2021 Commission on Defence Forces Submission
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
2021
Commission on Defence Forces
Submission
19th of March 2021
Submitted by Captain Paul Edward Roche
on behalf of the Irish Institute of Master
MarinersIrish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
The Irish Institute of Master Mariners (IIMM) is a non-political
organisation of qualified mariners. Our aim is to promote safe,
efficient and professional conduct in the public and commercial
maritime sectors in Ireland and internationally. The IIMM is a
member of the International Federation of Shipmasters’
Associations (IFSMA) and the Confederation of European
Shipmasters’ Associations (CESMA).
The Institutes’ expertise in the global maritime sector will be
reflected in this submission.
www.mastermariners.com
The Irish Institute of Master Mariners has made the following
submissions to the Irish Government in:
2019 National Security Strategy
2018 Marine Spatial Planning
2017 RIA on Merchant Shipping Bill
2015 Maritime Taxation
2014 Maritime Safety Strategy
2013 White Paper on Defence
2012 Harnessing Our Oceans Wealth
Page | 1 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
Irish Institute of Master Mariners ..................................................................................... 1
Contents .......................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3
Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... 4
Capabilities ...................................................................................................................... 5
Defence Attaché ............................................................................................................... 6
The Irish Naval Service (INS) ............................................................................................. 7
Maritime Risks to the State .............................................................................................. 8
Irish Naval Service Capability .......................................................................................... 10
Irish Merchant Marine .................................................................................................... 15
Army .............................................................................................................................. 16
Air Corps ........................................................................................................................ 17
Finance .......................................................................................................................... 18
Domestic Defence Industry ............................................................................................. 18
Structure ........................................................................................................................ 19
Navy Command .............................................................................................................. 19
Staffing .......................................................................................................................... 20
Reserve Defence Forces (RDF) ........................................................................................ 22
Irish Naval Service Reserve (NSR) .................................................................................... 24
Page | 2 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
Introduction
The first duty of the Irish Government is the defence of the State and the protection of its
citizens at home and abroad. To achieve this requires hard and soft power using a well trained
and equipped military force backed by international treaties in defence and trade.
The Irish Government tasks Óglaigh na hÉireann to use hard power in defence of the State
through continuous assessment of the security and defence environment 1. Óglaigh na
hÉireann also provides soft power through use of hard power assets such as in the United
Nations mandated Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean where the Irish Naval Service (INS)
rescued over 18,000 migrants in 4 years2.
Ireland must recognise a well-equipped and well-trained Defence Force is required to
preserve a safe, secure and stable democracy. If the security situation in Northern Ireland
rapidly destabilised would Ireland be able to cope with 100,000 refugees or more in a matter
of weeks? Difficult to calculate but a strong and capable Óglaigh na hÉireann significantly
improves the probability of a positive outcome.
To define the capabilities, structure and staffing for Óglaigh na hÉireann through to 2030
requires an effective strategy, properly resourced to meet the objectives set. For Óglaigh na
hÉireann to defend the State and its citizens successfully the Government needs to take bold
and decisive action by delivering a National Security Strategy (NSS). The ‘Programme for
Government: Our Shared Future’3 does not include this. The Office of the Taoiseach
requested public submissions to develop the NSS between 5th – 31st December 2019. Many
interested parties, including the IIMM, did so in a very tight time frame. The results of the
consultation have not been published4. No doubt epistemic security will be a new chapter to
add. The Government did publish a ‘National Risk Assessment 2019 - Overview of Strategic
Risk5. This deals with the potential risks to the State, however, there is no plan or outline of
how these risks will be managed or budgeted for to minimise the impact to the State.
In summary, to discuss the Capabilities, Structure and Staffing of Óglaigh na hÉireann up to
and beyond 2030 requires a National Security Strategy that is properly resourced to meet the
threats to the State and its citizens. In the absence of such a document, certain assumptions
must be made for the purposes of this submission.
1 Department of Defence. 2021. White Paper Implementation Programme. Dublin: Government of Ireland.
2 Irish Times. 2019. EU ends migrant rescue mission in Mediterranean. 27 March. Accessed 18 March, 2021.
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/eu-ends-migrant-rescue-mission-in-mediterranean
3 Department of the Taoiseach. 2020. Programme for Government: Our Shared Future. Dublin: Government of Ireland.
Accessed February 16, 2021. https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/7e05d-programme-for-government-our-shared-future/
4 Department of the Taoiseach. 2019. Public Consultation on the development of a National Security Strategy. 05
December. Accessed February 16, 2021. https://www.gov.ie/en/consultation/8b3a62-public-consultation-on-the-
development-of-a-national-security-strate/
5 Department of the Taoiseach, 2019. National Risk Assessment 2019 – Overview of Strategic Risk. Dublin: Government of
Ireland. Accessed February 21, 2021.
Page | 3 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
Executive Summary
A fit for purpose Óglaigh na hÉireann requires a National Security Strategy (NSS) which is
properly resourced. The NSS should be reviewed annually and subject to inspection by the
Oireachtas. Every 5 years a White Paper on Defence should be produced. This should have an
oversight body independent of the Department of Defence and Óglaigh na hÉireann and be
directly accountable to Dáil Éireann. Defined budgets should be agreed by all parties to ensure
recommendations are met. The oversight body should have sufficient powers to hold either
party accountable to Dáil Eireann if recommendations are not met or actioned.
Óglaigh na hÉireann has suffered from chronic underinvestment for years. Having the right
people is key to a strong and vibrant defence force. Retention and recruitment must be a
priority and providing an attractive pay and conditions package to Óglaigh na hÉireann
personnel is the first step. If Ireland is to overcome unplanned crises such as pandemics,
political instability or security events in the State and meet its international obligations in
regions that affect the stability and security of Europe, then it will need to increase investment
substantially so as to enhance the probability of a positive outcome. At 0.3% GDP, Ireland
continues to rank in the lower tiers in Western Europe in spend on Defence 6.
6 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2020. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Stockholm: Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, 13. Accessed February 16, 2021.
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932019%20as%20a%
20share%20of%20GDP.pdf
Page | 4 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
Capabilities
The military capabilities presented in this submission may appear unrealistic particularly
when viewed through the prism of present circumstances. The fact remains that in 10 years
defending and protecting Ireland, the European Union (EU) as a responsible member state,
and its citizens wherever they may be will require the military capability outlined in this
submission. The threats faced today are very different from those of 10 years ago and will be
different again in 10 years from now. The European migrant crisis in the Mediterranean,
Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic are unpredictable events which had a significant impact
in the last decade. However, the efforts of the Department of Foreign Affairs and deployment
of Irish military personnel and assets overseas provided the experience, knowledge and
resilience to achieve the best possible outcome for the State.
This will not be possible in the near future if significant investment in Óglaigh na hÉireann is
not made. It will be a high price to pay for the years of chronic underinvestment in not
maintaining, or enhancing, the existing Defence Forces’ capabilities. There is a historical
perception that defence was a luxury a poor country like Ireland could not afford. Ireland is
ranked by the International Monetary Fund7 as the fourth richest in the world by GDP per
capita. Allowing for skewed figures from multi-nationals, Ireland is still between the 8th and
12th richest country in the EU8. With an intelligent approach to investment, jobs can be
created by supporting a domestic defence industry. In providing this investment, the
Government should use all the financial instruments available to it such as accessing finance
through the European Defence Fund9 to build the military capabilities required for future.
Ireland may become a victim of its own very successful soft power strategy in Europe10 and in
the United States of America with a US President proud of his Irish heritage. As an EU member,
this success will not have gone unnoticed by the EU’s adversaries. Ireland’s strategic policy of
non-aligned military status and military neutrality11 will be tested and will require a strong
Óglaigh na hÉireann to meet the challenges head on.
With an increasingly connected, contested and complex international maritime security
climate, it is crucial that Ireland plans for and develops a capable and responsive military force
in the maritime domain. This is crucial given that nearly 90 per cent of the EU’s external trade
and more than 40 per cent of its internal trade is seaborne with nearly two billion tons of
7 International Monetary Fund. 2020. World Economic Outlook – GDP per capita. October. Accessed 12 March 2021.
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2020/October
8 Irish Times. 2021. We’re not as rich as we have been told to think we are. 04 February. Accessed February 26, 2021.
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/we-re-not-as-rich-as-we-have-been-told-to-think-we-are-1.4476247
9 Council of the EU. 2020. Provisional agreement reached on setting-up the European Defence Fund. 14 December.
Accessed February 17, 2021. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/14/provisional-
agreement-reached-on-setting-up-the-european-defence-fund/
10 The Economist. 2020. How Ireland gets its way. 18 July. Accessed February 26, 2021.
https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/07/18/how-ireland-gets-its-way
11 Department of the Taoiseach. 2020. Programme for Government: Our Shared Future. Dublin: Government of Ireland,
114. Accessed February 16, 2021. https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/7e05d-programme-for-government-our-shared-
future/
Page | 5 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
freight loaded and unloaded in EU ports each year12. Ireland’s reliance on the maritime
domain for its prosperity and a capable functioning economy is even greater, considering 99%
of trade by volume is via the sea and 95% by value13.
Strategic capabilities should focus on improving situational awareness, building awareness
and improving the ability of the State to identify and respond to threats and crisis’s (current
and future). It should match and, where possible, align with the EU goals of improving the
capacity to detect and understand malicious hybrid activities early and enhance the resilience
of critical infrastructure to withstand and recover from hybrid attacks14. Ireland offers little
or no deterrence to this type of warfare. The lack of a cyber-defence or intelligence cells both
civilian or militarily should be worrying.
Building situational awareness domestically and internationally is fundamental to defence.
Key to dealing with threats is early identification of their likelihood, effect and consequences
and plan accordingly. Asymmetric warfare now known as hybrid warfare is considered the
future of military engagement15 by some State Actors. Russia refined hybrid warfare in the
annexation of Crimea. It combined the military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, technological,
information and cyber capabilities, in order to achieve its tactical and strategic goals. This co-
ordination of technological, information and cyber capabilities has allegedly changed the
nature of warfare however, the major powers continue to invest heavily in hard power such
as warships, heavy armour and combat aircraft including cyber capabilities. Interestingly the
State does have a National Cyber Security Strategy since 201516. Ireland must be careful not
to presume that investment in technology can be at the expense of hard power.
Defence Attaché
The Department of Foreign Affairs has an excellent track record in diplomacy and the Irish
Defence Forces should capitalise on this by providing serving Officers of all three services of
Óglaigh na hÉireann as Defence Attaches17, as considered in the White Paper on Defence. The
Defence Attaché is a valuable tool in building international situational awareness by acquiring
knowledge and awareness of the host country's defence activities and requirements. This
includes knowledge of the country's military capabilities, operations, training and readiness,
12 Novo-Corti, Isabel, and Fernando Gonzalez-Laxe. 2009. “Maritime Transport and Trade: The Impact of European
Transport Policy. An Overview of Maritime Freight Transport Patterns.” European Research Studies 12, no. 1 (2009): 135.
13 Government of Ireland. 2012. Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth. Dublin: Government of Ireland, 15.
14 European Commission. 2018. Joint Report on the implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats.
Brussels: European Commission, 5-6. Accessed February 17, 2021.
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_the_implementation_of_the_joint_framework_on_countering_h
ybrid_threats_from_july_2017_to_june_2018.pdf
15 National Defence University Press. 2019. Countering Hybrid Warfare So What for the Future Joint Force? National
Defence University Press: Prism, Vol. 8. No.2pp 82-98. Accessed 19 March.
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism_8-2/PRISM_8-2_Monaghan.pdf
16 Government of Ireland. 2019. National Cyber Security Strategy 2019-2024. National Cyber Security Centre, Dublin:
Government of Ireland. Accessed February 21, 2021. https://www.ncsc.gov.ie/pdfs/National_Cyber_Security_Strategy.pdf
17 Government of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland. 29.
Page | 6 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
and equipment. International best military practice can be identified and applied to Óglaigh
na hÉireann.
The Irish Naval Service (INS)
The Irish Naval Service is the State’s principal seagoing agency and undertakes a broad range
of maritime security tasks18. As an Island Nation the maritime environment is Ireland’s first
line of defence against armed aggression and illegal activity that could threaten the State.
This requires ongoing surveillance and patrolling of the State’s coastal and territorial waters
including its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) which extends over 200 nautical miles into the
North Atlantic Ocean.
The Irish Naval Service operates primarily in a constabulary role19. It has a restricted capability
in a force protection/warfighting role as its current platforms have limited air surveillance, air
& surface defence and no sub-surface capability (limited sub surface multibeam search on 2
hulls, complemented by side scan sonar and AUV capability within the NS Diving Section).
In order to define the capabilities of the INS a Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) is necessary.
This should be an integral part of the National Security Strategy. An effective MSS will require
a thorough understanding of the value of the ocean economy in order to recognise maritime
risks Ireland faces, as well as having the capabilities to respond to maritime security incidents.
It should integrate with the EU Maritime Security Strategy20 and the INS should build working
relationships with our regional neighbours to strengthen capability. The IIMM submission in
2019 to the Department of the Taoiseach on a National Security Strategy, detailed its position
on the MSS21. Lacking a national maritime strategy, the EU MSS must be used as policy
guidance with respects to the requirements of maritime security and the threats that the EU
is facing in the maritime domain. The European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)
describes Maritime Security as:
“a state of affairs of the global maritime domain, in which international law and national
law are enforced, freedom of navigation is guaranteed and citizens, infrastructure,
transport, the environment and marine resources are protected.”22
The only way that Maritime Security can be enforced, guaranteed, and protected is by
ensuring that that military maritime component of the State has the capability to build and
establish domain awareness across Ireland’s area of responsibility and then has the capability
to provide that maritime presence, which means suitably empowered law enforcement
agents operating from suitably endowed and capable platforms – warships.
However, this hard power also provides a soft power projection capability in the
Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief (HADR) including non-combatant evacuation (NEO)
missions. Without investment in these hard power assets, Ireland will find it difficult to assist
as it did in Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean and other areas of national, regional and
18 Government of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland. 38.
19 Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press, 1990) pp. 237–40.
20 Council of Europe. 2014. EU Maritime Security Strategy. Brussels: Council of Europe.
21 Irish Institute of Master Mariners. Submission on National Security Strategy, 3. Cork: Irish Institute of Master Mariners
22 Council of Europe. 2014. EU Maritime Security Strategy, 3. Brussels: Council of Europe.
Page | 7 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
global interest. It gives the State the ability to form stronger and more durable international
ties considerably enhancing the soft power of Ireland.
Maritime Risks to the State
To outline the capabilities required by the INS the following are some of the risks to maritime
security, as highlighted in the EU MSS23:
a. Threat or use of force against Member States’ rights & jurisdictions over their maritime
zones
b. Threats to the security of European citizens and to economic interests at sea following
acts of external aggression including those related to maritime disputes, threats to
Member States’ sovereign rights or armed conflicts;
c. Trans-national organised crime, including Smuggling of Narcotics, weapons and human
trafficking.
o Self-Propelled Semi Submersibles (colloquially known as Narco-subs) are now a
risk24. Transnational organised criminal organisations are becoming more
innovative with the means by which they are making illegal shipments in the
maritime domain, the example being the interception of the SPSS off Spain in
201925. The use of navies to intercept narcotics at sea is essential and considered
more efficient, with the volume that can be interdicted in a singular seizure26. Once
ashore it is almost impossible to recover and gives huge financial power to gangs
significantly impacting domestic security.
d. Subsea security of subsea communications and offshore energy cables/pipelines
e. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing –
o Brexit will exacerbate this issue. Not only is there an increased risk of such IUU
fishing, but there will also be increased pressures on resources in Irish Waters
(EEZ) due to the displacement of EU fishing fleets from UK waters.
o IUU fishing is now considered a major threat by the EU and also by the United
States Coast Guard (USCG) , with global fisheries estimated to be worth $401
billion per annum and tens of billions of this revenue lost to IUU annually. It is also
considered that 93% of global fish stocks are now classed as exploited, over
exploited or significantly depleted27.
23 Council of Europe. 2014. EU Maritime Security Strategy, 7-8. Brussels: Council of Europe.
24 Forbes. 2020. Completely New Type of Narco Submarine Discovered in The Atlantic. 31 August. Accessed February 27,
2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/08/31/completely-new-type-of-narco-submarine-discovered-in-the-
atlantic/?sh=143aacb633be
25 Jones, Sam. 2019. Cocaine seized from 'narco-submarine' in Spain was likely headed for UK. 27 November. Accessed
February 21, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/27/police-in-spain-find-three-tonnes-of-cocaine-in-
narco-submarine
26 Germond, Basil. 2015. The Maritime Dimension of European Security. 1st. London: Palgrave McMillan.
27 Unites States Coast Guard. 2020. US Coast Guard Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook. US
Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement, Washington DC: USCG HQ, 3. Accessed March 2021, 07 .
https://www.mycg.uscg.mil/News/Article/2352693/coast-guard-announces-outlook-to-combat-illegal-unreported-and-
unregulated-fish/
Page | 8 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
f. The freedom of navigation and protection of international maritime trade (safe and
secure maritime routes) and the smooth and timely flow of maritime trade (supply chain
security). Such is the importance, that the EU has maintained an anti-piracy mission off
Somalia since 200828 and has also launched a pilot case for coordinated maritime
presence in the Gulf of Guinea to counter the increased piracy issues against maritime
trade in this region29.
g. Maritime Port Security, threats to ports and sea lines of communication by maritime
IED (mined) threats or threats of blockade.
o Irish ports have been subject to blockade by fishers throughout the past 30 years.
Such blockades can have a detrimental effect on the Irish economy, consider over
95% of trade to and from the island of Ireland is sea borne trade30.
o Paramilitary groups have also shown a willingness to blockade ports by the sinking
of vessels at harbour chokepoints, e.g., MV Nellie M (1981) and MV St Bedan
(1982)31 – both in Lough Foyle. It should be noted that Ireland’s three TEN-T Core32
(Tier One) ports have entrances that are easily blocked (Dublin, Cork & Shannon-
Foynes).
o One should be cognisant of recent use of maritime hybrid forces in the conflict in
Crimea and their ability to cut off the Kerch Strait. This action cut off the Ukrainian
Navy and the Ukrainian State’s use of the Azov Sea, thereby nullifying the
Ukrainian Navy in any potential conflict and constraining Ukrainian maritime
trade33.
28 EU Naval Force - Somalia. 2021. EU Naval Force - Somalia. Accessed March 07, 2021. https://eunavfor.eu/
29 Council of the European Union. 2021. Gulf of Guinea: Council conclusions launching the pilot case for the Coordinated
Maritime Presences concept. 25 January. Accessed March 07, 2021. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2021/01/25/gulf-of-guinea-council-conclusions-launching-the-pilot-case-for-the-coordinated-maritime-presences-
concept/
30 Government of Ireland. 2012. Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth. Dublin: Government of Ireland, 15.
31 https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/24/world/around-the-world-ira-guerrillas-destroy-a-british-cargo-ship.html#prof
Accessed 27 Feb 2021.
32 European Commission. 2021. Transport Modes - Ports. Accessed February 27, 2021.
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/ports/ports_en
33 Roth, Andrew. 2018. Kerch Strait confrontation: what happened and why does it matter? 27 November. Accessed
February 16, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/27/kerch-strait-confrontation-what-happened-
ukrainian-russia-crimea
Page | 9 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
Irish Naval Service Capability
The Naval Service must have a balanced fleet that is capable of dealing with the current and
future threats identified. It must have an ability to respond with hard power/military action
and the hulls must be future proofed to ensure that they can be suitable for future threats
and scenarios that may be encountered over the lifetime of a warship (which is normally
twenty to thirty years).
• 8 x Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) for North-East Atlantic Area of Operations –
necessary to provide a security presence in the North-Eastern Atlantic all year round.
This is as a minimum to allow rotation for maintenance, crew relief/rest-off in winter
and other operational deployments. The OPVs should be fitted with Autonomous
Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) with an all-
weather maritime surveillance system feeding into the Recognised Maritime Picture
(RMP). The provision of UAV capability will enhance the remote sensing capability of
the ships, providing more effective and efficient patrolling and increasing maritime
situational awareness. A-TechSyn in Shannon is one such company that can provide
such capability.
• 2 x Mine Counter Measure / Maritime Counter Improvised Explosive Device (MCM
M/CIED) vessels with associated diving support capability. The White Paper 2015
identifies the requirement of the replacement of L.E. ORLA & L.E. CIARA with such a
capability34. This capability is vital for the protection of Irish ports and our sea lines of
communication (SLOCs) to ensure that we, as an island nation, have a means to
counter any potential maritime threat to our trading economy35. A number of options
are available to the State in this regard.
o Procure second user Offshore Support / Light Construction Vessels. The RNZDF
recently procured a second user Offshore Light Construction Vessel, ex EDDA
FONN, which has been commissioned as RNZN MANAWANUI, at a cost of
NZD$103m, which equates to approximately €63m36.
o Procure new build hulls with remote capabilities (Unmanned Underwater
Vehicles & Unmanned Surface Vessels) to allow the Navy to develop their
counter mine / counter IED capability. Belgium and Netherlands have signed a
€1.756Bn contract for twelve vessels, which would equate to €146m per hull,
along with associated search equipment37.
o The Navy should be able to acquire synergies through involvement in such
PESCO projects as the MAS MCM Project, to standardise equipment, training
and flatten costs over the lifetime of such projects38.
34 Government of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland. 68.
35 Government of Ireland. 2012. Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth. Dublin: Government of Ireland, 15.
36 Naval Technology. 2019. HMNZS Manawanui Dive and Hydrographic Support Vessel. 09 July. Accessed February 16,
2021. https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/hmnzs-manawanui/
37 Naval News. 2019. Naval Group & ECA Group Win Belgian-Dutch MCM Vessel Competition. 15 March. Accessed February
16, 2021. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/03/naval-group-eca-group-win-belgian-dutch-mcm-vessel-
competition/
38 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). 2019. Maritime (Semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Counter Measures
(MAS MCM). Accessed February 16, 2021. https://pesco.europa.eu/project/maritime-semi-autonomous-systems-for-mine-
countermeasures/
Page | 10 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
• 2 x Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPVs) for East Coast Area of Operations – with Brexit and a
more benign AO these would be an efficient use of resources. The IPVs should have
Mine Counter Measure/Maritime Counter IED capability to secure East Coast Ports.
These will protect the ports and SLOCs by being able to counter such threats. The
Damen MRAV39 is a potential example. This subsea capability could be enhanced with
hydrographic equipment to enable surveying activity appropriate to the essential
interests of an island State and national coordination of Maritime Safety Information
(MSI) consistent with Ireland's international obligations through the World-wide
Navigational Warning Service40(WWNWS). As these vessels are unlikely to be
deployed overseas as they would be required to secure Tier 1 ports these hulls could
be fitted be equipped with an emergency tow capability (ETV) for commercial
shipping. Capabilities should include VTOL UAV fitted to feed the RMP, to enhance the
remote sensing capability of platforms and improve maritime domain awareness. The
acquisition of an inshore patrol capability would negate the requirement for the
Revenue Commissioners to procure new patrol cutters. As happens in other countries
such as New Zealand41, the inshore patrol vessels could embark Revenue personnel to
enforce their powers out to twelve nautical miles, while enhancing this capability with
the international powers of enforcement bestowed to warships42 on the High Seas
under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea43. This would provide better value for
money for the State.
• 2 X Multi-Role Vessels built to NATO standard for Force Protection, to include Air,
Surface & Sub-surface search capability, Electronic Warfare capability to counter cyber
threats and threats across the whole electro-magnetic spectrum. These vessels should
have a Command and Control (C2) for Fleet Headquarters (FHQ) and a lift capability
for HADR including NEO operations which could have been very useful in Lebanon in
200644 and Libya in 201145. This C2 and Lift ability will provide significant support to a
Land Component Commander for military operations, HADR and NEO both
domestically and internationally which is not currently available. A long-range
deployment capability with Replenishment at Sea (RAS) to better support the
European Union (EU) and Regional Partners in defence overseas deployments on UN
mandated CSDP operations (such as Operation Atalanta or Operation Irini). This
capability is badly needed if the INS is to provide protected mobility for naval units,
39
Damen. 2021. Multi-Role Auxiliary Vessel. 05 March. Accessed March 12,2021.
https://products.damen.com/en/ranges/multi-role-auxiliary-vessel
40 International Maritime Organisation. 2016. World Wide Navigational Warning Service. Accessed 14 March, 2021.
https://iho.int/mtg_docs/com_wg/CPRNW/WWNWS_Publications_&_Documents/English/MSC_Circ1364.pdf
41
New Zealand Defence Forces. 2018. Lake Class Inshore Patrol Vessels HMNZS Hawea – P3571. Accessed March 07, 2021.
https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/navy/capability/hmnzs-hawea-p3571-and-hmnzs-taupo-p3570/
42 United Nations. 1982. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. United Nations, Article 29, pg34-35.
43 United Nations. 1982. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. United Nations, Article 110, pg6
44 Irish Times, 2006. 100 Irish to be evacuated from danger zone today. Accessed 18 March, 2021.
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/100-irish-to-be-evacuated-from-danger-zone-today-1.1031408
45 Government of Ireland. 2011. Taoiseach praises the successful evacuation of Irish citizens from Libya. 03 March.
Accessed 12 March 2021. https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-release-
archive/2011/march/successful-evacuation-irish-citizens-from-libya/-taoiseach-praises-successful-evacuation-of-irish-
citizens-from-libya.php
Page | 11 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
merchant shipping and be able to defend subsea assets. Ireland will also be able to
meet its obligations as an EU nation and support its Regional Partners in maritime
missions.
• 1 x Fleet Support Vessel of 3000GRT capable of supporting the INS Fleet at sea – with
the increase in INS Fleet this class of vessel will be required to supply, repair and
maintain OPVs and MRVs on long range deployment in support of EU and Regional
partner operations. Will provide a continuous at sea capability which does yet exist in
Ireland.
• 1 x Emergency Towing Vessel stationed on the South Coast – this would be required
to provide emergency towing and search and rescue capability for shipping and to
prevent an ecological disaster on the Irish coastline. Should have subsea capability of
laying, servicing and recovery of subsea equipment including acoustic devices. Should
the IPV’s have this capability then there would be no requirement for this vessel.
• 1 x Sail Training Vessel (Asgard III) – required for training the next generation of
seafarers and can be used to promote the INS and the State without taking a warship
off patrol. The long-term benefit of sail training from a recruitment perspective should
not be underestimated. Also, there are potential diplomatic dividends to be harnessed
by a State-owned sail training capability46. Such a crew could be manned and run by a
NS crew along with 1st Line Reserve officers with specific maritime qualifications. The
previous State-owned Sail Training Vessel, Asgard II, was run by Coiste an Asgard and
funded through the Defence Vote, to an annual average cost of €800,000 per annum.
A replacement vessel was estimated to cost €16 million by the Atlantic Youth Trust in
201547.
• 6 x Motor Launches for Port Security Operations (Naval Service Reserve) – tasked with
providing maritime security and surveillance of the littorals & major ports of Ireland
and support the INS in a surge or in high tempo operations.
• Naval Service Reserve (NSR) – should be used to augment the INS not just during a
crisis. Should be expanded to 7 Units. There should be 6 NSR Port Units which will
require the formation of 2 new Units, one for Galway and one for Rosslare. The 7th
Unit which is Technical Support Unit should be significantly expanded but this is dealt
with under Staffing. The formation of these two units would significantly add to the
port security for these ports.
• Two Additional Naval Installations/Bases – one on the East Coast and West Coast of
Ireland. These Installations will not require the full logistics support of the Haulbowline
Naval Base, however, should be staffed and capable of providing substantial logistical
support for Naval vessels including dedicated Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL)
Storage, workshops and minor repair facility. It should also include overnight
accommodation for ship’s crew to rest-off in winter. One Installation should have a
Command, Control & Communication (C3) capability should the Haulbowline Naval
Base be compromised. The East Coast Installation should be considered for this
capability to build Navy resilience. Suggested locations would be Dun Laoghaire
Harbour which would be ideal for the East Coast and Galway for the West Coast. Dun
46 https://sailtraininginternational.org/life-onboard/value-sail-training/ Accessed 28 Feb 2021.
47 The Irish Times. 2015. Plan for all-island tall ship to replace Asgard II unveiled. Accessed 15 March 2021.
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/plan-for-all-island-tall-ship-to-replace-asgard-ii-unveiled-1.2291517
Page | 12 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
Laoghaire would require limited investment and could be operational within a year
given the right investment. Dun Laoghaire – Rathdown Council have an ongoing
consultation ongoing into their draft county development plan, which could provide
dividend by engagement with them at a policy level48. Galway would be a long-term
project requiring inter-departmental engagement with stakeholders such as Galway
Port49 and Galway Co. Council (substantial resources to be operational). The long-term
benefit of such additional bases will be an increased awareness of these communities
of the Navy and their operations, hence providing a new source of future recruitment.
It is also feasible that funding streams for such works (or considered expansions) may
be available at an EU level from such projects as the EU Action Plan on Military
Mobility50 or the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) Project on Military
Mobility51.
• Marine Radar Surveillance Network (MRSN) – one of the challenges in the maritime
domain is situational awareness. Information on the current situation in Irish waters
can be managed and from this an explanation generated, estimate built and a strategy
to achieve the best possible outcome. A MRSN managed by the INS will be another
important sensor feed into the RMP. Not all vessels carry Automatic Identification
Systems, or those that do may switch them off or as in the case of the derelict MV Alta
not functioning at all. The Irish Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) estimated
that the MV Alta could have been adrift in Irish Territorial waters for up to 43 days52.
Had there been an operational MRSN this derelict and others will be detected much
earlier. This MRSN can be achieved at relatively low cost by installing Marine Radar
Units at each Lighthouse on the coast of Ireland. The location of lighthouse around the
Irish coast makes the installation low cost as the infrastructure to support the
equipment already exits. These units can then transmit the data to the Naval
Operations Command Centre in Cork.
• Naval Aviation Squadron – This should consist of a squadron of land based maritime
surveillance heavy UAVs capable of providing all weather maritime surveillance 365
days of the year in the Irish AO. This would be complimentary to the Irish Air Corps
Maritime Reconnaissance missions. Costs for such capability have dropped
significantly in the past number of years and co-operation with EU agencies could
lower the cost significantly. Should be operated, maintained and under direct control
of Naval Operations Command. The use of UAVs (short, medium & long range)
provides key force enablers for the NS fleet by building and maintaining maritime
domain awareness over a much larger area, thus providing for a more effective
48 Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council. 2021. Draft Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown County Development Plan 2022-2028.
Accessed March 05, 2021. https://dlrcoco.citizenspace.com/planning/draftcdp2022-2028
49 https://theportofgalway.ie/port-of-galway-redevelopment/ Accessed 28 Feb 2021.
50 European Commission. 2018. Join Communication to the European Parliament and Council on the Action Plan on Military
Mobility. Brussels: EU Commission. Accessed March 05, 2021.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_2521
51 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). 2018. PESCO Project Military Mobility (MM). Accessed March 05, 2021.
https://pesco.europa.eu/project/military-mobility/
52 Marine Casualty Investigation Board. 2021. Investigation into an incident involving the grounding of the vessel ‘MV Alta’
at Ballyandreen Bay, Ballycotton, Co. Cork 16 February 2020. Marine Casualty Investigation Board, pg8.
Page | 13 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
patrolling and tasking of assets. The European Maritime Safety Agency are already
utilising such remote capabilities effectively throughout Europe53.
• Subsea acoustic network – a special naval unit should be formed with the laying,
servicing and monitoring of subsea activity in the Irish AO. The purpose is to monitor
and thereby protect subsea infrastructure such as communication cables, offshore
energy cables (wind/wave/kinetic energy recovery systems) and pipelines. There are
several solutions from active to passive detection assets which are available
commercially and full consideration should be given to partnerships with the EU and
private companies. Unmanned systems54 are just one of a number of low-cost
solutions for subsea monitoring and tracking of submarines. Sonardyne
International55 based in the United Kingdom provide a range of commercial solutions
from fixed to mobile sub surface detection of threats.
• Joint Maritime Security Centre (JMSC) - as an Island State Ireland needs better
situational awareness in the maritime domain to understand the threats which exist
in the Irish AO. The mission of the JMSC would be to co-ordinate maritime information
from multiple sources of maritime surveillance throughout the State. The Minister for
Defence can be briefed daily/weekly on the entirety of threats facing Ireland. Briefings
will give Government an appreciation of the threats the State faces and the value of
investment will become clear. The JMSC should be operated by the INS, continuously
assessing the threats and co-ordinating a multi-agency response when required. The
Irish Air Corps, public agencies such as the National Maritime Operations Centre (Irish
Coast Guard), Customs and Excise, An Garda Siochána, the Ports, the Irish Army (has
maritime assets), the Commissioners for Irish Lights and any other public organisation
with maritime information gathering capability should all have an operations desk on
site manned by their organisation. This co-operation of assets will create a very
comprehensive maritime picture while each agency remains in control of the
information it provides. This type of operation will build working relationships
between the organisations fostering co-operation and trust for a common purpose,
the security of the State. The United Kingdom has a JMSC56 and a working group
should be established to determine whether this model would be effective in Ireland.
• Maritime Cyber Security Unit (MCSU)– Cyber security crucial to maintaining a safe,
secure and resilient maritime transportation system which is critical to the economic
and national security of the State. Cameron Naron, Director Office of Maritime
Security, US Department of Transportation stated that sharing cyber security threats
and information would make maritime companies appreciate the threat to financial
and national security if they failed failing to invest adequately in cyber security57. The
53 European Maritime Safety Agency. 2021. Remote Piloted Aircraft Systems. 28 February, 2021.
http://www.emsa.europa.eu/rpas-operations.html Accessed 16 March 2021.
54 Defence News. 2020. US Navy should turn to unmanned systems to track and destroy submarines. Accessed 16 March,
2021. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/13/us-navy-should-turn-to-unmanned-systems-to-
track-and-destroy-submarines/
55 Sonardyne International. 2021. Who we are. Accessed 12 March, 2021. https://www.sonardyne.com/who-are-we/
56 Government of the United Kingdom. 2021. Joint Maritime Security Centre. Accessed 16 March, 2021.
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/joint-maritime-security-centre
57 Atlantic Council. 2020. Trouble Underway: Seven Perspectives on maritime cybersecurity. Accessed 16 March, 2021.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/trouble-underway-seven-perspectives-on-maritime-cybersecurity/
Page | 14 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
MSCU would be crucial in identifying potential Hybrid warfare threats and
disseminating this information to protect against cyber attacks on ports, ships agents
and shipping.
Irish Merchant Marine
We have no doubt that this section will be questioned as to where it fits in the Commission
for the Defence Forces. Ireland is an island nation heavily dependent on commercial shipping
and the INS is tasked with maintaining the sea lines of communication (SLOC). A regional
conflict will threaten commercial shipping and foreign seafarers may be unwilling to risk their
lives to transport essential supplies to Ireland. Yet little is being done to retain Irish merchant
mariners in the State. Small changes to the Irish tax system will encourage them to continue
their career at sea, leading to important maritime experience, and will encourage them to
return to live in Ireland. They will take up jobs within the commercial maritime sector ashore
in Ireland continuing an efficient port ship interface necessary for the continued economic
security of the State. These personnel can be tasked with manning merchant vessels to
support the State in a crisis.
To enable this, a separate budget should be under the control of Flag Officer Commanding
Naval Service (FOCNS) to encourage qualified Irish seafarers to crew Irish merchant ships in a
crisis. This may be through a Merchant Marine Reserve list with suitable inducements to
register.
Page | 15 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
Army
Requires a National Security Strategy to provide the budget necessary to align training,
procurement and equipment to meet the tasks set.
• Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) - Requires significant investment to provide
protected mobility for army units in the field and strategic State assets including VIP
security. It should be integrated into the Air Corps Air Defence network. The air
superiority of friendly nations is no longer guaranteed with the era of great power
competition returning. This will require ground-based radar systems with long range
capability, anti-aircraft artillery supported by medium to high level missile systems.
• Fit suppressors on personal weapons of the Óglaigh na hÉireann – will provide tactical
advantage in the battlefield through reducing sound profile and better
communication58. This will also provide health benefits.
• Army Ranger Wing (ARW) – Double or treble the strength as this unit is tasked with
direct action and therefore requires strength in depth to meet the challenges in the
next decade. The White Paper of 201559 recommended that it be doubled, however,
there is no confirmation this has occurred60. While numbers have never been released
it is believed to be less than 100. It should have air mobile vehicles and have
equipment suitable for transport by strategic heavy lift aircraft for rapid deployment
worldwide at short notice.
• Army Aviation Squadron – This should consist of a squadron mix of light, medium and
heavy UAVs capable of supporting intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and
reconnaissance (ISTAR) on the battlefield and the Irish Border. Such capability should
be deployable overseas and capable of deploying battlefield ordnance. ISTAR
capability should be all-weather 365 days of the year in the Irish AO with emphasis on
the Irish Border. This would be complimentary to the Air Corps support and not
replace it. Costs for such capability have dropped significantly in the past number of
years and co-operation with EU agencies could lower the cost significantly. Should be
operated, maintained and under direct control of Army Command.
• Army Reserve (AR) – be used to augment the Army not just during a crisis as is
currently the case. Focus should be on Combat Support Units, such as artillery etc. A
Technical Support Unit should be formed and staffed with specialist skills as required
by Army Command. Pay and conditions including overseas deployment are dealt with
in Staffing.
• Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) – a large part of the work is currently Aid to the
Civil Power (ATCP). Due to the high number of call outs consideration should be given
to forming and training a Garda Síochána EOD to release Army EOD units for overseas
duties.
58 Military.com. 2020. 29 December. The Marine Corps Has Started Fielding 30,000 Rifle Suppressors to Combat Units.
Accessed 02 March, 2021. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/12/29/marine-corps-has-started-fielding-30000-
rifle-suppressors-combat-units.html
59 Government of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland.
60 Department of Defence. 2021. White Paper Implementation Programme. Dublin: Government of Ireland.
Page | 16 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
Irish Air Corps
Should be renamed the Irish Air Force or Air Force of Ireland. The National Security Strategy
should have an Aviation Security Strategy outlining the roles that the Air Corps be tasked with.
• Air Defence Command and Control Centre – the Air Corps should be tasked with the
Air Defence of the State. It should be capable of co-ordinating Air Corps, Army and
Naval Air Defence assets into a combined air defence network under Joint Forces
Command.
• 1 x Jet Fighter Squadron – to provide fast air defence capability to the State
• 1 x Jet Fighter/Bomber Squadron – to provide air support to ground troops with a
fighter capability
• 2 x Air-to-Air Refuelling aircraft – to extend fighter squadron range and capability for
extended patrols and overseas deployment
• 2 x Strategic Heavy Lift Aircraft – multiple roles and would be first responders to any
crisis regionally or globally including HADR and NEO. Capability should include
deployment of the ARW, vehicles and equipment worldwide at short notice. Should
have the capability to carry heavy lift helicopters. Additional uses would be the
evacuation large number of Irish civilians at short notice from threat to life situations
abroad. In 2011 the security situation in Libya required the evacuation of Irish citizens
with some controversary as to how it was handled. The situation could easily have
spiralled out of control which would have led to a more critical review of what assets
were available to secure the safety of Irish citizens abroad (The Irish Independent,
2011).
• 2 x Strategic Heavy lift helicopters – multiple roles including support of the ARW and
Army units on deployment overseas. Should be capable of transport by strategic heavy
lift aircraft.
• Irish Air Corps UAV Squadron – this should consist of a squadron UAVs capable of
providing all mission roles of the Air Corps including air defence and SAR in the Irish
AO. This would be complimentary to the Air Corps crewed missions. Costs for such
capability have dropped significantly in the past number of years and co-operation
with EU agencies could lower the cost significantly. Should be operated maintained
and under direct control of Air Corps.
• Air Corps Search and Rescue Squadron – the search and rescue role should be
returned to the Air Corps. This unit should be composed of Fixed and Rotary wing
assets.
• Air Corps Reserve (ACR) – should be formed and used to augment the Air Corps. Focus
should be on attracting specialist skills sets from civilian aviation sector. Targeted
recruitment for specific skill sets.
• Air Corps Force Infantry Protection Unit – Platoon plus of Infantry trained Air Corps
service personnel who will be responsible for force protection of Casement
Aerodrome, Baldonnel, and air assets overseas on deployment.
Page | 17 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
Finance
If Óglaigh na hÉireann is to provide the protection the State needs it will need significant
investment. This is affordable with a modest increase in the defence budget. Merchant
vessels are large capital investments and are financed. The Irish Maritime Development Office
promotes Ireland as a base in which to offer Ship Finance61. One solution would be to finance
the vessels and equipment over a 20-year period. Properly managed the cost to the State to
rebuild the INS as outlined will add approx. €50 million per annum to the Defence Vote. The
IIMM are not finance experts and made general assumptions as an example of an affordable
cost. The figure of €50 million per annum was arrived at using an estimate of €900 million
over 20 years and was determined with an allowance for inflation and costs of financing
included. The EU Defence Fund62 can provide the finance necessary to ensure the
procurement cost is kept low.
Domestic Defence Industry
Smart investment would be to develop and expand the domestic defence industry. In 2018,
Irish military exports were over €37 million63. An enhanced domestic defence industry will
ensure this investment remains in the State boosting local economies through employment
and tax receipts to the exchequer. One of the largest capital expenditures to the Defence Vote
would be new vessels. Consideration should be given to building these vessels in Ireland
ensuring the majority of capital expenditure remains in Ireland. While the State has no ship
building capability it still retains the infrastructure in Cork Dockyard Limited which has a ship
repair facility. One possible solution is to use international companies which provide turnkey
projects. They provide the technical expertise to design and build vessels in the host country
and support the project to completion. One such company is Damen Technical Cooperation64
which has a proven track record internationally. Additionally, the Naval Basin in Haulbowline
could be converted to a dry dock facility and roofed to provide the INS with capability to dry
dock its vessels and conduct ship repair all year round. It would also add security for the INS
fleet as the recent COVID-19 pandemic impacted the ability of manufacturers contactors from
attending INS vessels. The IIMM believes a feasibility study was conducted some years on this
project but was not progressed on cost grounds. The IIMM were unable to locate a copy of
this document and therefore cannot reference it.
61 Irish Maritime Development Office. 2015. Ship Finance Opportunities for International Shipping. Dublin. Government of
Ireland.
62 European Commission. 2021. European Defence Fund. Accessed 16 March, 2021.
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/defence/european-defence-fund_en
63 The Irish Times. 2019. Irish military exports now worth more than €37m. Accessed 18 March, 2021.
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/manufacturing/irish-military-exports-now-worth-more-than-37m-1.3993361
64 Damen International. 2021. Damen Technical Cooperation. Accessed 18 March, 2021.
Page | 18 19th of March 2021Irish Institute Commission on Defence Forces
of Master Mariners
Structure
The Chief of Staff (CoS) should be appointed the Accounting Officer for the Defence
Vote/Budget. This will transfer responsibility for the day-to-day management of expenditure
of the Defence Vote leading to a timely and more effective use of limited resources. The CoS
will be required to answer for the performance of the Defence Forces to the Dáil and to the
Public Accounts Committee. The CoS will deliver agreed outcomes as safely, efficiently,
sustainably and economically as possible. S/he will also be required to ensure that the
Defence Forces stays within set financial limits. To assist the CoS in budget management, the
Heads of Military Commands should be given budgetary control subject to oversight by CoS.
The Chief of Staff should be redesignated as the Chief Head of Defence, along with the
requisite legal authority, command, control & governance over Óglaigh na hÉireann. The
command-and-control structures should be reviewed in line with best practice in other
European militaries (with the NATO Structures being considered the ‘ISO of the military
world’65. As such, Óglaigh na hÉireann should have a Command-and-Control structure and a
Joint Forces Command in line with the NATO standard international norms. Stemming from
this should be a requirement for service parity between the Land, Air and Maritime
Component Commanders, common among European nations (aligned and non-aligned).
Military Capability becomes hard power when the elements of military force are generated
and combined by the Military Commands to prosecute the conduct of an operation or task.
These Commands generate the military force elements to the required level of readiness to
deploy when needed. These are tasked and controlled by the Joint Forces Command.
- Chief Head of Defence
- Vice Chief Head of Defence
- Joint Forces Command (JFC)
- Chief Head of Navy and Maritime Component Commander
- Chief Head of Air Force and Air Component Commander
- Chief Head of Army and Land Component Commander
- Head of Cyber Command
Navy Command
• The Irish Naval Service should be renamed the Irish Navy.
• Flag Officer Commanding Naval Service (FOCNS) should have full budgetary control.
• As Maritime Component Commander should have parity with the Land and Air
Component Commanders.
• A Navy aviation arm for maritime security and surveillance. See capability for a more
detailed description of requirements.
65 Government of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland, 65.
Page | 19 19th of March 2021You can also read
