JANUARY 2020 - THE ATTACK ON CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY AND IN ISRAEL - CNCD-11.11.11
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T I O N
O C C U PA
d
Y 2020
n
UAR
JAN
a N K I N G
S H R I
S PA C E
THE ATTACK ON CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE OCCUPIED
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY AND IN ISRAEL
n
t e n t s
o n
tab le of c
Executive Summary 3
Introduction 7
1. Shrinking Space: Consequences for Palestinian Civil Society 8
1.1. What does Palestinian civil society think about shrinking space? 9
1.2. Shrinking space and Israeli government and pro-occupation groups 10
1.3. Shrinking space and Palestinian Authority 12
1.4. Shrinking space and de facto Hamas authorities 15
2. Shrinking Space: Consequences for Israeli Civil Society 16
2.1. What does Israeli civil society think about shrinking space? 17
2.2. Shrinking space and Israeli government and pro-occupation groups 18
3. Shrinking Space and International Organizations 24
4. The EU Context and Response 26
4.1. General EU policy framework 27
4.2. EU tools to counter shrinking space in Israel and Palestine 27
4.3. Recent developments in European policies 28
4.3.1. Dissolution Human Rights/IHL Secretariat 28
4.3.2. IHRA definition of anti-Semitism 28
4.3.3. Anti-BDS parliamentary motions in Germany, Czech Republic
and Austria 30
4.3.4. Criminalization of BDS and anti-Zionism in France 31
4.3.5. Attempts to defund CSOs supporting BDS 31
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 32
References 36
o P Ho n
Co l
This report is published by 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 • January 2020
Authors: Willem Staes and Nathalie Janne
Final editing: Peter Flynn
Layout and design: Betty Bex - Metronoom
Photos - cover: © Baz Ratner - Reuters
- backcover: © Abbas Momani - Getty Images
o
V E
© WILLEM STAES
U T I
EXECM A R Y
SUM
After decades of occupation, which already put severe restrictions on the ability of
CSOs to operate in the occupied Palestinian Territory, and at a time when the Israeli
government is no longer hiding its intention to permanently annex large swaths of oc-
cupied Palestinian Territory, the civic and humanitarian space in which Palestinian and
Israeli civil society are operating is rapidly shrinking.
Recent years have seen a virulent crackdown against civil society in Palestine and Israel. This “shrinking
space” for CSOs operating in Palestine and Israel is an inherent feature of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian
territory, and manifests itself in various ways:
•P
alestinian CSOs are prime victims of this shrinking space and are targeted from all sides: the Israeli gov-
ernment, extremist pro-occupation groups closely affiliated with the Israeli government, the Palestinian
Authority (PA) and the de facto Hamas authorities in the Gaza strip. They are confronted with administra-
tive and arbitrary detentions; physical threats and harassment; restrictions
on freedom of movement, expression and assembly; increasingly restric-
tive regulatory frameworks; and intense defamation campaigns aimed
Palestinian and Israeli CSOs at undermining their credibility and cutting their external funding.
are facing a strategic and • Israeli CSOs, meanwhile, are under constant attacks by the Israeli gov-
holistic campaign by dozens ernment and by extremist pro-occupation groups closely affiliated with
the Israeli government. They also face non-stop defamation and incite-
of extremist pro-occupation ment campaigns, a multitude of restrictive laws that seriously curtail their
groups operating in Israel, freedom of expression and association, and persistent efforts to cut their
foreign funding.
Europe and the US, which
is coordinated by the Israeli This report aims to shed light on the different ways in which Palestinian and
Israeli CSO actors are confronted with this “shrinking space”. It zooms in on
Ministry of Strategic Affairs the different ways in which Palestinian and Israeli CSOs are attacked by the
(MSA) Israeli government, pro-occupation groups, the Palestinian Authority and
by Hamas. It is based on a desk review of existing literature, as well as field
research in the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel in June 2019.
To complement initial findings, a survey was also circulated among 17 Pales
tinian and 10 Israeli CSOs in September 2019, including several partner organizations of 11.11.11’s member
organizations. The data collected during this survey should be considered indicative and prone to changes
over time, but nevertheless gives a good “snapshot” of the main issues threatening the operating space of
Palestinian and Israeli CSOs, as well as the policy actions they would like to see prioritized by the EU and EU
member states:
• In terms of main “shrinking space” for Palestinian CSOs, a number of factors stood out in this survey.
“Physical violence” by different actors is a main issue in all contexts surveyed (Israel, Area C, East
p
Jerusalem, PA-controlled areas in the West Bank, Gaza), while “decrease in external funding due to attacks
by nationalist NGOs” is identified as one of the three most important issues in East Jerusalem, Area C, PA-
controlled areas and in Gaza. Palestinian organizations working inside Israel and/or East Jerusalem are also
particularly worried about new Israeli legislation and efforts to delegitimize and discredit their work, while
organizations working in Area A and B of the West Bank are warning about a rapid decline in the rule of
law within PA-controlled areas. Finally, Palestinian CSOs working in Gaza also highlight the impact of travel
restrictions or travel bans, originating from the Israeli blockade of the Gaza strip.
Palestinian CSOs were also asked to identify the main actors threatening their space to operate. The
pro-occupation group NGO Monitor and the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs were identified as the
most threatening actors, followed by actions and statements by individual Israeli government officials.
This is also reflected in the main policy recommendations Palestinian CSOs have for the EU and EU mem-
ber states. After “increase in core funding”, Palestinian CSOs see the establishment of an EU no-contact
policy with NGO Monitor and the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs as a main priority.
• In terms of “shrinking space” for Israeli CSOs, a number of factors dominate. Three “shrinking space fac-
tors” stand out by far when compared to other factors. New legislation, delegitimization and defamation
campaigns, and the decrease in external funding due to attacks by nationalist NGOs are consequently
ranked as the three main issues at stake. Israeli CSOs operating in East Jerusalem (which was illegally
annexed to Israel in 1980) and Area C of the West Bank, however, face a different type of shrinking space.
They are predominantly confronted with arrests and detention, a wide range of administrative obstacles,
and with raids on their offices and/or the closure of their offices.
Unsurprisingly, Israeli CSOs see Israeli government officials, NGO Monitor and the Israeli Ministry of
Strategic Affairs as the three actors that most threaten their space to operate. Finally, the 10 Israeli CSOs
surveyed identify three main policy actions for the EU and EU member states: the re-establishment of the
“Human Rights and IHL Secretariat” (see more background in section 4.3.1) and an increase in field visits
by high-ranking European politicians and by members of European parliaments.
When asked about actors that threaten their space to operate, Palestinian and Israeli CSOs surveyed by 11.11.11
all identified the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs and “NGO Monitor” as the main actors. This report there-
fore paid particular attention to the anti-CSO campaign by Israeli authorities and affiliated groups, in addition
to the gross human rights violations and anti-CSO attacks by the PA and Hamas.
Palestinian and Israeli CSOs are facing a strategic and holistic campaign by dozens of extremist pro-occu-
pation groups operating in Israel, Europe and the US, which is coordinated
by the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs (MSA). Both the MSA and gov-
ernment-affiliated groups such as NGO Monitor are conflating legitimate
European territory and criticism of gross Israeli human rights violations with anti-Semitism and are
employing vague and unsubstantiated claims of terrorist affiliations against
politics have become Palestinian CSOs, in order to deprive the latter of funding essential to their
a main battlefield sustainability. In doing so, Israel wants to delegitimize liberal human-rights
voices advocating a free and democratic society in Israel and Palestine, and
for delegitimization is openly attacking the fundamental right to freedom of expression.
campaigns
This report therefore comes at a critical time. In recent years Israeli pro-
occupation actors have stepped up their efforts and have brought their dis-
information to the heart of European democracy. The EU has accused the
Israeli government of “disinformation campaigns” and has described NGO Monitor’s work as a “cocktail of
tendentious research, intentional inaccuracies and downright EU-bashing propaganda”.
European territory and politics have thus become a main battlefield for persistent efforts to delegitimize
any discourse about Palestinian rights and respect for international law. The number of worrying devel-
opments has rapidly proliferated in recent years. The Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs and its network of
extremist pro-occupation groups have taken credit for bringing down EU funding mechanisms such as the
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Secretariat. They have conflated human rights advocacy
and criticism of Israeli policies with anti-Semitism, as can be seen by the promotion of the IHRA definition
on anti-Semitism, the adoption of anti-BDS motions and legislation in Germany, Czech Republic, Austria and
France and problematic developments in the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland.
Yet the EU continues to engage with such disinformation actors and fails to hold them accountable for such de-
liberate disinformation campaigns. The EU, which remains by far the most important donor to both Palestinian
and Israeli CSOs, has so far not managed to sufficiently defend and preserve an enabling environment for local
q
CSOs. Interviews with Palestinian and Israeli CSO actors and with European diplomats have highlighted several
serious concerns regarding the EU’s ability to meaningfully alter the shrinking space landscape. Such concerns
include the non-existent or weak implementation of key EU strategy documents (most importantly the “EU
Country Roadmaps for Engagement with Civil Society”); a self-imposed censorship among EU officials to criti-
cize Israel, out of fear for being labelled as anti-Semitic; a clear lack of strong political backing from EU capitals to
hold all violators to account and impose consequences for attacks against CSO actors; and a lack of a dedicated
analytical capacity to systematically monitor the shrinking space for CSO actors by all actors.
d atio ns
m e n
Recom
The report therefore includes a set of 18 recommendations to ensure continued funding to Palestinian and.
Israeli CSOs, to differentiate between anti-Semitism and legitimate criticism of Israel and to prioritize the
fight against shrinking space in EU policy vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine, including:
1. EU member states should create a successor mechanism to the IHL and Human Rights Secretariat,
while also exploring possibilities to increase legal aid to Palestinian and Israeli civil society organiza-
tions under attack.
2. National parliaments in EU member states and the European Parliament should refrain from adopting
motions similar to the anti-BDS motion adopted by the German Bundestag in May 2019. Instead,
they should unambiguously and publicly state that BDS and other forms of criticism of Israeli policies
are a legitimate form of non-violent protest
3. The new EU High Representative for Foreign and Defence Policies and EU member states foreign
ministers should unambiguously and publicly re-iterate that the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions
(BDS) campaign and other forms of criticism of Israeli policies are a legitimate form of non-violent
protest.
4. When relying on the IHRA definition of anti-Semitism, EU member states should refrain from using
or referring to problematic examples, which are not part of the formal definition.
5. EU institutions in Brussels, the EU Delegation in Tel Aviv, the EU Representation in Jerusalem and EU
member states’ delegations in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem should review their relationships and engage-
ment with the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Israeli groups such as NGO Monitor, as well as
developing common EU messages towards such actors.
6. National parliaments in EU member states and the European parliament should more frequently
organize publicized field visits to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory.
7. High-level officials from EU institutions in Brussels, the EU Delegation in Tel Aviv, the EU Representa
tion in Jerusalem and EU member states should regularly and publicly meet with representatives
from Palestinian and Israeli CSOs, both at delegation and member state capital level.
8. EU member states and the European Representation in Jerusalem should structurally monitor the
shrinking space of Palestinian and Israeli civil society organizations. This can be done, among others,
by issuing regular HOMS reports on the matter.
9. EU member states’ delegations and the EU Delegation in Tel Aviv should ensure that an updated
EU Country Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Israel includes ambitious and measur-
able priority actions, regularly discuss progress reports and hold relevant actors accountable for
violations.
10. EU member states’ delegations and the EU Representation in Jerusalem should ensure that an
updated EU Country Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Palestine includes ambitious
and operational priority actions, should regularly discuss progress reports on the implementation
of the Country Roadmaps, and should hold relevant actors accountable for serious violations.
11. EU institutions in Brussels, the EU Delegation in Tel Aviv and EU member states’ delegations in Tel
Aviv should include the preservation of an enabling environment for Israeli CSOs as a key priority
objective in the upcoming “Human Rights and Democracy Israel Country Strategy” for the period
2020-2024.
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Palestinian and Israeli civil society actors play a key role in Israel and in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt).
They are “changemakers” who monitor and document serious human-rights and International Humanitarian
Law (IHL) violations committed by all parties2; provide vital humanitarian, socio-economic and legal support
to affected communities; contribute to inclusive and participatory communities; and monitor and scrutinize
abuses of power, corruption and bad governance.
However, the civic and humanitarian space in which Palestinian and Israeli civil society are operating is rapidly
shrinking. Fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of
association are restricted. This is to be seen in the context of a larger international trend, where civil society
actors seem to be increasingly the subject of defamation campaigns, restrictive regulations and physical
threats and assaults.
Whereas repression of CSOs in the occupied Palestinian territory has been a reality for decades, several
recent restrictive actions by Israel and by the Palestinian authorities can be seen as a prime example of this
global trend. This is no coincidence. Palestinian and Israeli CSOs are among the actors that form the last line
of defence against an entrenched Israeli occupation, the Israeli blockade of Gaza and resulting human rights
violations. Local CSOs have always been a key force in the opposition against the occupation and annexation
agenda of successive Israeli governments.
For decades, Palestinian civil society has been suffering from violent crackdowns and repression by Israeli
security forces, settlers and military courts. They are incessantly attacked by the Israeli government and its
global network of extremist pro-occupation groups. They also have to oper-
ate in an environment where both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas
have established an authoritarian rule and have committed serious human
The civic and humanitarian rights violations.
space in which Palestinian Recent years have also seen a virulent crackdown against civil society in
and Israeli civil society Israel. Many Israeli CSOs are under relentless attack from extremist forces
within Israeli society and politics, who are eager to remove any obstacle to
are operating is rapidly their annexationist agenda.
shrinking
This report aims to shed light on the different ways in which Palestinian and
Israeli CSO actors are confronted with this “shrinking space”. It zooms in on
the different ways in which Palestinian and Israeli CSOs are attacked by the
Israeli government, pro-occupation groups, the Palestinian Authority and by Hamas. It is based on a desk
review of existing literature, as well as field research in the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel in June
2019. To complement initial findings, a survey was also circulated among 17 Palestinian and 10 Israeli CSOs in
September 2019, including several partner organizations of 11.11.11’s member organizations. The data collected
during this survey should be considered indicative and prone to changes over time, but nevertheless gives
a good “snapshot” of the main issues threatening the operating space of Palestinian and Israeli CSOs, as well
as the policy actions they would like to see prioritized by the EU and EU member states.
Ultimately, this report tries to provide answers to two main questions: what do Palestinian and Israeli CSO
actors perceive as key obstacles to their work, both inside Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory? And,
most importantly, which specific policy measures would Palestinian and Israeli CSOs and individual activists
like to see prioritized by the EU and EU member states? In doing so, the report hopes to provide some guid-
ance on what concretely European governments could do differently in order to better defend and expand
the civic space in the oPt and in Israel.
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© MUSSA QAWASMA / REUTERS
u1.1. What does Palestinian civil society
think about shrinking space?
In September 2019, 11.11.11 conducted an online survey with 17 Palestinian CSOs.
Participants were asked six questions:
1. What do you consider the most important “shrinking space” factors in Israel?
2. What do you consider the most important “shrinking space” factors in Area C and Jerusalem?
3. What do you consider the most important “shrinking space” factors in Area A and B?
4. What do you consider the most important “shrinking space” factors in Gaza?
5. Which actor do you consider to be the most threatening to your space to operate?
6. Which policy actions would you like to see prioritized by the European Union (EU) and by
EU member states, in order to counter the shrinking space for
your organization?
Participants were asked to rank answer Palestinian CSOs were also asked to
options (and also add other answers), identify the main actors threatening
with 1 being the most important factor their space to operate. The pro-occupa-
or action. The data collected during this tion group NGO Monitor (see box below)
survey should be considered indicative and the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs
and prone to changes over time, but were identified as the most threatening
nevertheless gives a good “snapshot” actors, followed by actions and state-
of the main issues threatening the oper- ments by individual Israeli government
ating space of Palestinian CSOs, as well officials. This is also reflected in the main
as the policy actions they would like to policy recommendations Palestinian The Israeli Ministry of
see prioritized by the EU and EU mem- CSOs have for the EU and EU member
ber states. states. After “increase in core funding”,
Strategic Affairs and
Palestinian CSOs see the establish- NGO Monitor are identi-
In terms of main “shrinking space”, a ment of an EU no-contact policy with
number of factors stand out. “Physical NGO Monitor and the Israeli Ministry of
fied as most threatening
violence” by different actors is a main is- Strategic Affairs as a main priority. actors for civic space
sue in all contexts surveyed (Israel, Area
C, East Jerusalem, PA-controlled areas
in the West Bank, Gaza), while “decrease
in external funding due to attacks by
nationalist NGOs” is identified as one
of the three most important issues in
East Jerusalem, Area C, PA-controlled
areas and in Gaza. Palestinian organiza- NGO Monitor organizations (NGOs), their
tions working inside Israel and/or East funders, and other stakeholders,
Jerusalem are also particularly worried NGO Monitor was created in primarily in the context of the
about new Israeli legislation and efforts 2002 as part of the neoconserv- Arab-Israeli conflict.” However, as
to delegitimize and discredit their work, ative Israeli think tank “Jerusalem described in detail below, in reali-
while organizations working in Area Center for Public Affairs” (JCPA). It ty NGO Monitor is a highly biased
A and B of the West Bank are warn- presents itself as a “globally recog- organization with close ties to the
ing about a rapid decline in the rule of nized research institute promoting Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, Israeli
law within PA-controlled areas. Finally, democratic values and good gov- ministries and Israeli embassies that
Palestinian CSOs working in Gaza also ernance”, publishing “fact-based only targets Israeli, Palestinian and
highlight the impact of travel restric- research and independent anal- international CSOs that speak out
tions or travel bans, originating from the ysis about non-governmental against the Israeli occupation.
Israeli blockade of the Gaza strip.
vOffices of Palestinian CSOs are the
subjects of frequent raids, during
which files, computers and databases
are confiscated and/or destroyed
s u lts
3
which files, computers and databases
y r e
Surve
are confiscated and/or destroyed.5 This
has far-ranging implications for the
operations of Palestinian CSOs. Many
Palestinian CSOs already have to cope
with financial restraints and do not have
What do Palestinian CSOs see as main shrinking space factors inside Israel? the capacity to use the cloud or other
1. New legislation directly impacting civic space systems safely due to the surveillance
2. Delegitimisation and defamation employed by Israel. This often means
3. Physical violence by authorities that the computers taken contain the
only copies of documents and plans.6
What do Palestinian CSOs see as main shrinking space factors inside
East Jerusalem and Area C? Recent examples of such practices
1. Delegitimisation and defamation include a raid by Israeli forces on the of-
2. Physical violence by authorities fices of Palestinian human rights group,
3. Decrease in external funding due to attacks by nationalist NGOs Addameer on 19 September 2019,
during which they confiscated comput-
What do Palestinian CSOs see as main shrinking space factors inside ers and hard drives. One of Addameer’s
Area A and B? staff, Ayman Nasser, has also been
1. Decrease in external funding due to attacks by nationalist NGOs detained without charges since 17 Sep-
2. Erosion rule of law tember 2018.7 Another prominent ex-
3. Physical violence by settlers ample is Salah Hamouri, field researcher
for Addameer, who was arrested in
What do Palestinian CSOs see as main shrinking space factors inside Gaza? August 2017 and detained for one year
1. Physical violence by authorities without charge or trial. In 2018 the of-
2. Travel restrictions or travel bans fices of the Althouri Women Center
3. Decrease in external funding due to attacks by nationalist NGOs in East Jerusalem were also raided
by Israeli soldiers. Most recently, on 2
Which actors do Palestinian CSOs see as most dangerous for their and 11 October 2019, the Finance and
civic space? Administrative Director of Health Work
1. NGO Monitor (shared first place) Committees (HWC) was arrested and
2. Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs (shared first place) HWC offices were vandalized by Israeli
3. Israeli government officials soldiers. According to the UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights in the oc-
Which actions do Palestinian CSOs want the EU and EU member states cupied Palestinian territory, the increase
to prioritize? in such raids “underlines attempts to
1. Increase in core funding further silence civil society organiza
2. EU no-contact policy with NGO Monitor tions and human rights defenders,
3. EU no-contact policy with Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs particularly those working on account-
ability issues.”8
Prominent Palestinian human rights or-
ganizations like Al Haq and Al Mezan
1.2. Shrinking space and Israeli have also experienced frequent hack-
government and pro-occupation ing attacks on their email accounts and
have received intimidating phone calls.9
groups A report from 7amleh, a Palestinian or-
ganization specialized in digital rights,
also shows how Israel’s total control
-P
hysical violence, threats and vio
lence and administrative deten- over the Palestinian ICT infrastructure
harassment: tion against Palestinian activists and enables it to monitor all Palestinian on-
organizations, Israel tries to weaken line activity.10
Since the beginning of the Israeli occupa- or suppress any opposition to the oc-
tion, individual Palestinian activists have cupation. Civil leaders are also often The recent protests at the Gaza border
been killed, injured, threatened (includ- incarcerated for a long time, thereby re- are another case in point. The United
ing death threats) or otherwise harassed. moving a catalyst for the development Nations Commission of Inquiry on the
Israeli security forces also frequently of social movements.4 2018 protests has shown how Israeli
use violence against Palestinian pro- snipers were targeting medical person-
testers, which have resulted in the death In addition, offices of Palestinian CSOs nel and journalists, which amounts to
of several protesters. By employing are the subjects of frequent raids, during crimes against humanity.11 For example,
nmSeveral prominent Palestinian CSOs
and human rights organizations have
been the target of continued defama-
tion and stigmatization campaigns by
extremist pro-occupation groups
volunteers working for the Palestinian and closed down a lecture on Israeli that can be characterized as terrorism.
Medical Relief Society (PMRS) were shot demolitions of Jerusalemite houses at If you say that it concerns terrorism, this
and killed while providing paramedic aid Burj Luqluq Social Centre Society. has far-reaching consequences. This re-
to injured people in Gaza. ally has to be done carefully, with due
regard for the rights of the people and
Finally, it should also be highlighted that -D
efamation and subsequent organizations. The source of the ac-
Israeli authorities have frequently tar- cutting of funding cusation was usually NGO Monitor. I
geted Palestinian journalists operating say it very simply: honestly, it is of lit-
in the oPt. In 2018 alone, the Palestinian Several prominent Palestinian CSOs and tle use to me. Very often, it concerns
Center for Development and Media human rights organizations have been very vague accusations. For example,
Freedoms has documented 455 Israeli the target of continued defamation and someone would be a relative of a PFLP
attacks against Palestinian media stigmatization campaigns by extremist member. The accusations are at such
freedoms.12 pro-occupation groups. Such actions a level. Indeed, Ms. President [of the
often falsely depict Palestinian CSOs House], this is no reason to character-
and individual staff members as terror- ize organizations as supporting terrorist
-R
estrictions on freedom of move- ist supporters or anti-Semites in order organizations. If this were to be deter-
ment, association and assembly to undermine the legitimacy of the CSO mined, then there is no doubt that action
in question, reduce their public support would be taken. But such an accusation
Staff members of Palestinian CSOs have and cut off their external funding.16 deserves careful substantiation and that
routinely been denied permits to travel is lacking. Then we shouldn’t go along
between the West Bank, East Jerusalem Israeli ministers, including Prime Minister with such images.”
and Gaza. Many staff of Palestinian CSOs Netanyahu and Justice Minister Shaked,
have never been able to meet each have equally been involved in such ac- Yet, even if proven false or fabricated,
other in person, and can only commu- tions. They have on several occasions such accusations have a negative impact
nicate with each other through Skype, called on foreign governments, such as on Palestinian CSOs. The latter have to
VOIP or mobile phone.13 Moreover, staff Denmark and Norway, to cut financial deal with reputational risks, donors re-
members of Palestinian CSOs are often support to Palestinian CSOs because quiring special audits or (temporarily)
harassed at Israeli checkpoints while of their alleged anti-Semitism or links suspending programs, or new donors
travelling inside the West Bank. with terrorist groups.17 ‘They never at- becoming more sceptical about invest-
tack us on the content that we produce, ing in future projects with Palestinian
In East Jerusalem, occupied by Israel but only through vague allegations of CSOs for fear of taint by association.
since 1967 and illegally annexed in 1980, anti-Semitism or through guilt-by-asso-
120 Palestinian social, cultural, and po- ciation accusations of terrorism sup-
In addition to targeting external funding,
litical institutions have been closed port’, one senior Palestinian CSO staff defamation efforts have been directed
down by Israeli authorities since 1967.14 member told a staff member of 11.11.11.18 at private banks and consultancy firms.
Moreover, restrictions on building and Several other Palestinian activists also Several Palestinian CSO representatives
licences for Palestinian CSOs based in expressed their frustration with the con- operating in the West Bank told 11.11.11
East Jerusalem are limiting their abili- stant allegations of anti-Semitism. ‘We that they have recently experienced a
ty to expand and develop. Palestinian do not have any issue with Jews. Anti- serious increase in such attacks, where-
CSOs which have offices in different Semitism is a serious issue. It should by the banks and consultants they work
locations also need to get different thus clearly be defined in order to then with receive reports and letters by the
registrations from different authorities, address it. So please go after it, but Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs and
while Palestinian CSOs based in East do not simply mix it up with legitimate affiliated lobby groups asking them to
Jerusalem are obliged to change their criticism of the Israeli occupation’, one deny any services to the Palestinian
names to exclude the “Palestinian” iden- Palestinian CSO director expressed this CSOs in question.
tity from the title of the organization. widespread sentiment.19
This means that these organizations In addition to targeting external funding,
need to get different licences, accounts With regards to the accusations of affil- defamation efforts have been directed
and auditors based on their location. iation with terrorist entities, it should be at private banks and consultancy firms.
Meanwhile, several staff of Palestinian noted that such allegations have never Several Palestinian CSO representatives
CSOs are temporary banned from Jeru been substantiated. Take for example operating in the West Bank told 11.11.11
salem and deported either to a city inside the dismissal of such claims by then that they have recently experienced a
Israel or in the West Bank.15 Dutch Foreign Minister Halbe Zijlstra, serious increase in such attacks, where-
during a debate in the Dutch parliament by the banks and consultants they work
Recently, Israeli police has also intensi- on 15 November 2017 (emphasis added): with receive reports and letters by the
fied attacks against Palestinian human Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs and
rights and cultural organizations. In “Let it be clear that we have no evidence affiliated lobby groups asking them to
August 2019 alone, it prevented an event showing that Dutch-sponsored NGOs or deny any services to the Palestinian
at Yabous Cultural Centre, stopped a their board members in Israel or other CSOs in question.20
ceremony at the East Jerusalem YMCA, countries have been guilty of activities
nn1.3. Shrinking space and the Palestinian Authority
-A
uthoritarian tendencies work through engagement with PA line to work with Issa Amro or his organi-
ministries, have scrutinized national leg- zation, or face repercussions.30 Other
Recent years have seen an increasing islation, have mobilized the Palestinian activists have also been arrested for
slide towards authoritarianism in Area public on social and political issues, and criticizing the PA on social media or for
A and B, which are under the control have openly called for new elections to distributing anti-PA leaflets. ‘The cyber-
of the Palestinian Authority and repre- be held. In recent years, however, several crime law is by far the worst law the PA
sent 40 percent of the West Bank. The CSOs have increasingly been targeted has ever written, one of the worst things
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) by new legislation and by the Palestinian ever adopted in Palestine. It is a sort
has not been in session since 2007, and security services, as is further outlined of guillotine hanging over our heads,
Palestinian President Abbas has been below. which can be used at any time, against
ruling by Presidential decree ever since. anybody’, according to a prominent
The independence of the judiciary has Palestinian human rights worker.31 In
also been significantly constrained by -R
estrictions on freedom October 2019, 59 Palestinian websites,
Decree 16 and Decree 17, both issued of expression blogs and Facebook pages that oppose
in July 2019. These decrees direct- the Palestinian Authority were blocked
ly constrain the independence of the Individual staff members of Palestinian on the basis of the Cybercrime Law. This
Palestinian judiciary, forcing a quarter of CSOs, as well as individual activists, move also triggered a critical response
current judges (including the 35 judges students and journalists23, have on nu- from the European Union.32
of the Palestinian Supreme Court) into merous occasions been threatened,
retirement.21 In the words of one promi- arbitrarily arrested, detained and/or
nent Palestinian policy analyst: tortured by PA security forces.24 In 2018 -R
estrictions on freedom
alone, the Palestinian Centre for Devel of assembly
‘The government is acting illegal on a de opment and Media Freedoms has
facto basis. The PA is constantly brea- documented 88 attacks against media Law 12 (1998) on Public Assemblies
king its own laws, which are written on freedoms in PA-controlled areas of the allows, in principle, for the freedom
paper but not respected on the ground. West Bank.25 The Independent Commis-
The authorities are less willing to tolera- sion for Human Rights, an independent
te dissent, while the security services are human rights watchdog, has also docu-
without a leash and are only accounta- mented 201 cases of arbitrary detentions,
ble to Abbas, as the judiciary’s oversight many on political grounds.26 According
role is being ignored. In the end they to Human Rights Watch, torture by PA
just do what they want, they want to get security forces may amount to crimes
things done by whatever it takes.’22 against humanity, given its systematic
nature.27
This “slide towards authoritarianism”
has had a serious impact on the role In addition, the Palestinian “Cybercrime
of civil society. In the absence of a Law”, proclaimed in 2017, has also re-
functioning PLC, most CSOs have in- sulted in the closing down and banning
creasingly taken up a monitoring and of 29 news websites, while several TV
watchdog role, have done advocacy stations have been closed down by the
Palestinian Authority.28 Although this
Cybercrime Law was amended in May
2018, there remain significant concerns
about different vaguely defined pro-
visions that allows for misuse by the
Recent years have seen authorities.29 One victim of the new
an increasing slide to- Cybercrime Law has been Palestinian
human rights defender Issa Amro, direc- The slide towards
wards authoritarianism tor of the Hebron-based “Youth against authoritarianism
in areas under control Settlements”. Amro is on trial for charg-
has had a serious
impact on the role of
es related to the Cybercrime Law and is
of the Palestinian facing up to two years in prison. In early
Palestinian civil society.
© HOSSAM EL-HAMALAWY /
Authority 2019 Fatah also warned other CSOs not WIKIMEDIA
noof assembly in PA-controlled areas.
However, the law also contains a num-
For example, peaceful demonstrations
that called upon the PA to lift restric-
In recent years
ber of vague provisions that allows for tive measures against Gaza (June 2018) PA security forces,
different interpretations and opens the
door for repression. Under article 4 of
where violently curtailed, and at least 56
Palestinians were arrested and beaten.34
including forces that
the law, demonstrations can only be are financed by the
held if they are ‘far from areas of ten-
sion, and the purpose of the meeting -R
estrictive legislation
European Union, have
must not contradict with the law or pu- and administrative obstacles often used excessive
blic order.’33 Needless to say, notions like
“areas of tension” or “public order” can Freedom of association is, in princi-
force against peaceful
be interpreted in very different ways ple, guaranteed by article 26(2) of the demonstrators across
and may be used to restrict the freedom
of assembly.
Palestinian Basic Law. Under this arti-
cle, Palestinians have the right ‘to form
the West Bank
and establish unions, associations, so-
In recent years PA security forces, in- cieties, clubs and popular institutions
cluding forces that are financed by in accordance with the law’. Key na-
the European Union, have often used tional legislation regulating the work
excessive force against peaceful dem- of Palestinian CSOs are the “Law on
onstrators across the West Bank. Charitable Associations and Community
Journalists covering such protests have Foundations” (Law 1, 2000) and the
been harassed (including the confisca- “Regulation on Non-Profit Companies”
tion of their equipment), and activists
and peaceful demonstrators arrested.
np(Regulation 3, 2010).35 The 2000 NGO
Law is generally considered to be one of
the most liberal NGO laws in the region,
although implementation has often been
uneven.
However, in the past decade the Pal
estinian Authority has amended NGO
legislation, has significantly increased
the administrative burden on Palestinian
CSOs and has taken several steps to
increase control over funding sources
from Palestinian CSOs.
In June 2007, during the state of emer-
gency, Palestinian President Abbas
issued a decree which gave the minis-
try of Interior broad discretion to review
existing licenses of Palestinian CSOs.
According to Palestinian human rights
organization al Haq more than 100 CSOs
were dissolved on this basis. In July 2015
the Palestinian Council of Ministers also
passed an amendment to Regulation 3
(2010) on Non-Profit Companies, stating
that ‘acceptance of any gifts, donations,
aid, or funding is subject to prior ap-
proval from the Council of Ministers’.36
By doing so the PA gave itself a very
Palestinian CSOs powerful tool to effectively shut down
or silence critical CSOs, according to
have expressed serious many Palestinian CSOs and activists in-
concern about proposed terviewed by a staff member of 11.11.11.37
new amendments to In addition to this amendment, the
the 2000 NGO Law Palestinian Authority has announced
the creation of a new centralized fund
through which all CSO funding should
be channelled. The PA has also im-
posed several administrative burdens on
Palestinian CSOs, including more steps
in the registration process and admin-
istrative obstacles in opening new bank
accounts.
In addition, Palestinian CSOs have
© PIOTR W. BARTOSZEK / FLICKR
expressed serious concern about pro-
posed new amendments to the 2000
NGO Law. They have stated that the
proposed amendments would con-
strain their ability to access new funds,
would allow the ministry of Interior too
much discretion to interfere in CSOs
affairs and would allow the ministry of
Interior to dissolve the board of an CSO
altogether.38 According to Palestinian
nqhuman rights organization al Haq the Palestinian security agencies are already Hamas security forces
proposed amendments run counter constantly intervening in the registra-
to several provisions of the Palestinian tion process of CSOs (by obliging them have on numerous
Basic Law, as well as to provisions of the to get a security clearance if they want occasions imposed
International Covenant on Economic, to obtain a new registration or secure
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and foreign funding), although such inter- a violent crackdown
the International Covenant on Civil and ventions are not permitted under the on peaceful demon-
Political Rights (ICCPR). The State of existing 2000 NGO Law.39
Palestine has acceded to both treaties. strations in the
Finally, several Palestinian CSO staff Gaza strip
Others have been more cautious when highlighted the fac that the Palestinian
discussing the proposed amendments and international banking system have
to the NGO law, and do not anticipate become much more suspicious of
any formal new amendments anytime Palestinian CSOs. Consequently, the lat-
soon. But even when no amendments ter are facing higher standards for risk
would be passed in the future, the situa- classification, resulting in increasing dif-
tion on the ground remains problematic. ficulties to open new banking accounts
Human rights workers emphasized that or to transfer money.40
1.4. Shrinking space and de facto Hamas authorities
-R
estrictions on freedom For example, Amnesty International has
of expression reported that, between 14 and 18 March
2019, hundreds of protesters were beat-
Since 2007 Israel has imposed a block- en, arbitrarily arrested, detained and
ade on the Gaza strip, which has been tortured after peacefully protesting the
under the de facto control of Hamas. deteriorating socioeconomic situation
Individual staff members of Palestinian in Gaza. According to Amnesty, these
CSOs, as well as individual activists, human rights violations perpetrated
students and journalists41, have on nu- by Hamas forces against peaceful pro-
merous occasions been threatened, testers, journalists and human rights
arbitrarily arrested, detained and/or defenders in Gaza were the most se-
tortured by Hamas security forces.42 In vere for more than a decade.45 Among
2018 alone, the Palestinian Centre for the arrested persons were a number of
Development and Media Freedoms has staff members of prominent Palestinian
documented 41 attacks against media human rights organizations, including
freedoms in Gaza.43 According to Human Al Mezan and the Palestinian Center for
Rights Watch, torture by Hamas security Human Rights. Hamas also violently re-
forces may amount to crimes against pressed protests against the economic
humanity, given its systematic nature.44 situation in Gaza in May 2019, during
which it beat and arrested dozens of
peaceful protesters.46
-R
estrictions on freedom
of assembly
Hamas security forces have on numerous
occasions imposed a violent crackdown
on peaceful demonstrations in the Gaza
strip. At such occasions, Hamas security
forces have violently targeted peaceful
protesters, activists, human rights work-
ers and local journalists.
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© BAZ RATNER / REUTERS
ns2.1. What does Israeli civil society think
about shrinking space?
In September 2019, 11.11.11 conducted an online survey with 10 Israeli CSOs.
Participants were asked four questions:
1. What do you consider the most important “shrinking space” factors in Israel?
2. What do you consider the most important “shrinking space” factors in Area C and Jerusalem?
3. Which actor do you consider to be the most threatening to your space to operate?
4. Which policy actions would you like to see prioritized by the European Union (EU) and
by EU member states, in order to counter the shrinking space for your organization?
Participants were asked to rank answer confronted with arrests and detention, a CSOs surveyed identify three main policy
options (and also add other answers), wide range of administrative obstacles, actions for the EU and EU member states:
with 1 being the most important factor or and with raids on their offices and/or the re-establishment of the “Human
action. The data collected during this sur- the closure of their offices. Rights and IHL Secretariat” (see more
vey should be considered indicative and background in section 4.3.1) and an
prone to changes over time, but never Unsurprisingly, Israeli CSOs see Israeli increase in field visits by high-ranking
theless gives a good “snapshot” of main government officials, NGO Monitor and European politicians and by members of
issues threatening the operating space the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs as European parliaments.
of Israeli CSOs, as well as the policy ac- the three actors that most threaten their
su lts
tions they would like to see prioritized by space to operate. Finally, the 10 Israeli 47
e y r e
the EU and EU member states.
Surv
In terms of “shrinking space” for Israeli
CSOs, a number of factors dominate.
Three “shrinking space factors” stand
out by far when compared to other What do Israeli CSOs see as main shrinking space factors inside Israel?
factors. New legislation, delegitimiza- 1. New legislation directly impacting civic space
tion and defamation campaigns, and 2. Delegitimisation and defamation
the decrease in external funding due to 3. Decrease in external funding due to attacks by nationalist NGOs
attacks by nationalist NGOs are conse-
quently ranked as the three main issues What do Israeli CSOs see as main shrinking space factors inside East
at stake. Israeli CSOs operating in East Jerusalem/Area C?
Jerusalem (which was illegally annexed 1. Arrests and detention
to Israel in 1980) and Area C of the West 2. Administrative obstacles
Bank, however, face a different type of 3. Raids and/or closing down of offices
shrinking space. They are predominantly
Which actors do Israeli CSOs see as most dangerous for their civic space?
1. Israeli government officials
2. NGO Monitor
Israeli CSOs see Israeli 3. Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs
government officials, Which actions do Israeli CSOs want the EU to take?
NGO Monitor and the Is- 1. Re-establishment of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
raeli Ministry of Strategic Secretariat
2. Field visits by high-ranking European politicians, including meetings
Affairs as the three with CSOs
actors that most threaten 3. Field visits by members of European parliaments, including meet-
ings with CSOs
their space to operate
nt2.2. Shrinking space and Israeli government
and pro-occupation groups
-D
efamation, stigmatization “enemy collaborator”; former Defence -R
estrictive legislation
and incitement minister Lieberman has accused Israeli
CSOs of being “traitors” and “terrorist The above-mentioned defamation and in-
In recent years, and particularly since the collaborators pure and simple”; outgo- citement campaigns against Israeli human
start of the fourth Netanyahu govern- ing education minister Naftali Bennett rights and anti-occupation groups have
ment in May 2015, anti-occupation and accused Breaking the Silence of “poison- been accompanied by anti-democratic
human rights organizations have been ing” the minds of Israeli children51; and legislation that restricts the freedom of
targeted by an intense defamation cam- ministers Yariv Levin and Tzipi Hotovely expression of Israeli human rights and
paign.48 Government ministers, Israeli have described Breaking the Silence anti-occupation organizations56:
diplomats, right-wing politicians, right- as “spies” and “traitors from within”.
wing nationalist CSOs, social media Netanyahu also cancelled an April 2017 • The 2011 Budget Foundations Law
users and media close to the Netanyahu meeting with then German foreign min- (“Nakba Law”) allows for the revo-
government have branded such or- ister Gabriel over the latter’s refusal to cation of funding from organizations
ganizations “traitors”, “foreign agents”, cancel a meeting with Israeli human that question the notion of Israel
“terrorist collaborators”, “Trojan horses”, rights organizations, while the Israeli as a “Jewish State” or that mark
“lousy collaborators” and a “fifth col- Foreign Affairs Ministry reprimanded Israel’s Independence Day as a day of
umn”.49 According to the United Nations the Belgian Ambassador to Israel after mourning.57 The “Nakba law” impacts
human rights office, such verbal at- Belgian Prime Minister Michel met with in particular Palestinian cultural and
tacks by high-ranking politicians might representatives from Israeli civil society human rights organizations in Israel.
amount to incitement to violence.50 in February 2017.52
• The 2011 Law for the Prevention of
These defamation campaigns have been Meanwhile, extremist pro-occupation Harm to the State of Israel through
led and orchestrated from the very top of organizations like NGO Monitor, Im Boycott (“Boycott Law”) allows
Israel’s political establishment and have Tirtzu and Ad Kan have continuously for civil claims for damages against
been closely coordinated with extrem- engaged in hateful incitement against
ist pro-occupation organizations. For human rights and anti-occupation
example, Prime Minister Netanyahu has groups. One main example of such ef-
described the director of B’tselem as an fort is a 2015 “Foreign Agents” report
by Im Tirtzu.53 The report was accompa-
nied by an inflammatory video accusing
four well-known Israeli human rights
Extremist pro-occu activists of being ‘implants’ and ‘plant-
pation organizations ed agents’ from foreign governments
whose only aim is to defend Palestinian
like NGO Monitor, Im terrorists that stab Israeli citizens. ‘While
Tirtzu and Ad Kan have we fight terror, they fight us’, the video
concludes.54 The Shomron Settler Com-
continuously engaged mittee has also explicitly compared
in hateful incitement human rights organizations to Nazi
collaborators.55
against human rights
and anti-occupation
groups
nuindividuals or organizations that have • The 2016 NGO Transparency Law than anything, of the budding fascism
publicly called for a boycott of activi- obliges CSOs that receive over creeping into Israeli society”.63
ties in Israel or in territories occupied 50 per cent of their funding from for-
by Israel.58 In March 2017 the Israeli eign governments to disclose this in • In July 2018 the Israeli Knesset
Ministry of Interior also announced all their publications, communications passed an amendment to the State
the creation of a database to monitor and on their website.61 Critics, includ- Education Law (“Breaking the
Israeli “BDS supporters”. ing the UN Special Rapporteur for Silence Law”). Under this new regu-
Human Rights in Palestine, noted that lation, the Minister of Education can
• Under the 2017 Entry into Israel Law 25 out of 27 CSOs affected by the prevent organizations from entering
the Israeli Ministry of Interior can law are liberal anti-occupation and Israeli schools if their activities ran
deny an entry visa to foreign nation- human rights groups, while conserv- counter to (ill-defined) “educational
als who have publicly called for a ative nationalist CSOs that receive goals”.64 Moreover, organizations
boycott against Israel or a boycott money from private foreign sources involved in the prosecution of
of Israeli activities in the occupied are left untouched.62 The European Israeli soldiers abroad or assisting
Palestinian territory.59 A March 2018 Commission, in reaction, stated that in foreign legal proceedings against
amendment to the bill also provides the law goes “beyond the legitimate Israel are equally prevented from
for the revocation of the residency needs for transparency” and seems entering Israeli schools.65 Critics, in-
status of Palestinians living in Israel to be “aimed at constraining the cluding Amnesty International, have
on the basis of a “breach of alle- activities” of liberal CSOs working in warned that this new law is a serious
giance” to the State of Israel. On Israel. Then opposition leader Isaac
6 October 2019 Israeli Interior minis- Herzog (Labor) also lambasted the
ter, Arye Deri announced that he aims law, stating that it is “indicative, more
to use this amendment to revoke the
residency status of BDS spokesper-
son Omar Barghouti.60
© AMMAR AWAD / REUTERS
nvThe “anti-Semitic nature of BDS exposed”?
The Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs (MSA) is also step- In this report, the Special Rapporteur explicitly notes
ping up its efforts to delegitimize the Boycott, Divestment that the IHRA working definition does not designate
and Sanctions (BDS) movement as being anti-Semitic. In a the equation of Israeli policy with that of the Nazis as
September 2019 report, presented during a launch event in an example of speech that is ipso facto anti-Semitic,
the European Parliament, the MSA stated that “it is essen- but that such examples require a contextual assess-
tial to point out the causality between the BDS movement ment to determine if they are indeed anti-Semitic.84
and anti-Semitism”. The report claims to provide evidence A similar position is expressed in a recent expert
that several BDS activists have expressed anti-Semitic opinion on the IHRA working definition by Prof Dr
statements. Consequently, the MSA calls on governments Peter Ullrich (Center for Research on Antisemitism).85
and parliaments to adopt anti-BDS motions and to end
funding to NGOs that promote BDS.81 – In order to find 84 cases of anti-Semitism by BDS ac-
tivists across the globe, the MSA report had to include
The MSA report contains several problematic cases dating back to the year 2010. Even if one agrees
elements and flaws: that all 84 cases documented in the report are indeed
anti-Semitic, this can hardly be considered as sufficient
– While the MSA report does include several clear exam- empirical evidence to suggest a “causal” relationship be-
ples of anti-Semitism (certainly in the chapter on “the tween BDS and anti-Semitism, as the report claims.
BDS movement and classic anti-Semitism”), a closer look
at the 84 cases documented in the report shows that Even if one agrees that all 84 cases documented in the
many cases are clearly not of an anti-Semitic nature: report are indeed anti-Semitic, it should be noticed that
the vast majority of documented cases are related to
● The MSA report conflates criticism of “Israel” or individual BDS supporters, city chapters of national BDS
“Zionism” with anti-Semitism. As such, it fails to rec- groups, individual participants at events organized by
ognize that criticism of a political ideology (Zionism) BDS groups, posts by activist Facebook groups or even to
or the policies (including human rights violations) individuals who comment on Facebook posts published
of a state (Israel) can be very distinct from anti- by BDS groups. The MSA report itself acknowledges that
Semitism.82 Zionism is a political ideology and can BDS is a “loose-knit network of organizations” (p 17)
be criticized as such, in accordance with the right but holds every individual and organization that sup-
to freedom of expression. ports BDS collectively responsible for the 84 cases.
● The MSA report claims that BDS founder Omar – The MSA report relies on the IHRA Working Definition
Barghouti himself has stated that “Jews cannot have on anti-Semitism and its related examples (see below
their own state in Palestine”, and takes this as a for a more in-depth discussion) yet fails to mention that
clear evidence of Barghouti’s alleged anti-Semitism. these examples are not part of the working definition.
However, the report offers only a partial quotation of To the contrary, the report falsely claims that the IHRA
Barghouti’s complete statement, in which he merely definition “includes” several examples of anti-Semitism
expresses his opposition to “any kind of exclusionary (...) that were “incorporated” into the working definition
state” favoring one religion over another: “A Jewish (p 25).
state in Palestine in any shape or form cannot but
contravene the basic rights of the land’s indigenous – The MSA report does not attempt to define “BDS”,
Palestinian population and perpetuate a system of raising serious concerns that the perceived relationship
racial discrimination that ought to be opposed ca- between “BDS” and “anti-Semitism” can also be used
tegorically. As we would oppose a Muslim state or a in the future to label a “differentiation policy” (the sys-
Christian state, or any kind of exclusionary state, defi- tematic distinction between activities in Israel proper
nitely, most definitely we oppose a Jewish state in any and Israeli activities in the occupied Palestinian terri
part of Palestine. No Palestinian — rational Palestinian, tory, as required by UNSCR 2334) as a manifestation of
not a sell-out Palestinian — would ever accept a anti-Semitism.
Jewish state in Palestine.” 83 In this regard, it should be
noted that the EU has also not recognized Israel as a – Israeli minister for Strategic Affairs, Gilan Erdan has al-
“Jewish state”. so falsely claimed, during the launch of the MSA report
in the European Parliament (25 September 2019), that
● The MSA report argues that drawing comparisons the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion has
between Zionism and/or Israel with Nazism (so- condemned the BDS movement for encouraging an-
called “Holocaust inversion”) is anti-Semitic in itself. ti-Semitism across the globe. In fact, however, the UN
Although one can indeed argue if it is appropriate to Special Rapporteur has merely “noted” such claims,
draw such comparisons, comparing Israeli policies while also acknowledging statements by the BDS
with Nazism cannot in itself be classified as anti- National Committee that the latter categorically oppos-
Semitic. This is also confirmed in a recent report by es all forms of racism, including Anti-Semitism.86, 87
the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion.
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