Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile Phone Blackout and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria's Northeast region
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stability Jacob, J U and Akpan, I 2015 Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile Phone
Blackout and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria’s Northeast region. Stability:
International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 8, pp. 1-17, DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ey
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile Phone
Blackout and Counterinsurgency in
Nigeria’s Northeast region
Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob* and Idorenyin Akpan*
In the summer of 2013, the Nigerian military, as part of its counterinsurgency
operations against Boko Haram insurgents, shut down GSM mobile telephony in
three northeast states – Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. This article explores the
rationale, impact and citizens’ opinion of the mobile phone blackout. It draws on
focus group discussions with local opinion leaders and in-depth personal interviews
with military and security insiders, as well as data of Boko Haram incidences before,
during and after the blackout from military sources and conflict databases. It
argues that, although the mobile phone shutdown was ‘successful’ from a military-
tactical point of view, it angered citizens and engendered negative opinions toward
the state and new emergency policies. While citizens developed various coping and
circumventing strategies, Boko Haram evolved from an open network model of
insurgency to a closed centralized system, shifting the center of its operations
to the Sambisa Forest. This fundamentally changed the dynamics of the conflict.
The shutdown demonstrated, among others, that while ICTs serve various desirable
purposes for developing states, they will be jettisoned when their use challenges
the state’s legitimacy and raison d'être, but not without consequences.
1. Introduction largest mobile phone market with 167 mil-
New ICTs have fulfilled various desirable lion connected GSM lines (NCC). Billions
purposes for Nigeria, Africa’s largest econ- of dollars have been invested in Nigeria’s
omy. Nigeria’s social, economic and techno- mobile phone industry resulting in the con-
logical nervous systems now depend on the struction and deployment of additional base
Global System of Mobile communication stations, fiber optic networks and various
(GSM) – introduced in the country in August other infrastructure components.
2001. Since then, according to the Nigerian Prior to GSM, Nigerians depended mainly
Communications Commission (NCC), mobile on landlines provided by the state-owned
telephone usage has increased exponentially, monopoly, Nigerian Telecoms (NITEL). But
rising from 8.5 per cent in 2004 to 92.14 per with the growth of mobile telephony in
cent in 2014 (NCC). Nigeria now has Africa’s Nigeria, fixed land telephony has declined.
There are just over two million fixed tel-
* American University of Nigeria, Nigeria
ephone lines in Nigeria, out of which only
jacob.jacob@aun.edu.ng, 357,612 are active.1 With the decline of fixed
idorenyin.akpan@aun.edu.ng line telephony, government departments
Art. 8, page 2 of 17 Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram and functions, including security and law ICT disruptions by authoritarian regimes in enforcement agencies, now depend almost Myanmar, Iran and Syria, were enforced to entirely on mobile telephony. Mobile teleph- prevent or disrupt mass protests and citizen ony has also become a part of social prac- unrest rather than in response to an insur- tice across Nigeria, and has been adopted gency effort, they offer an interesting ante- by the government for governance and cedent to Nigeria’s ICT capture. While ICTs development. For example, the Ministry serve various desirable purposes for devel- of Agriculture maintains a database of the oping states, they are easily dispensed with mobile phone numbers of farmers in the when such ICTs challenge the regime’s legiti- country. The ministry texts vouchers to farm- macy and authority. ers on their mobile phones, which the farm- This research explores the impact of the ers then use like cash to buy farm inputs, shutdown in Nigeria and its implications including fertilizers and seeds. on contemporary debates on ICTs and gov- While mobile telephony has functioned as ernance, particularly in Africa and other a tool for development, it has also served as new democracies. The work draws on focus an enabling tool in the hands of insurgents. group discussions with local opinion lead- Since 2009, the Islamic sect Boko Haram2 ers in Adamawa State of Northeast Nigeria, has carried out a ferocious resistance against as well as in-depth personal interviews with the Nigerian state, leading to the death of security agents, experts in security and infor- more than 2,000 Nigerians in 2014 alone, mation technology, senior civil servants, and along with several hundreds of thousands of members of the so-called Civilian Joint Task individuals displaced (NEMA 2015). Many of Force (JTF), made up of local vigilantes and the sect’s attacks have been coordinated and former Boko Haram members now working assisted by mobile telephony. as informants for Nigeria’s security forces. As part of the state’s counterinsurgency The following background section provides (COIN) measures, a state of emergency was a much-needed context to the Boko Haram imposed in May 2013.3 During this time, insurgency and to mobile phone usage in Nigeria’s security forces shut down mobile Nigeria. This is followed by the methodology phone networks in Adamawa, Borno and section which discusses the methodological Yobe states in northeast Nigeria between 23 approaches, after which the main findings May and 12 July 2013. This study undertakes are presented. The final section discusses the an assessment of the impact of the mobile findings further and locates them within the phone ‘capture’ and the various coping and larger architecture of debates on ICTs and circumventing strategies developed by Boko governance in contemporary society. Haram, law enforcement agencies, private organisations and citizens in the region. 2. Background While it was the first time that the Nigerian As earlier noted, this section provides a military undertook such a drastic step to background to the Boko Haram insurgency, enforce state authority, it is not the first case including the origins of the sect, their ide- of state disruption of citizens’ ICT access as a ology and their interactions with mobile means of seeking to enforce state legitimacy. phone technology. It also discusses the con- In 2011 and 2012, during the so-called Arab text of mobile phone usage in Nigeria, argu- Spring, unpopular regimes in North Africa ing that mobile telephony has become part captured the Internet in response to citizen of social practice in the country, thereby efforts to use social media as a mobiliza- re-ordering patterns of social relations and tion structure in their protests (Filiu 2011; enabling even the rural poor to, on their own Ghonim 2012; El-Bendary 2013). Although terms, re-order what Giddens (1981) calls the North African cases, as well as similar time-space distantiation.
Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram Art. 8, page 3 of 17 2.1 Boko Haram: Origins and Ideology 2013). The sect drew membership from vari- Boko Haram broke into the global limelight ous fields of endeavours, ranging from the in April 2014 after the group raided a state military to government, politics, banking, secondary school in Chibok, Borno State and etc. The argument that youth disenfran- abducted 276 schoolgirls. The abduction chisement and unemployment is primarily sparked a global social media movement and responsible for the rise and endurance of the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls. Prior to Boko Haram is not entirely accurate because this date, very few people outside of Nigeria a significant number of people that joined knew much about the group. the sect were gainfully employed. Some were The name Boko Haram is an alias for paying membership dues on a weekly and the Islamist sect Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna monthly basis. It is also misleading to claim Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad – (People Committed that the sect has endured because of poverty to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and lack of access to education in northern and Jihad). The sect was nicknamed Boko Nigeria. Since the Maitatsine Islamic revival- Haram in 2002 by residents of Borno State ist movements of the 1980s, there have been in Northeast Nigeria because of the fiery various Islamist groups that have emerged anti-Western sermons of its former leader, in northern Nigeria and were either sub- Mohammed Yusuf. Boko Haram is a combi- dued militarily or hijacked by politicians. It nation of the Hausa word ‘Boko’ meaning is important to point out, however, that prior Western schools (or education) and the Arabic to July 2009, Boko Haram operated peace- word ‘Haram’ which means sacrilege or for- fully and was ostensibly committed to fight- bidden. The translation of Boko Haram as ing injustice and supporting ‘true’ Muslims ‘Western education is sinful’ is a transliteration to achieve positions of political authority in of the two words, but the intended expression northern Nigeria. is Western civilization is a sacrilege or forbid- The charismatic Yusuf was largely respon- den (Adibe 2013; Mantzikos 2010). Essentially, sible for raising the profile of Boko Haram the group is opposed not only to Western during his leadership. Local people saw the education but to the entire superstructure of group as a charitable organization commit- Western civilization and its various append- ted to the practice of true Islam. Although ages and influence, including democracy, civil its objective of enthroning pure Islamic law, human rights, language, etc. governance in northern Nigeria was not hid- Details on the group’s origins are dis- den, most people believed the group would puted, but the popular belief is that it was achieve its objectives through political founded in 2002 by Ustaz Muhammed Yusuf. means. A key informant and former member Until his death in 2009, Yusuf embarked on of the sect said membership was not secre- a massive recruitment drive, drawing mem- tive: ‘it was alright back then to tell some- bership mainly from the Kanuri speaking one that you are a member of Boko Haram tribe in Northern Nigeria. He drew on the without people looking back at you as a mur- local anti-Western sentiments, poor educa- derer. People only thought that you are one tion and pervasive poverty in the region and of those that seek to practice true Islam.’4 established mosques, Islamic schools and The sect’s terror activities started in 2009 associations that gave thousands of disen- after a military clampdown resulted in the franchised Muslim youths a sense of purpose death of about 800 sect members, including and a means of expression. But member- its charismatic leader Mohammed Yusuf. The ship was not limited to poor and disenfran- clampdown occurred after members of the chised youth. At the time of Yusuf’s death, sect clashed with local police in Maiduguri Boko Haram had more than 500,000 mem- when the police attempted to arrest some bers spread across northern Nigeria (Adibe members for defying a ban on riding okadas
Art. 8, page 4 of 17 Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram
(motorcyles).5 The clash coincided with police communication infrastructure that could be
investigations of the sect’s activities and claims targeted. Moreover, they have stronger levels
that the sect was secretly arming its members. of endurance than their military pursuers.
Yusuf was killed in police detention after Their ideology impels their aggression and
he had been captured alive by the military. unrelenting pursuit of martyrdom. The mili-
Since then, the group, under its new leader, tary clampdown of 2009 to 2012 forced the
Abubakar Shekau (aka Darul Tawheed) has group to disperse and go underground. Since
carried out series of attacks on civilians, their dispersion, an essential survival kit for
military posts and government buildings. Its the sect has been its ability to coordinate
objective is to impose a pure Islamic state in their activities across dimensions of space
northern Nigeria guided by strict Sharia law. and time. Building on Giddens’ (1981) pre-
In August 2014, the group declared Gwoza, vious works, Thompson (1995) has written
a boundary town in sourthern Borno it had eloquently on the instantaneity of mobile
earlier captured from Nigerian forces, as the communication, which eliminates temporal
headquarters of a new Islamic caliphate. delays in the mediation of symbolic forms.
Boko Haram sees Western influences as A new ‘simultaneity’ is introduced not only
a basis for the weakness of Islam (Onuoha into social life but also to violence and insur-
2013). Its ideology has its roots in Salafi gency. For insurgent groups like Boko Haram,
jihadism and driven by Takfirism. This ideol- this capability is essential for planning and
ogy seeks to return Islam to the original prac- executing attacks, surveillance, timing and
tices of the Prophet Muhammed and early the precision of surprise. Boko Haram relies
Islamic clerics by purging the religion of on the ‘simultaneity’ of mobile communica-
Western influence. Salafism sees violence as tions to coordinate attacks and activate cell
an acceptable tool for jihadism. In Takfirism, members based at locations proximal to
Muslims that do not follow their ideology the target. By bridging temporal and spa-
are seen as kafirs or infidels or even worse, tial dimensions of their activities, the sect
as kufars or disbelievers. This explains Boko achieves simultaneity in attacks – a capability
Haram’s seemingly indiscriminate attacks it has perfected in carrying out dummy and
on Muslims and Christians as well as Islamic active raids. In dummy raids, the sect raids
clerics that criticize their activities. To them, a particular location to distract attention of
‘moderate Muslims’ should be treated as infi- security forces while another unit goes on
dels.6 The sect is now renowned for attacking to carry out a larger attack on key targets.
schools, police and military posts, churches, For example, on the night of 14 April 2014
mosques and palaces of traditional rulers when Boko Haram raided the Government
that do not support their ideology. Secondary School at Chibok that sparked
the global #BringBackOurGirls campaign on
2.2 Boko Haram’s Communication social media, its operatives had detonated a
Capabilities and Government Response car bomb in Nyanya Abuja that killed scores
One of the fundamental capabilities of Boko earlier in the day. A similar pattern played
Haram has been its element of surprise. out on 24 May 2014 when the group deto-
They have been successful in multiplying nated a car bomb in Jos, Plateau state and in
their force through their detailed knowl- the same night carried out series of raids in
edge of the difficult and sometimes inac- Kamuyya villages in Biu Local Government
cessible terrains in Borno and the border area of Borno state, killing more than 20 peo-
hills between Nigeria, Cameroun, Chad and ple and abducting several others. There have
Niger. They are mobile and fluid; before been several such cases.
August 2014, when they declared Gwoza The ability to coordinate operations and
the capital of the new Islamic Caliphate, cells across spatially remote locations is at
they did not have a well-defined territory or the heart of Boko Haram’s diffusion of terrorJacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram Art. 8, page 5 of 17 in northern Nigeria. It is important to note, and kill many of our members and we will however, that Boko Haram has undergone continue with our attacks on them until various metamorphoses in response to tacti- they stop’ (Premium Times 2012). Since then, cal exigencies on the ground and its overall Boko Haram has carried out several attacks strategic objectives. on infrastructure that supports mobile In response to Boko Haram’s acts, and telephony in Nigeria, notably base transceiver with a paucity of consistent and credible stations (BTS) (or masts), both for revenge and human intelligence on the sect’s operations, for tactical reasons. In 2012 alone, 150 BTSs Nigeria’s security agencies have been com- or telecom masts were damaged by Boko pelled to rely on enabling technologies to Haram (Onuoha 2013). According to Onuoha tap phone lines of suspected terrorists and (2013), the strategic objective of the attacks their backers. The Nigerian government’s on telecom infrastructure ‘is to choke one of first step was to seize control of the more the supply lines of intelligence to Nigeria’s than 150 million mobile telephone lines intelligence and security system’ (23). Indeed, in the country. To achieve this, the govern- Boko Haram was the first to enforce targeted ment in 2011 mandated the NCC to register mobile phone blackouts for tactical purposes all mobile telephone lines in the country. before the Nigerian military. The sect regu- According to the NCC, the objectives of the larly attacked mobile phone masts to enforce mandatory national SIM registration exercise mobile phone blackouts and prevent raided were to ‘enhance the security of the state’ and communities from calling for help from secu- to enable operators to have ‘predictable pro- rity forces. This suggests that Boko Haram file about the users in their networks.’ SIM was using alternative means of communica- registration started on 28 March 2011 and tion, at least within the areas where mobile ended officially in January 2012 after which telephony infrastructure had been targeted. all unregistered SIMs were deactivated. With It is curious, therefore, that the Nigerian secu- this information, the intelligence gathering rity forces saw the mobile phone blackout, a capability of the Nigerian security services usual Boko Haram tactic, as a means of con- was remarkably enhanced, and a number of taining the insurgency. key Boko Haram commanders were captured, On 14 May 2013, after a series of attacks including Sani Mohammed, Kabir Sokoto on various targets in northern Nigeria, the and Shuaib Mohammed Bama (who was Nigerian federal government declared a arrested in the home of a popular politician) state of emergency in the three northeast- (Vanguard Newspaper 2012). In response, ern states to enable the military to intensify Boko Haram embarked on a campaign of COIN operations. The edict was intended to attacks on telecommunication base stations quarantine the conflict to the region and also both as revenge and in an effort to discourage to provide the military with broader powers telecommunications companies from coop- to deal with the insurgency. erating with security agencies. In September The state of emergency gave the military 2012 the sect claimed responsibility for the superior powers over the civilian arms of coordinated bombing of telecommunication government in the region. In his declara- base stations in four northern states – Borno, tion of the state of emergency, President Yobe, Bauchi and Kano. According to Abu Goodluck Jonathan said troops and other Qaqa, a spokesman for the sect, the instal- security agencies involved in the state of lations were targeted as retaliation for the emergency operations have orders to ‘take telecommunications industry’s cooperation all necessary action, within the ambit of with the state security services to reveal their their rules of engagement, to put an end to locations and phone conversations. He said, the impunity of insurgents and terrorists’ ‘We are attacking GSM companies because (Premium Times 14 May 2013).7 During the they have helped security agencies to arrest state of emergency, the military are able to
Art. 8, page 6 of 17 Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram Figure 1: ICT Access in Northeast Nigeria. Source: Nigeria Bureau of Statistics. make arrests without having to first secure Initially, the state of emergency seemed a warrant. They can stop and search anyone successful, as members of the sect were or any vehicle, detain suspects longer than driven from Maiduguri and its environs to the 24 hours, break into private properties with- vast and treacherous Sambisa forest. The sect out search warrants and carry out any other eventually turned the Sambisa forest, four such activity it deems necessary to fulfill its times the size of London, into their strong- mandate. On 23 May 2013 the military shut hold. More recently the sect has advanced down mobile communications in the three from Sambisa to capture and control territo- northeastern states. The mobile phone black- ries in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states. out was limited to GSM. According to the military, the objective of the shutdown was 2.3 Context and everyday usage of to limit Boko Haram’s communications capa- mobile telephony in Nigeria’s northeast bilities, restrict their ability to regroup and Although the standard of living and level of re-enforce and also limit their ability to deto- income in northeast Nigeria is far below the nate improvised explosive devises. During national average, mobile telephony has a the blackout, State security forces developed comparably high penetration. Radio remains new ways of communicating. The Nigerian the most popular communication medium police, for example, deployed an alternative in northeast Nigeria, but mobile phone has mobile communication system using Code achieved quite high penetration in a rela- Division Multiple Access (CDMA) on Global tively short time. See Figure 1 below. Open Trunking Architecture (GOTA) from Within a comparatively short period of the Chinese manufacturer ZTE. Since it was time, use of mobile telephony has evolved only GSM lines that were blocked, it was pos- to become routine and unencumbered. The sible for the police to use CDMA with ease. context within which locals use the mobile The GOTA phones were distributed to police phone is intricately entwined with their eve- officers in northeastern Nigeria just before ryday social life.8 the mobile phone shutdown. This enabled In addition to the routineness of mobile the police, along with other state security phone use as a function of a strong oral cul- units, to circumvent the shutdown. ture, there is the element of family closeness.
Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram Art. 8, page 7 of 17 Families in northeast Nigeria generally as landline telephony, fax, pagers, first gener- maintain unusually strong ties even across ation (1G) cellular phones, internet, etc. – the extended families. Particularly among low adoption of mobile telephony in northern income groups, calls to family members make Nigeria, like in several other African societies, up a substantial part of daily mobile phone skipped these development rungs. Users in talk time. Despite the various functionali- northeastern Nigeria leapfrogged from face- ties of the mobile phone (which may include to-face social interactions within a shared other non-call functions such as internet data, physical space and time to mobile telephony. calendar, reminders, SMS, etc.), talk remains Prior to the mobile phone, relationships the major, if not the only, function of the were primarily oral based and had to be con- mobile phone for most people. stantly renewed. Interactions were generally The Boko Haram insurgency in northeast- open ended. The introduction of mobile tel- ern Nigeria has had strong impacts on social ephones, however, enabled the evolution of life and on the use of mobile telephony. new forms or modes of interactions. Although local people normally call their fam- The nature and modes of interpersonal ily members many times in the course of the communications and relationships co-evolve day, the insurgency has increased the num- along with emerging technologies. In north- ber of such phone calls. Most parents now east Nigeria this co-evolutionary process was provide their children with mobile phones rather disjointed, as most people moved sud- so they can know about their welfare in the denly from face-to-face communication to course of the day. It is not uncommon for par- technologically-mediated interpersonal com- ents to now call their children at school twice munications. This resulted in patterns of open- during the 9am-3pm school time. ended social relationships, with their various Low literacy also accounts for the high eccentricities, moving onto new modes of voice call volume in the northeast region. interaction brokered by the new mobile tel- The region has one of the lowest literacy rates ephone technology. Patterns that characterize in Nigeria. Whereas some conversations or daily face-to-face conversations – pleasantries enquiries at other regions would normally and banter, including enquiries about the be expressed via SMS exchanges or via BBM, welfare of each family member, businesses Whatsapp or other SMS platforms, people in or livestock, as well as what is called ‘hailing’9 the region prefer to call instead. This accounts in Nigeria – were also carried onto mobile for the unusually high expenditure on mobile phone conversations. Mobile phone talk time, telephony in the region. According to a sen- despite the unusually high cost, is not limited ior management official of one of the popu- to the specific purpose for which the call was lar mobile phone companies in Nigeria, the made, but usually, conversations meander company lost some 5 million dollars (800 through a mesh of banters and ‘hailings,’ typi- million Naira) in call time recharge revenue cal in face-to-face encounters. in Adamawa State alone during the period that mobile phone service was shut down. In 3. Methodology the northeast region, mobile phone recharge The methodological approach used in this card accounts for the average highest monthly study was designed to achieve a deeper household non-food expenditure – higher awareness of the nature of impacts of the than expenditure on electricity, water and mobile blackout on citizens and on the insur- house rent combined. See Figure 2 below. gency itself. The methodology included focus Whereas in Western developed societies group discussions (FGDs) with local opinion mobile telephony developed through various leaders, in-depth personal interviews with processes of adoption – co-evolving with vari- military and security insiders and an analysis ous other communication technologies such of data aggregates on attacks obtained from
Art. 8, page 8 of 17 Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram Figure 2: Comparative Expenditures on Average Monthly Non-Food Items in Households in Northeast Nigeria (in Naira, 2013). Source: Nigerian Bureau of Statistics & African Develop- ment Bank. government and military sources, as well as in the other two northeast states, including conflict databases including the Council on religion, occupation, ethnicity and levels of Foreign Relations (CFR) databank on the education. The smallest group had six partici- Boko Haram insurgency. pants while the largest had nine, for a total of To develop a clearer awareness of the 46 participants. It was important that focus nature of impact the mobile phone shut- group participants be influentials or opin- down had on local people, FGDs were ion leaders in their communities in order to conducted with local opinion leaders (or have well-informed discussions. In this study, ‘influentials’) in Adamawa State. Six FGDs influentials, a term used by Keller and Berry were conducted between April and May (2003) for opinion leaders, were defined 2014 with participants drawn from three by their information-seeking and -giving geographically bound contexts or towns as behaviour at personal and community lev- primary units in Adamawa State (Jimeta, Yola els. These elements of opinion leadership town and Fufure).10 For security and logistical and its consequences for social embedded- reasons it was not possible to carry out FGDs ness and political participation have been in all the three states. However, residents well articulated by Burt (1999) and Rogers from the three towns selected—all of whom (2003). Information-seeking behaviour was were subject to the mobile phone shutdown defined in terms of participants’ ownership and to Boko Haram threats—shared similar and consistent use of mobile phones, level demographic characteristics with residents of exposure to the local media and other
Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram Art. 8, page 9 of 17
1. Have a mobile phone and use it consistently.
2. Have been a resident continually in their community in Adamawa state for the past one year
(including the period of the mobile phone disruption).
3. Attended a political rally, speech, or organized protest of any kind.
4. Been an active member of any group that seeks to influence public policy or government.
5. Held or ran for political office.
6. Been a member of the Adamawa Peace Initiative or attended a public meeting on commu-
nity peace-building or reconciliation matters.
7. Served on a committee for a local organization.
8. Met secretly or openly with other members of their network to seek the interests of the
community.
Table 1: List of Engagement Activities.
informal or social information transmitters. pre-selected within their contexts for the
Information-giving behaviour was defined in focus group discussions. To be part of FGDs
terms of influentials’ ability to inform mem- it was essential that participants own and
bers of their network. Social embeddedness in actively use mobile phones and were resident
the study is defined in terms of the density in Adamawa state during the mobile phone
of ties that participants had within and out- shutdown. Additionally, participants had to
side of their networks and the level of their demonstrate that they are active and influen-
social relations and community participa- tial members of their own communities.
tion (Weimann 1991; Knoke 1990a, 1990b). Using the engagement model in select-
The purpose of using influentials with these ing participants was informed by the need
characteristics was to ensure that opinions to gather participants that were not only
gathered from focus groups were from peo- embedded, but also engaged in their social
ple that would normally have used their contexts as thought leaders. Embeddedness
mobile phones not only for personal desir- opens access to giving and receiving informa-
able causes, but also for community causes. tion (Jacob 2010); moreover political informa-
Based on the above, Nisbert’s (2006) refine- tion is circulated not only through organised
ment of Kelly and Berry’s (2003) engage media, but also through informal social inter-
ment model of opinion leadership was actions within structured patterns of the soci-
adapted in selecting local influentials for ety (Nisbert 2006). Although this model was
focus group participation. Originally devel- originally tested in the United States (Keller
oped by Roper ASW, the model identifies and Berry 2003) and in Europe (Nisbert 2006)
opinion leaders based on a number of indica- it is reproducible and can be suitably adapted
tors ranging from civic engagement or politi- across various socio-cultural contexts to select
cal activism to social embeddedness. The influentials. It has been used by Jacob (2010,
activities were adapted into checklists (Table 2014) to select influential radio listeners as
1) and randomly distributed to respondents focus group participants in the Democratic
within the selected towns in Adamawa state. Republic of Congo. Indeed, as Marshall and
Respondents were asked if they had engaged Gitsordarmo (1995) have argued, some char-
in any of 8 activities within the previous 12 acteristics of opinion leaders are consistent
months. Any respondent that answered ‘yes’ across contexts. After testing a scale of opin-
to activities one and two and to at least one ion leadership across eight countries, they
of the other six engagement activities was observe that opinion leaders indeed shareArt. 8, page 10 of 17 Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram
common characteristics across cultures. Such they are not everywhere, they com-
characteristics include higher media expo- municate to people from different
sure, political interest and sociability. camps (or cells) where they have peo-
ple. When they want to carry out an
4. Findings attack, they call their members within
This section discusses key findings of the that location, muster them together
study. Firstly it explores the military’s opin- and they face a particular town. When
ion of the impacts of the shutdown and sec- they want to go out on a wide offen-
ondly citizen’s assessment of the impacts of sive, they normally use mobile phones
the shutdown. It argues that whereas the to bring themselves together and
military felt that the shutdown was success- carry out their attack. I can tell you the
ful as a means of preserving state authority mobile phone shutdown was success-
and legitimacy, citizens felt it was a ‘dumb’ ful. During that period their attack
strategy with severe social and economic was reduced to a minimum.
consequences.
In a separate interview, a director of Nigeria’s
4.1 Military Impacts and Government/ State Security Service in one of the states
Military Opinion of Shutdown under emergency rule further supported the
The military’s belief that mobile phones were claim that Boko Haram commanders relied
essential for Boko Haram’s activities—partic- extensively on mobile telephony to plan and
ularly during the three year period leading carry out attacks:
up to the state of emergency—was central to
the decision to shut down mobile networks, Although we successfully tracked
and the military and government officials calls and helped to effect arrests of
interviewed in this research all agreed that insurgents, the way Boko Haram used
the shutdown had the intended effect. A mobile phones made it essential to
Colonel in the Nigerian army11 stated: shut down the network. Insurgents
were captured and those not captured
The insurgents were using the phone were too afraid to operate within their
to their advantage. It was more of cells without any coordination from
[an] advantage to them [than to the outside. So many of them retreated
public]. We have GSM tracking mech- and fled. They were unable to call for
anism. We tracked a lot of their com- help and reinforcements when security
munication prior to attacks. They used agents closed in on them. So mobile
mobile phones to coordinate. So we phone shutdown was important to
were able to track them. We realized our counter-insurgency operations at
it was of more harm than good to the that phase of Boko Haram insurgency.
public. The moment we shut down It was a clearly thought out strategy to
communication, there was a lull in stop Boko Haram momentum.
their operations. We [the military] had
alternative means of communication This was corroborated in a separate interview
and they didn’t. The moment we shut with Adamawa State Police Public Relations
down GSM communication, we were Officer, ASP Othman Abubakar, who said that
able to carry out successful raids and the mobile phone shutdown helped to rout
cordon and search operations on so Boko Haram cells particularly in Borno State.
many Boko Haram camps. We caught Potential disruption to citizens’ access to
them unawares. Using mobile phones communication within business and social
to coordinate their activities made it settings was not considered. According to
look as if they were everywhere. But ASP Abubakar:Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram Art. 8, page 11 of 17
Figure 3: Boko Haram incidences before, during and after the mobile phone shutdown in
Northeast Nigeria. Source: Nigerian Military & CFR.
Security overrides everything else. the shutdown there were only 26 incidences
Social communication can only be across the region. In the three months after
done in the atmosphere of peace. the shutdown, attacks increased to 40. There
Security supersedes everything else. If was also a reduction in deaths from Boko
shutting down mobile lines is needed Haram attacks to 124 from 519 deaths in
for security then people must accept the previous three months. When phone
it. It is a sacrifice everyone must make. networks were restored, the number of Boko
Haram attacks and casualties increased. See
This position generally illustrates the pos- Figure 3 below.
ture of Nigeria’s security operatives and Security agencies attributed the reduc-
government in general. ICTs, human rights tion in the number of incidences and casu-
and personal freedoms are valued as part of alties from 23 May to 12 July 2013 to their
development and democracy, but the state is disruption of Boko Haram communications
more than willing to jettison these values to during the period. According to military offi-
enforce the state’s legitimacy. cials interviewed, however, the most signifi-
Official statistics from military sources and cant indicator of the success of the tactical
data from CFR databases appear to support blackout of mobile phone networks is the
the claims that the shutdown was effective, number of Boko Haram operatives captured
demonstrating a significantly smaller num- or killed during the period. The military
ber of Boko Haram attacks during the period captured or killed 1,956 insurgents during
of the mobile phone shutdown – from 23 the period compared with 734 the previous
May to 12 July, 2013 – compared with the three months. While there are no specific
previous three months. Whereas there were reasons to question the validity of military
a total of 52 Boko Haram incidences or data in this instance, it is important to locate
attacks in the previous three months, during these figures in context of the fact thatArt. 8, page 12 of 17 Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram
Nigerian security forces have been accused day-to-day relationships with close others.
of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings While business relationships and functions
(Amnesty International 2014). The Nigerian were affected, focus group discussants were
military has consistently denied the allega- most concerned about the impact the shut-
tion. It should also be noted that in most down had on their interaction with close oth-
counterinsurgency operations, there are ers in the course of the day. A general theme
always allegations of human rights abuses that emerged from FGDs was a feeling of
including unlawful detentions, torture and insecurity occasioned by the mobile phone
extrajudicial killings. The UK and the US have disruption:
not been exempted from such accusations in
the past. I was more scared throughout the
While military officials attribute the time that the mobile phone was not
achievements during this period to the available. Every time my husband
mobile phone shutdown, other factors could went to work and returned late, I was
have played a role as well. After the declara- very scared, not knowing what has
tion of the state of emergency, there was a happened to him. He is a taxi-driver
troop surge, and the military imposed cur- and sometimes may take passengers
fews and roadblocks across the region. They to Mubi or Jalingo. He would nor-
intensified cordon and search operations that mally call if he has to stay away late.
turned up weapons caches and intelligence But during that time we never heard
that led to more precise targets and arrests. from him till he comes back at night.
Various Boko Haram cells in Borno and It got me always worried until he
remote boundary towns and hills were dis- comes back (Focus Group Discussion,
rupted. There was more precise aerial bomb- Participant GRP4.3).
ing of Boko Haram strongholds and stronger
coordination among Nigerian security agen- The shutdown also had an impact on com-
cies. However, security chiefs interviewed for merce. Commercial activities that had
this project believed that the mobile phone been sped up by mobile technology were
shutdown gave them an operational and tac- negatively affected by the mobile phone
tical advantage over the insurgents. shutdown. A focus group participant was
Although there is evidence that the particularly upset:
mobile phone blackout helped to disrupt
Boko Haram’s activities, the dependence I know a lot of people that lost their
of social and economic activities on mobile livelihoods. Those that sell phone
telephony, as detailed in the following sec- recharge cards were particularly
tion, should have impelled security agencies affected. They went out of business. I
to find alternative means of disrupting Boko had a lot of difficulties calling for fruit
Haram’s communications. supplies from Lagos for my shop. I had
a box of grapes rotten at the motor
4.2 Social Impacts and Citizens’ Opinion park because my supplier sent me
of shutdown fruits but could not reach me to tell me
The shutdown of mobile telephony did about it. I still wonder how we survived
not necessarily affect social relationships, that time. It was very bad (Focus Group
as individuals evolved coping and circum- Discussion, Participant GRP 4.2).
venting strategies, but it did impact the
patterns in which those relationships were Although citizens said they believed that
expressed. The frustration of most people their personal security and safety were more
over the shutdown centered predominantly important than the temporary disruption of
on the separation of space from time in their their social and business communications,Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram Art. 8, page 13 of 17
many still expressed anger and frustration you’re the president and you feel like
at the way the mobile phone shutdown was you want to do the right thing for
carried out. your people (Focus Group Discussion,
Participant GRP 1.4)
I feel that at least for a couple of
months it should have been adver- It is not unusual for Nigerians to blame
tised as something that they would their president for every misfortune, and
do, no matter how secret they wanted the government of President Goodluck
it to be, we should know. … So for me, Jonathan is unusually unpopular especially
it wasn’t that I was sad, I was angry in northern Nigeria. Nigerian politics is very
when it happened (Focus Group closely aligned to ethnic origins, religion
Discussion, Participant GRP 1.2). and perceived opportunities for patronage.
Most people in northern Nigeria see the
A focus group participant said she felt the president, who is from the mainly Christian
region was no longer part of Nigeria: ‘We South South zone, in the Niger Delta region,
were cut off from life and from everyone as a stranger. He carries more blame for the
and everything else in Nigeria’ (Participant underdevelopment of the northeast region
GRP 6.8). In another focus group, a partici- than the powerful state governors and local
pant was more critical of the mobile phone government executives there.
blackout. Moreover, the inability of both the presi-
dency and the military to coordinate infor-
It was a very dumb decision. We use mation flows contributed to the confusion
phones more than [the terrorists], so about the mobile phone shutdown. There
why would you shut down the phones was no prior announcement about the shut-
that are more productive towards pre- down. Days into the shutdown there was
vention and say you’re trying to [stop still no clear information from the military
attacks]. It’s not sequential in any or from the government on the rationale for
way…. It made it easier for us to be tar- the shutdown. Indeed some residents for sev-
gets. … To me it didn’t just make sense; eral days did not know what was going on.
it was not a good decision to take According to a discussant:
(Focus Group Discussion, Participant
GRP 1.3). We woke up to find out that we could
not connect to any of the cell net-
Although the mobile phone blackout was works. We were completely cut off.
purely a military-strategic decision most peo- There was general calm but people
ple blamed the civilian federal government had no idea why all the networks were
for the shutdown: off. It was after a couple of days that
information started filtering in that it
[The government] didn’t make proper was a government thing, because of
provisions, because you can’t just Boko Haram (Focus Group Discussion,
shut down the network. Okay, what Participant GRP 5.2)
if … Boko Haram strikes, how were
we supposed to contact the outside Furthermore, the mobile phone blackout and
world to let them know what is going the state of emergency imposed in the three
on. And even if they want to take deci- northeastern states did not result in a total
sions like that, they should sit down clampdown on Boko Haram as expected.
and let people know how it would The general opinion that emerged not only
affect them, and you talk to them from FGDs but also from local media reports
about it, you don’t just do it because was that the mobile phone blackout, as wellArt. 8, page 14 of 17 Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram
as the state of emergency and curfews, did can thrive. And the mobile phone blackout
nothing to prevent Boko Haram attacks, was a means of preserving the state from
rather it helped to slowly choke what was left Islamist insurgency.
of the economy of the region. Indeed, an edi- Viewed from this perspective, while
torial in The Politico magazine reflected this new ICTs serve various desirable ends for
opinion when it derided the mobile phone Nigerians, their existence is contingent
shutdown and blamed the expansion of on uses that ultimately support the state’s
Boko Haram attacks on the blackout: development and raison d’être. In enforcing
the mobile phone blackout across a region
With GSM communications cut off the size of England with a population of
by the military, insurgents, who use 12 million for about two months as part
Thuraya satellite phone, took advan- of its COIN operations, the Nigerian mili-
tage of the lack of communications to tary proposed that where ICTs serve greater
unleash mayhem on [people]…It took purposes for insurgency or anti-state forces
the attack on the air force base in than they do for state security, they are no
Maiduguri for the military to restore longer valid for adoption in the society, irre-
GSM services to the residents of the spective of the good they serve. After more
three northeastern states (Shehu than 10 years of using mobile telephony and
2014). reordering social and commercial activities
to suit the new technology, organisations
and individuals had become so dependent
5. Discussion on the technology that they had to deploy
The astronomical growth of mobile teleph- new measures to circumvent its withdrawal.
ony in Nigeria has resulted in complete For organisations that had become depend-
dependence of both public and private sec- ent on the functioning of the technology,
tors on the smooth functioning of mobile their survival depended on their ability to
networks. The privatization of the telecom- circumvent the shutdown. The American
munications industry in Nigeria in 2001 University of Nigeria in Yola, for example,
offered the promise of a free liberalized quickly developed a means of circumventing
communication network without interfer- the shutdown via Skype call centres on cam-
ence from the state. Whereas the fixed land puses so that its staff and students (who are
lines operated by the state monopoly NITEL from more than 30 different countries) could
had various limitations to access, the new maintain communications with parents and
mobile phone revolution democratized com- loved ones and also carry out various other
munications. The major attraction for mobile necessary organisational activities.
telephony for most people is the sense of Individuals also developed their own cir-
individuality their own mobile phone gives cumventing strategies. Those that were
to them. Shutting down the mobile network technologically savvy used Skype, Rebtel,
was equivalent to rending that sense of indi- Whatsapp, BBM and other online communi-
viduality from them. cation platforms to circumvent the mobile
The Pyrrhic clampdown on mobile teleph- phone blackout. The elites acquired satel-
ony reminded citizens that although the ICT lite phones, primarily Thuraya, to continue
sector is liberalized, the state still has the communicating. Those that could not afford
ability, and even the authority, to capture and circumventing technologies travelled to
withhold ICTs based on exigencies of state neighboring states to make essential busi-
security. Although most people decried the ness and personal phone calls. Those that
shutdown, security operatives insisted that could not do this resorted to face-to-face
the state must exist first before democracy communication.Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram Art. 8, page 15 of 17
For Boko Haram, they developed more and sometimes legitimacy. For Nigeria, a
intricate and secure means of maintaining country that has suffered several years of
communications with their cells. While the military rule, the military’s shut down of
shutdown coincided with a reduction in Boko mobile telephony is significant and indeed
Haram attacks in the short term, it inspired worrisome. In addition to bringing memo-
the sect to make the important strategic ries of its active involvement in Nigeria’s
move of relocating members to the Sambisa politics since the first military coup in 1966,
forest, which they turned into a stronghold, it is a reminder that for Nigerian citizens, ICT
using captured women and children as access is not always a right. It is not enough
human shields in the forest. Moreover, it fun- that the military had good intentions. The
damentally altered the nature of their opera- mobile phone shutdown disrupted patterns
tions, resulting in a more closed, centralized of social living and brought difficult social
system rather than the previous open, cell or and economic times on citizens. Given the
networked system. Indeed, the development high level of penetration of mobile telephony
of Boko Haram from a ragtag band of insur- in Nigeria, technology has to be a partner in
gents into a regional security threat was, to nation building and conflict transformation,
an extent, impelled by the sometimes hap- not an adversary.
hazard response of Nigerian security forces.
While the mobile phone blackout helped Acknowledgements
checkmate Boko Haram in the short term, The authors acknowledge the two Research
it forced the group to develop new coping Assistants on this project, AUN students
strategies and to evolve. Zamiyat Abubakar and Maire Abia-Bassey
Deployment of new ICTs presupposes that for their contributions, particularly in the
the technologies will be used ethically to organization and moderation of focus group
fulfill desirable objectives. However, tech- discussions.
nology on its own is value neutral. While The authors also acknowledge the support
it may be used by Boko Haram militants to of the ICTs & Governance in Africa research
plan and execute attacks, it fulfills various project of the Programme on Comparative
other praiseworthy purposes in the society. Media Law & Policy (PCMLP) at Oxford
While the military decision of shutting down University and the Annenberg School for
mobile telephony was ostensibly meant to Communication, University of Pennsylvania
disrupt Boko Haram’s communication capa- under the Carnegie Corporation’s Program
bilities, it was seen by Nigerians primarily on Local Knowledge in Peacebuilding and
as another form of state disruption of their Statebuilding. This publication forms part
means of communication and private lives to of a special issue made possible in part by a
fulfill short term political exigencies. It is not grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York.
surprising that Nigerians felt that the deci- The statements made and views expressed are
sion to shut down mobile phone networks solely the responsibility of the author.
just to check Boko Haram was ‘dumb.’
Indeed, the shutdown demonstrated the Notes
discrepancies of citizens’ uses and gratifica- 1
As of February 2014.
tions of ICTs with those of the state. Whereas 2
In November 2013, the US government
the most paramount rewards of ICTs for citi- designated Boko Haram as a terrorist
zens is the comfort and ease of social and organization; on 22 May 2014 the UN
economic living such technologies enable, Security Council imposed funding, travel
the most paramount reward for states, on and weapons sanctions on the sect after
the other hand, is the ease with which such adding it to a list of designated Al Qaeda
technologies enable it to assert its authority entities.Art. 8, page 16 of 17 Jacob and Akpan: Silencing Boko Haram
3
The State of Emergency has been pp 9–15. Available at http://www.eir.
extended twice, for six-month peri- info/publication/boko-haram-anatomy-
ods in November 2013 and May 2014. of-a-crisis
In November 2014, Nigeria’s national Amnesty International 2014 Nigeria: More
assembly failed to approve an additional than 1,500 killed in armed conflict in
extension of the state of emergency. North-Eastern Nigeria in early 2014.
4
Anonymous, former member of Boko Available at http://www.amnesty.org/
Haram interviewed for this research pro- en/library/asset/AFR44/004/2014/
ject on 16 April, 2014. en/543f7ac9-6889-4f02-bf5a-
5
Sect members believed using helmets d73832e04229/afr440042014en.pdf
over their turbans was un-Islamic. Burt, R S 1999 The social capital of opinion
6
It is important to note that although the leaders. Annals of the American Acad-
group was not ostensibly violent under emy of Political and Social Science, 566:
Mohammed Yusuf, his fiery messages 37–54. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
clearly espoused this ideology. 0002716299566001004
7
Section 305 of the Nigerian constitution Eich, E, Macauley, D and Ryan, L 1994
empowers the president, with approval Mood dependent memory for events of
from two-thirds of the national assembly, the personal past. Journal of Experimen-
to proclaim a state of emergency in all tal Psychology: General, 201–215. DOI:
or parts of the country during threats to http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.
national security. 123.2.201
8
FGD, 4 May, 2014, Yola Town. El-bendary, M 2013 The Egyptian Revolution:
9
‘Hailing’ is a Nigerian pidgin English term Between Hope and Despair: Mubarak to
that describes various complex forms of Morsi. New York: Algora Publishing.
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10
Although FGDs were conducted about Ghonim, W 2012 Revolution 2.0: The Power
a year after the mobile phone blackout, of the People is Greater Than the People in
participants still had a strong recol- Power: A Memoir. New York: Houghton
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11
The Colonel interviewed preferred not to Jacob, J U 2014 Transforming conflicts with
be named, as he was not officially directed information: Impacts of UN Peace Radio
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How to cite this article: Jacob, J U and Akpan, I 2015 Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile Phone Blackout
and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria’s Northeast region. Stability: International Journal of Security &
Development, 4(1): 8, pp. 1-17, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ey
Published: 04 March 2015
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