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STRATEGIC TRENDS 2018 - Key Developments in Global Affairs - Center for Security Studies
Center for Security Studies

STRATEGIC
    TRENDS 2018
                      Key Developments in Global Affairs

  CSS
   ETH Zurich
STRATEGIC TRENDS 2018 - Key Developments in Global Affairs - Center for Security Studies
STRATEGIC TRENDS 2018 is also electronically available at:
www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends

Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2018: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe
Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger

Contact:
Center for Security Studies
ETH Zurich
Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW
CH-8092 Zurich
Switzerland

This publication covers events up to 5 March 2018.

© 2018, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich

Images © by Reuters

ISSN      1664-0667
ISBN      978-3-905696-62-2
STRATEGIC TRENDS 2018 - Key Developments in Global Affairs - Center for Security Studies
Center for Security Studies

STRATEGIC
    TRENDS 2018
                    Key Developments in Global Affairs

Editors:            Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe

Series Editor:      Andreas Wenger
Authors:	Brian Carlson, Severin Fischer,
          Tim Prior, Jack Thompson

   CSS
   ETH Zurich
STRATEGIC TRENDS 2018 - Key Developments in Global Affairs - Center for Security Studies
STRATEGIC TRENDS 2018 - Key Developments in Global Affairs - Center for Security Studies
Contents

Acknowledgments............................................................................................................. 5

Introduction......................................................................................................................... 7

CHAPTER 1
Superpower Constrained.................................................................................................11
Jack Thompson

CHAPTER 2
Room for Maneuver: China and Russia Strengthen Their Relations................... 29
Brian G. Carlson

CHAPTER 3
Technological Innovation and the Geopolitics of Energy......................................45
Severin Fischer

CHAPTER 4
Resilience: The ‘Fifth Wave’ in the Evolution of Deterrence.................................. 63
Tim Prior

                                                                                                                                    3
Acknowledgments
Strategic Trends is an annual publication of the Center for Security Studies (CSS)
at ETH Zurich. It aims to offer a concise analysis of major developments in world
affairs, with a primary focus on international security. Providing interpretations
of key trends rather than a comprehensive survey of events, Strategic Trends targets
a broad audience ranging from policy-makers to the media, academics, and the
general public. Strategic Trends 2018 is the ninth issue in the series.

The publication series is available for download at the website of the Center for
Security Studies (www.css.ethz.ch/publikationen/strategic-trends.html).

As always, we would like to thank this year’s authors, Jack Thompson, Brian
Carlson, Severin Fischer, and Tim Prior. In addition, a large part of the burden
fell on the CSS’ Miriam Dahinden-Ganzoni (graphic design and layout) and
Céline Barmet (data collection, graphic design and proofreading). They worked
exceptionally well, independently, reliable, and made our job thereby much,
much easier. Last but not least, the quality of this book was ensured through the
language editing by Christopher Findlay.

Many believe that the world is an ever more dangerous place today. Indeed, the
relationships between the three big actors USA, Russia and China are becoming
more complicated. At the same time, new technologies may make energy
resources more easily available, however resulting in significant changes for energy
markets. While there are still many conflicts to be resolved, resilience can offer
a response in the highly complex threat environment. Hence, the picture is not
necessarily as dark as it is often portrayed.

We hope you enjoy reading Strategic Trends 2018.

Should you have any feedback, please do not hesitate to contact us at oliver.
thraenert@sipo.gess.ethz.ch and zapfem@ethz.ch.

With best regards from Zurich,

Oliver Thränert                  Martin Zapfe
Head of Think Tank at CSS        Head of the Global Security Team

                                                                                5
A Fragmenting World – Does the West
Have Any Answers?

As has been the trend in recent years, 2017 was characterized by significant
changes in international politics, highlighting the growing complexity of the
world we live in. It seems increasingly difficult for Western policy-makers to
find the right mix of foreign and domestic policies to deal effectively with a frag-
mented world order. Further complicating matters are growing differences with-
in the Western world regarding security, trade, and global (sustainable) develop-
ment. The conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, and Eastern Ukraine do not appear
close to resolution, and the situation in Iraq remains fragile. The intensification
of the North Korean nuclear crisis was another worrisome development. There
were also major developments in cross-cutting areas such as trade and energy
relations. The US is beginning to take advantage of its role as the world’s largest
hydrocarbon producer, and OPEC is desperately looking for partners and a new
mission within a rapidly changing international energy landscape.

Although this general view gives us some reason to worry about the state of the
world, we also see some signs of consolidation. The world is starting to accept
US President Donald Trump as the new normal in the White House, although
the full effect of the new administration’s agenda will not be clear for some time.
Trump’s calls for other NATO members to increase their material contributions
to the alliance have set the tone in this respect. At the same time, Trump’s White
House continues to send conflicting signals. The president frequently suggests
that the US will pursue a more unilateralist and nationalist agenda, even as
many other officials signal a desire for continuity in most areas. This mixed

                                                                                  7
STRATEG I C TR EN DS          201 8

message can be seen in the new “National Security Strategy” of December 2017,
which promises to put “America First” even as it reiterates the importance of al-
liances and trade agreements.

An extended period of uncertainty about the US role in the world gave China
an opening to present itself as a new stabilizing force in the international sys-
tem. China enjoyed continuity in its domestic affairs, with President Xi Jin-
ping beginning his second five-year term in office and, with the elimination of
constitutional provisions limiting him to two presidential terms, showing every
intention of remaining in power much longer. One year ago, during the 2017
World Economic Forum in Davos, Xi portrayed his country as a leader in global
governance that would strive to uphold the international trading order and the
Paris Agreement on climate change. Although these claims were somewhat ex-
aggerated, they underscored the opportunity that the Chinese leadership per-
ceives in the West’s turmoil. Reflections on all these developments can be found,
in one way or another, in the contributions to this year’s “Strategic Trends 2018”.

In the first chapter, Jack Thompson looks at the new foreign policy of the US un-
der President Trump. In his view, the US will remain the most important player
in global affairs, but is struggling to adapt to the evolution of the international
system and will be more vulnerable than ever to changes in the geopolitical
landscape. At the same time, the new administration has expressed ambivalence
when it comes to playing its traditional role in leading the Liberal World Order
and shows little willingness to engage in questions of international governance,
which poses new security questions for the Europeans.

Managing relations with Russia and China will be among the main challenges
that the West will face in the coming years. Brian Carlson examines the China-
Russia relationship and its effects on world politics. The two countries have built
an increasingly close relationship, which is apparent in arms sales, energy, and
cooperation in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. This trend is likely
to continue, though the relationship will be increasingly tilted in China’s favor.

China is also an important factor in Severin Fischer’s chapter on the impacts of
technological change in the energy sector. In his view, China will be the domi-
nant player in the world of new and clean technologies, notably solar and bat-
teries. This could be good for development goals and limiting global warming,

8
I NTROD UCTI O N

but not necessarily for the influence of the Western world in other regions. At
the same time, the US is re-entering the hydrocarbon markets as a supplier due
to increased hydraulic fracturing and mixing up existing power relations. In this
context, the role of infrastructure will massively change in the coming decades.

Within this changing, and increasingly complex, international system, calls for
improving national resilience across different sectors in states and economies
are becoming louder. Tim Prior’s chapter examines the growing focus on resil-
ience in Western security policy, particularly with respect to deterring asym-
metric threats. He explores how systemic changes in governance arrangements,
embodying networked approaches that match the nature of the 21st-century
threat landscape, could present advantages in addressing security issues in the
international system.

                                                                               9
CHAPTER 1

Superpower Constrained
Jack Thompson

The US’ longstanding role of international leadership is under threat. It is
struggling to manage external challenges, including great power competi-
tion and globalization, and domestic constraints, such as underfunding and
mismanagement of the military and diplomatic corps. Unfortunately, pros-
pects for reform are uncertain given the dysfunctionality of the US political
system. This should worry European policymakers and will hopefully hasten
their efforts to develop a more robust and independent Common Security
and Defense Policy.

US President Donald Trump returns to the White House after addressing the Republican Congres-
sional Retreat, 1 February 2018. Yuri Gripas / Reuters

                                                                                          11
STRATEG I C TR EN DS          201 8

Introduction                               changes to the international system,
The United States enjoys an unrivaled      but they have the power to deploy
ability to shape world affairs. Thanks     US troops more carefully, to man-
in large part to its leadership of and     age the military and diplomatic corps
participation in the liberal world or-     more intelligently, and to address the
der (LWO), US military might is un-        underlying causes of opposition to
equalled, its economy is the largest in    international trade and declining at-
the world, and the US dollar’s status as   tachment to democratic norms.
the most important reserve currency
provides enormous benefits. Soft pow-      Unfortunately, a vigorous reasser-
er is another area of advantage, with      tion of US leadership appears to be
US culture in particular commanding        unlikely. Demanding deployments
global influence.                          and – in light of its many commit-
                                           ments – inadequate budgets have left
However, this favorable state of affairs   the military in a state of crisis. The
is under threat. Partly, this is due to    diplomatic corps is also struggling
structural changes in the internation-     under the weight of poor leadership,
al system. With the rise of persistent     a sharp reduction in numbers, sinking
global and regional challengers, the       morale, and the prospect of reduced
post-Cold War “unipolar moment”            funding. Some of these problems are
has ended, and US military and eco-        specific to Donald Trump’s presiden-
nomic predominance are no longer as-       cy, but the problems go much deeper
sured. Globalization and technological     than the current administration.
change have accelerated the process,
fragmenting power, diffusing informa-      In other words, reform is unlikely.
tion, and weakening support for inter-     There is little indication that the po-
national trade and democratic values.      litical will exists, or that the system is
Even its soft power could be at risk,      equipped to accommodate the sweep-
as political and economic dysfunction      ing changes that would be necessary
undermine the US’ image abroad.            to turn things around. Washington re-
                                           mains hamstrung by gridlock, which
If the US is to reverse these trends,      reflects the polarization that has di-
to retain a position of unquestioned       vided society in recent decades. It
leadership in world affairs, and to pre-   seems likely that the US will continue
serve the LWO, it will need to get its     to face significant constraints for the
house in order. There is little policy-    foreseeable future. In the meantime,
makers can do to reverse the structural    its rivals are gaining ground, and the

12
SU PER POWER                       CONSTRA I N E D

The Return of Geopolitics from a US Perspective

                                                                                           Russia

                                                                                                            North
                     United States                                        Syria Iran Afghanistan            Korea
                                                                             Iraq                   China

                                                                Niger
                                                                                Yemen
                                                                               Djibouti

     Great power challengers
     Regional challengers
     Hotspots
                                                   Approximately 6,000 US troops stationed
                                                   throughout the continent (biggest deployment
                                                   in Djibouti (4,700) and Niger (800))

Sources: Kathryn Watson, “Where does the U.S. have troops in Africa, and why?”, in: CBS News (21.10.2017); International Institute
for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2018 (Routledge, 2018), 59.

world is becoming less conducive to                                     Strategy acknowledges – “the primary
liberal internationalist values such as                                 concern in U.S. national security”.
democracy, free trade, and the rule of
law. This state of affairs should worry                                 Two nations, China and Russia, have
Europeans, as their foreign and secu-                                   not reconciled themselves to the cur-
rity policy relies upon vigorous inter-                                 rent international order and consti-
national engagement by the US.                                          tute the foremost threat to US lead-
                                                                        ership and the future of the LWO.
The Return of Geopolitics and the                                       China resents US predominance and
Forever War                                                             is positioning itself as a rival super-
The apparent post-Cold War triumph                                      power. Though Beijing is challenging
of the LWO has proven illusory. In-                                     US interests across the globe, its prior-
stead, the US and its allies face a                                     ity is to upend the status quo in East
fractured, multipolar system that is                                    Asia, where the US has long served
rife with threats, especially from revi-                                as the fulcrum for the region’s power
sionist powers. What Walter Russell                                     structure. Much as the US asserted
Mead dubbed the “return of geopoli-                                     itself in the Western Hemisphere in
tics” represents – as the Department                                    the early 20th century by forcing Eu-
of Defense’s 2018 National Defense                                      ropean nations to acknowledge its

                                                                                                                                 13
STRATEG I C TR EN DS         201 8

preeminent role, China seeks to re-        also serves the broader goal of but-
place the US as the leading power in       tressing Beijing’s claim to sovereignty
its neighborhood.                          over most of the South China Sea,
                                           the world’s most important shipping
Though the US position remains             zone. The US contests this claim by
strong, recent political and economic      regularly conducting freedom of navi-
developments have drawn attention          gation exercises, but has been unable
to Beijing’s growing influence. Presi-     to do anything to slow the reclama-
dent Trump’s decision to withdraw the      tion and fortification project. China’s
US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership      development of anti-ship ballistic
trade agreement – which excluded           missiles, which are designed to de-
China, and which the administration        stroy aircraft carriers, also threatens
of Barack Obama viewed as a way to         the ability of the US to intervene in
reinforce its standing in East Asia –      the region. China’s nuclear arsenal,
represented a setback. China quickly       though still small when compared to
moved to fill the vacuum by redou-         those of the US or Russia, is slowly
bling efforts to promote an alternative    increasing in size and in terms of its
arrangement, the Regional Compre-          capabilities.1
hensive Economic Partnership. This
dovetails with a desire to link Eurasia    China has moved aggressively to close
under Chinese economic leadership,         the gap with the US in the realm of
embodied in the Belt and Road Initia-      advanced technology, with consider-
tive, and a long-term goal of establish-   able success. When it comes to arti-
ing footholds in Europe, Latin Ameri-      ficial intelligence, for instance, China
ca, and Africa.                            has announced a goal of becoming
                                           the global leader by 2030, and is al-
Beijing is also challenging the US and     ready closing in on the US. China is
its allies on military, strategic, and     also a powerful player in the cyber
technological fronts. It is executing a    domain and is using its influence to
steady campaign of pressing a long list    shape the global development of the
of territorial claims in the region, in-   internet in ways that are conducive to
cluding a dispute with Japan over the      its own interests, but not necessarily
Senkaku Islands. Even more notewor-        to those of the West.2
thy is China’s project of creating arti-
ficial islands in the South China Sea,     Like China, Russia seeks to under-
several of which it is equipping for       mine US leadership, which it views
military purposes. Their development       as the foremost hurdle to its return

14
SU PER POWER           CONSTRA I N E D

to superpower status. Vladimir Putin’s       The US is also confronted by regional
campaign to revivify Russian power           powers that resent the status quo. The
has enjoyed considerable success, even       speed with which North Korea has
if the economic resources at his dis-        developed intercontinental ballistic
posal are more modest than China’s,          missiles that might already be able to
and much of his progress has come            reach the US mainland, and Pyong-
at the expense of the US and its al-         yang’s unwillingness to trade its nu-
lies. Military interventions in Georgia      clear weapons program for relief from
and Ukraine – nations that harbored          economic sanctions, has left policy-
ambitions of drawing closer to the Eu-       makers with a series of unappealing
ropean Union (EU) and/or the North           choices. They could accept North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)          Korea as a nuclear power and rely on
– elicited condemnation and econom-          deterrence. However, Kim Jong-un’s
ic sanctions from the West. However,         regime is particularly brutal and regu-
these have done nothing to impair            larly transgresses international laws
Moscow’s aggressiveness, which in-           and norms. It views a nuclear arsenal
cludes frequent violations of NATO           as more than merely a defensive in-
airspace. Even Moscow’s interference         vestment. Rather, it has a history of
in the 2016 US elections, the full ex-       engaging in brinkmanship to extract
tent of which remains unclear, has yet       concessions from the US and the rest
to elicit an effective US response.          of the international community.

Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civ-     One alternative to deterrence would
il war appears to have been a decisive       be an attack designed to destroy most
factor in the resurgence of Bashir al-       or all of the North Korean nuclear
Assad’s regime and should give Mos-          arsenal. The Trump administration is
cow a foothold in the Middle East for        currently considering such a “bloody
the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, in        nose” strike. However, even if a mili-
spite of the virtual defeat of the Islam-    tary raid achieved its objectives – and
ic State, the return on Washington’s         the chances of success would be low
investment of money and troops in            – Pyongyang also has extensive con-
Syria has been more modest. Never-           ventional armaments at its disposal.
theless, former Secretary of State Rex       These includes a large array of artil-
Tillerson recently announced that US         lery that potentially could inflict cata-
forces will remain in Syria for the fore-    strophic damage upon Seoul.3 A third
seeable future, thereby adding further       option, relying on North Korea’s only
strain to an overstretched military.         close ally, China, to force Pyongyang

                                                                                   15
STRATEG I C TR EN DS           201 8

to denuclearize has also failed. There       restart its nuclear weapons program.
are limits to Beijing’s ability to dictate   The preferred alternative of some
to North Korea and it is unwilling to        hawks – airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear fa-
impose conditions that would lead the        cilities – would further destabilize the
Kim regime to collapse, as the most          region. It would also be difficult to hit
likely outcome would be a united Ko-         all of the targets, and even a successful
rea closely allied to the US.                operation would only retard Tehran’s
                                             nuclear program for a few years.5
Policymakers are also uncertain how
to handle the emergence of Iran as a         The Trump administration’s attempt
regional power. The 2015 Joint Com-          to balance Tehran by reinvigorating
prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)            the long-standing alliance with Saudi
appears to have halted Iran’s nuclear        Arabia and moving even closer to Is-
weapons program. However, the pres-          rael also brings risks. By siding so de-
ident and some of his key advisors           cisively with Riyadh and Tel Aviv, the
have taken initial steps to undermine        US further undermines its previous
the JCPOA, and there are indications         status as an honest broker and makes
that they will withdraw from it alto-        a broader peace agreement in the re-
gether.4 Meanwhile, Iranian influ-           gion between Israel and its neighbors
ence in the Middle East continues to         more unlikely. This strategy also ties
increase. Tehran’s expansion has been        the US more closely to Saudi Arabia’s
enabled, in large part, by ineffective       disastrous intervention in Yemen,
US policy over the last 15 years, in-        which will do nothing to improve the
cluding the invasion of Iraq in 2003         US’ image in the region.
and the indecisive response to the Syr-
ian civil war.                               US troops have been involved in com-
                                             bat in the Middle East and South/
There are no appealing options when it       Central Asia for more than 15 years,
comes to restraining Iran. The Trump         and the recent announcement of the
administration complains that the            Trump administration that it is plan-
JCPOA, by ignoring the non-nuclear           ning for an open-ended commitment
aspects of Iranian expansionism, is          of forces in Syria confirms that there
worse than no deal. However, with-           is no end in sight to the “Forever War”
drawing from the JCPOA would al-             against terrorism and hostile regimes.
ienate the other signatories – espe-         The length of this conflict, which
cially the Europeans, who consider the       constitutes the longest in US history,
deal to be effective – and allow Iran to     does not indicate resolve. Instead, it

16
SU PER POWER           CONSTRA I N E D

underlines the inability of the US to        The Downsides of Economic
obtain its political and military objec-     Interdependence and Globalization
tives, or even to formulate a coherent       In the decades following World War
strategy for doing so. The prosecution       Two, the US did more than any other
of the Forever War has led to an unsus-      nation to create the foundations of
tainable dynamic: The US is fighting         the modern era. It encouraged free
on too many fronts and lacks the re-         trade and the lowering of barriers
sources and political will to maintain       to the flow of capital; US corpora-
the present situation. It is a textbook      tions penetrated new markets, tak-
example of imperial overstretch.             ing knowledge and technology with
                                             them; and millions embraced US
If anything, the situation is worsen-        popular culture. The results appeared
ing. Military involvement in Africa is       to be unequivocally positive. Many
a case in point. It has notably escalated    Americans attained unprecedent-
over the last 15 years and now affects       ed standards of living as a result of
almost every nation on the continent.        greater interdependence, and the US
Many soldiers – at least 6,000, accord-      economy remains the world’s largest
ing to the Department of Defense –           and arguably most dynamic.
are participating in ill-defined activi-
ties such as training or advising, which     Nevertheless, in the years since the
often entangle them in combat.               financial crisis of 2007 – 2008 the
                                             downsides of globalization have be-
Obama was anxious to avoid worsen-           come apparent. Indeed, even as the
ing the problem of overstretch, and          US appears to be thriving, it is also
Trump, albeit inconsistently, has also       increasingly constrained by many of
criticized the Bush administration’s         the forces it was instrumental in un-
overuse of the military. Yet neither         leashing. In spite of strong headline
has explained how to prevent it. This        numbers – including an unemploy-
suggests that the US is caught in a vi-      ment rate of approximately 4 per
cious cycle. Policymakers recognize          cent and an economic expansion of
that they need to use force more in-         2.3 per cent in 2017 – there is ample
telligently in order to husband finite       reason for concern. Partly, this can
resources and revitalize an exhausted        be ascribed to ineffective policymak-
military, but struggle to extricate the      ing at home. Inequality has reached
US from its existing obligations. Fur-       historic levels, and legislators appear
thermore, the temptation to intervene        to be more concerned with placating
in new hotspots is ever-present.             wealthy donors than with the need

                                                                                 17
STRATEG I C TR EN DS          201 8

to rebuild crumbling infrastructure        The nature of the Chinese regime and
or make university education more          its geopolitical ambitions also make
affordable.6                               its status as an economic superpower
                                           problematic. In spite of occasional
Changes in the structure of the glob-      friction between the US and Germa-
al economy also present long-term          ny or Japan over trade practices, the
obstacles. The rise of China – fa-         fact that they are close allies that hold
cilitated in part by the interdepend-      free elections and embrace the rule of
ence pursued by the US – is particu-       law means that they pose no threat to
larly problematic. In and of itself,       core US interests – a point that is lost
the emergence of a strong economic         on President Trump. China, by con-
counterweight is not necessarily cause     trast, has failed to democratize. This
for concern. The economic clout of         has confounded many analysts, who
allies such as Germany, Japan, or the      argued that accession to the World
EU – in spite of occasional alarmist       Trade Organization in 2001 and a
headlines – does not generate wide-        long-term program of economic lib-
spread alarm. However, the threat          eralization would force Beijing to re-
posed by China is more profound: it        form its political system. If anything,
is expected to surpass the US as the       the opposite has occurred, and Presi-
world’s largest economy in the near        dent Xi Jinping has redoubled the
future, and its ability to influence the   grip of the Communist Party, as well
global system dwarfs that of other         as his own, on the Chinese political
trade competitors.                         system.

The scale of China’s influence can be      This combination of economic power
seen in the consequences of its rapid      and resilient authoritarianism gives
growth. The “China Shock”7 – the in-       Beijing considerable global sway.8
ability of labor markets to adjust to      China is now Africa’s largest trading
competition from China – and other         partner and, in spite of Beijing’s of-
manifestations of interdependence,         ficial policy of “non-interference” in
such as the North American Free Trade      the internal affairs of other countries,
Agreement (NAFTA), have led to the         it has gradually expanded its influ-
loss of millions of jobs, the long-term    ence throughout the continent. In
decline of regions most vulnerable to      doing so, it has pursued strategic aims
increased competition, and an increase     – such as garnering support for its
in political populism, including calls     “One China” policy and its model of
for protectionism.                         non-democratic governance – as well

18
SU PER POWER           CONSTRA I N E D

as economic growth.9 Similar efforts        infrastructure of adversaries such as
in Latin America pair economic and          South Korea, and to undermine the
strategic objectives, such as counter-      dissemination of what it views as hos-
balancing the strong position of the        tile cultural products. The US has yet
US in East Asia.10                          to develop an effective response.12 Be-
                                            cause its economy is relatively primi-
Most worrying is China’s growing in-        tive, retaliatory attacks are of limited
fluence in Europe. It has used prom-        value, and until recently, the US has
ises of investment in the “16+1” group      been reluctant to respond with con-
of Central and Eastern/Southeastern         ventional military force for fear of
European countries to engender closer       sparking a broader conflict.
ties and more sympathy on issues such
as human rights.11 While China’s in-        Hostile powers and non-state actors
fluence is still modest in comparison       alike have discovered that some of
to that of the US – and is generating       the longstanding strengths of the US,
opposition in some corners of Europe        such as its democratic form of govern-
– its efforts underscore the sweeping       ment and the ability to develop and
scale of Beijing’s vision. Furthermore,     integrate advanced technology into
China’s emergence as an alternative to      its economy, render it vulnerable to
the US when it comes to leading the         cyber attacks. Russia’s interference in
international community on pressing         the 2016 election relied on a combi-
global challenges, such as trade liber-     nation of cyber espionage and collab-
alization or combating global warm-         oration with US citizens. WikiLeaks
ing, underscores the fact that the US       has caused considerable damage by
can no longer take predominance for         releasing a large number of sensitive
granted.                                    government documents. These data
                                            dumps, which have relied on leaks
Regional powers have also harnessed         from inside the US national security
aspects of globalization to increase        community and intelligence acquired
their ability to frustrate the US. North    by state actors such as Russia, have
Korea and Iran have used technology         angered allies and damaged US soft
first developed in the West in their        power.
quest to attempt to develop nuclear
arsenals. North Korea has developed         As the example of WikiLeaks indi-
sophisticated cyber capabilities and        cates, globalization has enabled some
used them to carry out cybercrime,          non-state actors to accrue dispro-
to infiltrate the political and military    portionate influence. The ability of

                                                                                 19
STRATEG I C TR EN DS          201 8

terrorist groups such as al-Qaida or        working-class white voters feel that
the Islamic State to confront the US        they have lost economic and political
would not have been possible in the         status and power.15 This perception
era before modern international travel,     has been amplified by the growing
mass immigration, and wider access to       diversity in the US – at some point
information about weapons and mili-         in the mid-21st century, whites will
tary tactics. The tendency of the US to     no longer constitute of a majority
overreact, and to pay correspondingly       of the population – and has fueled
less attention to more acute problems       support for extremist political ideas
such as global warming, only com-           and figures, with several notable
pounds the problem.                         consequences.

Domestic Constraints                        One is decreased enthusiasm for
Trade liberalization and advances in        democratic politics and norms –
technology have had a profound im-          which correlate closely with support
pact on US political culture. Politi-       for internationalism. This phenom-
cal polarization, for instance, has in-     enon is particularly notable among
creased in areas that are exposed to        younger Americans, but can be seen
increased international trade. Over the     throughout the US body politic.16
last 15 years, congressional districts      The rise in authoritarian values – a
represented by moderates have tend-         preference for order and conformity,
ed to replace them with more liberal        especially in times of crisis – and the
Democrats or more conservative Re-          growing tendency of authoritarians
publicans. In presidential races, these     to vote for the GOP, is a manifesta-
areas have become more likely to vote       tion of this tendency.17 Another is
for Republican candidates.13 The re-        the radicalization of border politics,
sults at the national level are striking,   as a majority of white Americans
as polarization has reached historically    have come to view immigration as
high levels and the Republican Party        a burden and/or threat.18 Opposi-
(GOP) is more conservative than at          tion to free trade has become an im-
any point in its history.14                 portant feature of US politics, espe-
                                            cially among culturally conservative
Related to this increase in partisanship    whites.19 Support for international
is the tendency of voters who have suf-     alliances is shaky and notably weak
fered economically as a result of free      among Republicans (though support
trade and/or technological change to        for NATO remains strong). Even
embrace radical political views. Many       when it comes to broad attitudes

20
SU PER POWER                        CONSTRA I N E D

Public Attitudes Toward International Engagement
Maintaining existing alliances is a very effective way to achieve the
foreign policy goals of the US:
2015                                               37%                                                   Democrats
                                            31%
                                                                           55%
                                                                                                         Republicans
2017                                                       43%                                           Core Trump Supporters

Free trade agreements have been a good thing for the US:
                                                                                           67%
2017                                              34%

Large numbers of immigrants and refugees entering the US represent a critical threat:
                                        29%
2015                                                                                  64%
                             20%
2017                                                                                61%

The US should be the dominant world leader:
                              21%
2015                                                38%
                                     26%
2017                                                             47%
                                                                        53%

The US should play a shared leadership role in world affairs:
                                                                                                  72%
2015                                                                          57%
                                                                                            68%
2017                                                              49%
                                                          42%

       0           10           20           30           40           50           60            70          80           90              100

Sources: Dina Smeltz et al., “What Americans Think about America First”, in: 2017 Chicago Council Survey, The Chicago Council on
Global Affairs (2017), p. 3, 5, 9; Dina Smeltz et al., “America Divided: Political Partisanship and US Foreign Policy”, in: 2015 Chicago
Council Survey, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2015), p. 12; Bradley Jones, “Support for free trade agreements rebounds
modestly, but wide partisan differences remain”, Pew Research Center (2017).

toward international engagement,                                         his promise to renegotiate or with-
which a large majority of Republicans                                    draw from NAFTA and to get tough
advocate, many in the party – and a                                      on Chinese trade practices; his at-
majority of Trump supporters – pre-                                      tempts to reduce the number of im-
fer a dominant position rather than a                                    migrants, legal and undocumented
shared leadership role.20                                                alike; his ambivalence about NATO;
                                                                         his enthusiasm for illiberal leaders;
When viewed in this light, the elec-                                     and his reluctance to condemn white
tion of Donald Trump is not surpris-                                     supremacists – all of these policies
ing. His withdrawal from the Trans-                                      are acceptable to millions of Ameri-
Pacific Partnership trade agreement;                                     cans, and in some instances enjoy the

                                                                                                                                      21
STRATEG I C TR EN DS           201 8

support of a majority of Republican        deal that would increase funding for
voters. Many in the GOP political          the military over the next two years
establishment have quickly embraced        by 160 billion USD, this is unlikely
the Trumpification of Republican           to include nuclear weapons. Further-
foreign policy. (It is also worth not-     more, though the additional funding
ing that in regard to some aspects of      is a necessary first step, it will still take
international engagement, such as free     time to undo the damage wrought by
trade, a large minority of Democratic      sequestration. For instance, in the
voters also express skepticism.)           event of a conflict, the Army would
                                           only be able to field an estimated
Overstretch, polarization, political       three brigade combat teams out of
dysfunction, and skepticism about in-      more than 50.22
ternationalist policies have contributed
to a crisis in funding and readiness for   The diplomatic corps is also in a state
the military. The problem began with       of crisis. At one per cent of the fed-
the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq,     eral budget, funding for the Depart-
which led to frequent and lengthy de-      ment of State and the Agency for
ployments for many soldiers and a cor-     International Development is already
responding drop in morale. This prob-      modest. To make matters worse, the
lem has been compounded by certain         Trump administration has proposed
provisions in the Budget Control Act       sweeping cuts to these departments
of 2011 – commonly referred to as se-      – though Congress is unlikely to ap-
questration – which was opposed by         prove these reductions in full. This in-
most members of Congress, but was          difference to the importance of diplo-
nevertheless implemented because no        macy and development, along with
agreement could be reached to fund         mismanagement by former Secretary
the government. Sequestration has re-      of State Tillerson, has resulted in a
quired substantial spending cuts and       steep decline in morale and a mass
led to uncertainty about long-term         exodus of senior diplomats. Mean-
funding streams.21                         while, a hiring freeze by Tillerson has
                                           dramatically lowered the number of
President Trump has called for a sus-      incoming Foreign Service Officers.23
tained increase in military spending,
including an upgrade and expansion         With the exception of the ongoing
of the nuclear arsenal that will cost at   disaster at the State Department, it
least 1.2 trillion USD. Although Con-      would be a mistake to blame Trump
gress recently agreed to a spending        for these developments. Rather, the

22
SU PER POWER                             CONSTRA I N E D

The US National Defense and International Affairs Budget
1990 – 2019 (in billion USD)

                                                                                                  se or in State nse,
                                                                                                                  e
                                                                                            de all pt. of r Def
                                                                         tan

                                                                                                            et se
                                                                                                              ses

                                                                                                         c t of

                                                                                                        dg ea
                                                                     nis

                                                                                                      De fo
                                                                                         Cri

                                                                                                     bu cr
                                                                                                      ffe ct

                                                                                         Tru s for eases
                                                                   ha

                                                                                                   s e ol A
                                                                                      ial
                    r

                                                                  q
                 Wa

                                                              Afg

                                                              Ira

                                                                                      nc

                                                                                                ake ntr

                                                                                               fen s f
                                                                                             cu incr
              old

                                                                                    na
                                                           of
                                                           of

                                                                                           11 t Co
                                                                                  l Fi
                                                        on
                                                       on
            fC

                                                                                         of p c
                                                                                         big st
                                                                                         20 et

                                                                                                t
                                                                                 ba
                                                    asi

                                                                                              e
                                                asi
          do

                                                                                            dg

                                                                                             m
                                                                                             d
                                                                                Glo

                                                                                         Mo
                                                 Inv
                                             Inv

                                                                                         Bu
         En

800
700           National Defense Budget
              International Affairs Budget*
600
500
400
300
200
100
   0
        1990
         1991
        1992
        1993
        1994
         1995
        1996
         1997
        1998
        1999
        2000
        2001
        2002
        2003
        2004
        2005
        2006
        2007
        2008
        2009
        2010
          2011
         2012
         2013
         2014
         2015
       2016**
       2017**
       2018**
       2019**
* International Affairs Budget consists of International Development and Humanitarian Assistance, International Security
   Assistance, Conduct of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Information and Exchange Activities, International Financial Programs
** Estimate

Sources: U.S. Government Publishing Office; Paul Singer, “What’s in the senate budget deal? Billions for defense, infrastructure,
disasters and more”, in: USA Today (7.2.2018).

president embodies an evolving politi-                                         The rest of the world has noticed.
cal culture in which actual or perceived                                       Although there is still widespread
threats assume disproportionate im-                                            admiration for some aspects of the
portance for many. This imposes ad-                                            US, such as popular culture, there is
ditional constraints on foreign as well                                        widespread unease about its political
as domestic policy making and makes                                            system and opposition to the spread
it more difficult to sustain interna-                                          of its ideas and customs. Partly, these
tionalist policies such as admitting                                           attitudes can be linked to the election
immigrants, promoting trade deals,                                             of Trump, who is unpopular in all but
maintaining alliances, and upholding                                           a few countries.24 It is also evidence
democratic values.                                                             of a wider sense of disquiet about the

                                                                                                                               23
STRATEG I C TR EN DS                               201 8

US Soft Power Since 2012
                                                                                                       Obama Presidency 2012
Favorable view of the US:                                                                              Trump Presidency 2017
                                                                                52%
- the German public                                            35%
                                                                                52%
- the Russian public                                                 41%
                                                                                                       72%
- the Japanese public                                                                 57%

Confidence in the US President:
                                                                                                                    87%
- the German public                    11%
                                                               36%
- the Russian public                                                              53%
                                                                                                        74%
- the Japanese public                              24%

Global job performance approval rating:
                                                                     41%
- US leadership                                          30%
                                                                     41%
- German leadership                                                  41%
                                                  23%
- Russian leadership                                 27%
                                                      29%
- Chinese leadership                                    31%

Favorable view of US music, movies and TV:
                                                                                                 67%
- the German public                                                                                     74%
                                                                            48%
- the Russian public                                                                56%
                                                                                                   69%
- the Japanese public                                                                                 73%

Favorable view of US ideas about democracy:
                                                                         45%
- the German public                                              37%
                                                     26%
- the Russian public                                    30%
                                                                                             64%
- the Japanese public                                                                       63%
                              0                   20                   40                   60                 80                     100

Sources: Andrew Kohut et al., “Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted”, Pew Research Center (2012), p. 3, 5,
22 – 23; Richard Wike et al., “U.S. Image suffers as Public Around World Question Trumps Leadership”, Pew Research Center (2017),
p. 22, 28, 34, 93 – 94; Gallup (2018), Rating World Leaders: 2018, p.2.

future of US global engagement. Ap-                                    prevailed during the Bush administra-
proval of US leadership worldwide                                      tion. It now ranks on par with China,
rose between 2008 and 2016, but has                                    a troubling omen for those who con-
since returned to the low levels that                                  sider US soft power to be an advantage

24
SU PER POWER           CONSTRA I N E D

in its rivalry with Beijing. Also worry-     Aspects of soft power, such as popular
ing is that only one-quarter of Europe-      culture and the reputation of its lead-
ans approve of US leadership.25              ing universities, will continue to be
                                             a strength, but the longer the US is
Conclusion: the Consequences of              plagued by political dysfunction and
Constraint                                   radicalization the more difficult it will
Policymakers face a different geopo-         be to attract talented foreigners and
litical landscape than their post-World      influence other nations. One worry-
War Two predecessors. The US remains         ing sign is that after years of steady
the world’s most powerful nation, but        growth, enrollments by international
its influence is undermined by foreign       students at US universities declined in
and domestic constraints that are un-        2016 and 2017.26
likely to dissipate. Great power com-
petitors such as China and Russia will       Meanwhile, the diffusion of informa-
remain antagonistic – though China,          tion and technology will continue to
given its economic strength, has a           empower regional competitors and
much better chance of sustaining its         non-state actors. Here, too, policy-
challenge over the long term.                makers remain at a loss as to how to
                                             respond. The nature of the US eco-
The downsides of globalization will          nomic and political system, with its
also endure. Economic interdepend-           reliance on the rule of law, advanced
ence, a source of considerable strength      technology, and the free flow of infor-
for the US economy, will also con-           mation and people, leaves it uniquely
tinue to fuel inequality and – in com-       vulnerable to asymmetric attacks
bination with cultural conservatism          from weaker and authoritarian foes.
– political radicalization. There is lit-    Partisanship further complicates mat-
tle reason to expect that the political      ters by making it difficult to assess the
will exists to address this paradox, or      impact of previous attacks and to im-
that the system is even capable of ac-       plement effective countermeasures.
commodating the type of changes that
would be necessary. On the contrary,         What does all of this mean for the
the situation appears set to worsen, as      future of US foreign policy? Sweep-
key arms of the US foreign policy and        ing predictions are unwise in the era
national security apparatus – its mili-      of Trump, but the evidence suggests
tary and diplomatic corps – are in the       several trends. Fears that the US will
midst of crises that could leave them        embrace a form of neo-isolationism
hobbled for years.                           are unjustified. However, we can

                                                                                   25
STRATEG I C TR EN DS          201 8

expect more extreme swings in behav-         2010 NPR called for modernizing
ior, based partly on which party holds       the nation’s nuclear arsenal, but also
power. The GOP has fused comfort-            sought to lead the way on arms con-
ably with Trumpism, leaving it more          trol. In keeping with his skepticism
nationalist and unilateralist than was       regarding the value of international
previously the case – a fact which is        cooperation, Trump shows no such
highlighted by the administration’s          interest.27
decision to continue using the unsa-
vory phrase “America First”, which ap-       European policymakers are under-
pears numerous times in the recently         standably concerned about the direc-
released National Security Strategy.         tion of US foreign policy. It is more
This means it will be prone to bouts         aggressive but less effective, and more
of protectionism, nativism, xenopho-         demanding of its allies but unwilling
bia, and illiberalism. This will hamper      to provide leadership. This state of af-
efforts to sustain an internationalist       fairs presents potential opportunities
grand strategy in the coming years.          and pitfalls. The return of geopolitics
The Democratic Party, meanwhile,             will focus US attention on Africa, the
continues to be more committed to            Middle East, and East Asia, leaving
engagement, multilateralism, and             limited time and resources for as-
democratic values. However, a vocal          sisting allies across the Atlantic. This
minority of the party firmly opposes         could encourage Europe to accelerate
trade liberalization and favors further      the development of a robust Com-
cuts in military spending – tendencies       mon Security and Defense Policy
which bode poorly for revitalizing US        (CSDP) and, in the best-case scenar-
leadership.                                  io, lead to a more equal and fruitful
                                             US-European relationship.
In the worst-case scenario, extremist
nationalism combined with an inabili-        However, if the US continues to
ty to satisfactorily counter asymmetric      struggle to adapt to the evolution of
threats could lead to a more danger-         global politics and to address its most
ous, unpredictable foreign policy. One       pressing domestic challenges, the
hint of this troubling possibility can       transatlantic alliance will suffer ac-
be found in the 2018 Nuclear Posture         cordingly. This would be dangerous
Review (NPR). It expands the category        for both sides – and for the entire in-
of threats that could elicit a nuclear re-   ternational system.
sponse and calls for placing more em-
phasis on low-yield devices. Obama’s

26
SU PER POWER                 CONSTRA I N E D

1 Hans M. Kristensen/Robert S. Norris, “Chinese           13 David Autor et al., “Importing Political Polari-
  Nuclear Forces, 2016”, in: Bulletin of the Atomic          zation? The Electoral Consequences of Rising
  Scientists 72 (2016), 205 – 211.                           Trade Exposure”, in: NBER Working Paper
                                                             no. 22637 (2017).
2 Nigel Inkster, China’s Cyber Power (London:
  Routledge, 2017); Sophie-Charlotte Fischer,             14 Noland McCarty, “What we know and don’t
  “Artificial Intelligence: China’s High-Tech                know about our polarized politics”, in: The
  Ambitions”, in: CSS Analyses in Security Policy,           Washington Post, 08.01.2014.
  no. 220 (2018).
                                                          15 Justin Gest, The New Minority: White Working
3 Uri Friedman, “What Are America’s Options on               Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and
  North Korea?”, in: The Atlantic, 07.04.2017.               Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press,
                                                             2016).
4 Jack Thompson/Oliver Thränert, “Trump Pre-
  paring to End Iran Nuke Deal”, in: CSS Policy           16 Yascha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa, “Yes,
  Perspectives 5, no. 4 (2017).                              people really are turning away from democ-
                                                             racy”, in: The Washington Post, 08.12.2016.
5 The Iran Project, Weighing Benefits and Costs of
  Military Action Against Iran, 2012.                     17 Christopher Weber et al., “How authoritarian-
                                                             ism is shaping American politics (and it’s not
6 Maggie Severns, “Big Donors Ready to Re-                   just about Trump)”, in: The Washington Post,
  ward Republicans for Tax Cuts”, in: Politico,              10.05.2017.
  29.01.2018; Jack Thompson, “Looking Beyond
  Trump”, in: Strategic Trends (2017), 35 – 54.           18 Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan Hajnal, White
                                                             Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American
7 David H. Autor et al., “The China Shock:                   Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
  Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to                   2017).
  Large Changes in Trade”, in: NBER Working
  Paper, no. 21906 (2016).                                19 Bradley Jones, “Support for free trade agree-
                                                             ments rebounds modestly, but wide partisan
8 Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century?                  differences remain”, Pew Research Center,
  Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and       25.04.2017.
  Road Initiative (Seattle: The National Bureau of
  Asian Research, 2017).                                  20 Dina Smeltz et al.,“What Americans Think
                                                             About America First”, Chicago Council on
9 Yun Sun, “Africa in China’s Foreign Policy”,               Global Affairs Report, 10.2017.
  Brookings Institution Report, 04.2014.
                                                          21 Grant A. Driessen/Marc Labonte, “The Budget
10 Thorsten Benner et al., “Authoritarian Advance:           Control Act of 2011 as Amended: Budgetary
   Responding to China’s Growing Political Influ-            Effects”, Congressional Research Service Report,
   ence in Europe”, Global Public Policy Institute           12.2015.
   Report, 02.2018.
                                                          22 United States Government Accountability
11 Keith Johnson, “China’s New Silk Road into                Office, Department of Defense: Actions Needed
   Europe is about more than Money”, in: Foreign             to Address Five Key Mission Challenges, 06.2017;
   Policy, 01.06.2016; Lucrezia Poggetti, “China’s           Katherine Blakely, “More Money on the Hori-
   Charm Offensive in Eastern Europe Challenges              zon? Analysis of the FY 2018 Defense Budget
   EU Cohesion”, in: The Diplomat, 24.11.2017.               Request”, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
                                                             Assessments Report, 12.2017; Dan Goure, “The
12 Jenny Jun et al., “North Korea’s Cyber Opera-             U.S. Military Is Suffering A Crisis Of Strategy,
   tions: Strategy and Responses”, Center for Strate-        Not Just One Of Readiness”, in: The National
   gic and International Studies Report, 11.2015.            Interest, 30.05.2017; Statement by General
                                                             Daniel Allyn, Vice Chief of Staff of the United
                                                             States Army, Senate Armed Services Committee
                                                             Subcommittee on Readiness and Management
                                                             Support, 08.02.2017.

                                                                                                             27
STRATEG I C TR EN DS    201 8

23 Barbara Stephenson, “Time to Ask Why”, in:
   The Foreign Service Journal, 12.2017, 7; Robbie
   Gramer et al., “How the Trump Administration
   Broke the State Department”, in: Foreign Policy,
   31.07.2017.

24 Pew Research Center, U.S. Image Suffers as Pub-
   lics Around World Question Trump’s Leadership,
   06.2017.

25 Gallup, Rating World Leaders: 2018.

26 Elizabeth Redden, “International Student Num-
   bers Decline”, in: Inside Higher Ed, 18.01.2018.

27 Oliver Thränert, “President Trump’s Nuclear
   Posture Review”, in: CSS Analyses in Security
   Policy no. 223 (2018).

28
CHAPTER 2

Room for Maneuver: China and Russia
Strengthen Their Relations
Brian G. Carlson

At a time of turmoil in the West, China and Russia pose growing challenges
to the liberal international order. The China-Russia relationship has grown
stronger in recent years, as the two countries have increased coordination
on North Korea and other issues. China and Russia are not about to form
an alliance, but neither are they likely to drift apart in the near future. Their
shared concerns about US power and resistance to liberal norms provide a
strong basis for a continued close relationship, albeit one increasingly tilted
in China’s favor.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands during a meeting
in Danang, Vietnam, 10 November 2017. Sputnik, Konstantin; Zavrazhin, Kremlin / Reuters

                                                                                           29
STRATEG I C TR EN DS          201 8

As US President Donald J. Trump’s           interference in the 2016 presidential
first year in office drew to a close, his   election, hindered Trump’s ability to
administration increasingly pointed to      conduct diplomatic outreach toward
the national security challenges posed      Russia. Regardless of domestic po-
by China and Russia. The new Na-            litical constraints, however, attempts
tional Security Strategy of the Unit-       to pry Russia away from China were
ed States, issued in December 2017,         never likely to succeed. The Cold War
named China and Russia as “revision-        context that gave rise to Kissinger’s
ist powers” that “challenge American        strategy is long gone. Russian leaders,
power, influence, and interests, at-        having absorbed the painful lessons of
tempting to erode American security         the Sino-Soviet split, recognize that
and prosperity.”1 The summary of the        their country’s security and prosper-
2018 National Defense Strategy, un-         ity depend on maintaining friendly
veiled in January 2018, identified the      relations with their increasingly pow-
“central challenge to U.S. prosperity       erful neighbor, regardless of the state
and security as the reemergence of long-    of relations with the US. For its part,
term, strategic competition” by these re-   China needs friendly relations with
visionist powers.2                          Russia in order to assure itself of a
                                            “strategic rear” to the north, given
These policy declarations represented       its tense relations with several other
a shift from one year earlier, when         neighboring countries. Moreover, the
Trump entered office amid specu-            common positions that China and
lation that he would pursue a rap-          Russia hold on many international is-
prochement with Russia. One of the          sues, including their discomfort with
purported goals of such a policy was        US power, objections to an interna-
to wrest Russia away from China’s em-       tional order reflecting liberal norms
brace, using a strengthened US-Russia       and values, and shared desire to resist
relationship as leverage over China.        perceived threats to their forms of
Such an attempt at triangular diplo-        domestic governance, provide ample
macy would have been straight out           reason for them to maintain close
of the playbook of former secretary of      relations.
state Henry Kissinger, with the roles
of Moscow and Beijing reversed this         As Jack Thompson argues in this vol-
time.3                                      ume, a series of factors both foreign
                                            and domestic are placing US foreign
Bipartisan domestic opposition, based       policy under stress. In the coming
partly on concerns about Russia’s           years, the challenge that China and

30
RO OM     FOR      M AN E UVE R

Russia pose to the liberal interna-          Russia sought both an economic
tional order will be one such factor.        lifeline and a diplomatic partner to
For both the US and Europe, the ex-          reduce its isolation. China was the
tent of coordination between China           obvious candidate. Subsequent de-
and Russia deserves close watching.          velopments, including the contin-
In recent years, this coordination has       ued stalemate in Ukraine, Russia’s
grown stronger. A think tank report          intervention in the Syrian civil war,
published in 2016, co-authored by            and allegations of Russian meddling
Russian and Chinese experts, argued          in US and European elections have
that “Russia-China rapprochement             ensured continued friction in rela-
in security is special in that the two       tions between Russia and the West.
countries have come close to the line        China, meanwhile, perceives grow-
that distinguishes partnership from a        ing pressure from the US as its rise to
military and political alliance,” though     power gathers force. These tensions,
neither state wished to cross this line.4    in turn, lay the groundwork for sus-
That same year, in an article aimed at       tained cooperation between China
Western audiences, a former vice for-        and Russia.
eign minister of China argued that the
two countries, despite having no in-         The growing strength of the China-
tention to form an alliance, neverthe-       Russia relationship has belied the ex-
less shared sufficiently close interests     pectations of many Western analysts.
and values to ensure that their partner-     The two countries remain unlikely to
ship would remain durable.5                  form an alliance, partly because nei-
                                             ther wishes to be dragged into the
China and Russia have gradually              other’s regional conflicts. Moreover,
strengthened their relationship over         the balance of power within the rela-
the past quarter-century. Vladimir           tionship is shifting rapidly in China’s
Putin’s return to the Russian presi-         favor, which could eventually become
dency in 2012 and Xi Jinping’s ac-           a major concern for Russia. To date,
cession to power in China that same          however, the two countries have set
year were important stimulants to the        aside their differences in order to
bilateral relationship. The onset of the     pursue common interests. Their “stra-
Ukraine crisis strengthened relations        tegic partnership”, though subject
further by driving Russia into China’s       to limitations, is not likely to break
arms. Facing Western sanctions for its       down in the near future. Under this
annexation of Crimea and its support         arrangement, which is looser than an
for insurgents in eastern Ukraine,           alliance, the two countries offer each

                                                                                 31
STRATEG I C TR EN DS          201 8

other a measure of diplomatic sup-          China-Russia relationship through-
port on a range of issues and at least      out the post-Soviet era. The volume
“friendly neutrality” in each other’s re-   of bilateral trade consistently pales in
gional disputes. In 2018 and beyond,        comparison to China-US, China-EU,
the China-Russia relationship will          and Russia-EU bilateral trade vol-
continue to exert significant influence     umes. Russia has also relied primarily
on issues of international concern, un-     on Western financial markets for ac-
folding at the bilateral, regional, and     cess to credit.
global levels.
                                            In 2014, the year that the West began
The Bilateral Level: Economics,             to impose sanctions, the volume of
Energy, and Arms                            China-Russia bilateral trade reached
In the face of Western sanctions fol-       an all-time high of 95 billion USD.
lowing the onset of the Ukraine crisis,     However, this figure fell to 68 bil-
Russia attempted a pivot to China in        lion USD in 2015, largely because of
order to compensate, at least partially,    a sharp drop in energy prices.6 The
for the resulting economic losses. The      trade volume remained flat in 2016
chief result, however, was that China       and remains well short of the 2014
increased its bargaining leverage in the    peak. Some Russian critics concluded
two strongest sectors of the bilateral      that Russia’s attempted pivot to Asia,
economic relationship, namely energy        which in practice focused heavily on
and arms sales. In both sectors, nego-      China, had been largely a failure in
tiations on important deals had begun       economic terms.7 The most signifi-
before the Ukraine crisis but had failed    cant results of bilateral economic di-
to reach conclusion. After the out-         plomacy have been major agreements
break of the crisis, the two countries      on natural gas and weapons sales.
achieved important breakthroughs
in these negotiations, with results         During Putin’s visit to China in May
that were especially advantageous for       2014, China and Russia struck a 400
China.                                      billion USD gas supply deal, with
                                            Russia’s Gazprom agreeing to supply
The benefits that Russia hoped to           the China National Petroleum Cor-
achieve from its economic outreach to       poration (CNPC) with up to 38 bil-
China have been slow to materialize.        lion cubic meters of gas per year for 30
This should not have been surprising,       years, starting in 2018. Analysts esti-
considering that bilateral economic         mated that the price China would pay
ties have been a weak link in the           for the gas, which was not disclosed

32
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