Right-to-Work Legislation and the Manufacturing Sector
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH
M I L L E R C O L L E G E O F B U S I N E S S • B A L L S TAT E U N I V E R S I T Y
Right-to-Work Legislation
and the Manufacturing Sector
Michael J. Hicks, Ph.D. Director and Associate Professor
This study extends the analysis of the impact of right-to-work legislation
in very narrow areas—industrial composition, manufacturing income,
employment and wages in the United States.
INTRODUCTION There are a great many additional issues, RIGHT-TO-WORK LEGISLATION
Researchers have been long interested some purely economic, others beyond the The National Labor Relations Act of
in evaluating the role right-to-work traditional scope of economic analysis. This 1935 (the Wagner Act) permitted unions
(RTW) laws play in wages, employment, study will not address issues beyond the to enforce membership by all employees
firm location, industrial structure and empirical matters mentioned. All research represented by that union. Certain types of
other economic outcomes in states that is limited in scope, and while the issues workers—management, railroad, domestic
have implemented these policies. These we examine are important, their relative services and government employees—were
remain timely questions, because several importance cannot be determined without exempt from the law.[2] In 1947, the
state legislatures are currently considering more comparative research. So, we cannot Taft-Hartley Act eased this restriction,
RTW legislation. This study extends the conclude from this work alone, the efficacy permitting some employees to avoid union
analysis of the impact of RTW legisla- of the legislation, or even whether or not membership and avoid paying union dues.
tion in very narrow areas—industrial these issues are of primary importance to However, the full implementation of the
composition, manufacturing income, the evaluation of this issue.[1] law required individual states to implement
employment and wage rate in the United We begin by briefly reviewing RTW legislation to this effect. This has become
States. Examining more than a half cen- legislation, highlighting some regions of known as right-to-work legislation.
tury of changes, we seek to incorporate particular interest. This is followed by an The original states who adopted RTW
significantly more available information explanation of the ambiguity present in policies were heavily concentrated in the
regarding a number of unsettled questions economic theory regarding the effects of southern and southwestern United States.
surrounding RTW laws. RTW legislation. This is then placed in the At the time, these were places that were
The questions we ask are not new, but context of the existing body of research on not heavily industrialized. Further, there
we focus on quantifying the changes to the subject. We follow this with explicit appeared some cultural antipathy towards
manufacturing associated with RTW laws economic modeling of the influence of the labor movement in the South (Black
in each of the 48 conterminous United RTW laws in the United States on the 1989). In the Midwest, the state of Indi-
States and the District of Columbia. These manufacturing share of income in each ana passed RTW legislation in 1957 but
are among the questions facing citizens state’s economy, manufacturing incomes. rescinded private sector RTW in 1965.
and public policy makers when consid- We end with conclusions, recommen- Since the Taft-Hartley Act, there has been
ering their stance on changes to RTW dations for further analysis and policy slow adoption with 22 states currently
legislation. However, they are not the only considerations. having passed RTW legislation.
questions involving changes to RTW laws.
1. The political economy literature has also shown some interest in more fundamental issues regarding limits to the freedom of association and the specter of free riders
enjoying the putative gains of union membership without suffering the costs (of dues).
2. Some states passed RTW laws prior to the Taft-Hartley Act.
CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1 BALL STATE UNIVERSITY – JANUARY 2012SIDEBAR A: Geographic Distribution of States with Established or WHAT IS RIGHT TO WORK POLICY?
Right to work policy is essentially the right
Potential Right-to-Work Laws of an employee to work for a business without
being obligated to join a labor union. Arkan-
sas’s state constitution offers a more technical
definition:
1935
No person shall be denied employment
because of membership in or affiliation with
1985 1946 or resignation from a labor union, or because
1963 of refusal to join or affiliate with a labor
1974 union; nor shall any corporation or individual
1946
1911 or association of any kind enter into any
1955 contract, written or oral, to exclude from
1947
1958 employment members of a labor union or
1947 persons who refuse to join a labor union, or
1947
because of resignation from a labor union; nor
2001 1954
1946 1944 shall any person against his will be compelled
1947 to pay dues to any labor organization as a
1943
1954 prerequisite to or condition of employment.
1993 (Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 34 § 1)
1976
As of January 2012, 22 states have right-
1943
to-work policies in place and several states are
considering the introduction of RTW policies.
Most right-to-work states introduced a RTW
Has established right-to-work law policy through state legislation, but five states
(Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi and
Source: National Right to Work Legal Defense and Considering right-to-work law Oklahoma) have RTW statutes amended to
Education Foundation, Inc.; and CBER research. Has no right-to-work law their state constitutions.
ECONOMIC THEORY AND RIGHT-TO- in firm location decisions. For example, Conversely, the convergence of state
WORK LEGISLATION negotiating with unions is costly, and much level industrial structure in the past half
Right-to-work legislation has been of the cost increasing effects of unions are century would tend to push increased lev-
hypothesized to influences firm and worker embedded in work rules, and decreased els of more unionized industries (primarily
behavior in ways that render aggregate the- flexibility in hiring and discharge, not pay. manufacturing and transportation since
oretical predictions murky. As an example, This is especially true in those industries mining, a heavily unionized industry is not
Reed (2003) provides an excellent review with higher levels of human capital, such particularly footloose) in states that had
of the complexity of economic theory. He as government and the service sector. In historically low levels of manufacturing.
presents differing theoretical arguments these sectors, unions do not appear to have This well could have occurred without any
regarding the wage effects of RTW laws. generated a large wage differential, so the consideration of RTW legislation.
First, the free riding by non-union work- concerns of business are more frequently The benefit of theoretical results regard-
ers may erode the strength of unions to expressed as a concern over flexibility in ing RTW legislation and industrial compo-
bargain, reducing the wage premium for work rules and hiring. sition is fleeting. The only sure conclusion
workers. Second, the increased require- For the size and composition of is that whatever preconceived notion an
ment for effective unions under the RTW industry, the theoretical explanations individual or group brings to the policy
environment may motivate unions to for RTW are only modestly less murky. discussion is likely to find supportive
demonstrate their effectiveness by securing RTW legislation may well have been theory. For our purposes, it is the empirics
higher wage and benefit gains. influenced by initial union conditions (or of the matter that are necessary to evaluate
Obviously, these two plausible explana- local preferences). Thus, strong unions in the role of the legislation.
tions offer different predictions regarding industrialized states may have blocked the
the effect of RTW laws on wages. A full legislation, while less industrialized states EMPIRICAL FINDINGS RELEVANT TO
review of the existing theory is only of would be more likely to endorse RTW THIS DISCUSSION
tangential interest to this primarily empiri- legislation. These heavily industrialized A large body of analysis has been per-
cal work. We note however, that wages and states may enjoy manufacturing clusters formed regarding the effects and efficacy
benefits are not the primary cost differential that continued to attract new firms seek- of right-to-work legislation. The bulk of
between union and non-unionized firms. ing the benefits of the cluster, and are the analysis, especially in recent years, has
So other matters may play a bigger role therefore less sensitive to unionization. been supplied by advocacy groups. The
CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH 2 BALL STATE UNIVERSITY – JANUARY 2012quality of these analyses range from very Louisiana-Mississippi border shows stark the most heavily unionized private sector
fine scholarly analysis to astonishingly differences in manufacturing location; industry, manufacturing. We exclude
biased creeds. I leave these un-reviewed, both are RTW states, but Louisiana mining, as it is not typically viewed as
and instead focus on studies from within has suffered a long history of antipathy sufficiently footloose to be influenced by
the peer-reviewed literature. Here, I focus towards business. RTW laws, and we also exclude service and
on findings from a few recent studies. Stevans (2009) examined another public sector employees who are also not a
Any analysis of the effects of RTW important question surrounding RTW footloose sector. We examine the contermi-
legislation faces considerable analytical legislation at the state level. This study nous 48 states and the District of Colum-
challenge. The first is the difficulty in dis- introduced a method for correcting for bia from 1929 through 2005.
entangling RTW effects from other factors. a problem known as endogeneity, which We are attempting to estimate the
A study that examines the role of RTW is the possibility of reverse causation in incremental contribution of RTW laws on
that is absent of such issues as tax policy, the adoption of a RTW law. Because it is different measures of manufacturing. To
weather and the like will be unable to tease possible that local factors (such as strong do this, we construct a very basic treatment
out the influence of legislative change from unions) prevent the passage of RTW laws, model from which to estimate impacts of
these factors. any test of RTW versus non-RTW states RTW legislation:
Yi,t = α + αi + β (RTWi,t) + δWYj,t
A study that examines the role of right to work that is absent of such + θγi,t-1 + εi,t
issues as tax policy, weather and the like will be unable to tease out
the influence of legislative change from these factors. ...where the dependent variable Y is the manu-
facturing share of income in state i, in year t or
income in the manufacturing sector. These are
While it is fairly straightforward to is not a natural experiment, but is biased estimated as a function of a common and fixed
account for overall economic trends, tax (statistically) either for or against finding effects intercept (α + αi), a presence variable
policy and weather in a statistical model, it effects. This problem has plagued RTW for right-to-work legislation (RTW), a first order
is far more difficult to measure the various studies. Stevans found that there were no spatial contiguity element to correct for spatial
and disparate elements of public policy wage or employment effects of RTW legis- autocorrelation (δWYj,t), a first order temporal
that contribute to firm location decisions. lation when correcting for the endogeneity autoregressive element (θγi,t-1), and a white noise
One important attempt at this was pro- problem. A concern with the Stevans study error term, εi,t.[3]
vided by Holmes (1998), who measured is the absence of strong analysis over time
firm location decision using RTW as a tool in the effects he measures. The choice of the fixed-effects model
to measure other business friendly policies There are many other studies, but the is motivated by a fundamental critique
on firm location decision at the county Holmes (1998) and Stevans (2009) studies of earlier studies of RTW legislation that
level. This study was especially important provide some of the most careful treatment are the absence of controls for underlying
in that it included other business-friendly of the empirical problems, while framing conditions both to economic structure and
policies (such as tax rates) in a carefully the debate sufficiently for our purposes cultural acceptance of unionization (see
executed study of counties in different here. I now measure RTW and report the Reed 2003). The fixed-effects intercept
states, but with contiguous borders. This results using lessons from both authors. then captures time invariant characteristics
study used RTW legislation as a proxy for of each state, and permitting parsimony
business-friendly legislation, and reports MODELING INDUSTRIAL COMPOSITION in the actual estimation (for which theory
a very large increase in manufacturing AND RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS is again too ambiguous to provide reli-
employment in places with a RTW law, if One purpose of this paper is to estimate able guidance on specification). Thus, the
accompanied by business-friendly policies how the share of heavily unionized indus- fixed-effects offer significant benefits over
and no unusual geographic complica- tries may be influenced by right-to-work common or random effects as it controls
tions. For example, Holmes notes the legislation within a state. We focus on the time invariant characteristics of the
3. There are some considerations in the estimation process to be considered. The dependent variables in one estimation is industry share. This is problematic, as is the
potential for non-spherical errors generated by the spatial interaction and autoregressive element of the modeling. To correct for these problems, we employ a panel cor-
rected standard error (PCSE) estimate. This provides the efficiency enhancements not available through FGLS, while preserving consistency and unbiasedness in the esti-
mates (see Park and Katz, 1995). Finally, the PCSE estimates are estimated with White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity invariate, variance-covariance matrix. All dependent
variables are estimated in first-differenced logarithmic form to ensure stationarity.
CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH 3 BALL STATE UNIVERSITY – JANUARY 2012TA B L E 1 : Summary Statistics, 1929–2006 ($ Millions, Nominal)
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Manufacturing Share 0.17 0.16 0.52 0.02 0.09 0.50 2.80
Manufacturing Income 5,997,473 1,268,621 144,000,000 1,236 11,883,691 4 27
Right-to-Work States 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 1.05 2.10
Old South States 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.43 1.19 2.41
Manufacturing Income,
3,865,163 2,347,648 24,052,176 262,002 4,700,227 2 9
1947
conterminous states and the District of TA B L E 2 : Right-to-Work Effect on Manufacturing
Columbia. The data appear in Table 1.
Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing
One further problem is the concern that Share of Income Aggregate Level of Employment Wage Rate
RTW legislation is not spontaneously vary- (t-Value) Income (t-Value) (t-Value) (t-Value)
ing across states. If RTW legislation in a 0.002018*** -0.038467*** 0.99*** 0.03
C
(3.25) (-9.8) (8.18) (0.73)
particular state is caused by some other fac-
0.000880 0.007671 0.015 0.0078
tor, such as existing low rates of unioniza- Right to Work
(1.13) (1.54) (1.27) (0.66)
tion or historical antipathy towards unions, Spatial Correction
0.018874 -0.003496*** -0.077*** 2,571.6
(1.13) (-3.86) (-7.76) (0.49)
the model will be biased (in a statistical
-6.76E-05*** 0.000723*** -0.0007*** -0.0003
sense) and not provide useful results. Trend
(-4.25) (14.1) (-4.97) (-0.057)
To correct for this problem, we use 0.057998 -0.000675 0.27*** 0.35*
Autocorrelations
a method designed to account for the (0.96) (-0.01) (8.52) (1.69)
predisposition of a state to adopt a RTW Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
law. This is known as a correction for Adjusted R 2
0.04 0.23 0.24 0.00
endogeneity, which in non-technical terms Note: *** denotes statistical significance to the 0.01 level. * denotes statistical signifacance to the 0.10 level.
is a correction for the ‘reverse causation’ Both models were statistically significant to the 0.01 level on the standard F-test.
that might bias the model. This correc-
tion takes the form of modifying the years (1947). In other words, not making meaningful, so RTW legislation does not
dependent variables of industry income this correction would bias the study.[4] affect the size of the manufacturing share,
shares and the level of income, accounting inflation-adjusted wages for manufacturing
for the level of manufacturing in a state ESTIMATION RESULTS workers, employment in manufacturing nor
immediately following the Second World Our estimates of the right-to-work leg- worker wage rates.
War and whether or not the state was part islation on manufacturing share of income This analysis suggests RTW laws do not
of the Old South. To the layperson, these and aggregate manufacturing income are matter in explaining industrial structure
might seem fanciful elements to include displayed in Table 2. across the United States. However, this
in this type of study, but in truth, it is the These provide empirical estimates of is not a resolved issue because there is not
presence of factors such as anti-union feel- changes to industrial composition and purely empirical method of evaluating the
ing in the Old South, and the strength of manufacturing wages caused by of RTW endogeneity correction. Though these find-
unions in the industrial states prior to the legislation from 1929 through 2005. Over- ings corroborate the most recent studies in
1950s that require this sort of analysis. So all, the industrial composition estimates this area (Stevans 2009), the outcomes here
any study that attempts to draw conclu- offers a weak explanation for overall changes call for a more specific analysis of the legis-
sions regarding the effect of RTW without to the economy (manufacturing share). lation. In other words, I might be wrong.
addressing this problem should be viewed The income model performs fairly well in A series of models that captures the
with some skepticism. capturing changes to inflation-adjusted total relationship between two variables in
A key test of the value of these two met- manufacturing income when accounting which causation can run in either direction
rics in accounting for such bias is that wages for these state-specific conditions, surround- have seen widespread application. These
and manufacturing share were both strongly ing state wages, trends, persistence and the models—developed by 2011 Nobel Laure-
correlated with variables that accounted endogeneity of RTW laws. Of primarily ate Christopher Sims—allow two variables
for states in the Old South and the level of interest in this research is the role RTW laws to interact upon each other, permitting the
manufacturing in the immediate post war play. In no model were estimates statistically analyst to decompose the relative effects on
4. This ‘weak instrument test’ passed for this model.
CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH 4 BALL STATE UNIVERSITY – JANUARY 2012each other. To better understand the effect FIGURE 1: First Ten Years of Accumulated Growth of Manufacturing
of this legislation on a particular state, we Incomes and Annual Changes in Share Since the Introduction of Right-to-
isolate our analysis to those states that have Work Law by State
changed their RTW laws over the past half
A: Florida B: Idaho
century. We can then confine our analysis A C C U M U L AT E D
40% 40%
to the ten states that have changed their
30% 30%
legislation since our data began.[5]
20% 20%
To do so, we construct a model in which A C C U M U L AT E D
10% 10%
total manufacturing income (adjusted for ANNUAL
0% 0%
inflation) is affected by the passage of a ANNUAL
-10% -10%
RTW law. To accomplish this we must -20% -20%
translate the zero-or-one nature of the Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Y E A R S A F T E R I M P L E M E N TAT I O N ( 1 9 4 3 ) Y E A R S A F T E R I M P L E M E N TAT I O N ( 1 9 8 5 )
RTW law into a variable that can take any
value between 0.0 and 1.0. To do this, we C: Iowa D: Kansas
adapt a technique described by Duecker 40% 40%
(2001) that replaces a qualitative variable 30% 30%
A C C U M U L AT E D
(e.g. the yes/no conditions of RTW laws 20% 20%
in a state) with a forecast. This adjustment 10% 10%
ANNUAL
unfortunately precludes using Indiana for 0% 0%
ANNUAL
A C C U M U L AT E D
the set of evaluated states because its fore- -10% -10%
cast remained constant, despite a change -20%
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
-20%
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
in 1957 through 1965. Also, we have to Y E A R S A F T E R I M P L E M E N TAT I O N ( 1 9 7 4 ) Y E A R S A F T E R I M P L E M E N TAT I O N ( 1 9 5 8 )
isolate a second relationship between these
E: Louisiana F: Mississippi
variables that does not change through
40% 40%
time and choose how long the effect of the A C C U M U L AT E D
30% 30%
change in a law should be modeled.[6] As A C C U M U L AT E D
20% 20%
with the earlier model, here we estimate
10% 10%
the change to wages, not simply the level.
0% 0%
For each of the ten selected states, we can ANNUAL ANNUAL
-10% -10%
measure two factors. The first is the size
-20% -20%
of the change to manufacturing incomes Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Y E A R S A F T E R I M P L E M E N TAT I O N ( 1 9 7 6 ) Y E A R S A F T E R I M P L E M E N TAT I O N ( 1 9 5 4 )
(total, not per capita) of the introduction
of a RTW law within a state. Second, we G: South Carolina H: Texas
can estimate the share of the year-to-year 40% 40%
change in these wages attributable to the 30% 30%
A C C U M U L AT E D
passage of a RTW law. The share of year- 20% 20%
to-year changes (variance) ranged from 14 10% 10%
ANNUAL
percent to 46 percent in this sample of ten 0% 0%
ANNUAL
states. The impacts, both year-to-year and -10% -10%
A C C U M U L AT E D
cumulative, appear in Figure 1. -20% -20%
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
These results paint an interesting story Y E A R S A F T E R I M P L E M E N TAT I O N ( 1 9 5 4 ) Y E A R S A F T E R I M P L E M E N TAT I O N ( 1 9 9 3 )
about the effect of RTW legislation within
individual states. In seven of the ten states, I: Utah J: Wyoming
the cumulative 10-year impact of RTW 40% 40%
A C C U M U L AT E D A C C U M U L AT E D
30% 30%
20% 20%
10% 10%
5. We exclude Oklahoma due to its recent change in
2001. 0% 0%
ANNUAL ANNUAL
6. This is known respectively as estimating a -10% -10%
cointegrating equation and determining optimal -20% -20%
lag lengths (for which we minimized the Akaike Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Information Criterion). Y E A R S A F T E R I M P L E M E N TAT I O N ( 1 9 5 5 ) Y E A R S A F T E R I M P L E M E N TAT I O N ( 1 9 6 3 )
CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH 5 BALL STATE UNIVERSITY – JANUARY 2012legislation was an increase in inflation- economists are particularly suited to address. sectors, ranging from significant
adjusted manufacturing incomes of This study has attempted to evalu- declines (greater than 10 percent
between 15 percent and 40 percent. This ate some of these factors. This study is over a decade) to very large gains
suggests either a growth in the number of incomplete and does not fully evaluate all (almost a doubling of manufactur-
manufacturing jobs in these states, higher industries or all aspects of the workplace. ing). These responses to the shock of
wages for existing manufacturing jobs As such, this study cannot be interpreted a RTW law point to highly variable
or both. This results from an increase in alone as a call for or against passage of a impacts of a change in legislation.
manufacturing jobs, or wages, or poten- RTW law in Indiana. However, we can One reasonable interpretation is
tially both. Interestingly, in all but one draw some conclusions from our reading that other factors matter more than
state, Wyoming, the impact in the first year of existing studies and the new analysis RTW in determining the size of the
was slightly negative, perhaps as evidence presented here. manufacturing industry in a state.
that poor economic times precipitated the Among these findings are: • Overall, based on the experience in
legislative change. In Idaho, the cumulative • The impact of right-to-work legisla- other states, right-to-work legisla-
effect over 10 years was an almost 8 per- tion is difficult to disentangle from tion is not likely to have an effect
cent increase in manufacturing incomes. other business friendly policies. on the manufacturing industry in
However, in Iowa and South Carolina we However, the more business- Indiana.
find that manufacturing income declined friendly a state is at any given time,
over the 10-year period following intro- the more muted the enactment of a REFERENCES
duction of the RTW legislation. These RTW law is likely to be. Black, Earl and Merle Black (1989). Politics
findings mimic those of Holmes (1998), and Society in the South. Boston: Harvard
who finds that while RTW as a proxy for • The presence or absence of right-to-
University Press.
business friendly policies boosts manu- work legislation in a state is not a
natural experiment, so any analysis Reed, W. Robert (2003). How Right to Work
facturing share of an economy, but that Laws Affect Wages. Journal of Labor Research,
important geographic idiosyncrasies exist. that fails to attempt to control
24(4): 1-18.
for this is inherently flawed. This
includes simple comparisons of Holmes, Thomas J. (1996). The Effect of State
SUMMARY
RTW states with non-RTW states Policies on the Location of Industry: Evi-
Right-to-work legislation is a politically dence from State Borders. Journal of Political
tactile subject that has far reaching consid- on any issue.
Economy, 106(4): 667-704.
erations and motivations. We acknowledge • Our estimates of the impact of
National Right to Work Legal Defense and
this and admit the facility of economic right-to-work laws on manufactur-
Education Foundation, Inc. (2010). Right to
analysis to speak to these matters is limited. ing, which accounted for factors
Work States. Online: http://www.nrtw.org.
However, economic considerations in terms that would lead to changes in leg-
Stevans, Lonnie K. (2009). The Effect of
of the manufacturing share of the economy islation isolated no effect of RTW
Endogenous Right-to-Work Laws on
(a proxy for more manufacturing rather legislation.
Business and Economic Conditions in the
than less) and the growth of the industry • States that changed their right-to- United States: A Multivariate Approach. The
in an absolute manner (total manufactur- work laws experienced significant Review of Law and Economics, 5(1): 595-614.
ing incomes), manufacturing employment variation in their manufacturing
and manufacturing wages are matters that
BALL STATE CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH
Center for Business and Economic Research
Miller College of Business, Ball State University
Whitinger Business Building, room 149
2000 W. University Ave. • Muncie, IN 47306
Phone: 765-285-5926 • Email: cber@bsu.edu www.bsu.edu/cber
CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH 6 BALL STATE UNIVERSITY – JANUARY 2012You can also read
