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Naryad-V
Spaceand
Chronicle,
the Soviet Anti-Satellite
Vol. 69, pp.?-?, Fleet
2016
Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
BART HENDRICKX
Minervastraat 39, 2640 Mortsel, Belgium.
This paper discusses various anti-satellite projects initiated by the Soviet Union in the 1980s, mainly in response to the Strategic
Defence Initiative announced by US President Ronald Reagan in 1983. Most attention is focused on Naryad-V, which reached
the flight testing stage in the early 1990s and later evolved into the Rokot/Briz-KM launch vehicle programme.
Keywords: Soviet anti-satellite programme, Naryad-V, Rokot, Briz, IS, Skif, Kaskad, Kamin, Kontakt, Strategic Defence Initiative
Introduction
A rocket that Russia occasionally launches from the Plesetsk design bureau based on the R-7 missile. The Soviet TASS news
cosmodrome these days is the Rokot booster, a converted agency announced these missions to the world as Polyot-1 and
ICBM topped by the Briz-KM upper stage. This is used to place Polyot-2 (polyot meaning “flight”) and described them as the
relatively small satellites into low Earth orbits. What few people first manoeuvrable satellites, not giving away anything about
realize, however, is that the Rokot/Briz-KM has its roots in a their true purpose. Polyot-1 used its on-board engine system
ground-based Soviet anti-satellite (ASAT) system developed to change both altitude and inclination, but Polyot-2 barely
in the 1980s. Called Naryad-V, this was only one component manoeuvred at all and recently declassified documents suggest
of a much larger Soviet ASAT effort initiated in the 1960s and that it may not have been as successful as the Russians claimed
later bolstered by the announcement of the American Strategic at the time [1].
Defence Initiative in 1983. The Naryad-V programme saw two
suborbital test flights in 1990 and 1991 and there is evidence to In October 1964 Chelomei lost much of his political support
suggest that an orbital mission launched by the Rokot booster when Khrushchov was ousted by Leonid Brezhnev. The change
in late 1994 included an attempted covert test of the system in of power in the Kremlin had two immediate implications for the
orbit. IS programme. Chelomei was forced to relinquish control of
the programme to the KB-1 design bureau (more particularly,
The IS Programme a division of KB-1 called OKB-41, which in 1973 became
independent under the name TsNII Kometa). This had earlier
By the time work on Naryad-V got underway in the mid-1980s, acted as a subcontractor to develop the satellites’ guidance and
the Soviet Union already possessed an operational anti-satellite control systems. Now the roles switched, with KB-1 becoming
system. Called IS (for istrebitel’ sputnikov or “satellite destroyer”), the lead design bureau and OKB-52 relegated to the role of
it had been conceived in the early 1960s at the OKB-52 design subcontractor, being responsible only for the development of
bureau headed by Vladimir Chelomei. At the time Chelomei the satellite bus. Another consequence was that Chelomei had
enjoyed almost unconditional support from Soviet leader Nikita to abandon plans to launch the IS satellites with his own UR-
Khrushchov, whose son worked at Chelomei’s bureau. Brimming 200 rocket. The UR-200 was cancelled in 1965 and replaced
with ambition, Chelomei proposed a wide array of military space as IS launch vehicle by a rocket based on the R-36 ICBM of the
projects, some more realistic than others. One of those was to OKB-586 Yangel design bureau (the rocket was retrospectively
develop a piloted anti-satellite vehicle, but eventually he had to called Tsiklon-2). This had two launch pads in Area 90 of the
settle for a more modest unmanned system. The IS programme Baikonur cosmodrome.
was officially approved by a government decree on 16 March
1961. It was a so-called “co-orbital” ASAT system, in which a The IS satellites were built around a drum-shaped bus
weapon with conventional explosives is launched into the same that contained the main power and control systems (Fig. 1).
orbit as the target and then moves near enough to destroy it. Attached to one side of the bus was a radar antenna to locate
the target. An alternative infrared homing system was also
Two test flights of the IS system were performed in November developed, but it failed on all its four missions [2]. Mounted on
1963 and April 1964 using a booster of Sergei Korolyov’s OKB-1 the other side of the bus were spherical propellant tanks and
This paper was presented at the British Interplanetary Society Soviet/
a truss structure carrying the main engine. The satellite also
Chinese Technical Forum held on 19-21 June 2015. had a variety of attitude control thrusters. Extending from either
1Bart Hendrickx
rolled out the pad at very short notice if the need arose. It would
have taken only about 1.5 hours to prepare the rocket for launch
in case the command was given [3].
An early operational capability was achieved in February
1973. That same year work got underway on a slightly modified
interceptor called IS-M that began test flights in 1976 and
achieved operational status in November 1979. In all, 41 objects
were placed into orbit in the framework of the IS programme
(including the Polyots). The last mission (Kosmos-1375/1379)
was flown in June 1982 and was part of a large-scale military
exercise that also included ICBM, IRBM and SLBM test
launches. The exercise, which tested the Soviet command,
control and communications networks in a simulated wartime
environment, became known in the West as the “seven-hour
nuclear war” [4].
Just over a year later, on 18 August 1983, Soviet leader Yuriy
Fig. 1 The IS satellite. Key: 1. Radar antenna; 2. Guidance and
control systems; 3. Thrusters; 4. Propellant tanks; 5. Explosive Andropov, who had replaced the deceased Leonid Brezhnev in
charges; 6. Guidance and control systems; 7. Main engine. November 1982, announced a unilateral moratorium on anti-
(A. Lobanov/I. Afanasyev/A. Suvorov/A. Novichkov)
satellite tests. What drove Andropov to declare the moratorium
is open to speculation, but the decision may well have been
prompted by a genuine concern over the escalation of the
side of the satellite were short extendable booms that carried arms race into space. Having said that, the Soviet Union was
explosive charges. The shrapnel resulting from the explosion in an advantageous position, because unlike the US it had an
was supposed to knock out the target satellite. The first target operational ASAT system that could be re-activated at any time if
satellites were also manoeuvrable and apparently based on needed. Moreover, the moratorium didn’t stop the Russians from
the IS design. In 1971 they were replaced by lighter, non- continuing extensive research on more advanced ASAT systems.
manoeuvrable target satellites (designated DS-P1-M) built
by the Yangel bureau that were launched by the Kosmos-3M The Soviet Response to SDI
booster from Plesetsk.
On 23 March 1983 President Ronald Reagan unveiled plans
Test flights of the IS system began in 1967 and the first for a multi-layered defence system capable of intercepting
successful intercept took place on 1 November 1968. Two incoming Soviet missiles and warheads throughout their flight
basic mission scenarios were observed in the following years. (boost, post-boost, midcourse and terminal), thus creating a
In one of them, the target satellite was placed into a relatively shield against a massive Soviet nuclear attack. Formally called
low orbit (usually around 500 km high) and the interceptor the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the programme became
into a highly elliptical orbit, intercepting the target at perigee. popularly known as “Star Wars”, since it would include a
In another pattern, the target satellite entered a higher orbit significant amount of space-based components. The prime goal
(about 1,000 km up) and the interceptor rendezvoused with of the space-based components was to negate Soviet missiles
it during the apogee of its elliptical orbit. Most intercepts during the boost or post-boost phase, before they had a chance
occurred at altitudes around 500 km or 1,000 km, but there to deploy their multiple warheads and decoys.
were exceptions. The lowest intercept altitude observed was a
mere 150 km and the highest 1,575 km. All interceptors were Early plans called for the use of directed energy weapons
inserted into orbits co-planar with their targets, with inclinations (DEW) such as lasers and neutral particle beam accelerators,
ranging from 62° to 66°. The rendezvous usually took place but DEW technology was still immature and the costs associated
during the 2nd revolution, but in some instances the intercept with fielding such weapons in the short term were prohibitive.
was carried out near the end of the 1st revolution, less than two Therefore the focus soon shifted to more conventional kinetic
hours after launch. weapons. In 1987 the Department of Defence approved a
Phase 1 Architecture that envisaged the launch of big “garage
Initially, the purpose of the tests was to actually destroy the satellites” (officially called Carrier Vehicles) housing multiple
targets, but later the focus shifted to demonstrating the ability kinetic kill vehicles called Space-Based Interceptors (SBI).
to approach the target close enough for the explosive charges Also part of the space-based tier of SDI were early warning
to do their job and the interceptors either self-destructed or satellites equipped with infrared sensors to detect Soviet missile
de-orbited themselves after the intercept. Several Tsiklon-2 launches. The Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS)
boosters were reportedly on standby at Baikonur, ready to be was a constellation of satellites in geostationary orbit to detect
2Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
missiles in the boost phase and the Space Surveillance and
Tracking System (SSTS) was to be deployed in medium Earth
orbits (MEO) to spot missiles in the midcourse phase.
Reagan’s speech immediately spawned negative reactions
from the Soviet Union, which claimed that the missile shield
undermined the delicate strategic balance between the two
superpowers. It was widely believed that it was aimed at giving
the United States a first-strike capability and significantly
downgrading the retaliatory potential of Soviet strategic forces.
Nevertheless, Reagan’s speech does not seem to have
immediately set in motion a major Soviet initiative to counter
SDI. After all, the true scale of the programme did not really
become clear until February 1984 with the official establishment
of the Strategic Defence Initiative Organization (SDIO).
Andropov’s announcement of the ASAT moratorium in August
1983 was most likely not directly linked to Reagan’s “Star Wars”
speech, but the culmination of earlier efforts to ban space-based
weapons and a reaction to appeals by the international scientific
community to prohibit the deployment of ASAT weapons [5].
One step undertaken in response to SDI under Andropov
was the formation of a commission to study the feasibility of Fig. 2 Yevgeniy Velikhov. (IPPI)
the missile shield and, in particular, the use of directed energy
weapons, which were a key component of the earliest “Star Wars” Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat (CSS),
proposals. Appointed by the Military Industrial Commission which together with the Federation of American Scientists
(VPK), a powerful body under the Council of Ministers that published several reports throughout the 1980s that questioned
managed the entire defence industry, the commission was the technological feasibility of SDI and underlined its negative
headed by nuclear physicist Yevgeniy Velikhov (Fig. 2), the vice- impact on strategic stability.
president of the Academy of Sciences. It was a multidisciplinary
group that included representatives of the scientific community, Despite these developments, the almighty Soviet military
the military and the defence industry [6]. industrial complex, eager to obtain lucrative new subsidies for
the design bureaus and production facilities, managed to secure
In making its assessment, the commission had more to go a top-level decision on a response to SDI. On 15 July 1985 the
on than the information available on the American programme. Central Committee and the Council of Ministers passed a decree
The Soviet Union itself had done some limited research on that approved two major “umbrella” programmes that together
space-based missile defences since at least the late 1960s, but comprised nearly 300 projects ranging from fundamental
none of it had led to any concrete results [7]. The latest proposal research to development of specific systems. The first, called
had been put forward in the late 1970s by Vladimir Chelomei. D-20, concentrated on ground-based missile defences and was
Inspired by Anatoliy Basistov, the head of the NPO Vympel assigned to the Ministry of the Radio Industry, which traditionally
design bureau, Chelomei had proposed a network of space- had managed missile defence programmes. The second, dubbed
based interceptors to destroy US ICBMs, apparently involving SK-1000, focused on space-based elements and was entrusted
the use of Proton-launched spaceplanes called LKS. However, to the Ministry of General Machine Building, which oversaw most
a commission appointed by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev of the design bureaus involved in space and missile programmes.
came to the conclusion that the shield would be unable to More specifically, SK-1000 encompassed space-based missile
stop a massive US nuclear attack. One of the members of the defence, anti-satellite systems (both ground-based and space-
commission had been Velikhov [8]. based) and systems designed to strike targets on the ground
from space. However, it also included almost all launch vehicle
Not surprisingly, after several months of work, the Velikhov and satellite programmes already underway at the time (including
commission came to the conclusion that SDI was unrealistic manned programmes such as Buran and the Mir space station).
and that even prototypes of space-based directed energy In fact, many of the projects under D-20 and SK-1000 had already
weapons were unlikely to be orbited before 2000 [9]. While been under development prior to the July 1985 decree and were
the commission set up by the VPK worked in secret, Velikhov now brought together under a common denominator, probably
also launched a public attack on SDI in close co-operation with in an attempt to obtain stable funding. D-20 and SK-1000 were
equally skeptical American scientists. Shortly after Reagan’s expected to cost tens of billions of rubles, keeping the design
speech, he took the initiative to set up the Committee of Soviet bureaus and production facilities occupied into the late 1980s.
3Bart Hendrickx
However, at the same time no commitment was made to actually missiles, but also to destroy enemy satellites as well as targets
deploy most of these systems. Rather the goal was “to create by on the ground, in the air and on the sea. In fact, the objectives
1995 a technical and technological base in case the deployment were very similar to those of the later SK-1000 programme.
of a multi-layered missile defence system would be necessary”
[10]. Another government decree specifically focusing on space- The ASAT tier of the NPO Energiya programme consisted of
based elements to counter SDI is known to have been issued in two types of “battle stations” based on the civilian Salyut space
January 1986 [11]. stations (Longterm Orbital Stations or DOS). One was called
Kaskad (“Cascade”) and would be equipped with a large amount
The July 1985 decision came despite the rise to power of of self-guided missiles developed by the KB Tochmash design
Mikhail Gorbachov, who had been appointed the new Soviet bureau of Aleksandr Nudelman to nullify targets in medium
leader in March 1985 after the death of Andropov’s successor and high Earth orbits. The other was called Skif (“Scythian”)
Konstantin Chernenko. Gorbachov was wary of pouring more and would use laser systems to destroy targets in low Earth
money into the Soviet Union’s vast military industrial complex, orbits (Fig. 3). The stations would be periodically visited for
but having been in office for only several months, there was little maintenance and refuelling. Experimental versions would be
he could do at this point to keep the influential Soviet defence launched by the Proton rocket and operational versions by the
industry from imposing its wishes. However, as his political Buran space shuttle. Also initiated in 1976, Buran was mainly
influence grew and US-Soviet relations evolved, the focus of seen by the Russians as a project to counter the perceived
the anti-SDI effort gradually shifted to an asymmetric response. military threat of the US Space Shuttle [15].
Accounts suggest that a prominent role in this change of direction
was played by Velikhov, who became one of Gorbachov’s key In 1981 NPO Energiya transferred its ASAT work to a newly
science advisors [12]. acquired branch that received the name “Salyut Design Bureau”
(KB Salyut). Headed by Dmitriy Polukhin, this had formerly been
Rather than deploy a Soviet missile shield, something that “Branch nr. 1” of the rival Chelomei design bureau (known at
would place a heavy burden on the country’s ailing economy, it the time as the Central Design Bureau for Machine Building
made more sense to concentrate on developing countermeasures or TsKBM) and had been responsible (among other things) for
against America’s space-based missile defences. This could be the development of the Proton rocket and the cargo sections
achieved by improving the ability of missiles to penetrate the
shield, but also by neutralizing the space-based elements of the Fig. 3 The original NPO Energiya design of Skif (above) and
missile shield. The big orbiting garages housing the Space Based Kaskad. (RKK Energiya)
Interceptors were essentially sitting ducks in orbit and a single
Soviet ASAT could easily destroy an entire garage and its suite
of interceptors. The aim was not to destroy the entire US missile
shield, but breach it sufficiently for the Soviet Union to launch
a successful retaliatory strike [13]. The asymmetric response
programmes were grouped under new umbrella programmes
called “Protivodeistviye” (“Counteraction”) and “Kontseptsiya-R”
(“Conception-R”), approved in the second half of 1987 [14].
While ASAT weapons had already been an important part of the
SK-1000 programme, they now became one of the most critical
components of the asymmetric response to SDI.
A Plethora of ASAT Systems
The existing IS anti-satellite system was clearly deemed
insufficient to counter the perceived US threat, forcing the
Russians to significantly upgrade their ASAT capability. Not
only was it necessary to initiate the development of several new
systems, but also to speed up work on two ASAT projects that
had already been conceived in the 1970s.
In 1976 the Soviet government had issued a decree that
placed NPO Energiya (the former Korolyov bureau) in charge of
a space weapons programme that according to the company’s
official history was a response to similar work “begun by the
United States in the late 1960s-early 1970s”. It envisaged the
use of space-based weapons not only to destroy incoming US
4Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
(“Functional Cargo Blocks” or FGB) of the 20-ton Transport
Supply Ships (TKS) that were to launch cosmonauts and
supplies to Chelomei’s military Salyut space stations (Almaz).
The transfer of the design bureau from TsKBM to NPO Energiya
in June 1981 took place only months before a government
decree banned Chelomei’s bureau from any involvement in
space-related projects.
However, it should be noted that the branch enjoyed a great
deal of independence from its central design bureau. Even while
it had been subordinate to Chelomei’s bureau, Branch nr. 1 had
acted as a subcontractor to NPO Energiya for the development
of the civilian Salyut space stations. Similarly, when KB
Salyut became part of NPO Energiya, it retained much of its
independence and seems to have had only loose ties with the
new central design bureau in Kaliningrad. KB Salyut was based
in the Moscow suburb of Fili and located on the same territory as
the Khrunichev Machine Building Factory. Although Khrunichev
manufactured the hardware designed or co-designed by KB
Salyut (like the Proton rockets and the Salyut space stations),
it was an independent entity. In June 1988 KB Salyut split
off from NPO Energiya to become part of a newly formed
organization called NPOEM (Scientific Production Association
of Experimental Machine Building). In 1991 KB Salyut acquired
independent status before being merged with the Khrunichev
factory in 1993 to form the Khrunichev State Space Scientific
Production Centre (GKNPTs imeni Khrunicheva).
After the transfer to KB Salyut, both Skif and Kaskad Fig. 4 The Energiya rocket with the Skif-DM/Polyus payload.
underwent significant changes. Because the gas dynamic laser (V. Lukashevich)
system needed for Skif turned out to be much heavier than
projected, the spacecraft was transformed into a 100-tonne
Although Skif and Kaskad pre-dated SDI, indications are
class vehicle to be launched by the Energiya heavy lift launch
that prior to SDI NPO Energiya’s space weapons programme
vehicle. An experimental version (called Skif-DM or Polyus) not
had been a relatively poorly funded research effort that took
equipped with a laser system was flown on the maiden mission
a backseat to NPO Energiya’s ongoing manned programmes
of Energiya on 15 May 1987, but failed to reach orbit due to
(Soyuz/Salyut and Buran) [18]. When they were incorporated
a problem with the spacecraft’s navigation system following
into the SK-1000 anti-SDI programme in July 1985, they are
separation from Energiya (Fig. 4).
likely to have received a boost in funding.
Kaskad remained within the 20-tonne launch capacity of the
In addition to Skif and Kaskad, KB Salyut began work on
Proton rocket, but instead of being built on the basis of the DOS
three new ASAT systems that were also part of SK-1000:
space stations would now use a bus derived from the propulsion
section that delivered the Kvant astrophysics module to the • Naryad-V[19]: a ground-based kinetic kill vehicle using a
Mir space station in 1987. This propulsion section, known as silo-based ICBM (the UR-100N UTTKh) and a new upper
stage to reach targets from low Earth orbits (LEO) to
Functional Service Block (FSB) or 77K, in turn was a stripped-
geostationary orbits (GEO).
down version of the FGB cargo sections of the TKS transport • Kamin (literally “Fireplace”, but in fact a compound of the
vehicles designed by KB Salyut in the 1970s. Attached to the words kosmicheskaya mina or “space mine”): a constellation
bus would be three small space tugs each carrying one or more of small ASAT weapons deployed in orbits close to potential
missiles of the Tochmash design bureau (the exact amount target satellites for very quick intercepts. Using a new
lightweight bus, several of them could have been launched
is unknown). After separating from Kaskad in low Earth orbit,
in one go by launch vehicles such as Zenit or Buran.
the space tugs would use their own propulsion and guidance
• Lider (“Leader”): an ASAT vehicle using particle beam
and control systems to get as close as possible to their targets weapons to disable electronic systems of enemy satellites.
in higher orbits and then launch the missiles at them [16].
Incidentally, the FSB also served as the bus for an offensive Like Kaskad, Naryad-V and Kamin were to be outfitted with
space-to-ground system called Bolid that KB Salyut worked on space-to-space missiles of the KB Tochmash design bureau for
in the second half of the 1980s [17]. a hit-to-kill intercept of target satellites. In order to save costs,
5Bart Hendrickx
the initial hope was that the three systems could employ a
common space tug that would be loaded with different amounts
of propellant depending on the mission. However, that plan was
abandoned by late 1987 because the distances to be covered by
the tugs were too different. Instead, Kaskad would be equipped
with tailor-made tugs and Kamin, flying very close to its target,
could do without a tug and instead carry more space-to-space
missiles or perform the intercept itself through a direct collision
with the target (with or without the use of explosive devices).
The ground-based Naryad-V would rely on a more powerful
propulsion unit that would act both as a third stage and a space
tug. It would first be ignited to place itself into a parking orbit and
then be re-ignited one or several times to approach the target
and then deploy its missile(s) [20].
In addition to the aforementioned ASAT projects, the Soviet
Union began working on an air-launched ASAT system very
similar to one that had been under development in the United
States for several years. The US ASAT programme had been
much smaller in scope than the Soviet programme, possibly
because Soviet military satellites were not considered as much
of a threat to US strategic forces. Apparently, the main driving
force behind US ASAT programmes (at least in the 1970s and
1980s) was not so much to disable Soviet satellites, but to
deter the Russians from using their ASAT weapons against US Fig. 5 American ASAT test on 13 September 1985.
(P. Reynolds/USAF)
satellites [21].
Plans for an Air Force co-orbital ASAT system called SAINT Although the US Congress banned further tests of the ASM-135
were cancelled in 1962 in favour of two ground-based direct on targets in space in December 1985, there were two more
ascent systems that would use nuclear warheads to knock out successful test flights using simulated targets in August and
enemy satellites in orbit. One was an Army project (Program September 1986. However, in 1988 the Reagan administration
505) using Nike Zeus missiles from the Kwajalein Atoll in the cancelled the project due to its ballooning cost and a variety of
Marshall Islands chain in the Pacific. The other was an Air technical problems.
Force project (Program 437) relying on Thor missiles stationed
on Johnston Island in the Pacific. Although both programmes In what clearly was a direct response to ALMV, the Russians
saw a number of test launches in the 1960s, they had many started the development of a similar air-launched ASAT system
operational drawbacks. Program 505 was cancelled in 1966 called Kontakt (also named 30P6). The formal go-ahead was
and Program 437 in 1975, among other things because it was given by a government decree on 27 November 1984, barely
found to offer little or no protection against the Soviet Fractional two weeks after the second US ASM-135 test. Indications are
Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS), a single-orbit nuclear that Kontakt was not billed by the defence industry as an anti-
weapon delivery system that was considered to be the main SDI project, but justified by the proven argument that any new
Soviet space-based threat against the US [22]. American weapons system needed to be matched by a Soviet
counterpart. An initial order to start work on the project is said
One of the disadvantages of the ground-based ASAT to have come in January 1983, two months before Reagan
missiles was that they had to wait for a target satellite to overfly unveiled SDI. The lead design bureau was TsKB Almaz (the
their launch sites. In the late 1970s the Air Force initiated former KB-1), which like TsNII Kometa (the bureau in charge of
the development of an air-launched hit-to-kill ASAT system IS) was also under the Ministry of the Radio Industry. The carrier
that would provide more flexibility in engaging satellites. The aircraft was a modified MiG-31 fighter jet (designated MiG-31D)
programme became known as the Air-Launched Miniature outfitted with a three-stage solid-fuel missile named 79M6
Vehicle (ALMV) and involved the use of ASM-135 missiles that developed by the MKB Fakel design bureau (Fig. 6). Two of the
would be launched from an F-15 fighter jet. The ASM-135 was a aircraft were built. Test flights from the Flight Research Institute
two-stage solid-fuel missile carrying a kinetic energy warhead. (LII) in Zhukovskiy (near Moscow) began on 17 January 1987
and were later transferred to the Sary-Shagan test range in
After two test flights on 21 January and 13 November 1984, Kazakhstan. The system was reportedly capable of engaging
the ASM-135 successfully destroyed a partially operational US targets up to an altitude of 600 km with inclinations ranging from
scientific satellite called Solwind on 13 September 1985 (Fig. 5). 50° to 104° [23].
6Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
Fig. 6 The MiG-31D jet and the 79M6 ASAT missile. (www.airwar.ru)
Finally, it should be noted that the A-35 and A-135 nuclear- Third, the IS system relied on just two launch pads at
tipped anti-missile defence systems deployed around Moscow Baikonur, making it vulnerable to attack. Two Tsiklon pads
are also said to have had a limited capability to destroy targets were also available at the northern Plesetsk launch site, but
in LEO [24]. Around the mid-1980s the TsNPO Vympel design these were only used for the three-stage version of the rocket
bureau reportedly also began work on a non-nuclear satellite (Tsiklon-3) and there is no evidence that IS interceptors were
interceptor for the A-135 system that was known as Amulet [25]. ever deployed at Plesetsk.
Putting it all together, by the mid-1980s four different Soviet The air-launched Kometa system offered the advantage that
design bureaus were working simultaneously on at least eight it was not tied to a specific launch site and therefore had more
ASAT systems: flexibility in reaching its targets, but it was also restricted to LEO
targets and had a ceiling even lower than IS (600 km).
• Ground-based/Air-based kinetic systems: IS-M (TsNII
Kometa), Kontakt (TsKB Almaz), Naryad-V (KB Salyut),
Amulet (TsNPO Vympel) Both Naryad-V and Kaskad addressed the altitude problem.
• Space-based kinetic systems: Kamin, Kaskad (both KB They were primarily designed to attack satellites in MEO and
Salyut) GEO, although they could also have been aimed at targets
• Space-based directed-energy weapons: Skif, Lider (both
in LEO. Deployed in orbit, Kaskad theoretically had a quicker
KB Salyut)
intercept time than Naryad-V, but Naryad-V had the advantage
of being stationed in hardened ground-based silos that were
Complementary Capabilities
less vulnerable to attack. The estimated intercept time for
The multiple ASAT systems were supposed to complement each Naryad-V was from 30 minutes (for LEO targets) to 7 hours (for
other and compensate for some of the shortcomings of IS, the GEO targets) [28].
only operational ASAT system. First, IS was limited to relatively
low orbits (with a demonstrated ceiling of 1,500 km), implying The Kamin interceptors would have been the quickest-
that many critical American military satellites remained out of response kinetic ASAT weapons, possibly needing only minutes
its reach. These were the Navstar/GPS navigation satellites in to sneak in on their targets. Kamin was originally conceived to
20,000 km circular orbits and a variety of geostationary satellites engage targets in LEO, but later it was decided to deploy the
for early warning, communications and signals intelligence. On system in higher orbits as well. The low-altitude version became
the other hand, virtually all low-orbiting US military satellites would known as Kamin-N (“N” standing for nizkiy, “low”) and the high-
have been vulnerable to an IS attack (inclinations attainable from altitude version as Kamin-V (“V” standing for vysotnyy, “high”)
Baikonur were between 45° and 135°, assuming range-safety [29].
restrictions would have been lifted in a wartime situation) [26].
The laser-equipped Skif was also targeted at objects in LEO.
Second, the IS interceptors were co-planar, meaning Whereas the American space-based laser systems proposed
they had to wait for a target’s orbital plane to pass over the under SDI had to be accurately aimed at ballistic missiles or
launch site. Therefore they could be launched at a target only warheads flying at large distances and high speeds, Skif
twice each day from any given launch site. A launch into the needed less power-hungry lasers to hit orbiting satellites at
same orbital plane as the target was also a dead give-away much closer range and lower relative speeds [30]. Advantages
of intent and this, combined with the relatively long intercept over the kinetic systems were the shorter intercept times and
time, would have given the target satellite enough time to make the ability to destroy multiple targets with a single vehicle.
evasive manoeuvres or take other countermeasures to prevent However, Skif was a cumbersome vehicle that was dependent
destruction [27]. on the expensive Energiya rocket and, like the carrier vehicles
7Bart Hendrickx
of the US Space Based Interceptors, would have been an easy constellation would have been to destroy the low-orbiting carrier
target for enemy ASATs. Moreover, even the development of a vehicles of the Space Based Interceptors, allowing as many
short-range space-based laser was a challenging task that was Soviet missiles as possible to penetrate the US missile shield in
continuously running far behind schedule. The Skif-DM mission a retaliatory strike. The response time was estimated to be no
in 1987 was not part of a carefully devised step-by-step test more than 15 minutes (the time needed for American submarine
programme, but a stopgap mission thrown together relatively launched ballistic missiles to reach Soviet territory minus the
quickly to test the Energiya rocket until the much-delayed Buran time needed to detect the US launches and send the necessary
space shuttle was ready for flight. The Soviet Union also studied commands to the ASATs). This was too short for ground-based
ground-based laser systems for satellite negation, but the systems as Naryad-V and IS (and, presumably, Kontakt) to
research never advanced as far as some alarming Pentagon reach their targets. Although Naryad-V could reach LEO in a
reports in the 1980s suggested [31]. matter of minutes, its upper stage would still have needed to
make manoeuvres (possibly plane-changing burns) to reach its
Lider, the space-based particle-beam weapon, was target and therefore would not have been much more efficient
also a huge vehicle requiring the Energiya rocket [32]. The than the co-orbital IS system. The Kaskad platforms, although
development of a space-based particle-beam weapon was in having the advantage of already being in orbit, would not
an even more immature stage than that of a laser system and necessarily be positioned correctly for their tugs to reach the
the project probably never advanced beyond the drawing board. US battle stations in time. Naryad-V and Kaskad would only be
useful in this scenario if they were deployed in huge quantities,
War Scenarios outnumbering their targets. The most effective weapons in such
a scenario were considered to be the Kamin-N space mines,
The simultaneous existence of so many ASAT projects can only circling the Earth very close to their targets.
be explained by the fact that each of them would have been
assigned specific tasks in a given wartime situation. Some An additional way to ensure the success of a Soviet
insight into the objectives of the various ASAT systems has been retaliatory strike would have been the quick destruction of
provided by a KB Salyut veteran who worked for the design geostationary DSP early warning satellites (or the BSTS and
bureau’s so-called “systems analysis department” (Department SSTS early warning systems developed in the framework of
117). The department’s task was to assess how feasible the SDI), limiting America’s capability to detect Soviet missiles
technical specifications issued by the military “customers” were launched in response to the US attack. Since Naryad-V and
from the standpoint of spacecraft designers. In order to do that, Kaskad would have needed hours to reach GEO, Kamin-V
the department also needed to know what kind of targets the was seen as the primary ASAT system for that task (and that
ASAT systems were aimed at, but since the military community seems to have been its very raison d’être). In short, the Kamin
was not prepared to share that sensitive information with the vehicles were to become the core element of the Soviet anti-
civilian design bureaus, the systems analysis department SDI ASAT response. Nonetheless, the development of Kamin
had to draw up potential scenarios for the use of such ASAT seems to have proceeded without a sense of urgency. When the
systems itself, essentially duplicating the work already done by programme was initiated in 1985, the preliminary design was to
the military customers. Although little information is available on be finished in 1989, with test flights not getting underway until
the actual scenarios modelled by the military R&D institutes, KB 1992, another indication that the Soviets did not expect SDI to
Salyut’s systems analysts were able to deduce from the rare become a reality in the immediate future [34].
contacts with their military colleagues that they were thinking
along the same lines. KB Salyut’s analysis (performed in the Systems such as Kaskad and Naryad-V were primarily
1987-1988 timeframe) centred mainly on Naryad-V, Kaskad needed in the second scenario, a non-nuclear conflict between
and Kamin, because Skif and Lider were expected to be fielded the USSR and the US. In such a conflict the prime targets would
much later and IS and Kontakt were developed by other design have been the GPS/Navstar navigation satellites in MEO and
bureaus [33]. communications satellites in GEO. Here the response time
was less critical and ample time was available for Kaskad and
The basis for KB Salyut’s analysis were three possible war Naryad-V to reach their targets in high orbits. Although not part
scenarios. In the first scenario (considered the most likely from of the KB Salyut analysis, one can assume that IS and Kontakt
the Soviet standpoint) the United States would launch a nuclear were also best suited for use in a non-nuclear conflict, targeting
attack on the Soviet Union and then activate its SDI missile US reconnaissance satellites in LEO and possibly also the
shield to defend itself against a Soviet retaliatory strike. In the Transit navigation satellites that orbited the Earth in roughly
second scenario a large-scale conventional war would break out circular 1,000 km orbits with an inclination of 90°. Although
between the two superpowers. In the third scenario (considered Transit was being phased out in the 1980s in favour of the higher
the least likely) the Soviet Union itself would be forced to mount orbiting GPS/Navstar satellites, the final IS mission in 1982
a nuclear attack on the United States. (flown at an altitude of 1,000 km) is said to have simulated the
intercept of a Transit satellite (despite the lower 65° inclination
In the first scenario, the main objective of the Soviet ASAT used by the mission) [35].
8Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
KB Salyut’s analysts also considered scenarios
in which a conventional war between the US and
USSR would escalate into a nuclear conflict. In
case the Americans were on the brink of losing
the conventional war, the analysts reasoned, they
might be tempted to launch a desperate nuclear
strike against the USSR. This would lead to the
first scenario, the only difference being that a
considerable portion of the ASAT assets would
have been exhausted during the conventional war.
Alternately, if the Soviet Union threatened to lose
the conventional war, it might be forced to unleash
its nuclear arsenal, resulting in the third scenario.
One option considered was to use only the Kaskad
platforms in a conventional war, leaving the
Naryad-V interceptors on stand-by in their hardened
silos in case the war turned into a nuclear conflict.
All these scenarios assumed that the Soviet ASATs
themselves would not be targeted by American
ASAT systems. However, the Russian also worked
out scenarios that took into account the capabilities
of the US air-launched ASM-135 interceptors. The
20-tonne Kaskad satellites were considered to be
most vulnerable to US ASAT attacks and one way of
avoiding their destruction would have been to deploy
decoys or quickly change their orbits. The small
Kamin interceptors would circle the Earth so close
to their targets that any attempts to disable them
with the ASM-135 missiles were expected to fatally
damage the targets themselves. Nevertheless,
the TsNII-50 military research institute did devise
plans for stealthy Kamin vehicles that would have
been difficult to detect by optical, radar and infrared Fig. 7 Brilliant Pebbles. (SDIO)
means [36].
of inclinations, making an efficient ASAT response extremely
Scaling Down the ASAT Programme challenging, if not impossible. One crazy idea was to launch a
huge quantity of solid particles into orbit that essentially would
Of course, American SDI architects were equally aware of the have formed a ring around the Earth and destroyed the Pebbles
potential threat posed by Soviet ASAT systems. Realizing that upon impact. However, the ring would, of course, also have been
the big orbiting garages were easy targets for Soviet ASATs, SDI lethal to Soviet satellites, basically ending satellite operations in
planners shifted their attention to smaller interceptors that would low Earth orbit. Another idea was to shoot down American launch
be highly autonomous through the use of miniaturized sensors vehicles before they could deploy the Pebbles, but it would have
and computers, giving them the capability to operate without the been very difficult to distinguish between launches related and
sensors and communications equipment of the garages. Called unrelated to SDI, not to mention the fact that any such action
Brilliant Pebbles, they would be housed in protective cocoons would undoubtedly have given rise to a further escalation of
(“life-jackets”) to provide housekeeping support. When a Soviet tensions. The only way out for the Russians was to deploy their
missile attack was detected, the Pebbles would be armed for own constellation of Brilliant Pebbles, but that would have forced
combat, shed their life jackets and be sent on a collision course them to abandon the concept of an “asymmetric response” to SDI.
with the attacking Soviet missiles (Fig. 7). The Brilliant Pebbles NPO Energiya did conduct some studies of a Soviet equivalent
concept was publicly revealed in early 1988 and integrated into to Brilliant Pebbles, but it is unclear whether this research ever
the SDI architecture in 1989/1990. progressed beyond the paper stage [37] (Fig. 8).
For the Soviet ASAT planners, Brilliant Pebbles presented a As the decade drew to a close and warming relations between
nightmare. Not only would they be launched in huge numbers, the two superpowers diminished the threat of a nuclear war, the
they would also be scattered around the Earth in a wide variety Russians scaled down their ASAT programme. The appearance of
9Bart Hendrickx
Fig. 8 Soviet equivalent of Brilliant Pebbles. (RKK Energiya)
Brilliant Pebbles probably sounded the death knell for the Kamin-N ASAT system with MEO/GEO capability that stood a chance
interceptors. Before that the military had already lost most of their of becoming available in the short run. Relying on an existing
interest in Kaskad (presumably because of its vulnerability) and the ICBM, Naryad-V was much cheaper than the Proton-launched
high-orbiting Kamin-V space mines [38]. Apparently, the objective Kaskad. When the project was initiated in 1985, it was expected
of quickly neutralizing satellites in MEO and GEO had gradually lost to reach flight status as soon as 1987 [43]. Indeed, it would
priority. Meanwhile, the Skif project was suspended in September become one of the few elements of the SK-1000 umbrella
1987 because of its high cost [39]. The only programmes that programme to reach the flight testing stage, but later than
survived into the 1990s were Kontakt, IS and Naryad-V. This very planned.
fact adds further weight to the assumption that their main goal
was not to attack elements of the SDI constellation. In early 1991 Naryad-V Design
President George Bush shifted the focus of SDI to theatre missile
defence. Responding to the growing threat of nuclear proliferation, Naryad-V was developed at the KB Salyut design bureau under
the shield was now supposed to provide protection against the leadership of Lev Kiselyov [44]. Its launch vehicle was an
accidental, unauthorized or limited missile attacks from what later ICBM designated UR-100N UTTKh (also known as 15A35,
would become known as “rogue states”. RS-18B and by the NATO code SS-19 mod 2 (Stiletto)) [45].
This was the last modification of the Chelomei bureau’s UR-
The Kontakt test programme may have been much broader 100 ICBM conceived in the 1960s (earlier modifications having
in scope than initially believed. Some of the MiG-31D test pilots been the UR-100K, UR-100U and UR-100N). Actually, the
involved in the project later revealed that numerous test flights idea of using UR-100 type missiles for an ASAT role was not
were carried out from the Sary-Shagan range with “live” missiles entirely new. In the early 1960s Chelomei had proposed the
being shot at targets in space, albeit it only with the intention of development of a missile shield called Taran that would have
passing close to them rather than actually hitting them [40]. One seen the deployment of nuclear-tipped UR-100 missiles to
source claims the tests continued until 1995 [41]. destroy incoming American ICBMs in space. Although the prime
purpose of Taran was anti-missile defence, an additional goal
The IS programme was resumed after the death of Yuriy was to destroy enemy satellites in low orbits. The preliminary
Andropov in early 1984. In 1978 work had already begun on design of Taran was finished in July 1964, but the system
a further modification called IS-MU capable of intercepting was deemed too expensive and cancelled in the wake of
manoeuvrable targets. In the late 1980s TsNII Kometa is said to Khrushchov’s overthrow in late 1964 [46].
have initiated the development of yet another modification called
IS-MD to reach targets in geostationary orbits, but details on this Development of the UR-100N UTTKh was approved by a
are sketchy. Despite attempts by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign government decree on 16 August 1976. Like its predecessors,
Affairs in 1989-1990 to terminate the project, the IS-MU system it consisted of two lower stages and a post-boost stage to
was declared operational in April 1991 after a series of ground- place its six multiple warheads on the proper trajectory for re-
based simulations. Sixteen of the interceptors were reportedly entry. All engines burned storable propellants (unsymmetrical
kept in storage at the Baikonur cosmodrome. It wasn’t until April dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4)).
1993 that President Boris Yeltsin signed an order to dismantle Improvements included a modernized post-boost stage,
the IS-MU system [42]. upgraded engines, an increased range and better protection
against nuclear blasts. Test flights from the Baikonur
With Kontakt and IS-MU constrained to LEO and IS-MD in cosmodrome began on 26 October 1977 and were finished on
the very early stages of development, Naryad-V was the sole 26 June 1979. The missile was officially declared operational
10Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
on 17 December 1980. In all, about 360 of the missiles were its payload within the same parameters as that of the post-boost
deployed in silos in four locations in the western Soviet Union stage and its multiple warheads. Lacking the power to place
(Tatishchevo (Saratov region), Kozyolsk (Kaluga region), itself into MEO or GEO, the upper stage would first insert itself
Pervomaisk and Khmelnetskiy (Ukraine)). The missile was into a parking orbit in LEO. Once positioned correctly, it would
manufactured by the Khrunichev factory [47]. re-ignite its engine one or more times and approach its target as
closely as possible, subsequently releasing the missile(s) for a
Turning the UR-100N UTTKh into an ASAT booster was a high-speed intercept [48].
relatively straightforward affair. The two lower stages essentially
remained unchanged. The main change required was to replace The new upper stage was called “Briz” (“Breeze”) [49] (Fig.
the post-boost stage by a more powerful, restartable upper 10). Briz had the shape of a truncated cone that fitted under
stage equipped with one or more space-to-space missiles of the existing payload shroud of the UR-100N UTTK and was
Nudelman’s KB Tochmash design bureau (Fig. 9). KB Salyut attached to the second stage via a short, newly developed
designers did struggle to keep the mass of the upper stage and interstage. It consisted of an equipment bay (in the upper part)
and a propulsion section. The fuel tank (UDMH) and oxidizer
tank (N2O4) were separated by a common bulkhead and the
lower oxidizer tank surrounded the main engine. Each tank
contained baffles, feed pipes and ullage control devices to
facilitate main engine restarts in weightlessness. Development
of the main engine was assigned to KB KhimMash (the
former Isayev bureau) in Kaliningrad (near Moscow), which
specialized in spacecraft and upper stage engines. The engine
was designated S5.98M (14D30) and was derived from the
S5.92 engine of the Phobos interplanetary probes (launched
in 1988) (and later also used on the Fregat upper stage). This
in turn was based on the 11D417 engine used by the third-
generation Luna probes and the 11D425 engine of the Mars-
2/3 probes. It was a pump-fed engine that could be gimballed
and restarted at least eight times (compared to five times for
Fig. 10 The Briz upper stage at the 1995 Paris Air Show.
(C. Lardier/Air et Cosmos)
Fig. 9 The UR-100N UTTKh missile
with the Briz upper stage. Key:
1. Fairing; 2. Briz upper stage; 3.
Interstage; 4. Second stage oxidizer
tank; 5. Second stage fuel tank; 6.
Second stage engine; 7. First stage
oxidizer tank; 8. First stage fuel
tank; 9. Tail section.
(Yu. Pavutnitskiy)
11Bart Hendrickx
the S5.92). The Briz also had four low-thrust engine units used interceptors that could be deployed. Any UR-100N UTTKh silo
for propellant settling and attitude control. Each unit consisted converted for Naryad-V could no longer be used by the ICBM (at
of one 11D458 propellant settling thruster and three 17D58E least in the short run). Building dedicated silos for Naryad-V was
attitude control thrusters. All these thrusters were developed by not an option because the START agreement being negotiated
the NiiMash design bureau in Nizhnyaya Salda. The 11D458 at the time between the US and the Soviet Union limited the
was originally developed for an unmanned radar-equipped number of ICBMs that could be deployed, irrespective of
version of the Almaz space station and later also flew together whether they carried nuclear weapons or ASAT weapons. This
with the 17D58E on the Mir modules Kvant-2, Kristall, Spektr meant that the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), the branch
and Priroda and on the Zarya module of the International of the armed forces overseeing missile programmes, would
Space Station. Briz had a dry mass of 1,500 kg and a maximum have been forced to sacrifice a certain number of its UR-100N
fuel and oxidizer mass of 1,665 kg and 3,300 kg respectively, UTTKh silos for Naryad-V. It is not clear if any deal on this was
giving a maximum total mass of 6.465 tonnes. Standing 24.6 m ever reached between the RVSN and the Missile and Space
high, the UR-100N UTTKh/Briz combination had a launch mass Defence Forces (Voiska PRO i PKO), the branch of the armed
of 106.7 tonnes. More details on the rocket’s dimensions and forces that had operational control over ASAT programmes.
engine systems are given in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4. Even KB Salyut seems to have been kept in the dark about
the number of silos that would be converted for Naryad-V,
The Briz required a significantly modified guidance and although internally specialists of the design bureau estimated
control system. Developed by the NPO Elektropribor design that the best they could hope for was about ten [50]. However,
bureau in Kharkov (Ukraine), this was not only supposed to declassified documents indicate that as many as one hundred
control the lower two stages, but also had to ensure the proper were discussed at one point, which would have been about a
functioning of the upper stage itself and control the complex third of the total amount available [51].
manoeuvres needed to get it close to the target satellites. The
new guidance and control system necessitated significant Very little is known about the space-to-space missiles of
modifications to the launch control equipment in the silos. the KB Tochmash design bureau, not even how many were
This had important implications for the number of Naryad-V supposed to be installed on the Briz upper stage (probably one
or two) [52]. Once the Briz had reached the vicinity of its target,
TABLE 1: UR-100N UTTKh the missile would have been released upon a command of the
Dimensions. Briz guidance and control system. The interceptor was capable
Length Diameter of adjusting its trajectory with small bursts from four liquid-fuel
Stage 1 17.2 m 2.5 m thrusters installed at 90° angles to one another in the vehicle’s
Stage 2 3.9 m 2.5 m centre of mass perpendicular to the flight path. The thrusters
Briz 3.38 m 2.28 m reportedly used a “specially developed fuel”, which was injected
into the combustion chamber in small portions by a mechanism
that worked according to the same principle as a rapid-firing
TABLE 2: UR-100N UTTKh First Stage Engine Data.
cannon. The interceptor would home in on its target with the help
Name RD-0233 (15D95) (3x)
of a self-guided seeker head (developed by the KB Geofizika
RD-0234 (15D96) (1x)
design bureau) that had its own miniature computer [53].
Manufacturer KBKhA (Voronezh)
Type cardan gimballed/pump fed/closed cycle The missiles have been described as being very similar
Propellants UDMH/N2O4 to the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV), the final stage of the
Sea-level thrust 1870 kN (each engine 470 kN) American air-launched ASM-135 ASAT missile [54]. This used a
Vacuum thrust 2070 kN (each engine 520 kN) cryogenically cooled infrared sensor to detect its target, but unlike
Sea-level Isp 285 s the Soviet missiles had solid-propellant motors for manoeuvring
and attitude control. The infrared sensor maintained track of
Vacuum Isp 310 s
the satellite and reported the satellite’s position to the guidance
Burn time 121 s
computer, which then calculated the manoeuvres needed to keep
TABLE 3: UR-100N UTTKh Second Stage Engine Data.
Name RD-0235 (15D113) (main engine) (1x) RD-0236 (15D114) (vernier) (1x)
Manufacturer KBKhA (Voronezh) KBKhA (Voronezh)
Type fixed/pump fed/closed cycle fixed/pump fed (single pump and four combustion chambers)/open cycle
Propellants UDMH/ N2O4 UDMH/ N2O4
Vacuum thrust 240 kN 15.76 kN (total)
Vacuum Isp 320 s 293 s
Burn time 183 s 200 s
12Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
TABLE 4: Briz Engine Data.
Name S5.98M (14D30) (main 11D458 (settling thruster) (4x) 17D58E (attitude control
engine) (1x) thruster) (12x)
Manufacturer KB KhimMash (Kaliningrad) NIIMash (Nizhnyaya Salda) NIIMash (Nizhnyaya Salda)
Type cardan gimballed/pump fed/ fixed/pressure fed fixed/pressure fed
closed cycle
Propellants UDMH/N2O4 UDMH/ N2O4 UDMH/ N2O4
Vacuum thrust 20 kN 400 N 13 N
Vacuum Isp 325.5 s 275 s 270 s
Mode Steady state with up to 8 Pulse mode with up to 33,000 Pulse mode with up to
ignitions ignitions 450,000 ignitions
Total available impulse 2 x 107 Ns 14112 Ns -
Minimum impulse bit 25000 Ns 40 Ns 0.068 Ns
Minimum/maximum burn time 1 s/1000 s 0.1 s/3000 s 0.03 s/10000 s
Off time 15 s to 1 h - -
the satellite in the cross hairs of the sensor. This process was
continued repetitively until the MHV collided with its target [55].
It is known that the space-to-space missiles intended for
Kaskad were supposed to have been tested in space from
modified Progress cargo ships. The NPO Energiya design
bureau even started the construction of five such vehicles for
missions in 1986-1988. When those plans were abandoned,
the vehicles were rebuilt as standard resupply ships for the Mir
space station [56]. The space-to-space missiles intended for
Naryad-V, Kaskad and Kamin are likely to have been very similar
and therefore the Progress-based tests would undoubtedly
have been applicable to Naryad-V as well.
Fig. 11 UR-100N UTTKh missile being installed into a silo at
Baikonur. (www.leninsk.ru)
One declassified document has revealed that at one point
consideration was given to outfitting both Naryad-V and the
A-135 Moscow ABM system with warheads generating X-rays perform the test missions. The establishment of this unit began
[57]. A similar warhead called W-71 was developed in the with an order from the commander of the Baikonur cosmodrome
1960s for the US Spartan ABM system and was designed for in October 1985 and was completed on 22 September 1987.
intercepts of re-entry vehicles at high altitudes comparable Military Unit 55056 was subordinate to a new directorate
to low Earth orbit. It had the advantage of being capable of established at the cosmodrome on that very same day. Known
disabling incoming re-entry vehicles at much greater distances as the 7th Scientific and Testing Directorate for Special Space
than traditional warheads (up to 16 km), making guidance less Systems (7 NIU), this directorate also absorbed the unit in
challenging. Why such a warhead was envisaged for an ASAT charge of Tsiklon-2 launches (Military Unit 46180), which earlier
system as Naryad-V is unclear. had been part of the directorate that oversaw Proton launches
(4 IU). Apparently, the purpose of the new directorate was
Naryad-V Suborbital Test Flights to integrate launch operations in the interests of the Soviet
Missile and Space Defence Forces and the Navy. The Tsiklon-2
The Naryad-V test programme envisaged several suborbital launched not only the IS interceptors, but also radar and
missions and also at least one orbital mission. The test flights electronic ocean reconnaissance satellites (known as US-A and
were to be performed from the Baikonur cosmodrome, where US-P). However, as part of cutbacks in military spending, the 7
two UR-100N UTTKh silos were modified for test flights of the NIU and 4 IU directorates were merged in November 1989 to
Naryad-V system (Fig. 11). These silos were located in Areas form the 2nd Centre for Tests and Applications of Space Assets
131 and 175 in the western part of the cosmodrome in the same (TsIP KS 2).
general area as the Proton and Tsiklon-2 pads.
Military Unit 55056 consisted of two groups and a so-called
A new military unit (Military Unit 55056, also known as the “independent brigade”. Group 1 was in charge of transporting
326th Independent Engineering and Testing Unit) was formed to the missile to the silo and fuelling it. Group 2 was responsible
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