THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE - CEPA
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THE EVOLUTION
OF RUSSIAN
HYBRID WARFARE
The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
Contents Acknowledgements
Introduction......................... 2 The authors are grateful for research
assistance provided by U.S.-based
Ukraine.................................. 7 journalist Iryna Solomko, as well as the
Estonia................................... 18 communications and editorial team at
the Center for European Policy Analysis
United Kingdom................. 27 (CEPA). The authors would also like to
EU/NATO.............................. 36 thank the external peer reviewers for their
invaluable comments and suggestions,
Conclusion............................ 44 as well as Donald Jensen for his original
Endnotes............................... 48 framing of the research question. This
report was made possible with generous
support from the Smith Richardson
Foundation.
About CEPA
The Center for European Analysis (CEPA)
is a non-partisan think-tank dedicated
to strengthening the transatlantic
relationship. Headquartered in Washington,
D.C. and led by seasoned transatlanticists
and young leaders from both sides of
the Atlantic, CEPA brings an innovative
approach to the policy arena. Our cutting-
edge analysis and timely debates galvanize
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in the next generation of leaders to
understand and address present and future
challenges to transatlantic values and
principles.
All opinions are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily represent the position or
views of the institutions they represent or
the Center for European Policy Analysis.
Cover: Members of the Emergencies
Ministry of the separatist Donetsk People’s
Republic demine the area at the militants’
former positions on the contact line with
the Ukrainian armed forces following
troop withdrawals near the settlement of
Petrivske (Petrovskoye) in Donetsk region,
Ukraine November 19, 2019. REUTERS/
Alexander Ermochenko.
ii
The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
About the Authors
Alina Polyakova is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for European
Policy Analysis (CEPA). She serves on the board of the Free Russia Foundation and the
Institute of Modern Russia and is professor of European studies at the Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Dr. Polyakova was the founding director for global
democracy and emerging technology at the Brookings Institution.
Mathieu Boulègue is a research fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham
House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London. Before joining Chatham House,
Mathieu was a partner at the risk management and strategic research consultancy AESMA,
where he worked as director of Eurasian affairs. In his research, Mathieu focuses particularly
on Eurasian security and defence issues as well as on Russia’s domestic and foreign policy.
Kateryna Zarembo, Associated Fellow, the New Europe Center. She teaches at the
International Relations Department at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.
From 2010 to 2017 worked at the Institute of World Politics; she was a Deputy Director at the
New Europe Center in 2017-2019. She got her Ph.D. from the National Institute for Strategic
Studies (Kyiv, Ukraine), holds an MA in European Studies from the University College
Dublin (Dublin, Ireland) and an MA in English and Italian Languages at the National Taras
Shevchenko University (Kyiv, Ukraine).
Sergiy Solodkyy, First Deputy Director of the New Europe Center, is an expert in foreign
policy, international relations, and security. Previously, he worked at the Institute of World
Policy (2010-2017). Solodkyy graduated from the Westminster University majoring in
International Relations and also from the Institute of Journalism of the Taras Shevchenko
National University of Kyiv.
Kalev Stoicescu is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security
(ICDS) in Estonia. Prior to joining ICDS in August 2014, Kalev was an Estonian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence official. Among other fields, he specializes in
issues related to Russian foreign and domestic policy, as well as developments in the field of
NATO’s defence and security. He served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1991-2000,
including as Ambassador to the OSCE and Ambassador to US and Canada. He was a member
of the Estonian delegation in border negotiations with Russia and Latvia.
Precious N Chatterje-Doody is a Lecturer in Politics and International Studies at The Open
University, UK. Her research focuses on Russian approaches to communication, memory and
security, and she is the author (with Dr Ilya Yablokov, Leeds University) of Russia Today and
Conspiracy Theories: People, Power and Politics on RT, forthcoming with Routledge in 2021.
Oscar Jonsson is academic director at the Center for the Governance of Change at IE
University. He was earlier director of Stockholm Free World Forum, a subject-matter at
Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, and a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley. He holds a PhD
from Department of War Studies, King’s College London and is the author of The Russian
Understanding of War (Georgetown University Press).
1
The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
INTRODUCTION
Alina Polyakova and Mathieu Boulègue
In 2018, CEPA examined Russia’s approach But hybrid war is not static. Over time,
to nonlinear competition in its well- Russia’s views on the conduct and efficacy
received report “Chaos as a Strategy: Putin’s of its chaos strategy with the West has
‘Promethean’ Gamble.”1 The report’s initial evolved based on experience, development
assessment was that Kremlin leaders were of new tools, and assessment of the
applying military and nonmilitary means Western response. From the West’s point of
as one in the same, that they were strategic view, it is paramount to assess the evolution
in intention and opportunistic in their use of Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics to better
of chaos, and that they were succeeding understand likely developments in multi-
by effectively managing two of the most vector warfare against Western interests,
essential variables in their strategy: time international institutions, and frontline
and risk. states.
The result is a form of strategic The West, however, is not united on how
competition whereby Russia sows chaos to confront the issue and define common
to achieve its agenda beyond its borders solutions to the problem, especially
by deploying an array of hybrid warfare because lessons learned from one case
tools. This “chaos strategy” calculates rarely apply to another. Given that Russia’s
that a relatively weakened Kremlin can strategic assumptions about the conduct
avoid direct competition with the West to of hybrid warfare appear to be changing,
still successfully compete by splintering Western policymakers would benefit
its opponents’ alliances, dividing them from a fresh examination of how Russia’s
internally, and undermining their political strategists and military leaders are adapting
systems, and by doing so ensure long-term hybrid warfare tools to increase chaos, and
regime survival.2 Western responses to it.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, hybrid This report seeks to assess, understand,
warfare is a tactical application of the and respond to the evolution of Russia’s
chaos strategy. It is full spectrum warfare vision of the chaos strategy through critical
that deploys a blend of conventional examples of Russia’s use of hybrid warfare.
and nonconventional means aimed at It looks at the evolution and adaptations of
affecting on the ground changes in target Russian hybrid warfare against four target
while seeking to avoid direct military countries and institutions — Ukraine, a
confrontation with Western states. Hybrid frontline state suffering the consequences
warfare is employed in a tailored way to of aggressive Russian military and sub-
sow chaos in target countries. Such efforts threshold action; Estonia, whose resilience
generally include irregular warfare, active against Russian cyberattacks has inspired
measures, and special operations.3 Unable major policy changes in Europe regarding
to compete in direct confrontation, the information security; the United Kingdom,
Kremlin’s use of hybrid warfare is a means a unique and remarkable example of
to compensate for its weaknesses vis-à-vis how Western countries are affected by
the United States and NATO. subthreshold activities, especially in
the informational realm; and, finally,
2
The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
institutions like the European Union (EU) For Russia, the problem
and NATO, which are seeing their internal
cohesion put to the test by Russian non- remains that it cannot
linear operations.
compete in a direct contest
Each case study examines the evolution
of Russia’s tailored toolkit of nonlinear
of national power
means of action, the impact on respective
countries and institutions, as well as policy architecture. This would have forced Russia
responses to the challenge. However, to choose confrontation over cooperation
the Russian toolkit of hybrid means is with the West.
different in each case study because these
represent diverse theaters of operation for The Russian leadership has the perception
the Russian regime. Different tools are, that there is a window of opportunity to
therefore, deployed to different degrees to take action and make foreign policy and
obtain different results. security intentions a reality5 — the war
with Georgia in 2008 was a harbinger
What ties these case studies together is of Russia’s reassertion. What followed
the fact that they are all targets of the were calculated steps aimed at doing
Kremlin’s chaos strategy. A key takeaway away with an international order the
for understanding differing effects is Kremlin leadership feels cheated by and
that chaos strategy works in concentric disappointed with.
circles: the further a country is from
Russia, the less exposed it becomes in For Russia, the problem remains that it
terms of diversity and impact of hybrid cannot compete in a direct contest of
tools employed against it. Responses must, national power — political or conventional
therefore, be crafted to fit the specific military — with its peer and near-peer
national and institutional environments. competitors. The Russian leadership
fundamentally feels its conventional
military is inferior to the West’s, and
Russia’s Worldview and especially NATO. Therefore, as Russia
the Birth of Chaos cannot compete symmetrically, it chooses
to contest and disrupt asymmetrically.6
The chaos strategy, and the tactical use
of hybrid warfare, was borne out of the It follows that Russia has seeded chaos
perception among the Russian leadership via asymmetrical means through
that Russia is locked in a form of great- disinformation, cyberattacks, political
power competition with the United States subversion, business ties, and economic
and Europe, as well as increasingly with warfare, among other tools. The approach
China. The stakes are high: ultimately, it is has combined both old and new, drawing
about the survival of the current Russian on lessons from the successful use of
regime.4 Soviet-era asymmetric strategies, but
amplified with the power of modern
For decades since the end of the Cold War, technology and social media.
Russian authorities have been feeding
a sense of post-Cold War humiliation Nonmilitary hybrid tools, as those being
that Russia’s security concerns were not pondered by Russian military planners,
sufficiently taken into consideration, if are part of warfare per se.7 Such means
not downright ignored. This grievance represent a coordinated and tailored
narrative is reinforced by a “besieged effort at the strategic level to reshape the
fortress” mentality at home that is fueled internal course — be it political, economic,
by a fear of encirclement by NATO forces or societal — of target countries. Russia
and exclusion from the European security uses a synergetic and convergent toolkit
3
The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
of military and nonmilitary tactics8 in In his text, Gerasimov described the way
its protracted conflict with the West, advanced military powers in the West
honed by a willingness to alter, by force engage in warfare, while outlining the
if necessary, the Western-led liberal importance of nonmilitary means to
international order. This effort also seeks achieve military goals. He highlighted the
to increase Russia’s international standing primary threats to Russian sovereignty
in absolute and relative terms as well as and suggested that the Kremlin’s political
advance Russian interests against the West. leadership needed to be more open
to innovative ideas on future security
challenges.11 Gerasimov drew from
Chaos 1.0: The Rise and Russian military strategists like Vladimir
Fall of the ‘Gerasimov Slipchenko, the former vice president of
the Russian Academy of Military Science,12
Doctrine’ military writers Sergey Bogdanov and
While many voices feed the collective Sergey Chekinov,13 and Chief of Main
picture of Russia’s military posture, Directorate for Political-Military Affairs
Western analysis was swift to attribute of the Russian Armed Forces Andrey
the origins of Russia’s current behavior Kartapolov.14
to Chief of the Russian General Staff
This is rather a tactical applications of how
Gen. Valery Gerasimov. In February
Russia understands modern warfare. It
2013, Gerasimov articulated his theory of
reflects a pragmatic acceptance of the need
modern warfare in a now-famous article
to take what opportunities arise. What
for the Military-Industrial Kurier.9 “Hybrid
makes this chaos strategy unique is the fact
warfare” and the “Gerasimov doctrine”
that the synergy between nonlinear and
were consequently coined as umbrella
nonmilitary tactics is no longer auxiliary to
terms10 in the West to describe, often
the use of force, but rather the equivalent
without context or erroneously, Russia’s
of force itself. Of course, Russian military
nonlinear approach to conflict. Indeed,
thinkers did not exclude the use of
the article was written in the context of
conventional forces. On the contrary, they
Russia’s response to the Arab Spring and
stressed Russia’s need for innovation and
fears of the spread of color revolutions
the wider modernization of its armed
against Kremlin-friendly regimes.
forces. Russia’s “soft power” (miagkaia sila)
Gerasimov fused methods from previous
is only here to prepare the ground for hard
attempts to use nonlinear competitive
power.
strategies against more powerful rivals
with updated technology and military Based on Western responses to their
concepts. behavior patterns thus far, Russian leaders
could draw the conclusion that time is
In this context, Russian operations must
indeed on their side. Disorientation and
lead to information and psychological
distraction in the West produce more
dominance of the enemy. Seeding chaos
one-sided concessions, and, therefore,
is, therefore, part of what Russian military
purchase more time for Russia than victory
strategists refer to as the “initial period
on any battlefield. Worse yet, the second
of war” — taking after Soviet military
lesson that Russian leaders could draw
theory but applied to modern warfare.
is that risk-taking works. CEPA’s analysis
These concepts eradicate the line between
of the “Chaos 1.0” strategy warned that
peace and war, placing politics and armed
an underlying danger for Russia was in
conflict in the same category.
executing the strategy over an extended
period.15
4
The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
its allies that the chaos strategy is indeed
Chaos 2.0: working. Instead of becoming subtler and
Understanding the more nuanced, Russia’s ambitions for chaos
are becoming bolder and more direct, as
Evolution of Hybrid War depicted in the case studies.
Chaos is not entirely static. A significant
The strategy of active defense aims to
event in the evolution of Russia’s use of
preemptively neutralize threats through
chaos to compete against the West occurred
active measures. Accordingly, this would
when Gerasimov delivered a keynote
be a response to Western interference,
speech to the Russian Academy of Military
depicted by Gerasimov as a “Trojan
Science in March 2019.16 Gerasimov
Horse.” This reference to the West is more
reported on evolutions of military strategy
confrontational than before: it frames the
and military-scientific developments.
United States as an “aggressor” and accuses
The address was important in how it
it of developing interference strategies that
differed from his 2013 assessment on the
combine fifth-column political warfare and
use of nonlinear means to sow chaos.17
color revolutions with high-tech global
While presenting operational lessons
strike capabilities. This, too, is linked to the
learned from recent deployments in Syria,
preparation of the operational environment
Gerasimov insisted on the use of military
through information superiority and the
power as well as political-military coercion.
use of nonlinear tactics. Active defense
Throughout his speech, Gerasimov insisted employs the Soviet toolkit of deception
on two main “vectors” in the development (maskirovka) and places the onus on
of Russian military strategy: limited action nonmilitary means of action.19
and active defense. These developments
will influence military thinking and,
subsequently, military procurement in the
Entropy in a
coming years, as well as likely inform new Changing World
iterations of the Russian military doctrine.
Russia’s military interventions in Syria,
All these represent, in a way, Gerasimov’s
Venezuela, and, more recently, Libya
personal military legacy.
raise the question whether the Kremlin
The strategy of limited action outside Russia’s is still being opportunistic or whether it
borders seeks to counter existing threats to has revised its military strategy to better
Russian national interests through limited project force around the globe based on
out-of-area military intervention. This a single playbook. These interventions
largely encompasses lessons learned from have taken advantage of preexisting
operations in Syria, and to an extent in chaos and weakness that Russia did not
eastern Ukraine. Accordingly, asymmetric directly cause. Together with its growing
and nonlinear methods of action are conventional power, Russia is now far more
paramount, not least to obtain and keep confident about using hard power in the
informational superiority throughout the hybrid mix.
duration of military operations with an
The aforementioned changes in Russian
emphasis on surprise and decisiveness.
military thinking reflect a reinvigorated
While this does not offer a blueprint
confidence in the efficacy of chaos as
for persistent global power projection,
a competitive strategy. If anything, the
which Russia cannot afford, limited
Kremlin leadership feels vindicated about
action endorses the focused application of
the usefulness of hard power options,
conventional military power as a tool of
while categorizing nonmilitary means as a
state power to achieve national aims.18 This
tool to prepare conflict environments and
is a dangerous reminder for the West and
make the use of force more effective.20 This
5
The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
is best exemplified by Kalev Stoicescu’s Further afield, in the United Kingdom,
chapter on Estonia, where the threat Precious Chatterje-Doody explores how
of Russia’s military action cannot be Russian hybrid operations — mainly
dissociated from hybrid tools aimed at information operations — have been
testing the country’s resolve below the adapting in order to infiltrate networks,
threshold of Article V of NATO’s founding destabilize internal norms, and ultimately
treaty, which commits the Alliance to create an environment conducive to
collective defense. Russian interests. Oscar Jonsson outlines
Russian tactical adaptations in the EU and
Among the drivers of change in Russian NATO, where Russian hybrid tools are
thinking, disappointment and unexpected used to increase political polarization and
outcomes have been some of the most challenge institutional cohesion.
powerful. As Kateryna Zarembo and Sergiy
Solodkyy show, this is most notably the Chaos strategy through hybrid, multi-
case with low-intensity military operations vector warfare is here to stay. The
in Ukraine: difficulty in upholding a consequences of this are many and
degree of “plausible deniability” of direct unwanted, and notably include the
military intervention; war fatigue; issues potential for miscalculation with the
with managing proxy groups and local West. To avoid such a situation, U.S.
militia; the failure of “Novorossiya” and experts and leaders can learn much from
other ideological products in Ukraine;21 the knowledge and experiences of allies
the absence of an exit strategy in the and partner states in Europe — countries
Donbas, etc. Russia has now altered its and institutions which have long been
originally ambitious aim (to control Crimea contending with the most aggressive forms
and the Donbas) in favor of perpetuating of Russia’s hybrid warfare.
a persistent, low-scale conflict that will
impede Ukraine’s integration into Western
security structures.22
6The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
UKRAINE
Kateryna Zarembo and Sergiy Solodkyy
no official declaration of war or even an
Evolution of Russia’s admission by the Russian government that
Hybrid Warfare: The it had sent soldiers to Ukraine. Russian
President Vladimir Putin acknowledged
Case of Ukraine that his country’s troops had occupied
As a target of Russia’s hybrid warfare, Crimea only after the special operation was
Ukraine is a unique case study. Not only over.24
does it offer valuable data for analysis and
Meanwhile, the Russian leadership
lessons learned, but it is also arguably
has never acknowledged the presence
one of the most vulnerable victims. Its
of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine,
geographical and historical proximity to
although the evidence shows that Russia
Russia, as well as Russian ambitions to
has sent modern arms and troops to the
take control of Ukraine as a part of its own
fight. The Kremlin has played word games
heritage, likely mean that the Kremlin has
to whitewash its violations of international
trained the full force of its hybrid warfare
law, claiming, for instance, that Russian
machinery on Ukraine.
soldiers “got lost” and found themselves
With this in mind, the resilience Ukraine in the war zone.25 Another time, when
has demonstrated since independence, and members of Russian special forces were
especially after 2014, is remarkable and captured in Ukraine, Putin averred that
worthy of detailed analysis. In particular, Russia “has never said that there were no
assaults on Ukraine’s politics, military, people who are engaged in solving certain
economy, social fabric, and information issues, including in the military sphere.”26
space have to be considered. This chapter
As for the presence of their weapons in
offers an explanation of Ukraine’s
Ukraine’s occupied territories, Russian
successes, address its challenges, and
officials have said that perhaps fighters
concludes with lessons learned from its
had seized them from the Ukrainian army
experience.
or had somehow acquired them on their
own. In another example of hybridity,
Russia’s Hybrid Tools mercenaries from the so-called Wagner
Group — a Russian paramilitary formation
of Aggression against that has fought in global conflicts,
Ukraine including in Syria and probably in Sudan
and the Central African Republic — have
Russia has used conventional military means
turned up in Ukraine.27
against Ukraine, but it has added a few
twists to further frustrate and exhaust Just as energetically, and despite the
its victim. Russian troops, who even international inquiry, Russia denies that
during the most sweeping of military its troops shot down a Malaysia Airlines
operations against Ukraine in 2014-2015 passenger plane over Ukraine in July 2014.
were dressed in Russian military green One of Russia’s arguments is that Ukraine
uniforms without insignia and chevrons, was obliged to close the airspace in the
were labeled “green men.”23 But there was war zone. Russia has also blocked efforts
7The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma
The primary goal of Russia’s in the early 2000s, when Ukraine’s
military operations at this relations with the West were strained over
persecution of the political opposition
stage is to keep Ukrainians and independent media. Medvedchuk
held no position in the governments of
demoralized and stressed Presidents Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010),
from the ever-present threat Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014), or Petro
Poroshenko (2014-2019), but he was still
of ramped-up aggression. considered a prime mover behind the
scenes and nicknamed the Gray Cardinal.31
to set up an international tribunal and When Russia began its incursions into
ignored major requests from investigators Ukraine in early 2014, Medvedchuk
in the Netherlands, undermining and took on the role of negotiator with
slowing the probe. Russia is trying to shift representatives of Russia-controlled
responsibility from itself to Ukraine, even members of militarized groups in the
when the evidence unequivocally proves Donbas. According to a report from
Russia’s guilt. Espresso TV, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, after reportedly being asked by
The primary goal of Russia’s military
Putin, appealed to Poroshenko to involve
operations at this stage is to keep
Medvedchuk in the talks.32 Medvedchuk
Ukrainians demoralized and stressed from
turned out to be a key player in
the ever-present threat of ramped-up
negotiations for the release of Ukrainian
aggression. By keeping the war on a steady
hostages held captive in Russia or in
simmer, Russia feeds the frustration and
prisons in Russia-controlled Crimea and
resentment that it hopes Ukrainians will
eastern Ukraine.
gradually direct at their own politicians.
That anger gives rise to suspicions that, Political tools currently play a key role
for example, Ukrainian politicians are in influencing the situation in Ukraine.
not interested in ending the war, possibly The presidential and parliamentary
profit from it, or are using it to antagonize elections in 2019 showed considerable
pro-Russia voters.28 In this way, the public support for politicians who could
prolonged conflict sows chaos in Ukraine’s find peaceful solutions with Russia.33
politics and gives a boost to movements However, Ukrainians were still not ready
that seemed either marginal or even hostile to massively support those politicians who
to Ukraine five years ago. are extremely pro-Russia. Medvedchuk
enjoys little popularity in Ukraine, and
Political tactics are among the most
his party’s support is purely regional.
significant weapons in the hybrid warfare
Pro-Russia forces would have had much
arsenal. Russia’s most obvious use of
more opportunity to influence the political
them in Ukraine is its support for the
agenda had Russia not occupied territories
leaders of the Opposition Platform –
most loyal to such politicians.
For Life (Opozytsiyna platforma – Za
zhyttia, OPZZh) party, who call for closer The economic dimension of hybrid warfare is
relations between Ukraine and Russia. equally relevant to this discussion. Ukraine
Party leader Viktor Medvedchuk has never suffered economic blows on several fronts,
hidden his friendly ties with Putin, who including lost industries in Crimea and
is the godfather of his daughter.29 One of the east, direct costs of the war, lost trade
Ukraine’s richest politicians, with assets with Russia, and Russia-imposed punitive
estimated at $133 million,30 Medvedchuk measures from import bans to economic
headed the presidential office of then- sanctions against individuals. As a result,
8The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
after 2014 trade between Russia and 112 Ukraine, and Zik television channels
Ukraine dropped by 75% and, according to belong to Taras Kozak, a former member
Ukrainian economists, has fallen back to of parliament from the Opposition Bloc
its early-2000s level. All of these problems who is said to be a close Medvedchuk ally.38
helped shrink Ukraine’s economy, with And, of course, the Kremlin makes liberal
GDP dropping from $183 billion in 2013 to use of trolls and bots on social media in
$91 billion in 2015, reaching $153 billion in Ukraine, as it does around the globe.
2019.34
The aim of Russia’s information strategy
Energy trade is a major component of is not so much to make Ukrainians
economic warfare. Russia has worked look kindly on Russia as to sow distrust
to undermine Ukraine’s reliability as an and instability within the country, to
energy transit country, most notably by delegitimize the government, and to
shutting off the flow of gas to Central and drive wedges between the people and the
Eastern Europe in the winter of 2009 over authorities, and between various groups
a pricing dispute with Ukraine. It has also in society and politics. There are several
pushed forward with work on the Nord examples of Russia’s hybrid warfare in
Stream 2 undersea pipeline to Germany, Ukraine — such as support for attacks on
which would bypass Ukraine and weaken minorities to instigate interethnic violence
the country’s leverage as an energy transit or accusations against Poroshenko of
partner in dealings with Russia. profiting from his chocolate factory in the
Russian city of Lipetsk while the then-
Attacks on Ukraine’s social fabric and president’s company insisted that profits
information space are closely linked. The from the plant actually went for taxes and
Institute for the Study of War’s Mason charities in Ukraine.39 Some Ukrainians
Clark has written that Russian strategists fear that if civil unrest were to break out,
consider information operations “the most Russia would use it as a pretext for military
important sphere of military operations, intervention as a “peacekeeper,” which
as both an independent battlefield and an would eventually lead to a total loss of
enabler of successful kinetic actions.”35 sovereignty. These fears have been voiced
Clark also writes that “the Russian military for years since Russian aggression against
views this new relationship between Ukraine started in 2014.40
information and kinetic operations as a
two-way street: kinetic operations are now But sometimes Russia’s strategy is self-
inherently subordinate to the information defeating. One effect of its hybrid warfare
campaign of a hybrid war; no kinetic in Ukraine has been to build domestic
operation can succeed unless it is nested support for Ukraine joining the European
in and enabled by the overall information Union (EU) and NATO. Prior to Russia’s
campaign.”36 This strategy translates into seizure of Crimea and military actions in
a hybrid war in which society is as much eastern Ukraine, the country had been
a target as the central government or split on the question of accession to either
military. Depending on the circumstances, organization. Russia’s belligerence has so
Russia employs the tools that seem most outraged Ukrainians that now almost half
appropriate for the purpose and timing: support membership in NATO, a record
different phases of Russian hybrid warfare high, and almost 60% favor joining the EU
are characterized by different instruments. (26.9% oppose joining the EU and 32.8%
oppose joining NATO, according to the poll
In Ukraine, information warfare in conducted by SOCIS and Razumkov Center
traditional media is waged less through in July 2020).41 Russia has unwittingly
Russian networks, which reach only 9% helped clarify some thinking in Ukraine
of the population,37 than through local and eased a long-standing source of
channels. For example, the NewsOne, disagreement.
9The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
An armed serviceman looks out from a Russian army vehicle outside a Ukrainian border guard post
in the Crimean town of Balaclava March 1, 2014. REUTERS/Baz Ratner.
year after Ukraine had done so. Russian
The Phases of Russia’s diplomats also repeatedly delayed
Hybrid Warfare against negotiations on delimiting the countries’
shared borders so that an agreement was
Ukraine not signed until 2010, almost 20 years after
A constant in Ukraine and Russia’s Ukraine gained independence. The two
frequently turbulent relationship has countries still have not been able to agree
been Russia’s view of its neighbor as an on the division of the maritime space, and
extension of itself that was never meant the Russian occupation of Crimea ensures
to be independent. There have long that they will not do so any time soon.
been politicians in Moscow who speak
Looking over the past three decades, we
of Ukraine as a territory of Moscow’s
can discern at least four stages of Russia’s
“privileged interest,” and Russia’s top
political influence on Ukraine. First came
leadership has sincerely regretted the
the preparatory phase, which covers the
collapse of the Soviet Union.42
period from the collapse of the Soviet
Russian elite make great efforts to thwart Union to the beginning of the military
Ukraine’s development as a full-fledged operation against Ukraine that Russia
state. For example, Russia ratified the launched in February 2014. The second
“Big Treaty” (the Treaty on Friendship, stage was the failed blitzkrieg, when Russia
Cooperation, and Partnership), which moved to take control of Ukraine’s south
provides for the inviolability of Ukraine’s and east, including Crimea. This stage,
borders, in December 1998, nearly a which lasted until early 2015, was a turning
10The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
point because it saw the most intensive a frightened population to its coming
involvement of Russian armed forces. incursions.
The third stage began in February 2015, Moreover, Russia already had experience
after the signing of the so-called Minsk conducting special operations in Crimea, in
II agreements, when Russia stepped up particular during a dispute over tiny Tuzla
its use of political, economic, social, and island in the Kerch Strait in 2003 when
information campaigns as it dialed back Russia tried to connect the Ukrainian island
military operations. We are now witnessing with its Taman Peninsula, and the campaign
the fourth phase of this hybrid war, which of Yuri Meshkov, who was elected president
began in the spring of 2019 and is waged of Crimea in 1994 after calling for the
primarily through agents of influence in peninsula’s accession to Russia.
Ukraine. This period has seen growing
support for political forces that promote The Tuzla operation set the precedent
concessions to Russia. for some special operations tactics in the
framework of a hybrid war. For example,
Clearly, Russian policy toward Ukraine the Russian government dissociated itself
has changed little since 1991. The Kremlin from the construction of a dam to Tuzla
has never accepted the notion of an that had precipitated the dispute, pointing
independent Ukraine, free to join the EU the finger instead at local authorities.
or NATO, which it is convinced would Despite diplomatic notes and harsh public
undermine its traditional influence in statements, Russia remained silent. Only
this part of the world. What has changed Ukraine’s coordinated position forced
in the last three decades is how much Russia to stop the dam construction right
the Kremlin relies on various means of at the Soviet-era administrative border.44
influence to keep Ukraine under its thumb,
culminating in Russia’s 2014 military Meshkov’s increasingly bold pro-Russia
attack on Ukraine. agitation, which ended with special
forces invading his residence, and the
Tuzla crisis are two of the better-known
2.1 Phase 1: preparation conflicts between Ukraine and Russia
To analyze the evolution of Russia’s before the 2014 hybrid war, although there
hybrid war, it is important to consider were many others, including “gas wars”
the preparatory period, before the use of over pricing, and Russia’s interference in
military force against Ukraine, because Ukraine’s 2003 presidential election.
it allowed the Kremlin to test certain
These episodes taught Moscow several
methods of coercion first. Thus, Moscow
important lessons:
was aware of the Ukrainian army and
security services’ weaknesses, especially Special operations are best launched when
in Crimea, where 90% of members of the the central government is particularly
Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) switched weak and vulnerable. The hybrid war in
to the Russian side after the occupation.43 2014 had early success as a power vacuum
Russia also understood how to work in had formed in Kyiv after Yanukovych, who
the information sphere. Russian television, was president at the time, fled the capital.
which was especially popular in eastern
and southern Ukraine, spread stories Support among local leaders, who can be
during the 2014 protests about a coup d’état disorganized and disruptive, for a special
in Kyiv by right-wing radicals who posed operation plays a secondary role. The
a threat to Russian-speaking citizens. In Russian government must play a crucial,
this way, the Russian government worked albeit covert, role in special operations.
in advance to tamp down resistance among
11The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
Trust between the Ukrainian authorities (and wrongly) had envisioned a bloodless
and its Western allies must be undermined. operation in which part of Ukraine would
For instance, Ukraine successfully appealed be taken over by pro-Russia or Russian
to international partners during the Tuzla representatives. It did not expect this level
crisis in 2003. Statements by Western of military reaction and massive public
governments likely influenced the actions resistance, which forced the leadership to
of Russia, which at the time seemed to change its initial plans.
value cooperation with international
institutions. In 1993, the issue of
ownership of Crimea was even discussed
2.3 Phase 3 (2015-2019): low-
in the United Nations Security Council intensity conflict and other
where Russian diplomats — who were means
allied with then-Russian President Boris After the Minsk agreements in February
Yeltsin against a revanchist parliament — 2015, Russia pivoted to a low-intensity
supported Ukraine’s position. military conflict in the east combined
Crucially, do not accept responsibility for with hybrid attacks on the rest of Ukraine.
a hybrid, unconventional attack. Moscow Its moves served primarily to destabilize
declares its non-involvement in the action Ukraine and discredit Ukraine’s leaders in
and thus avoids responsibility under the eyes of their people and their Western
international law. Hybrid provocation is partners. Russia’s policy changed due to
also cheaper than a large, overt campaign. the introduction of EU and U.S. sanctions
as well as the signing of the Minsk
agreements. Russia was interested in their
2.2 Phase 2 (2014-2015): failed implementation, as they would effectively
blitzkrieg allow Ukraine’s federalization and
legitimization of Russia’s “stooges” among
The hybrid war just after Russia’s
the local elite. In addition, maintaining a
annexation of Crimea in March of 2014
low-intensity hybrid conflict is militarily
included clear and coordinated Russian
cheaper than a full-scale one.
actions inside Ukraine, along with efforts
to discredit the new government abroad. To begin with, the GRU, Russia’s military
Russia aimed to carry out a kind of intelligence service, and the FSB, Russia’s
blitzkrieg, so things moved fast in Crimea domestic intelligence agency, have carried
and southern and eastern Ukraine. out dozens of special operations in
Ukraine, which have been meticulously
But if Crimea was captured without a
documented by researchers.46 These
single shot fired, the rest of Ukraine began
include attacks on critical infrastructure
to resist the “Russkaya Vesna” (Russian
and armament depots, and assassinations
Spring, a militarized allusion to the Arab
of members of Ukraine’s security services,
Spring), which aimed at the secession of
soldiers, and Russian dissidents who had
Ukraine’s regions. Ukraine’s government
fled to Ukraine.47 There have also been
had been slow to react to developments in
more subtle information attacks, such
Crimea because it did not know if its army
as a phone call between the Ukrainian
and special forces were ready to defend the
and Russian presidents Petro Poroshenko
country’s sovereignty, and because foreign
and Vladimir Putin that the Russians
allies urged Ukraine “to resolve the conflict
leaked in order to stir up distrust of
peacefully” and not to “take hasty steps.”45
the Ukrainian head of state.48 As for
After the seizure of office buildings in “conventional” espionage, there was the
eastern and southern Ukraine, Kyiv Russian spy Stanislav Yezhov who served
decided to use its military. Russia likely as an interpreter to the Ukrainian prime
minister.49
12The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
In addition, the Ukrainian security service Fakes and disinformation
has said Russian agents were behind attacks
on ethnic minorities in Ukraine, including have become integral to
Roma, Jews, Hungarians, and Rusyns, with
the goal of instigating interethnic tensions
Russia’s hybrid warfare.
and violence.50
for the armed conflict and mobilizes
Cyberattacks have also been central to Ukrainian public opinion against Russia
Russian hybrid warfare. In 2018 alone, as well as Western support for Ukraine.
the SBU reported some 360 known For example, it was only after the open
cyberattacks against Ukraine, and in 2019, aggression in 2014 that support for the
the number approached 500.51 In the lead- union with Russia among Ukrainians
up to the presidential election in 2019, dropped radically: from 30% in May 2013
Ukraine braced for more cyberattacks, to 21.4% in May 2014 to 7.8% in June
especially against its Central Election 2017 (according to a poll conducted by
Committee. While the election took the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives
place without major disruptions, some Foundation).56 As for Western support,
Ukrainian officials counted as many as a relevant example relates to Russia’s
one cyberattack every 40 minutes against November 2018 attack on and seizure of
certain Ukrainian institutions. NATO three Ukrainian navy vessels in the Kerch
specialists trained their Ukrainian partners Strait. This incident prompted the EU to
to counter cyberattacks ahead of the open a field office of its advisory mission
country’s local elections in 2020.52 (EUAM) in Mariupol, a step that EU
Fakes and disinformation have also become countries had strongly opposed earlier as
integral to Russia’s hybrid warfare. As just too sensitive for EU policy regarding the
one instance, an analysis by Internews conflict in the east.57
Ukraine of the Ukrainian segment of the
Russian social network VKontakte ahead 2.4 Phase 4 (2019-present): is
of the 2019 presidential election found Russian soft power back?
a largely negative portrayal of both the
presidential candidates and Ukraine as a A change in Ukraine’s leadership in
dysfunctional state.53 2019 might have presented Russia an
opportunity to change its approach to its
All the while, Ukrainians have lived under neighbor. Instead, while Ukraine’s new
the constant threat of further military president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, adopted
aggression. From 2015 to 2019, Russia some different policies toward Russia, the
violated the cease-fire negotiated by the Kremlin kept to relatively the same tactics.
Minsk Trilateral Contact Group more The only noteworthy difference is that
than 20 times,54 including in the first conditions in Ukraine have provided more
hours after it was proclaimed. Russia also opportunities for hybrid influence.
regularly holds military exercises close
to Ukrainian territory and amasses its In the first place, pro-Russia political
military units along the Ukrainian border forces have gained ground in Ukraine, as
and in occupied Crimea, combining hybrid over time ties to Russia have become less
means of aggression with psychological disqualifying in the country’s politics. For
pressure.55 example, the Opposition Platform – For
Life party won 43 seats in parliament in
One lesson the Kremlin has repeatedly 2019, up from 29 seats in 2014, even after
drawn from its warfare against Ukraine two of its members, Medvedchuk and
is to avoid open aggression, which pro-Russia oligarch and energy tycoon
does not allow it to deny responsibility Yuriy Boyko, met with then-Russian
13The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev four only hypothesize whether the idea was
months earlier. In fact, it was in 2019 concocted in the Kremlin given that the
that Medvedchuk made a comeback in appeal was submitted by the chief pro-
Ukraine’s national politics, running on Russia party. Be that as it may, the outcome
the Opposition Platform party list and serves Russian interests well.
becoming a member of parliament.
In the armed conflict, the most notable
Since the election, the initial trust that recent change has been the replacement
Ukrainians had placed in Zelenskyy’s of Vladislav Surkov, a former aide to
victorious Servant of the People party has Putin and the Kremlin’s informal chief
dwindled, while the Opposition Platform of propaganda, by Dmitriy Kozak as the
has gained support. A recent opinion poll stage manager of Russia’s involvement
found that if parliamentary elections were in Ukraine. Kozak is best known as the
held in November 2020, the Opposition champion of a failed Russian plan for
Platform and European Solidarity parties Moldova in 2003 that would have made
would have shared second place, each with concessions to separatists in the country’s
roughly 16% of the vote, an unimaginable Transnistria region but would have
result back in 2014.58 Even some notorious reunited both sides in a federation (and
pro-separatist politicians in eastern which Moldova’s then-President Vladimir
Ukraine — for instance, Nelia Shtepa, Voronin pulled out of right before the
a former mayor of the city of Sloviansk expected signature).59
who was arrested in 2014 on charges of
violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity The change of personalities in Moscow has
but later released without trial — fared not translated into a change in policy as
decently in the 2020 local elections, yet. The Kremlin has so far manipulated
coming third with 16.6% of the vote. the conflict-settlement process to its own
advantage, winning back some crucial
The Kremlin’s tactics, though, aim not so figures captured by the Ukrainian security
much to install a pro-Russia government services in prisoner exchanges, including
in Kyiv as to destabilize Ukraine until Vladimir Tsemakh, suspected of downing
it becomes the failed state that Russian the Malaysia Airlines plane in 2014.
propaganda has long claimed it to be.
The most recent example of such an Some Ukrainian journalists have alleged
approach appeared in October 2020 Zelenskyy’s office and the SBU sabotaged
when the Constitutional Court, acting some special operations, including the
on the Opposition Platform’s appeal, capture of Russian mercenaries from
ruled e-declarations by public officials the Wagner Group who are reportedly
to be unconstitutional. Not only was fighting in eastern Ukraine.60 While these
the introduction of e-declarations for allegations have not been proven, they
public officials considered to be the one feed suspicion and distrust toward the
of the key post-Maidan anti-corruption authorities.
measures, the court’s ruling threw Ukraine
Some analysts predict that the Kremlin
in a constitutional crisis. Indeed, any
will try to destabilize Ukraine through
action against the ruling or the court
regional referendums. Zelenskyy is trying
itself could undermine the separation of
to change Ukrainian law to permit such
powers and start a spiral of illegality, not
referendums.61 This idea is consistent with
to mention jeopardize Ukraine’s relations
the Kremlin’s strategy in Ukraine.
with its Western partners. One can
14The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and servicemen walk in a trench near the frontline with
Russian-backed separatists in Krasnohorivka in Donetsk Region, Ukraine August 7, 2020. REUTERS/
Gleb Garanich.
Reforms are key to Ukraine’s ability
Ukraine’s Recipe for to withstand Russia’s hybrid warfare.
Resilience Ukraine’s desire to join the EU and NATO
adds fuel to the country’s efforts to root
3.1 What has worked … out corruption and strengthen the rule of
law, while hybrid wars are more effective
Ukraine’s success in countering Russia’s in countries where institutions are weak
hybrid war is difficult to assess. The and elite corrupt. Thus the Ukrainian
Kremlin continues efforts to shape government has set a course to reform
Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy those areas that can counter Russian
agendas in a conflict intended to exhaust aggression directly, such as defense, and
Ukrainian resources and cause enough those that affect its security and resilience
economic or societal havoc that Kyiv will more generally (fight against corruption,
be forced to make concessions. rule of law, decentralization, etc.). It has
faced an extraordinary challenge due to a
It is impossible to know how the conflict
shortage of honest politicians and funds.
would have developed had the West not
supported Ukraine, or how Russia would As many have noted, Ukraine is forced to
have acted and how Ukraine would have wage two wars simultaneously: one on
fared had the government in Kyiv not sent its eastern front to stop Russian attacks
the army to meet Russian aggression in the and the other at the national level to push
Donbas in 2014. Still, we can draw certain through reforms opposed by an old guard
lessons from Ukraine’s experience. of bureaucrats and oligarchs.62 Independent
15The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
assessments have credited Ukraine with Russia’s information warfare, are a trump
making significant improvements in its card for Ukraine that the Kremlin failed
defense capabilities. The Ukrainian army to anticipate. Promisingly, Ukraine’s civil
has come a long way toward reaching society has become a recruiting ground for
interoperability with the armies of NATO the country’s political class.
countries, and it has gained valuable
experience in its conflict with Russia.63
3.2 ... and what hasn’t
Contacts between Ukrainian and Western Despite the abovementioned achievements,
officials have played an important role Ukraine’s track record on reform is mixed.
in deterring further Russian aggression. This per se doesn’t belittle Ukraine’s
Keeping its Western partners (above all, achievements in countering Russian hybrid
Germany, France, and the United States) aggression. However, every incomplete
involved in mediation and holding Russia reform or weak spot in its institutions is
accountable has been one of Ukraine’s something that the adversary can capitalize
biggest achievements in dealing with the on, especially in such spheres as security
conflict. It has been crucial that Germany and defense. The reform efforts, which
and France have led negotiations with are crucial for the country’s resilience, are
Russia under the Normandy Format. They sometimes seen as one step forward and
have supported Ukraine on key matters, one step back.65
such as insisting that eastern Ukraine be
demilitarized before any new political For example, in an attempt to eradicate
arrangements, or “special status,” for the bribery, the Ukrainian authorities have
embattled regions can be made. Another created an anti-corruption infrastructure
important point is that EU and U.S. that includes the High Anti-Corruption
sanctions against Russia clearly signal who Court, the National Anti-Corruption
the aggressor is, even if the aggressor itself Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the Specialized
denies its involvement. Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, and
the National Agency for the Prevention
Another less publicized but important of Corruption. However, until now
backstop has been support for Ukraine there have been no “big” cases involving
in international tribunals, including the the prosecution and punishment of
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the corrupt officials. In addition, some
International Tribunal for the Law of the interinstitutional controversies remain,
Sea. An interim success for Ukraine came for example, the willingness of both
in November 2019 when the ICJ ruled that Poroshenko and Zelenskyy to retain their
its claims against Russia are proper and control over NABU.66 The abovementioned
within the court’s jurisdiction.64 Ukraine constitutional crisis, which dealt a blow to
filed its case back in 2017, accusing Russia both anti-corruption infrastructure and the
of violating international agreements judiciary, is another case in point.
against racial discrimination and financing
terrorism. It took the Ukrainian side three The long-overdue reform of the SBU is
years to prepare 29 volumes and more than still a work in progress, despite ambitious
17,500 pages of evidence against Russia. legislation, significant public pressure,
and unprecedented Western support.67
Also contributing to Ukraine’s resilience Meanwhile, while the Ukrainian army of
is its civil society. Groups such as Come 2020 compared with that of 2014 is indeed
Back Alive, which provides equipment, like a phoenix reborn from the ashes, some
medical supplies, and training to the of its standards should still be improved.
army, and StopFake, the Ukraine Crisis In 2018-2020, 77,000 contract officers,
Media Center, and Internews Ukraine, almost one-third of Ukraine’s armed forces,
all of which work to reveal and counter
16The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
left the army.68 Ukrainian authorities must criticized the move as an infringement on
make more of an effort to make Ukraine’s the freedom of speech.
armed forces a genuinely elite, mission-
driven institution. All these missteps are certainly explainable.
No state-building process can run perfectly,
In addition, Ukrainian officials have not especially in a country which is a victim of
always managed the delicate balance hybrid aggression. However, it is important
between democratic freedoms and security, to bear in mind that any mistake made by
or communicated their intentions clearly. officials could not only hurt the country,
For example, Ukraine’s security-motivated but also be exploited by the adversary.
2017 ban of the Russian social networks This, as well other chapters of Ukraine’s
VKontakte and Odnoklassniki (prolonged experience, lay the productive ground for
in 2020 until 2023)69 caught unawares lessons to learn and examples to emulate.
some of its Western partners, who later
17The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare
ESTONIA
Kalev Stoicescu
customer. Russia tried only once to punish
Russia’s non- Estonia by switching off the gas in the
conventional hybrid early 1990s, but it realized quickly that
the first to suffer were Russian-speaking
warfare against Estonia people and households in North-East
Russia’s use of hybrid war against Estonia Estonia - exactly those the Kremlin
has evolved in recent months and years, arguably defended.
not least because these efforts differ from
All of which means that Russia uses
other theaters of operation, but because
considerably different weapons in its
Estonia is a member of NATO and the
hybrid war against Estonia than against
European Union. Unlike in Ukraine, using
Ukraine or Belarus. The Kremlin’s efforts
force against Estonia would mean conflict
against Estonia are focused primarily
between Russia and NATO. So the Kremlin
on the country’s less-integrated Russian
would naturally wish to keep its moves
speakers and Estonia’s highly digitalized
against Estonia and other Baltic states
society. Russia backs these up with a steady
under the threshold of NATO’s Article V,
military buildup and show of force in its
unless Russia were already in open and
Western Military District, which includes
direct military conflict with NATO or the
the Kaliningrad exclave to the west and
United States elsewhere.
borders Estonia to the east. Other tactics,
Estonia is not a weak state that Russia can such as massive money laundering through
relatively easily destabilize and manipulate. Nordic banks based in Estonia, are part of
It is governed by the rule of law, the level a much wider Russian pattern of using the
of corruption and criminality are low, and West’s weaknesses to its own advantage.72
it has no relevant pro-Kremlin political Massive flows of Russian money to
parties, politicians, and movements. European and off-shore banks - most of
Nor is it in a gray zone, as it is strongly which are likely laundered considering
anchored in the Western community and the obscurity of the schemes and actors -
institutions. Again unlike some other serve not only the purpose of fulfilling the
countries in the neighborhood, Estonia’s financial and personal interests of Russia’s
economy, including its energy industry, leaders and oligarchs, but also of feeding
does not depend on Russia. The electric corruption and manipulating Western
power grids of the Baltic states are in the countries.73
process of separating from the Russian and
Russia’s non-conventional actions against
Belarusian system,70 and although Russia is
Estonia have a long history, stretching
Estonia’s main supplier of natural gas, that
back at least as far as a failed coup d’état
is not unusual in the European Union.71
attempt in Tallinn organized by the Soviet
Besides, Europe’s gas supply will diversify, Union on December 1, 1924. Fifteen years
and since Estonia pays the market price for later, the Soviet occupation and annexation
its deliveries, Russia has little incentive to of the Baltic countries in 1939-1940 finds
use one of its preferred methods, such as echoes in Russia’s seizure of Crimea in
cutting off gas flows, to punish a lucrative 2014.
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