Reforming the European Parliament - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
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SWP Comment
Introduction
Stiftung
Wissenschaft und
Politik
German Institute
for International and
Security Affairs
Reforming the European Parliament
Brexit Creates Opportunity for More than Just Seat Redistribution – But Plans
Are Modest (for Now)
Nicolai von Ondarza and Felix Schenuit
Reform of the European Parliament is on the agenda in the run-up to the 2019 Euro-
pean elections. Two impulses coincide here: First of all, Brexit requires a decision on
whether to redistribute the 73 British seats, and if so how. Secondly, the European
Parliament is sitting on a backlog of long-overdue reforms relating to its composition;
this latter aspect is unlikely to be resolved before the 2019 elections. The Italian and
French governments suggest creating a single EU constituency fought on the basis of
transnational lists, to strengthen the European plane of party-political competition.
But the European Parliament’s rejection of the proposal underlines the lack of majority
support for federal initiatives in the EU’s year of reforms. Yet the single constituency
discussion does offer potential: Leveraging it to reduce the existing discrepancies in
required votes per seat would represent a major contribution to strengthening the
Union’s democratic legitimacy.
The European Parliament (EP) plays a para- Almost 40 years after the first direct elec-
doxical role in the debate over the EU’s tions, the European Parliament is still
democratic deficits. On the one hand it selected via a set of parallel national ballots
serves as the EU’s sole directly elected organ whose European legitimacy remains scant:
and as such as a vehicle for further democ- voters choose among their respective
ratisation. Every treaty amendment to date national parties. While the parties do then
has therefore expanded the EP’s powers. join to form pan-European political groups
The share of EU legislation adopted with in the EP, these lack any autonomous rela-
the Parliament’s full participation has now tionship to the public. Despite the intro-
reached almost 50 percent. One sign of Par- duction of the Spitzenkandidaten principle,
liament’s growing assertiveness is its deci- turnout at European elections has con-
sion to use its new powers to elect the Com- tinued to fall – to just 42.6 percent in 2014.
mission President in 2014 (the so-called The question of reform of the European
“Spitzenkandidaten” principle). Parliament is therefore a persistent feature
But on the other hand the EP itself is also of the EU’s institutional reform debate.
implicated in the EU’s democratic deficits.
Dr. Nicolai von Ondarza is Deputy Head of the EU / Europa Division at SWP SWP Comment 10
Felix Schenuit is Research Assistant of the EU / Europa Division at SWP February 2018
1Impulses for EP Reform recently in 2013 after the accession of Croa-
A political window of opportunity for such tia. The principle of degressive proportion-
reforms opens up in 2018. On the one hand, ality seeks to reconcile two objectives: fair
Brexit will leave the 73 British seats avail- representation of citizens and minimum
able for redistribution. On the other, there representation of smaller member states.
is growing pressure to break the logjam Under this arrangement each member state
and institute comprehensive reforms, after has at least six MEPs (with the minimum
years of provisional arrangements. applying to Cyprus, Estonia, Malta and
Luxembourg). The number of MEPs grows
with the country’s population, but not en-
73 Empty Seats tirely proportionally; while a Luxembourg
First and foremost, Brexit will force a deci- MEP represents about 80,000 inhabitants,
sion on the distribution of seats in the EP. their German counterpart is responsible for
After triggering Article 50 TEU on 29 March more than 800,000.
2017 the United Kingdom is expected to This principle is anchored in the treaties
leave the European Union exactly two years and – despite misgivings over the inequali-
later. So barring unforeseen surprises, the ties it produces – is not up for discussion.
British will quit the Union’s political insti- Within the system, however, there are also
tutions roughly one month before the next specific issues that affect particular states.
European elections in May 2019 (see SWP For example Italy is more populous than
Comment 54/2017). Until that point the Spain but has fewer voters per MEP. The 73
British MEPs remain full members of the EP; empty seats could potentially be used to
when the UK leaves their seats fall vacant. iron out such discrepancies. Germany’s rep-
Three different scenarios are under discus- resentation cannot be increased without a
sion for dealing with the 73 empty seats treaty amendment, as its 96 MEPs represent
within the scope of the existing treaties. the ceiling stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty.
Firstly, the seats could simply be re- The third and most radical proposal goes
moved, reducing the size of the Parliament further than simply redistributing seats to
from 751 MEPs to 678. One of the argu- member states: The creation of a separate
ments put forward by advocates of this ap- single European constituency to elect MEPs
proach is that the EP, whose size is capped on transnational lists would enable the
at 751 by the Lisbon Treaty, is already one European parties to compete directly for
of Europe’s largest parliaments; Brexit seats in the European Parliament. And Brexit
offers the EU an opportunity to make offers the opportunity to create such a Euro-
visible economies. By way of comparison, pean single constituency without any mem-
the EP is almost twice the size of the Span- ber state having to “relinquish” seats. In
ish Congress of Deputies, but the same recent discussions the Italian government,
order of magnitude as the current German French President Emmanuel Macron and
Bundestag, which has 709 seats. Notably, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker
the 794-member British House of Lords is have argued for such transnational lists.
larger than the European Parliament. This
route would also obviate the politically
delicate process of renegotiating the allo- Parliament’s Backlog of Reforms
cation of seats to countries. A second set of impulses for reform emerge
The second option would be to use some from the EP’s internal dynamics. The com-
or all of the 73 seats to reduce the existing position of the EP and the procedures for its
inequalities of representation between the elections are laid out in the 1976 Act Con-
27 member states. The current seat distri- cerning the Election of the Members of the
bution is based not on a mathematical for- European Parliament by Direct Universal
mula, but was politically negotiated – most Suffrage, which was last amended in 2002.
SWP Comment 10
February 2018
2Demands to overhaul the EP’s composition tal reform and a permanent solution have
have been growing for some time. In 2009, been pushed back to the subsequent elec-
with its position strengthened by the Treaty tion in 2024.
of Lisbon, the EP sought to apply that mo- In February 2018 the Parliament adopted
mentum to initiate a reform of the electoral a proposal for a temporary solution that
system. The Constitutional Affairs Commit- combines the aforementioned versions 2
tee appointed Andrew Duff (ALDE) as rap- and 3: for 2019 the EP will be reduced pro-
porteur, but it took the parliament until visionally to 705 members, using 27 of the
2013 to agree on reform proposals. Earlier British seats to balance out discrepancies
versions of the report contained far-reaching (see graphic, p. 4). The other 46 seats would
ideas, including the introduction of a be kept free for possible enlargements or for
twenty-five-member single EU constituency, a single EU constituency in future elections.
but failed to find a majority in the EP.
The 2014 European elections forced Par-
liament’s hand, and a provisional arrange- Is a Single EU Constituency
ment was cobbled together. In the discus- the Answer?
sion the EP threw its support behind the An explicit call to introduce a single Euro-
Spitzenkandidaten principle, which was pean constituency for the 2019 election
later codified at its instigation. But the pro- failed to find a majority in the EP’s plenary
posal no longer mentioned the idea of a session in February 2018. But even if Par-
single EU constituency. At the same time liament had approved the idea, it is more
the EP’s report committed it to finding a than questionable whether the single con-
“permanent and transparent” solution for stituency would actually have been realised
2019 and propose it to the Council (whose for 2019 – given that the fundamental deci-
approval is required). sion about what is done with the British
The resulting proposal was adopted in seats and the introduction of transnational
plenary session on 11 November 2015, by a lists must be taken unanimously in the
comparatively narrow majority of 52 per- European Council, where opinions are
cent. It calls for the European character of similarly divided. Recently the EuroMed 7
EP elections to be strengthened through states and Ireland expressed their support
measures including naming the European for France and Italy’s transnational lists
parties on the ballot papers and harmonis- proposal, while the Visegrád states (Czech
ing national election rules. The European Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) for
Parliament also called for the creation of a instance voiced public opposition.
single EU constituency to be fought by the Upon closer examination, moreover, it
lead candidates. becomes apparent how many questions
Since then the EP’s proposal been stuck remain unresolved and how much political
in Council, without any decision being will would be required to realise the Euro-
taken to date. The British, Dutch, French, pean single constituency – especially in
Luxembourgish and Swedish parliaments, time for the 2019 elections. In general
for example, criticised the proposal’s vio- terms, four aspects need to be considered
lation of the subsidiarity principle, object- when assessing the initiative: the under-
ing in particular to the requirement for lying objectives of the reforms, their con-
voting to be run to a particular timeframe. crete shape and form, the associated legis-
Now, after the Council’s failure to approve lative requirements, and the political ob-
its proposal, the European Parliament again stacles that need to be overcome.
finds itself seeking a provisional solution to The declared goal of the supporters of
ensure that orderly elections can be held in a single EU constituency is to enhance
2019 – and in particular an arrangement the democratic legitimacy of the Union by
for the 73 vacant British seats. Fundamen- strengthening the pan-European character
SWP Comment 10
February 2018
3February 2018 EP proposal for seat redistribution after Brexit
Reallocation of 27 seats
Country Current seats Additional seats
France 74 +5
Spain 54 +5
Italy 73 +3
Netherlands 26 +3
Ireland 11 +2
Poland 51 +1
Romania 32 +1
Sweden 20 +1
Austria 18 +1
Finland 13 +1
Slovakia 13 +1
Denmark 13 +1
Croatia 11 +1
Estonia 6 +1
of its elections. If European parties with existence of two parallel arrangements
transnational lists compete directly for could generate tensions within Parliament,
seats, the argument runs, they would sig- pointing out that national elections in Ger-
nificantly improve their electoral visibility many and Hungary for example also use
– even if the number of seats involved re- mixed-member proportional representa-
mained small. It would also force the Euro- tion.
pean parties to select their own candidates
for the first time and in the process agree
at least on the fundamental thrust of their Requirements for a Single EU
respective campaigns. In combination with Constituency with Transnational Lists
the – still controversial – Spitzenkandida- A range of different models have been put
ten principle, it is argued, this would forward for the concrete shape of such a
rescue the European elections from their single constituency. The first question is
current “second class” status. its size, often discussed in terms of the pro-
Critics of the single EU constituency posal for a transnational list with 25 MEPs
respond that such a reform could in fact repeatedly put forward by Andrew Duff
actually weaken the EU’s democratic legiti- since 2011. A second – rather unlikely –
macy. On the one hand, they fear that it option would be for all 73 vacated British
could produce two classes of MEP, on the seats to be filled by way of a transnational
other that the connection between MEPs list. The most far-reaching proposal to date
and their constituents could become even comes from French President Emmanuel
weaker than is already the case, especially Macron: to have about half of MEPs elected
in the larger member states. On those points via the single EU constituency as of the
the advocates of reform reply that all MEPs 2024 elections. But that would call into
would continue to enjoy the same rights question the entire system by which EP
and obligations, and that each of them seats are distributed. The option with the
would represent all EU citizens. The pro- best medium-term political prospects of
reform side also rejects concerns that the realisation would be for a portion of the
SWP Comment 10
February 2018
4vacated British seats – say 30 to 50 – to be S&D group (with 26.74 percent) came in
used for a single EU constituency. fractionally ahead of the conservative EPP
Next, it would be necessary to clarify the (26.67 percent) but the EPP was stronger
voting system. The introduction of a single in the smaller member states – and thus
EU constituency presupposes that each received more MEPs relative to vote share.
European party would create its own list The upshot of the fragmented voting sys-
and compete for party list votes across all tem was that the EPP received 28.8 percent
the member states. France has also pro- of the seats, the S&D only 25.3 percent (see
posed a rule – analogous to the rules for Table, p. 6).
forming a group in the EP – that the first This discrepancy had far-reaching con-
seven places on the list must include can- sequences, because the Spitzenkandidaten
didates from seven different countries. This principle requires the Commission Presi-
would prevent a situation arising where a dent to be chosen in light of the outcome
handful of large member states dominate of the European elections. As the largest
the supposedly “transnational” lists. group, the EPP claimed the post for its
Even the supporters of a single EU lead candidate Jean-Claude Juncker – even
constituency disagree among themselves though the formulation in the EU Treaty is
whether the reform should be formally tied vague enough that the S&D could also have
to the Spitzenkandidaten principle. Some insisted on their candidate Martin Schulz
are clear that the respective lead candidates on the basis of winning the largest share
should also head their party’s transnational of the absolute vote. But with the EP at the
list to ensure that they are directly elected – time wanting most of all to defend the Spit-
unlike for example Jean-Claude Juncker in zenkandidaten principle against the national
2014. Independently of this, the European governments in the European Council, the
parties would have to create internal mecha- mainstream groups quickly united behind
nisms for nominating the candidates for Juncker and the EPP. The transnational lists
their transnational lists – which would con- could be used to allocate adjustment seats
siderably expand their influence over the in line with the Europe-wide distribution
EP’s membership as this is presently the of list votes and thus even out discrepancies
prerogative of the national parties. Imme- created by degressive proportionality. This
diately after the EP’s rejection of the single would do a great deal to boost fairness of
EU constituency, leading MEPs emphasised representation in the European Parliament
that the decision in no way affected the and thus the democratic legitimacy of the
Spitzenkandidaten process introduced EU. After the EP’s rejection of the single EU
in 2014, which the EP was determined to constituency this could be an argument for
retain. keeping the idea alive until 2024.
A Means to Improve Representation The Need for Further Harmonisation of
While a single EU constituency could con- European Election Voting Rules
tribute to bringing forth real party-politi- One decisive obstacle to the creation of a
cal competition at the European level, single EU constituency is that the legis-
this would do little to resolve the issues of lation for European elections would have
unequal representation. But the introduc- to be harmonised across the member states.
tion of a second list vote for the European In technical terms European Parliament
elections could also be used to correct some elections are still a collection of national
of the distortions created by the system of ballots where certain important aspects are
degressive proportionality. In political terms stipulated (for example dates, proportional
these are not insignificant. In the 2014 elec- representation), but significant details dif-
tion the parties of the social democratic fer. For example there is neither a uniform
SWP Comment 10
February 2018
5Table ties in European elections. The situation at
European election 2014: present is that national parties standing in
Vote share and seats gained European elections may join together in and
beyond the EP, but their European political
Group Vote Seats Seats Difference affiliations play little or no role in the cam-
share (ideal) (actual) (actual- paign. Because the transnational lists would
ideal) represent the European parties, there
GUE/NGL 8.26% 62 52 –10 would need to be some kind of link to show
G/EFA 7.67% 58 50 –8 which national parties they are associated
S&D 26.74% 201 191 –10 with. Clarity over the connection between
ALDE 8.83% 66 67 1 second list vote and European party would
be especially relevant if the transnational
EPP 26.67% 200 221 21
lists – as proposed above – were used for
ECR 7.89% 59 70 11
adjustment seats.
EFDD 7.29% 55 48 –7
Secondly there is currently no uniform
Non- 6.63% 50 52 2 deadline by which candidates for European
attached elections need to be registered. The national
Source: http://www.foederalist.eu/2014/10/warum- deadlines range from three months (Swe-
die-sozialdemokraten-bei-der.html. den) to less than three weeks (Greece, Spain).
For transnational lists to function, there
voting age nor a shared deadline for voter would need to be a single deadline for
registration. Nor are national parties or candidate registration.
their candidates required to identify with a Thirdly – especially from the German
European party. Misgivings over excessive perspective – the question of a uniform
harmonisation have often led to rejection threshold for the European elections arises.
of EP reforms, which is good reason to As the German Federal Constitutional
devote greater attention to this factor. Court ruled in 2014, Germany’s 3 percent
The EP’s report of 2015 already called for threshold is unconstitutional in European
a far-reaching harmonisation of national elections unless it applies across all mem-
legislation for European elections. But a ber states. Since then the German govern-
string of its demands collide with national ment has been pressing for an obligatory
voting traditions, leading the member states minimum threshold of 3 percent for all EU
to reject the proposals in the Council. In states, to be introduced for the next Euro-
view of this blockade it is necessary in par- pean elections. But this is hardly a pressing
ticular to clarify which aspects of electoral question for most other states, as they
law must absolutely be harmonised for an either have their own national threshold or
EU-wide constituency to be created, and the number of MEPs they elect is so small
which can be left alone in deference to na- that it would be impossible for one to be
tional preferences. For example, although elected with less than 3 percent of the vote
it would be helpful in terms of generating anyway. In fact, such a clause would be
political enthusiasm to hold the European relevant only for Spain and Germany. The
elections on a single day across the Union, introduction of a transnational list would
member states have different traditional require a decision on whether a Europe-
voting days that are unwilling to concede. wide threshold is required, and if so at
There are three aspects where realisation what level it should be set.
of a single EU constituency leaves no alter-
native to harmonisation of the rules for
European elections. Firstly, the introduc- Legal and Political Challenges
tion of transnational lists presupposes In theory the introduction of a single Euro-
stronger involvement of the European par- pean constituency would be possible with-
SWP Comment 10
February 2018
6out risking the vagaries of an EU treaty The processes within the European par-
amendment, because the EU Treaty defines ties represent a fourth challenge. Trans-
the minimum and maximum size of na- national lists would expose the differences
tional constituencies but does not tie these between the national constituent parties
explicitly to the nationality of the candi- a great deal more starkly than already oc-
dates. Proponents of a single European con- curred in the process of selecting lead can-
stituency therefore argue that the candi- didates for the 2014 election. For example
dates on the transnational lists would stand the German CDU and Hungary’s FIDESZ
not as citizens of a member state but as EU would have to agree on a transnational list
citizens. Already a German can for example with at least a rudimentary joint manifesto.
win a seat in France without this affecting
the upper limit of 96 “German” MEPs.
Nevertheless, four central and closely Outlook
interconnected hurdles remain. Firstly a The current impulses for reforming the
reform of the EP involves many veto players European Parliament open up a new per-
– even for the EU – who could block the spective in the complex debate about the
project or demand concessions. For example EU’s democratic deficits. As the analysis
Article 223 TFEU grants the European Par- shows, a single European constituency
liament the right to propose arrangements could contribute to making European elec-
for elections to select its members. How tions more European and creating party-
closely contested the majorities can be was political competition at the European level.
seen in the February 2018 vote on the single But it would not be a panacea. In particular
EU constituency, where the outcome the discrepancies in representation in the
remained unclear until the vote was held. EP can only be reduced if the transnational
And then the Parliament’s proposal must lists are used to allocate adjustment seats –
not only be adopted unanimously by the which would require a complex and finely
Council but also ratified by the member tuned system.
states in accord with their respective consti- The biggest challenge for reform of the
tutions. In Germany for example the Bun- EP is the combination of time pressure,
destag must approve. And the respective legal complexity and political conflict. A
national election laws would need to be treaty amendment might not be needed,
amended. but such a reform would still require un-
Secondly there is the time factor. In order animity in the Council, approval by the EP
to conduct orderly European elections, the and amendment of electoral legislation in
European and national prerequisites need all 27 member states.
to be clarified no later than the beginning After the Council blocked the EP’s 2015
of 2019, for reasons including deadlines for proposal and Parliament in February 2018
candidate registration. Thirdly, fundamen- again resorted to a provisional solution, it
tal differences between member states and is clear that there is currently no majority
between political currents over the ques- for federal proposals in the European insti-
tion of where the EU should be heading tutions. Trumpeted as the year of reform,
also affect the question of EP reform. This is 2018 in fact begins with agreement on the
because creating a single EU constituency, lowest common denominator. Significant
the associated strengthening of the Euro- innovations in the EP are unlikely, with a
pean electoral dimension, and the at least proper breakthrough on parliamentary
implicit linkage of the reform to the Spit- reforms put back until 2024.
zenkandidaten principle all represent a The minimum goal for the coming nego-
brand of federalism that is rejected by cer- tiations between the EU institutions over
tain member states, such as Hungary and redistribution of the British seats should
Poland. therefore be to ensure that leeway remains
SWP Comment 10
February 2018
7to introduce a single EU constituency at a
later stage. The provisional solution adopted
for 2019 should avoid creating further new
path-dependencies.
Especially Germany, which is especially
affected by inequality of representation,
must possess an interest in pressing ahead
with longer-term reforms. After the Euro-
pean Parliament blocked the path to intro-
ducing a single EU constituency for the
2019 elections, the ball is now in the mem-
ber states’ court. What is needed most of
all is an understanding about how the 2019
European elections can be organised in
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und such a way as to strengthen the democratic
Politik, 2018 legitimacy of the EU. That means abiding
All rights reserved
by the Spitzenkandidaten principle.
This Comment reflects
the authors’ views.
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SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik
German Institute for
International and
Security Affairs
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ISSN 1861-1761
Translation by Meredith Dale
(English version of
SWP-Aktuell 11/2018)
SWP Comment 10
February 2018
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