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Taking stock: a rapid review and critical
analysis of UNFCCC COP26 outcomes and
potential implications for indigenous
peoples’ rights.
June 2022
1
Authors
Oda Almås Smith (FPP) and Joan Carling (IPRI) with contributions from Tom Griffiths (FPP).
Acknowledgements:
Gratitude is extended to colleagues in FPP who reviewed and commented on draft versions of this paper,
including Anouska Perram, Gabriela Quijano, Helen Tugendhat, Lan Mei, Patrick Anderson, and Tom Younger.
Special thanks are also due to external reviewers for their valuable insights and contributions, including
Immaculata Casimero (SRDC), Pasang Dolma Sherpa (CIPRED), Simon Counsell, and Stefan Thorsell (IWGIA).
The contents of this report may be reproduced and distributed for non-commercial purposes if prior notice is
given to the copyright holders and the sources and authors are duly acknowledged.
©Forest Peoples Programme 2019. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). The publication is freely available online
at www.forestpeoples.org. Copyright is retained by the Forest Peoples Programme. This overall copyright
attribution of the publication does not overwrite the copyright attributions of the single images inside the
publication. For all the images and figures that are not Forest Peoples Programme originals, the photographer
and original source has been credited, and the copyright is with the authors of those images and figures.
This publication has been produced with funding support from the Global Grants Programme of the Climate
and Land Use Alliance (CLUA), The Waterloo Foundation, Good Energies Foundation and The Christensen Fund.
The analysis and views in this publication remain the sole responsibility of the authors and do not represent
those of the donor organisations.
© Forest Peoples Programme
June 2022
Forest Peoples Programme, 1c Fosseway Business Centre, Stratford Road, Moreton-in-Marsh, GL56 9NQ,
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Front page image: Meyos-Obam , South province, Cameroon, on the 4th of May 2018 - Cecile Mekam, 48 years old, poses for
a picture in a field she is clearing. Credit: Adrienne Suprenant
2
Contents
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................... 5
Threats and challenges at a glance: ................................................................................................................... 5
Opportunities at a glance: .................................................................................................................................. 6
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................ 7
Was COP26 a success? ....................................................................................................................................... 7
Success for whom? ............................................................................................................................................. 8
Purpose of this policy paper ............................................................................................................................... 9
PART 1: WHAT HAPPENED AT COP26 OF RELEVANCE TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES? ........................................ 10
Outcomes of the formal negotiations ......................................................................................................... 10
Glasgow Climate Pact ....................................................................................................................................... 10
Adaptation and ‘loss and damage’ ................................................................................................................... 10
Article 6 and carbon markets ........................................................................................................................... 11
Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) ......................................................................... 11
Outcomes on the side-lines ........................................................................................................................ 14
COP26 IPLC forest tenure Joint Donor Statement (IPLC pledge):..................................................................... 15
Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forest and Land Use (Leaders’ Declaration): .............................................. 15
Global Forest Finance Pledge: .......................................................................................................................... 15
Announcement by the Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance (LEAF) coalition: ........................ 16
Agricultural commodity companies corporate statement of purpose:............................................................ 16
Financial sector commitment letter on eliminating commodity driven deforestation:................................... 17
Joint Statement by the Multilateral Development Banks: Nature, People and Planet: ................................... 17
Corporate and state net zero pledges and targets: ......................................................................................... 17
PART 2: IMPLICATIONS OF COP26 OUTCOMES FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES.................................................. 19
Funds targeting indigenous peoples and forest tenure governance ............................................................. 20
Indigenous peoples’ own funding initiatives and other emerging direct finance innovations ........................ 21
Halting deforestation: REDD+ and deforestation-free agricultural supply chains and investment ................ 22
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) ................................................................ 23
FACT dialogue ................................................................................................................................................... 24
Company deforestation-free commitments and policies ................................................................................ 25
Deforestation-free investment portfolios ........................................................................................................ 26
Deforestation-free supply chain laws .............................................................................................................. 28
Marketing carbon and ecosystem services.................................................................................................. 28
3
UN regulated carbon markets .......................................................................................................................... 29
Voluntary carbon markets................................................................................................................................ 31
LEAF-ART-TREES – example of voluntary high-quality carbon credits? ........................................................... 31
Ecosystem services markets ............................................................................................................................. 32
Greening multilateral development finance – what is in it for human rights? .............................................. 33
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ............................................................................................. 34
RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................. 36
4
The paper is organised in two main parts.
First, it reviews a series of COP26 outcomes considered to be of particular relevance
to indigenous peoples, both tied to the formal UNFCCC treaty process and other state
and non-state actor initiatives launched globally from the side-lines.
Second, it seeks to analyse to what extent these outcomes may constitute specific
threats or opportunities for indigenous peoples.
Finally, it sets out some recommendations that indigenous rights advocates may find
useful for their advocacy with governments, companies, investors, and philanthropic
organisations with the aim of making advancements towards climate solutions that
put indigenous peoples’ right at their centre.
SUMMARY
Indigenous peoples have long called for national and global actions to tackle the root causes of the climate and
biodiversity crisis and associated rights abuse. They have additionally demanded that all international climate
policies, funding, and initiatives must respect and protect their rights, cultures, and knowledge. They have
insisted repeatedly that they be acknowledged and compensated as rights holders and as key actors in designing
and implementing local, national and global climate solutions. Yet, international climate policies and initiatives
developed and implemented to date have often marginalised their communities and failed to uphold their rights.
Did the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
change that? 1 This policy paper builds on a paper published in the lead up to COP26 which critically reviewed
indigenous peoples’ rights in international climate policies and finance. 2 It seeks to take stock of and analyse
some of the formal outcomes from the UNFCCC process, as well as government and private sector initiatives
and pledges on the margins of COP26, and preliminarily assess some possible implications for indigenous
peoples. It finds that despite unprecedented visibility of indigenous peoples at COP26, as well as a growing
attention paid to the importance of indigenous knowledge, effective protections and guarantees for their
rights in COP26 outcomes remain limited. While the remaining gaps potentially pose major potential threats to
indigenous peoples, there are also opportunities to be explored.
Threats and challenges at a glance:
Official UNFCCC outcome documents from COP26, such as the Glasgow Climate Pact and the rulebook for new
global regulated carbon markets (article 6 rulebook), do contain general references to indigenous peoples’
rights. However, no explicit protections for their rights to land or resources are included. Neither is the all-
important principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) which, in accordance with international human
rights law, is required for any actions that may affect indigenous peoples and their lands and territories. As a
1
COP26 took place in Glasgow, Scotland, between 31st October and 12th November 2021.
2
https://www.forestpeoples.org/index.php/en/report/2021/climate-change-policies-finance-indigenous-cop26
5
result, new and growing carbon and ecosystem markets pose significant potential risks of driving up land
expropriation and land and forest enclosures in the name of green climate projects and offsets. Donor country
pledges on the side-lines of COP26 contain more progressive commitments, including to recognise indigenous
peoples’ rights and strengthen their participation. 3 However, possible avenues through which states are
planning to implement these pledges currently fail to include effective human rights protections (e.g., FACT
dialogue and proposals for statutory supply chain regulation). Pledges to halt deforestation in supply chains and
portfolios and to mainstream nature in all financing made on the side-lines by agribusiness companies,
institutional investors, and development finance institutions largely lack commitments to respect indigenous
peoples’ rights. In general, respect for and protection of indigenous peoples’ rights in the implementation of
climate policies and associated finance continues to rely primarily on the enforcement of national level laws,
which in many countries do not provide internationally-agreed protections for indigenous peoples’ rights. 4, 5
Opportunities at a glance:
Within the UNFCCC process, the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) and the continued
elaboration of rules for the operationalisation of Article 6, represent openings through which indigenous peoples
can continue to promote respect for their knowledge, roles and rights in international climate solutions and
funding. Explicit language in a $1.7 billion donor pledge to strengthen land tenure and resource rights of
indigenous peoples and local communities through support for national land and forest tenure
reform processes may also open political space and assist indigenous advocates calling for alignment of national
legal frameworks with international human rights law (albeit the funding pledge is particularly geared towards
indigenous peoples who live in forests). 6 Commitments in the same pledge to partner with indigenous peoples
in “the design and implementation of relevant programmes and finance instruments” are positive and
represent an opportunity for indigenous rights holders and advocates to influence a shift towards more direct
donor funding for their peoples and communities.
3
See e.g. https://ukcop26.org/glasgow-leaders-declaration-on-forests-and-land-use/ and https://ukcop26.org/the-global-forest-finance-
pledge/
4
See here for case studies explaining the weaknesses of national laws when it comes to protecting indigenous peoples’ rights in a number
of countries: https://www.forestpeoples.org/en/rights-land-natural-resources/briefing-paper/2022/preventing-human-rights-violations-
associated
5
In many countries, indigenous peoples are even experiencing that rights protections in national legal and policy frameworks are
weakened in response to the Covid19 pandemic. See
https://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/default/files/documents/Rolling%20Back%20Social%20and%20Environmental%20Safeguards%20-
%20Global%20Report%20ENGLISH%20FINAL.pdf
6
A number of the processes/initiatives reviewed in this paper – and the related threats and opportunities that are highlighted – have a
specific focus on forests. It should be noted that indigenous peoples who do not live in forests also need funding and political support to
defend their rights and protect the ecosystems they live in and depend on.
6
INTRODUCTION
Chief Galois Flores Pizango, pamuk ayatke (vice president) of the Autonomous Territorial Government of the Wampis Nation
(GTANW) in Peru, is interviewed at the Indigenous Peoples Pavilion at COP26, Glasgow, November 2021. Credit: Tom
Dixon, FPP.
Was COP26 a success?
There is one measure often used to discuss the degree of overall success of COP26. It is the question of whether
it enabled the world to ‘keep 1.5°C alive’. Keeping 1.5°C alive refers to the aspiration contained in the Paris
Agreement of limiting the increase in global average temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. 7
Theoretically, Glasgow did achieve keeping 1.5°C alive, with all the parties to the UNFCCC reaffirming this goal
in the Glasgow Climate Pact – the overall agreement adopted by all the UNFCCC parties at the end of the
conference. However, in reality, the combined mitigation pledges from UNFCCC parties at the close of COP26
put the planet on track to a temperature rise between 1.8°C and 2.4°C by 2100, 8 and that is if the pledges are
all implemented. That said, all countries agreed to revisit and strengthen their current emission targets
(expressed in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)) by the end of 2022 9 and an increasing number
of countries are making long-term net zero targets that go beyond their NDCs. 10 Despite this, the challenges for
tackling the climate, ecological and humanitarian crises remain substantial. Many indigenous organisations
lament that COP26 facilitated the continuation of false solutions and colonialism, and together with most climate
activists and scientists they argue that policy change and actions must go beyond COP26 outcomes and recent
new voluntary initiatives announced by big business. 11 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
7
Article 2 of the Paris Agreement describes the Parties’ aim of “Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”.
8
https://sdg.iisd.org/news/governments-adopt-glasgow-climate-pact-operationalize-paris-agreement/
9
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Overarching_decision_1-CMA-3.pdf
10
See page 13 below and https://www.wri.org/insights/how-countries-net-zero-targets-stack-up-cop26
11
See for example https://www.indigenousclimateaction.com/entries/cop26-negotiations-close-ndn-collective-and-indigenous-climate-
action-respond-to-outcomes, https://www.ienearth.org/unfccc-cop26-negotiations-end-with-false-solutions-insufficient-to-mitigate-
warming-to-1-4c/ and https://www.iwgia.org/en/ip-i-iw/4709-iw-2022-unfccc.html
7Change (IPCC), “limiting global warming to 1.5°C” needs “…rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all
aspects of society”. 12
The fossil fuel lobby continues to represent a powerful counterforce to the development and implementation
of transformative climate policies. 13 This industry lobby had a delegation larger than any single country at
COP26. 14 Although it is considered by some as a win that the Glasgow Climate Pact mentions fossil fuels as a
part of the climate problem – the first COP decision in UNFCCC history to do so – States Parties were not able
to agree on language around “phasing out” coal and other fossil fuels. 15
Success for whom?
Apart from the overarching focus on keeping 1.5°C alive, there are many other metrics used by different actors
to evaluate to what extent COP26 was successful. Many measure success based on the amounts of climate
finance pledged. While realising that funding is an important prerequisite, climate justice activists often see
success as being about fairness and effectiveness in the use of funds, rather than the volumes of money. This
review takes that perspective: it looks at to what extent proposed climate solutions, and finance backing these,
respect human rights – in particular the rights of indigenous peoples. It also looks at to what extent indigenous
peoples have access to direct finance to meet their needs and priorities as stewards of nature.
Indigenous peoples have long demanded that all international climate policies, funding, and initiatives must
respect and protect their rights, cultures, and knowledge. They have also insisted repeatedly that they be
acknowledged and rewarded as rights holders and key actors in climate solutions. One thing immediately clear
at COP26 was that indigenous peoples managed to achieve an unprecedented level of visibility, both inside and
outside the formal negotiation area, for their struggles for climate justice as well as their proposed solutions. 16
One example is the UK COP26 Presidency-organised dialogue with indigenous peoples during the first days of
the summit aiming to provide an “important space for Parties to engage with the experience and perspectives
of indigenous peoples in the international climate policy process.” 17 Another noteworthy example is the
organisation of the Indigenous Peoples Pavilion, which for the first time in its history was located in the Blue
Zone (the official negotiation zone). 18 Over the two weeks of the conference, the Pavilion hosted around 70
events, all live-streamed on a dedicated website. 19 Finally, media coverage around the conference frequently
featured reminders of the continuously growing recognition that forests and other ecosystems managed or
owned by indigenous peoples and communities with customary tenure systems are in better health than those
12
https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warming-of-1-5c-approved-by-
governments/
13
For example, China’s coal production reached a six year-high after COP26 and commitments to raise climate ambitions:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/cop26-china-coal-summit/2021/11/15/28810538-45ef-11ec-beca-
3cc7103bd814_story.html; and an average of only 1-4% of oil and gas companies’ capital expenditure goes to investment in clean energy:
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/feb/11/more-cash-than-we-know-what-to-do-with-oil-and-gas-companies-report-bumper-
profits?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Other
14
See https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/states-fail-adequately-address-climate-change-indigenous-peoples-analysis-cop26-decisions
and https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/hundreds-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-flooding-cop26-climate-talks/
15
The Glasgow Climate Pact calls upon parties to accelerate “efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies”. Another small step in the right direction came with United States, Canada and 18 other countries
committing to stop public financing for fossil fuel projects abroad: https://ukcop26.org/statement-on-international-public-support-for-
the-clean-energy-transition/
16
See e.g. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/argyll-its-just-like-home-for-indigenous-leaders-at-cop26-5lj9grqgg;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LyykKYbb2eE; https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/the-climate-summit-has-me-energized-and-
very-afraid/; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/15/indigenous-peoples-clear-vision-cop26-not-delivered;
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-59117796; https://www.businessinsider.com/indigenous-communities-climate-justice-cop26-
glasgow-2021-11; https://www.niatero.org/stories/we-will-have-to-watch-closely-following-cop26
17
https://lcipp.unfccc.int/node/439
18
https://www.iwgia.org/en/ip-i-iw/4709-iw-2022-unfccc.html#_edn10
19
https://www.iipfccpavilion.org/livestream
8under any other management system and that this is associated with lower carbon emissions. 20 What is less
clear following COP26 is whether this visibility and acknowledgement of their important role in climate action
will be accompanied by climate solutions that treat indigenous peoples as equal and legitimate partners in
design and execution and that ensure robust guarantees, and protections of their rights, culture and knowledge.
In addition, some fear that the visibility of indigenous peoples was tokenistic and that nothing has changed in
concrete terms in relation to how COPs are structured and how UNFCCC decisions are made. One indigenous
delegate stated that “we're working in a colonial framework to solve a problem caused by colonization” and
lamented that indigenous peoples do not have an official seat at the negotiation table even when the lands,
waters and forests being discussed are theirs. 21 Even as observers, many found that they could not access
negotiation rooms during this conference due to Covid capacity restrictions. And many more were not able to
be present in Glasgow at all due to visa and pandemic restrictions and exorbitant costs.
Purpose of this policy paper
This stocktake is primarily intended to provide information and rights-based critical analysis for indigenous
activists and organisations working on indigenous peoples’ rights and climate related policies. It looks specifically
at the threats and opportunities that COP26 outcomes may represent for indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights
(hereinafter referred to as ‘indigenous peoples’ rights’) as defined under international human rights law,
particularly in relation to collective rights grounded in the underlying right to self-determination. The review and
its analysis may also be of interest to other peoples and communities, including those that do not identify as
indigenous and tribal, but who hold lands collectively and in accordance with their customary tenure
systems/laws. 22
The stocktake will also be found useful by state policy makers, donor organisations, philanthropists, companies,
and investors seeking to bring their climate related policies, plans, operations, investments, and actions in line
with the internationally protected rights and self-determined priorities of indigenous peoples.
20
See some examples: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/nov/01/cop26-indigenous-peoples-to-get-17bn-in-recognition-
of-role-in-protecting-forests-aoe; https://www.iucn.org/news/forests/202111/they-work-land-they-protect-land-does-cop26-notice. See
also selected sources confirming indigenous peoples’ important role in achieving forest and climate goals: Veit, P. (2021) 9 facts about
community land and climate mitigation https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/2021-10/9-facts-about-community-land-and-climate-
mitigation.pdf; World Resources Institute (2016) Climate Benefits, Tenure Costs https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-
public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs.pdf ; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2019) Special Report on Climate Change
and Land https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/; Diaz, S. et al. 2019. Report of the Plenary of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. IPBES: https:// www.ipbes.net/sites/default/files/ipbes_7_10_ add.1_en_1.pdf
21
https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/09/world/cop26-climate-talks-race-intl/index.html
22
In general, when a people or community maintains traditions of collective customary tenure, strong ties to their land, and distinct
cultural traditions, collective land and associated rights protections may be applicable. E.g. this is the case for some Afro-descendant
communities - see Inter-American Court on Human Rights decision, https://iachr.lls.edu/cases/case-afro-descendant-communities-
displaced-cacarica-river-basin-operation-genesis-v-colombia and CERD General Recommendation No. 34,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-and-recommendations/general-recommendation-no-34-2011-racial
9PART 1: WHAT HAPPENED AT COP26 OF
RELEVANCE TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES?
Indigenous groups from around the world led the Climate March during the COP26 negotiations in Glasgow, November
2021. Credit: Claire Bracegirdle, FPP.
Outcomes of the formal negotiations
Glasgow Climate Pact
Reiterating the Preamble of the Paris Agreement, The Glasgow Climate Pact acknowledges that states should
“respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on [..] the rights of indigenous peoples” in actions
to address climate change and recognises the important role of indigenous peoples and their knowledge in these
actions. 23 It also urges states to “actively involve indigenous peoples and local communities in designing and
implementing climate actions” and to engage with the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform
(LCIPP) (see details on the LCIPP below). 24 Yet to date, NDCs, which are states’ most official response to UNFCCC
requirements and expectations, often fail to even mention indigenous peoples. For example, an indigenous-led
research project looking at 10 NDCs in Asia has found that, with very few exceptions, indigenous peoples are
“invisible as rights-holders, knowledge-holders and agents of positive change”. Where mentioned at all, it is as
23
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop26_auv_2f_cover_decision.pdf, see preamble, para 38 and 55.
24
Ibid, para 66.
10victims of serious climate change impacts rather than actors and knowledge holders with agency in climate
change responses. 25
Adaptation and ‘loss and damage’
For indigenous peoples and communities already experiencing devastating impacts to their lands, livelihoods
and lives from climate change, the discussions in Glasgow on adaptation and on ‘loss and damage’ are of high
relevance. In high-level meetings, indigenous advocates highlighted the need for adaptation funding to support
indigenous peoples and their knowledge as they continue to build resilient food and water systems in the face
of the interlinked climate and biodiversity crises. 26 In terms of official outcomes on adaptation, some progress
was seen with a promise by developed countries to double the funds to developing countries for adaptation by
2025 27 and with the launch of the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation. 28
The latter will aim to help the world make progress towards the global goal on adaptation (which was established
in the Paris Agreement) and contains a decision to ensure that activities under the programme should “take into
account traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples
and local knowledge systems, and be gender-responsive”. 29
In relation to ‘loss and damage’, 30 COP26 succeeded in putting this topic high on the agenda for future COP
negotiations, even if no major agreements were achieved. A push from a group of developing countries to
establish a ‘Glasgow Loss and Damage Facility’ for financial assistance to vulnerable countries was not successful,
however, instead a Glasgow Dialogue was established to discuss funding arrangements. 31 The Glasgow Climate
Pact also contains a decision to fund the Santiago Network, established at COP25, which is tasked to catalyse
technical assistance for addressing loss and damage in developing countries. 32
Article 6 and carbon markets 33
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement was a key element of the COP26 negotiations. This article deals with ways in
which States Parties can cooperate through finance and other measures in meeting their climate targets (as set
out in their NDCs). Before the conference this remained one of the only areas of the Paris Agreement for which
the parties had not yet been able to agree a set of rules detailing requirements for implementation. This and
other outstanding items of the ‘Paris rulebook’ were finally adopted in Glasgow.
Article 6 establishes three different tools for cooperation: two are market-based and one is non-market-based:
25
C.R. Bijoy et al (2022) Nationally Determined Contributions in Asia: Are governments recognizing the rights, roles and contributions of
Indigenous Peoples? Regional summary of 10 country studies from Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal,
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam (AIPP, FPP, UNDP, UNEP) https://aippnet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/06/Nationally_Determined_Contributions_in_Asia_Overview_-_digital_-_Amended_03June-compressed.pdf
26
See e.g. USAID event on adaptation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UWZyT6aKv18 (min 43:40)
27
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_L16_adv.pdf, para 18.
28
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma3_auv_4ac_Global_Goal.pdf
29
Ibid, para 9.
30
The term ‘loss and damage’ is used in the UNFCCC context to refer to consequences of climate change that people are not able to adapt
to.
31
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_L16_adv.pdf, para 73.
32
Ibid, para 67.
33
Disclaimer: Since the rules of article 6 contain a lot of detail and are still relatively new, stakeholders, observers and experts are in the
process of analysing the different paragraphs and parts. This means that different interpretations of the rules may exist, and this review
does not aspire to comprehensively summarise the rulebook or recognise all existing interpretations.
11• Market mechanism under Article 6.2: This mechanism will allow states who have overachieved on their
climate targets to sell carbon credits to countries that are not able to meet their targets through
emission reductions at home.
• Market mechanism under Article 6.4: This mechanism is often referred to as the ‘sustainable
development mechanism’ or ‘the global carbon market’. It will allow for carbon credits generated
anywhere in the world to be sold and bought by both states and private sector actors to fulfil their
climate goals and commitments.
• Non-market approaches under Article 6.8: This article sets up a framework for countries to cooperate
on their NDC implementation efforts via, inter alia, technology transfer, capacity building and
development aid.
The Article 6 rules are highly complex and laid out across three different outcome decisions, relating to each of
the three paragraphs (2, 4 and 8). 34 This review does not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the
rules, but rather to highlight some key parts of concern to indigenous peoples.
In relation to all the Article 6 mechanisms, the rulebook recalls the eleventh preambular paragraph of the Paris
Agreement, which states that states should “respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on
human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities [..] when taking actions to
address climate change. In addition, in relation to Article 6.2 activities states are required to report on how this
paragraph has been “reflected”. In relation to Article 6.4 activities there is a narrow consultation requirement,
subject to national law 35 as well as a vague reference to an “independent grievance process” (no details are
provided on what this process entails). 36 Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the Article 6.4 rulebook is that
a new Supervisory Body shall establish “requirements and processes” necessary to ensure that States Parties
“respect, promote and consider” their obligations on indigenous peoples’ rights and that “robust social and
environmental safeguards” are applied. The Article 6.8 rulebook clarifies that all non-market approaches must
be conducted in a manner that respects, promotes and considers state obligations on indigenous peoples’ rights.
The reaction of the International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change (often referred to as the
Indigenous Caucus) to the Article 6 rules reads as follows:
“We welcome the inclusion of the rights of Indigenous Peoples in some provisions of
Article 6, however we wanted to see an independent grievance mechanism, not a process,
in article 6.4. We are also dismayed at the exclusion of our rights in activity design and
implementation. In particular, the consultation provision in 6.4 is inadequate. It needs to
include applicable international standards and ensure compliance with the right of
Indigenous Peoples to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC)” 37
In summary, the steadfast advocacy by indigenous peoples and their allies within the COP negotiation process
over the years has resulted in inclusion of some human rights language, however, it remains on a relatively
general level without guarantees for fundamental rights. Critically, there is no explicit reference nor specific
requirements with regard to indigenous peoples’ rights to land and resources, nor to FPIC, to ensure that
34
See outcome decisions here: Article 6.2: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma3_auv_12a_PA_6.2.pdf; article 6.4:
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma3_auv_12b_PA_6.4.pdf; and article 6.8:
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma3_auv_12c_PA_6.8.pdf
35
Paragraph 30(e) says that activities “Shall undergo local and, where appropriate, subnational stakeholder consultation consistent with
applicable domestic arrangements in relation to public participation, local communities and indigenous peoples, as applicable.”
36
Paragraph 62
37
See closing statement by the Indigenous Caucus: https://twitter.com/hindououmar/status/1459667035529654279
12projects that produce carbon credits for these markets can only take place on indigenous peoples’ lands with
their express consent.
Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP)
Indigenous peoples’ organisations have since 2001 been recognised as one of the official NGO constituencies of
the UNFCCC. This means they are allowed to participate in the conferences as observers. While this status has
allowed indigenous representatives to attend some high-level fora – which sometimes entails the opportunity
of making statements as a constituency – their official role within the UNFCCC has been limited. This started to
change at COP21 in Paris in 2015, when after long-term advocacy by indigenous peoples to have their voices,
solutions and knowledge recognised in the UNFCCC process, the LCIPP was established. 38
BOX 1: Finance for nature / nature-based solutions
NbS was a buzz word at COP26. It was a term heard often in government and business-led side events. While the official
UNFCCC documents do not specifically use the term, many of the proposed climate mitigation and adaptation actions
fall under this category (such as REDD+ and trade in nature-based carbon credits). It was a priority of the UK COP
Presidency to push for increased finance for NbS, based on existing estimations that only 3% of global climate finance
go to such solutions [1]. Heavy focus was also put on the need to particularly increase the role of private finance since
it makes up only 14% of the current funding for nature and NbS (see also box 2 on general private finance focus at COP)
[2].
There is little doubt that harnessing natural solutions offers necessary and positive ways to address some of the
challenges of the climate crisis. However, with NbS still lacking a universal definition, the term covers a mixed bag of
actions - some of which are potentially beneficial but also others that could be very harmful [3]. On the positive side,
NbS projects could support tenure security for indigenous peoples, revitalise or promote traditional sustainable
management, and restore damaged ecosystems. However, NbS policies might also promote carbon offsetting for highly
damaging industrial sectors (including the offsetting of continued emissions). NbS may also support carbon market
mechanisms and top-down forest ‘set asides’ or other high carbon areas (imposed on land under customary ownership
without consent – leading to land grabs). It could also include inappropriate industrial monoculture tree-planting
proposals that are proven to carry high risks of harm to human rights and the environment. (see discussion in Part 2 of
this paper below).
Indigenous peoples are demanding strong guarantees for their collective rights, robust definitions and clarifications on
NbS that must exclude unjust and harmful interventions, fully uphold indigenous peoples’ rights and directly recognise
and reward their historical and ongoing defence and maintenance of nature and the climate. Indigenous peoples are
also asserting their own rights-based, culture-based and community-based solutions to climate change and to
biodiversity loss and seeking recognition and support for them [4].
[1] https://ukcop26.org/nature/
[2] UNEP and WEF (2021) State of Finance for Nature https://www.unep.org/resources/state-finance-nature
[3] See e.g. https://www.forestpeoples.org/en/briefing-paper/2021/re-thinking-nature-based-solutions
[4] See e.g. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e8e4b5ae8628564ab4bc44c/t/617dd09782932606fc3933c2/1635635372986/ICA_-
_NbCS_Sneak_Peek_Report__final_.pdf and https://www.tebtebba.org/index.php/news-and-updates/nature-based-solutions-nbs-for-climate-change-
a-vision-from-indigenous-peoples
The LCIPP is an open and inclusive space and its purpose is: “To strengthen the knowledge, technologies,
practices and efforts of local communities and indigenous peoples related to addressing and responding to
climate change, to facilitate the exchange of experience and the sharing of best practices and lessons learned
related to mitigation and adaptation in a holistic and integrated manner and to enhance the engagement of
38
https://unfccc.int/LCIPP
13local communities and indigenous peoples in the UNFCCC process” (decision 2/CP.23, para. 5). One of the
functions of the Platform is to ‘strengthen the capacity for engagement’. This, importantly, relates to both the
capacity of indigenous peoples and local communities to engage in the UNFCCC process and of States Parties to
engage with indigenous peoples and local communities. 39
At COP24, a Facilitative Working Group (FWG) was formed as a constituted body of the UNFCCC to operationalise
the LCIPP. 40 This working group is comprised of 14 representatives, seven are representatives of indigenous
peoples and seven are representatives from States Parties. With the FWG, indigenous peoples have gained an
official advisory role to the UNFCCC. During COP26, a first of its kind meeting manifesting this important role
was organised where 28 indigenous knowledge holders – including elders, women, and youth – from the seven
UN-recognised indigenous socio-cultural regions met States Parties of the FWG to share lived experiences,
wisdom, challenges, and proposed solutions to the impacts that climate change is presenting. 41
A new three-year workplan of the FWG/LCIPP was adopted in Glasgow. 42 This workplan contains a series of
planned meetings and workshops and other actions seeking to ensure that indigenous peoples’ knowledge is
recognised in the design of climate change solutions and that their capacity to actively participate in climate
policy processes is increased. The workplan additionally aims to promote States Parties’ engagement with
indigenous peoples. Between 2022 and 2024 there will be a number of possibilities for indigenous organisations
to participate in meetings focusing on indigenous knowledge, indigenous education and curricula, youth, and
gender. Many LCIPP meetings will take place online, while others are planned as in-person regional events. 43
Outcomes on the side-lines
In advance of COP26, it had been identified that in order to meet international targets for tackling the global
climate, biodiversity and land degradation crises, the world must by 2050 quadruple annual finance for solutions
offered by nature – often referred to as Nature-based Solutions (NbS) (see box 1). 44 Subsequently, in what has
been referred to as the ‘Nature COP’, 45 the UK COP26 Presidency made the topic of NbS a high priority and
sought to treat the climate and biodiversity emergencies as intertwined. 46 While the Glasgow Climate Pact did
include an acknowledgement of the interlinkage between the crises (there is none in the Paris Agreement), it
was outside the formal treaty process that the major announcements on nature were made - by states, donors,
companies, multilateral development banks and financial institutions (key examples are presented below). A
majority of these were made during the COP26 World Leaders Summit ‘Action on Forests and Land Use.’
39
https://lcipp.unfccc.int/about-lcipp/functions-lcipp
40
A constituted body is a technical subsidiary body with limited membership stablished under the Convention: https://unfccc.int/process-
and-meetings/bodies/the-big-picture/what-are-governing-process-management-subsidiary-constituted-and-concluded-bodies
41
See co-leads note https://lcipp.unfccc.int/first-annual-gathering-knowledge-holders
42
See annex to this document: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2021_01E.pdf
43
While virtual meetings exclude indigenous communities without any access to internet, they could be an opportunity for those who do
have access to learn more about the climate change negotiations and how they can engage, without having to travel to large international
meetings to do so. For any questions about the work of the LCIPP or how to engage, contact LCIPP@UNFCCC.int
44
UNEP and WEF (2021) State of Finance for Nature: https://www.unep.org/resources/state-finance-nature
45
https://www.wri.org/insights/what-cop26-means-forests-climate
46
Instead of as separate, which historically has been the case at the international level since these topics are the focus of two separate
international conventions. See e.g. https://ukcop26.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/COP26-Negotiations-Explained.pdf, p 15.
14COP26 IPLC forest tenure Joint Donor Statement (IPLC pledge) 47
Through this unprecedented statement, 18 philanthropic donors and five governments (Norway, UK, US,
Netherlands, and Germany) collectively pledged $1.7 billion between 2021 and 2025 to “support the
advancement of Indigenous Peoples’ and local communities’ forest tenure rights and greater recognition and
rewards for their role as guardians of forests and nature.” The statement specifies that finance will be directed,
inter alia, at “activities to secure, strengthen and protect indigenous [peoples’ and local communities’ land and
resource rights”, which will include “support to national land and forest tenure reform processes and their
implementation, and support to conflict resolution mechanisms”. Importantly, the pledgers committed to
“consult and partner with” indigenous peoples in “the design and implementation of relevant programmes and
finance instruments”. See further discussion on opportunities linked to this pledge in section 2, part 1. It must
be noted that much of this pledge does not represent new financial commitments as many of the signatories,
both governments and philanthropists, have already allocated large parts of their contribution.
Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forest and Land Use (Leaders’ Declaration) 48
The 141 signatory countries to this declaration committed to “working collectively to halt and reverse forest
loss and land degradation by 2030” and recognised that to meet their “land use, climate, biodiversity and
sustainable development goals, both globally and nationally, will require further transformative action in
the interconnected areas of sustainable production and consumption; infrastructure development; trade;
finance and investment; and support for smallholders, indigenous peoples, and local communities, who depend
on forests for their livelihoods and have a key role in their stewardship.” The leaders also promised to
strengthen their efforts of “recognising the rights of indigenous peoples, as well as local communities, in
accordance with relevant national legislation and international instruments, as appropriate.” Initiatives such
as REDD+, the intergovernmental FACT Dialogues and national legislation to eliminate deforestation in supply
chains are among the avenues currently explored by states to eliminate their own role in deforestation (see
discussion in part 2, section 2).
Global Forest Finance Pledge 49
Underpinning the Leaders’ Declaration, 11 countries plus the EU pledged to collectively provide $12 billion of
ODA funds between 2021 and 2025 towards ending deforestation no later than 2030. The pledgers will promote
“the full, effective, and willing participation of indigenous peoples and local communities in programmes
that protect and restore forests, reduce deforestation and forest degradation, and ensure that benefits reach
smallholders and local communities”. Particularly noteworthy in this pledge is that these donors will enable
“activities that support and strengthen forest and land governance and clarifying 50 land tenure and forest rights
for indigenous peoples and local communities”. It is not known what exactly is meant by ‘clarifying’ and
whether it will indeed entail a process to recognise and protect currently untitled customary lands of indigenous
peoples.
As part of the $12 billion, 12 international donors, 51 specifically set out a collective financial pledge of $1,5 billion
between 2021 and 2025 to support the protection and sustainable management of the Congo Basin forests. 52
This pledge contains no specific commitments on indigenous peoples, but it acknowledges that forests are
47
https://ukcop26.org/cop26-iplc-forest-tenure-joint-donor-statement/
48
https://ukcop26.org/glasgow-leaders-declaration-on-forests-and-land-use/
49
https://ukcop26.org/the-global-forest-finance-pledge/
50
Sic - direct quote from the Pledge
51
The EU, 10 country donors and Bezos Earth Fund.
52
https://ukcop26.org/cop26-congo-basin-joint-donor-statement/
15important to livelihoods and culture of indigenous peoples and local communities. Critics have pointed out a
contradiction between the aim of this pledge and the fact that many of its signatories have greenlighted the plan
by DRC to lift its 2002 logging moratorium. 53
In addition to the $12 billion covered above, approximately $7 billion has been reported to be promised by
companies and philanthropists to support the efforts to end deforestation. 54 The exact breakdown of the public
and private $19 billion pledge is not available – e.g. who will pay how much and through which channels – but
early indications suggest that a significant proportion of the pledged funds come from pre-existing public
financial commitments, and are thus not additional. 55 How indigenous peoples’ rights will be respected in
practice and how much funding will be directed to different initiatives such as REDD+, the centre of attention
for UNFCCC‘s forest conservation policy development to date, remains unclear (see part 2, section 2).
Announcement by the Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance (LEAF)
coalition
The Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance (LEAF) coalition, consisting of three governments
(Norway, the US and the UK) and 19 large companies (BlackRock, Burberry, EY, Inditex, Intertek, SAP,
Walmart.org, Amazon, Airbnb, Bayer, BCG, Delta Air Lines, E.ON, GSK, McKinsey, Nestlé, PwC, Salesforce, and
Unilever) announced that its members had mobilised $1 billion for forest conservation. 56 The money will be
channelled through purchases of forest carbon credits from tropical forest countries and sub-national
jurisdictions. At the time of the climate conference, 23 jurisdictions 57 (countries, states, or provinces) had
submitted applications for participation in the scheme and Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Nepal, and Vietnam were
announced as the first that will sign Letters of Intent with Emergent (a new non-profit intermediary entity
connecting the sellers and buyers of LEAF enabled carbon credits). 58 What this announcement means for
indigenous peoples is discussed in part 2.
Agricultural commodity companies corporate statement of purpose 59
Twelve companies 60 with a major share in global markets for agricultural commodities such as soy, palm oil
cocoa and cattle, released a short statement at COP26 noting that they “have a shared commitment to halting
forest loss associated with agricultural commodity production and trade” and that they will lay out a shared
roadmap at COP27 for enhanced action consistent with a 1.5°C pathway. While more detail will likely be revealed
in the promised roadmap, it is telling that the statement fails to mention impacts on human rights and
indigenous peoples that are regularly associated with deforestation in agricultural supply chains. Without an
express focus on human rights, it is highly unlikely that a future corporate roadmap will address past and ongoing
serious and well documented shortcomings in the implementation of existing company human rights or
53
https://news.mongabay.com/2021/12/1-5-billion-congo-basin-pledge-a-good-start-but-not-enough-experts-say/
54
Yet very little information is available in the public domain regarding this private finance. See mention here:
https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-the-united-states-can-fulfill-its-critical-forest-pledges/
55
https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-the-united-states-can-fulfill-its-critical-forest-pledges/
56
https://www.emergentclimate.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Press-Release-LEAF-Coalition-Mobilizes-1-Billion-for-Tropical-Forest-
Conservation_021121-1.pdf
57
Acre (Brazil); Amapá (Brazil); Amazonas (Brazil); Burkina Faso; Costa Rica; Ecuador; Ghana; Guyana; Jalisco (Mexico); Kenya; Maranhão
(Brazil); Mato Grosso (Brazil); Nepal; Nigeria; Papua New Guinea; Para (Brazil); Province of Tshuapa (DRC); Quintana Roo (Mexico);
Roraima (Brazil); Tocantins (Brazil); Uganda; Vietnam, and Zambia.
58
https://www.emergentclimate.com/
59
https://ukcop26.org/agricultural-commodity-companies-corporate-statement-of-purpose/
60
ADM, Amaggi, Bunge, Cargill, COFCO International, Golden Agri-Resources, Louis Dreyfus Company B.V., Marfrig, Olam International,
Viterra and Wilmar International.
16corporate social responsibility policies and related no deforestation, no peat, and no exploitation (NDPE)
commitments (see discussion in part 2, section 2 below).
Financial sector commitment letter on eliminating commodity driven
deforestation 61
In this statement, 30 financial institutions with over $8.7 trillion of assets under management committed to
strive “to eliminate commodity-driven deforestation from their investment and lending portfolios by 2025”.
They also committed to disclose mitigation activities such as due diligence and publicly report on progress
against the overall goal. Again, this global statement does not contain any commitment when it comes to
addressing human rights abuses associated with deforestation, but it acknowledges that “weakening
environmental and human rights policies and lack of effective enforcement” are exposing the financial sector to
growing risks. In addressing those risks the statement focuses on engagement with companies through active
ownership. A related Q&A document emphasises that such an engaged approach to mitigating risks and impacts,
as opposed to withdrawal of finance, “is critical for local communities” and important to avoid that financiers
without sustainability policies take over. Divestment should only be considered where “financing recipients”
have not met risk-reduction criteria. 62
This financial sector commitment letter fails to see matters of environment and human rights as interlinked.
Even though it mentions both weak human rights and environment policies as risks to financial returns, the
highly environmentally-focused response shows that risks faced by people – especially communities and
indigenous peoples – as a result of company conduct and deforestation are not taken seriously. Whether the
implementation of this commitment will benefit these rights-holders in any way, is an open question (see section
2 of part 2 for a preliminary discussion).
Joint Statement by the Multilateral Development Banks: Nature, People and
Planet 63
In another finance sector announcement, 10 multilateral development banks, confirmed their ongoing efforts
to include environmental and social considerations in all policies and operations and reiterated commitments
to assist clients do the same. They committed to “meaningfully engage with traditional and indigenous
communities as experts in protecting and managing biodiversity and natural resources, while respecting their
rights to their lands, culture and spirituality.” The banks further said they will help “develop, test, and expand
the use of innovative instruments to support nature positive investment” and assist countries to implement NbS,
among others in NDCs and NSBSAPs. They will also “…support countries and ministries of finance […] to develop
[…] investment frameworks and agreements that value and enhance natural assets for the benefit of all people,
including women, vulnerable and marginalized populations while supporting climate and nature goals”.
This statement mentions a number of new and existing ways in which MDBs will seek to mainstream nature into
their “policies, analysis, assessments, advice, investments, and operations”. However, despite some mention of
indigenous peoples there is no clear deliberation on where human rights fit into this mainstreaming effort.
Without a specific focus and commitment to both strengthen and improve the implementation of existing MDB
social safeguard policies, it is unlikely that this statement will address historic and ongoing human rights abuses
related to development finance (see part 2, section 4 for further discussion).
61
https://racetozero.unfccc.int/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/DFF-Commitment-Letter-.pdf
62
https://racetozero.unfccc.int/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/FAQ_FI-commitment-letter_COP26.pdf
63
https://ukcop26.org/mdb-joint-statement/
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