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Krise der Entwicklung - Entwicklung der Krise, Teil 1 | Brasilien: Landgrabbing und die Neue Rechte - exit!-Lesekreis in Hamburg
Krise der Entwicklung – Entwicklung der
Krise, Teil 1 | Brasilien: Landgrabbing und die
                  Neue Rechte

                        Fábio Teixeira Pitta
         Post-Doc in Geography, University of São Paulo /
   and Economics, Lateinamerika-Institut, Freie Universität Berlin

             Exit! Lesekreis Hamburg: Do, den 06. Juni
Krise der Entwicklung - Entwicklung der Krise, Teil 1 | Brasilien: Landgrabbing und die Neue Rechte - exit!-Lesekreis in Hamburg
Map 1. Brazilian Cerrado Area and MATOPIBA Region
Krise der Entwicklung - Entwicklung der Krise, Teil 1 | Brasilien: Landgrabbing und die Neue Rechte - exit!-Lesekreis in Hamburg
Communities and Geomorphology: Plateaus and Low Lands
Krise der Entwicklung - Entwicklung der Krise, Teil 1 | Brasilien: Landgrabbing und die Neue Rechte - exit!-Lesekreis in Hamburg
Communities and Geomorphology: High Lands, Flat Plateaus /
         Native Cerrado and SoyBean Production
Krise der Entwicklung - Entwicklung der Krise, Teil 1 | Brasilien: Landgrabbing und die Neue Rechte - exit!-Lesekreis in Hamburg
Communities and Geomorphology: Low Land Community
Krise der Entwicklung - Entwicklung der Krise, Teil 1 | Brasilien: Landgrabbing und die Neue Rechte - exit!-Lesekreis in Hamburg
Photo: Irrigated Soybean Production over the Plateau
Krise der Entwicklung - Entwicklung der Krise, Teil 1 | Brasilien: Landgrabbing und die Neue Rechte - exit!-Lesekreis in Hamburg
Photo: Mechanized Soybean Production over one Plateau –
                  South Piauí - Brazil
Krise der Entwicklung - Entwicklung der Krise, Teil 1 | Brasilien: Landgrabbing und die Neue Rechte - exit!-Lesekreis in Hamburg
Krise der Entwicklung - Entwicklung der Krise, Teil 1 | Brasilien: Landgrabbing und die Neue Rechte - exit!-Lesekreis in Hamburg
Table – SugarCane Agroindustry Production (expansion)
            in Brazil, on the XXIst Century
Krise der Entwicklung - Entwicklung der Krise, Teil 1 | Brasilien: Landgrabbing und die Neue Rechte - exit!-Lesekreis in Hamburg
Map 2: 21st Century SugarCane Agroindustry Expansion
          From São Paulo, SouthEast - Brazil
Photo: Sugarcane Manual Cutter (São Paulo)
Mechanic Sugarcane Harvest – São Paulo/Brazil
Table: OverExploitation of Labor in Sugarcane Manual Cutting (São Paulo – Brazil: 1980 – 2012)
                  Production Payment            Cutting Productivity   Dairy Earnings

          Years   Reais Per Tons of SugarCane   Tons / Men / Day       SugarCane Cutters
          1980    2,29                          3,97                   9,09
          1982    2,17                          4,50                   9,77
          1985    1,92                          5,00                   9,60
          1988    1,25                          5,00                   6,25
          1990    0.96                          6,10                   5,86
          1992    0,84                          6,30                   5,29
          1994    0,83                          7,00                   5,81
          1996    1,05                          7,00                   7,35
          1998    1,06                          7,00                   7,42
          2000    0,88                          8,00                   7,04
          2002    0,88                          8,00                   7,04
          2004    0,86 (v.c.:R$ 2,93)           8,00                   6,88
          2005    0,86 (v.c.:R$ 3,11)           8,11                   6,97
          2006    0,85 (v.c.:R$ 3,11)           8,48                   7,21
          2007    0,85 (v. c.:R$ 3,27)          8,74                   7,42
          2008    0,79 (v. c.:R$ 3,45)          8,61                   6,80
          2009    0,84 (v. c.:R$ 3,65)          8,79                   7,38
          2010    0,85 (v. c.:R$ 3,93)          8,67                   7,37
          2011    0,89 (v. c.:R$ 4,46)          8,93                   7,95
          2012    0,89 (v. c.:R$ 4,80)          8,71                   7,75
Number of Workers Employment and
             the Mechanization Process
• Until 1970 there was 2 million workers in São Paulo in agriculture.

• Until the 1990s, there was 500 Thousand workers (manual sugarcane
  cutters / harvesters)

• Until 2014 there was 90 Thousand workers in sugarcane production in
  Bundesland São Paulo.

      There are current cases of workers in situation analogous to
       enslavement in mechanized sugarcane cutting / harvest.
Patriarchy and Racism
Migration: afro-descendants / indigenous-descendants (Northeast)
• Men used to migrate to cut sugar cane (1960 – nowadays).
• Women took care of families and production of the means of life on the origin place.

After mechanization process:
- Many men unemployed and injured – much less migration, more drug dealing.
- Women: take care of what is left of production; search for work in urban centers –
  precarious (care / prostitution) labor conditions.

- In general, small farmers: no more access to work/wage labor at all.
- No access to enough land to produce for themselves.

    General Consequence: after the prices fell, around 1/4 of bankruptcy in sugarcane
               agroindustry. Also sugarcane area is decreasing since 2018.
                        This trend was generalized in Brazilian
                                   economy, since 2008
Table: SoyBean in Brazil, yield, production and area – safras 1996/97 a 2015/16

                    Produção             Produção           Área Plantada              Área
  Ano-Safra                                                                                                Produtividade (kg/ha)   Produtividade %
                  (mil toneladas)           %                  (mil ha)                 %
   1996/97           26.160,0              12,8               11.381,3                  6,7                       2.299                  5,7
   1997/98           31.369,9              19,9               13.157,9                  15,6                      2.384                  3,7
   1998/99           30.765,0              -1,9               12.995,2                  - 1,2                     2.367                 -0,7
   1999/00           32.890,0               6,9               13.622,9                  4,8                       2.414                  2,0
   2000/01           38.431,8              16,8               13.969,8                  2,5                       2.751                 14,0
   2001/02           42.230,0               9,9               16.386,2                  17,3                      2.577                 -6,3
   2002/03           52.017,5              23,2               18.474,8                  12,7                      2.816                  9,3
   2003/04           49.792,7              -4,3               21.375,8                  15,7                      2.329                 -17,3
   2004/05           52.304,6               5,0               23.301,1                  9,0                       2.245                 -3,6
   2005/06           55.027,1               5,2               22.749,4                  -2,4                      2.419                  7,8
   2006/07           58.391,8               6,1               20.686,8                  -9,1                      2.823                 16,7
   2007/08           60.017,7               2,8               21.313,1                  3,0                       2.816                 -0,2
   2008/09           57.165,5              -4,8               21.743,1                  2,0                       2.629                  -7
   2009/10           68.688,2              20,2               23.467,9                  7,9                       2.927                  11
   2010/11           75.324,3               9,7               24.181,0                  3,0                       3.115                  6
   2011/12           66.383,0              -11,9              25.042,2                  3,6                       2.651                  -15
   2012/13           81.499,4              22,8               27.736,1                  10,8                      2.938                  11
   2013/14           86.120,8               5,7               30.173,1                  8,8                       2.854                 -2,9
   2014/15           96.228,0              11,7               32.092,9                  6,4                       2.998                  5,1

   2015/16           95.434,6              -0,8               33.251,9                  3,6                       2.870                 -4,3
Fonte: CONAB (Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento). Para os dados consultar: .
 Org.: Cecilia Vecina
SoyBean Territorialization in Brazilian Cerrado
Farmland Prices Brazil, 2006 - 2016
Chart: Land Prices in MATOPIBA (2003 – 2016)
    Preços de terras de alta produtividade - MATOPIBA (R$/ha)
                                                                                                                               Pedro Afonso (TO)
                                                                                                                               Bom Jesus (PI)
                                                                                                                               Uruçuí (PI)
                                                                                                                               Balsas (MA)
25000                                                                                                                          Luís Eduardo Magalhães (BA)

20000

15000

10000

 5000

    0
        2003

                  2004

                          2005

                                   2006

                                           2007

                                                   2008

                                                           2009

                                                                    2010

                                                                            2011

                                                                                    2012

                                                                                            2013

                                                                                                    2014

                                                                                                             2015

                                                                                                                        2016
                Fonte: FNP.
                Org.: Débora Lima. Preços corrigidos pelo IGP-M (índice Geral de Preços do Mercado) de abril de 2015.
Chart: Income SLC Agrícola/LandCo, in R$ Millions (2011-2016), SoyBean (Blue) x
                                    FarmLand (Orange)
                                     Net income from soy and land
250,0

200,0

150,0

100,0

 50,0

   -
             2011          2012          2013                 2014   2015       2016
Chart: Indebtedness SLC Agrícola/LandCo em R$ mil (2011-2016)
                           Loans current and non-current
2000000

1800000

1600000

1400000

1200000

1000000

800000

600000

400000

200000

     0
Transnational Rural Real Estate Companies in
                 MATOPIBA Region:
• Radar S/A: joint venture between Cosan S/A (Sugar Cane) e TIAA-CREF (Professors Pension
  Fund USA) = Climax! Cosan speculated with land and sold its shares to TIAA – CREF, second
  semester of 2016.

• SLC Land Co.: joint venture between SLC (soybean) and Valiance investment fund = Land as
  an asset to be used as collateral to inflate prices in stock markets and speculative soy bean
  production.

• Tiba Agro – ( Vision Brasil Investment Fund) – ABP (Netherlands Pension Fund) + Fazendas
  Reunidas Boi Gordo = financial Ponzi scheme/ Pyramid and money laundry (2004).

• Insolo = Harvard Endowment (Collin Butterfield – former Radar CEO).

• BrasilAgro – Real Estate capital from Argentina + Cyrella Brasil = Land as the main asset of its
  stock market shares.
Radar S/A and its Financial Scheme to Grab Land in the
             MATOPIBA Region in Brazil
Photo: Big Chain used to deforestation in Brazilian
              Cerrado - MATOPIBA
Photo: Farm From TIAA (EUA) in South Piauí/BR Partially
                    Deforested
Deforestation – South Maranhão / South Piauí – Brazil (2000)
Deforestation – South Maranhão / South Piauí – Brazil (2008)
Deforestation – South Maranhão / South Piauí – Brazil (2016)
Photo: Dried up River on the Cerrado Region
Current Land Grabbing Phenomenon in MATOPIBA:
• Land as a global financial asset class in current capital crisis (2008 – 2019)
       ❖ Detachment between value and commodity prices – future markets;
       ❖ Detachment between commodity inflated prices and land inflated prices;
       ❖ Land Grabbing as an important business – Formation of land very cheap and inflation of land prices = as
         a financial asset (fictitious capital simulation of reproduction).
       ❖ Fictitious Production of Space
• Nas áreas de Chapada / Over the High Plateaus
       ❖ Direct Deforestation, with no accumulation over past labor in opening the “new” frontiers;
       ❖ Big Chains deforesting;
       ❖ Original accumulation reproduction? Landnahme Theorien?
       ❖ Sassen, 2014 = “Expulsions” – No wage labor. Roswitha Scholz, 2016: Überflüssigkeit – “superfluity”.
• Nos Baixões / In the Low Lands (Communities inhabit these places).
       ❖ Communities keep very small pieces of land – racism against afro-descendants, indigenous, women;
       ❖ No labor on the cities neither in Agroindustries..;
       ❖ Communities could improve consumption with State distribution. It was able to do that with
         commodities boom = Merchandise as the social mediation and contradiction. Distribution was
         determined by commodities boom: overexploited, evicted and expulsed people = Patriarchy and
         Racism
How can financial / Fictitious Capital be possible?
We would have to comprehend:
• How can capital accumulate if it is expulsing labor from the process of production?
• How can production of space (accumulation by dispossession / original accumulation /
   Landnahme) happen after that – land as a global financial asset class? Green grabbing, water
   grabbing?
• What changed concerning the so called “peasants” social reproduction (historically in Brazil) in
   relation with the changes in
 the historical contradictory process of the merchandise (Financialization and Global
Entanglement)?
• How does the category of fictitious capital can help to explain such theorical issues?

                    What changed after financialization of capitalism?
              3 different approaches (Keynesianism or traditional Marxism)

     • How does capitalism simulates reproduction nowadays since its so called
                              financialization process?
Financial Crises and Fictitious Capital???
• There is a difference between Financial capital and Fictitious capital:
- Fictitious is the capital that earns interest without having exploited enough labor
  to pay profits and interests:
           = There is not enough surplus value to pay for the interest rates.

• Three examples of money autonomization (Verselbständigung) in “Das Kapital”:
   1) The commerce between England and India on the 21st Century –
Overproduction Crisis
         (while producing commodities to rollover indebtedness is the main goal )

            2) Capacity of bank system to create new money = leverage

  3) Stock markets as a sort of secondary market (detachment between production
                           and financial system - CRISES)
How did historically Financial Capital become
      determinant for the Capitalist Society?
                     Three Main Different Explanations:

• 1) Deregulation and financialization of capital: Monthly Review / Chesnais;
- Michel Hudson’s New-Keynesianism and neoliberalism critique = against
composed interest
       (interests are always higher than “productive” surplus value)

• 2) Socialist explanation – David Harvey and neoliberal class struggle:
  overaccumulation + overexploitation + financialization = 2008 crisis.
• Or Andrew Kliman explanation – Current Tendency of the Profit Rate to
  Fall (after the 70s).

• 3) Fictitious capital determinations and the critique of value
                   The crisis of capital and labor = Robert Kurz
1) State Deregulation (F. Chesnais) and Financial
 Capital after the 70s (Michel Hudson - The Boom
         and Beyond, 2012, p. XVII and XXI)
• But Money doesn’t work in the sense that labor or tangible capital
  expends effort to produce commodities. Credit is debt and debt
  extracts interest. [...] The effect is to turn the economic surplus into a
  flow of interest payments, diverting revenue from tangible capital
  investment. As the economy’s reproductive powers are dried up, the
  financialization process is kept going by easing credit terms and
  lending – to bid up prices for financial assets.
• Economic Policies should regulate finance (interest rates, leverage) to
  be able to support commodity production, what would stop financial
  detachment and fictitious capital and would bring back economic
  wealth to capitalism.
2) Class Struggle and Financial capital after the 70s
(David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital, 2011, p. 16,
                    22 and 100)
• My opinion is that neoliberalism is a class Project that began with capital crisis of
  the 70s. Masked with a discourse about individual liberty, personal responsibility
  and privatization process, it legitimated policies to rescue and consolidate the
  power of capitalist class after Fordist boom and Welfare State post Second World
  War.
• A synthetic way to understand 2008 capital crisis would assume that: the issue
  was excessive capitalist power in relation to labor and consequent labor earnings
  repression, what conducted to issues with demand and consumption. That
  problem was partially solved with personal indebtedness, what did not solve
  demand problem for capital, but postponed it until real state bubble burst.
• The gap between what labor was earning and what it could spend was fulfilled
  with personal credit and family's indebtedness. Financial institutions had lots of
  credit and started to finance the income of the poor families. If not, whom would
  had bought all the new houses that real state enterprises were constructing and
  financing? [...]. Financial institutions were controlling either offer either the
  demand in real state industry in the center of capitalism.
3) How did historically Fictitious Capital become
           capital Society determinant?
• Automatization (robotics and microelectronics – Third Industrial Revolution) –
  Expulsion of productive workers from Labor Processes – Tendency of the Profit
  Rate to Fall (1970) / Labor Crisis (1970 until nowadays – Revolution 4.0)
• With no labor to explore: Capitalist society reaches its fundamental crisis period
• Peripheries can also achieve central capitalism patterns of production, but also
  expulsing labor from the productive process.
• People need to work, to buy commodities and there are no jobs.
• Capital needs to explore labor, and there is no labor places to be productively
  exploited.
• Money migrates to financial system – capital market.
• End of Gold Standard – Dollar Standard – Creation of currencies future markets
  and speculation with currencies as a sort of financial derivative.
• Peripheries over indebtedness and Debt Crises = 1983 (México) – 1986 (Brazil).
Consequences of Fictitious Capital Determination
                 Of Capitalism
• There was a change in prices formation: from the production moment = value as
  the labor time socially (average) necessary to produce a commodity;

       To financial markets moment defining prices and production.

       Main Current Capitalist logic = Economic bubbles – Boom and Burst =
 Faster and Faster (Subprime, Commodities, Land, Chinese Stock Markets in 2016)

   Everything functions as a financial asset = to buy cheap and to sell expensive
                       For example – Land as financial asset
                = Inflation over the price of property titles (Marx)
Kurz, Weltkapital, S. 241 – “Von der Aktien- zur
     Immobilienblase und zurück: Das Recycling des »fiktiven
                Kapitals« in die Realwirtschaft”
       Das Weltkapital als Krisenkapital der dritten industriellen Revolution
ist also im wesentlichen »fiktives Kapital«; und daran anschließend oder
davon generiert in zweiter Linie »fiktives Realkapital«, wie man es paradox
ausdrücken könnte. Denn es handelt sich dabei nicht mehr um eigenständig
akkumulierendes Realkapital, aus dessen fordistischer Überakkumulation die
neue Finanzblasenökonomie ursprünglich hervorging, sondern um einzig von
Kaufkraft aus aufgeblasenem »fiktivem Kapital« hervorgetriebene reale
Warenproduktion; also eben um ein Recycling des Blasenkapitals in die
Realökonomie. Das Verhältnis von Portfolio- und Direktinvestitionen
entspricht    diesen      Bedingungen.       Der      Ausgangspunkt       der
Wertschöpfungsketten ist zunehmend irreal, und das läßt nach wie vor auf
die Unausweichlichkeit eine Entwertungskettenreaktion im globalen Ausmaß
schließen.
Kurz, Weltkapital, S. 243 – “Von der Aktien- zur
    Immobilienblase und zurück: Das Recycling des »fiktiven
               Kapitals« in die Realwirtschaft”
       Kunststück, geht es doch Kreditgebern wie Kreditnehmern weder um
die Seriosität der Ausgangslage noch überhaupt um eine private oder
kommerzielle Realinvestition und deren Erträge, sondern allein um die
erwartete spekulative Wertsteigerung der Eigentumstitel - eine
kapitalistische creatio ex nihilo. Zum Schluß ist mehr Geld da, als der
Investor ursprünglich nicht hatte. Indem so aus den Finanzblasen in
bestimmten Weltregionen Liquidität für Konsum und Investitionen geschöpft
und eine Scheinkonjunktur angekurbelt wird, regt diese wiederum Importe
von Waren und Dienstleistungen an. So verschränkt und verfilzt sich der
spekulative Gesamtprozeß immer mehr mit der transnationalen
Betriebswirtschaft des produzierenden Gewerbes und der Dienstleistungen.
Und diese Verschränkung läßt dann ihrerseits neues spekulatives,
transnationales Geldkapital in die gerade boomenden Sektoren der
»Finanzindustrie« strömen, wo es mit den entsprechenden Instrumenten auf
die nationale Ebene heruntertransformiert und teilweise wieder auf die
realwirtschaftlichen Binnenmärkte geschleust wird als Nachfrage. Dieser
Kumulationseffekt macht lüstern.
From Rolling Over indebtedness to Asset Prices Inflation
(transformations in Fictitious Capital reproduction on the 90s)
 • Brazil’s over indebtedness and Bankruptcy (1986) as an example.
 • Brady’s Plan (1994 and Brazilian Reais and Brazilian neoliberalism):
        - Creation of securitization of debts (1980 / 1990)
        - And of Secondary markets (1980/1990): Brazilian Bonds
 • Brazil’s internal (against previous external) new cycle of indebtedness
   (21st Century) - The commodities boom and its burst (2008 – 2017)
     = Creation of Money Within Financial Markets on the 1990s
          Nasdaq Crisis = Subprime Crisis (The Big Short) +
        Commodities Boom (2002) = Brazil as a financial asset
  Land Speculation Globally – Wertabspaltungskritik (no Landnahme
      Explanation) = Fictitious Production of Space (Kurz, 2005).
Agroindustry Commodities
Prices (Index for 2000–2015)
Brazil’s Federal Public Debt, Billions of Reais
                (2002 – 2009)
Selic Rate and Average Cost of Domestic (DFPD) and
   Federal Public Debt (FPD), Brazil (2005 – 2015)
Business Cycle: Fixed Investment and GDP Growth
              Brazil - (1996 – 2014)
Brazilian Industry (2002 – 2016)
Brazilian Profit Rate (2000 – 2016)
Brazilian Official Interest Rate (SELIC) - 2004-2015
Brazilian Inflation: 2000 – 2016 (red line)
Government Balance % Of GDP (12 months) –
           Brazil (2002 – 2015)
Brazil, Unemployment (2012 – 2017)
Different Explanations for Brazilian Crisis (2008 –2015)
• Bresser–Pereira – New Developmentalism and the Dutch Disease = reprimarization

• Guilherme Delgado / Ricardo Carneiro – Bubble and financial overappreciation of Brazilian
 Currency with losses of international competition (indebtedness) = reprimarization

• Ladislau Dowbor: Rentism and Fiscal Adjustment (only in 2015) = underconsumption (Marxist)

• Marquetti: Class Struggle Marxists / Kalecki explanation = Profit Squeeze - Fall in Profit Rate

• Felipe Batista – Marxism = The Tendency of the Profit Rate to Fall because Brazil is backwards
 regarding the center of capitalism and Fictitious Capital

• Felipe Rezende – Hyman Minsky Keynesian theory of financial cycle:
   ▪ Bubble bust; Falling world trade; rolling over debts; Ponzi scheme; Deficit in Brazilian Current Account (since
     2007); Deficit in Brazilian Fiscal Balance; Indebtedness; Inflation = Excess of optimism (Keynes / Minsky)
Society Structural Changes – Brazilian Society
                (2002 – 2015)
Up to date Trends and Current Capitalist Society
                Crisis (After 2008)
             • Robots and trends in financial system nowadays
• High Frequency Trading = insider trading and reproduction of frauds after
                                     2008.
  War as financial asset (the case of MOAB in Afghanistan and Raytheon =
Predator Drones) – Social Credit in China – Capitalist Society Crisis and trend
   towards barbarism – Right wing Populism nowadays = Trump, Brexit,
                              Bolsonaro (Brazil)

                      • Saskia Sassen – “Expulsions”
            • Scholz Wertabspaultungskritik and refugees' crisis

Crisis of labor and necessity of the critique of commodity form as a social
  mediation; Labor and of Dissociation in the moment of fundamental
                               Kapital crisis.
References:

• DELGADO, Guilherme. Capital Financeiro e Agricultura: 1965-1985. São Paulo, Ícone, 1985.
• ____________. Do capital financeiro na agricultura à economia do agronegócio - mudanças cíclicas em meio século. Porto Alegre,
  Editora UFRGS, 2015.
• ALVES, Vicente Eudes. “O mercado de terras nos cerrados piauienses: modernização e exclusão”. Em: Revista AGRÁRIA, São Paulo,
  números 10/11, pp. 73-98, 2009. Disponível em: http://www.revistas.usp.br/agraria/article/view/154, p. 95 – 96.
• HARVEY, David. O Enigma do Capital e as crises do capitalismo. São Paulo, Boitempo Editorial, 2011.
• Hudson, Michael. The Bubble and Beyond. Islet Verlag, Dresden, Deutschland, 2012.
• KURZ, Robert. WeltKapital, 2005.
• KURZ, Robert. World Power and World Money: The Economic Function of the U.S. Military Machine within Global Capitalism and
  the Background of the New Financial Crisis (Robert Kurz, 2008): Website: https://orca.cf.ac.uk/59445/1/Marxism-and-the-Critique-
  of-Value.pdf
• MARX, Karl. O Capital – Crítica da Economia Política. Livro I, Tomo I. São Paulo, Abril Cultural, 1983 (Série “Os Economistas”).
• PITTA, Fábio T. – As transformações na reprodução fictícia do capital na agroindústria canavieira paulista: do Proálcool à crise de
  2008.       Tese       de      Doutorado      em        Geografia,       FFLCCH,        USP,      2016.       Disponível        em:
  .
• PITTA, Fábio T. - Finanzkapital und illegale Landnahme nach der Krise von 2008: Land als neue Finanzanlage in der MATOPIBA-
  Region in Brasilien. .
• SASSEN, Saskia. Expulsions, 2014.
• SCHOLZ, Roswitha. GESELLSCHAFTLICHE FORM UND KONKRETE TOTALITÄT. Zur Dringlichkeit eines dialektischen Realismus heute in
  revista EXIT! Krise und Kritik der Warengesellschaft, 6 (2009).
• SCHOLZ, Roswitha. Christoph Kolumbus Forever, 2016. http://www.obeco-online.org/roswitha_scholz24.htm
• Valor Econômico – Cresce o número de falências entre as usinas sucroalcooleiras. 25 de outubro de 2017.
http://www.valor.com.br/agro/5131622/cresce-o-numero-de-falencias-entre-usinas-sucroalcooleiras
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