Humanitarian Exchange - Special feature The conflict in Syria HPNHumanitarian
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
HPN
Humanitarian
Practice Network Humanitarian
Exchange
Managed by
Humanitarian Policy Group
Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI Number 59 November 2013
Special feature
The conflict in Syria
HPN Humanitarian
Exchange
Humanitarian
Practice Network
Managed by
Humanitarian Policy Group
Number 59 November 2013
Contents Editorial
The conflict in Syria
3 Humanitarianism besieged
6 Ethical and legal perspectives on cross-border
humanitarian operations
9 The challenge of access in Syria
10 How Islamic Relief is working across Syria’s
borders
11 Cities in conflict: the lessons of Syria
13 An interview with Dr Nizar Hammodeh, Union
© IRIN/Jodi Hilton
of Syrian Medical Relief Organisations
15 ‘You got the stuff?’: humanitarian activist
networks in Syria
17 The Syrian refugee crisis: findings from a real-
time evaluation of UNHCR’s response
20 Refugees, host states and displacement in the This edition of Humanitarian Exchange, co-edited with Ben Parker, features
Middle East: an enduring challenge the humanitarian crisis created by the conflict in Syria. Since the civil war
22 Out of the spotlight and hard to reach: Syrian began there in March 2011, an estimated 100,000 people have been killed,
refugees in Jordan’s cities five million have been displaced within Syria and over two million – half of
25 Can Jordan’s water market support the Syrian them children – have fled to neighbouring countries. Humanitarian agencies
refugee influx? have struggled to reach people in desperate need of assistance in both
27 Schooling in a crisis: the case of Syrian government- and rebel-controlled areas, hampered by ongoing conflict and
refugees in Turkey government-imposed bureaucratic restrictions. During the almost three years
29 Lessons from assessing the humanitarian of conflict, 22 Syrian Red Crescent volunteers have been killed and several aid
situation in Syria and countries hosting workers have been kidnapped.
refugees
33 Syria: a child protection crisis. Key findings In his lead article, Ben Parker shows how Syria has exposed the weaknesses
from a 2013 interagency assessment of child in conventional humanitarian practice and the difficulties of engaging in such
protection trends inside Syria a fluid and complex environment. Reflecting on three main types of cross-
border operations in humanitarian history, Hugo Slim and Emanuela-Chiara
Gillard discuss whether such operations can be pursued ethically and legally
in Syria, while Brian Tisdall and Samina Haq explain the different approaches
the International Committee of the Red Cross and Islamic Relief have taken to
reach people in need. Echoing Ben Parker’s conclusions, François Grünewald
argues that effective humanitarian response in conflict-affected urban areas
in Syria requires risk-taking and a capacity to engage in principled strategic
About HPN dialogue with a wide range of actors. Tania Cheung reports on an interview
The Humanitarian Practice Network at the Overseas
Development Institute is an independent forum with Dr. Nizar Hammodeh, a British-Syrian doctor, on diaspora-led medical
where field workers, managers and policymakers relief efforts, neutrality and humanitarian access in Syria, and a local Syrian
in the humanitarian sector share information, activist, forced to remain anonymous for safety reasons, highlights how the
analysis and experience. The views and opinions
expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily techniques activists used to organise protests and demonstrations were
state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy quickly adapted to provide vital humanitarian and social assistance.
Group or the Overseas Development Institute.
Cover photo: © UNICEF/Romenzi Frances Voon discusses the findings of an evaluation of UNHCR’s response to
the refugee crisis, while Simone Haysom, Ben White and Eleanor Davey explore
past episodes of displacement in the region. The response to the refugee
crisis in Jordan is assessed by Sandrine Tiller and Sean Healy, and Carol Brady
and Thomas Wildman report on using market assessments to help refugees
access water there. The challenges of providing education to Syrian refugees
Britain’s leading independent think-tank on international in Turkey are highlighted by Selin Yildiz Nielsen and Mark Grey. The issue ends
development and humanitarian issues with articles from the Syria Needs Assessment Project (SNAP) and the Child
Overseas Development Institute Protection Working Group, on key findings from a 2013 interagency assessment
203 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NJ
United Kingdom. of child protection inside Syria.
Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300, Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399
HPN e-mail: hpn@odi.org.uk As always, we welcome any comments or feedback, which can be sent to hpn@
HPN website: http://www.odihpn.org odi.org.uk or to The Coordinator, 203 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NJ.
exchange
humanitarian
The conflict in Syria
Humanitarianism besieged
Ben Parker
A political or military solution to
stop the carnage in Syria seems as
remote as ever. The war seems only
to bring even worse depths of human
suffering and diplomatic impotence.
Syrian civilians are in a state, not just
of terror, but of horror – hostages
in a geopolitical, ideological and
sectarian catastrophe. On the face of
it, getting humanitarian assistance
to the millions affected should be
easier to deal with than the political
and military mess. In the space of
two years, a major relief operation
within Syria has indeed come to life
despite the extreme circumstances.
But these persistent, sincere and
often brave efforts are compromised
© Ben Parker
and deeply problematic. Although
they have grown in breadth and
scale, the response is still a
Bullet hole in a Syrian Arab Red Crescent ambulance outside of Homs,
disappointment to all sides: the
Syria in June 2012
government and opposition groups,
donors, Syrian civil society, humanitarian workers in on grounds of national security and because it was seen
Syria themselves and the global public. Syria has tested as in tension with a general policy of national self-reliance.
conventional humanitarian practice up to and beyond its For example, the handful of international NGOs working
limits, and exposed some uncomfortable truths about for Iraqi refugees before the civil war were forbidden to
helping civilians in conflict. This article examines the meet together independently, and had to furtively arrange
humanitarian response in Syria and humanitarian space their encounters in restaurants and cafes.
there in general, mainly from the perspective of operations
run from government-held areas. With memories of the UN mandate which authorised
military action in Libya fresh in the mind, which used civilian
International bodies routinely call for ‘unimpeded humani- protection as a justification, the Syrian government sees
The conflict in Syria
tarian access’, but in reality there are few places in the world humanitarian operations as a Trojan horse to delegitimise
where aid workers are less free to move around, assess the state, develop contacts with the opposition and win
needs and deliver services independently. Humanitarian international support for military intervention.
action in Syria is plagued by insecurity, bureaucracy,
manipulation, intimidation and limited operational In government-controlled parts of Syria, what, where and
capacity. External political and organisational agendas to whom to distribute aid, and even staff recruitment,
only make matters worse. To work on humanitarian issues have to be negotiated and are sometimes dictated. The
in Syria is to walk an ethical tightrope. The humanitarian handful of operational agencies that have been allowed
principles which underpin the Western aid system are in have a state-imposed limitation on the number of
under extraordinary pressure. Independence, neutrality, international staff they can bring in, often achieved by
impartiality and humanity are under continual strain due to arbitrary denials or delays in issuing visas. Nationals
murky – if necessary – compromises and accommodations. of countries perceived as hostile to the Syrian state are
Conventional humanitarianism is besieged. particularly unlikely to get visas. The list of acceptable
nationalities shrank fast.
Operational access
The attitude of the state is central to the humanitarian According to the Syrian government’s official position,
response in Syria. The government is used to having humanitarian agencies and supplies are allowed to go
rigid control over most aspects of society, and keeping anywhere, even across any frontline. But every action
a very close eye on foreigners. Even before the conflict, requires time-consuming permissions, which effectively
international involvement in humanitarian operations in provide multiple veto opportunities. To send staff to the
Syria was tightly controlled and viewed with suspicion both field, an agency must put in a request, days in advance,
Number 59 • November 2013
listing the names of the travellers, their nationalities, other sources: Western donors closely interrogate them
passport numbers and titles, and the licence plate about what percentage of their aid reaches opposition
number of every vehicle. This goes first to the Syrian Arab areas, and high-profile cross-line convoys are sometimes
Red Crescent (SARC). If endorsed, SARC then sends the mounted to prove the point that access is not one-sided,
request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If the Ministry even when routine deliveries are getting through.
approves it – and it is widely assumed that the Ministry
also seeks the nod from the security apparatus – SARC Relieving besieged areas is notoriously risky. Last
then signs a facilitation letter that will allow the vehicles autumn, after weeks of painstaking negotiations, the
to get through checkpoints. ICRC prepared a convoy to enter Homs’ rebel-controlled
Old City, which had been under tight siege by government
Further paperwork requirements change often and are forces for months. The ICRC had assurances of safety from
unpredictable. Medical supplies come under particular the government and its security agencies, and from a
scrutiny, with aid agencies virtually prohibited from significant proportion of over 20 various armed groups and
sending surgical material to opposition-held areas, the units in the area, garnered through weeks of negotiations.
assumption being that they could be used to patch But the lead vehicle came under fire as it was crossing the
up wounded rebel fighters. Missions or deliveries are frontline – it is not clear from whom. When the SARC tried
liable to be cancelled at the last minute because of to reach the pro-government town of Harem, under siege
‘security concerns’, which frequently correlate with areas by rebels, it too was attacked.
of particular strategic significance. Once on the road,
supplies and staff still face arbitrary searches, delays and Partner access
theft as local commanders may simply disregard paperwork In the limited humanitarian space that remains, the SARC is
issued in Damascus. Opposition fighters at checkpoints at the centre. Not only does it see its role as defending and
also have harassed and detained humanitarian staff and acting on the humanitarian principles of the Red Cross and
looted humanitarian supplies. Red Crescent Movement, it also occupies a powerful but
fraught position of simultaneously being coordinator and
Crossing the frontline between government and rebel- gatekeeper for other relief agencies, both international and
controlled territory presents another range of potentially domestic. SARC approval is required for the registration of
deadly risks and difficulties. There are hundreds of humanitarian INGOs and their programmes. The SARC is
rebel groups whose control over different territories the conduit for the majority of UN-supplied food aid and
is constantly changing. Meanwhile, many of the ever- a significant proportion of international non-food aid. Its
growing array of Islamist groups have little interest or agreement is required for field offices, visits and needs
regard for international humanitarian law. Humanitarian assessments. It is the primary agency for registering and
agencies struggle to find a suitable interface with assessing populations in need, which itself is a politically-
insurgent groups; painstaking negotiations for access charged process. The government expected the SARC to
are typically done through a third party and circuitous both manage the humanitarian crisis and the blowback
communication channels. of the crisis in terms of bad publicity and international
‘interference’.
Conditional access
Despite these heavy operational restrictions, humanitarian At its worst, SARC is a monopolistic bottleneck, deeply
supplies continue to move around the country and across compromised by pressure from the government. At its best,
some front lines. Navigating what one observer has called especially in the field, it is an inspiring beacon of decency
The conflict in Syria
the ‘leopard skin’ map of Syria’s religious and sectarian and service. Without its field network and volunteers, there
divisions, as well as its patchwork of military and rebel would be scant capacity to manage supplies and organise
control, is both extremely difficult and dangerous. Worse distributions and emergency services. Without it, and its
still, some areas have been deliberately besieged or thousands of volunteers, the suffering in Syria would be
blockaded by both government and opposition forces. much deeper. Its volunteers come from the communities
Civilians in these areas may voluntarily stay for family they serve and many are staunchly anti-government.
or political reasons, or stay out of fear of being killed or They take heroic risks under huge pressure. Caught in the
detained by the other side if they leave. Depending on the middle, SARC staff and volunteers are regularly accused
viewpoint, they could be regarded as human shields or by the government of facilitating assistance to rebels, and
victims of collective punishment, or both. in some cases detained and allegedly abused. Splits have
emerged between the highly-controlling Damascus HQ
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has and the regional offices of the SARC, especially those in
said that one of its toughest challenges in Syria is reaching areas under long-term opposition control.
tens of thousands of civilians surviving in harsh conditions
in sealed-off areas. Some of these areas have gone months After many months of negotiation and pressure, UN
– some over a year – without any formal assistance. In this agencies and international NGOs have been able to
context, the government has at times engaged in a ‘tit-for- expand their partner base. The government has allowed
tat’ approach – allowing aid agencies access to opposition them to work directly through several dozen pre-approved
areas under siege in exchange for their influence in getting local NGOs. But many of these NGOs and charities have
aid to government sympathisers that the government limited or no experience of humanitarian work and do not
cannot access. Aid agencies are also under pressure from have a nationwide presence. These national NGOs have
exchange
humanitarian
little capacity in programming at the scale required and procedures designed to unlock the best people and
some have a fractious relationship with the SARC at the the best decision-making to sophisticated assessment,
local level. The other channel available for implementation mapping, international lobbying, advocacy and fund-
is through the government line ministries, which are of raising, the international humanitarian community should
varying effectiveness and unpalatable to some donors. have been in a position to respond in the best possible
way to the crisis in Syria. Some of these systems did
With some creativity and guile, aid operations were able work, but many did not – a textbook approach was
to find cracks in these rules – offering arm’s-length or never going to be appropriate to the situation, which
mutually deniable support to small or well-placed local rather demands creativity, pragmatism and some cold,
NGOs operating under the radar. The formal aid system calculating realism.
made little progress in linking with civilian volunteer
networks and coordination committees. The diplomatic deadlock led to misdirected pressure on the
humanitarian system to deliver a substitute for what politics
Cross-border and cross-line access could not. The ability to deliver good-quality, principled
A number of Syrian aid groups, international NGOs and programmes was not only constrained by restrictions inside
Red Crescent national societies are working in opposition- Syria, but also by a clamour of pressures from outside.
controlled Syrian territory without the permission of These ranged from organisational hubris and rivalry, to an ill-
Damascus. The Syrian government regards them as disguised preference for the opposition from some donors,
illegal, and has made it clear to Damascus-based agencies which leaked into humanitarian decision-making, to an
that, if they undertake any cross-border operations, inability by aid agencies to say ‘no’, or ‘we don’t know’ when
their operations would be shut down. Any cross-border faced with unrealistic expectations and demands for data.
operations have been kept discreet by most agencies The international aid system became warped under this
and their donors, so details are limited on their scale onslaught, leading to turf battles and sharp practice, fund-
and effectiveness. Certainly, cross-border operations face raising contradictions, donor interference, double-speak
their own constraints: insecurity and risk has kept them and poor risk management, all the while under intense
largely confined to areas near the Turkish border; Turkey is pressure and micro-management from headquarters and
increasingly restricting the ease with which they can cross capitals. Any divisions between aid agencies were exploited
the border and operate; and they face challenges – like by government and security agencies.
the agencies working with Damascus – in maintaining a
healthy distance from militarised political forces. Despite all this, many victories large and small were
celebrated too: bold, creative and crafty solutions and
Assessment, monitoring and evaluation on all sides is alliances were found, and a sheer doggedness to not give
very weak. The numbers and nature of people in need, up became a source of pride and motivation. Looking
wherever they found themselves, are often highly abstract ahead, there can only be more players, more complexity,
and politicised, but partly due to a political culture of more expectations and more risks of every kind in a
record-keeping and statistics, there were in fact sources humanitarian crisis as severe as the one still deepening
of information that could be tapped on all sides. There in Syria. A balance will have to be found between ‘state
has been little direct contact or coordination between of the art’ humanitarian practice and what works and
international NGOs operating cross-border in rebel-held is ‘good enough’. Humanitarian action in Syria has to
parts of Syria and those working with the permission of work within a fluid and complex network of actors and
Damascus. In one case, an aid agency took major risks to through innovative and changing practices, not a rigid
The conflict in Syria
cross a frontline only to find upon arrival that assistance ‘architecture’.
had already been delivered to the area from across the
Turkish border. Opposition disunity held back the potential Syria’s implosion will have profound implications for the
establishment of an opposition relief wing with which region and beyond. It is a live and terrible test of the
international efforts could liaise, a commonplace practice in international status quo: in terms of promoting peace
other conflicts. With Western backing, the opposition finally and security, implementing a humanitarian response and
set up the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) in December preventing mass atrocities against civilians. Tested and
2012 to coordinate assistance in Syria's rebel-held north, found wanting, the established humanitarian system
but the ACU has had limited impact on the ground. ignores the lessons of Syria at its peril.
Besieged Ben Parker was head of the UN Office for the Coordination
The international humanitarian system brought its whole of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Syria from March 2012
toolkit to Syria – in theory at least. From ‘Level 3’ special to February 2013. He writes here in a personal capacity.
Number 59 • November 2013
Ethical and legal perspectives on cross-border humanitarian
operations
Hugo Slim and Emanuela-Chiara Gillard
The devastating armed conflict in Syria has once again in the 1990s, had the consent of both the governments
raised the question of the ethics and legality of cross- concerned and armed groups. OLS built on shared
border humanitarian operations. Many humanitarian incentives to prevent refugee flows and respond instead
agencies that have been excluded from working in Syria to internally displaced and vulnerable populations in
by the Syrian government have rightly explored other ways situ during ongoing armed conflict. Humanitarian law
to protect and assist civilians in opposition-held parts and principles were a key part of the agreement in OLS’
of the country that are not easily or routinely reached seminal Ground Rules for the consortium of UN agencies
by cross-line humanitarian operations authorised by the and 35 NGOs involved. OLS marked the first time that the
government. This article looks briefly at three main types of UN had worked directly with armed opposition groups
cross-border operations in humanitarian history, and then and government together. This was made possible largely
addresses two main questions: can cross-border operations because of strong and united international pressure on
be pursued legally?; and what constitutes ethical cross- Sudan, and a strong lead agency in the shape of the UN
border operations? Children’s Fund (UNICEF).
Precedents for cross-border operations 3. Imposed forcefully by the UN Security Council with
History suggests three main types of cross-border the consent of neighbouring states
operation. This third type of cross-border operation is represented by
the UN-imposed ‘safe haven’ in Northern Iraq in 1991, in
1. Unauthorised by the affected state but agreed to by the wake of the first Iraq war. Here, neighbouring Turkey
armed groups and the neighbouring state and Iran were reluctant to accept a massive caseload
There are two famous examples of cross-border operations of Kurdish refugees. With Turkish and Iranian consent,
that were not authorised by the state concerned, but were France, the UK and the US promoted the idea of a safe
agreed to by a neighbouring state and implemented by haven and no-fly zone in Kurdish areas of Iraq to which
armed groups controlling territory within those states. refugees and IDPs could return and be supported with
cross-border humanitarian aid from Turkey and Iran. The
In the Nigerian civil war from 1967–70, many humanitarian safe haven was established following UN Security Council
agencies led a cross-border air-bridge into Biafra from Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991, and managed as part
Sao Tome. This cross-border operation was started by a of the military–humanitarian operation Provide Comfort,
consortium of church agencies, Joint Church Aid, frustrated led by the allied victors of the Iraq war, UN agencies and
with official International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) international NGOs.
and UN operations that were being negotiated with the
Nigerian government. Joint Church Aid flew 66,000 tonnes The legality of cross-border humanitarian
of relief supplies into Biafra on 5,310 relief flights and had operations
several planes shot down by the Nigerian air force. The legality of cross-border humanitarian operations turns
mainly on the two issues of the consent of the affected state
The conflict in Syria
In the Ethiopian civil war of the 1980s, church agencies and the exclusively humanitarian character of any cross-
formed a consortium in Sudan, the Emergency Relief Desk border aid. Under international humanitarian law (IHL),
(ERD), to move relief supplies across the Ethiopian border the consent of the state in whose territory operations are
with Sudan without Ethiopian government consent. The to be implemented is required. So too is the consent of the
ERD was established in 1981 and worked directly with the neighbouring state from which any cross-border operation
Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and the Relief Society is to be mounted. In practice, consent is also required from
of Tigray (REST), the relief wings of the Eritrean People’s any non-state armed actor in effective control of territory
Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation through which the relief goods must transit or for whose
Front (TPLF). ERA and REST managed the delivery and civilians they are intended.1
monitoring of relief operations with limited oversight by
ERD teams making cross-border assessments. Throughout Although consent is required, states do not have unlimited
the cross-border operation the ERD had the consent of the freedom to refuse relief actions. If relief is clearly necessary
government of Sudan, which kept the border open. The and the agency offering its services clearly humanitarian,
ability (and desire) of the ERA and REST to meet the needs then states must not arbitrarily withhold consent. They
of their populations was in stark contrast with the Ethiopian may do so for valid reasons like military necessity or a
government’s lack of access and its starvation strategy. justified suspicion that humanitarian actors or staff are not
acting in a way that is guided by humanitarian principles.
2. Authorised by the affected state, the neighbouring They may not refuse for arbitrary reasons like a desire to
state and armed groups 1 While opinions are divided as to whether the consent of armed
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a joint government and UN groups is required and, indeed, sufficient, it is usually essential in
cross-border operation from Kenya into southern Sudan practice if aid is to be delivered safely and effectively.
exchange
humanitarian
© IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation
Delivering aid on the Syria–Turkey border
weaken the resistance of the enemy, cause starvation, deny a specific location in extreme need, when no alternative
wounded enemy combatants medical care or deliberately exists. NGOs are not subjects of international law so cannot
discriminate between particular groups. Refusing consent violate a state’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. Instead,
in such circumstances would violate IHL. unauthorised operations do not benefit from the safeguards
of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and staff may face
The law does not stipulate how consent must be given. proceedings under national law.
It need not be publicly expressed but could be based on
private assurances or an attitude that could, in good faith, Legally, there is nothing intrinsically good, bad, better
be interpreted as acquiescence. or worse between in-country and cross-border aid. Aid
The conflict in Syria
modality does not affect the legal position. Only the
If state consent is withheld for valid reasons then un- grounds on which consent is refused and the principled
authorised relief operations are unlawful. Although the quality of humanitarian practice determine the legality of
International Court of Justice has ruled that the provision humanitarian action.
of humanitarian assistance in a principled manner does not
amount to intervention, such operations would nonetheless The ethics of cross-border operations in
violate the affected state’s territorial integrity as well as Syria
IHL. Staff may be turned back at the border or, if already If the law allows cross-border humanitarian operations in
in-country, goods and equipment can be confiscated and certain situations, what are the main ethical considerations
staff deported. Staff may also face proceedings on grounds in the decision to pursue such operations? Like most
ranging from illegal entry to supporting the enemy. humanitarian decision-making, these turn on issues of
need, context and capability, and issues of principle
If consent is withheld for arbitrary reasons, perhaps counter- around impartiality, neutrality and independence.
intuitively, unauthorised operations are not automatically
lawful. If carried out by a state or international organisation Humanitarian needs are not being met across Syria by the
they would violate the affected state’s sovereignty and humanitarian agencies currently authorised to operate
territorial integrity. However their wrongfulness might there by the Syrian government. Needs remain unmet
be precluded in exceptional circumstances by the legal because of active hostilities, the creation of new needs
principle of necessity.2 An example could be a one-off relief on a daily basis and because securing cross-line access
operation to bring lifesaving supplies to a population in from all parties to the conflict is routinely problematic.
2 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Article 25. There is a significant shortfall in humanitarian funding
Number 59 • November 2013
and capacity in areas under government control. This is victims on all sides of the conflict in a war whose geography
because of government suspicion of international NGOs is changing fast. Agencies must aim for neutrality so that
and donor suspicion of government manipulation of aid. their resources and advocacy do not give unfair advantage
to any party to the conflict. Operational decision-making
The prospects for positive international action to reduce must be as independent as possible so that agencies make
needs and increase humanitarian access are poor. For humanitarian choices with autonomy.
political reasons it is unlikely that any measures under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter will be taken. Significant 3. Feasibility
international and regional support for the Syrian Agencies must constantly weigh up what is possible for
government means that there is a lack of unanimity at humanitarian action within the cluttered, contested and
the United Nations to take more forceful protective action inexperienced realm of opposition politics. They must work
for affected civilians.3 Armed intervention by one or more with partners who are willing and able to develop genuine
states looks politically imprudent. The increasing number humanitarian capacity that is principled, determined
of parties joining the conflict increases the likelihood of and effective. This will require courage, patience, good
a long regional war in a volatile part of the world. This judgement, accompaniment and ethical red lines that put
volatility increases the risk that any protective action by an absolute moral markers around good and bad practice. At
outside state will cause it to become embroiled in a costly, present, remote management and its attendant problems
protracted and widening war. are likely to be the norm. Serious risks to the lives of
humanitarian workers will persist and need to be weighed
All of these factors increase the potential significance against effectiveness.
of cross-border operations and give them humanitarian
salience and moral logic as a possible third way that Ultimately, if agencies judge that effective humanitarian
agencies are obliged to explore. But the splintered and action is not feasible in a cross-border operation they
conflicted Syrian opposition offers no easy option for must be ready to withdraw and try something else. A
humanitarian partnerships in any cross-border operation. reasonable chance of success is ethically important. The
They are no ERA or REST, and their political supporters possibility (or not) of actually implementing operations
want to provide humanitarian, military and political and doing so fairly and safely for all people concerned
support simultaneously. The increasing Islamist element needs to be taken into account.
in the opposition also means that the most disciplined
partners best able to organise humanitarian aid may be 4. Cooperation
the least politically desirable to Western donors. Many agencies have operated quite secretly in cross-
border operations to date and in deliberate isolation from
In this very non-ideal context, a number of conditions must one another. This may be wise if it is essential to staff
be met if cross-border humanitarian operations are to be safety and discrete access. But it may be wrong if it is
ethical as well as legal. The first two overlap strongly with primarily competitive and about stealing an advantage
international law. The others are more strictly ethical and over competing NGOs. A consortium approach has been
concern the weighing of goods and the pursuit of virtues a strong feature of successful cross-border operations
in a difficult situation. in the past and may be a more ethical way to proceed in
terms of maximising common goals and finding strength
1. An exclusively humanitarian goal in numbers for the benefit of affected people. Optimising
Legally and ethically, this condition is primary. Any humani- collective action is always ethically important.
The conflict in Syria
tarian agency engaging in cross-border humanitarian
operations should be doing so for humanitarian reasons 5. Complementarity with cross-line aid
alone. No agency should be running humanitarian Agencies must also weigh up the impact of cross-border
operations as part of a wider political aim to support operations on cross-line aid. Both types of programme
the development and success of opposition forces. must combine to best effect to avoid gaps and duplication,
Partisan politics is perfectly ethical in itself, but it cannot and to aim for fairness in shared measures and standards of
masquerade as neutral and impartial humanitarian action. aid. Cross-border and cross-line assistance must also take
Agencies will constantly have to make this position clear due care to ensure that one programme is not politically
to the many donors who have taken sides and to their manipulated to the detriment of the other. The existence
opposition partners. Nor would it be right for agencies to of cross-border aid must not be used as a justification for
undertake cross-border operations purely because they restrictions on cross-line aid, and vice versa. Transparency
feel an organisational need to be present and boost their and coordination between both sides are the best means
brand accordingly. In an already confused and sensitive to generate fair discussions of the humanitarian value and
operational space, there is no room for agencies engaging coverage of each approach.
primarily for publicity and reputation alone.
6. Best value relative to regional and global options
2. Principled operations Agencies should also weigh wider considerations
All humanitarian decision-making should be principled. when deciding about cross-border aid investments in
Impartiality will be essential so that an agency can reach somewhere as difficult as Syria. If operational feasibility
3 At the time of writing, consultations were under way regarding a is significantly limited and humanitarian principles are
possible Chapter VII cross-border aid resolution. at risk, then an agency is duty bound to consider other
exchange
humanitarian
uses for its resources. They may find better value in from it, demands a ten-year view at least. This requires
wider regional programmes like refugee support or any agency to think about where it can be most usefully
lobbying for peace. It may be wiser to stop high levels placed now in order to build the relationships and capacity
of organisational energy and resources being consumed that will make it a constructive and resilient humanitarian
in the Syrian crisis when a larger and more immediate player for communities who will continue to suffer the
impact could be made elsewhere. effects of this conflict over the decade to come.
7. A long view Hugo Slim and Emanuela-Chiara Gillard are Senior
Any consideration of options must also think long term. Research Fellows at the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law
The Syrian crisis, and any wider conflict that emanates and Armed Conflict, University of Oxford.
The challenge of access in Syria
Brian Tisdall
All sides acknowledge that not enough aid
is reaching Syrian civilians in desperate
straits. Security challenges, bureaucratic
impediments and a pervasive mistrust of the
motivations of humanitarian organisations
© Syrian Arab Red Crescent/MALLA, Ibrahim
have severely limited who can operate
within Syria, and where they can operate.
Faced with distribution difficulties, aid
organisations have disagreed openly as to
the best way of accessing those in need.
Some have argued that impediments to aid
distribution have unbalanced the whole
humanitarian effort, with certain groups
receiving relief and others not.
Local people help Syrian Arab Red Crescent volunteers
The International Committee of the Red unload food parcels in Homs, Syria
Cross (ICRC) agrees wholeheartedly that
more needs to be done to address suffering, including help reaches far more people, on both sides of the conflict,
for civilians in opposition-held areas. Indeed, we push for than can be directly identified. Engineers work to restore
this on a daily basis and with all sides of the conflict. There pumps, provide generators and supply chemicals for
are cumbersome rules for aid agencies working in the purification to ensure drinkable water regardless of
country, security challenges caused by the fragmentation whether the water flows to opposition- or government-
of the armed opposition and risks associated with the controlled areas. The engineers provide technical and
intensity of military confrontations. We have decided that material support for local water boards in the hardest-hit
The conflict in Syria
the best way to access suffering groups, often located areas and in camps accommodating displaced people.
deep in urban Syria, has been to build an operation from
inside the country. We do not exclude working across Syria is the ICRC’s largest operation globally. In 2012, the
borders to access opposition-held areas, provided that this ICRC and SARC distributed food to 1.5 million people, water
is accepted by all parties to the conflict. However, given to 14m people and other essential items (hygiene items,
the reluctance of the Syrian government to approve relief kitchen sets, blankets and mattresses) to another half a
operations that go across borders, the ICRC has focused million people, in addition to providing medical supplies
on negotiating access across frontlines to provide a lifeline for the treatment of thousands of sick or wounded people
for those in need. Other organisations travel across borders inside Syria. The goal in 2013 is to provide monthly food
without the formal approval of the Syrian government parcels for 450,000 people, most of them displaced, and
to deliver vital assistance, mainly to the opposition-held household essentials for up to 112,500 people. In addition,
areas of northern Syria. They also face many challenges, we will make sure that potable water continues to be
particularly in ensuring it is safe for their staff to work. provided for more than 12.5m people across the country.
Together with volunteers from the Syrian Arab Red Fundamentally, the reality of the Syrian conflict is that
Crescent (SARC), the ICRC has been able to work across only political action will resolve it. Politicising aid is not
frontlines to deliver food and essential household items the answer and will only hinder access for organisations
to a number of hard-to-access areas, including Deir like the ICRC.
Ezzor, Hama, Qusair, eastern Aleppo and parts of Rural
Damascus. Some of the support the ICRC is able to give Brian Tisdall is Head of Policy Division, ICRC.
Number 59 • November 2013
How Islamic Relief is working across Syria’s borders
Samina Haq
Islamic Relief is one of the few humanitarian
organisations working cross-border to
deliver aid in response to the deepening
crisis in Syria. The conflict in the country has
killed tens of thousands of people, and has
driven over 1.5 million across its borders.
For those still inside the country, needs are
increasingly acute as conditions continue
to deteriorate. It is estimated that over six
million people are in need inside Syria.
Islamic Relief staff have seen for themselves
the horrific situation inside Syria. Millions © Islamic Relief
are thought to be in dire need of food, water
and sanitation. In the countries that border
Syria, the humanitarian needs of many living
in limbo in ever-expanding camps and host Islamic Relief delivering aid in Syria
communities are deepening. Yet the lack of
any significant international presence and proper camp issue for cross-border work, both along the borders and
management inside Syria is striking. inside Syria. To combat the security risks – including
the high risk of aid workers being kidnapped – Islamic
Islamic Relief has been delivering humanitarian Relief minimises its presence inside Syria. Our local
assistance to the people of Syria since May 2012, partnerships allow work to continue.
both within the country and in neighbouring countries.
Working effectively in Syria and across the border Despite the risks, Islamic Relief attempts to work in both
in Turkey has been vital to get aid to where it is opposition- and government- held areas – supported by
most needed. Islamic Relief is one of the few agencies staff who are able to negotiate with local councils and
working cross-border, in partnership with a local Turkish camp and community leaders. As a result, we have been
organisation. Partnering with a local agency means able to gain access to areas that are completely cut off
that we can operate efficiently within Turkey and across from systematic humanitarian assistance. Islamic Relief
the border into Syria. Our local partner supports us in has distributed aid in the suburbs of Idlib, the coastal
procuring food and non-food items within Turkey and area of Lattakya, Aleppo, Al Raqqa and the eastern areas
getting them into areas deep inside Syria as quickly of Deir Azzor, Al Bokamal and Al Mayadeen, in addition
as possible, though the large volumes required mean to most of the border camps. Recently, however, the
that the process from procurement to delivery can relief road to Damascus has been cut, and Islamic Relief
The conflict in Syria
be a long one. As well as receiving in-kind donations, has been unable to get its convoy through crossing-
Islamic Relief purchases medicines and medical supplies points. Homs and Hamah are presently under siege
directly, contracting companies and purchasing goods and cannot be reached. For the internally displaced
with money transferred directly to the supplier. Around inside the country, there is no official UN registration so
90% of the goods are Turkish, and most suppliers take families languish in makeshift camps with nowhere to
the goods direct to the border. With goods coming from go and without access to the most basic of supplies. The
Istanbul and Ankara, this can be expensive even when scale of the suffering is horrific.
Islamic Relief handles the logistics – but there is no
other option at present. Both the government and opposition groups must help
to ensure that aid reaches those most in need. This
Islamic Relief undertakes capacity-building as part of its must mean allowing aid to cross lines of control, and
agreement with partners. This includes the provision of allowing organisations such as Islamic Relief to continue
training to staff and NGO partners (including nine local their cross-border work, and for those agencies working
Syrian NGOs) in disaster management and emergency out of Damascus to be allowed to reach populations
response methods. We have a team inside Syria that in opposition areas. Around one million people have
assesses needs, distributes aid and monitors distributions been helped by Islamic Relief’s response to the Syria
as far as is possible, for example through local councils. conflict. Despite the challenges, we will continue to
A small team of permanent staff covers Idlib, Atma and work extensively in Syria and neighbouring countries to
Aleppo, and also travels widely throughout the country. reach even more people in this bloody conflict.
We also have Syrian employees working in Turkey to
provide logistical support. Security, of course, is a major Samina Haq is Head of Programmes, Islamic Relief UK.
exchange
humanitarian
10Cities in conflict: the lessons of Syria
François Grünewald
Syria is a highly urbanised country, and the conflict there and religious organisations. Security conditions make
has had a particularly devastating impact on its cities and classic urban search and rescue operations impossible,
towns. Homs, Aleppo, Damascus and many smaller towns and it is very difficult to extract people from the rubble of
have served as battlegrounds for government and rebel bombed buildings, retrieve the wounded from the streets
offensives, with tragic humanitarian consequences for and set up triage and evacuation mechanisms. The high
their inhabitants. The battles for these cities have caused prevalence of unexploded ordnance (a result of extensive
the breakdown of entire urban systems, destroying homes bombing of urban areas), combined with ambushes, sniper
and public services and distorting urban markets and attacks and systematic booby-trapping, puts urban dwellers
economies. Urban demographics have changed significantly and humanitarian and rescue teams at huge risk.
as millions of Syrians have abandoned their homes. People
displaced from one city to another or from rural areas to Treating the high concentrations of wounded after each
urban environments are forced into close proximity; to military operation requires surgical teams with specialised
take just one example, one neighbourhood in Homs, Al skills, as well as sufficient supplies of blood, anaesthetics,
Waer, has seen a four-fold increase in population since the drugs and disinfectant. Electricity and water must be
conflict began, to 450,000 people, an estimated 80% of available to maintain cold chains and minimum hygiene
whom are internally displaced.1 This influx is exacerbating standards, but supplies are erratic and power cuts
social and communal tensions and increasing the pressure common. NGOs providing medical and surgical assistance
on damaged or unmaintained water, sewage and energy in urban areas in Syria report taking every opportunity
services in urban areas. Although impossible to assess to replenish medical and surgical supplies to maintain a
in detail, as a result of the conflict humanitarian needs minimal capacity to treat casualties, but blood supplies
in urban areas are clearly significant, but insecurity, are either very limited or not available at all. Through the
access and logistical constraints and government and SARC and the handful of NGOs working in urban areas,
opposition obstruction have made it extremely difficult for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has
aid agencies to respond at scale. tried to provide enough drugs and equipment to support
basic health and surgical care, as well as delivering food,
The challenges of urban programming water and household kits, renovating or upgrading public
Insecurity and danger are the defining characteristics facilities and providing water treatment supplies, spare
of operating in Syria in general, and in Syrian cities in parts, pumps and generators. Médecins Sans Frontières
particular. Part of the challenge confronting agencies (MSF) and Médecins du Monde (MDM) are working through
stems from the nature of urban warfare itself. Conflict in small-scale structures which are either very mobile or very
urban areas typically involves the use of heavy artillery, discreet, and with networks of Syrian practitioners (who
snipers and small mobile groups familiar with the terrain. are frequently assaulted by government security forces).
Fighting takes place in densely populated neighbourhoods These NGOs have to negotiate the movement of medical
rather than on an open battlefield, and heavy shelling teams and supplies across borders and lines, which
is combined with street-to-street or even apartment-to- involves passing through checkpoints controlled by a
apartment search and kill operations. People are forced range of different armed groups. The ICRC has also tried
The conflict in Syria
to take refuge in cellars, and are often afraid to go out in to negotiate with the Syrian government and insurgent
search of water and food – rightly so in Syria, given reports groups for permission for the SARC to evacuate civilians
of government attacks on bread queues outside bakeries – especially the wounded, women and children – from
in Aleppo in 2012.2 Particularly in rebel-held urban areas, combat zones in Homs and Aleppo, but with limited
basic services have essentially ground to a halt as the success as many insurgent groups consider the SARC to
conflict has undermined the authority (and revenues) be a tool of the government, and neither side is willing to
of municipalities, destroyed infrastructure and killed or cede control over territory and people to allow evacuations
displaced skilled staff. Fighting has divided cities into to take place.
areas controlled by the central state and those controlled
by a constellation of different militias with neither the For displaced families staying in schools and public
technical personnel nor the capacity to provide services in buildings, and especially for those forced to stay outside
the areas they control. in summer temperatures, water is the number one priority.
The government has primary responsibility for ensuring
Given this chaos and insecurity, humanitarian action in access to water, with the private sector playing a supporting
urban areas in Syria is extremely difficult and dangerous, role, mostly in low-density residential areas. Many of these,
and very few international agencies are operational on the such as peri-urban Damascus, now host large numbers
ground. The bulk of assistance is being provided by Syrians of internally displaced people. UNICEF and a number of
themselves, either neighbour to neighbour or through the NGOs are trying to repair water systems and resupply
Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and other local charitable some of the water treatment plants still operating with
1 WFP Syria Crisis Response, Situation Update, 9–23 August 2013. purification chemicals, and some are even trucking water.
2 See http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/30/syria-government- For example, in Damascus, where in summer temperatures
attacking-bread-lines. can exceed 40°C, NGOs like Première Urgence-Aide
Number 59 • November 2013
11© UN Photo/David Manyua
Smoke billows skyward as homes and buildings are shelled in the city of Homs, Syria
Médicale Internationale (PU) and Secours Islamique France become a flood, with almost 1.8 million refugees registered
(SIF) have organised water trucking, with PU distributing with UNHCR by the end of August 2013. UNHCR believes that
55,000 litres of water to 5,000 people every day. SIF trucks the majority of refugees are living off-camp, in cities, towns
water to other parts of Damascus and is also implementing and rural areas, not in the formal camps that have been the
small-scale sanitation schemes. main focus of international attention. Many of these out-
of-camp refugees live in poor shelter, with precarious and
In winter, warm clothes and blankets have been distributed uncertain access to basic services and livelihoods. They
to displaced people in makeshift shelters. However, also face a range of protection threats, including domestic,
The conflict in Syria
as with medical assistance bringing large quantities of sexual and gender-based violence, labour exploitation,
these much-needed goods into urban war zones in Syria including child labour, and recruitment by armed groups.
has proved very difficult. In the absence of adequate According to an evaluation of the UNHCR response, ‘Ensuring
assistance, survival strategies include staying with host timely registration, outreach and access to services for such
families, renting or occupying empty buildings3 and public a vast and geographically dispersed refugee population has
facilities, and even organising communal shelters. A UN- been particularly challenging’.5 In urban areas in Jordan, for
HABITAT survey reports4 that, in the cities that it was able example, over 120,000 Syrian refugees were receiving food
to access, 174,000 people were living in more than 800 assistance by the end of March 2013, and more than 37,000
collective shelters. These are highly mobile populations, were receiving regular financial assistance, but even so
moving from one location to another depending on the unmet needs remained considerable, with three-quarters of
direction and spread of the fighting. Active fighting in the off-camp population demonstrating ‘a significant degree
urban areas means that IDP families are forced to move of vulnerability’.6 Likewise, just one-third of the estimated
repeatedly, following the rhythm of military operations. 600,000 urban refugees in Jordan were expected to receive
basic non-food items by the end of 2013, compared to
Responding to urban needs outside Syria 100% coverage in camps.7 As well as putting pressure on
The conflict in Syria has triggered a huge outflow of refugees basic services, infrastructures and economies, the refugee
to neighbouring countries. What started as a trickle has 5 Jeff Crisp et al., From Slow Boil to Breaking Point: A Real-time
3 UN-HABITAT, Urban Snapshots 1, June 2013, Evaluation of UNHCR’s Response to the Syrian Refugee Emergency,
http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/UrbanSnapshots1.pdf UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES), July 2013.
4 UN-HABITAT, Urban Snapshots 2, June 2013, 6 UN, Syria: Regional Response Plan, January to December 2013.
http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/UrbanSnapshots2.pdf. 7 Ibid.
exchange
humanitarian
12influx into Syria’s neighbours is having a destabilising effect Syria requires a capacity to engage in strategic dialogue,
on their social fabric, notably in Lebanon, where sectarian firmly rooted in humanitarian principles, with a wide range
tensions have increased since the conflict began, prompting of actors, including the government, political/religious
clashes and bomb attacks in Beirut and the northern city factions and associated armed militias and what remains of
of Tripoli. Access for humanitarian actors in these highly municipal institutions. Such negotiations demand language
sensitive areas is becoming increasingly difficult. and negotiation skills, a thorough understanding of both the
urban and underlying socio-political context, the networks
Conclusion to facilitate the necessary connections and a willingness to
To effectively support conflict-affected people in Syrian cities accept relatively high levels of risk.
means working in very complex, volatile, unpredictable and
dangerous environments. Humanitarian agencies have to François Grünewald is Executive and Scientific Director of
be agile, flexible, opportunistic and risk-taking. Classic Groupe URD
operational modalities imposed by donor procedures or 8 See UN-HABITAT, Meeting Humanitarian Challenges in Urban Areas:
‘good practice’ guidelines, which require lengthy planning, Review of Urban Humanitarian Challenges in Port-au-Prince, Manila,
standardised operational modalities and sophisticated Nairobi, Eldoret, 2011; François Grünewald et al., Humanitarian Aid
accountability mechanisms, are of limited use in these in Urban Settings: Current Practice, Future Challenge, Groupe URD,
highly volatile and complex urban contexts.8 Effective December 2011; A. B. Kyazze et al., Learning From the City: British Red
humanitarian response in conflict-affected urban areas in Cross Urban Learning Project Scoping Study, 2012.
An interview with Dr Nizar Hammodeh, Union of Syrian Medical Relief
Organisations
A British-Syrian doctor on diaspora-led medical relief efforts, neutrality and humanitarian
access in Syria
‘It’s been very difficult’, acknowledges Dr Nizar Hammodeh of 2007, SBMS sought to improve medical knowledge and
the Union des Organisations Syriennes de Secours Médicaux understanding in the Syrian medical sector, through
(UOSSM) [Union of Syrian Medical Relief Organisations], a conferences and information-sharing activities that brought
medical relief organisation founded by health professionals together British-Syrian medical professionals with their
in the Syrian diaspora. ‘Hopefully it will improve soon.’ For counterparts in Syria. ‘When this conflict started, [the
many humanitarians working long hours is second nature, Syrian doctors] called us, saying they needed help.’ SBMS
whether driven by the humanitarian imperative, personal started supplying medicine, sharing medical information
belief or sheer will. But Dr Nizar’s drive to dedicate himself and providing support to local doctors seeking to provide
to the humanitarian response in Syria is all the more medical care to people under fire. Over time, SBMS joined
pronounced as it is his people who are currently in need, together with similar like-minded medical organisations
on both sides of the battlefield. As he says, ‘Because of my run by members of the Syrian diaspora in the United
The conflict in Syria
Syrian descent, I understand the situation and have this States, Canada, France and Saudi Arabia, amongst others,
passion; it’s natural – it’s my people, it’s my land’. to form UOSSM. ‘We found that by doing this together we
could benefit the people of Syria much more’, reflects Dr
The Syrian backgrounds of UOSSM members have Nizar. They began to pool information and resources and
provided more than just motivation; they have also given coordinate programming decisions.
them a close understanding of the situation, as well as
personal contacts. ‘The good thing in the Syrian situation Despite the very personal nature of the driving force
is, being Syrian, we have connections to the Syrian behind UOSSM’s work, Dr Nizar stresses the importance
people anywhere in Syria.’ These contacts have served as of humanitarian principles, striving to maintain the
implementing partners for UOSSM, says Dr Nizar. ‘They neutrality and impartiality of UOSSM’s work. ‘We have
work with local people in Syria, and the local people are been pressured by some Syrian political groups to be
our main strength in that we are able to communicate affiliated with them. But we have completely refused to
with the people on the ground who know exactly what’s be affiliated with any political party or side. We’ve always
happening, what their needs are and so on.’ Thanks to maintained our neutrality – especially as doctors, as
these strong local contacts, UOSSM has been able to medical aid personnel.’ Referring to the basic medical
provide a referral system for international NGOs seeking to principle of providing care to those who need it, regardless
establish a presence inside opposition-held territory. of their ethnicity, religion or affiliation, Dr Nizar draws links
between core principles of both the humanitarian and
Many of these contacts were made during Dr Nizar’s medical sectors, noting that increased interaction with
previous work with the Syrian British Medical Society established humanitarian agencies has only strengthened
(SBMS), a member organisation of UOSSM. Founded in his commitment to such principles and code of ethics.
Number 59 • November 2013
13You can also read
