SIM Evolution Klaus Vedder - SIGOS

 
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SIM Evolution Klaus Vedder - SIGOS
SIM Evolution

              Presented by: Klaus Vedder              For: 20th Sigos Conference

                                           10 July 2018
© ETSI 2018
SIM Evolution Klaus Vedder - SIGOS
The Subscriber Identity Module in 1988
       "A SIM is the physically secured module which contains the IMSI, an authentication algorithm, the
        authentication key and other (security related) information and functions. The basic function of
         the SIM is to authenticate the subscriber identity in order to prevent misuse of the MS (Mobile
                                           Station) and the network."
                                                                 From the report of SIMEG#1 in January 1988

GSM System Requirement: provide the same level of security as the fixed network

                                                              The question at the time:
                                                              Wouldn't it be sufficient to have a
                                                              functional specification and let
                                                              every operator specify its own
                                                              interface (except for the form
                             Plug-in SIM with carrier         factor) ?
                              Telemig, Brazil, 2005

© ETSI 2018                                                                                                   2
SIM Evolution Klaus Vedder - SIGOS
3

    The Form Factors in 1988

                                     Option 1: "IC card"

                                     The ID-1 card used by Deutsche Telekom
                                     in their analogue network

     Option 2: "Fixed" = Software SIM fully incorporated into the handset
      Rejected due to security concerns and less flexibility - would require operator
      specific personalisation of the handset
                                                a

      Option 3 (Plug-in SIM):
      "Removable"
                                                    vs
                                  24 pin DIL
    © ETSI 2018             with 8 pins connected                                       3
SIM Evolution Klaus Vedder - SIGOS
Some Early SIMs
  The SIM card: The key to gain
    access to your customer

                                  Used for the first call in June 1991

                                                                          Signature strip
                                  The contact area well integrated into   Plastic not suitable for embossing
                                  the design                              and use as a credit card
© ETSI 2018                                                                                                    4
SIM Evolution Klaus Vedder - SIGOS
Security, Technology and Services
The SIM: Providing the security
         Issuer specific authentication algorithm
         Issuer specific algorithm for cipher key generation
         Security management specified by issuer
  Attacks
         1998 black box attack against Comp 128-1
              Chosen plaintext-ciphertext attack to calculate the secret authentication key
         2013 Black Hat Conference Las Vegas: Faulty SW implementations
              “… This talk ends this myth of unbreakable SIM cards … and illustrates that the cards - like any
              other computing system – are plagued by implementation and configuration bugs.“ Karsten Nohl
The SIM card: Providing universal plastic roaming
The SIM card: Fostering the mass market by “Freeing the Mobile of the subscription“
The SIM: Driving Technology and Applications
         Leading to new generations of micro-controllers
         Memory requirements for smart cards were driven solely by GSM
         High temperature card material to satisfy the new environment
The SIM Application Toolkit
         The world's first global platform for secure Value Added Services

© ETSI 2018                                                                                                      5
SIM Evolution Klaus Vedder - SIGOS
From the SIM to the UICC
or from “mono”-application to multi-application

1999/2000 Split of all SIM specifications and responsibility
         A generic part (UICC) to form the multi-application platform (ETSI)
         An application specific part, the SIM application (3GPP)
The UICC consists of (all) application independent functions and features
         Separation of lower layers and applications

                                                                                              Fire walls between applications
         Up to 20 logical channels to run applications in parallel                    ID
         USB, NFC, security, … part of UICC specification                         Ticketing

                                                                             Electr. Purse
         Specified by
         the                     USIM              SIM
         respective                                                  Public
                                                                     Transport
         industry
         sector                             Toolkit
        Specified by
        ETSI
                                 UICC
                                 the multi-application smart card platform
        TC SCP
© ETSI 2018                                                                                                                     6
SIM Evolution Klaus Vedder - SIGOS
7

    Some Thoughts on Standardisation
    Standardisation can create a mass market
        GSM vs Telepoint ("Birdie", "Rabbit“, …)
    Standardisation can drive technology
    Standardisation is a way to achieve interoperability
        There is, however, more needed than just the specification containing the technical
        realisation of the requirement specification
    Standardisation shall not prevent technical, commercial and market progress
        Backwards compatibility is not always a desired feature
             Advancing from 2G to 3G and ignoring total backwards compatibility would have
             provided a huge improvement on the technical side with a high potential for the
             commercial side in the mid to long term
        Using a standards body to delay or block a topic may prove counterproductive
        and lead to a fragmented market
    Standardisation for the sake of standardisation is a waste of
    time and money
    © ETSI 2018                                                                                7
SIM Evolution Klaus Vedder - SIGOS
The Machine
What’s         to?Machine UICC
       in a Title

March 2010: ETSI TC SCP approves a new specification for UICCs inM2M
(TS 102 671 Smart Cards, Machine to Machine UICC, Physical and logical characteristics)
     M2M specific constraints
     such as data retention,                              Plug-in SIM card
     temperature, memory update cycles,                   15mm x 25 mm
     vibration resistance, humidity
          MFF1 (M2M Form Factor 1)
          socketable 8 pin solution
          MFF2 : a non-removable,                                   SON8
                                                                    5mm x 6mm
          to-be-soldered package (SON8)                            SON8
                                                                   5mm x 6mm

     Can the use of M2M Form Factors really be restricted to
               Machine-to-Machine applications ?
© ETSI 2018                                                                               8
                                                                                              8
SIM Evolution Klaus Vedder - SIGOS
Some Impacts of a Solderable UICC

No more "plastic roaming "
         Need to change the operator after deployment

Ownership of an embedded UICC
         In some countries the end user will own the "black beetle “

No point in stealing a mobile device with an embedded UICC
Lifetime issues of the chip - as long as the device (?)
Lifecycle management - personalisation and distribution
Future role of the MNOs and service providers (car manufacturers,
energy suppliers, …)
© ETSI 2018                                                            9
SIM Evolution Klaus Vedder - SIGOS
Managing an embedded UICC

      Today: HW, SW, security data out of one and the same source
               The SIM manufacturer develops OS including security optimised algorithms
               The SIM manufacturer generates personalisation data (serial numbers, keys, MNO
               credentials, …), loads them into the chip in its premises, together with an MNO
               specific profile, and sends SIMs and data to the MNO

      Tomorrow: Split system
               OEMs (device vendors) are provided with chips containing OS and algorithms
               Subscription Manager (SIM manufacturer) generates personalisation data (serial
               numbers, keys, MNO credentials. …) and sends these data to MNO and OEM
               OEM loads data on its premises in a secure way into the UICCs

           Two questions:
              How to handle the case that the device is not specifically produced for a specific MNO
              (in particular in the case of M2M devices)
              How to change the subscription of a device in the field
     © ETSI 2018                                                                                       10
10
Challenges

              Provisioning of subscriptions over-the-air or over-the-wire
                          after production, outside of factory

               New ecosystem with dynamic subscription management
                 (changing of subscriptions and profiles in the field)

© ETSI 2018                                                                 11
The Road to embedded UICCs, the Loss of the Fast
Interface and Other Form Factors

   "Today's SIM card is the most expensive piece of real estate on a PCB"
                          (OEM manufacturer in 2012)

                         The ID-1 Card
                         (1FF, 1988)
                                                               3FF (2003)       4FF (2012)
                                                                                             Non-standardised
                                                                                             packages - size of
                                                                                             the package
                                          Plug-in Card                             ~ 2016    down to chip-
                                                                       MFF2
                                          (2FF, 1989)                  (2010)                scale

        VCC      GND
                       The 4th form factor does not provide the space for the USB                                 Courtesy
                                                                                                                  Giesecke & Devrient
        RST      SWP   interface which had taken years to be approved
        CLK      I/O   SWP (Single Wire Protocol) is the standardised interface for
                       NFC-applications
        USB      USB

© ETSI 2018                                                                                                                         12
Secure Elements: From Separate to Integrated

The traditional SIM needs to be re-considered in the context of new mobile
communication challenges, including machine to machine communications.*
eUICC**
     The UICC becomes an integrated, though dedicated piece of hardware of the device (e.g.,MFF2)
     Provides the possibility of dematerialising the issuance of the SIM

SSP (Smart Secure Platform)
     First informal discussions at SCP#71 in Cupertino in October 2015
            Idea: Get rid of the UICC transport protocol (T=0), APDUs, …..
            Create a new high level interface application - independent of lower levels

* Prof. Mike Walker when presenting the work of Deutsche Telekom, G&D, Telefónica O2 UK and
Vodafone on the management of embedded UICCs at the ETSI Security Conference in January 2011
** An embedded UICC or eUICC is a "UICC which is not easily accessible or replaceable, is not intended to be removed
or replaced in the terminal, and enables the secure changing of subscriptions" (ETSI TS 103 383)
© ETSI 2018                                                                                                            13
The Smart Secure Platform
Objective: better integration of the UICC into the              Layout of the SSP protocol stack
specific use case while retaining its characteristics
SSP is designed to be a modular platform offering a
core set of features as well as a number of options
that need to be selected at the time of
implementation based on the intended application
(e.g., a system of sensors in an IoT application will
most likely not require full fledged UICCs in every
sensor).
    An open platform for multiple applications
    Clear separation of layers
    Choice of protocols (SPI, I2C, …)
    Faster and flexible
    Choice of hardware
    New filesystem
    Support of existing features
                                                        Figure taken from ETSI TS 103 465 v 1.3.0
         Contactless, Toolkit, …
© ETSI 2018                                                                                         14
The New SSP Specifications
The SSP “classes”
         iSSP: the UICC (and thus the SIM) becomes an integrated part of the chipset (SoC)
         eSSP: SSP version of the eUICC;
         rSSP: SSP version of the (removable) UICC
Priority on integrated SSP; eSSP and rSSP to follow
Requirements split into generic requirements for all classes and class
specific requirements (currently only for iSSP)
         TS 103 465 Smart Secure Platform; Requirements
              Status: under change control
The technical realisations
         TS 103 666-1 Smart Secure Platform; General characteristics
         TS 103 666-2 Smart Secure Platform; Integrated SSP (iSSP) characteristics
              Status: both are approaching completion

© ETSI 2018                                                                                  15
The iSSP Concept
     Integration of the functionality of the UICC into a System on Chip (SoC) solution. The
     iSSP is an independent secure processor within the SoC
     Advantage lies in the reduction of the number of chips, deeper integration and thus
     reduced amount of space
     Several bundles may co-exist in the SoC; one being executed within the Tamper
     Resistant Element (TRE) and the rest stored securely outside the TRE, ready to be
     swapped in and executed as required

          Bundle 1                 Bundle 2                 Bundle 3           Bundle 4   Bundle 5

       Telecoms                  Payment                   Identity            DRM         IoT

                                                                                                  Technology
                                                    Primary Platform Interface                     & use ase
                                                                                                 independent

                                                   Primary Platform *
                                                (underlying HW, low level OS, …)

     *For details and a diagram depicting an SoC solution see GlobalPlatform
     Technology VPP –Concepts and Interfaces Version 1.0 (March 2018)

© ETSI 2018                                                                                                    16
Multiple Industry Sector SSP

                                                                                         3GPP Functions
Device                                                      Connections                              Connects to the enabled
                                                            forbidden ?                              and active Telecom
                                                          Under discussion                           Bundle(s)**
                                                                                                                                    ** “(s)“ or no “(s)“ ,
                                                                                                                                    that’s the question
         Payment Bundle Management Entity*                                         Telecom Bundle Management Entity*

                                                                                                                                    *Not yet specified;
                                                                                                                                    rules up to the
             Bundle 1          Bundle 2            Bundle 3                  Bundle 4          Bundle 5           Bundle 6          specific industry
SSP                                                                                                                                 sector
         Family Identifier:Family Identifier:   Family Identifier:       Family Identifier: Family Identifier: Family Identifier:
           “Payment”         “Payment”               “XYC”              “Telecom Bundle”“Telecom Bundle” “Telecom Bundle”

                                                Primary Platform Interface

                                                       Primary Platform

   © ETSI 2018                                                                                                                                               17
Conclusion

The standardised SIM packages

                                                                    x
will (largely) disappear

                                                                SoC
                and

a new logical interface will replace today’s rather old interface
              for use by all industry sectors.

© ETSI 2018                                                             18
Where is this Trip Really Leading Us ?

              The meeting which started the concept of the UICC at the total eclipse of the sun in 1999
© ETSI 2018                                                                                               19
Thank You
                                                   nearly

              Dr. Klaus Vedder
              Chairman ETSI TC SCP
              Zeata Security Ltd.

                ETSI TC Smart Card Platform

                     Home of the UICC
                The most widely deployed Secure
                     Element in the world

                Next ETSI TC SCP Plenary Meeting
                           Paris, France
                     20-21 September 2018
                       see: www.etsi.org
© ETSI 2018                                                 20
ETSI TC SCP
 Home of the UICC – the most widely deployed Secure Element with more
 than 5 billion pieces going into the market every year
      30 years of dedication and real-life experience
      Scope
          Creation of a series of specifications for a Secure Element platform on which bodies from inside and outside
          the telecom-world can base their system specific applications to achieve compatibility between all
          applications resident on the Secure Element
          Development and maintenance of interface, procedures and protocol specifications between the Secure
          Element and entities (remote or local) used in the management of that Secure Element. This includes
          interfaces, procedures and protocol specifications used between such entities for the secure provisioning and
          operation of services making use of that Secure Element

      Output
          Over fifty specifications and reports on Secure Elements encompassing for every topic the whole range
          from requirements via the technical solution to the related test specification; topics range from administrative
          commands to APIs, browsers, Internet connectivity, Machine-to-Machine,
          new interfaces for high speed and NFC as well as remote management
          All specifications can be downloaded free of charge from the ETSI website

                 The specifications are application agnostic.
© ETSI 2018                                                                                                                  21
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