NZ Port and Harbour Marine Safety Code Review - February 2014 Prepared by Debra Player
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NZ Port and Harbour
Marine Safety Code
Review
February 2014
Prepared by
Debra PlayerContents
Executive summary .......................................................................................................................... 1
Background ................................................................................................................................. 1
Methodology................................................................................................................................ 2
Key findings of the Environmental Scan ....................................................................................... 3
1.0 Relevance ............................................................................................................ 3
2.0 Effectiveness ........................................................................................................ 3
3.0 Efficiency.............................................................................................................. 4
4.0 Equity ................................................................................................................... 5
5.0 Voluntary code ..................................................................................................... 5
6.0 Suggested Priority Actions .................................................................................... 5
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 8
1.0 Background ................................................................................................................. 8
2.0 Methodology ................................................................................................................ 9
Key Findings of environmental Scan ............................................................................................. 10
3.0 Relevance: has the Code remained ‘fit for purpose’ .................................................... 10
3.1 The Maritime Transport Amendment Act 2013 ........................................................... 10
3.2 Relevance of the Code’s approach to risk assessment ............................................... 12
3.3 Technology advances ................................................................................................ 13
3.4 Relevance of MNZ’s compliance role in the Code....................................................... 14
3.5 Accuracy of general information ................................................................................. 15
3.6 Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 15
4.0 Effectiveness: performance outputs and outcomes ............................................................ 15
4.1 Statistical analysis ..................................................................................................... 15
4.2 Audits as evidence of the Code’s effectiveness .......................................................... 16
4.3 The Code as champion of effective safety systems .................................................... 17
4.4 Continuous improvement through effective engagement ............................................ 18
4.5 MNZ’s role in supporting performance outputs and outcomes..................................... 19
4.6 Conclusion................................................................................................................. 20
5.0 Efficiency – managing the Code implementation process................................................... 20
5.1 Inefficiencies and barriers related to SMS .................................................................. 21
5.2 Communication.......................................................................................................... 22
5.3 Value for money......................................................................................................... 23
5.4 Better public services ................................................................................................. 23
5.5 Conclusion................................................................................................................. 24
6.0 Equity................................................................................................................................ 24
6.1 Harbourmasters ......................................................................................................... 24
6.2 Equity issues associated with fees for audits .............................................................. 25
7.0 Voluntary or Mandatory ..................................................................................................... 25
8.0 Summary of Themes ......................................................................................................... 26
8.1 Relevance ................................................................................................................. 26
8.2 Effectiveness ............................................................................................................. 27
8.3 Efficiency ................................................................................................................... 27
8.4 Equity ........................................................................................................................ 28
i
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.8.4 Voluntary Code .......................................................................................................... 29
9.0 Suggested priority actions ................................................................................................ 29
References ....................................................................................................................................... 31
Appendix 1: - Analysis of accidents and incidents in ports and harbours between 1999 and 2012. ..... 33
Appendix 2: – The ACC audit process ............................................................................................... 47
Appendix 3: – Terms of Reference .................................................................................................... 48
Appendix 4: - Meetings ..................................................................................................................... 51
Appendix 5: – Other Interviews ......................................................................................................... 52
ii
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.Executive summary
Background
Between 2002 and 2003 New Zealand experienced a number of groundings and near groundings of
large cargo ships in its ports and harbours. The cluster of incidents left Maritime New Zealand (MNZ)
concerned about the management of risk in New Zealand’s waterways. A step change was required in
the way risks in port and harbours were assessed and managed.
In consultation with the maritime sector, the Maritime Safety Authority (MSA) looked to the United
Kingdom’s voluntary port and harbour safety code as an example that New Zealand might follow.
Changes were made to suit the New Zealand setting and in 2004 the New Zealand Port and Harbour
Marine Safety Code (the Code) was published and actively promoted by the MSA.
Over the next few years the Code was adopted by almost all New Zealand’s regional councils as a
benchmark for ensuring safety in their harbours. Port companies supported the Code’s
implementation, as the safety management system approach it promulgated was compatible with their
business requirements for safe operation of their ports.
The Code was always intended to be supported by legislation and in 2007 the Ministry of Transport
put out a discussion paper to get feedback on the statutory changes needed to support effective
implementation of the Code. Proposed legislation would include the local maritime safety roles and
responsibilities of regional councils and harbourmasters (drawn from the Local Government Act 1974).
It also expressed the regulatory role of government to enforce compliance; should such a step be
necessary. Due to a number of circumstances it took a further six years for the legislation to come into
1
force.
A review of the Code was timely at this point, to assess how the 2013 amendments to the Maritime
Transport Act (MTA) would impact on the Code’s relevance, and to find out whether the code was still
fit for purpose ten years after it was published.
1
Maritime Transport Act 1994 Part 3A (local regulation of maritime safety) was amended in October 2013.
1
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.Methodology
The MNZ/Regional Council Chief Executive (CEO) Steering Group decided to undertake an
2
environmental scan to determine how relevant, effective and efficient the Code remained after ten
years, for those primarily engaged in implementing it. The scan was undertaken with representation
from the Port Company CEO group. A review of Harbour Control Functions was also planned and it
was anticipated that the findings of both reviews would assist regional council, port company and MNZ
leadership to make decisions on how to refresh the management of port and harbour safety in a post-
MTA amendment context.
The scan sought the views of the sector through face to face meetings and conference calls with port
company and regional council management, harbourmasters, marine managers and others. The scan
also considered available quantitative information to inform views on the Code’s effectiveness.
The Environmental Scan terms of reference are attached as Appendix Three. The goals and
objectives are fully reported on in this report, under the headings of relevance, effectiveness and
efficiency. Equity has been added for discussion following issues of equity being raised at several
meetings. Comments from participants at the meetings have been used throughout the report to
highlight the consultative approach taken.
Definitions
Port –
(a) means an area of land and water intended or designed to be used either wholly or partly for the
berthing, departure, movement, and servicing of ships; and
(b) includes any place in or at which ships can or do –
(i) load or unload goods:
(ii) embark or disembark passengers; and
(c) also includes a harbour
Harbour –
(a) means any natural or artificial harbour; and
(b) includes any place in or at which ships can or do obtain shelter.
The Code used the following definition of harbour:
Harbour includes the waters and any port within any pilotage area defined in Part 90 of the maritime
rules, and any other coastal or inland waters that a regional council determines are a harbour for the
3
purpose of this Code in accordance with a Code application assessment.
2
An Environmental Scan is a quick assessment of what is working, and not working for those engaged in a programme -
environment in this context means the broader setting.
3
New Zealand Port and Harbour Marine Safety Code, 2004, p. 7.
2
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.Key findings of the Environmental Scan
1.0 Relevance
The Code is regarded as highly relevant, by harbourmasters, marine managers and their managers in
regional councils and port companies. There was unanimous and enthusiastic support for the Code
from all those who refer to it regularly; however some changes are required to update and refresh the
Code.
The roles and responsibilities described in the Code are closely aligned with the MTA apart from
harbourmaster competencies and qualifications; this is one aspect where the Code is more
prescriptive than the MTA.
The Code’s guidelines are out of date as there have been advances in risk assessment approaches,
technology, and navigational aids since 2004.
Compliance theory has also evolved in the past decade. The Code’s use of the term ‘approval’ was
questioned. Approval is used to describe MNZ’s confirmation that a Safety Management System
covers all the aspects of risk management set down in the Code.
The development of a new edition of the Code would provide the opportunity to refresh the Code, to
renew a sense of sector commitment to the process, and to position the Code as a relevant guide for
strengthening nationally consistent safety management practice in New Zealand’s ports and harbours.
2.0 Effectiveness
Insufficient objective evidence currently exists to conclude that the Code has been effective in
establishing a consistent standard of port and harbour safety management, however there are some
strong indicators of effective practice.
Statistical analysis revealed that few conclusions could be drawn from the data available on accidents,
incidents and mishaps for the period 1999 – 2013 (see Appendix One). Questions asked by the
reviewer at the regional meetings seeking views on the evidence that would indicate successful
performance of a safety management system (SMS) drew rather inconclusive responses.
Confirmed Code-compliant safety management systems and timely monitoring audits would indicate
that effective safety management is in place. Unfortunately only half of New Zealand’s ports and
harbours with pilotage have had the opportunity to demonstrate this status through the current
approval and audit process.
3
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.The Code has been an effective catalyst for establishing a culture of safety management. Meeting
participants confirmed that safety management systems now exist in all of New Zealand’s ports and
harbours. This is a vast improvement on the situation in 2004 when only those regional councils with a
recent serious accident were likely to have begun work on a systems approach to safety management.
Implementing the Code has led to the formation of strong functional port and harbour safety meetings
in some jurisdictions. The commitment that some councils and port companies have made to
collaborative decision making and safety management may inspire others to follow their example.
There appeared to be a link between functional collaborative relationships and a well-designed and
operating SMS.
MNZ’s inability to resource its Code implementation role within the timeframes expected has impacted
on the effective implementation of the Code.
3.0 Efficiency
Most regional councils expected their harbourmaster(s) to lead the implementation of the Code in their
region. The leadership qualities and the maritime knowledge of the harbourmaster had some bearing
on how efficiently this task was carried out. Larger councils and port companies usually had the
advantage of more staff to share the task and to input into the process. ‘Early adopters’ of the Code
were usually those that had sufficient resource to approach the task with confidence, or because they
had a head start due to local navigational safety issues in 2004.
MNZ has increasingly become unable to put staff resource into its role of advice, support, approval
and audit. This situation contributed to the progressive inefficiency of Code implementation. MNZ also
struggled to respond to queries and advice requests in a timely way as remaining Councils worked
toward completing their risk assessment and SMS documents. As a result the momentum of
implementation was lost. MNZ appeared not to make its situation clear to the sector with regard to
resourcing Code implementation.
Value for money inefficiencies were also raised at regional meetings and in discussions with MNZ.
Some port companies and regional councils with long delays in receiving feedback on their SMS
documents considered that without the approval certificate they had nothing to demonstrate a change
of status despite their substantial outlay of funding and resource. The MNZ funding review (2012)
signaled that MNZ needed to recover costs for audit activities. Carrying out audits and other related
activities at no cost to those benefiting from the service was regarded as unsustainable for the crown
entity.4
4
MNZ, Funding Review Consultation, 2012.
4
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.The Scan meetings also revealed that a lack of clear communication about the monitoring audit
process has been a barrier for some. There were harbourmasters and marine managers who did not
understand or appreciate the rationale for a monitoring audit which appears overly paper based.
4.0 Equity
Regional councils and unitary authorities vary in size and rating base around the country and some
find the financial and human resource required to meet their obligations quite onerous.
5.0 Voluntary code
The 15 meetings largely endorsed the voluntary nature of the Code. Smaller councils were more likely
to see the advantage of a mandatory code. It is unlikely that there would be the political will to make
the Code mandatory.5
6.0 Recommendations
The 15 regional meetings gathered views from regional council and port company CEOs,
harbourmasters, marine managers and other relevant staff, on the strengths and weaknesses of the
Port and Harbour Marine Safety Code (2004). The following recommendations generally represent a
consensus view drawn from the meetings and interviews:
Revive and strengthen joint commitment of the port and harbour marine safety code
1. The Code should remain as the national safety standard against which the safety performance
of port companies, regional councils, and MNZ can be measured, but it does not need to be
legally mandated.
2. The strong support for the Code articulated by the sector at the 15 meetings should be used to
refresh joint commitment of the Code’s implementation process.
Address outstanding SMS ‘approvals’
3. The back-log of SMS plans should be addressed as an immediate priority in order to
demonstrate that a high standard of safety management exists nationally (the Regional Council
CE/MNZ Steering Group may be best placed to decide how to clear the SMS back-log as soon
as possible). Councils that are completing or revising their SMS should make this task a
priority, so that all SMS achieve the standard by December 2014.
5
It could be argued that the final shape of the MTA and Ministerial correspondence in response to questions on
the Code signaled Government preference for the status quo. A provision in the Act enables the Director MNZ to
impose conditions on port operators should evidence support such a move.
5
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.Update the Code and supporting guidelines
4. The Code should be updated to reflect the MTA in its references to regional councils, port
companies, harbourmasters and MNZ. The Code could either remove detailed role descriptions
or refer readers to the Act; or it could replace current text with wording that is aligned with the
MTA.
5. The Code guidelines should be updated as a priority to ensure the advice and guidance is
current, and to remove all historic and inaccurate references.
6. The MNZ website Code references require a similar cleansing.
7. The Code should be updated in a style that is less prescriptive than the current document. This
may include a framework that accommodates a broader concept of best practice risk
assessment and safety management practice than the current Code.
Improve the Code’s operational efficiency
8. In considering how a refreshed Code will maintain and enhance safety management systems,
the principle of minimizing the compliance burden, and matching similar government audit
systems should be kept in mind. The current approval and audit system should be assessed
against efficiency of operation to best achieve the outcome sought, whilst maintaining
congruence with the roles and responsibilities described in the MTA.
9. Opportunities could be explored for providing technical support to harbourmasters, marine
managers or others seeking expert advice/ peer review of this work.
10. Noting that aspects of MNZ’s future role will include activities that will need to be charged for as
a result of its recent funding review, MNZ will ensure that information is provided about this as
part of discussing and clarifying its role in the ongoing development and operation of the
refreshed Code.
Collect and communicate evidence of the Code’s effectiveness
The reviewer considers that implementing the following three recommendations could provide an
evidence base for the Code, should it continue as the operational performance standard for New
Zealand’s ports and harbours.
11. Statistical trend analysis on port/harbour accidents and incident could be given higher visibility.
A decision needs to be made about what should be measured to provide meaningful evidence
to demonstrate effectiveness, and how such data could be collected by the sector.
12. National data analysis could be reported to the sector annually to champion effective
implementation of the Code.
6
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.13. An annual meeting would also provide an opportunity to share information from individual port
and harbour Code audits and reviews, learn from others’ relevant experience and apply
lessons learnt, in order to promote continual improvement.
7
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.Introduction
1.0 Background
New Zealand’s ports and harbours are the gateway to the country for those who trade with us, and
increasingly for tourists who choose to visit New Zealand by ship. By 2040 New Zealand’s freight
volume is projected to double as even greater quantities of cargo are freighted by increasingly larger
ships. At present 99% of international freight by volume arrives and leaves by ship, 75% of freight
6
movement by value is in containers . Cruise ship voyages have increased by 15% each year on
average over the last six years. The numbers of cruise ships visiting New Zealand waters have also
increased from 32 in 2006/07 to 57 in 2012/13. Most freight and cruise operators visit several New
Zealand ports on each voyage7.
The Code was published in 2004 as a national safety standard against which the safety performance
of port companies, regional councils and Maritime New Zealand could be measured. 8
The regulatory and operational environment of New Zealand’s ports and harbours lacked clear and
9
consistent standards prior to 2004 . The Code aimed to assist those with responsibility for safe marine
operations, to understand and execute their duties, by setting a nationally agreed standard in the
discharge of such duties.
Under the Code regional councils in association with local port companies were required to first
assess risk and then developed a safety management system for their ports and harbours. MNZ’s role
was to provide guidance for these tasks, to approve plans and to carry out regular audits. In 2004 the
priority was ports and harbours with compulsory pilotage – New Zealand’s main commercial ports plus
Fiordland and the Bay of Islands.
The Code was intended to be ‘a living document’ that would evolve to reflect changes to the legislative
environment as they occurred.10 A Law Review Working Group (LRWG) was initially established to
identify the legislative changes needed. In its submission to Ministry of Transport (MoT) in 2008, MNZ
commented that a lack of legislative backing for the Code left the system with an inherent weakness.11
A health check of the Code is timely. There was no point in revisiting the Code until the MTA was
amended. The MTA amendment was the long-anticipated legislation expected to trigger an update of
the Code, and MNZ is a vastly different organisation to the Maritime Safety Authority that lead the
6
Freight Information Gathering System April 2012-March 2013, Ministry of Transport, July 2013
7
Quarterly Report Jan-Mar 2013, Nicholas Eacott, Maritime NZ, June 2013
8
New Zealand Port and Harbour Marine Safety Code, MSA, 2004.
9
The New Zealand Port and harbour Marine Safety Code (policy paper) V.Lenting, 2009.
10
Port and Harbour Navigation Safety Management: a discussion paper for public comment, Ministry of Transport.
2007.
11
Submission to Ministry of Transport discussion paper: Port and Harbour and Navigation Safety Management,
Maritime NZ, January 2008
8
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.Code’s development ten years ago.12 There are other environmental, economic, and political factors
that also warrant analysis for their impact on the Code’s relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency.
The amended MTA gives support to the Code’s key concepts of risk management. The Act brings
together regional council and harbourmaster powers and duties, thereby creating a higher level of
visibility for these responsibilities. It expresses, and in some cases creates, a new power enabling the
Director (MNZ) to impose conditions on port operators and to audit and inspect them. It also provides
the Minister of Transport with the ability to make rules relating to port and harbour safety.
MNZ acknowledges that insufficient resource has been available to undertake a timely approval and
an iterative audit process for SMS due to other priorities and consequently the work is behind
schedule. Similarly, some regional councils have not implemented the code in a timely manner.
The scan will assist the Regional Council CE Steering/MNZ Steering Group to decide on the future of
the Code.
2.0 Methodology
Information was gathered from chief executives, harbourmasters, marine managers, and other
relevant staff from councils, port companies, and Maritime New Zealand through a series of regional
meetings. The full list of meetings and participants is attached as Appendix Four. 15 regional meetings
were held in larger centres; conference calls were used for smaller regions. A number of interviews
were also held with Maritime New Zealand staff and some external people with relevant knowledge of,
or experience with, the Code.
The Regional Council CE/MNZ Steering Group also commissioned a review of harbour control
functions. This review will explore a range of options for managing the risks associated with large
ships in New Zealand ports and harbours, whereas the Scan concentrated solely on the strengths and
weaknesses of the Code and its implementation. The reviewers held joint meetings as they needed to
meet with the same staff in regional councils and port companies.
Environmental scanning has been termed ‘street level intelligence gathering’. It can provide useful
information about how programmes and their associated operational policies are functioning in current
13
environmental conditions . This consumer information enables adjustments to be made to
programmes that add value to organisations’ operational and policy activities. The term
‘environmental’ in this context means the broader operational setting.
The scan was not a review, and accordingly the report includes some quantitative analysis of
incidents, accidents and mishaps over the past ten years, however there is not extensive analysis of
quantitative data. Neither is there a detailed review of the ten year operational history of the Code. The
12
The organisation underwent restructuring in 2005/6 and 2011/12
13
Scott & Baehler ,2010, Policy Analysis and Advice.
9
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.review of harbour control functions will include discussion about the Port Taharoa - consequentially
this scan will not address the issues specific to that Port.
The scan is divided into sections on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, as indicated in the terms of
reference. Equity has been added due to the diversity of size and resource uncovered through the
interview process. The voluntary nature of the Code will be considered separately as a special feature.
The scan will conclude with a summary of themes, and some recommended priority actions. Quotes
from the 15 meetings around the country have been used to illustrate various scan themes. It should
be noted that the quote may simply reflect the view of one person at the meeting. A glossary of terms
has not been provided as the audience for the report is the maritime sector, which is familiar with
terms used.
Key Findings of the Environmental Scan
3.0 Relevance: has the Code remained ‘fit for purpose’
The amended MTA is the anticipated legislative underpinning for the Code, sought since its release in
2004. While some would argue that the MTA amendments did not go far enough, nevertheless it is the
legislation that now guides the sector on local regulation of maritime activity in New Zealand’s ports
and harbours.
The scan assessed the MTA for its impact on the relevance of the Code. Consideration of relevance
also focused on the Code itself - was it still regularly referred to and valued by the sector. The Code’s
assigned roles and responsibilities were assessed against the MTA’s description of roles and
responsibilities and against organisational change over the time period. The guidelines developed to
support the Code in 2004 were also appraised to assess their continued fitness for purpose.
3.1 The Maritime Transport Amendment Act 2013
Prior to the MTA the legislation outlining the powers and duties of regional councils and the
responsibility of port operators was spread across a number of statutes. Many of those interviewed
thought the 2013 amendment endorsed expectations that regional councils should actively manage
risk to ensure safety in their marine environment. The MTA now sets out clearly the roles and
responsibilities, powers and duties of regional councils, port operators, and harbourmasters; however
it appears to use less prescriptive language for this than the Code does. For example on
harbourmaster qualifications …’the regional council must satisfy itself that a person appointed as
harbourmaster is suitably qualified to perform the functions of harbourmaster in respect of the relevant
10
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.14
port, harbour, or waters.’ Whereas the Code states …’the harbourmaster shall hold a certificate of
competency at least equal to that required for command of any vessel that calls at the harbour.’15
If the Code continues to be used, some changes to the style and emphasis of the Code’s text will need
updating in the next edition to reflect the legislation more accurately as the harbourmaster example
above illustrates. But this is not likely to impact on the Code’s relevance.
Description of Roles in the Code
The Code describes MNZ’s delegated authority and management role as:
x Promoting a safe maritime environment at reasonable cost.
x Consult, comment on, and approve risk assessments and safety management
systems
x Review the marine safety system, provide information and advice, and process
documentation as soon as reasonably practical.
x Monitor and audit compliance
x Preview and publish guides of good practice
x Receive reports of [self] audit and review from regional councils
The regional council’s role is to:
x Be accountable for and regulate navigational safety in ports and harbours
x Coordinate and develop a harbour risk assessment for each harbour within its
jurisdiction, and where appropriate:
x Coordinate and develop a safe operating procedure in respect of each harbour
within its jurisdiction
x Ensure that the harbourmaster is adequately resourced and funded to exercise
his or her statutory powers and functions
x Monitor and adopt good practice, promote a safety culture fostered by visible
and active leadership of senior management.
Note: Performance of these functions can be delegated or contracted out using
an MoU.
The Port Company’s role is to:
x Provide and safely manage its port facilities and service – unless additional
functions are formally delegated by the regional council
The harbourmaster’s role is to:
x Ensure the harbour safety management system is functioning effectively,
independent of commercial interests.
x Coordinate the integration of the Port Company’s safety management system
into the harbour SMS.
There was no sense from meeting participants that the amendment to the MTA significantly altered the
roles and responsibilities described in the Code, rather it had strengthened them .
There was agreement that the core business of the port company is aligned with the actions required
under the Code and the accountability described in the MTA to operate and maintain a port safely.16.
14
Maritime Transport Amendment Act 2013, Part 33D (4)
15
New Zealand Port and Harbour Marine Safety Code, 2004, p.19.
11
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.The Code continues to align well with regional councils’ powers and associated duties to ensure
maritime safety in their harbours.
…“our number one job is to safely bring ships in and out of our port, not damaging our gateway, our
assets or our reputation.” (Wellington)
The MTA confirms MNZ’s role to monitor maritime safety through audit and inspection, and further, the
MTA bestows on the Director the power to step in and take decisive action should there be evidence
that maritime safety is being compromised. People thought that there was a logical connection
between MNZ’s role as outlined in the Code, and MNZ’s role of encouraging compliance by providing
information to assist jurisdictions in the pursuit of a high standard of risk management. MNZ must also
assure the government that quality safety systems are in place around the country to manage risk.
The Code was considered relevant as a means of setting the benchmark for such systems.
“MNZ needs to have confidence that right across the country everything has been done to a high
standard. And you should be able to see what that standard is, and you should have benchmarks for
measuring it.” (Marlborough)
“The fundamental objective of a national regulator is to keep the maritime industry safe. MNZ has a
role to influence and persuade people that they need to stay safe. It is a core function of MNZ in
general, not just an auditing role. Someone has to lead [maritime] safety nationally. There is a role for
MNZ to give comfort to the government that we have reached a standard of safety around the country”
(Auckland).
MNZ’s role as national regulator does not over-ride the legal requirements of operators in the sector to
manage risks.
3.2 Relevance of the Code’s approach to risk assessment
The Scan found that Code’s guidance on risk assessment and safety management systems is also in
need of refreshing as it is somewhat out of date due to recent developments in risk management.
The degree of risk and associated consequence within New Zealand’s ports and harbours remains
high, however port company chief executives, regional council chief executives and harbourmasters
have both the duty and business incentive to comply with the law/rules – the Code assists them to
manage risk effectively. Many councils use industry best practice standards, such as the
Australia/New Zealand International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) quality assurance
standards. 17 The Code’s risk assessment guideline made limited reference to the Australia/New
Zealand standards. Since 2004 there have been two more updates of the AS/NZS ISO 31000 series,
with the latest updated manual due for release in February 2014. Risk assessment awareness and
16
Maritime Transport Act, 1994, part 3A
17
Ministry of Transport: Transport Regulatory Policy Statement, 2012.
12
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.implementation skills have advanced significantly in New Zealand.18 Some councils that have adopted
the ISO risk management approach in their organisations reported having to alter their systems in
order to meet the prescriptive headings under the Code.
. “It was right in its time – probably one of the best things to have happened around the country…but
too straight-jacketed an approach to risk assessment and safety management systems. The risk
assessment process we’re going through with Milford is a lot different than the one we did in
Bluff…probably a more holistic approach, and the understanding I got was that things have moved on
in the world of risk assessment.” (Southland)
“Three of the biggest risks for Port Nelson are marine risks. That’s another change in the last ten years
– the area of risk assessment and management has changed (including expectations) it is dramatically
ahead of where it was ten years ago. The board’s understanding of safety has dramatically improved.
(Nelson)
3.3 Technology advances
The Aids to Navigation guideline needs refreshing as navigational aids have advanced in accuracy
and scope over the past ten years. It was suggested that an annex to the Aids to Navigation guideline
could cover electronic aids to navigation.
The availability and sophistication of ship simulators has improved significantly in the past decade.
Harbourmasters, pilots and marine managers regularly mentioned using the simulators to assist
business development by testing the risk scenario created by a larger ship accessing their
ports/harbours (and also as part of pilot training and on-going competency). The simulators are an
important tool, as ports/harbourmasters increasingly receive requests for port entry from larger ships.
Harbourmasters said that the guidelines were very effective in assisting regions with the Code in the
early years, and they are still referred to regularly but the fact that they have never been updated has
made them less relevant as time has gone by.
Technology is advancing faster than regulation; this is a critical tension that is increasing all the time.
Technology is leaving regulation further and further behind. Ports of Auckland uses its available
technology to deploy virtual AIS beacons on potential offshore hazards…this type of thing makes for
safer navigation for large ships but at present it probably sits a little uncomfortably with the [current]
regulatory environment. (Auckland)19
18
Interview with Geraint Bermingham, Navigatus, 8 January 2014.
19
Note that the regulatory process for these AIS aids is still in development. They require modern AIS receivers
to be fitted on ships.
13
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.3.4 Relevance of MNZ’s compliance role in the Code
Compliance theory has evolved over the past decade. MNZ’s compliance operating model uses a
logical framework to assess the degree of risk against the nature of the conduct involved, the attitude
to compliance, and the public interest, when determining the correct intervention to make. MNZ aims
to make compliance as easy as possible for those [organisations] that are capable and want to comply
20
with regulation, by providing support, education and access to the right tools for the job MNZ’s role of
‘approving’ risk assessments and safety management systems was one area where the Code’s fitness
for purpose was questioned. There did not appear to be a fit between the word ‘approve’ and the
action actually being undertaken. The documentation that MNZ sends to councils following the
approval assessment is in fact a confirmation that the Risk Assessment and the SMS address all of
the requirements of the Code. ACC also carries out this assessment step when organisations adopt
the Workplace Safety Management code of practice. ACC refers to this step as the initial audit.21
The Code says “MNZ approves the Risk Assessment and Safety Management System” – you have
got to be careful about approval or MNZ could be responsible for the management of an incident. I
would suggest that [approval] is taking the lid off a can of worms. The regulator is taking on
responsibility that they should perhaps not venture into…the word ‘approve’ has connotations. That’s
why you have to understand what it means and what it might demonstrate.” (Northland)
MNZ must monitor the national standard of maritime safety so that the Director can step in when there
are reasonable grounds to believe that risk is not being managed. 22 Accordingly the audit role remains
highly relevant for MNZ. The majority thought that confirmation was a more appropriate term to
describe the important validation activity undertaken by MNZ, which is followed by regular monitoring
audits.
Participants in the Code discussion meetings also thought that the 2013 amendments to the MTA
strengthened the ability of regional councils to regulate maritime safety in local ports and harbours. A
co-operative approach to voluntary Code compliance could more accurately reflect the roles of the two
regulators – regional councils locally, and MNZ nationally.
“People want to know that a port is safe. If you can point to a common system across New Zealand to
show it is safe, then that has huge advantages. I am always in favor of a common system.”
(Canterbury).
20
Maritime New Zealand Statement of Intent 2013-2016
21
ACC audit process - Appendix Two
22
Maritime Transport Act, 1994
14
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.3.5 Accuracy of general information
The Code is out of date in its references to MNZ. Logos, website and communication information
within the Code are years out of date. It refers to MSA throughout (MSA became MNZ in 2005), and is
accompanied by contact and website information that is well out of date or no longer exists. For
example the website describes the National Advisory Committee as if it currently exists to oversee the
implementation of the Code when in fact the committee has not met since 2009.
3.6 Conclusion
The Code has retained strong relevance since 2004. Its overall content and purpose were found to be
highly relevant and useful for the sector, despite the changes that have occurred over the past
decade. There was unanimous support for the Code as a guide for achieving this standard. If it is
retained then the time has come to write a new edition of this document, and to update the guidelines
that support it. The amendments to the MTA have strengthened rather than changed the roles outlined
in the Code; however the interviews also revealed that some content changes are necessary to
ensure its full compatibility with the MTA and MNZ’s [the Government’s] approach to compliance.
The Code is very helpful; it was instrumental in decisions made about the focus on tugs and
navigational aids. It is outstanding in terms of the benchmark it sets. (Wellington)
4.0 Effectiveness: performance outputs and outcomes
The effectiveness of the Code is best judged using evidence that it is achieving its objectives. The
three safety management objectives of the Code are to provide for safe practices in port operation and
a safe operating environment in the harbour; identify all risks and establish safeguards to ensure that
all the identified risks are kept as low as reasonably practical; and continuously improve the safety
management skills of all personnel.23
4.1 Statistical analysis
An analysis was made of the events in New Zealand’s ports and harbours over the past 14 years
using the data available (Appendix One). It was difficult to source sufficient consistent data for this
analysis - a discovery that led to one of the recommendations from the Scan. The attached graphs
demonstrate that currently it is difficult to draw any effective conclusions from the statistics available.
The quantity of vessel movements, the size of ships, and the characteristics of the port are likely to
have a bearing on the number of events. Some accidents and incidents are difficult to avoid even with
a fully functioning SMS in place. The management of such events is the purpose of a continuously
23
Port and Harbour Marine Safety Code, 2004
15
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.improving SMS and an incident statistic may actually reflect an effective SMS in operation – in the
sense of greater reporting, not more frequent occurrence. The discussion about indicators of
successful implementation did not bring forth particularly conclusive responses. One reason for this
may be that the Code prioritised safety inputs rather than emphasising the demonstrated achievement
of outcomes. It will be important that a sector decision is reached on what information needs to be
consistently collected and analysed to provide evidence of effectiveness.
4.2 Audits as evidence of the Code’s effectiveness
MNZ carries out audits of the SMS for ports and harbours (with pilotage), first to provide initial
approval of the risk assessment and the SMS, and then to monitor the SMS in place. The first re-
approval takes place after 3 years and subsequent re-approvals at five year intervals. MNZ also
conducts a verification audit during the initial 3-year period (typically 18 months after the initial
approval) and during subsequent 5-year periods (typically 24- 36 months after re-approval).
MNZ has approved the SMS of eight ports/harbours: Akaroa, Bluff, Northland (including Whangarei &
Bay of Islands), Napier, Waikato, Taranaki, Auckland and Gisborne. Six of these have had a re-
approval audit, in fact 3 of the 6 that have been re-approved have had 4 audits each – 1 initial
approval, 1 verification, 1 re-approval and a further verification. All of the audits confirmed a high level
of adherence to the SMS benchmark, with no audits revealing significant safety concerns.
“Having a system where you analyse your risks and then manage them is an eminently sensible and
straightforward way to manage risks, and the Code provides for that. The question is – does the
structure put in place, actually manage the risk? (Northland)
All port and harbour review meetings expressed frustration about the nine ports/harbours currently
without SMS approval (Milford, Tauranga, Marlborough, Nelson, Lyttelton, Timaru, Westport,
Wellington, and Otago - which is yet to submit any documentation to MNZ). There was uncertainty
about the status of the SMS in some cases, given the time delays experienced.
From an evidence perspective, only half of the ports and harbours have been assessed as ‘approved’
under the Code after ten years of implementation. This situation calls into question whether the Code
can be regarded as effective in demonstrating a consistent standard of navigational safety in New
Zealand’s ports and harbours. Nevertheless effective local port and harbour risk management was
confirmed by participants at all of the meetings held. Issues with Code implementation had not
impeded their commitment to on-going maritime safety in their region.
16
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.Status of outstanding Safety Management Systems
Otago Wellington Tauranga Marlborough Milford Westport Lyttelton Timaru Nelson
Not yet Submitted to Submitted MNZ MNZ Submitted Submitted Submitted Submitted
to MNZ in
submitted MNZ early waiting waiting to MNZ to MNZ in to MNZ in to MNZ in
2010. MNZ
2012 requested for for May 2013 July 2013 July 2013 2012
update.
Marlborough Southland’s
Risk
assessment to revise revision
is being
updated.
Historically Otago Regional Council has not engaged with the voluntary code, and this was regarded
by other Councils as an obstacle to achieving national consistency. However the meeting with Otago
Regional Council CEO, staff, and port company representatives revealed a collaborative port and
harbour management team with a strong commitment to risk management. Otago meeting participants
said that an unsatisfactory early experience with their first attempt to implement the Code was a
contributing factor to a perceived lack of engagement. Otago Regional Council and Port Otago have
concrete plans to fill maritime staff gaps in the New Year. A marine manager has been employed to
head the marine section at Port Otago, and a contract for service (including for harbourmaster
services) is to be signed between the port company and the regional council.
“We are absolutely comfortable that what we have works for us. We’ve got a detailed operating plan,
we have peer reviews. We think we have implemented [the Code]. We consider it to be best practice.
Our main focus was getting the commercial side all ticked off…We’ve been through it and we’ve
addressed the bits we weren’t doing and got that sorted. So now what we really need to do is send it
off to MNZ…” (Port Otago)
4.3 The Code as champion of effective safety systems
There are strong indications that the Code has brought about a culture of systems-based risk
assessment and safety management in New Zealand’s ports and harbours. Prior to the Code’s
introduction, those port companies and regional councils fortunate enough to be free of major
incidents were unlikely to have specific safety management systems in place.
“From a commercial point of view, it was a bit on the fly – doing what we’d always done…we relied on
past experience and an ad-hoc structure. But the risk assessment [process] changed our complete
way of thinking. At the same time ships were getting bigger, so the Code was very timely. That is why
we embraced the Code so quickly.” (Wellington)
17
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.Commitment to a safety systems culture was also demonstrated by the actions that councils and port
companies took to ensure they achieved the Code’s safety standard. This included paying for external
assistance, or committing significant amounts of regional council and port company staff time to
reaching the standards set as they developed the SMS. Another indicator was the resource outlay for
improved navigational aids, tugs, staff, and training over the past ten years.
“The SMS we developed using the Code influenced our decisions about the staff we needed. It
supported the business case for a deputy harbourmaster by clearly setting out the specific safety
management resource requirements. Having the Code really helped with the politicians - being able to
say there was a code of practice [for the sector]. The introduction of the Code really helped
harbourmasters.” (Northland)
4.4 Continuous improvement through effective engagement
The Code was most effective when it was championed by the harbourmaster and when there was
visible commitment and support from chief executives. The reviewers were impressed by the
enthusiasm for collaboratively developing a safety culture that was apparent in some regions. Strong
functional relationships were easy to spot, and those councils and port authorities that met and
planned together seemed to have the edge.
An effective system engages key stakeholders in iteratively developing and implementing that system
in a way that enables learning from relevant experience, and applies the lessons learnt. Together
these and other elements combine to ensure a process of continuous improvement in safety
performance – a key objective of the Code. The reviewers began to notice a correlation between
strong joint commitment to continuous risk assessment and safety management in a region, and an
associated commitment to (and enthusiasm for) meeting regularly to discuss safety in the port and
harbour. A number of regions have established a formal meeting structure.
Northland commented that in a busy port environment, the meeting participants created a forum that
was also brought together, often virtually, in order to use the group’s expertise to reach decisions on
new issues or risks. This group is aware that they are facilitating the running of a system.
The Auckland example has been chosen to illustrate the meeting content. The meeting has an agenda
that guides the content and discussion. The headings have evolved over the years into a generic set
of discussion starters that cover important safety matters. Participants look forward to the weekly
meetings, which are regarded as an important piece of the risk management jigsaw.
18
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.Ports of Auckland and Harbourmaster Consultation Meeting
Agenda items:
1. Port and Harbour Safety Code
e.g. X – SMP to be formulated
Mid term audit report actions
2. Navigation Aids
e.g. legal discussion on installing a virtual aid
3. Shipping Incidents
4. Pollution response
5. Regulations
6. Licences and PEC’s
7. General/Previous business
8. New Business
9. Upcoming Events
“The Code is a tool, but what drives what we do is these discussions – everybody works together. The
Code provides a framework that enables us to have those discussions in a logical manner, but the key
to doing it though, is discussion and that comes down to individuals [and their ability to cooperate].”
(Auckland)
The Code implies that a strong working relationship between port companies and regional councils is
necessary to meet its three objectives: safe practices in the port and harbour, achieved through
identified risks, established safeguards, and continuously improving safety management skills. The
more functional these relationships are the greater likelihood that the objective of continuous
improvement of all personnel will be achieved.
4.5 MNZ’s role in supporting performance outputs and outcomes
The Code set high expectations of MNZ’s commitment. The foreword states… “MSA is committed to
commenting on and approving assessments and plans” and this expectation was reinforced at a
number of the meetings around the country. However when reading further on the same page, the
director at the time, Russell Kilvington also envisaged that the regional councils and port companies
19
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.would be requiring that initial high level of commitment ‘over the next twelve months’.24 Ten years of
implementation has demonstrated that the commitment required was considerably greater than
anticipated.
MNZ has a completely different structure to the 2004 Maritime Safety Authority and, due to competing
urgent priorities; the very explicit role description outlined in the Code document for MNZ has been
difficult to resource adequately within MNZ’s structure for a number of years. Nevertheless the current
situation is impacting on the effectiveness of the Code. Participants at the 15 meetings voiced sincere
concern about the very slow progress on the outstanding SMS ‘approvals’.
4.6 Conclusion
The Code’s emphasis on inputs and outputs now needs to be balanced by evidence of outcomes. A
sector–wide decision is needed on how best to evaluate the effectiveness of the Code. Timely audits
of all ports and harbours with pilotage would provide one layer of evidence, but one would expect that
quantitative data on accidents and incidents should be available in a more useful form than it currently
is. The graphs in Appendix One provide limited information but allow few conclusions to be drawn. The
Sector thought that the Code had been very effective in establishing a systems approach to port and
harbour safety around New Zealand. Some jurisdictions had examples of highly collaborative
processes in place to champion the Code and to maximize opportunities for continuous safety
improvement. All regional councils and associated port companies considered that they had good
systems in place.
The outstanding approval for nine of New Zealand ports and harbours creates a gap in the evidence
for nationally consistent practice of a high standard. This has implications for the sector if it wants to
demonstrate to the government, overseas counterparts, and industry, that New Zealand has a
collective high standard of risk management benchmarked against a credible, national code of
practice.
5.0 Efficiency – managing the Code implementation process
Efficiency was assessed by considering the enabling factors and barriers experienced by the sector
when implementing the Code. The resulting feedback focused on the quality of MNZ and regional
management, timeliness, value for money, and process compatibility with other central government
risk management audits that impact on local government and port companies.
24
New Zealand Port and Harbour Marine Safety Code, MSA, 2004.
20
13 August 2014 4.26 p.m.The Code outlined the process of implementation in stages. There was a procedure for initial risk
assessment approval followed by SMS approvals, then monitoring audits, including self-auditing and
reviews. Audits and reviews were to be undertaken at specified intervals. A training strategy between
port companies and regional councils was advocated.
5.1 Inefficiencies and barriers related to SMS
The Code emphasised the regional councils’ pivotal role in ensuring the efficient management of the
activities described in the Code, for championing the Code, and for coordinating the effective
involvement and participation of those with roles directly contributing to a safe port and harbour
25
system . Councils usually assign the harbourmaster these responsibilities. There seemed to be fewer
indicators of the SMS in action in regions where the harbourmaster did not demonstrate this
leadership style.
The drawn out and incomplete approval of SMS for some of New Zealand’s ports and harbours is
evidence that the Code is not operating efficiently. Greater Wellington Regional Council has been
waiting for two years to have their SMS approved; others have been waiting almost as long. MNZ
consistently informed the harbourmasters at Harbourmaster Special Interest Group (HMSIG) meetings
that the work would be completed by the end of a financial year, only to miss that deadline due to
other urgent priorities.26
There was general disappointment expressed that MNZ had reduced its level of commitment to the
Code. The staff members responsible for Code approvals, support and advice are highly regarded by
all of the people interviewed, and it was acknowledged by some that MNZ was stretched due to the
impact of SeaCert and the Maritime Operator Safety System (MOSS). When questioned about its
commitment to resource the Code adequately, MNZ staff stated that there was no intention to demote
the Code’s importance rather that other commitments had stretched resources and limited MNZ’s
capacity to respond in the past few years. When deciding what to prioritise due to limited time
allocated to the Code, the decision was made to prioritise monitoring audits for those that had been
approved. The rationale was that ‘it would be worse to get it [an approved SMS] and then lose it
27
[through a lack of external audit] than not having got it at all’.
28
Staff at MNZ estimated that an approval process took about eight to ten days of one person’s time.
Those waiting for approval reported a sense of frustration at this situation; however they continued to
implement the system and they expressed confidence that their system matched the Code
specifications. The lack of ‘sign off’ on the safety management system represented for them,
inefficiency that did not match their expectations of good business practice. The disclosed unease
25
New Zealand Port and Harbour Marine Safety Code, MSA, 2004.
26
HMSIG minutes 2010-2013.
27
Discussion with Victor Lenting, December 2013.
28
Discussion with Victor Lenting, December 2013.
21
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