SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE - Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

Page created by Jerome Paul
 
CONTINUE READING
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE - Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung
Issue 5
                      December 2019

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
                        ISSN 2406-1824
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung
               Fostering democracy and upholding human rights, taking action to prevent the destruction
               of the global ecosystem, advancing equality between women and men, securing peace
               through conflict prevention in crisis zones, and defending the freedom of individuals
               against excessive state and economic power – these are the objectives that drive the
               ideas and actions of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. We maintain close ties to the German
               Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens) and as a think tank for green visions and projects,
               we are part of an international network encompassing well over 100 partner projects in
               approximately 60 countries.
               The Heinrich Böll Foundation works independently and nurtures a spirit of intellectual
               openness. We maintain a worldwide network with currently 30 international offices. Our
               work in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo concentrates on the democratisation process,
               political education, and environmental protection and sustainable development. We support
               and open public fora about topical and marginalised socio-political issues and we enable
               networking among local and international actors whose work aligns with Green values.

Cover design   Bogdan Maksimović
Introduction    Southeastern Europe    3

Kosovo: A Hostage Crisis
By Natalija Miletić

Twenty years on from the Kosovo War, the       ing conducted by the very politicians who
collective memory of both parties in the       were on opposing sides during the war in
conflict remains burdened by myths and         1998-99. The fact that the negotiations are in
incontestable truths about what actually       a state of stalemate, and have been for a
took place. Nationalist and ethnocentric       long time, should come as no surprise.
narratives about the war in the former Yu-     The hostage crisis known as Kosovo, in
goslav autonomous province continue to         which the populations of both Kosovo and
dominate public discourse of both Kosovo       Serbia are held as ideological hostages by
and Serbia.                                    their own political elites, has already been
The process of reconciliation and building     going on for twenty years. The lack of prog-
longstanding peace is being undermined,        ress in the official negotiations between
primarily, by political elites in both coun-   Belgrade and Pristina is an obstacle to
tries, whose populist policies amplify the     peacebuilding and the normal coexistence
prejudices between Kosovar Albanians and       of the two Kosovar communities. However,
Serbs. The political establishment in both     bad policies made by local and interna-
countries –composed of, inter alia, war-       tional stakeholders, mainly affect the lives
mongers, former combatants, convicted          of ordinary citizens, rather than the politi-
and non-convicted war criminals– face          cians and policy makers that are involved.
pressure from the international community      This issue of Perspectives on the 20th anni-
to finally, and without hesitation, resolve    versary of the Kosovo War and the NATO
the question of the former province of the     bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
ex-Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and normal-     slavia, is dedicated to ordinary citizens.
ize relations between Kosovo and Serbia.       These are the people who, to this day, live
 The current problems concerning relations     with the consequences of war, even if they
between the two countries are partly the re-   took no part in it; the youth raised to hate;
sult of the normalization negotiations,        anti-war activists who are considered ene-
which have been going on for more than a       mies of the state; minorities that are used
decade under the patronage of the interna-     as pawns in political maneuvering; victims
tional community. Kosovo’s status negotia-     of war crimes and victims of the NATO mil-
tions, which have taken place in the after-    itary campaign. In this issue of Perspec-
math of a conflict that claimed the lives of   tives we aim to highlight the fact that Koso-
thousands of civilians, destroyed tens of      vo is not just a toponym, but a country
thousands of homes and displaced more          burdened by its recent violent history,
than a million people, led to thousands of     where common people are struggling to
women being raped, and which only ceased       rebuild the broken societies that the con-
following the intervention of NATO, are be-    flict has left behind.

                                                                                                Natalija Miletić, journalist
4      Southeastern Europe     Introduction

           Introduction
           By Marijana Toma

                                      In the early 1980s, after the death of Social-   choice of official language, control of the
                                      ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)        police, as well as veto powers over any fur-
                                      President Josip Broz Tito, demonstrations        ther changes to the Constitution of Serbia.
                                      took place in Kosovo as Kosovo Albanians         A wave of demonstrations were organized
                                      sought for Kosovo to be recognized as a Re-      across Kosovo, involving students and
                                      public within SFRY. At the same time, in-        teachers, intellectuals, and miners, which
                                      creasing numbers of prominent individu-          led the Presidency of SFRY to impose ‘spe-
                                      als and institutions in Serbia began to          cial measures’, with federal authorities
                                      request that Kosovo’s autonomy be re-            assuming responsibility for security within
                                      duced, claiming that the Kosovo Albanian’s       the province. In that period, thousands of
                                      protests were “organised counter-revolu-         Kosovo Albanians employed in the public
                                      tionary activities”. Additionally, the emi-      sector– doctors, teachers, university pro-
                                      gration of Serbs and Montenegrins from           fessors, workers, judges, police and civil
                                      Kosovo intensified in this period, accom-        servants– were dismissed from their posi-
                                      panied by increasingly vocal demands             tions and replaced by non-Albanians. At
                                      from the Serbian public to halt this trend.      the same time, police violence against
                                      During the mid-1980s, the division be-           Kosovo Albanians increased.
                                      tween Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo was
                                      evident and deep: Albanians continued to         A decade of non-violent
                                      request that Kosovo be granted the status
                                      of a Republic, as well as for greater liberal-
                                                                                       resistance and the formation
                                      ization, and expressed concerns about            of the Kosovo Liberation
                                      Kosovo’s underdevelopment within SFRY,           Army
                                      while Serbs were concerned about discrim-        In September 1991, after the war in Slovenia
                                      ination against them by the Kosovo Alba-         already ended, and war in Croatia was on its
                                      nian-led provincial government. After the        way, Kosovo Albanian political leaders gath-
                                      Central Committee of the League of Com-          ered together within the Democratic League
                                      munists of Serbia elected Slobodan Mi-           of Kosovo, led by Ibrahim Rugova, a promi-
                                      lošević as the new Chairman of the Presid-       nent writer and intellectual, and embraced
                                      ium of the Central Committee, he managed         a policy of non-violent civil resistance, es-
                                      to marginalize his political opponents in        tablishing a system of unofficial, parallel
                                      the Party and established full control over      institutions in the health care and education
                                      the Serbian branch of the League of Com-         sectors. Kosovo Albanians held an unoffi-
                                      munists, allowing him to crucially influ-        cial referendum in which they voted over-
                                      ence political events in Yugoslavia.             whelmingly for independence from Serbia
                                      At the beginning of 1989, amendments to          and Yugoslavia. Between 1992 and 1995, the
                                      the Constitution of Serbia were adopted by       situation in Kosovo remained tense, but did
                                      the National Assembly. These constitu-           not erupt in violence , despite the
                                      tional changes revoked Kosovo’s autono-          strong-handed rule of the Serbian regime.
                                      my: most of the Provinces’ autonomous            After almost a decade of non-violent resis-
                                      powers were annulled, including control          tance by Kosovo Albanians, the Kosovo
    Marijana Toma, historian          over economic and educational policy,            Liberation Army (KLA), an armed resis-
Introduction   Southeastern Europe   5

tance organization, was formed by late         After additional attempts by international
1997 and began attacking Serbian police        mediators to persuade Slobodan Milošević
and civilians in Kosovo. In late 1996 and      to accept the agreement, US Ambassador
1997, the KLA claimed responsibility for       Richard Holbrooke announced the failure
armed attacks on members of the military       of negotiations on March 23rd 1999, after
in Kosovo, as well as against civilians. The   which NATO Secretary General Solana di-
beginning of armed conflict between the        rected Wesley Clark to commence air
Yugoslav Army and Serbian police with the      strikes, which began on the March 24th and
KLA is commonly connected to the attack        continued until June 10th 1999.
by Serbian police special forces on the fam-
ily compound of Adem Jashari in the vil-       Operation Allied Force -
lage of Donje Prekaze in March 1998, in
which Jashari, one of the founders of the
                                               NATO military intervention
KLA, along with an estimated 50 others         against the Federal Republic
members of his family and associates, in-      of Yugoslavia
cluding several women and children, were       Between March 24th and June 9th 1999, large
killed. During the spring of 1998, the KLA     areas of Serbia, including Kosovo, Bel-
gradually increased the intensity of attacks   grade and Novi Sad, were targeted by
in Kosovo, including against police patrols.   NATO bombing. While Montenegro was
The Army of Yugoslavia and Serbian police      not targeted often, Podgorica was bombed
responded by shelling Albanian villages. In    at the end of April 1999. According to the
July 1998, the KLA began an offensive in       Army of Yugoslavia, the Belgrade region
the Municipality of Orahovac, in an at-        was most intensively targeted by NATO’s
tempt to take control of the area, which       firepower. Although NATO and allied gov-
resulted in the killing of many civilians,     ernments and military officials stressed
both Albanian and Serb, by both the Serbi-     their intent to limit civilian casualties and
an security forces and KLA. Following the      other harm to the civilian population, from
KLA’s operations in the Orahovac region,       the outset of operation Allied Force, civil-
the Serbian army and police coordinated        ian casualties occurred.
action against KLA forces, and by early        Human Rights Watch, which conducted an
September 1998 the KLA had lost much of        investigation in NATO’s intervention, report-
the territory it had previously held.          ed ninety separate incidents involving civil-
                                               ian deaths during the bombing campaign.
Diplomatic efforts                             During the NATO air campaign, the inter-
to stop the war                                national community continued with diplo-
Following a massacre in mid-January in the     matic efforts to persuade the Yugoslav
village Račak, in central Kosovo, the Con-     leadership, primarily Milošević, to accept
tact Group called for a peace conference to    an international military presence in Koso-
be held in France at the beginning of Febru-   vo. Based on the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari
ary 1999. Despite efforts by the Contact       plan, a Military Technical Agreement be-
Group, the negotiations failed due to sub-     tween the International Security Force
stantial differences between the Federal       (KFOR) and the Governments of the Fed-
Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbian authorities     eral Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia was
and the international community on the is-     signed on June 9th, 1999 in Kumanovo, then
sue of implementation and an international     Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
military presence in Kosovo. According to      The agreement encompassed the with-
the ICTY, the diversity of the Kosovo Alba-    drawal of Serbian-Yugoslav forces from
nian delegation caused indecision and nu-      Kosovo, deployment of KFOR in Kosovo
merous changes in their position; the ap-      following the adoption of a UN Security
proach of the Troika (Austrian Ambassador      Council resolution, and allowing KFOR to
Wolfgang Petritsch, acting as the European     operate without interference. On June 10th
Union’s Special Envoy for Kosovo, Russian      1999 the Security Council adopted Resolu-
envoy Ambassador Boris Mayorski, and           tion 1244, authorizing the creation of an
U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill) did not      international civil presence, the purpose of
encourage confidence in the process; and       which was to provide an interim adminis-
the involvement of the U.S. Secretary of       tration for Kosovo, demilitarization of the
State, Madeleine Albright, introduced con-     KLA, and safe return of refugees and inter-
fusion and uncertainty into the position of    nally displaced persons. Following the
the international negotiators.                 withdrawal of the Serbian police and Yugo-
6   Southeastern Europe   Introduction

                                  slav Army, according to the records of the      Korenica, and other villages in the Reka
                                  Government of Serbia, more than 187,000         Valley, Serbian forces killed at least 287
                                  Serbs and other non-Albanians left Kosovo       Kosovo Albanian men and forcibly ex-
                                  and moved to Serbia. Those who stayed in        pelled a number of Kosovo Albanian civil-
                                  Kosovo were targeted by Albanians in re-        ians and forced them to leave for Albania.
                                  prisals. In this post-conflict violence, be-    A significant number of bodies of these
                                  tween June 12th 1999 and December 31st          men were later discovered in a mass grave
                                  2000, 932 non-Albanians were killed, ab-        in Batajnica, during the exhumations con-
                                  ducted or went missing, mostly Serbs.           ducted in 2001-2002. In Izbica, on March
                                  Post-conflict relations between Serbs and       28th 1999, over 100 mostly older men were
                                  Albanians have developed slowly. Violence       separated from women and children, gath-
                                  did not end in 1999, erupting again in          ered in a field, divided into two groups and
                                  March 2004 when ethnic tensions led to un-      shot. In Podujevo, on March 28th 1999, the
                                  rest and riots in what is now known in Ser-     Serbian Scorpions police unit committed
                                  bia as the “March Pogrom”, in which 15          a massacre, killing 19 Albanian women
                                  Albanians and 12 Serbs were killed, 170         and children from the Duriqi and Boguje-
                                  Serbs were seriously injured, around 800        vci families.
                                  Serb houses were destroyed or seriously
                                  damaged, as well as 90 Ashkalia and two         Victims of victimhood
                                  Albanian houses, and 36 Serbian Orthodox        Since the end of the armed conflict, Serbia
                                  Churches and other religious places were        and Kosovo have been in dispute over al-
                                  completely or partially destroyed. In recent    most every issue related to the conflict,
                                  years, the security situation in Kosovo has     from the causes of the conflict, its chronol-
                                  improved and although the return of Serbs       ogy, and nature, to the atrocities that were
                                  is slow, relations between Serbs and Alba-      committed, and the number of people who
                                  nians in Kosovo are slowly normalizing.         lost their lives during and after the conflict.
                                                                                  Since mid-2000s, the Humanitarian Law
                                  War crimes in Kosovo                            Center in Serbia (HLC) and Humanitarian
                                  During the entire period of the NATO            Law Center Kosovo (HLC Kosovo), two hu-
                                  bombing, the Army of Yugoslavia and po-         man rights organizations and documenta-
                                  lice forces of the Republic of Serbia contin-   tion centers, have conducted extensive
                                  ued to specifically target Kosovo Albanian      research on human losses in connection
                                  civilians, committing killings, including       with the Kosovo conflict. According to the
                                  executions, and forcing civilians to leave      Kosovo Memory Book Database, a total of
                                  Kosovo for Albania and Macedonia. Atroc-        13,535 persons were killed or disappeared
                                  ities began almost immediately after the        during and in the context of the armed
                                  beginning of NATO bombing. One of the           conflict in Kosovo, 10,812 of which were
                                  first major crimes was committed by mem-        Kosovo Albanians, 2,197 were Serbs, and
                                  bers of Serbian police in Suva Reka, on         526 were Roma, Bosniaks, Montenegrins,
                                  March 26th 1999, when 45 members of Ber-        and other non-Albanians. HLC and HLC
                                  isha family were killed. Among them were        Kosovo have analyzed more than 31,600
                                  many women and children, whose bodies           documents from numerous sources, in-
                                  were discovered and exhumed from a              cluding a large number of statements giv-
                                  mass grave at the police compound in            en by victims or witnesses of war crimes.
                                  Batajnica, a Belgrade suburb. One area          According to the HLC and HLC Kosovo
                                  targeted by the Army and Police was the         database, during the conflict in Kosovo in
                                  municipality of Đakovica, where Serbian         1998, 2,046 persons were killed or went
                                  police began killing Kosovo Albanians and       missing, of which 1,705 Albanians, 280
                                  burning houses in March and April 1999 in       Serbs, and 61 were other non-Albanians;
                                  order to create an atmosphere of fear           1,018 were Kosovo Albanian civilians, 129
                                  among those civilians who refused to leave      were Serb civilians, and 44 other non-Al-
                                  their homes and flee to Albania. During         banian civilians; 682 were Kosovo Alba-
                                  the Reka Valley operation, launched in          nian members of the KLA, one Kosovo
                                  part as a response to the killing of five po-   Albanian who was a member of the Army
                                  licemen on April 22nd 1999, the Army and        of Yugoslavia/Serbian police, 151 Serb
                                  Police acted in conjunction, expelling          members of Army/Police, and 16 persons
                                  Kosovo Albanian civilians from their vil-       of other ethnicities who were members of
                                  lages and sending many of them to Alba-         the Army of Yugoslavia/Serbian police. It
                                  nia. On April 27th 1999, in villages Meja and   was impossible to determine the status of
Introduction   Southeastern Europe   7

four Albanians and one non-Albanian as          ones on Surdulica, where 29 people were
combatant or civilian.                          killed, Niš, where 19 civilians were killed,
Between March 20th and June 14th 1999, Ser-     and on the Radio-Television of Serbia stu-
bian forces killed or destroyed the bodies of   dio in Belgrade, where 17 civilians were
6,901 Albanian civilians. In the same peri-     killed.
od, the KLA was responsible for the killing
or disappearance of 328 Serbian civilians       Reconciliation
and 136 Roma persons and other non-Alba-        While some progress has been made in the
nian civilians. Combat between the Army of      area of dealing with the past and transi-
Yugoslavia/Serbian police and KLA result-       tional justice, the process of reconciliation
ed in the killing or disappearance of 1,204     still lies in the distant future in the region
members of the KLA and 559 members of           of the post-Yugoslav states, and in Ser-
the Army of Yugoslavia and Serbian Police.      bia-Kosovo particularly. It is therefore nec-
During the NATO bombing, HLC and HLC            essary that Serbia and Kosovo, as well as
Kosovo documented 758 persons who lost          other countries in the region, accept the
their lives as a result of NATO attacks, of     already established facts about war crimes
which 205 Serbian civilians, 220 Kosovo-Al-     committed in the Yugoslav wars during the
banian civilians, 28 Roma civilians and ci-     1990s, demonstrate additional willingness
vilians of other ethnicities, 30 members of     to address these issues through the estab-
the KLA, and 275 members of the Army of         lishment of regional truth experiments,
Yugoslavia and Serbian police. NATO             repair the damage inflicted upon victims,
bombs killed 260 people in the territory of     and establish accountability for past atroc-
Serbia, 10 in Montenegro, and 488 in Koso-      ities, through war crimes prosecutions and
vo. The two most deadly NATO attacks were       halting the promotion of war criminals.
in Korisa, where 77 Albanian civilians were     These steps present the only solid ground
killed, and Bistražin, where 64 Albanian ci-    for the long awaited reconciliation be-
vilians were killed, whereas on the territory   tween Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, as well
of Serbia, the most deadly attacks were the     with other neighbors in the region.
8      Southeastern Europe         Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils

           Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing –
           the lesser of two evils
           By Simon Ilse and Milan Bogdanović

                                          In early 1999, German Tornado jets took part in airstrikes against targets in Serbia, thus
                                          opening a new chapter in the history of Germany. The decision to participate in the NATO
                                          intervention in the Kosovo war, taken by the newly formed red-green government in
                                          Germany, headed by Gerhard Schroeder, caused major internal strains, primarily in the
                                          ranks of the Greens. The focal point of criticism was the “Green” Minister of Foreign Af-
                                          fairs, Joschka Fischer, whose support for military intervention clashed with the Green
                                          Movement’s anti-war policies. Winfried Nachtwei, former member of the German Bun-
                                          destag and the Alliance 90/Greens, interviewed for this edition of Perspectives, speaks
                                          about the controversial dilemma of protecting human rights through the use of military
                                          force and the policy of non-violence, as well as about the lessons learned from the war
                                          and the process of peacebuilding in Kosovo.

                                          In regard to the NATO intervention in                legitimized under international law. In this
                                          1999 – did the Greens do the wrong thing             respect, it was clear to us that we support-
                                          for the right reasons?                               ed one evil to prevent another intolerable
                                          That thought came to me a few weeks after            evil.
                                          the beginning of the NATO intervention,
                                          because the intention to avert an immi-              Could you describe this dilemma?
                                          nent humanitarian threat within a short              The Green Party, including the peace move-
                                          period of time was not achieved. The in-             ment, have argued for years about how ad-
                                          tention was right, I still believe that, but the     equately Western European states could
                                          result is questionable. The thought came             have reacted to the wars in the Balkans. It
                                          up: “Was one being naive about the effec-            was agreed that humanitarian aid should be
                                          tiveness of this kind of military action?”           supported, aid should be given to refugees,
                                                                                               refugees should be admitted and sanctions
                                          Was the decision to participate in opera-            should be imposed on the main aggressors.
                                          tion Allied Force, from a German point               Whether military action should be taken
                                          of view, and in conditions that were not             was the subject of huge debate, and it was
                                          easy, the right one?                                 postponed by the Greens, in the autumn of
                                          From the very start it was mainly about the          1996, when a delegation from our parlia-
                                          dilemma of preventing another Bosnia in              mentary group and our party visited Bosnia
                                          the European political sphere of interest            and Herzegovina. There, in Sarajevo, we
                                          and, in that sense, it was very much the             really understood what had happened to
                                          right and necessary thing to do. A major             the defenseless population in besieged Sa-
                                          problem was that the United Nations Se-              rajevo, and how Europe had done nothing
                                          curity Council was unable to legitimize              effective against it. This was precisely where
                                          military action, i.e. the use of force, be-          we, most of whom were pacifists, came to
    Winfried Nachtwei, former
    Bundestag MP (Alliance ‘90/Greens)
                                          cause of the veto announced by Russia and            realize there are situations in which the use
    Simon Ilse, hbs Belgrade office       probably also China. The threat of military          of military force can be necessary, legiti-
    director                              strikes, air strikes, was justified, given the       mate and justifiable, in order to prevent
    Milan Bogdanović, hbs Belgrade
    program coordinator
                                          real situation in Kosovo, but it was not             mass violence.
Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils   Southeastern Europe   9

In 1998 the violence had escalated consid-        their support. Had the majority of them
erably. In September 1998 the UN Security         withdrawn their support of their own For-
Council stated how the development in             eign Minister, Joschka Fischer, it would
Kosovo posed a threat to security and             have led to the Green Party leaving the co-
peace in the region. The issue was ad-            alition and the German Government, and
dressed to both parties in the conflict, in-      Fischer would not have been Foreign Min-
cluding the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army,          ister any more. Fischer had already made
Albanian Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës -           good progress agitating for a political solu-
Ed.], but the armed Serbian forces were           tion to the conflict, with the five points of
marked as the main driver and as the side         the so-called Fischer Plan. It tried to in-
responsible for the violence. That was the        clude Russia and the Western states were
main reason for the final approval.               behind it.
                                                  Fischer was the main proponent of a dip-
And the dilemma in the German public              lomatic solution to the Kosovo war, and
discourse – what was it like from your            thus the party conference of Bielefeld was
perspective?                                      essential for the further development –for
The support of Germany for the NATO in-           the political development, in Europe– re-
tervention meant that democratic Germa-           garding the war in Kosovo.
ny participated in a war for the first time.
In the case of the Greens, it was aggravated      Was the Fischer Plan, with its famous 5
by the fact that in our party programme –         points, the crucial step towards the reso-
even in 1998– we rejected United Nations          lution of the conflict?
combat missions. We only voted for the            It would be an overestimation to say it was
weakest form of blue helmets. When we             the crucial point. There are different fac-
agreed to the NATO intervention, we sim-          tors that came together, but it did set the
ply broke with the essential pillars of our       diplomatic stone rolling. If, however, the
peace policy. That brought a storm of in-         US and Moscow had dismissed it, the ini-
dignation from substantial parts of our           tiative would have gone up in smoke.
own membership and voters, because                There was a will to find a resolution. That
those who were involved in the govern-            was especially obvious on June 2nd when
ment were considered traitors to our pre-         two envoys of the Troika –Chernomyrdin
vious principles. However, the problem            and the Finnish President Ahtisaari– were
was that those who condemned the inter-           in Belgrade. There was another urge from
vention could not provide any suggestions         Russian President Yeltsin: “You have to
as to what else was possible and necessary        reach an agreement!” Milošević sensed
to do in Kosovo.                                  then that he didn’t have Russian support
In summary, we had a dilemma between              anymore, which is why he gave in.
the protection of human rights, on the one        To summarize, there were several people
hand, against mass violence, and on the           seeking solutions and the stubborn Mi-
other hand the obligation to non-violence         lošević had to give in.
- non-violence as a fundamental value for
the Greens.                                       How do you see the role of Joschka Fis-
                                                  cher, the then main politician of the
Shortly before the intervention the fa-           Greens, today? How much is his public
mous Green Party conference of                    image influenced by 1999?
Bielefeld took place. Joschka Fischer’s           Joschka Fischer did indeed play a very es-
speech and the paint bag attack1 left a           sential role in this. As a political realist he
strong historical impression. What was            was aware even before October 1998, be-
the most important thing about that par-          fore the red-green coalition was formed,
ty conference?                                    what the participation of the Greens in the
I was at the party conference in May 1999.        Government of Germany would mean. The
The NATO intervention had already been            rest of us, me included, were not com-
going on for a few weeks and it hadn’t            pletely aware of that in advance.
shown the effect we had hoped for. The            If you are part of the Government, it isn’t
conference was essential, because there           enough to just criticize what has been
was a discussion about whether the Greens         done and say what should be done better.
would continue to support the course of           You have to practice politics in the given
the Federal Government and support its            circumstances – with strong principles and
Foreign Minister or would they withdraw           with the ability to form an alliance. He was
10   Southeastern Europe   Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils

                                  very dedicated to the principle that Ger-            KFOR did not show determination in many
                                  many must not act alone, but always to-              areas. There were organized demonstra-
                                  gether with partners. He had a strong                tions, with around 50,000 people attending
                                  opinion about that and pursued it with the           in Kosovo, which is very small. Some of the
                                  best powers of persuasion, leadership and            protesters were armed and behaved like a
                                  rhetoric. In this stormy political sea he            mob. KFOR soldiers mostly did not inter-
                                  was, I believe this strongly, the best and           vene and during the days of the March ri-
                                  strongest navigator. I am very sceptical             ots many Kosovo Serbs were forced from
                                  whether there was anyone else in the                 their homes. Ten Serbian Orthodox sacred
                                  Green Party that could provide such strong           buildings were destroyed in the Prizren
                                  leadership, who would be able to do what             area alone at that time.
                                  he did.                                              That was an extremely disturbing setback.
                                  If the Bielefeld party conference had devel-         However, we had the impression that les-
                                  oped in another direction, it would have led         sons were learned relatively quickly at an
                                  to the break-up of the government. It would,         operational level. It got a little tricky again
                                  most probably, not have changed the fact             in North Mitrovica, in the areas predomi-
                                  that Germany was participating in it [NATO           nantly inhabited by Serbs, in connection
                                  intervention - Ed.] – it would have just par-        with the unilateral independence, then
                                  ticipated under another government.                  again in 2011, in relation to the customs
                                  For the Greens this would possibly, or even          issues, when a KFOR soldier was shot.
                                  probably, have led to a split and thus to a          These crises flared up over and over again.
                                  considerable decline. The Greens are to-             What was not achieved was to reduce the
                                  day the second strongest and sometimes               considerable influence of organized crime
                                  even the strongest party in Germany - this           within the top political circles. It was also
                                  success might not have happened in that              not possible to effectively reduce unem-
                                  case.                                                ployment and the lack of prospects, espe-
                                                                                       cially for younger people.
                                  As a member of the Bundestag’s Defense               However, it must be said that KFOR cannot
                                  Committee, you have been to Kosovo                   do this. These things have to be supported
                                  several times since 1999. What was your              by UNMIK. I do not dare to say from a de-
                                  experience of the 2004 riots, the 2008               fense policy perspective why this was so
                                  declaration of independence and other                unsuccessful.
                                  inter-ethnic tensions?
                                                                                       To what extent do you think the decision
                                  As members of the Defense Committee,                 to intervene in Kosovo influenced later
                                  we were mainly involved in KFOR. I had               discussions about military interventions
                                  contact with UNMIK police and we also                worldwide?
                                  met representatives from Kosovo, includ-             Kosovo taught us decisive and fundamental
                                  ing civil society actors, on a regular basis.        lessons related to stabilization operations in
                                  As far as KFOR is concerned, I always had            post-conflict environments, with consider-
                                  the impression that on the whole they act-           able potential for violence. The experience
                                  ed appropriately and predominantly                   was used in Afghanistan by Bundeswehr
                                  wisely.                                              soldiers and our NATO partners.
                                  In the first few years, stabilization and pre-       Each crisis operation is different, because
                                  venting major outbursts of violence was              all countries in crisis are different, and the
                                  the priority. All of a sudden the March riots        significantly different framework condi-
                                  happened, I was there and I saw how it ex-           tions in Afghanistan were not considered
                                  ploded, so to say. I noticed a few things:           sufficiently. It was a totally different war,
                                  First of all, the so-called community of             with a different balance of powers, where
                                  states had, in the meantime, lost interest           a wave of wars over decades meant the
                                  in Kosovo, partly due to other crises, espe-         Mujahedin, the Taliban, were very experi-
                                  cially in Afghanistan after September 11th.          enced in the affairs of war. In other words,
                                  There was a certain Kosovo-fatigue in the            the experience from Kosovo was trans-
                                  Parliament as well as the urge to reduce             ferred too simply to the next mission.
                                  the number of KFOR soldiers more
                                  quickly.                                             That sounded a little like the grand topic
                                  The so-called frozen conflict, which had             of “Lessons Learned”. Did the Green Par-
                                  previously been neglected at the interna-            ty or Germany learn from Kosovo? Are
                                  tional level, exploded again in March 2004.          there certain strategies or new ways of
Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils       Southeastern Europe   11

approaching conflicts as a consequence              At the time, that was hugely underestimat-
of the experience in Kosovo?                        ed by the German Government. We now
The experiences of the OSCE and KFOR                need to draw a line and evaluate what went
mission in Kosovo from autumn 1998 until            wrong, what should be done better in the
March 1999 were the starting point. There           future in order to promote an empirical
was a huge observer mission with a con-             narrative that is as realistic and factual as
flict dampening function, but there were            possible. At the time, Foreign Minister Fis-
not enough sufficiently educated and ca-            cher also said: “We must look to the
pable people. It is something that has been         future”.
corrected.                                          It was not understood by the ruling parties
The creation of the Civil Peace Service,            that they must not only stay politically ac-
with advisors working against social hos-           tive in relation to such conflicts, but that
tility and the Center for International             there is also a continuing struggle for legit-
Peace Operations in Berlin, which is inter-         imation and acceptance.
nationally highly recognized – they were
one lesson.                                         After the intervention in 1999 you men-
Another lesson was the Stability Pact –             tioned there was fatigue regarding Koso-
transnational, comprehensive support for            vo in Germany. What is the situation
the Western Balkans, which was supposed             now, 20 years later? Is Kosovo still of in-
to bring together different ethnicities and         terest in Germany in 2019?
regions through practical work. Many les-           The “Kosovo fatigue“ –lower interest among
sons were learned from the crisis in the            the public about Kosovo– is still present. It
Presevo Valley in 2000 and in Macedonia             is a fatigue towards countries in conflict
in 2001. There was a danger of a new inter-         with which European countries, or now the
nal war, which was prevented for the first          European Union, and the Federal Republic
time through coordinated crisis manage-             of Germany, had special dealings in the
ment by the international community.                past; for some years now, since 2014 at
Still, in my opinion, the German Govern-            least, it applies very clearly to Afghanistan.
ment did not do any systematic and public           There are only reports in the media when
evaluation of the Kosovo war, of its own            something huge happens. The problem is
participation in it and of the whole mission        that there is an enormous crisis competi-
– and this also applies to many other coun-         tion today. The most actual crises, in
tries. There hasn’t been an overall “lessons        which our own soldiers are involved, get
learned” process at the political and strate-       the most attention.
gic level and for the current political gen-        International efforts of stabilization and of
eration the experiences from Kosovo are             peace building are much more complicat-
not relevant.                                       ed and have a more long-term character
                                                    than it was imagined at the end of the
How do you explain the fact that the West           1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s.
has suffered a severe defeat regarding the          There is now the possibility, twenty years
justification and interpretation of this war        after the war in Kosovo, twenty years since
and that to this day it continues to be a           the beginning of KFOR and UNMIK, to
great hurdle with regard to normalizing             draw attention again. Many women and
relations between Kosovo and Serbia?                men, who were familiar with the initial
I have also observed this loss of interpretive      phase of intervention are now saying that
sovereignty or legitimacy of one’s own ac-          KFOR and its troops, who had the task to
tions, which was already apparent in the im-        ensure peace and to prevent new violence,
mediate years following this intervention.          were successful.
These are narratives that are still wide-
spread among the population today, that                                Translated by Sanja Katarić
the population was lied to, that there were
other interests at play. The point of view          	The conference was marked by heated anti-war protests,
                                                    1

has been adopted that the war in Kosovo               both in and outside the venue. At one point, Mr. Fischer
                                                      was hit by a bag of red paint, causing damage to his ear
and the violence started with NATO bomb-
                                                      drum - Ed.
ings and there was no history behind it.
12      Southeastern Europe            The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia

             The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia:
             Its functions, problems, and critiques
             By Ivan Čolović

                                              The myth of the Battle of Kosovo Field on June 28th 1389, in which the armies of the Otto-
                                              man Sultan Murat I and Serbian Prince Lazar clashed, has, since the early 19th century to
                                              this day, served the purpose of legitimizing various political and military projects: From
                                              the breakup of communist Yugoslavia and the policies of Slobodan Milošević, through the
                                              “Kosovo is Serbia” motto, as part of the Serbian “European agenda”, to the dialogue –both
                                              internal and with Brussels– led by Aleksandar Vučić. The “Kosovo Covenant” in modern
                                              Serbian history is used to accommodate various political ideas and actions.

                                              The colloquial use of the word myth is wide-      auspices of “sacred Kosovo” or the “Kosovo
                                              spread today, to denote a story without ba-       covenant” - as the mythical narrative about
                                              sis in reality, one which is not true. Con-       the Battle of Kosovo is most widely referred
                                              trary to this, I understand myth in an            to today. This function –that of political
                                              anthropological sense, as a story with the        myth– was already present in the memory
                                              status of paramount truth in a particular         of this battle in the cult writings about
                                              society, a truth which is not debated, one        Prince Lazar written a few years after the
                                              which an individual is not obliged to be-         battle. However, the mature Kosovo myth,
                                              lieve in, but must not disturb, must not          with all of the episodes we know today, was
                                              publicly question. This is why myths are          only formed in the first half of the 19th cen-
                                              sometimes referred to as “divine stories”.        tury, and has served to legitimize various
                                              The political function of myth is based on        political and military projects ever since.
                                              this divinity and unquestionable nature,          During that time, the solemn, sacred story
                                              because it can serve those in power, or           of the Battle of Kosovo has not only served
                                              those seeking power, as a tool to legitimize      to legitimize the policies of Serbian politi-
                                              their policies. They do this by placing them-     cians and the Serbian authorities. It wasn’t
                                              selves and their political and military proj-     always solely a Serbian myth. It also served
                                              ects and actions under the protection of the      to legitimize political and military projects
                                              sanctity of myth, constructing a tailor-made      undertaken in the name of other peoples,
                                              version of mythical narration, so that they       so that there are Croatian, Bosniak, Monte-
                                              themselves may become mythical heroes,            negrin, Albanian, and Yugoslav versions of
                                              or at least their devotees and followers, thus    the Kosovo myth, in addition to the Serbian
                                              “inscribing” themselves into the myth.            one. However, after the Kingdom of Yugo-
                                              The same is true of the Kosovo myth, the          slavia was dissolved in 1941 –a country
                                              myth of the Battle of Kosovo Field on June        where Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day, the day of
                                              28th 1389, in which the armies of the Otto-       the Battle of Kosovo, June 28th) was a na-
                                              man Sultan Murat I and Serbian Prince La-         tional holiday, a holiday shared by all Yu-
                                              zar clashed. It is important to note that not     goslav peoples, when the famous Battle of
                                              all of the diverse evocations of this battle in   Kosovo Field was emphasized as being a
                                              folklore, historiography, literature, and         shared political and cultural heritage– the
                                              church literature are myth. Mythical are          Kosovo myth has been exploited most of-
                                              only those offered up as paramount, “sa-          ten, if not exclusively, as a Serbian national
     Ivan Čolović, political anthropologist   cred”, in order to place some political idea      myth. It was revived in that capacity by the
     and writer                               or action, as well as its actors, under the       Quisling government led by Milan Nedić
The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia   Southeastern Europe   13

during the German occupation of Serbia          versions of the Kosovo myth have also de-
(1941-1944). Nazi sympathizers close to         veloped, emphasizing the participation of
Nedić proposed that the authentic Serbian       Albanian warriors in the Battle of Kosovo
myth of Kosovo should be revived, as it was     Field. It goes without saying that they did
alienated from the “Serbian soul” in the        battle on the side of the Christians, which is
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, highlighting its         to prove that Albanians are also an old Eu-
similarity to the German racial myth that       ropean and Christian people, who have
had been revived in Nazi Germany. After         always stood at the vanguard of Europe. In
the Second World War, communist Yugo-           corroboration, a national poem is offered
slavia did not restore the Kosovo myth as       about the Albanian hero Miloš Kobilić2 and
part of a common Yugoslav heritage, be-         his feat – the killing of Sultan Murat I, writ-
cause that role was reserved for the solemn     ten in the first decades of the 20th century3.
narrative about the People’s Liberation         Writer Ismail Kadare greatly contributed to
War, the Partisans, and their leader Tito.      the popularization of the Albanian version
Instead, the Kosovo myth was assigned the       of the Kosovo myth. Since 2011, two plays
role of keeping the memory of the import-       about the Battle of Kosovo have been part
ant contribution of the Serbian people’s        of the repertoires of two Pairisian theaters,
heroic ancestors in the fight for freedom, a    one of which was written based on the po-
freedom which would be fully realized,          ems of the “Kosovo Cycle” from the collec-
with similar contributions from other Yu-       tion by Vuk Karadžić, and the other is a
goslav peoples, only with the victory of        theater adaptation of Kadare’s book, Three
Communism. This was also the role of the        Elegies for Kosovo4.
Monument to the Heroes of Kosovo, erect-
ed in 1953 by Serbian communists in
Gazimestan.
                                                “Kosovo is Serbia” –
In the time of crisis, wars, and the dissolu-   A New Kosovo Covenant
tion of communist Yugoslavia (1985-1995),       After the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Her-
the Kosovo myth served to legitimize the        zegovina, and Kosovo in the 1990s, the Ser-
main policy goals of the Serbian regime,        bian politicians who took over governing
headed by Slobodan Milošević. The main          the country found themselves tasked with
portion of the 600th anniversary celebration    adapting the Kosovo myth - which was still
of the Battle of Kosovo (July 28th 1989) –a     an important political resource for them –
grand rally organized in front of the Gaz-      to fit the new situation. It was to be separat-
imestan Monument– was used by Milošević         ed and saved from being compromised as
to portray himself as the new Serbian lead-     a result of what some would say was its
er, a worthy successor to those who led the     abuse by Milošević and other Serbian lead-
Serbs into battle against the Turks 600 years   ers during the wars, and adapted to the new
before, and to promise that he would lead       goals of Serbian policy, among which was
the Serbian people into new battles. During     the “European agenda” of moving toward
the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herze-       the EU. This is why, when the Battle of
govina, Serbian soldiers were also called to    Kosovo was evoked in public events, it was
follow the example of famous Kosovo he-         emphasized that the bravery of the Kosovo
roes. This sort of motivation for battle was    heroes could still serve as inspiration to 21st
used most by Bosnian Serb leaders, por-         century Serbs, but that it can also manifest
traying Bosniaks as descendants of the          itself as political and diplomatic struggle to
Turks, and the war against them as a con-       keep Kosovo as part of Serbia, instead of
tinuation of the Battle of Kosovo and an        waging a new war – as Milošević did, to the
opportunity for the Serbs to take revenge       detriment of the Serbian people.
on the Turks for their defeat in Kosovo in      After 2008, when Kosovo Albanians de-
1389. This is exactly how General Mladić        clared Kosovo’s independence, the Vido-
hailed the capture of Srebrenica and the        vdan celebrations at Gazimestan became a
slaughter of its Bosniak residents, which       frustration, because Serbian politicians and
was ruled to have been genocide by the In-      religious leaders could only go there with
ternational Court of Justice in 2007: Re-       KFOR’s permission, as well as the police
venge against the Turks1.                       force of independent Kosovo. This is why
In more recent times, in the context of re-     the most important Vidovdan celebrations
viving Albanian nationalism in Kosovo, the      were moved to Kruševac in Serbia and
war of 1998-1999, and the creation of an        Višegrad in Republika Srpska. On the other
independent state of Kosovo, Albanian           h a n d , K o s o v o’ s d e c l a r a t i o n o f
14   Southeastern Europe   The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia

                                  independence served to revive warmonger-         after announcing the internal dialogue, “is
                                  ing versions of the Kosovo myth, even lead-      to worry about earthly life, and let someone
                                  ing to attempts to rehabilitate Milošević and    else worry about the afterlife.”6
                                  his Kosovo policy, elevating him to be a new     The version of the Kosovo myth in Serbia
                                  Kosovo martyr. The culmination and failure       dominant today originated in the first half
                                  of this new mobilization for battle with the     of the 19th century, when concern for the
                                  Kosovo Albanians in the name of the “Koso-       afterlife was abandoned and the story of
                                  vo covenant” was the grand rally in Belgrade     Prince Lazar choosing the Kingdom of
                                  organized on February 21st 2008 by the Ser-      Heaven over the Kingdom of Earth –which
                                  bian government, headed by Vojislav Koštu-       was included in Serbian church writings as
                                  nica, to protest Kosovo’s declaration of inde-   early as the 14th century, as well as in folk
                                  pendence. Following a series of incendiary       songs recorded by Vuk Karadžić– was re-
                                  speeches, and chants of “Kosovo is Serbia”,      vised. At the time when Serbs and other
                                  some protestors caused mayhem in the city,       South Slavs were fighting for liberation
                                  including an attack on the U.S. embassy. A       from Turkish, and then Austro-Hungarian
                                  few months after this rally, on May 11th 2008,   rule, evoking the famous Battle of Kosovo
                                  Koštunica’s party, the Democratic Party of       served to raise the morale of these warriors
                                  Serbia (DSS), lost the parliamentary             for the Kingdom of Earth, and so Lazar was
                                  elections.                                       asked to give up on the Kingdom of Heaven
                                                                                   or step back and allow Miloš Obilić, who
                                  Holy Serbia and Profane                          had slayed Murat, to take the lead role.
                                  Kosovo                                           Having renounced the Kosovo myth as a
                                  Aleksandar Vučić, leader of the Serbian          concern with the afterlife, Vučić has actu-
                                  Progressive Party (SNS), which has occu-         ally reasserted his belief in the Kosovo myth
                                  pied the most important positions of power       as heroic death for earthly life, the main
                                  since 2012, is considered to be the politi-      version of this myth from the 19th century
                                  cian whose word on all matters of Serbian        until today.
                                  policy is final, notwithstanding the consti-     It is important to note that the people using
                                  tutional powers he actually possessed as         the Kosovo myth to strengthen their politi-
                                  Deputy Prime Minister (2012-2014), Prime         cal positions today never mention it under
                                  Minister (2014-2017), or now as President.       that name, rather using the terms “Kosovo
                                  This is why his influence on Serbia’s Kosovo     covenant” or “Vidovdan covenant”, sug-
                                  policy has been decisive, as well as the use     gesting that they are talking about some-
                                  of the Kosovo myth to further that policy,       thing supposedly more true and valuable
                                  which is ambivalent, to say the least – si-      than what the colloquial use of the term
                                  multaneously renouncing and fully affirm-        “myth”, defined as a story without basis,
                                  ing the myth.                                    would imply. That is why there is actually
                                  Vučić himself publicly professes doubts          no difference between calls by Vučić for
                                  about what he calls the “mythical ap-            Kosovo to be discussed without using the
                                  proach” to the Kosovo problem. At his in-        “mythical approach” and the frequent
                                  auguration as President of Serbia, Vučić         statements and warnings to Serbs by his
                                  announced a new approach to this prob-           closest advisors that the “Kosovo covenant”
                                  lem, finding a solution through dialogue,        must be kept. The head of the Govern-
                                  without prejudice, and without myths:            ment’s Office for Kosovo and Metohija,
                                  “That is why I want to open up an internal       Marko Đurić, is also aware that he is not
                                  dialogue on the matter of Kosovo and Me-         contradicting Vučić by saying that “Vido-
                                  tohija, with all our differences, without        vdan is the Serbian covenant, the covenant
                                  prejudice, upholding our country’s Consti-       of all Serbs, wherever they may live and
                                  tution. We have to be open, to renounce the      work”7. The decision by the authors of the
                                  mythical approach, but without simply giv-       Strategy for the Cultural Development of
                                  ing away that which we have every right to.      Serbia from 2017 to 2027 to give the “Koso-
                                  Our internal dialogue is perhaps even more       vo covenant” a prominent role in the docu-
                                  important than the one we should be hav-         ment is also based on the premise that the
                                  ing with the Albanians.”5 However, this re-      mythical approach to Kosovo is not the
                                  nunciation of the Kosovo myth by Vučić           same as the covenant. The covenant is
                                  applies only to one essentially benign as-       mentioned as the “heroic dimension of Ser-
                                  pect of it – the versions referring to a so-     bian culture”, with a very important func-
                                  called “celestial Serbia”. “Our job”, ex-        tion – to ensure the “self-preservation of
                                  plained Vučić in a statement a few days          society in the face of existential challenges
The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia        Southeastern Europe   15

and challenges to identity”. Other aspects       founded in 2012, chose the name “Zavetni-
of Serbian culture are also set out – the “En-   ci”8 for itself, explaining that it was done “in
lightenment-European” and “democratic”           accordance with the Kosovo Covenant, the
dimensions– but there is no doubt that           spiritual and historical path of the Serbian
these are only secondary, because they do        people through the centuries, followed by
not provide what is most important, the ex-      our greatest rulers and minds1.”
istence and identity of the nation, a task       Furthermore, any critique of the Kosovo
entrusted to the “heroic” dimension of Ser-      myth –if undertaken to protect values such
bian culture, that is to say the “Kosovo cov-    as enlightenment, democracy or human
enant”, or the Kosovo myth under another         rights– will be ineffective if it limits itself to
name.                                            questioning the contents of the messages
                                                 conveyed under the auspices of this myth,
                                                 because these messages are not necessarily
Critical Analysis of the                         unacceptable from the point of view of the
Kosovo Myth                                      critic. It is important to identify and differ-
There are a few things to keep in mind re-       entiate them, but it is even more important
garding the critical analysis of the Kosovo      to point out that all of them, no matter the
myth in modern Serbia. Firstly, it is import-    differences in content, have one common
ant to note that this analysis cannot be re-     characteristic which separates them from
duced to differentiating between the few         the values of enlightenment and democra-
historically accurate pieces of information      cy. Namely, all messages relying on the
about the Battle of Kosovo and the histori-      myth, messages which inscribe themselves
cally unsubstantiated stories about that         into it, including those “conveyed” by the
event, which serve as the basis for the          Kosovo myth today, are to be accepted
Kosovo myth, including its modern ver-           without thought or discussion. The myth
sions. As noted by historian Sima Ćirković,      empowers them to impose themselves on
all the materials about Kosovo, the entirety     certain political collectives, while making
of the “Kosovo tradition”, as he would say,      them unacceptable to collectives fostering
deserves the attention of historians and         humanist and democratic values.
other researchers. Therefore, to interpret
the Kosovo myth critically, it is not enough               Translated by Nemanja Georgijević
to determine whether there is historical
                                                 1
                                                   	An overview of the creation and evolution of the Kosovo
truth to it, but we must also determine the          myth, and the main literature on the topic is available in
purpose served by stories about the Battle           Miodrag Popović’s study Vidovdan i časni krst (St. Vitus
of Kosovo, who told them and with what               day and the Holy Cross), Ogled o književnoj arheologiji
purpose, what their political and ideologi-          (4th Edition, Bibiloteka XX vek), as well as in my book
                                                     Smrt na Kosovu Polju. Istorija kosovskog mita (Death on
cal messages were, and how they changed              Kosovo Field, a History of the Kosovo Myth) (2nd Edition,
over time. The same can be said for re-              Biblioteka XX vek).
searching and interpreting the role of the       2
                                                   	Miloš Obilić is said to have been the Serbian knight who
Kosovo myth in Serbian society and politics          assassinated the Ottoman Sultan Murad I in the Battle of
                                                     Kosovo during the Ottoman invasion of Serbia -- Ed. note
today.                                           3
                                                  	An analysis of the written versions of this poem and the
It is also important to determine where we           explanation of its role in modern Kosovo’s identity politics
encounter this myth today, and how to                can be found in Anna di Lellio’s book The Battle of Kosovo
identify it, as it appears in various types of       1389. An Albanian Epic, I.B. Tauris&Co.Ltd., London, 2009.
                                                 4
                                                   	La Bataille de Kosovo 1389, translated from the Serbian
text – from newspaper articles to scientific         and directed by: Nathalie Hamel, Theatre du Nord Ouest,
studies, and from political speeches to reli-        Paris. – “La viellle guerre. La Bataille du Kosovo”, directed
gious sermons. Rarely is it a well-developed         by Simon Pitaqaj, based on “Trois chants funebres de
narrative, as in Zdravko Šotra’s film The            Kosovo” I. Kadare, Théatre de l’Oprimé, Paris.
                                                 5
                                                   	Serbian President’s address to Parliament, TANJUG, May
Battle of Kosovo (Boj na Kosovu, 1989).              31st 2017
Statements are most often put under the          6
                                                   	Vučić: It’s time to talk about the Constitution and Kosovo”,
protection of the Kosovo myth by using               TANJUG, June 2nd 2017
quotes from certain passages of canonical        7
                                                   	h ttp://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/
                                                     2781371/djuric-nikada-necemo-odustati-od-kosova-i-
texts about the Battle of Kosovo (from Vuk           metohije.html
Karadžić’s “Kosovo Cycle” or Njegoš’s            8
                                                   	Translator’s note: this can roughly be translated as
Mountain Wreath), or even more simply,               “Defenders of the Covenant”
by claiming that the statement or action is      9
                                                   	Zavetnici
                                                     website https://web archive.org/ web/ 20180207002002/
in line with the “Kosovo covenant”. For ex-          http://zavetnici.rs/?page_id=7542
ample, one political organization in Serbia,
16      Southeastern Europe          A Lesson in History

             A Lesson in History
             By Jelena Krstić

                                             The prewar political history of the former Yugoslav autonomous province of Kosovo was
                                             shaped by its educational system. Both Albanians and Serbs have omitted the other com-
                                             munity’s language and history from their curricula. Today, twenty years after the armed
                                             conflict, Albanian and Serbian students are using textbooks with different versions of
                                             history. Some of the controversial phrases from Kosovar textbooks describing actions by
                                             Serbs include: “violence and chauvinist terror”, “terror and genocide”, and “horrific bar-
                                             baric scenes of bloody squadrons”. Serbian textbooks use phrases such as “attacks by
                                             Albanian gangs” and “Albanian terror over the Serbs”. Such language in school textbooks
                                             amplifies prejudice, inter-ethnic intolerance, and nationalist ideas.
                                             “I am deeply sorry for all the victims in Kosovo, and for their families’ suffering. Yes, I knew crimes
                                             were committed...Yes, I was involved in moving bodies to Batajnica… I didn’t oppose the conceal-
                                             ment of crimes. I took no action to find and process the perpetrators, as I should have done.”1
                                                                                                                                 Vlastimir Đorđević
                                                                                 Sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment for crimes against humanity

                                             Early one morning, the S. family had to              claiming that the new constitution gives the
                                             leave their village in Kosovo. The mother            province too much power. At the beginning
                                             had dressed the children well, so that they          of the 1980s, Albanians ask for Kosovo to be
                                             wouldn’t be cold, and prepared some food             recognized as a constituent Republic of the
                                             for the journey. A group of armed men                Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
                                             stopped them in a nearby settlement and              (SFRY), while Serbs intensify their calls for the
                                             separated them, detaining the father and             province’s autonomy to be reduced. In March
                                             two sons and ordering the rest to keep go-           1989, amendments to the Constitution of Ser-
                                             ing. They did keep going and spent some              bia strip the province of its autonomy. The
                                             time far away from their home, school,               situation in Kosovo deteriorates.
                                             friends, and relatives. Only after the war           In June 1990, the Serbian Assembly de-
                                             had ended did they return to their home. It          clares that special circumstances have
                                             was a few years later that they found out            arisen in Kosovo aimed at upending the
                                             that all three of the men had been killed            constitutional order. A few days later,
                                             and their bodies hidden in a mass grave.             Kosovo Albanian MPs declare Kosovo to
                                             The mother and two sons from the S. fam-             be an independent Republic. The Serbian
                                             ily are currently living in their home village       Assembly then dissolves the Kosovo As-
                                             again, in difficult conditions, lacking em-          sembly. This officially dissolved Assembly
                                             ployment or regular income.                          compiles a Draft Constitution, which is
                                             What happened to the S. family?                      then accepted by a majority of Albanians
                                                                                                  in a local referendum. In September 1990,
                                             The Crisis between 1980 and                          the new Constitution of Serbia diminishes
                                             1998                                                 Kosovo’s autonomy even further.
                                             The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Feder-        A period of discrimination and repression
                                             ative Republic of Yugoslavia grants the Au-          against the Albanian population in Kosovo
     Jelena Krstić, Helsinki Committee for   tonomous Province of Kosovo greater auton-           ensues. Albanian language radio and tele-
     Human Rights in Serbia                  omy. A section of the Serbian public object,         vision are limited, and newspapers are
You can also read