Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
William H. Cooper
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Ian E. Rinehart
Analyst in Asian Affairs
February 15, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33436
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress Summary Japan is a significant partner for the United States in a number of foreign policy areas, particularly in terms of security priorities, from responding to China’s rise in the region to countering threats from North Korea. The post-World War II U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in East Asia. The alliance facilitates the forward deployment of about 49,000 U.S. troops and other U.S. military assets based in Japan in the Asia-Pacific. If Japan decides to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement, it will become an even more critical element in the Obama Administration’s rebalancing to Asia strategy. Japan has struggled to find political stability in the past seven years. Since 2007, six men have been Prime Minister, including the current premier Shinzo Abe, who also held the post in 2006- 2007. His Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) returned to power in a landslide election in December 2012. The current opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) had ruled for three tumultuous years since their own watershed election victory in 2009. Japan’s leaders face daunting tasks: an increasingly assertive China, a weak economy, and rebuilding from the devastating March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster. In recent years, opposition control of one chamber of parliament has paralyzed policymaking in Tokyo and made U.S.-Japan relations difficult to manage despite overall shared national interests. Abe is unlikely to pursue controversial initiatives before the next national elections, for the Upper House of parliament (called the Diet) in July 2013. Perhaps most significantly, the United States could become directly involved in a military conflict between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets in the East China Sea. Past comments and actions on controversial historical issues by Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet have raised concern that Tokyo could upset regional relations in ways that hurt U.S. interests. Abe is known as a strong nationalist, and he is now under pressure on the right from a newly formed party touting its own hawkish views on national security. Abe’s approach to issues like the so-called “comfort women” sex slaves from the World War II era, history textbooks, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine that honors Japan’s war dead, and statements on a territorial dispute with South Korea will be closely monitored by Japan’s neighbors as well as the United States. The massive and immediate humanitarian relief provided by the United States following the March 2011 “triple disaster” bolstered the bilateral alliance, but difficult issues remain, particularly those related to the stationing of marines on Okinawa. Washington and Tokyo have agreed to relocate several thousand marines from Okinawa to Guam and other locations in the region, but the two governments have been unable to make tangible progress on implementing a 2006 agreement to relocate the controversial Futenma Marine Corps Air Station to a less densely populated location on Okinawa. In addition, the U.S. Congress has restricted funding for the realignment because of concerns and uncertainty about the cost of the realignment plans. Japan is one of the United States’ most important economic partners. Outside of North America, it is the United States’ second-largest export market and second-largest source of imports. Japanese firms are the United States’ second-largest source of foreign direct investment, and Japanese investors are the second-largest foreign holders of U.S. treasuries, helping to finance the U.S. deficit and reduce upward pressure on U.S. interest rates. One exception was U.S. criticism over Japan’s decision in 2003 to ban imports of U.S. beef, which have since resumed, resolving one issue that could have been an obstacle to the United States agreeing to Japan’s joining the TPP. Congressional Research Service
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Contents
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 1
Shinzo Abe and the LDP Return to Power ................................................................................ 1
Senkaku/Diaoyu Territorial Dispute with China ....................................................................... 1
Abe’s Economic Agenda and U.S. Beef Imports....................................................................... 2
Japan’s Foreign Policy and U.S.-Japan Relations ............................................................................ 4
Abe and History Issues .............................................................................................................. 4
Comfort Women Issue ......................................................................................................... 5
Territorial Dispute with China ................................................................................................... 6
China-Japan Trade ............................................................................................................... 7
Japan and the Korean Peninsula ................................................................................................ 7
Japan’s Ties with South Korea ............................................................................................ 7
North Korean Issues ............................................................................................................ 8
March 2011 “Triple Disaster” .......................................................................................................... 9
Japan’s Nuclear Energy Policy .................................................................................................. 9
Exports of Liquefied National Gas (LNG) to Japan.......................................................... 10
Japanese Participation in Sanctions on Iran ............................................................................ 11
International Child Custody Disputes...................................................................................... 12
U.S. World-War II-Era Prisoners of War (POWs) ................................................................... 13
Alliance Issues ............................................................................................................................... 14
Futenma Base Relocation Controversy ................................................................................... 14
Progress on Other Elements of Military Realignment and Alliance Transformation .............. 15
Deployment of the MV-22 Osprey Aircraft to Japan............................................................... 16
March 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami: U.S.-Japan Alliance Performance .............................. 16
Constitutional Constraints ....................................................................................................... 17
Burden-Sharing Issues ............................................................................................................. 17
Extended Deterrence ............................................................................................................... 18
Japan’s Counter-Piracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden .............................................................. 18
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 19
Overview of the Bilateral Economic Relationship .................................................................. 20
Bilateral Trade Issues .............................................................................................................. 22
Japan’s Ban on U.S. Beef .................................................................................................. 22
Japan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)............................................... 22
Insurance ........................................................................................................................... 24
“Zeroing”........................................................................................................................... 24
The Doha Development Agenda ....................................................................................... 25
Japanese Politics ............................................................................................................................ 26
The December 2012 Elections: A Landslide Without a Mandate for the LDP.................. 26
Abe’s Priorities .................................................................................................................. 27
The DPJ and Alternative Political Forces.......................................................................... 28
Structural Rigidities in Japan’s Political System ............................................................... 29
Japan’s Demographic Challenge ............................................................................................. 29
Selected Legislation ....................................................................................................................... 30
112th Congress ......................................................................................................................... 30
111th Congress.......................................................................................................................... 30
Congressional Research Service
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress Figures Figure 1. Map of Japan .................................................................................................................... 3 Figure 2. Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Japan ........................................................................ 19 Figure 3. Party Affiliation in Japan’s Lower House of Parliament ................................................ 27 Figure 4. Party Affiliation in Japan’s Upper House of Parliament ................................................ 27 Tables Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Japan, Selected Years ....................................................... 20 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 32 Congressional Research Service
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress Recent Developments Shinzo Abe and the LDP Return to Power In elections for the Lower House of the Japanese parliament (called the Diet) on December 19, 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) scored a commanding victory that swept the party and its leader, Shinzo Abe, back into power. The LDP and its coalition partner won 324 of the chamber’s 480 seats, up from 141. The LDP has now ruled Japan for all but about four years since the end of World War II. Abe (pronounced “ah-bay”) was also Prime Minister for about a 12-month period in 2006 and 2007. The December elections toppled the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which had been Japan’s ruling party since the previous Lower House vote in 2009. The DPJ’s seat total tumbled from 230 seats to 57. A new group, the Japan Restoration Party, led by two controversial figures known for their iconoclastic and generally hawkish views, won 54 seats to become Japan’s third-largest party. As discussed in the Japanese Politics section below, most observers interpreted the election more as a rejection of the DPJ than an endorsement of the LDP. The LDP will now turn its attention toward securing an outright majority in the Upper House in elections for half of that chamber’s seats in July 2013. Since 2007, no party has controlled both the Lower and Upper Houses of the Diet for more than a few months, paralyzing policymaking. Because these elections will be pivotal—if the LDP loses seats, the Diet will remain divided— many analysts believe Abe is unlikely to take steps before the polls that are politically controversial, such as joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations or loosening Japan’s ban on participating in “collective self-defense,” that is, combat cooperation in defense of another country. Senkaku/Diaoyu Territorial Dispute with China Japan and China have engaged in a struggle over islets in the East China Sea known as the Senkakus in Japan, Diaoyu in China, and Diaoyutai in Taiwan, which has grown increasingly heated in the past six months. The uninhabited territory, administered by Japan but also claimed by China and Taiwan, has been a subject of contention for years, despite modest attempts by Tokyo and Beijing to jointly develop the potentially rich energy deposits nearby, most recently in 2008-2010. In August 2012, the Japanese government purchased three of the five islands from a private landowner in order to preempt their sale to Tokyo’s nationalist governor Shintaro Ishihara, who now is a leader of the aforementioned Japan Restoration Party. Although intended to tamp down the controversy, Japan’s “nationalization” of the territory upset the status quo, leading to massive Chinese protests, sharp objections from Beijing, and a drop in Sino-Japanese trade. Since then, China has conducted increasingly aggressive operations by dispatching both military and maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to the area, compelling the Japanese to respond with their own forces and heightening the potential for escalation. On one occasion both countries scrambled fighter jets, and subsequently a Japanese official publicly mulled firing warning shots. In February 2013, the Japanese government reported that a Chinese naval ship locked its weapons-targeting radar on Japanese assets on two occasions. Although no shots were fired, the incident was considered a major escalation in the standoff and sparked questions about whether the Chinese operator was acting on orders from Beijing, military commanders, or his own discretion. Beijing has denied the accusation. Congressional Research Service 1
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress The United States has remained neutral on the sovereignty of the islands but re-affirmed that the territory is covered under Article Five of the U.S.-Japan Security, which stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the Administration of Japan” and Japan administers the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands). The Treaty obligates the United States to defend Japan. Due to the risk of U.S. involvement in military operations, U.S. officials have urged caution and encouraged both sides to avoid a conflict. The Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict embodies Japan’s security challenges. The maritime confrontation with Beijing is a concrete manifestation of the threat Japan has faced for years from China’s rising regional power. It also brings into relief Japan’s dependence on the U.S. security guarantee and its anxiety that Washington will not defend Japanese territory if it risks going to war with China. Operationally, Japan has an acute need for its military, known as the Japan Self Defense Forces, to build up their capacity in the southwest part of the archipelago. Similarly, many observers cite the lack of coordination and clear delineation of responsibilities between the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces and Coast Guard. Abe’s Economic Agenda and U.S. Beef Imports Abe has made it a priority of his administration to grow the economy and to eliminate deflation, which has plagued Japan for many years. After assuming power, Abe’s government announced a $122 billion stimulus package aimed at spending on infrastructure, particularly in areas affected by the March 2011 disaster. While the package is expected to boost growth somewhat, it will also add to Japan’s already large public debt. Under pressure from Abe, the independent central bank announced that it would undertake quantitative easing measures and raise its inflation target to 2% within two years. The Japanese yen then rapidly dropped in value against the U.S. dollar and other major currencies. On February 1, 2013, the Japanese government loosened its restrictions on U.S. beef imports to allow beef from cattle 30 months or younger for the first time since December 2003. These steps would appear to provide the opportunity for growth in U.S. beef imports to Japan and to resolve an issue that had been a major irritant in the bilateral trade relationship, as well as a potential obstacle for Japan to join the TPP. Congressional Research Service 2
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Figure 1. Map of Japan
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Congressional Research Service 3Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Japan’s Foreign Policy and U.S.-Japan Relations1
The U.S.-Japan relationship is broad, deep-seated, and Japan Country Data
stable but has been handicapped by the political Population: 127.4 million
paralysis in Tokyo. The annual replacement of prime % of Population over 64: 24% (U.S. =
ministers since 2006 has made long-term planning with 12.4%)
Japan complicated, particularly as the United States
Area: 377,835 sq km (slightly smaller than
seeks reliable partners in the Obama Administration’s California)
rebalancing to Asia strategy, also known as the “Pacific
Pivot.” Both Tokyo and Washington seek to manage Life Expectancy: 84 years
relations with a rising China, as well as address the Per Capita GDP: $36,200 (2012 est.)
North Korean threat. Alliance cooperation at the purchasing power parity
working level has been strong, driven closer by Primary Export Partners: China 19.7%,
assertive Chinese behavior and North Korean US 15.5%, South Korea 8%, Hong Kong 5.2%,
provocations. Although major basing issues in Okinawa Thailand 4.6% (2011)
remain stubbornly unresolved, other security matters Primary Import Partners: China 21.5%,
such as ballistic missile defense cooperation have US 8.9%, Australia 6.6%, Saudi Arabia 5.9%,
progressed under both the DPJ and LDP governments. UAE 5%, South Korea 4.7% (2011)
The joint response to the March 2011 disasters remains Yen: Dollar Exchange Rate: 79.42 (2012
a vivid reminder to both sides of the underlying strength est.), 79.81 (2011 est.), 87.78 (2010 est.),
93.57 (2009), 103.58 (2008)
of the alliance.
Foreign Exchange Reserves: $1.351
It remains uncertain how Prime Minister Abe will fare trillion (December 2012 est.)
as a steward of the relationship. On the one hand, he is Source: CIA World Factbook, February 2013.
known as a strong supporter of the U.S. alliance and
promotes a number of security positions that align with the United States. He is an advocate of
building relations with fellow democracies, particularly advancing security ties with Australia and
India. On the other hand, Abe faces questions about his ability to steer foreign policy away from
divisive regional issues that could hurt U.S. interests. (See section below for discussion.) In
addition, domestic political divisions mean that major U.S. priorities such as Japan joining
negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (see “Economic Issues” section for more) and
allowing for more advanced defense cooperation (see “Alliance Issues” section for more) will
likely remain on hold until after the July 2013 Upper House elections.
Abe and History Issues
During his year-long stint as Prime Minister in 2006-2007, Abe was known for his nationalist
rhetoric and advocacy for more muscular positions on defense and security matters. Some of
Abe’s positions—such as changing the interpretation of Japan’s pacifist constitution to allow for
Japanese participation in collective self-defense—were largely welcomed by U.S. officials eager
to advance military cooperation. Other statements, however, suggest that Abe embraces a
revisionist view of Japanese history that rejects the narrative of imperial Japanese aggression and
victimization of other Asians. He has been involved with groups arguing that Japan has been
unjustly criticized for its behavior as a colonial and wartime power. Among the positions
advocated by these groups, such as Nippon Kaigi Kyokai, are that Japan should be applauded for
1
This section was written by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
Congressional Research Service 4Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress liberating much of East Asia from Western colonial powers, that the 1946-1948 Tokyo War Crimes tribunals were illegitimate, and that the killings by Imperial Japanese troops during the 1937 “Nanjing massacre” were exaggerated or fabricated. Historical issues have long colored Japan’s relationships with its neighbors, particularly China and South Korea, who remain resentful of Japan’s occupation and belligerence during the World War II period. Abe’s selections for his Cabinet appear to reflect these views, as he chose a number of politicians well-known for advocating nationalist, and in some cases ultra-nationalist views. The previous DPJ government adopted a more conciliatory view of Japan’s past and worked to mend historical wounds with South Korea and China. In August 2010, the 100th anniversary of Japan’s annexation of the Korean Peninsula, then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan renewed Japan’s apology for its treatment of Koreans during colonial rule, and offered to return historical documents and other artifacts taken from Korea. Until the end of their time in power, DPJ leaders also avoided visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, a shrine that honors Japan’s wartime dead and includes several Class A war criminals. Visits to the shrine by LDP Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had severely strained Tokyo’s relationships with Beijing and Seoul in the early and mid- 2000s. Abe last visited the Yasukuni Shrine in October 2012, after he was elected president of the LDP but before the parliamentary elections that made him Prime Minister. Many analysts say that Abe’s re-ascension to the premiership risks inflaming regional relations, which could disrupt regional trade, threaten security cooperation among U.S. allies, and further exacerbate already tense relations with China. Abe is under pressure from the Japan Restoration Party, a new fiercely nationalist party that won the third largest number of seats in the Diet. On the other hand, during his last stint as Prime Minister, Abe successfully repaired ties with South Korea and China and is regarded by some observers as a pragmatic operator. Since becoming prime minister, he has not repeated his calls while in opposition to station Japanese civilians on the Senkaku Islands and to designate a national “Takeshima Day” to promote Japan’s assertion of sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima island that is controlled by South Korea. Although relations with China are far more problematic now, he recently sent an envoy to reach out to the new government in South Korea, raising hopes that relations will not deteriorate significantly. Comfort Women Issue2 Abe’s statements on the so-called “comfort women”—sex slaves used by the Japanese imperial military during its conquest and colonization of several Asian countries in the 1930s and 1940s— have been criticized by other regional powers and the U.S. House of Representatives in a 2007 resolution. Abe has suggested that his government might consider revising a 1993 official Japanese apology for its treatment of these women, a move that would be sure to degrade Tokyo’s relations with South Korea and other countries. In the past, Abe has supported the claims made by many on the right in Japan that the women were not directly coerced into service by the Japanese military. When he was Prime Minister in 2006-2007, Abe voiced doubts about the validity of the 1993 “Kono Statement,” an official statement issued by then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono that apologized to the victims and admitted responsibility by the Japanese military. As the U.S. House of Representatives considered 2 For a lengthier discussion of the comfort women issue, please request a copy of a 2007 CRS congressional distribution memo on the topic authored by Larry Niksch. Congressional Research Service 5
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress H.Res. 121, calling on the Japanese government to “formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility” for forcing young women into military prostitution, Abe appeared to soften his commentary and asserted that he would stand by the statement. The House later overwhelmingly endorsed the resolution. Then-Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Hakubun Shimomura had been leading the movement to revise the statement; Abe recently appointed him Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology. The issue of the so-called comfort women has gained visibility in the United States, due primarily to Korean-American activist groups. These groups have pressed successfully for the erection of monuments commemorating the victims, passage of a resolution on the issue by the New York State Senate, and the naming of a city street in the New York City borough of Queens in honor of the victims. In addition, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly instructed the State Department to refer to the women as “sex slaves,” rather than the euphemistic term “comfort women.”3 Territorial Dispute with China4 Japan, China, and Taiwan all claim sovereignty over a small group of uninhabited islets located about 120 miles northeast of Taipei, known as the Senkakus in Japan, the Diaoyu in China, and the Diaoyutai in Taiwan. China considers the islets to be part of Taiwan, over which it claims sovereignty. Geologists believe that the waters surrounding them may be rich in oil and natural gas deposits. The disputed claims are long-standing, but the episodes in early 2013 escalated beyond previous incidents. In April 2012, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara announced in Washington, DC, that he intended to purchase three of the five islets from their private Japanese owner. Ishihara, who is known for expressing nationalist views, called for demonstrating Japan’s control over the islets by building installations on the island and raised nearly $20 million in private donations for the purchase. In September, the central government purchased the three islets for ¥2.05 billion (about $26 million at an exchange rate of ¥78:$1) to block Ishihara’s move and reduce tension with China. Protests, sometimes violent, erupted across China in response. Starting in the fall of 2012, China began regularly deploying China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) and Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) ships near the islands and stepped up what it called “routine” patrols to assert jurisdiction in “China’s territorial waters.” Chinese military surveillance planes reportedly have entered airspace that Japan considers its own, in what Japan’s Defense Ministry has called the first such incursion in 50 years. In early 2013, near-daily encounters have escalated: both countries have scrambled fighter jets, Japan has threatened to fire warning shots, and, according to the Japanese government, a Chinese navy ship locked its fire- control radar on a Japanese destroyer and helicopter on two separate occasions. U.S. administrations going back at least to the Nixon Administration have stated that the United States takes no position on the territorial disputes. However, it also has been U.S. policy since 1972 that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the islets, because Article 5 of the treaty stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the Administration of Japan” and Japan administers the islets. China’s increase in patrols appears to be an attempt to 3 “‘Comfort Women’ Were Sex Slaves,” Chosun Ilbo, July 13, 2012. 4 For more information, see CRS Report R42761, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations, by Mark E. Manyin. Congressional Research Service 6
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
demonstrate that Beijing has a degree of administrative control over the islets, thereby casting
into doubt the U.S. treaty commitment. In its own attempt to address this perceived gap, Congress
inserted in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239) a
resolution stating, among other items, that “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the
United States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.” Perhaps
responding to the criticism of the Administration’s rhetoric, in January 2013 Secretary Clinton
stated that “we oppose any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese
administration,” of the islets.
China-Japan Trade
One of the side-effects of the China-Japan islands dispute has been the adverse impact on their
bilateral trade, especially on Japanese exports to China. China is Japan’s most important trading
partner—its largest export market and its largest source of imports—having overtaken the United
States in that role long ago. The relationship developed as Japanese multinational companies
established production facilities in China that assemble finished goods that are exported
elsewhere, including to the United States. In addition, as Chinese citizens have become wealthier,
China has become a growing market for consumer goods such as cars. Japanese exports to China
declined 11% in 2012 with much of the decline occurring in the fourth quarter.5 These trends are
similar to those with other major partners: Japan’s exports to the United Kingdom declined 18.8%
and to Germany—14.6%, reflecting moderate economic growth or slowdown and the strong yen.
However, observers have noted that the political tensions caused by the confrontations over the
Senkaku/Daioyu islands may have spilled over in the commercial arena. During the height of the
fracas in September 2012, nationalists in China called for a boycott on Japanese goods and
defaced Japanese retail stores. Japanese auto manufacturers experienced sharp declines in sales in
China beginning in September 2012.6 To what degree these trends are a function of politics or
macroeconomic factors would require further analysis and more data.
Japan and the Korean Peninsula
Japan’s Ties with South Korea
After a period of relatively warm ties and the promise of more effective security cooperation,
Tokyo-Seoul ties appear to have cooled anew. Under the DPJ governments and the Lee Myung-
bak administration in Seoul, South Korea and Japan managed historical issues, cooperated in
responding to North Korean provocations, and exchanged observers at military exercises. The
two countries were on the verge of concluding two modest but significant bilateral security
agreements on information sharing and military acquisitions until an anti-Japanese outcry in
South Korea scuttled the signing. The new governments in both capitals appear less likely to
reach out to each other, dimming U.S. hopes for more sustained trilateral cooperation among the
three democracies. Policy toward North Korea has been the one issue where regular trilateral
consultation persists, and the February 2013 nuclear test by North Korea will provide an
opportunity for the three capitals to coordinate their response.
5
GTIS, Inc., Global Trade Atlas.
6
IHS Global Insight, October 12, 2012.
Congressional Research Service 7Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress In addition to the comfort women issue discussed above, the perennial issues of a territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea and Japanese history textbooks continue to periodically ruffle relations. A group of small islands in the Sea of Japan known as Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese (referred to as the Liancourt Rocks by the United States) are administered by South Korea but claimed by Japan. Mentions of the claims in Japanese defense documents or by local prefectures routinely spark official criticism and public outcry in South Korea. Similarly, Seoul expresses disapproval of some of the history textbooks approved by Japan’s Ministry of Education that South Koreans claim diminish or whitewash Japan’s colonial-era atrocities. Some of Abe’s cabinet appointments have raised concern among South Koreans. Minister of Education Hakubun Shimomura has criticized history textbook companies for being insufficiently patriotic by, among other items, giving undue deference to the concerns of China and South Korea in their presentation of Japan’s colonial past. Abe’s appointment of Shimomura appears to signal his intent to follow through on the LDP’s pre-election advocacy of reducing “self-torturing views of history” in education and of giving the central government greater authority over the content of history textbooks. Abe’s Cabinet also includes Internal Affairs Minister Yoshitaka Shindo and Minister for Administrative Reform Tomomi Inada, who have aggressively asserted Japanese territorial claims, including a well-publicized attempt to visit South Korea in 2011 to advocate for Japanese sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. North Korean Issues Since 2009, Washington and Tokyo have been strongly united in their approach to North Korea. Although the U.S. and Japanese positions diverged in the later years of the Bush Administration, Pyongyang’s string of provocations in 2009-2010 forged a new consensus among Japan, South Korea, and the United States. North Korea’s provocations have helped to drive enhanced trilateral security cooperation between Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul. Japan also appeared to be at least somewhat in synch with the United States in late 2011 and early 2012 when the Obama Administration—with the blessing of the South Korean government—was negotiating agreements with North Korea over its nuclear and missile programs and food aid. North Korea’s 2012 missile launches and the February 2013 nuclear test are likely to drive closer cooperation among the three governments. Tokyo has adopted a relatively hardline policy against North Korea and plays a leadership role at the United Nations in pushing for stronger punishment for the Pyongyang regime for its military provocations and human rights abuses. Japan has imposed a virtual embargo on all trade with North Korea. North Korea’s missile tests have demonstrated that a strike on Japan is well within range, spurring Japan to move forward on missile defense cooperation with the United States. In addition to Japan’s concern about Pyongyang’s weapons and delivery systems, the issue of several Japanese citizens abducted by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s remains a top priority for Tokyo. Japan has pledged that it will not provide economic aid to North Korea without resolution of the abductee issue. The abductee issue remains an emotional topic in Japan. In 2008, the Bush Administration’s decision to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for North Korean concessions on its nuclear program dismayed Japanese officials, who had maintained that North Korea’s status on the list should be linked to the abduction issue. Although the abductions issue has lost potency in recent years, Abe came onto the political scene in the early 2000s as a fierce advocate for the abductees and their families and could dedicate attention to the issue. Congressional Research Service 8
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
March 2011 “Triple Disaster”
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake jolted a wide swath of Honshu, Japan’s largest
island. The quake, with an epicenter located about 230 miles northeast of Tokyo, generated a
tsunami that pounded Honshu’s northeastern coast, causing widespread destruction in Miyagi,
Iwate, Ibaraki, and Fukushima prefectures. Some 20,000 lives were lost and entire towns were
washed away; over 500,000 homes and other buildings and around 3,600 roads were damaged or
destroyed. Up to half a million Japanese were displaced. Damage to several reactors at the
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant complex led the government to declare a state of
emergency and evacuate nearly 80,000 residents within a 20 kilometer radius due to dangerous
radiation levels.
In many respects, Japan’s response to the multifaceted disaster was remarkable. Over 100,000
troops from the Self Defense Forces (SDF), Japan’s military, were deployed quickly to the region.
After rescuing nearly 20,000 individuals in the first week, the troops turned to a humanitarian
relief mission in the displaced communities. Construction of temporary housing began a week
after the quake. Foreign commentators marveled at Japanese citizens’ calm resilience, the lack of
looting, and the orderly response to the strongest earthquake in the nation’s modern history.
Japan’s preparedness—strict building codes, a tsunami warning system that alerted many to seek
higher ground, and years of public drills—likely saved tens of thousands of lives.
Despite this response to the initial event, the uncertainty surrounding the nuclear reactor accident
and the failure to present longer-term reconstruction plans led many to question the government’s
handling of the disasters. As reports mounted about heightened levels of radiation in the air, tap
water, and produce, criticism emerged regarding the lack of clear guidance from political
leadership. Concerns about the government’s excessive dependence on Tokyo Electric Power
Company (TEPCO), the firm that owns and operates the power plant, amplified public skepticism
and elevated criticism about conflicts of interest between regulators and utilities.
Japan’s Nuclear Energy Policy
Japan is undergoing a national debate on the future of nuclear power, with major implications for
businesses operating in Japan, U.S.-Japan nuclear energy cooperation, and nuclear safety and
non-proliferation measures worldwide. Looking back to 2006, the “New National Energy
Strategy” had set out a goal of significantly increasing Japan’s nuclear power generating capacity,
partly as a way to decrease dependence on foreign energy supplies and partly to decrease
emissions of greenhouse gases. By 2011, nuclear power was providing roughly 30% of Japan’s
power generation capacity.
The policy of expanding nuclear power encountered an abrupt reversal in the aftermath of the
March 11, 2011, natural disasters and meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
Public trust in the safety of nuclear power collapsed, and a vocal anti-nuclear political movement
emerged. This movement tapped into an undercurrent of anti-nuclear sentiment in modern
Japanese society based on its legacy as the victim of atomic bombing in 1945. As the nation’s 54
nuclear reactors were shut down one by one for their annual safety inspections in the months after
March 2011, the Japanese government did not restart them—except for two reactors at one site in
central Japan.
Congressional Research Service 9Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress The drawdown of nuclear power generation resulted in many short- and long-term consequences for Japan: rising electricity costs for residences and businesses; heightened risk of blackouts in the summer, especially in the Kansai region; widespread energy conservation efforts by businesses, government agencies, and ordinary citizens; the possible bankruptcy of major utility companies; and increased fossil fuel imports (see next section). The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, calculated that the nuclear shutdowns led to the loss of 420,000 jobs and $25 billion in corporate revenue in 2012.7 With prominent intellectuals and politicians calling for the end of nuclear power in Japan, the DPJ attempted to author a long-term energy policy. On September 14, 2012, the sub-Cabinet- level Energy and Environment Council announced an ambitious plan to eliminate all nuclear power generation in Japan by 2030. Leading voices in the Japanese business community harshly criticized the plan and warned of the hollowing out of Japanese industry. One week later, the Noda Cabinet announced a more flexible “Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment,” which pushed back the deadline for nuclear drawdown to 2040, continued the present nuclear fuel cycle policy, and allowed the completion of under-construction plants and possible reactor life- span extensions past 2040. American observers have raised concerns about losing Japan as a global partner in promoting nuclear safety and non-proliferation measures. The LDP has promoted a relatively pro-nuclear policy, despite persistent anti-nuclear sentiment among the public. The LDP party platform for the December 2012 election called for the restart of nuclear reactors as soon as new safety regulations are implemented and promised to study Japan’s energy situation thoroughly before developing a national policy. In comments to the Diet on January 30, 2013, Abe called the DPJ’s zero-nuclear energy policy “groundless.”8 Yet, 48% of the population does not agree with the Abe Cabinet’s approach to reactor restarts, compared to 46% in favor. The Abe Cabinet faces a complex challenge: how can Japan balance concerns about energy security, promotion of renewable energy sources, the viability of electric utility companies, the health of the overall economy, and public concerns about safety? Exports of Liquefied National Gas (LNG) to Japan Japan imports more LNG than any other country and would be a large market for potential LNG exports from the United States. Due to the near-elimination of nuclear power at present, Japan has become increasingly dependent on fossil fuels for electric power generation (see previous section). Japan’s LNG imports for the year from April 2012 to March 2013 are expected to reach 90 million metric tons—an 18% increase on the previous 12 months.9 Japanese utility companies are attracted to the large difference between global market prices for natural gas and the much lower price prevailing in North America. The lower price is largely a result of the recent expansion of natural gas production from shale. The U.S. government must satisfy legal requirements before additional LNG exports from the continental United States to Japan are permitted (a relatively small amount of natural gas is currently exported to Japan from Alaska). The 2005 Energy Policy Act requires that the Department of Energy (DOE) issue a permit to export natural gas to countries with which the 7 Masakazu Toyoda. “Energy Policy in Japan: Challenges after Fukushima,” Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, presentation prepared for delivery on January 24, 2013. 8 “Abe Aims for Japan to Join Child Custody Pact Soon,” Kyodo News Agency, January 31, 2013. 9 Eric Johnston, “LNG Gains Political Value as Japan’s Needs Soar,” Japan Times, January 3, 2013. Congressional Research Service 10
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress United States does not have a free trade agreement (FTA), including Japan. DOE must also determine that export to non-FTA countries is in the public interest. A DOE-commissioned study concluded in December 2012 that LNG exports would produce net economic benefits for the United States, but the study has been controversial. After the study completes a 45-day public comment period, DOE will make a decision on 20 pending permits to export LNG to non-FTA countries. At present only one export terminal in the continental United States, Sabine Pass in Louisiana, has been approved. That terminal will likely begin export operations in late 2015 or early 2016.10 Members of Congress have joined the debate on LNG exports to Japan. On January 31, 2013, Senator John Barrasso introduced a bill (S. 192) “to enhance the energy security of U.S. allies” by having DOE automatically approve natural gas exports to U.S. treaty allies, regardless of their FTA status. Senator Lisa Murkowski wrote in a letter to the Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, “Exporting LNG, particularly to allies that face emergency or chronic shortages, but with whom we do not have free-trade agreements, is in the public interest.”11 On the other side of the debate, Senator Ron Wyden, chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, wrote in a letter to Secretary Chu, “The shortcomings of the [DOE] study are numerous and render this study insufficient for the Department to use in any export determination.”12 In February 2012, Congressman Ed Markey introduced legislation (H.R. 4024) to suspend approval of LNG export terminals until 2025. Japanese Participation in Sanctions on Iran Over the past decade, growing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program have led to increased U.S. scrutiny of Japan’s longstanding trade with and investments in Iran. Japan is the third-biggest customer for Iranian oil, and for most of the past decade Iran has been Japan’s third largest source of crude oil imports, accounting for a little over 10% of the annual total.13 As part of their efforts to tighten economic penalties on Iran, the Bush and Obama Administrations have pushed Japan to curtail its economic ties with Tehran. In general, although Japan has been a follower rather than a leader in the international campaign to pressure Tehran, Japanese leaders have in recent years increased their cooperation with the U.S.-led effort, reducing significantly what had been a source of tension between Washington and Tokyo during the 1990s and early 2000s. Most recently, in September 2012, the Obama Administration granted Japan a second exemption under P.L. 112-81, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, which could have placed strict limitations on the U.S. operations of Japanese banks that process transactions with Iran’s Central Bank.14 Japan has reduced its imports of Iranian oil over the past several 10 Alex Benedetto and Barbara Shook, “Study Pushes US LNG Exports One Step Closer to Reality,” World Gas Intelligence, December 12, 2012. 11 Geof Koss, “With Eye on Japan, Murkowski Makes Case for Gas Exports,” CQ Roll Call, January 25, 2013. 12 Office of Senator Ron Wyden, “Wyden Highlights Flaws in DOE Export Study,” press release, January 10, 2013, http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-highlights-flaws-in-doe-export-study-. 13 Iran data is from Economist Intelligence Unit, Iran Country Report, March 2012. Japan data is a CRS adaptation of data provided in Japan Statistical Yearbook 2012, Table 10-13, “Imports of Crude Oil by Region and Country.” During the same time period, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Japan’s two largest oil suppliers, generally accounted for approximately 29% and 25%, respectively. 14 State Department Press Release, “Statement on Significant Reductions of Iranian Crude Oil Purchases,” March 20, 2012. For more on Iran sanctions, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service 11
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress years, despite its increased need for oil imports with the shutdown of virtually all of its nuclear power industry. Japan’s crude oil imports from Iran fell by roughly 40% in 2012, and a further decline of 15% is projected for 2013.15 Iran’s share of Japan’s oil market has fallen by several percentage points, to less than 8%, a level not seen since 1988.16 Additionally, Japan has restricted the activities of 21 Iranian banks.17 New U.S. sanctions that went into effect on February 6, 2013, pressure banks that deal with the Iranian Central Bank to either prevent repatriation of Iran’s foreign currency (non-rial) assets or else be frozen out of the U.S. financial system. Iran can still use the funds to finance trading activities not covered by sanctions, but, since it runs a large trade surplus with Japan (and other Asian oil importers), a significant portion of its oil export earnings will likely be held in Japan and other importing countries.18 Japan has taken steps on Iran in the past to cooperate with the United States. Japan announced in September 2010 that it would impose new restrictions, including a broad ban on investments in and restrictions on sales to Iran’s energy sector, as well as a freeze on certain assets of Iranian banks. These steps exceeded the requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 that sanctioned Iran. Earlier in the decade, after pressure from the Bush Administration, Japan’s quasi-governmental INPEX firm dramatically scaled back its involvement in developing Iran’s Azadegan oilfield. In October 2010, INPEX announced its complete withdrawal from the project and, as a result, it was granted an exemption from U.S. sanctions under a provision of the Iran Sanctions Act that was added by a July 2010 law (P.L. 111-195). In addition, several major Japanese corporations, including Toyota Motors, viewing Iran as a “controversial market,” have ceased doing business in Iran even though no U.N., U.S., or Japanese government sanctions would apply to those transactions. International Child Custody Disputes The issue of overseas Japanese women in failed marriages taking children to Japan without the consent of the foreign husband or ex-husband has become an issue in bilateral relations. Sometimes, these women have acted in contravention of custody settlements and, after arriving in Japan, have prevented the children from meeting their fathers. In recent years, both Congress and the executive branch have urged Japan to address the problem, provide access to the children to the aggrieved parents, and join the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.19 The increased publicity has raised awareness of the issue in Japan, particularly among Diet members. In March 2012, the Japanese government submitted a bill that would adjust domestic 15 “Corrected: Japan Nov Crude Imports from Iran Fall 20.3 Pct yr/yr—METI,” Reuters News, January 7, 2013. 16 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Historical Statistics of Japan, “Table 10-12 Imports of Crude Oil by Region and Country (F.Y.1970-2003),” http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/index.htm; “Table 10-13, “Imports of Crude Oil by Region and Country,” in Statistical Yearbook of Japan, 2008, 2010, and 2012. Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, “Preliminary Report on Petroleum Statistics February 2012,” http://www.meti.go.jp/ english/statistics/tyo/sekiyuso/index.html. 17 Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Trade Press Release, “Addition of an Entity Subject to Accompanying Measures Implemented Pursuant to the UN Resolution Against Iran,” March 13, 2012. 18 “Asian Buyers to Deepen Iranian Crude Import Cuts in 2013,” Metis Energy Insider, December 24, 2012. 19 “Abe to tell Obama Japan Will Speed Up Steps to Join Hague Convention,” Kyodo News, January 16, 2013. Congressional Research Service 12
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress law to allow Tokyo to accede to the Convention. However, the Diet did not vote on the bill in 2012 due to reservations in both the opposition and ruling parties and preoccupation with other legislative issues. The government of Prime Minister Abe in 2013 declared its intent to follow through on accession to the Hague Convention with the “aim to conclude the treaty early.” With cases involving approximately 100 American children, the United States reportedly has the largest number of such disputes with Japan. Legally, Japan only recognizes sole parental authority, under which only one parent has custodial rights, and there is a deep-rooted notion in Japan that the mother should assume custody. Japanese officials say that, in many cases, the issue is complicated by accusations of abuse or neglect on the part of the foreign spouse, though a senior U.S. State Department official has said that there are “almost no cases” of substantiated claims of violence.20 Some observers fear that, even if Japan signs the Hague Convention, it is unlikely to enforce the treaty’s provisions, given the existing family law system.21 U.S. World-War II-Era Prisoners of War (POWs) For decades, U.S. soldiers who were held captive by Imperial Japan during World War II have sought official apologies from the Japanese government for their treatment. A number of Members of Congress have supported these campaigns. The brutal conditions of Japanese POW camps have been widely documented.22 In May 2009, Japanese Ambassador to the United States Ichiro Fujisaki attended the last convention of the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor to deliver a cabinet-approved apology for their suffering and abuse. In 2010, with the support and encouragement of the Obama Administration, the Japanese government financed a Japanese/American POW Friendship Program for former American POWs and their immediate family members to visit Japan, receive an apology from the sitting Foreign Minister and other Japanese Cabinet members, and travel to the sites of their POW camps. Annual trips were held in 2010, 2011, and 2012.23 It is unclear whether the Abe government will continue the program. It is also unclear if Abe and other LDP politicians’ suggestions that past Japanese apologies should be reworded or retracted include the apologies to the U.S. POWs. In the 112th Congress, three resolutions—S.Res. 333, H.Res. 324, and H.Res. 333—were introduced thanking the government of Japan for its apology and for arranging the visitation program.24 The resolutions also encouraged the Japanese to do more for the U.S. POWs, 20 U.S. State Department, “Press Availability on International Parental Child Abduction, Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” February 2, 2010. 21 Leah Hyslop, “Hope for Parents Denied Access to Children in Japan,” The Telegraph, March 19, 2012. 22 By various estimates, approximately 40% percent held in the Japanese camps died in captivity, compared to 1%-3% of the U.S. prisoners in Nazi Germany’s POW camps. Thousands more died in transit to the camps, most notoriously in the 1942 “Bataan Death March,” in which the Imperial Japanese military force-marched almost 80,000 starving, sick, and injured Filipino and U.S. troops over 60 miles to prison camps in the Philippines. For more, see CRS Report RL30606, U.S. Prisoners of War and Civilian American Citizens Captured and Interned by Japan in World War II: The Issue of Compensation by Japan, by Gary Reynolds, currently out of print but available from the co-authors of this report. Estimates of the death rates in German prison camps for POWs are in the low single digits, compared to rates near 40% for Imperial Japanese camps. 23 For more on the program, see http://www.us-japandialogueonpows.org/. Since the mid-1990s, Japan has run similar programs for the POWs of other Allied countries. 24 S.Res. 333 (Feinstein) was introduced and passed by unanimous consent on November 17, 2011. H.Res. 324 (Honda) and H.Res. 333 (Honda) were introduced on June 22, 2011, and June 24, 2011, respectively, and referred to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. Congressional Research Service 13
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