and
Schmitter. Haas (1971) points to the problems of linking "the variables that describe the
rate of transaction between units with variables that describe the attitudes of masses and
members of the elites" (Haas, 26-30, in Sinnott, 1995, 19). A major link is thus considered
to be the social learning. Schmitter introduces more elements of public opinion as well;
while he still refers mainly to elites, the way he operationalises the concept of elite, whether
narrower or broader, leave space to more mass participation (in Schmitter, 1971, 233, in
Sinnott, 1995, 20). A major contribution is brought by Nye, and his concept of attitudinal
integration: "the concept of integration must be dissaggregated into economic, social and
political dimensions. Each of these dimensions is further subdivided: economic integration
into trade and common services; social integration into mass and elite level; and political
integration into institutional, policy, security-community, and attitudinal" (Nye in Sinnott,
1995, 20).
He conceives a revised neo-functionalist model, in which public opinion intervenes at
two points. Attitudinal integration is viewed as a process mechanism, and is therefore
described as an identitive appeal. The role of mass opinion in the domestic arena creates the
legitimacy of the integration programs in a specific country. Nye enumerates four
conditions likely to characterize the integration process over time: politicization,
redistribution, reduction of alternatives, and externalization. Public opinion intersects
especially with the politicization, when it comes to "broadening of the arena of
participants" (Nye, 1971, 89, in Sinnott, 1995, 21).
III. 1.3. The 1980s and the commencement of the public opinion era
Finally, the third phase institutionalizes the role of public opinion In the eighties,
"sentiment and culture play a prominent role" (Sinnott, 1995, 23). "Expectations, common
identity or consciousness, and a 'sense of community' are acknowledged to be essential
elements of political integration but, as noted earlier, they are 'the most contested, because
the most difficult to measure'" (Wallace in Sinnott, 1995, 23; Wallace inspired herself
rather from Deutsch than neofunctionslism).
These developments led authors like Keohane and Hoffmann - a synthesis of
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism - to assert that "successful spillover requires
prior programmatic agreement among governments, expressed in an intergovernmental
bargain" (Keohane and Hoffmann in Sinnott, 1995, 24). The importance of public opinion
8appears in some points along their thesis: the domestic backlashes (revolts against the
economic hardships the single market might impose on certain sectors), the problem of
democratic deficit, and various paradoxes: "integrated economies and separate politics,
elaborate process of multinational bargaining coexisting with an obstinately national
process of political life and elections, the paradox of the emergence of a European identity
on the world scene coexisting with continuing national loyalties" (Keohane and Hoffmann
in Sinnott, 1995, 24).
In conclusion, even if we acknowledge a very important role for the elites in the
process of integration, there still remains a need to incorporate public opinion. In the
following lines, we will refer to the concept of attitude.
III. 2. Decomposing the concept of attitude
Jo Saglie (2000) discusses the difference between attitudes and perceptions. Although
Niedermeyer and Westle (1995) dismiss the difference on grounds of insufficient
distinctiveness, we find Saglie's approach persuasive.
The author analyses three interrelated concepts: values, attitudes and perceptions. He
considers the difference between the first two constructs as straightforward, and thus does
not elaborate any further: "values usually refer to general goals, whereas attitudes are
evaluative orientations towards specific objects" (Saglie, 2000, 229). The distinction
between perceptions and attitudes is more complex; according to the author the first are
"cognitive and descriptive" while the second are "affective and evaluative" (Saglie, 2000,
229).
Furthermore, he points out that the rational way of conceptualizing this tripartite
relationship (attitudes-values-perceptions) is to assume that "a person's attitude to the EU
follows from his or her values and perceptions" (Saglie, 2000, 229). However, the process
might not be so straightforward, and it is more accurate to consider a mutual influential
relationship between values, perceptions and attitudes (especially for the latter two).
For our perspective it is relevant to note the possibility of a continuous interplay
between the three concepts. The countries in CEE find themselves in a period when they
need to redefine/reinvent parts of their values, and thereby to develop new attitudes. Due to
the dismantling of the communist regime and the void of political values (values
compatible with the democracy to be). Therefore, it seems that the Central and Eastern
European countries could develop a "parallel" process of building attitudes and values, as
both concepts emerge in the same time. However, a conflicting situation arises: perceptions
of political events (including the EU as a new polity) might be prone to excessive critique,
since satisfaction with the new democracy is not expected to be high (especially due to the
poor economic consequences of the transition). Therefore, one has to question the path of
forming attitudes: values could indicate the praise of democracy, while the perceptions
might in fact illustrates high dissatisfaction with democracy.
Hans Dieter Klingemann (1998) proves that the concept of dissatisfied democrats is
the key solution in this case. He argues, based on empirical evidence, that people in CEE
are capable of discerning between democracy as a form of political regime, and a particular
democratic government. According to him, people in CEE can be highly dissatisfied with
9the way democracy is working in their countries, while holding in the same time, deep
democratic values. This finding is particularly important because it reduces the risk of bias
induced by highly dissatisfied publics in Central and Eastern Europe, on their assessment of
the European Union.
The necessity of classifying attitudes is proved by itself: in order to assess people's
support for the EU we have to know how to record this support and also what are its
highest, respectively its lowest limits. Niedermeyer and Westle (1995) refer first to two
main types of attitudes towards internationalized governance, and then narrow down the
topic to the case of the European Union.
The two important perspectives in the study of attitudes towards political regimes, in
general, belong to Almond and Verba(1963, 1980), and respectively to David Easton(1965,
1975).
III. 2.1. Almond and Verba on political attitudes
Almond and Verba formulated their perspective in 1963, and then revisited their
theory in 1980, operating relevant changes. The role of political culture in determining the
role of public opinion is, we think, beyond question. In their first work they define political
culture: "the particular distribution of patterns of orientations toward political objects
among the members of a nation" (Almond and Verba in Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995,
33). They distinguished between objects and modes of orientations. The modes of
orientations consist of three different elements: cognition, affects and evaluations. The
political objects are different in their relation with the political system in general, input
objects, output objects and the self as a political actor. The combination of modes and
orientations resulted in a well-known matrix, whose cells represent different types of
political culture - parochial, subject and participant. In their reformulation of the theory in
1980, they changed their opinion: the modes of orientation are interrelated aspects of the
one and the same attitudinal phenomenon. The other dimension of the matrix is placed
under the heading of substantive content, including system culture, process culture and
policy culture. They distinguish between system, process and policy culture. The system
culture is the broadest, and includes attitudes towards the national community, the regime,
the authorities, the legitimacy of a certain regime, and the legitimacy of the incumbents in
particular roles (Almond and Verba, 1980, 28). The process culture includes attitudes about
the self and about the other actors in the game. It brings into discussion the issue of trust
and cooperation (Almond and Verba, 1980, 28). Finally, the policy culture refers to "the
distribution of preferences regarding the outputs and outcomes of politics, the ordering
among different groupings in the population of such political values as welfare, security
and liberty" (Almond and Verba, 1980, 28, in Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 35).
III. 2.2. Easton on attitudes.
Easton's approach towards attitudes is best illustrated in his theory of political systems
(1965). Easton describes three components of a political system, which can become objects
of support: the political community, the regime, and the political authorities (Niedermeyer
and Westle, 1995, 36). The political community consists of "that aspect of a political
10system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political
division of labor" (Easton, 1965, 177). In turn, the regime consists of three elements: the
values of its political philosophy, the norms of the political order, and the structure of
authority rules (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 36). Finally, the political authorities are the
occupants of authority roles (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 36).
Additionally, Easton distinguishes between diffuse and specific support - "diffuse
support denotes a generalized evaluation, whereas specific support means an output-
directed evaluation" (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 36). The diffuse support takes
different forms depending on the object:
1. In relation with the political community, support is thought of as a primarily affective
feeling of identity or loyalty.
2. In relation with the regime it is conceived as two dimensions ideological and value-
oriented beliefs concerning the institutional structure and trust or sympathy as a
spillover from ideological or even instrumental evaluations of outputs.
3. In relation with political authorities it is ideologically based trust (Niedermeyer and
Westle, 1995, 37).
III. 2.3. Modes of Orientation
Niedermeyer and Westle first define what the modes of orientation are, then they
develop a scheme to locate them within the broader concept of attitudes, and finally they
place them into categories: "We define orientations as anything people have in mind with
respect to a specific object" (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 44).
Social psychology presents us with two views on attitudes:
1. the multi-component view - connected with theories such as cognitive-consistency
theory, or the theory of cognitive dissonance. "In this view, attitudes are seen as
comprising three components: cognitive, affective, and behavioral. An underlying
attitude is indicated when these components show some consistency" (Niedermeyer and
Westle, 1995, 45).
2. one-dimensional definition of attitudes - "narrowly defined as categorizations of an
object along an evaluative and/or affective dimension which should be measured on a
bi-polar scale of affect" (la fel). Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) make a distinction between
beliefs, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and behavior.
The two approaches share the fact that they both consider attitudes as hypothetical
constructs, "forming an enduring predisposition to respond in a consistently positive of
negative way to a given object" (nw, 1995, 44).
Another approach is used in the analysis of attitudes towards the EC, by Hewstone in
1986. However, the authors do not consider it flawless, and criticize the weak distinction
between beliefs and attitudes. They identify to be two paths to break this deadlock: A. "the
evaluative nature of attitudes and the non-evaluative, rather rational and neutral character of
beliefs, which simply represent subjective knowledge of an object".
11B. "the affective, generalized, and enduring nature of an attitude and the singular,
(potentially) evaluative character of a belief" (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 46). The
authors offer support for this second view. In this case attitudes serve as a filter for beliefs.
However they will build their own model, as none of these mentioned models prove to be
satisfactory.
For Niedermeyer and Westle the modes of orientation represent the positions that
people can take when relating to objects. Therefore, they distinguish three modes of
orientation:
1. psychological involvement is the weakest and most passive form, and thus comprises
"neutral knowledge of and about an object, interest in it, the salience of it, and non-
normative expectations related to it" (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 48). This mode is
non-evaluative.
2. evaluations involve those positions which necessarily entangle the distinction between
good and bad (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 48). These modes could be long lasting
and enduring or short term and changeable: "an evaluation is the result of a normative
idea about how an object should be or should act and perceptions of how the object
really is or acts" (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 48). Evaluations could be made
directly, through positive/negative judgement, or indirectly through formulating a
demand. They take Easton's approach into consideration, making the difference
between specific and diffuse evaluations.
3. behavioral intentions "include all actions which might be taken with different degrees
of subjective probability in regard to a particular object"(Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995,
50). Eg: the intention to vote, the intention to join a party
III. 2.4. Objects of support
Among the existing objects of support, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) distinguish
between the political collectivity, the political order, the political authorities, and policies.
The political collectivity is primarily defined in Easton's terms, thus emphasising the role
played by the division of labor- "that aspect of internationalized governance which consists
of its members seen as a group of countries and their peoples, bound together by a political
division of labor" (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 41). The unit of analysis and the issue of
membership need more elaboration though. The unit of analysis is important in the sense
that people are members to more than one political community. Furthermore, there are
different types of membership. States are members, but individuals, their citizens, are
members as well: "Whereas the territorial element can be described as primarily a political
factor, the personal element of the political collectivity in our concept can be described in
terms of the 'social' or 'socio-political system'"(Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 42).
The personal element of the political collectivity refers to the inclusion of "not only
'others' but also 'the self' as an object" (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 42). The self
includes responding individuals and the people of their own country. In relation with
internationalized governance, both territorial and personal aspects of the collectivity will be
included in the analysis.
The political order - "refers to the organization of the political division of labor within
12the collectivity" (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 43). It consists of two elements - its
political philosophy and its institutional structure. The first focuses on general values and
norms in the realm of internationalized governance (Niedermeyer ad Westle, 1995, 43).
The institutional structure refers to the horizontal and vertical power scheme.
The political authorities are "the occupants of the political roles at the international
level" (Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995, 43). They should change, at least in a democratic
system.
The policy component refers to "substantive" issues in the internationalized
governance "In addition to policy plans, outputs, and outcomes, this component includes
orientations towards the functional scope of a specific form of internationalized governance;
that is, the range of substantive policies to be dealt with at the international level"
(Niedemeyer and Westle, 1995, 44).
III. 2.3. Attitudes towards the EU
Turning to the more specific case of the EU, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970)
conceptualize a framework of analysis for studying orientations towards the EC. The same
steps will be followed, as in the previous sub-chapter related this time with Euro-attitudes.
Lindberg and Scheingold differentiate between identitive and systemic support
"identitive support 'gauges what might be termed "horizontal" interaction among the
broader publics of the system, while systemic support probes "vertical" relations between
the system and these publics" (Lindberg and Scehingold in Niedermeyer and Westle, 1995,
38).
Furthermore they divide the systemic support between community and regime. The
political community, in their view, preserves Easton's division of political labor element.
However they relate it to the EU, thereby questioning the scope of the system (Lindberg
and Scheingold, 1970, 40). The regime "refers to the nature of the political system and,
therefore, directs us to such issues as the extent of supranational authority and the division
of power among the institutions of the Community" (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, 40).
The issue of modes of orientation marks the differences between utilitarian and
affective support: the utilitarian mode is related to some "concrete interest", while the
affective mode indicates "a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague
ideals embodied in the notion of European unity" (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, 40). The
authors build upon David Easton's dichotomy between diffuse and utilitarian support.
However, while Easton deals exclusively with political orientations, Lindberg and
Scheingold focus mainly on social orientations. The authors adopt the structure with objects
and modes of orientation, Easton developed. Moreover, they refer to more than political
orientations. Linberg and Scheingold distinguish between attitudes towards the EU as a
one-issue concept, and attitudes towards its components. In the following we will refer to
objects of support and modes of orientation respectively.
III. 3. Determinants of Euro-attitudes
The third part of this chapter regards the determinants of Euro-attitudes. There is a
13wide variety of such causing factors, and they can be grouped in two categories. However,
we will first present the two possible ways of forming attitudes, in respect with the two
important actors, the elites and the general public. Second, we will offer the socio-
demographic determinants. Third we will refer to economic determinants. We refer just to
these two important classes of attitudes because they group the most relevant models
developed in the literature until now.
III. 3.1. Bubbling up or trickling down
Wessels clearly introduces the two competing arguments in this respect, namely the
pull and the push models: "in one, elites pull publics; in the other, publics push elites"
(Wessels, 1995, 137). Following Wessels, we offer a brief encounter of the two arguments.
The elite driven process of building attitudes refers to different cascade model, as a
metaphor to explain the flow of information from the elite to the mass public. First,
Deutsch envisage a five stage model, the flow of information starting with the socio-
economic elites, and "trickling-down" trough political elites, mass media, the net of
opinions leaders, until the "relevant strata of the society " (Wessels, 1995, 137-8). Second,
Rosenau operates changes to the original five step model, thus building a four step one:
"news and interpretations of an event are first carried by, say, a newspaper; this then is read
and adapted by opinion makers, who assert (step 2) their opinions in speeches on the
subject that are reported (step 3) by the press and thereupon picked up by 'opinion leaders'
in the general public who in turn pass on (step 4) the opinions through word-of-mouth"
(Rosenau in Wessels, 1995, 138). Finally the third quoted model is built by Lazarsfeld,
Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) who design the simplest two step model in which "opinion
flows from the mass media to the public via opinion leaders" (we, 1995, 138).
The opposed argument is strongly advocated by Inglehart who "seems to suggest that,
by means of intergenerational valued change and increasing political mobilization the
process of European integration has become 'mass pushed'" (Wessels, 1995, 139). After
testing Deutsch's cascade model hypothesis on existing Eurobarometer data, the author
found confirmation: the development of support is more congruent between opinion leaders
and the highly attentive publics than between opinion leaders and the less attentive strata of
society" (Wessels, 1995, 161). Trying to include the mass-pushed model assumptions, the
author found that the party supporters influence the direction and content of the party
manifesto, given that in a small amount. The correlative influence from the party manifesto
to the public is consistently higher. The mobilizing efforts deployed by the party elites are
thus important for building more substantial support: the inference is that a system of
internationalized governance such as the EC could not expect support if there were nom
political elites, political parties, and attentive publics who care about it" (Wessels, 1995,
162). And this stands true even if "there is a discrepancy between the EC orientations of
party supporters and the position of parties regarding the EC" (Wessels, 1995, 161).
III. 3.2. Socio-demographic determinants
A first set of determinants is related to the commonly used socio-demographic
determinants. In this context we discuss the relevance of age, education, social status in
14determining various levels of EU support. The present study deal, with each of these
variables in turn, and add also the religious variable. The research incorporates Inglehart's
thesis of value change and generational replacement and Wessels' thesis of intra-societal
diffusion.
According to Wessels, the pre-condition for developing and attitude lies in the
awareness that there is something to attitudinally relate to. Accordingly, Wessels finds that
higher education/more specialized education has a positive impact on awareness (Wessels
109). Gender also seems to play a role, with men usually being more involved in politics.
The issue of age brings into discussion the two theses mentioned above. Inglehart thus
"formulated the hypothesis of persisting age group differences in support for European
integration, with the implication that, in the long run, these will lead to an increase in
support through generational replacement (Wessels 106) "a fundamental change in values
and attitudes was taking place among the mass publics of the Western European nations,
especially among the younger age cohorts. Pro-Europeanisation and support for European
institutions was part of this value change. For Inglehart, acquisition of supportive attitudes
and the perception of legitimacy for a particular political system is the result of a
socialization process" (Inglehart, in Handley, 1981, 337). Inglehart also developed the
concept of cognitive mobilization, relating to peoples' abilities to "identify with complex
and remote political situations, institutions and systems", (Handley, 1981, 338); "cognitive
mobilization leads people, on an increasing scale, to identify with a European polity: it is a
function of individual and social prosperity permitting access to skills (e.g. higher formal
education) necessary for integration into increasingly complex social and political
communication channels" (Handley, 1981, 338).
In opposition to this theory, Wessels develops the hypothesis of intra-societal
diffusion: "the first implication of this idea is that awareness of the EC and access to this
still remote institution have a tendency to become less dependent than they were on
political skills, knowledge, involvement, and the like. In other words, differences in
orientations between particular segments of society tend to decrease over time. The second
implication is that attitudes towards the EC, whether favourable or not, become more
consensual among mass public within and across countries" (Wessels, 1995, 106).
Nelsen, Guth and Fraser (2001) emphasize the role of religion in shaping public
support for the EU. They operationalise levels of religiosity by church attendance, and
hypothesize that higher levels of religiosity result in higher rates of support in the case of
Catholicism, and works the opposite in the case if Protestants. The differences reside in the
approach towards integration that the two churches have: "in the early years integration and
religion, especially Catholicism, were explicitely linked, theoretically and politically"
(Nelsen et al, 2001, 193). "The Protestant countries are reluctant to abandon sovereignity
for historical and political reasons, including an ancient distrust of 'Catholic Europe'"
(Nelsen et al, 2001, 193). Catholicism is uniting (i.e. the role of the Pope) while the
Protestants are more locally organized.
Wessels’ conclusion is thus the following: assuming that the EU is an innovation
gathering popularity via diffusion, it seems that the traditional socio-demographic variables
loose their importance in determining levels and intensity of support. However, while this
gap is increasingly reducing, political factors are still important. The author thus mentions
three variables causing the coming into existence of different groups as being relevant for
15differentiated support for the EU: left-right orientations, the materialist-postmaterialist split,
and the party affiliation (Wessels, 1995, 135).
III. 3.3. The economic explanation
One interpretation is that a type of economic calculus determines the evaluation
people make of the European Union. Bosch and Newton (1995) conducted a study referring
particularly to this topic; they were questioning the assumption of whether EU citizens
evaluate their supranational polity in economic terms, or in more idealistic concepts. They
mention a fairly strong line of analysis emphasizing this utilitarian aspect of support.
Inglehart and Rabier are important in this line of argument with their affirmation that
"favourable economic payoffs are conducive to - perhaps even essential to - the processes
of national and supranational integration"(Inglehart and Rabier, 1978, 69). Nye also
mentions the importance of perceiving economic advantages as producs/by-products of the
integration (Nye in Bosch and Newton, 1995, 73).
Finally, Dalton and Eichenberg (1993) clarify the utilitarian model of support for the
EU. They find that specific national circumstances determine people's evaluation of the EU.
Dalton and Eichenberg focus on pubic opinion towards the EU in the '70s and '80s,
and the factors impeding on these attitudes. The authors conceptualise public opinion "as a
function of both domestic and international conditions - economic and political" (Dalton
and Eichenberg, 1993, 509). They indicate two groups of countries, which have persistently
behaved differently in relation to their support for European integration. The first group is
formed by Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, and for this
group the percent of those supporting European integration remained more or less around
60% during the '70s and the '80s. The second group comprises Denmark, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom, and their correspondent percent of support oscillated between less than
10% and 30%, with a clear increase in the late '80s.
Dalton's and Eichneberg's earlier hypothesis indicated a relationship between national,
basic economic conditions and attitudes towards the EU. Therefore, in this article, they
analyze the following independent variables: the effects of national economic conditions
(inflation, unemployment, GDP), international exchanges and the balance of costs and
benefits from integration, national traditions and political events.(Dalton and Eichenberg,
1993, 520).
This analysis indicates that inflation is the strongest predictor: "a 1 percent increase in
the inflation rate produces a decrease in net support for the community of almost 2 percent"
(Dalton and Eichenberg, 1993, 521). Unemployment and overall condition of a national
economy are not highly related with support, "possibly because EC policies initiatives in
these areas are less direct or substantial than those that affect prices" (Dalton and
Eichenberg, 1993, 522). We will apply this approach when analysing the data available for
CEE. However, we do not think the indicators Dalton and Eichenberg use are valuable in
our case mainly because the economies of CEE are weak, and inflation is a common reality.
Moreover, the CEE countries are not part of the EU, so that they cannot equate economig
gains or losses with the membership thereof. However, questions about the economic
situation of the countries and the gains the membership could bring are valuable.
16A different body of literature has argued that citizens' support for the European Union
is determined by their affects rather than by pragmatic economic calculus. As in the first
section of this chapter, one needs to refer to the sense of community people experience, and
their related trust. In Easton's words, it is all about a diffuse-affective type of support.
Bosch and Newton thus perceive these two potential explanation of support as
complementary, and thus assert: "mass opinion anything as large and complex as the
European Community is highly likely to be based upon a mixture of different factors and
dispositions, ranging from naked economic self-interest, through sociotropic calculations of
an economic nature, to considerations of an idealistic kind" (Bosch and Newton, 1995, 75).
Their conclusion confirms their initial assumption and perceptions. They found that the EU
integration is not largely evaluated in economic terms. Also, "support seems to be
associated more strongly with social and attitudinal variables of a non-economic kind"
(Bosch and Newton, 1995, 101). Additionally, diffuse and more affective determinants of
the EU support are more important than specific economic reasons. They affirm the
existence of a deeply rooted mechanism of generating more trust over the years, especially
in the original six member states. Economic calculus remains important not in terms of
individual strategies, but rather in terms of "anticipated national benefits" (Bosch and
Newton, 1995, 102). One comment needs to be made here: there is considerable stability of
support for the EU, independent of changes in the economic or political realm, and this
indicates a rather low level of saliency of the EU topic in the Euro-citizens' lives (Bosch
and Newton, 1995, 103). This last point relates though with the question political
information and interest, which will be treated with in another part of this chapter.
Matthew Gabel introduces a rather different approach, based on micro-economics
"citizens of the European Union form attitudes towards EU membership - an international
economic policy - that are consistent with their occupation-based economic interests"
(Gabel, 1998, 936). This is complementary to Dalton's and Eichenberg's approach, macro-
economic approach.
His findings confirm the hypotheses, and challenge the conclusions early studies of
public opinion had (mainly Rosenau saying that citizens' opinions are generally incoherent):
"EU citizens also form coherent opinions on internationals affairs" (Gabel, 1998, 950).
The conclusions one can draw at the end of this section on economic determinants of
the favorable Euro-attitudes is that both the macro and the micro economic determinants
influence the formation of favorable European attitudes. It is rather unimportant whether
the economic calculus is the only form of forming attitudes, or the latter are related with
deeper feelings of trust. What matters is that in both case, economic determinants have an
impact both on micro and macro level of economics.
IV. Developping European attitudes in CEE
The section's aim is to introduce the main trends of support for the EC, observe their
measurement, and then replicate the study for data available for CEE countries. It builds
upon some of the macro-level hypothesis discussed in previous chapters in order to explain
and to compare public opinion attitudes in different countries. It also refers to the moment
represented by the signing of the Maastrischt Treaty in this framework. We will first refer
to the existing measures of attitudes in the West. Second, we will present the available data
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