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UNSC B UPDATE PAPER
Email: info@imuna.org
Phone: +1 (212) 652-9992
Web: www.nhsmun.nyc
Secretary-General Dear Delegates,
Ankita Bhat
It is with immense pleasure that I present to you all this Update Paper and welcome you to
Director-General
NHSMUN 2022! My name is Rishi Amladi, and I am the Assistant Director of the Security Council
Kathy Li
B for Session I. The topics that the UNSC-B are debating are very important on the international
Chiefs of Staff stage, and I hope that this Update Paper can bring upon a more recent context to these issues.
Jon Basile Since the Background Guide was written, a lot has changed, so having the most recent context is
Abolee Raut paramount to creating an effective solution.
Conference Services
Hugo Bordas As a former NHSMUN delegate, I have been in your shoes and hope my experience can help me
Sofía Fuentes better tailor your experience to be more engaging. Being active in Model UN since the seventh
grade, I have developed a passion for international relations that has followed me to every city
Delegate Experience
I have lived in. Out of all the conferences I attended in high school, I always looked forward to
Akanksha Sancheti
Beatriz Circelli NHSMUN because of the diverse group of delegates I would meet from around the world. It was
exciting to see so many other students passionate about international studies, and that excitement
Global Partnerships
drove me to return to NHSMUN as a staff member. Outside of NHSMUN, I am a second-year at
Katherine Alcantara
the University of Michigan, majoring in Biomedical Engineering. I also enjoy action thrillers and
Clare Steiner
cooking, and I am an avid fan of Michigan sports (Go Blue!).
Under-Secretaries-
General This Update Paper will bring the final stretch of preparation and excitement for the amazing week
James Caracciolo you will have. I hope that you find this Update Paper as a very useful complement to the Background
Ana Margarita Gil Guide that can both be used as stepping stones for your research. Quality research is paramount to
Ming-May Hu a successful conference and an engaging experience for you and your fellow delegates. For a couple
Brandon Huetter
of days, you and your peers will be making decisions that will have major ramifications on the world
Juliette Kimmins
Caleb Kuberiet stage, and I cannot wait to see what you all come up with. NHSMUN was one of the best MUN
Victor Miranda experiences I ever had, and I am confident you will be able to say the same. Please do not hesitate
Anikait Panikker to contact me if you have any questions, and good luck. See you all in March!
Frances Seabrook
Best,
Sharon Tang
Kylie Watanabe Rishi Amladi
Sophia Zhukovsky
Assistant Director
Security Council B, Session I
rishi.amladi@imuna.org
Email: info@imuna.org
Phone: +1 (212) 652-9992
Web: www.nhsmun.nyc
Secretary-General Dear Delegates,
Ankita Bhat
It is my honor to be your Assistant Director for the second session of the United Nations Security
Director-General
Council B (UNSC-B). My name is Elie El-Kefraoui, and I am a sophomore at the University of
Kathy Li
Pennsylvania majoring in economics and political science. The topics you will be discussing at
Chiefs of Staff NHSMUN 2022 are of pressing importance for millions of lives in the regions affected, and given
Jon Basile the current era of unpredictability we live in, I hope that this Update Paper will provide you with
Abolee Raut the needed context to finalize your research before our conference.
Conference Services
Hugo Bordas Allow me to share a little bit about myself. I have been involved in Model UN since my freshman
Sofía Fuentes year of high school and have been particularly interested in the impact of armed conflicts on the
lives of local civilians. Outside of MUN, I compete in Mock Trial, am part of Penn’s Student
Delegate Experience
Government, and volunteer at local high schools to educate students about international relations
Akanksha Sancheti
Beatriz Circelli and diplomacy as part of the Community Outreach and Engagement initiative. I have been staffing
MUN committees for the past two years, but I must say that the topics of this committee are
Global Partnerships
particularly dear to me. I am an international student here at Penn, originally from the Middle
Katherine Alcantara
East. As a result, armed conflicts are no stranger to me. Keep in mind that the topics at hand,
Clare Steiner
though meant for a simulation, have real-life impacts on people just as real as you and me. As such,
Under-Secretaries- I encourage you all to delve into the intricacies of the reality at hand in order to come up with
General
creative resolutions. I am certain that all of you will be up to the task, and I cannot overstate how
James Caracciolo
Ana Margarita Gil excited I am to listen to what you all have to say!
Ming-May Hu With this Update Paper comes the final stretch before the conference. Here’s my advice to you all
Brandon Huetter
before then: keep going. NHSMUN brings together some of the brightest minds, and you may feel
Juliette Kimmins
Caleb Kuberiet overwhelmed or even tempted to give up, but I implore you to keep going. This conference is a
Victor Miranda unique opportunity to showcase your skills and creativity, and nothing would make us happier here
Anikait Panikker at NHSMUN than seeing you do just that.
Frances Seabrook
If you have any questions, feel free to reach out to me. Good luck and don’t forget to have fun!
Sharon Tang
Kylie Watanabe Best,
Sophia Zhukovsky
Elie El-Kefraoui
Assistant Director
UNSC-B, Session II
elie.el-kefraoui@imuna.org
UNSC B
NHSMUN 2022
Topic A:
The Situation in Cyprus
Photo Credit: Jpatokal
Topic A: The Situation in Cyprus
Introduction |5
Introduction
Due to its robust supply of natural resources and its geopolitical alignment, Cyprus has remained
a region in contention for centuries. Major powers such as Greece and Turkey have been wrestling
for control of the island since before the Roman Empire.1 Additionally, due to Cyprus’s ethnic
makeup of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the situation has only become more complicated.
Currently, the conflict revolves around the issue of the island being recognized as a sovereign state,
as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) partitioned and declared itself an independent
country.2 However, only Turkey recognizes the TRNC as a sovereign country, and reunification talks
between TRNC and the rest of Cyprus mediated by the international community have yielded no
results thus far.3 It is key that delegates understand the different developments in Cyprus when
debating and crafting solutions to this complex issue. Whether discussing reunification, COVID-19,
economic development, the reopening of Varosha, or the burgeoning migrant crisis, it is clear that
this multifaceted issue demands equally nuanced solutions.
Current Reunification Talks in Cyprus that “Greek Cypriots ‘cannot even discuss’ the two-state
deal Turkish Cypriots and Turkey want because it’s outside
Reunification has been a diplomatic priority since the
the framework of the Security Council resolutions and the
formation of the TRNC to avoid a divided island and to
Gutterres’ mandate.”5 This shows the complications of these
preserve Cyprus’s sovereignty. President Nicos Anastasiades
negotiations and the importance of the Security Council’s
of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) has supported reunification
work to update regulations and solutions on this matter.
and has attempted to restart talks but has been unsuccessful
thus far. The United Nations has been a strong supporter of On October 23, 2021, local Cypriot newspaper CyprusMail
reunification, with United Nations Secretary-General António reported that President Anastasiades called for a special envoy
Guterres most recently attempting to restart peace talks to push for more settlement talks and condemned Turkey’s
between the TRNC and the ROC on September 27, 2021.4 “latest illegal actions”—specifically activity from Turkish
Guterres hosted Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot Leader Cypriots in Cyprus’s exclusive economic zone.6 On November
Ersin Tatar at the UN headquarters in New York. The hope 4, 2021, Secretary-General Guterres appointed Colin Stewart
was to continue negotiations to reunite the country, but this as the new Special Representative and Head of the United
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).7
was largely unsuccessful. At the meeting, the Turkish side
continued to push for a two-state solution that would result Since Stewart’s appointment, negotiations have continued
in the TRNC being recognized by the broader international to lag and stall, much to Secretary-General Guterres’
community. This push has run into a stalemate, where disappointment. With growing concern for the state of the
Anastasiades dismissed this proposal as a nonstarter, stating island and the communities on both sides, Secretary-General
1 “Cyprus Profile-History,” CyprusProfile, accessed January 14, 2022, https://www.cyprusprofile.com/page/country-information/
history?lang=en.
2 Britannica, “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkish-Republic-of-Northern-
Cyprus.
3 Handan Kazanci, “Turkey will continue efforts for international recognition of Turkish Cyprus,” Anadolu Agency, July 21, 2021,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-will-continue-efforts-for-international-recognition-of-turkish-cyprus/2310730.
4 Associated Press, “With Lunch Invite, UN Chief Tries to Restart Cyprus Talks,” U.S. News and World Report, September 27, 2021, https://
www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-09-27/with-lunch-invite-un-chief-tries-to-restart-cyprus-talks.
5 Associated Press, “With Lunch Invite, UN Chief Tries to Restart Cyprus Talks,” U.S. News and World Report, September 27, 2021, https://
www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-09-27/with-lunch-invite-un-chief-tries-to-restart-cyprus-talks.
6 Evie Andreou, “President sends fresh plea to Guterres over special envoy,” CyprusMail, October 23, 2021, https://cyprus-mail.
com/2021/10/23/president-sends-fresh-plea-to-guterres-over-special-envoy/.
7 United Nations, “United Nations Secretary-General Appoints Colin Stewart of Canada Special Representative and Head, United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” news release, November 4,2021, https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sga2072.doc.htm.
Topic A: The Situation in Cyprus 6| Introduction Varosha, Cyprus Guterres pressed the need for decisive action, noting that in achieving a peaceful outcome to this dispute is dwindling the longer negotiations take, the more each side continues due to “certain steps taken, in particular with respect to the to dig their heels in, making coming to a comprehensive fenced-off part of Varosha and the buffer zone,” which is solution harder to accomplish. On January 12, 2022, the UN causing added mistrust amongst both sides.10 Delegates must released a document that provided an update on the ongoing note that this report highlights that time is of the essence UN efforts in the region. Published through the Security when considering this issue. Therefore, the Security Council Council, the report from the Secretary-General outlined four should meet this issue with a renewed sense of urgency. As “significant developments” and concerns that had occurred the Secretary-General has explained, the longer negotiations in recent months up to the end of December 2021.8 The take, and the more significant changes are stalled, the greater first noted development was the aforementioned lunch the risk will grow. held by Secretary-General Guterres, Greek Cypriot leaders, The discussions surrounding the town of Varosha have and Turkish Cypriot leaders. The report noted that while also been tumultuous. Although many people involved in consensus is still far away, “the two leaders also indicated their the negotiations consider the reopening of Varosha to be a interest in continued engagement.”9 The second development necessary and important political step, some in the region do touched upon the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically outlining not feel this is possible. This is because Turkey handed over that the two sides have “harmonized” regarding response control of Varosha to the TRNC.11 This partial reopening measures and that the socioeconomic challenges brought on meant that just under four percent of the area was reopened by the pandemic continue to impact the entire island. The to visitors, where they could visit from 8 AM and 8 PM.12 third development touched upon the ongoing discussions Varosha is a portion of the Cypriot city of Famagusta, which by Special Representative Stewart regarding increased was a major tourist destination prior to the Turkish invasion tension along the buffer zone, and the fourth development of 1974. It was also home to many Greek Cypriots that highlighted Guterres’ grave concerns regarding lengthening became displaced when the Northern Cypriot military sealed talks. In addition, the report highlights that public confidence off the region. As such, Varosha being reopened “paves the 8 UN Security Council, United Nations Operation in Cyprus, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/1110 (Dec. 31, 2021), https:// uncyprustalks.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_2021_1110_e.pdf. 9 S/2021/1110. 10 S/2021/1110. 11 Economist, “Putting Cyprus Together may be impossible,” The Economist, November 20, 2021, https://www.economist.com/ europe/2021/11/18/putting-cyprus-together-may-be-impossible. 12 “Varosha reopening in accordance with civil rights: Turkish Cyprus,” Daily Sabah, January 5, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/ diplomacy/varosha-reopening-in-accordance-with-civil-rights-turkish-cyprus.
Topic A: The Situation in Cyprus
Introduction |7
way for the development of property still claimed by displaced island nation being forced into a public health crisis, Cyprus
Greeks,” which some argue may further legitimize the has taken measures to mitigate the COVID-19 spread in the
TRNC and stall reunification talks.13 In the aforementioned region. As of January 17, 2022, Cyprus reported an average
Secretary-General report, observations were made that show of 2,871 new cases per day, with January 3, 2022, reporting a
a difficult process in reopening Varosha. The report outlines record high of 5,024 new cases in one day.16 Since the pandemic
that since the lifted the military status of the partial area in began, the country has reported a total of 228,656 cases and
Varosha, little has been done to make significant changes in 684 deaths—a significant number for its small population of
the area, despite an influx of demand from visitors to the just 1.2 million.17 Amid the recent spikes in COVID-19 cases
area. Aside from mainly clearing vegetation, there have been and deaths, Cyprus has taken strong public health measures.18
very small-scale infrastructural developments, but large-scale In addition to strict border entry requirements, the country
improvement seems to be slow-moving. This has resulted has rolled out a wide-reaching vaccination campaign, with
in increased trespassers, where the UNFICYP has had to an estimated 68.2 percent of the country fully vaccinated.19
implement fences around its areas, which reportedly led to a This places Cyprus’ vaccination rate even slightly ahead of
standoff with Turkish Cypriots for several weeks.14 A concern the United States, which is currently about 63 percent fully
that Secretary-General Guterres outlined and that the Security vaccinated.20
Council should consider is the legitimacy of the UN mission
to the Turkish side. Concerns exist that Turkish Cypriots While Cypriot authorities have taken swift action to safeguard
have restricted the UN mission from accessing certain areas public health, COVID-19’s social and political effects have
of the island and have not adequately responded to Security permeated the island, once again bringing into question
Council resolutions. The report noted that actions along the the future of the divided state and the possibility of future
buffer zone and in Varosha “contributed to a deterioration reunification. After 17 years of relatively free movement
in respect for the mandated authority of UNFICYP.”15 As between the TRNC and ROC, COVID-19 lockdown and
highlighted throughout the report, it is essential that tensions travel restrictions effectively segregated the two halves of the
do not escalate between Cyprus and the TRNC; it would be island, making interaction and movement between Turkish
catastrophic for innocent Cypriot citizens. In addition, the Cypriots and Greek Cypriots impossible.21 In February 2020,
committee should aim for a resolution to the conflict, whether the ROC government announced the closure of four out of
that means keeping the two nations separate and independent nine crossing points across the UN-monitored buffer zone
or finding a means to reunify the nations back into one. dividing Greek-controlled Cyprus from Turkish Cyprus.22
This unprecedented border closure lasted for more than a
The Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on year until June 2021, when restrictions finally eased marginally.
Cyprus
Initial reactions to the border closures sparked intense protests
The COVID-19 pandemic had a major impact on all regions throughout early 2020, with hundreds of protestors from
around the world, and Cyprus was not exempt. With the both the Greek and Turkish sides demanding its reopening.23
13 Economist, “Putting Cyprus together may be impossible.”
14 S/2021/1110.
15 S/2021/1110.
16 “Cyprus,”Reuters COVID-19 Tracker, Accessed February 14, 2022, https://graphics.reuters.com/world-coronavirus-tracker-and-maps/
countries-and-territories/cyprus.
17 Reuters COVID-19 Tracker, “Cyprus.”
18 World Health Organization, “Cyprus,” World Health Organization, January 5, 2022, https://www.who.int/countries/cyp/.
19 Reuters COVID-19 Tracker, “Cyprus.”
20 “U.S. COVID-19 vaccine tracker: See your state’s progress,” Mayoclinic, Accessed February 14, 2022, https://www.mayoclinic.org/
coronavirus-covid-19/vaccine-tracker.
21 “Coronavirus tears Greek and Turkish Cypriots apart — again,” DW, Accessed February 14, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/cyprus-
greek-turkish-cypriots-coronavirus-restrictions/a-55132876.
22 Fiona Mullen and Hubert Faustmann, The Impact of the COVID-19 Crisis on Divided Cyprus (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2020),
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/zypern/16785.pdf.
23 Agence France-Presse, “Coronavirus: Cyprus police deploy tear gas at protest against border crossing closure,” South China Morning Post,
March 8, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3074110/coronavirus-cyprus-police-deploy-tear-gas-protest-against-Topic A: The Situation in Cyprus
8| Introduction
The skirmish resulted in Cyprus police deploying tear gas on tourism and export sectors in the TRNC have been especially
hundreds of protestors, though no arrests or fatalities were hard hit. In Turkish Cyprus, where retail and tourism
reported.24 In what was described as a unilateral move to close accounted for 20 percent of its GDP in 2019, tourism activity
the borders by Greek Cypriot authorities, these COVID-19- fell by more than 80 percent in 2020, depriving the Turkish
related developments have stoked fresh divisions between Cypriot community of a major source of revenue.29 The
both the Cypriot people and the two Cypriot governments. deep recession in 2020 exacerbated an already fragile TRNC
economy, where real GDP growth in 2019 was just a meager
Much like travel between different countries, as of November
0.2 percent.30 According to World Bank projections, the
2021, crossing the Cypriot border requires travelers to
COVID-19-induced recession 2020, following the economic
submit proof of negative COVID-19 tests and proof of
slowdowns in 2018 and 2019, will likely widen income gaps and
vaccination.25 These measures have effectively split the
other disparities across the island.31 Moreover, in June 2021,
North and South halves of Cyprus, establishing the two
the IMF assessed that young people, low-income workers,
sides as insulated autonomous regions. The current COVID-
and women in Cyprus would shoulder a disproportionate
19-induced divisions are highly reminiscent of the period
from 1974 to 2003, where travel to opposing sides of the amount of the economic burden.32 Based on these concerning
divided island was prohibited, and tensions between Cypriots statistics, it is imperative for the Security Council to consider
inhabiting opposite sides of the island ran high.26 Some how the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic may
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, many of whom have built their affect the internal social and political fabric of Cyprus.
lives along both sides of the Green Line dividing Cyprus, are As the Turkish Cypriot community slowly rebounds from
concerned that Cypriots on both sides will once again get the 2020 deep recession, it is crucial that ethnic disparities
used to the division.27 The COVID-19 pandemic, which has
and wealth inequities between the Greek and Turkish sides
evidently catalyzed a renewed period of division as opposed
of the island be closely monitored. The TRNC has typically
to an opportunity for closer collaboration, has brought the
fared worse than its Greek counterpart in economic and
diplomatic progress between the TRNC and ROC to a halt.
social outcomes. In 2019, the per capita income of Turkish
The future of diplomacy and reconciliation between the
Cypriots was only 36 percent that of Greek Cypriots and 28
two parts of Cyprus will rely heavily on a unified internal
percent of the average per capita income in the EU.33 While
political landscape that favors reunification. However, given
experts from the World Bank have pushed for reunification to
the unprecedented challenges of COVID-19, that progress
bolster the Cyprus economy, pre-existing economic outcome
appears more distant now than ever.
disparities between the TRNC and ROC (projected to deepen
Aside from the major political impacts of COVID-19, the as a result of COVID-19) cast more doubt on the possibility
pandemic has also placed unprecedented strain on the TRNC of reconciliation. Amid a fragile economy and internal social
economy, with its GDP contracting by nearly 14 percent in terrain, Cypriot officials and international policymakers
2020—one of the most severe contractions in Europe.28 The alike must tread carefully as they seek to resolve the Cyprus
border.
24 Agence France-Presse, “Coronavirus.”
25 Faruk Zorlu, “New COVID rules imposed on Cyprus border crossings,” AA, November 19, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/latest-on-
coronavirus-outbreak/new-covid-rules-imposed-on-cyprus-border-crossings/2424937.
26 DW, “Coronavirus tears Greek and Turkish Cypriots apart.”
27 DW, “Coronavirus tears Greek and Turkish Cypriots apart.”
28 Natasha Rovo, Vincent Tsoungui Belinga, and Stefano Curto, Turkish Cypriot Economy: Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Path to Building
Back Better (Washington: World Bank Group, 2021), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35588/Turkish-
Cypriot-Economy-Impact-of-the-COVID-19-Pandemic-A-Path-to-Building-Back-Better-Special-Issue-Improving-the-Effectiveness-of-
Public-Funds-in-Agriculture.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
29 Rovo, Belinga, and Curto, “Turkish Cypriot Economy.”
30 Rovo, Belinga, and Curto, “Turkish Cypriot Economy.”
31 Rovo, Belinga, and Curto, “Turkish Cypriot Economy.”
32 Anita Tuladhar, Estelle Xue Liu, and Ruifeng Zhang, “A Three-Point Plan to Tackle the Pandemic in Cyprus,” IMF News, June 16, 2021,
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/06/15/na061521-a-three-point-plan-to-tackle-the-pandemic-in-cyprus.
33 Rovo, Belinga, and Curto, “Turkish Cypriot Economy.”Topic A: The Situation in Cyprus
Introduction |9
question. ROC officials have claimed that the vast majority of
migrants entering the country do so illegally by crossing UN
The Migrant Crisis in Cyprus buffer zones and have gone so far as to accuse Turkey of
orchestrating the migrant crisis by allowing migrants to enter
Like many other European countries, Cyprus is an increasingly
the ROC illegally.39 Due to increasing caseloads, ROC officials
important destination for migrants and asylum seekers.
have claimed that the migrant situation is overwhelming state
Cyprus has generally maintained liberal refugee policies, with
institutions. In November 2021, the ROC spokesman Marios
important policies like the 2000 Refugee Law, which assigns
Pelekanos requested the European Union suspend all asylum
the Cyprus government full responsibility for refugee issues.34
applications and relocate some asylum seekers to neighboring
However, like many other host countries, Cyprus has size
countries.40 It is evident that the migrant situation in Cyprus is
and resource constraints that make hosting large amounts of
no longer just an administrative issue for the two governments
migrants and asylum seekers difficult. Since 2018, the number
on the island. Rather, the crisis has become yet another point
of refugees and asylum seekers arriving in Cyprus have
of contention between the ROC, the TRNC, and the TRNC’s
increased significantly, placing strain on the small island state.
most important ally—Turkey.
The Republic of Cyprus, for example, received a record 12,724
asylum applications in 2019, followed by a dip in numbers in In order to manage this migrant crisis, the Cypriot government
2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but numbers jumped has been in discussions with French-speaking African
back up to over 14,000 applications in 2021.35 countries to potentially allow rejected asylum applicants
from those countries to be accepted back to their original
Approximately 80 percent of migrants enter Cyprus first host country.41 This development is due to the large influx
through the TRNC before making their way to the Republic of migrants entering the island, with numbers already 38
of Cyprus—a migrational pattern that has both overwhelmed percent higher than 2020 being reported. In addition, these
ROC institutions and stoked political tensions between the arrivals are mostly “from Sub-Saharan-African countries with
TRNC and ROC.36 Seeing as the TRNC is only officially which the EU does not have such send-back agreements.” It
recognized by Turkey, all migrants entering Cyprus must is reported that around 15,000 migrants who have rejected
present themselves to ROC authorities. As per the Dublin asylum applications cannot be sent back to their host countries
Procedure, migrants must file for asylum in the ROC—an from Cyprus due to the EU’s lack of such agreements with
official European Union member state—even if they intend their host countries.42 The migrant crisis will be an important
to live elsewhere.37 This stipulation complicates the asylum- humanitarian issue that should be discussed by the UNSC, as
seeking process for Cypriot authorities, because once an thousands of migrants are left in limbo with deportation not
asylum seeker files their case in Cyprus, the ROC government being possible, which could create additional issues between
is responsible for their case. As such, Cyprus is responsible the two governments as tensions are rising. To address the
for all migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers that appear in its migrant crisis, the ROC, TRNC, and Turkey must agree on
borders and must also oversee repatriation processes should border policies that will not overwhelm the ROC’s ability
the number of migrants exceed the official capacity.38 to process migrants and asylum seekers. However, such an
34 “Protection,” UNHCR Cyprus, Accessed February 14, 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/cy/protection.
35 UNHCR Cyprus, “Protection.”
36 Associated Press, “Cyprus: France to help with migration talks with African nations,” AP News, November 6, 2021, https://apnews.com/
article/immigration-middle-east-france-europe-migration-05633acfc4a8bb00f90a0844724be954.
37 UNHCR, “Applying for asylum,” UNHCR, https://help.unhcr.org/cyprus/applying-for-asylum/how-and-where-can-i-apply-for-
asylum/.
38 UNHCR, “The Dublin Procedure,” UNHCR, https://help.unhcr.org/cyprus/applying-for-asylum/the-dublin-procedure.
39 “Divided Cyprus, island at frontline of migrant flow,” France24, Accessed February 14, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-
news/20211201-divided-cyprus-island-at-frontline-of-migrant-flow.
40 Menelaos Hadjicostis, “Cyprus wants EU support for migrant crackdown as flows rise,” AP News, November 10, 2021, https://apnews.
com/article/immigration-business-cyprus-migration-asylum-seekers-c5ebdc195efc22ef6bf85587e3dde559.
41 Associated Press, “Cyprus: France to help with migration talks with African nations.”
42 Reuters, “Cyprus wants asylum right curbed for irregular migrants,” Reuters, November 12, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/
middle-east/cyprus-wants-asylum-right-curbed-irregular-migrants-2021-11-10/.Topic A: The Situation in Cyprus 10|I ntroduction agreement is only possible if tensions between all groups are lower, which the UNSC must address in upcoming resolutions. Conclusion Overall, the situation in Cyprus has had many recent developments that will have impacts on the solutions crafted by the committee. The UNSC must consider updates to the reunification talks, COVID-19, and the migrant crisis, among other factors, when assessing the feasibility of solutions. Without collaboration and increased diplomacy in the area, the situation in Cyprus could put millions of Cypriot citizens and encourage parties to leave ongoing negotiations. The UNSC must put forth recommendations that allow all parties to feel more comfortable in negotiations and address the underlying socioeconomic issues that COVID-19 has exacerbated— without such action, the situation in Cyprus could lead to lower security and increased violence in the region.
UNSC B
NHSMUN 2022
Topic B:
The Situation in Western Sahara
Photo Credit: Alexander GerstTopic B: The Situation in Western Sahara
12|I ntroduction
Introduction
August 2021 marked a time of heavy conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front over Western
Sahara. Tensions heightened following the reemergence of heavy shootings and missile exchanges
between both sides.1 Although a United Nations armistice was implemented, it fell apart shortly after
in November 2021 when Morocco marched its troops into the previously Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR)-controlled city of Guergerat. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to Western
Sahara: on the one hand, Morocco asserts the legitimacy of its claim by citing the importance of the
integrity of the Maghreb region. In other words, Morocco claims that both uncontested Maghreb
lands as well as Western Sahara share a common history, culture, and people and must thus be united
under a Moroccan flag.2 On the other hand, the Polisario Front claims that the Sahrawi People deserve
a nation of their own, removed from what it perceives as Moroccan colonization.3 To this end, the
conflict over Western Sahara has recently evolved, with tensions reaching new heights. Specifically,
recent military and diplomatic standoffs between the two sides have displaced hundreds, with
approximately 170,000 refugees living in Algerian camps. Recent developments have also infuriated
neighboring countries, particularly Algeria, leading to an utter collapse in diplomatic relations. The
accumulation of these developments has caused a seismic shift in the political landscape at large,
leading to the rise of a centrist government in Morocco and the Polisario Front resorting to terror
organizations like Hezbollah for help.4
The situation is equally as humanitarian as it is political. camps as “morally abhorrent.” The Tindouf Camps, located
Conditions in refugee camps are rapidly deteriorating. near Algeria and administered by the Polisario Front under
The World Food Programme (WFP) reports that acute UN observation, have witnessed some of the worst atrocities
malnutrition rates among refugee youth are expected to of the conflict.6 UN reports point to ongoing cases of sexual
increase from 10 percent to 30 percent, with an estimated abuse, accompanied by illegal forceful detention and family
58 percent of refugees at high risk of losing access proper separation, in the camps. Witness testimonies have also
nutrition.5 Considering the important recent developments to pointed to a near-complete lack of education among female
the conflict, this paper will discuss human rights violations refugees in the Tindouf Camps. Nevertheless, this was met
perpetrated by both sides, sovereignty transgressions, and by conflicting testimonies from several camp refugees who
disputed alleged wrongdoing by the Polisario Front, instead
ongoing international positions on the situation.
choosing to cast blame on the Moroccan government’s severe
Refugee Camp Conditions resource embargo on the camp. In fact, the resurgence of
COVID-19 under the Delta variant gave way for Moroccan
As violence escalates, refugees and civilians are bearing the authorities to increase security and strengthen its blockade
brunt of the effects. An August 2021 report by the Special around the area. This has denied women and children in
Political and Decolonization Committee of the United the camps access to basic necessities such as pregnancy and
Nations described the status of women in Sahrawi refugee sanitation equipment, milk and other nutritious products, and
1 Nabil Sharaf, “The Polisario Front, Morocco, and the Western Sahara Conflict,” Arab Center Washington DC, September 8, 2021, https://
arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-polisario-front-morocco-and-the-western-sahara-conflict/.
2 “Western Sahara: Map Agency Cancels Dispatch on Sahrawi Army Shootings against Moroccan Forces in El Guerguerat,” AllAfrica,
November 17, 2021, https://allafrica.com/stories/202011170127.html.
3 Sharaf, “The Polisario Front, Morocco, and the Western Sahara Conflict.”
4 “Algeria,” ACAPs, accessed January 22, 2021, https://www.acaps.org/country/algeria/crisis/sahrawi-refugees; International Crisis Group,
Relaunching Negotiations over Western Sahara (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021), http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep36623.6.
5 International Crisis Group, Relaunching Negotiations over Western Sahara.
6 United Nations, “Speakers Addressing Fourth Committee Report Rights Violations in Tindouf Camps, Differ over Morocco’s Role,
Continuing Consideration of Western Sahara,” news release, January 4, 2022, https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/gaspd731.doc.htm.Topic B: The Situation in Western Sahara
Introduction |13
Sahrawi women survey the damage following a flood
proper access to education.7 meaning that these laws are wide-reaching throughout the
region.8 As a result, the UNHCR announced in October 2021
LGBTQI+ Rights Violations its commitment to the expansion of its Age, Gender, and
Diversity (AGD) policy, originally drafted in 2018. Under the
There is very little public information about the lives of
initiative, the UNHCR will request all of its partners in Western
LGBTQI+ individuals in Western Sahara. However, in
Sahara to provide disaggregated data, which will separate and
August 2021, a report released by the United Nations High
analyze important information which can be used to devise
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) points to several
protection, assistance, and support programs for LGBTQI+
cases of abuse against LGBTQI+ groups in Western Sahara, individuals. It will also continue employing adapted planning
especially in refugee camps. The surrounding countries and working modalities to adapt to changing conditions within
of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania maintain strict laws Western Sahara by conducting participatory assessments,
against what they perceive as “lewd or unnatural acts with focus group discussions, and other community consultations
an individual of the same sex,” with prison sentences for to ensure the continuous inclusion and full political and social
same-sex activities ranging from six months to three years participation of refugees and asylum-seekers. Special focus
according to the Moroccan penal code. It is worth noting will be given to ensure the participation and inclusion of
that Morocco controls around 75 percent of Western Sahara, people with disabilities, women, young people, older people,
7 United Nations, “Speakers Addressing Fourth Committee Report Rights Violations in Tindouf Camps.”
8 “Western Sahara: Freedom in the World 2021,” Freedom House, accessed February 9, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/country/western-
sahara/freedom-world/2021.Topic B: The Situation in Western Sahara
14|I ntroduction
and LGBTQI+ individuals.9 of the Security Council, and it is imperative that delegates
take action to restore humanitarianism, security, and law to
Militarization and Armed Groups the Tindouf camps.
The situation in the Tindouf Camps now involves foreign
Escalations Between Morocco and Algeria
militias such as Hezbollah, a Lebanon-based Shi’ite armed
militia funded by the Islamic Republic of Iran.10 According to In November 2021, Morocco and Algeria once again descended
witness testimonies and a report submitted by the European into fraught tensions when three Algerian civilian truck
Union, armed groups and militias have taken hold of some drivers were allegedly murdered by Moroccan armed forces
refugee camps in Western Sahara in collaboration with the in Western Sahara. According to BBC Monitoring, Algerian
Polisario Front.11 Speakers and journalists addressing the officials believe the incident came in the wake of Algeria ending
UN General Assembly Fourth Committee in October 2021 gas transfers through a shared Moroccan pipeline on October
reported that the Tindouf Camps have become hotbeds for 31, 2021. Algeria had also stopped supplying Morocco with
radicalization, where Hezbollah has begun actively recruiting natural gas and blocked Algerian airspace to Moroccan flights.
camp residents to join its ranks. There have been further These decisions came after Algeria alleged that Morocco had
allegations of Hezbollah disseminating weapons in the repeatedly been seeking to stabilize the Algerian regime after
camps, which simultaneously threatens the security in the Algeria’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with Morocco
region and erodes the civilian and humanitarian character on August 24, 2021.15 In August, Algeria’s High Council for
of the camps, instead turning them into militarized training Security unilaterally announced its decision to sever diplomatic
camps. Mohammed Elaissaoui, a petitioner and refugee in ties, accusing Morroco of undermining Algerian security by
the Tindouf Camp, described the situation saying that “the supporting terrorist organizations. Importantly, the United
camps have become [a] breeding ground of terrorist groups States’ recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western
looking to recruit members from among the disillusioned Sahara contributed greatly to Algeria’s decision to sever
and disenfranchised youth.”12 These reports come only a few diplomatic relations, as Morocco’s diplomatic victory here
months after the establishment of bilateral relations between likely frustrated Algeria, which has competed with Morocco
Morocco and Israel, which was fostered and kicked off by for regional leadership for decades.16 After the October 2021
an aggressive push from the United States to increase Israeli deaths of the Algerian truckers, Algerian authorities released
influence in the region.13 Importantly, Israel and Iran have a statement claiming that Morocco’s “illegal occupation” of
had hostile relations for decades, making this growing alliance Western Sahara could be qualified as “state terrorism” since
between the Iran-backed Hezbollah and the Polisario Front the truck drivers were “innocent victims of this practice.”17
an alarming military development in this conflict, which Moroccan authorities have yet to comment on the incident,
threatens to drag more foreign state actors into this prolonged though Moroccan news agencies were quick to deny the
conflict.14 These recent developments should alarm members allegations and accused the Algerian authorities of bias and
9 “Algeria,” UNHCR, accessed January 4, 2022, https://reporting.unhcr.org/algeria.
10 Kali Robinson, “What Is Hezbollah?” Council on Foreign Relations, October 26, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-
hezbollah.
11 James Wilson, “Oppression of the Sahrawi People by the Polisario Front: Time for Justice,” EU Political Report, accessed January 15, 2021,
https://www.eupoliticalreport.eu/oppression-of-the-sahrawi-people-by-the-polisario-front-time-for-justice.
12 United Nations, “Speakers Addressing Fourth Committee Report Rights Violations in Tindouf Camps.”
13 “Morocco, Israel mark first anniversary of US-brokered renewal of ties,” The Times of Israel, December 22, 2021,
https://www.timesofisrael.com/morocco-israel-mark-first-anniversary-of-us-brokered-renewal-of-ties.
14 Dalia Dassa Kaye, Alireza Nader, and Parisa Roshan, Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2011), 9-18,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1143osd.7.
15 “Algeria accuses Morocco of killing three of its nationals in Western Sahara,” BBC Monitoring, November 3, 2021, https://advance-lexis-com.
proxy.library.upenn.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:640S-WBW1-DYRV-31H0-00000-00&context=1516831.
16 Samir Bennis, “Algeria-Morocco Relations: r Morrocans, It’s Deja-Vu,” Washington Institute, August 31, 2021, https://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/algeria-morocco-relations-moroccans-its-deja-vu.
17 BBC Monitoring, “Algeria accuses Morocco of killing three of its nationals in Western Sahara.”Topic B: The Situation in Western Sahara
Introduction |15
a lack of trustworthiness.18 The ongoing escalations sound the establishment of Israel-Morocco bilateral relations, the
a familiar tune, a time when diplomatic discussions collapse Polisario Front vowed to escalate its “just war of liberation”
and tensions rise, again signaling the ever-important role the with Morocco.21 In line with this promise, the Polisario Front
Security Council must play in this situation to help bridge has strengthened ties with Algeria and formed military bases
deepening tensions and prevent any further escalations to the where it can train and weaponize its militants. Additionally,
conflict. the Polisario Front has allowed foreign militias such as
Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda to essentially recruit individuals
Escalations within Western Sahara from the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in exchange for
weapons, intelligence and strategy sharing, and training.22 This
According to the Sahrawi National Commission on Human
escalation pushed the Moroccan government, along with the
Rights, Morocco has fiercely expanded its silencing of
United States, to pressure the United Nations to designate the
political opposition in Western Sahara. In November 2021,
Polisario Front as a terrorist organization in December 2021.
it was reported that Moroccan police infiltrated the homes
As of January 2022, the United Nations has yet to release any
of outspoken Sahrawi activists to threaten them, even
official statement.23
placing some political dissidents under house arrest. Sultana
Khaya and Luara Khaya—two Sahrawi women and human
Recent Strides Made Towards the Resolution
rights advocates—are among the Sahrawis who have been of the Conflict
under house arrest since early November 2021. According
to accounts from the two and media reports, Moroccan Despite the increased tensions, both sides have recently
police allegedly cut their access to electricity and water and made efforts to resolve the conflict or, at the very least,
repeatedly terrorized their family members. It has also been pacify tensions. On November 10, 2021, Moroccan Foreign
widely reported by both the UN and other media outlets Minister Nasser Bourita released a statement signaling that
that the two sisters were sexually assaulted by Moroccan the Kingdom of Morocco is committed to resolving the crisis
officers during the house raids.19 Similar reports of Sahrawi in Western Sahara as soon as possible with as few casualties
advocates being put under house arrest have emerged within as possible. In his statement, Bourita lifted blame from the
Western Sahara, with some reports detailing death threats Polisario Front, instead casting it upon Algeria, accusing the
made against prisoners’ families.20 These recent escalations country of artificially creating a conflict in the area to promote
paint an increasingly urgent picture of militarization, human its own interests and destabilize the region. However, Bourita
rights violations, and government corruption—all of which stressed that Morocco would never “surrender the Kingdom’s
constitute significant threats to regional peace and security. legitimate rights over the disputed territory.”24 Instead, a
foreseeable resolution would include giving the Sahrawis
Escalations with the Polisario Front further autonomy within the context of a greater Moroccan
State.25
In response to the US recognizing Morocco’s claim of
sovereignty over Western Sahara on December 10, 2020, after Furthermore, the Polisario Front expressed willingness
18 BBC Monitoring, “Algeria accuses Morocco of killing three of its nationals in Western Sahara.”
19 “Morocco: UN human rights expert decries ‘clampdown’ on human rights defenders,” OHCHR, July 1, 2021, https://www.ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=27244&LangID=E.
20 “Tone Moe: UN, states and ICRC failure to act on abuses in Western Sahara encourages Morocco to escalate violations,” Sahara Press
Service, November 20, 2021, https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.library.upenn.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:64
4F-3M81-F11P-X4NF-00000-00&context=1516831.
21 “US praises Morocco plan on Western Sahara as tensions rise,” Agence France Presse, November 23, 2021, https://www.barrons.com/
news/us-praises-morocco-plan-on-western-sahara-as-tensions-rise-01637634607?tesla=y.
22 United Nations, “Speakers Addressing Fourth Committee Report Rights Violations in Tindouf Camps.”
23 Agence France Presse, “US praises Morocco plan on Western Sahara as tensions rise.”
24 “Western Sahara - Morocco keen to turn page on W. Sahara conflict but no shift on territorial rights,” RFI, November 10, 2021, https://
www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20211110-morocco-keen-to-turn-page-on-western-sahara-conflict-but-no-shift-on-territorial-rights-algeria-polisario.
RFI, “Western Sahara - Morocco keen to turn page on W. Sahara conflict but no shift on territorial rights.”
25 RFI, “Western Sahara - Morocco keen to turn page on W. Sahara conflict but no shift on territorial rights.”Topic B: The Situation in Western Sahara 16|I ntroduction to negotiate with the Moroccan government following the formation of a new centrist Moroccan government in September 2021. This became possible with the election of Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch, the leader of the centrist National Rally of Independents (RNI) party.26 While diplomacy and peaceful resolution to the conflict will be a lengthy and complex process, these recent strides signal that further diplomatic resolutions are possible. It is in the best interest of the Security Council and all parties involved to continue exploring pacifist paths to peace and security in the region. Conclusion The conflict in Western Sahara has assuredly seen a spike in violence and aggression over the second half of 2021. Both sides increased hostilities, with the Moroccan government abusing vulnerable citizens’ and refugees’ rights on the one hand and the Polisario Front resorting to extreme measures in order to counter Moroccan dominance on the other. The involvement of foreign actors has only increased the weight of the crisis, with Algeria cutting diplomatic ties with Morocco and escalating tensions between the two countries. Nevertheless, the rise of a centrist government in Morocco has provided both sides with the necessary momentum to return to the negotiating table, with a diplomatic resolution to the conflict potentially on the horizon. The crisis in Western Sahara has impacted millions of lives, with some left with no resources to fend for themselves. If a ceasefire were to be implemented, the United Nations Security Council has a duty to ensure that this ceasefire lasts and its terms are respected. Peacekeeping missions that previously proved unsuccessful must be improved, especially given the increasing human rights violations in Western Sahara. If a one-state solution under Moroccan rule is a possibility for Sahrawis, the United Nations Security Council must examine the intricacies of the situation in Western Sahara and draft an acceptable plan for all parties. No matter the path forward, the road to peace and security must ensure peace and prosperity for all, especially the most vulnerable. 26 RFI, “Western Sahara - Morocco keen to turn page on W. Sahara conflict but no shift on territorial rights”; Rachid Bouanani, “Morocco: Aziz Akhannouch, the billionaire ally of Mohammed VI,” Middle East Eye, September 15, 2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ morocco-aziz-akhannouch-billionaire-service-his-majesty-mohammed-vi.
UNSC B
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