European Security in Crisis What to expect if the US withdraws from NATO - International Dialogue Körber Policy Game - Körber-Stiftung
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International Dialogue
Körber Policy Game
Eu r o p e a n
Secur i t y i n C r i s i s
ithdraws from N AT O
ex p ec t if th e U S w
What to
A cooperation of
Körber-Stiftung International Dialogue Conflicts arise in situations that are fraught with misunderstandings and lack debate. Moreover, such conflicts are often grounded in the past. This is why we champion inter- national dialogue and foster more profound understandings of history. We address political decision-makers as well as civil society representatives and emerging leaders from the younger generations. Our geographic focus lies on Europe, its eastern neigh- bours, the Middle East, and Asia, especially China. We strengthen discussions about history at the local level in a manner that stretches beyond national borders and encouragepeople to share their experiences of cultures of remembrance. Our foreign- and security-policy formats provide safe spaces for confidential talks built on trust. However, we also employ formats that involve the public, such as publications, compe- titions and networks, to provide impulses to the debate about common European valuesand inspire the further development of international cooperation. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The IISS is the leading authority on geopolitics, defence and security policy, and geo- economics. As a non–profit organisation, the IISS has a mission to provide objective facts and data to support independent analysis that assists the adoption of sound policies to further global peace and security. A truly global organisation with a 60- year pedigree, the IISS has a highly cosmopolitan membership and staff, and diverse international governing and advisory boards. Through rigorous and independent researchand analysis, and its unique convening power, the IISS has become a shaper of international affairs: sharpening policies and forging networks that span the world, and encompass leaders in government, the military, business, the expert community and the public at large.
Introduction
Liana Fix Dr. Bastian Giegerich Theresa Kirch
Programme Director Director of Defence and Programme Manager
International Affairs, Military Analysis, Inter International Affairs,
Körber-Stiftung national Institute for Körber-Stiftung
Strategic Studies (IISS )
R
ecent developments in transatlantic rela- Executive Summary
tions have reignited the debate about the
need for Europeans to assume greater re- › Transatlantic relations: The Körber Policy Game
sponsibility for their own security. Yet, demonstrated that a transactional relationship with
effortsby European leaders to substantiate the general the US could become the “new normal” in US -Euro-
commitment to “take their fate into their own hands” pean relations, with the US slowly drifting out of
are so far lacking sufficient progress. the European strategic sphere. Whereas Europeans
Against this backdrop, the Körber Policy Game brought hoped for a continued strategic US interest in Eu-
together a high-level group of senior experts and gov- rope and a value-based partnership, the US team
ernment officials from France, Germany, Poland, the focused primarily on a “fair deal” addressing both
UK and the US to address a fictional scenario that in- defence and trade issues.
volves a US withdrawal from NATO , followed by multi › Divided Europe: Without US security guarantees,
ple crises in Europe. Europeans faced a serious risk of splitting into dif-
How will Europeans organise their security and ferent camps. Especially those countries that felt
defence if the US withdraws from NATO ? To what ex- most vulnerable and did not trust Europe’s ability
tent will future European security be based on mutual to organise collective defence were tempted to con-
solidarity, ad-hoc coalitions or a bilateralisation of rela- clude bilateral arrangements with the US , leading
tions with the US ? Which interests would the respec- to a “bilateralisation” of security and defence. For
tive European governments regard as vital and non- Europeans without nuclear capabilities, the sce
negotiable? What role would the US play in European nario presented an existential security threat.
security after the withdrawal? › Wait and see: During the Körber Policy Game, a sig-
The Körber Policy Game is based on the idea of proj nificant deterioration of the security situation in
ecting current foreign and security policy trends into a Southern and Eastern Europe had to take place be-
future scenario – seeking to develop a deeper under- fore Europeans were willing to take proactive steps
standing of the interests and priorities of different in security and defence. At first, most teams focused
actors as well as possible policy options. The starting on persuading the US to return to NATO , signalling
point is a short to medium-term scenario. Participants a willingness for concessions that were unthink
are part of country teams and assume the role of advis- able before.
ers to their respective governments. › Article 5 after US withdrawal: Most teams antici-
The discussions took place in a confidential setting pated that remaining NATO member states would
in Berlin in July 2019. This report summarizes the in- struggle to agree on the invocation of Article 5 in a
sights and positions generated by the Körber Policy Game grey-zone scenario, even when a NATO member
and was compiled in cooperation with the International state was threatened. This raises serious questions
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. We would about the credibility of Article 5 and the mutual
like to thank Douglas Barrie and James Hackett for their defence commitment following a US withdrawal
valuable input and advice in drafting the scenario. from NATO .
European Security in Crisis 1
› Nuclear deterrence: European nuclear deterrence tecture. Given its significant defence capabilities,
based on French and British capabilities was consid- the UK team saw its country in a powerful negotiat-
ered a possibility after a US withdrawal, yet this ing position and was sceptical of French-German
would entail significant costs. The burden-sharing leadership on defence issues.
debate would return to Europe, especially to Ger- › Russian offers rejected: Throughout the policy
many. Failing this, some teams anticipated the pro- game, all teams consistently rejected Russian offers
liferation of nuclear weapons among Europeans. for conflict resolution in exchange for concessions
› Choice of institutional framework: Most Euro on European security. This demonstrates that Rus-
pean teams were adamant that the NATO com- sia was not considered a credible security provider
mand structure should be maintained after a US in Europe.
withdrawal. The French team preferred an EU -cen- › European military capabilities: Shortfalls in Euro-
tred collective defence structure in the long term, pean military capabilities, especially in air and mis-
but this position was met with scepticism especial- sile defence, were acknowledged as serious risks in
ly from the British and Polish side. a short-term crisis scenario. Given that filling these
› UK matters: A post-Brexit UK would consider itself gaps would require long-term investment, Europe
a leading actor in European security, willing and would likely remain vulnerable for years to come in
capable of shaping Europe’s future security archi- such a scenario.
Selected European Equipment Shortfalls
Shortfall (limited conven- Cost estimate
Equipment
Platform type tional war scenario against (acquisition only)
examples
a state-level opponent) US$ bn 2019
Long-range air defence (force
protection and protection of Patriot; SAMP/T 102–120 batteries 88–104
critical military infrastructure)
Leopard 2A6/2A7;
Main battle tanks 2,500–3,750 25–38
M1 Abrams
Destroyer with anti-ship missiles;
hangar; surface-to-air missiles Type-45; Horizon 16 31–33
(air defence role)
Fighter aircraft Typhoon; Rafale 264 25–31
Infantry fighting vehicles CV90 ; Puma; VBCI 2,500–3,750 13–19
Short range air defence CAMM ; Land Ceptor 162–216 batteries 10–14
Destroyer with anti-ship missiles;
hangar; surface-to-air missiles
FREMM ; Type-26 7 9–13
(Anti-submarine warfare and
general purpose roles)
Air-to-air missile (radio frequency) Meteor 2,112 10
Anti-submarine warfare aircraft P-8 27 9
Source: IISS
2 European Security in Crisis
Policy Recommendations
1. Engage the public in a sustained debate
about security and defence in Europe. If
the electorate were better informed about threats and
4. Strengthen efforts to reassure European
member states which feel exposed in the
East. European solidarity should be expressed in terms
how these are likely to affect them, this would facili- of measurable commitments to those countries’ secu-
tate a deeper understanding of the value of cooperation rity. Given that individual European states are not pow-
in security and defence. This strategic communication erful enough to provide for their own security, the
will not necessarily translate into support for specific “bilateralisation” of security and defence is otherwise
policy choices advanced by governments, but it will a likely consequence. Already, diverging threat percep-
serve as a bulwark against misinformation as well as tions are a source of weakness, both for NATO and the
populist arguments and enhance societal resilience. EU . Maintaining unity in the context of a continuously
changing security environment will be difficult but of
2.
utmost importance.
Think about the unthinkable. Two as-
5.
sets that are of critical importance to the
ability of Europeans to defend themselves are the Accept that building European military
NATO command structure and the extended nuclear capabilities and creating a convincing
deterrence provided by the US . If these were to be with- deterrence and defence posture will take more than a
drawn or dismantled, Europeans would immediately decadeand will require sustained financial investment.
have to provide alternatives. Their ability to mount There are no shortcuts to credibility and existing
significant military operations or deter state-level op- vulnerabilitiescannot be eliminated immediately. From
ponents would otherwise not be plausible. a military perspective, priority areas for investment are
integrated air and missile defence, combat enablers,
3.
cyber and space capabilities, anti-submarine warfare,
Invest in European military capabilities and long-range precision fires.
and the mechanisms to deploy them. This
6.
is necessary to hedge against US disengagement while
demonstrating European resolve to provide a greater Should Europe face a situation where the
share of NATO ’s collective capability. Current burden- US withdraws from NATO , adjusted and
sharing across the Atlantic is not equitable, but the strengthened European security structures should pro-
sole focus on NATO ’s input target of “2% of GDP on vide mechanisms for the US to contribute to European
defence” obscures the fact that, in terms of output, security on a “plug and play” basis. In the short term,
Europe’s current contribution to transatlantic security this will help to keep the US engaged, to maintain
and defence leaves much to be desired. By doing more, Europeans’ focus on military interoperability with the
Europeans would make it less likely that the US decides US and to ensure a maximum level of transatlantic
to leave while also becoming more self-sufficient in political cohesion. In the long term, it may lower the
case the US does disengage. hurdles for re-engagement and would serve as an im-
portant reminder that even a withdrawal can be re-
versed.
European Security in Crisis 3
The Scenario
2021: The US withdraws from NATO
February 2021 The US Secretary of Defence reaffirms that the US will
A few months after his re-election as President of the not assume any military role and will instead focus on its
United States, Donald Trump declares that NATO has be- ongoing withdrawal from Europe. President Putin warns
come obsolete and the United States withdraws from the against Western meddling and offers all European states
alliance, formally coming into effect as per Treaty provi- bilateral security and reinsurance treaties with Russia.
sions one year after notice.
The US Department of Defence and the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR ) confirm that all US November 2021
forces – military personnel and equipment – including All US forces, military units and equipment, including
nuclear and missile defence assets will be withdrawn nuclear and missile defence assets, have been withdrawn,
from Europe as soon as possible. This includes the US lead leaving only facilities that serve broader US military pur-
nation battalion within NATO ’s Enhanced Forward Pres- poses beyond Europe, such as Ramstein Air Base. All US
ence in Poland. Henceforth, security guarantees will only staff in NATO have left their posts.
be provided in the form of bilateral security partnerships. The European NATO member states announce a sum
Russian President Putin proposes taking advantage mit in Bruges to discuss the future architecture of Euro-
of this “window of opportunity” to establish “equal and pean security and defence. Declaring his “disappoint
indivisible security on the continent” and to draft a ment” at the muted response to his proposals, President
new legally binding European security treaty based on Putin demands that Europeans “return to compliance
Medvedev’sproposals from 2008. with the provisions of the NATO -Russia Founding Act”
and withdraw all remaining rotating NATO troops sta-
tioned in the Baltic States. Shortly afterwards, Moscow
May 2021 conducts test launches of Iskander short-range missiles
A conflict erupts in a Western Balkan NATO member stationed in Kaliningradwith a range of 500 km.
state. An armed group supported by pro-Russian oppo In a common statement, the leaders of the Baltic
sition parties occupies the parliament and demands the states urge their European partners to substantially in-
country’s withdrawal from NATO as well as a rerun of crease troop presence, provide missile defence, and ex-
recent parliamentary elections. Demonstrations sup- tend their nuclear capabilites. In the subsequent weeks,
porting the demand erupt across the country. The Prime the Russian Defence Minister declares that an extended-
Minister, who is being held under house arrest, calls on range version of the SSC -8 Screwdriver land attack cruise
the EU and NATO to intervene. missile with a range in excess of 4,500 km will be sta-
Several dozen foreign military servicemen without tioned in Western Russia. A prominent European news-
insignia, identified by locals as Russian military-intelli paper leads with the headline: “This is Europe’s Cuban
gence officers, have entered the country and are travel- Missile Crisis”.
ling to the capital to support the agitators. Sea ports,
strategically located with access to the Mediterranean
Sea, are blocked by Russian warships.
4 European Security in Crisis
Interests and Policy Options
Discussing the scenario of a US withdrawal from NATO and Europe followed by crises
in Southern and Eastern Europe, the five country teams defined their countries’ interests
and formulated policy options. The following sections outline the crisis response that
each team would recommend to their respectivegovernments in this scenario.
France:
Time for an EU Security Alliance
The French team outlined two main priorities: First, to maintain unity “NATO is dead
within the European Union in order to prevent individual European coun- without the US .”
tries from signing bilateral security agreements with the US , and second,
to keep the US engaged in Europe after the withdrawal. Paris should pro-
mote a stronger European defence posture, including higher defence
spending, and further develop the EU ’s Common Security and Defence Preferred future
Policy (CSDP ). A post-Brexit UK should be kept fully involved in European security framework:
security to prevent a bilateral UK -US agreement. In consultation with the EU -centred security alliance
UK , France would consider extending its nuclear umbrella to EU members, (“EU +”), including collective
while upholding the French President’s authority over the use of nuclear defence and nuclear deterrence.
force. This would come at a significant cost for France and lead to the
returnof the burden-sharing debate within Europe. Future role of the US :
France would counter efforts to stoke unrest in the Western Balkans Bilateral security agreement
with an active posture. However, the French team anticipated a lack of betweenan EU -centred alliance
consensus among the remaining NATO members on invoking Article 5. and the US .
Thus, an ad-hoc “coalition of the willing” should lead any form of military
action. Possible measures would include the dispatch of French Special Red lines:
Forces and a show of force at sea and in the air, as well as targeted sanc- Full independence in the use of
tions. The French team recommended seeking de-escalation vis-à-vis Russia nuclear force, to be authorized by
through European or bilateral diplomatic channels, yet refrained from the French President.
offeringRussia any concessions on European security.
In the event of an escalation of tensions in Eastern Europe, France
should engage in missile defence efforts and seek to fill the gaps left by
the US departure, for example as lead nation in Poland within NATO ’s
Enhanced Forward Presence. In the short term, dependence on existing
NATO structures would continue. For the longer term, the French team
expressed a preference for a new, EU -centred security alliance (“EU +”).
NATO members that are not part of the EU (Albania, Canada, Iceland,
Montenegro, Norway, Turkey, and post-Brexit UK ) could affiliate with the
new alliance on a bilateral basis.
European Security in Crisis 5gERMaNy:
Facing an Existential Security Crisis
“For Germany, this The German team defined the safety of Germany and Europe as its primary
is the worst-case interest and regarded a US withdrawal from NATO as an existential secu-
rity crisis. The team suggested that Berlin should use all possible means –
scenario.”
including concessions in trade and energy policy as well as an increase in
defence spending and procurement – to reverse any such decision. Ger-
many would work towards a common or collectively coordinated European
Preferred future approach to prevent bilateral agreements with the US . The German team
security framework: suggested exploring the possibilities offered by the Franco-German Aachen
Maintaining NATO , comple- Treaty to provide for future nuclear deterrence. To demonstrate its com-
mented by EU defence capabil- mitment to NATO , Berlin should enhance its military posture in Eastern
ities, including European European member states. The German team also underlined the necessity
nuclear deterrence (“NATO -”). of having a serious domestic debate on security and defence.
Germany would consider a crisis in a Western Balkan country as a test
Future role of the US : case for European security, and support the invocation of Article 5 in order
Keep possibility for the US to to prevent a hybrid war scenario in a NATO member state. Measures to
“opt in” European security. deter Russia from interference should include political pressure, economic
(Nuclear) capacity building in sanctions and military action, for example through the mobilisation of
Europe, including Ballistic Missile NATO ’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF ). Berlin would also try
Defence. to convince the US to contribute to these efforts.
The German team warned against the emergence of different zones of
Red lines: security in Europe in response to Russian actions in Eastern Europe and
Due to domestic opposition, rejected appeasement. They acknowledged significant shortcomings in air
German nuclear weapons would and missile defence that would put Germany and other non-nuclear Euro-
remain an unlikely option. pean states at immediate risk. Berlin should thus ask France and the UK to
Appeasement of Russia and the expand their nuclear umbrellas to other European countries. The German
emergence of different zones team was undecided about the question of German nuclear weapons given
of security in Europe. an assumed strong domestic opposition. For the future of European secu-
rity, Germany would suggest maintaining NATO military structures even
without the US (“NATO -”), but complemented in the long-term by further
developed EU defence capabilities.
PoLaND:
Keep the US Engaged on the Eastern Flank
The Polish team defined as its main priorities to preserve a US military
presence in Poland and to keep NATO alive. Poland would re-negotiate the
presence of the US rotational brigade and regional missile defence based
on a bilateral agreement. As a next step, Warsaw would form a regional
coalition of the “Bucharest 9” (Poland, Romania, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and the Baltic States) together with the Nordic
6 European Security in Crisiscountries and encourage Germany and France to commit more resources “If the US withdraws
to the Eastern flank. The Polish team would recommend to preserve from Europe, the
NATO ’s Washington Treaty and military structures as the only credible
Eastern flank should
option. For Warsaw, an open-door policy towards the US to “plug in” any
future structures was non-negotiable. Poland understood its role as that of
be the last place.”
a facilitator of good relations with the US to the benefit of all Europeans.
The Polish team regarded a crisis in a Western Balkan country as part
of a wider Russian destabilisation strategy, potentially also affecting Polish Preferred future
security. A resolute response would require a military and diplomatic show security framework:
of force to demonstrate NATO ’s willingness and readiness to act. The Pol- Upholding NATO as a security
ish team suggested consultations on Article 4 or Article 5, followed by mea- alliance, possibly including
sures such as Special Forces operations, securing accessto sea routes, and Sweden and Finland.
the mobilization of NATO ’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF ).
The EU should also consider a police mission as well as economic sanctions Future role of the US :
towards Russia. “Plug in” option for a US return to
A missile crisis in the Eastern neighbourhood would come as no NATO and Europe, otherwise close
surpriseto the Polish team and could only be prevented by the build-up of partnership.
European missile defence capabilities. Any dialogue with Russia on Euro-
pean security should require as a precondition Russia’s withdrawal from Red lines:
Crimea. Poland’s primary objective would be to remain part of the US Principles of the Helsinki Final Act
nuclear umbrella. If this were not possible, Poland would want the French (1975) and the Paris Declaration
and the British to extend their nuclear capabilities to the rest of Europe. (1990).
Failing this, the Polish team anticipated the proliferation of nuclearweap-
ons among European states.
United Kingdom:
Maintaining a Say in European Security
The British team defined as their primary objectives to maintain a say in “The UK would design
European security and, if possible, to delay a US withdrawal from NATO . European security,
The UK would reaffirm its commitment to NATO and its European allies. At
not just sign on a
the same time, London would view proposals for an EU -centred security
arrangement with great scepticism. The British team would also recommend
dotted line.”
to limit opportunities for a Franco-German “go it alone” approach to Euro-
pean security. A bilateral arrangement with the US would remain a fall-
back option. They warned against growing isolationist sentiments in the Preferred future
UK ’s domestic political discourse. security framework:
The British team considered a crisis in the Western Balkans as a European security alliance sepa-
watershedmoment for NATO and recommended a robust and immediate rate from the EU (“NATO 2.0”),
response. This would involve the deployment of UK assets and a strong UK including a single command struc-
role to deter Russian interference, including the dispatch of British Special ture, collective security guaran-
Forces, a reinforced naval presence, and targeted sanctions. The British tees and credible nuclear deter-
team assumed a lack of consensus within NATO on the use of Article 5, rence (“no talking shop”).
and proposed Article 4 consultations first in order to avoid discrediting
Article5.
European Security in Crisis 7Future role of the US : An escalation in Eastern Europe would lead to an increase in UK mili-
Maintain openness towards a tary deployments in that region. Rejecting nuclear coercion as a bluff,
return of US forces to Europe London would aim to minimise Russia’s role in European security (“no veto
(“enabling clauses”). option”), especially given an assumed likely German interest in dialogue.
The UK should engage with France to establish credible nuclear deterrence
Red lines: for Europe, but would oppose an institutional link to the EU . If the US
Adequate burden-sharing. withdrawal were irreversible, the British team would prefer to retain as
No EU army. much of the existing NATO structures as possible, pending the creation of
Autonomy of decision-making a successor structure (“NATO 2.0”). Overall, the British team understood
over the use of nuclear force. the UK ’s role in European security as that of a leading actor, designing the
future architecture on equal terms with France.
UNITED STaTES:
a Transactional Relationship
“Countries who The US team defined its two primary interests as keeping Europe out of
care will find a way to the Russian and Chinese spheres of influence, and shifting the trans-
atlantic relationship towards more equitable terms. The future transatlan-
keep us engaged.”
tic security arrangement should be more advantageous and flexible for the
US , allowing for a pivot to the Indo-Pacific sphere in the long term. The US
team called on the Europeans to put everything on the table in return for
Preferred future US security guarantees, including trade, investment and energy policy. Eu-
security framework: ropeans should also engage in greater burden-sharing in the Middle East
“Europe standing on its own feet”, and Africa. In the future, Washington would scale down its outsized global
with a specific vision to be defined role and avoid long-term deployments.
by the Europeans. The US team assessed the situation in the Western Balkans as a
primarily European security problem and not as a military crisis that
Future role of the US : would lead Washington to war. Thus, the US should follow Europe’s lead in
Bilateral negotiations with Euro- conflict management and sanctions, assuming the Europeans formulate a
pean countries on a new security strong policy response that goes beyond consultations. Apart from con-
arrangement. demning the coup attempt in the Western Balkans, the US team would
consider CIA covert action, provided that Europe reacted accordingly.
Red lines: An escalation in Eastern Europe would not lead to an immediate US
Subsidizing European security. return to NATO , even though the US team expected domestic debate
on that question, spurred by Congress. Nevertheless, since the Europeans
would remain Washington’s most important partners, the US should dem-
onstrate openness towards re-negotiating a “better deal” with interested
countries on three conditions: a comprehensive offer that combines trade
and defence issues; support for US policy, for example on Iran; and co-
ordination between Europe and Washington on policy towards China.
The US would expect returns on investments in Europe and would not con-
tinue to subsidize European security.
8 European Security in Crisis2018 / 19
47 %
77 %
Yes:
No: 46 %
Was EU enlargement in 2004 the right believe the cohesion between EU
decision? Germans are divided member states has weakened
43 %
are in favour of Germany
65 % 73 %
believe the UK should be treated describe US -German relations today
increasing its defence spending like any non-EU member state as somewhat bad or very bad
78 % 74 %
10 The Value of europe The Value of europe 11
say Germany should coordinate
its refugee policy together with its
are in favour of sanctions for EU
member states that violate fundamental
“Our aim is to is the eu on the right track?
German ForeiGn
European partners
Policy
EU values such as the rule of law
strengthen cohesion” 63 % 32 %
78 %
No Yes 2018
in PersPective Interview with Heiko Maas, German Foreign Minister
59 % 36 % 2017
2018: don’t know 4 %, no answer provided 1 %
With contributions by Kersti Kaljulaid, Filippo Grandi,
2017: don’t know 5 %
mateusz morawiecki, Heiko maas and others
agree that Germany and the EU are
raising tariffs against the US Körber-Stiftung: Foreign Minister, why do you the EU level. I think that the EU and its member resurrect Europe after the Second World War, and
think that “Europe United” is the answer to states should take these grievances very seriously. the EU was a crucial factor behind reuniting the
“America First”? The recent decisions in Brussels regarding internal continent after 1990. The EU is attractive because
MaaS: “Europe United” is, to my mind, our best and external security issues, economic and finan it is not just an economic project. It is, first and
response to a dramatically changing strategic cial governance, and migration and border protec foremost, about democracy, the rule of law and
and geopolitical environment. The global order is tion illustrate that we are on the right track. freedom.
Involvement or Restraint?
THE BERLIN PULSE 2018 / 19
© Thomas Imo / photothek.net
faltering and old and new powers like China and Körber-Stiftung: Certain governments in Europe Körber-Stiftung: The German-Polish Barometer
Russia are challenging the foundations of the global no longer seem to share or even disregard found that 39 % of Poles – the largest group
and regional security architecture. Moreover, the fundamental EU values. Are sanctions a useful of respondents – considered Germany to be too
A representative survey on German attitudes to US Government under President Trump is develop option in these cases? How could these partners dominant and not demonstrating enough
ing an approach that combines withdrawal from be persuaded to return to European values? willingness to compromise at the EU level. What
foreign policy commissioned by Körber Foundation international agreements with a policy of maxi HeiKo MaaS MaaS: In the EU , some national governments have is your response to this perception?
mum pressure visàvis friends and foes alike. In this foreign Minister of Germany different interpretations of European norms and MaaS: I take it seriously. Germany would be
new strategic context, “Europe United” is and values due to their specific history and experiences. well advised to take a close look at such criticism.
remains the overarching aim of our foreign policy. We have to manage these differences, but at the Fortunately, the GermanPolish Barometer also
We want to build a strong, sovereign Europe MaaS: Since 2008, the EU has been more or less same time, we have to protect and preserve the core revealed that 64 % of Poles consider relations with
based on the rule of law and respect for the weak, in constant crisis mode, beginning with the bank of our common values and convictions. I believe Germany to be good or very good, and 74 % would
and in the firm belief that international coopera ruptcy of Lehman Brothers 10 years ago, which that our values are indeed an essential part of the favour even closer cooperation with Germany.
tion is not a zerosum game. Our influence on global led to a deep economic and financial crisis in Europe European identity. But this is not an issue between Our aim is to strengthen cohesion within the Union.
issues like climate change, free and fair trade, and beyond. The terrorist attacks that hit many Germany and the countries concerned. It is a We are constantly seeking to consult and reach out
migration, crisis management and the social impact European societies as well as the migration crisis in European issue that is currently being discussed in to all our partners, such as with France and Poland
of globalisation will increase significantly if we 2015 / 16 also gave rise to a general feeling of inse a constructive manner – in the European Parliament bilaterally and in the Weimar Triangle. Further
act with the combined forces of 500 million Euro curity. This accumulation of crises together with the as well as in the Commission and the Council. It more, we consider our special dialogue formats with
peans. repercussions of globalisation and the rapid spread is within these institutions that we should try to the Baltic and Nordic countries to be particularly
Körber-Stiftung: What are the main reasons of digital technology resulted in an eroding of find European answers. We must not forget that the valuable. My experience is that these exchanges
behind the recent drop in approval ratings for trust in political and economic elites within our European idea was always the antithesis to totali help a great deal to prepare the ground for political
64 pages with numerous illustrations
the EU in many member states? societies. This happened at both the national and tarian ideas. The European Communities helped to compromises at the European level.
Available in English only
46 a NeIGhbourhood IN TurMoIl a NeIGhbourhood IN TurMoIl 47
Körber-Stiftung: A Europe-wide approach seems ranean basin. Notwithstanding this, the right to
to narrow down to increasing border protection seek asylum in Europe needs to be absolutely
and outsourcing the processing of asylum preserved, as one of the foundational elements of
requests to other countries. How do you view the system of human rights so carefully developed
this development? over decades.
grandi: Despite the political rhetoric around Körber-Stiftung: According to the UNHCR ,
refugee and migrant flows, Europe is by no means since the end of the Second World War there
THE BERLIN PULSE
in the centre of a migration or refugee ‘crisis’. have never been as many people fleeing crises
Around 60,000 people have crossed the Mediter and violent conflict as in 2017. Why has the
ranean to Europe between January and July this year international community become less and less
– around half the number for the same period last able to solve conflicts?
© uNhCr / bassam diab
year, and far short of the million who arrived by grandi: The rising number of those displaced
land and sea in Europe in 2015. Therefore, this is the around the world by conflict, persecution and
moment to find predictable structures and systems violence – now standing at some 68.5 million people
for sharing responsibility and avoid the pressure worldwide – is an indicator of a system of inter
being put on just a few states. Closing borders and national cooperation in crisis. Current weaknesses filippo Grandi on a visit to aleppo, february 2017
ports, weakening rescue at sea, and blocking access in the multilateral system, and in the ability
to asylum in Europe, cannot be the answer. to prevent and resolve conflicts, mean that new
German Foreign Policy in Perspective
Despite the falling numbers, the rate at which conflicts emerge at the same time as existing ones and responding to displacement, and securing burden of hosting large numbers of refugees alone,
people are dying at sea is on the rise. Recent drag on. From Afghanistan, to Myanmar, South solutions for the millions of people uprooted around and puts in place practical measures to translate the
incidents in which some states have refused dis Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, the human consequences the world, so that they are able to return home principle of shared responsibility for refugees into
embarkation of people rescued by NGO vessels are of political failures are evident. and rebuild their lives. reality.
deeply worrying. Together with the International Körber-Stiftung: How can Germany and the In the meantime, it is crucial to recognise the It aims to rapidly galvanise support whenever
Organisation for Migration, we have recently EU engage more in finding solutions to conflicts enormous contributions of the countries in develop countries experience a sudden, largescale influx, as
proposed a new collaborative approach to make in their neighbourhood? ing regions next to conflict zones that receive and well as sustaining attention on protracted crises.
search and rescue and disembarkation arrangements grandi: Germany is an important contributor to support the vast majority of the world’s refugees. It brings together governments, humanitarian and
more predictable and manageable, so that people humanitarian and development action globally, and They keep their borders open despite huge pressures development actors, the private sector, and civil
rescued in international waters can be quickly one of UNHCR ’s strongest partners. Together with on their own resources, delivering a global public society, with a focus on fostering refugee inclusion
brought ashore in safe locations around the Mediter other states, it has a key role to play in preventing good, and contributing to regional and international in national systems and building their resilience
stability. and selfreliance, as well as strengthening the
Since 2014, Körber-Stiftung regularly publishes
Europe’s response must encompass this broader communities hosting them. And it also includes
Should germany …? dimension. More support is needed to countries measures to increase the admission of refugees to
of origin and transit, along with investments in third countries – including through traditional
20 %
resolving conflict and addressing the root causes of resettlement and expanding the range of pathways
78 %
largely determine its
displacement, and an expansion of resettlement for legal admission.
own refugee policy
a representative survey on German attitudes to
and other legal pathways for refugees to alleviate Germany has played a prominent role in the
the pressure on first countries of asylum and development of the compact, drawing on its decades
actively coordinate its refugee policy
together with its european partners provide protection for the most vulnerable. of experience in receiving and hosting refugees
Körber-Stiftung: Why will the planned Global and strong engagement in international coopera
Compact on Refugees encourage states to do tion. Its strong leadership on international refugee
more for refugees? protection both – within and beyond Europe –
foreign policy. In the second edition of The Berlin
grandi: The new Global Compact on Refugees continues to provide an important model globally.
don’t know 1 %, no answer provided 1 % recognises that states cannot be left to shoulder the
Pulse, we present the survey results along with
the perspectives of international political leaders 16 The Value of europe The Value of europe 17
who express their hopes and expectations for
German foreign policy in 2019. “I do not see the risk” the rule of law, but I do not see the risk. I am
convinced that the reformed judiciary system will
provide more justice, more objectivity, and more
MorawiecKi: There are no particular fields where
we would like to see less integration, as long as
there is no intrusion into necessary domestic
Mateusz Morawiecki, Prime Minister of Poland, explains why transparency. reforms. Can EU officials from Brussels properly
Körber-Stiftung: Let us turn to the future of the judge what is best for the Polish judiciary system?
concerns about reforms in Poland are ungrounded EU . If the EU were pefect in 2030, what would I would look forward to more integration in 70 %
it be like? of the areas and less misunderstanding in 30 % of the
MorawiecKi: The perfect EU would contain a fully areas by 2030.
implemented single market, where the freedom Körber-Stiftung: In contrast, what is your
of movement applies not only to goods, people and dystopian vision for the EU ?
capital, but also to services. There would be more MorawiecKi: We still have a very dangerous
The authors of the second edition include
convergence with respect to wealth and income Eastern neighbour. Russia is trying to disintegrate
across countries, and stronger cohesion. In other the EU by stirring uneasiness and anxieties in
words, Central Europe would have caught up European societies. We must address this threat,
with Western Europe. And the perfect EU would for example by avoiding a divide of NATO . I would
be proud of a strong common defence system that also be worried if we allowed a disintegration
Kersti Kaljulaid, President of Estonia;
Körber-Stiftung: Prime Minister Morawiecki, is integrated into NATO . of the European single market, which has made our
why do the Poles have a more favourable view of Körber-Stiftung: In one sentence: deeper companies so much more efficient and effective.
the EU than all other EU citizens? integration in economic governance and defence? Finally, I am also concerned about a future with
MorawiecKi: Poland was part of the Soviet sphere MorawiecKi: Absolutely. increasing misunderstandings between European
of influence, but Europe was our promised land. Körber-Stiftung: Which fields should be less societies. We should try to understand each other
© Körber-Stiftung / Stephan pramme
Filippo Grandi, UN High Commissioner for Refugees;
Therefore, we wanted to be a part of the European integrated? better, Germans and Poles, the French, the British.
Union. Many Poles migrated to Western Europe
during the darkest days of communism, which has
left scars.
Körber-Stiftung: Does the past nourish the
Poles’ pro-European attitudes more than the
Mateusz Morawiecki, Prime Minister of Poland;
present? MateuSz MorawiecKi was eu eastern enlargement in 2004 the right decision?
MorawiecKi: Both play a significant role. We are prime Minister of poland
a part of Europe and we have always felt a part of it.
Körber-Stiftung: Why, of all member states, is
Poland then the first-ever country to face an time ago. This is why I believe we will manage to
and German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas,
infringement procedure under Article 7 of the explain to the European Commission that our
Treaty of the EU ?
MorawiecKi: These are two different aspects.
reforms will not make our judicial system less
independent or less objective. 46 % No Yes 47 %
Europe is the symbol of our aspirations, but at the Körber-Stiftung: Is the infringement procedure
same time, we have to rebuild the postcommunist merely a misunderstanding between Poland
among many others.
society. We never underwent a deep vetting pro and the EU Commission about the importance
cess of our judiciary system 1990, as happened in of Article 2?
Germany for example. Berlin kept after very few of MorawiecKi: Fighting for democracy and freedom
its judges and prosecutors. In Poland, the commun has been Poland’s motto for centuries. Therefore,
ist apparatchiks remained in charge for many we are aware of the importance of Article 2. Some
years, and this should have been changed a long people try to call our judicial reform a risk to don’t know 6 %, no answer provided 1 %
Coming soon: The Berlin Pulse 2019/2020
All articles, detailed results and previous surveys are available at:
www.theberlinpulse.orgKörber-Stiftung Social development needs dialogue and understanding. Through its operational projects, in its networks and in conjunction with cooperation partners, Körber-Stiftung takes on current social challenges in areas of activities comprising Innovation, International Dialogue and Vibrant Civil Society. At present its work focuses on three topics: Technology needs Society, The Value of Europe and New Life in Exile. Inaugurated in 1959 by the entrepreneur Kurt A. Körber, the foundation is now actively involved in its own national and international projects and events. In par ticular, the foundation feels a special bond to the city of Hamburg. Furthermore, the foundation holds a site in the capital of Germany, Berlin. Körber-Stiftung Berlin Office Pariser Platz 4a 10117 Berlin Germany Phone +49 · 30 · 20 62 67 - 60 Fax +49 · 30 · 20 62 67 - 67 E-mail ip@koerber-stiftung.de www.koerber-stiftung.de/en Facebook www.facebook.com/KoerberStiftungInternationalAffairs Twitter @KoerberIP Imprint “European Security in Crisis – What to expect if the US withdraws from NATO ” Publisher: Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg Responsible according to the German Press Law: Dr. Lothar Dittmer Editors: Liana Fix, Bastian Giegerich, Theresa Kirch Proofreading: Textpraxis, Hamburg |textpraxis.de Illustration Cover: Pia Bublies | piabulbies.de Photos p.1: Körber-Stiftung, IISS Design: Groothuis. Hamburg | groothuis.de Print: Hans Monno | monno.de © Körber-Stiftung 2019
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