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CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE
The Role of Misperception in Decisions to Go to War: A Case Study on the First
Gulf War
A graduate project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science
By
Humoud Aladwani
December, 2020The graduate project of Humoud Aladwani is approved:
_________________________________________ ______________
Dr. Tyler Hughes Date
_________________________________________ ______________
Dr. Jennifer De Maio Date
_________________________________________ ______________
Dr. Keiko Hirata, Chair Date
California State University, Northridge
iiAcknowledgement
I am grateful to my committee members for assisting me throughout this journey. Special
thanks to Professor Keiko Hirata for helping me with my project and for believing in my
potential as a graduate student. I really appreciate your patience and time.
Also, thanks to Professor Jennifer DeMaio for participating in my committee and
introducing the theory of perception and misperception. Also, thanks to Professor Tyler
Hughes for participating with enthusiasm in my committee. Thank you all for joining my
committee!
Last and least, my faith helped me achieve the impossible as started writing this project in May,
2020. I would like also to thank my family for supporting me throughout this journey. Thanks
to Aunt Khlood Doshan Al Shammari for helping me and understanding my goals. Also, Thanks
to my cousin Mubarak Shaab Al Shammari who throughout the six-year period helped and
motivated me toward success. Thank you all!
iiiTable of Contents
Signatures ii
Acknowledgement iii
Abstract v
Introduction 1
Literature Review 3
Methodology 12
A Case Study of Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait 13
Discussion 25
Conclusion 28
Bibliography 30
ivAbstract
The Role of Misperception in Decisions to go to War: A Case Study on the First
Gulf War
By
Humoud Aladwani
Master of Arts in Political Science
This paper examines the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It asks what led Iraq to invade
Kuwait. The paper first compares four major approaches in International Relations and Foreign
Policy Analysis, namely Realism, the bureaucratic politics model, rational choice theory, and
psychological perspectives. The paper argues that the psychological perspectives best explain
Iraq’s decision to invade Kuwait.
vThis paper highlights the major role of human psychology in foreign policymaking. The
paper focuses on how an individual's cognitive factors shape foreign policy decisions.
Through a process-tracing method to analyze the cause and effect relationship of the Iraqi
invasion, the paper argues that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s biases and misperceptions
affected his decision to invade Kuwait. The paper further argues that his personal
characteristics, such as narcissism and paranoia in particular, and his past experiences shaped
his biased beliefs and prevented him from predicting a possible war with the United States
and its coalition allies.
vi. Introduction
For centuries, scholars have sought to understand the main causes of War. Wars are
costly and risky, so why do states go to war rather than settling disputes through peaceful
matter? What motivates states to attack another state when the prospect of success appears
remote?
Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and caused an uproar throughout the world. The
Iraqi invasion infringed on the sovereignty of Kuwait and violated international law. In 1990,
Iraq had just emerged from a debilitating war with Iran that had lasted eight years. The war left
Iraq worse off than when it started, causing economic turmoil and tremendous loss of life.
Why did Iraq start another costly war shortly after the previous one had ended? What were the
Iraqi motivations for starting a war with Kuwait? The Iraq invasion was an important historic
event that led to the U.S-led Operation Desert Storm against Iraq, also known as the First Gulf
War (January - February 1991). The coalition consisted of troops from 35 allies and involved
the largest deployment of U.S troops since the Vietnam War (Miller 1998). Furthermore, the
Iraqi invasion and the subsequent Gulf War was an important precursor to the U.S. invasion of
Iraq in 2003, which led to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
marked a significant turning point in international politics and helped to solidify a U.S.
dominated unipolar world system in the post-Cold War era.
1This study examines why Iraq invaded Kuwait. It analyzes different theoretical approaches
in International Relations., including realism, the bureaucratic politics model, rational-choice
theory, and psychological perspectives.
The study argues that the psychological perspectives account best for the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait. Furthermore, it contends that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein misperceived U.S.
intentions on Iraq, and miscalculated the outcome of the invasion of Kuwait.
Saddam Hussein’s miscalculation of the international response was costly. Iraq was
defeated decidedly by the U.S-led coalition forces and forced to withdraw its troops from Kuwait
on February 24, 1991. Through the use of case study and close reading of primary and secondary
sources, this study argues that Saddam Hussain’s personality and biases contributed to his
miscalculation of the U.S. response to the invasion.
This paper first analyzes four competing approaches in International Relations: Realism,
the bureaucratic politics model, rational-choice theory, and psychological perspectives. The
paper then discusses the methodology of the study, followed by a case-study analysis. This
section examines major events in Iraq from the 1950s through the 1980s as well as the process
that led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Finally, the paper analyzes how Saddam's
personality traits and biases affected Iraq’s war decision.
2Literature Review
International Relations (IR) scholars use various perspectives to examine state behavior.
Some IR scholars analyze how structural forces shape state behavior. Others focus on actors at
the organizational or individual level and examine how their interests, goals, or beliefs affect
state behavior.
This paper analyzes four major approaches in IR and discusses which one best explains the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. These approaches are realism, the bureaucratic politics model,
rational choice theory, and psychological perspectives. Realism focuses on how international
structural forces shape state behavior. The bureaucratic politics model, rational choice theory, and
psychological perspectives fall in the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in IR. FPA
scholarship examines how domestic interests are reflected in state behavior at the international level.
FPA focuses on specific actors and analyzes the process, strategies, and outcomes of foreign policy
decision-making (Hudson 2013).
Realism
Realism is one of the main system-level theories in International Relations.
Realism assumes that states pursue power by practicing realpolitik. Realist ideas trace back to
the writings of historical scholars, such as Thucydides (Peloponnesian War), and Renaissance
philosopher’s such as Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince) and Thomas Hobbs
(Leviathan). Realism emerged in the 20th century as a critique of idealism, which assumes
that states seek to cooperate through international institutions to maintain peace and stability.
3Realism has several key assumptions. First, realism assumes that the international
system is anarchic without central authority above sovereign states. Realism assumes that due
to anarchy, states operate in a self-help system. Second, realism is state-centric and regards
states as the primary actors in international politics (Kauppi and Viotti 2020).
Third, realism regards states as unitary actors. It does not pay attention to domestic actors
or domestic forces affecting foreign policy. Instead, realism assumes that systemic factors
contribute to state behavior. Fourth, in the realist view, states are rational-actors who pursue
their relative self-interests. Fifth, Realism assumes the ultimate goal of each state is to ensure
security (Kauppi and Viotti 2020).
Sixth, Realism argues that if a state becomes powerful and threatens other states, those
states usually form a balancing coalition to counter the rising power (Nobel 1995). Hanish
(2013) applies Realism to his analysis of the Iraq-Kuwait war and argues that Iraq invaded
Kuwait to gain power by amassing resources in the country. Iraq had accumulated a debt of
$250 billion during the Iraq-Iran war and had been on the brink of economic collapse. The
neighboring Gulf States supported Iraq during the war, but after the war ended, they
demanded that Iraq repay its debt to them. Iraq faced great difficulties in repaying those debts.
Realism stresses that states seek power to survive (Hanish 2013).
From the Realist perspective, Iraq decided to invade Kuwait to survive. Iraq accused
Kuwait of deliberately increasing its oil production to 1.5 million barrels a day in 1989 to
destroy Iraq’s economy (Nasrawai 1990). From a realist lens, the main purpose of the invasion
was to annex the entire state of Kuwait. Iraq also brought up its old claim that Kuwait was an
integral part of Iraq. In the Gulf States’ views, Iraq was a revisionist state in the Arab world,
and other states in the Gulf region such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
4Kuwait, and Bahrain wanted to contain the rising influence of Iraq, thus balancing power
against it (Hanish 2013).
The major flaw of Realism is that it fails to address the internal characteristics or
attributes of states and pays little or no attention to domestic actors who make foreign policy
decisions. Domestic politics can play an important role in shaping the states' national interests
and behavior. However, Realism treats domestic politics as a black box and ignores the role
that domestic actors play in the process of decision-making. In other words, Realism focuses
primarily on Waltz’s (1959) “third image” (international system) and ignores his “second
image (domestic politics, structure or characteristics) and “first image” (individuals; Waltz
2001).
Bureaucratic Politics Model
As explained by Allison and Halperin (1972), the bureaucratic politics approach assumes
that major bureaucratic actors shape foreign policy. From this perspective, policy outcomes derive
from negotiations or bargaining among government officials representing their own organizations.
These actors have different preferences, interests, and goals and pursue policies that best serve
their organizational interests rather than national interests (e.g. “where you stand depends on
where you sit”). The bargaining process is not dominated by one bureaucratic unit and is subject
to pulling and hauling by bureaucratic actors. It is likely to result in suboptimal outcomes that do
not meet the goals of any of those involved in the policymaking process.
5In his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison (1969) compares three theoretical
perspectives: The Rational Policy Model (Model I), the Organizational Process Model
(Model II), and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III). The Rational Policy Model
assumes that the state is unitary and that it makes rational policy decisions through cost-benefit
analysis (Allison 1969). The Organizational Process Model stresses that organizations operate
based on their Standard Operating Procedures [SOPs] rather than rational calculations of costs
and benefits (Allison 1969). According to this model, policies are directed by the SOPs, and
decision-makers have few options for independent actions.
Allison (1969) argues that the Bureaucratic Politics Model best applies to the Cuban
Missile Crisis. He demonstrates that during the crisis, decisions-makers pursued policy options
that they thought would benefit the organizations they represented. They prioritized their
organizational interests over national interests in the policymaking process.
The bureaucratic politics approach emphasizes that the state is not unitary and that
bureaucratic actors compete for influence in foreign policy. The bureaucratic politics approach
also illustrates that foreign policy is not necessarily an outcome of rational decision-making.
However, this approach has some weaknesses. It overemphasizes organizational interests
and goals and fails to address individual decision-makers personality, traits, and interpersonal skills.
In addition, this approach does not apply to autocratic states such as Iraq, where a single leader,
Saddam Hussein, ruled the state with terror from the 1970s through the early 2000s.
As pointed out by Blaydes (2018), Saddam Hussein consolidated his power by purging
his political opponents in the 1970s and 1980s. No bureaucratic agencies or individuals were
able to openly question the policies that he made. He held several key positions in Iraqi politics:
He was President, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, and General Secretary of
the Ba’ath Party in the 1970s through 1990s (Blaydes 2018).
6Rational Choice Theory
When we analyze foreign policy in autocracies such as Iraq, it is important to focus on
individual leaders who have absolute power over policy decisions. How do they make foreign
policy decisions? Rational choice theory, which originated in the writing of Cesare Beccaria in
the 19th century, focuses on individuals' choices or preferences, which are also known as
methodological individualism (Wright 2009).
Rational choice theory assumes that individuals use logic to determine an outcome.
Individuals set goals, analyze the various choices available to them, rank these choices from most
preferred to least preferred, and select the optimal choice that will help them achieve their goals.
Each possible outcome is measured in terms of utility or payoffs, and individuals choose the choice
that results in the largest payoff. According to the rational choice approach, individual behavior is
goal-oriented or purposeful, and individuals make rational utility-maximizing decisions (Redd and
Mintz 2013).
Rational choice theory is parsimonious and is often used to analyze decision-making in
foreign policy. It analyzes individuals’ preferences, strategies, and goals. However, it does not
address the cognitive aspects of decision-making. For example, it cannot explain individuals'
biases or emotions that affect their decisions (Boudon 2013). Also, the rational-choice approach
ignores individuals' tendency to resort to analogical reasoning. Rather than solely using current
information that is available to them, individuals often refer to historical analogies to make
choices. However, individuals may make inaccurate analogies and oversimplify their individual
situations. Analogical reasoning can result in misperceptions and misjudgments (Redd and Mintz
2013).
7Psychological Perspectives
Another approach to decision-making is a psychological approach that examines how
decision-making is influenced by cognitive factors such as beliefs, perceptions, and emotions.
To better understand psychological perspectives, it is important to define key concepts.
Belief is an internalized state of mind that has a strong foundation in the decision
maker’s mind and motivates different behaviors (Jervis 2017). Belief is hard to change unless
there is collusion or new evidence that can create what is known as cognitive dissonance (Jervis
1976). Perception is an interpretive process in the form of seeing and observing (Jervis 1976).
Perception is one's understanding of a given phenomenon and is influenced by previous
information. One may perceive others' behavior, form images of them, and make judgments
about their intentions. Nevertheless, these images and judgments can be inaccurate. In Jervis's
view, misperception takes place when it diverges from reality. Emotion is a mental mood that
reflects happiness, sadness, anger, and fear. Jervis (1976) argues that emotions can interfere
with one's ability to accurately perceive others' intentions.
These cognitive factors have a significant impact on decision-makers. For instance, if
decision-makers have to solve an issue that requires an immediate response, perception, belief,
or emotion could be mobilized to address the issue they face. Decision-makers might not be able
to rationally calculate the costs and benefits of the various options available to them in a limited
time period.
8Jervis (1976) analyzes how perception and misperception influence foreign policy
decisions. He argues that individuals tend to avoid cognitive dissonance when they process
incoming information. They attempt to make it consistent with their pre-existing beliefs and
images. They attend to evidence that supports their beliefs and neglect or discount information
that contradicts their beliefs. Jervis (1976) calls this tendency confirmation bias.
Policymakers may reinforce their pre-existing beliefs and images of other actors. Also,
they may fail to calculate the costs of the option they have chosen and may not realize that other
options might be more effective than the one they chose (Jervis 1976).
Jervis (1976) also argues that what policymakers learn from historical events affects how
they interpret incoming information. In Jervis’s view, policymakers make similar decisions in
different situations at different times and repeat their behavior. They make historical analogies
by seeing similarities between the current event and previous ones. Historical analogies appeal
to policymakers because they provide cognitive and analytical shortcuts. However, they may
reinforce policymakers’ pre-existing beliefs and biases and lead to perceptual errors. They may
fail to notice important differences between present and past events.
In addition to the cognitive factors that Jervis (1976) points out, decision-makers’ personal
characteristics affect their decisions. Personality disorders include narcissism and paranoia.
Narcissism means that individuals are preoccupied with themselves. Narcissistic leaders are
egocentric, have excessive pride, repeatedly take credit only for themselves, and crave attention
and admiration from others. They lack empathy toward others and are often cruel and
exploitative, taking advantage of others to achieve their own goals. Narcissism is characterized
by traits of self-importance, lack of empathy, and lust for power (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006).
Paranoia is another personality disorder. Paranoia is a pattern of thinking that puts
individuals in a doubtful box of thoughts and makes them overly suspicious of others. Paranoia
9leads to irrational thoughts and delusions. Individuals with paranoia suspect, without evidence,
that others are harming them. They tend to predict negative outcomes or events (Kirmayer
1983).
Individuals who possess paranoia can be destructive. Leaders with a paranoia orientation
tend to be highly anxious and as a result, they may make irrational decisions. According to
Hudson (2013), President Richard Nixon abused alcohol and prescription drugs to cope with his
depression and mood swings. His anxiety was aggravated by substance abuse. Critics argue that
his paranoia led him to commit crimes, most notably his involvement in the Watergate scandal,
which cost him his presidency (Hudson 2013).
Narcissism and paranoia interfere with an actor's ability to think rationally and perceive
the world accurately. Narcissistic individuals tend to have idealized self-images, have
difficulties accepting criticism, and overestimate their intellectual abilities and leadership skills,
thereby failing to see the shortcomings of their decisions. They see only what they want to see,
that is, things that help them maintain their self-esteem and self-importance. They may
control or intimidate subordinates who criticize them or bring unpleasant information to them.
In addition, they often ignore the feelings and the needs of others and they do not understand
other people's pain (Grijalva and Harms 2014).
Malignant narcissist leaders may pursue extremely harmful policies such as mass murders.
Surrounded by obedient subordinates who do not criticize them, these leaders reconstruct their
realities and justify their actions. Notable examples of malignant leaders are Adolf Hitler, Joseph
Stalin, Benito Mussolini, Nicolae Ceaușescu, and Saddam Hussain (Post 1991).
10Paranoia also compromises cognition. Individuals with paranoia create false realities.
They see the world as a place where they are surrounded by enemies who want to hurt them.
They may be preoccupied with others’ hidden motives. They may justify the use of violence to
protect themselves from perceived enemies.
In summary, psychological perspectives focus on policymakers’ mental frameworks and
demonstrate how cognitive factors constrain their rationality. These perspectives emphasize that
policymakers’ beliefs and emotions filter incoming information and reinforce pre-existing
stereotypes, thus affecting how policymakers perceive or misperceive the world.
Policymakers may also resort to historical reasoning in making decisions, but by doing
so, they may overemphasize similarities and underestimate significant differences between past
and present situations. These cognitive biases are further amplified by policymakers’ particular
personal characteristics such as narcissism and paranoia.
The psychological perspectives also demonstrate that individual leaders play a
significant role in foreign policymaking. It is particularly pertinent to use these perspectives to
examine the foreign policy of an autocratic regime such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Iraq under
Saddam was a dictatorship in which all political dissent was suppressed and opponents were
eliminated through purges and massacres (Malik 1994).
11Methodology
This study uses a single case study approach to analyze the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990. Specifically, it adopts a process-tracing approach to examine the decision-making
process of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The purpose of the study is to examine the cause-effect
relationships of the invasion. The approach uses detailed information about the process of an event
and allows causal inferences to be drawn. The major advantage of process-tracing is that it helps us
gain an in-depth understanding of how an event unfolds over time (Collier 2011).
This study examines two time periods of Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq. The first period
(1950s-1980s) tracks the rise of Saddam and his policies. The second period (1989-1990) focuses
on a series of events that led to the Iraqi invasion. By tracing major events and Saddam’s words
and actions, the study examines his beliefs and misperceptions and analyzes the link between
these cognitive factors and his decision to invade Kuwait.
This study uses primary and secondary sources including UN documents on Security
Council resolutions, books, journal articles, news reports, and biographies of Saddam Hussain.
12Case Study of the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
This section of the paper examines Saddam Hussain's rise to power and the process that
led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The first part of this section examines major political
events from the 1950s through the 1980s, including the purge of the Ba'th party members in
1979, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, and the Anfal massacre of the Kurds in northern Iraq in
1988. The second part of the section focuses on the process that led Iraq to invade Kuwait. It
covers major events in 1989-1990, such as Saddam's meeting with the U.S.
Ambassador April Glaspie, and the Iraq-Kuwait meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia at the end of
July 1990. The events from the 1950s through the 1980s illustrate Saddam’s narcissistic
characteristics. The events in 1989-1990 demonstrate how his personal characteristics impacted
his thought process and decision-making.
Before the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
Saddam Hussein entered politics through his uncle, Khairallah Talfah, a member of
the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. Khairallah, a Pan-Arab nationalist, raised Saddam and instilled PanArab
nationalism and the Ba'athist ideology in the young Saddam. After joining the party in 1958,
Saddam quickly climbed the ranks among party members and became one of the party's
prominent leaders (Post 1991). In 1959, Saddam participated in a failed attempt to assassinate
the Iraqi dictator Abdul Kareem Kasim, who tried to persecute the Ba'th Party. Saddam fled
Iraq and was exiled in Egypt until 1963 when the Ba'th Party overthrew the Kassim's regime.
In 1968, the Ba'athists seized power in Iraq and installed Saddam’s cousin Ahmad Al-Baker as
President and Saddam as Vice President. In 1979, Saddam assumed the presidency after
allegedly forcing President Al-Baker to resign. Saddam claimed that Al-Baker suffered a heart
attack (Langewiesche 2017).
13Shortly after declaring the presidency, Saddam purged 50-60 Ba’athists. He convened
a conference for the Revolutionary Command Council where a senior Ba’ath party official
named Muhi Hussain was brought in and confessed his role in plotting to overthrow Saddam’s
new government. Under pressure from Saddam, Hussain named his co-conspirators one by
one. Then, each identified individual was escorted by soldiers and immediately tortured and
executed. The purge demonstrated Saddam’s brutality and willingness to use force against his
perceived enemies. The purge was intended to eliminate any political rivals seen as posing a
threat to Saddam’s rule (Yusuf 2020).
Outside the Ba’ath Party, Saddam’s perceived enemies included Iran and its allies,
Iraqi-Kurdish rebels, and Shia militias in Iraq. The Shah of Iran backed Kurdish insurgents in
Iraqi Kurdistan (and the United States under the Nixon administration provided covert military
assistance to the insurgents). The Kurdish insurgency during the 1970s cost 60,000 Iraqi
casualties, prompting the Iraqi government to seek out a solution to stop the violence (Post
1991). Saddam as Vice President signed an accord with the Shah of Iran during an
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meeting in Algiers in 1975, giving
Iran control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, including Zain Qaws and Saif Saad, in exchange
for an end to Iran’s support for the Iraqi Kurdish rebels. The accord contained the Kurdish
insurgency for several years (Simons 2004).
However, when Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Iran in 1979, paving a way for a
revolution in the country, Saddam feared the return of the Kurdish insurgencies as well as the
increased influence of Iran within Iraq. Khomeini’s rise deteriorated Iraq-Iran relations.
Khomeini backed insurgency activities against Saddam’s regime by Al-Dawaa, a Shia group in
Iraq, (Mitchell 1991). Because of the group’s anti-government activities, Saddam ordered
massive deportation of the Shia population in Iraq, prompting Al-Dawaa to attempt to
14assassinate Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in April 1980. Saddam reacted to the plot by
executing an Iraqi Shia cleric who had a strong tie with the Iranian government. Infuriated,
Khomeini demanded that Saddam be overthrown from power (Malik 1994).
In September 1980, Saddam suddenly abrogated the 1975 Algiers accord with Iran.
Immediately afterward, his army invaded Iran to gain control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway
and take over the oil-rich province of Khasatan. Saddam also hoped to contain the influence of
radicalized Shias in Iraq and Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, but the war prolonged in a
stalemate for eight years. The war had a significant impact on Iraq's economy and caused
casualties of 300, 000 Iraqi soldiers (Simons 2004).
When the war ended in 1988, Saddam emerged as the winner of the war, forcing
Khomeini to sign UN Resolution 598 for a ceasefire (S/RES/598 1987). However, fearing that
the Kurdish army and Iranian soldiers might violate the UN resolution, Saddam decided to
keep 500, 000 soldiers in the disputed border region to keep the Iranian hostility in check (Post
1991).
During the Iran-Iraq War, the United States restored diplomatic relations with Iraq to
stop the expansion of the Iranian revolution in the Persian Gulf region. During the war, the
U.S. removed Iraq from its terrorist list. Since Khomeini was perceived as anti-West and anti-
Israel, U.S. policymakers chose to cooperate with Saddam. In 1986, the United States provided
satellite assistance to locate Iranian troops to help Saddam fight the war (Mitchell 1991).
One of the most brutal atrocities committed by Saddam was the genocide of the Kurds in
northern Iraq in 1988. In the final month of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam’s military forces advanced
to Iraqi Kurdistan and conducted an operation known as the Anfal Campaign, killing over 100,
000 civilians (Joost 2008).
15The Anfal massacre consisted of two major waves. In the first wave, Saddam's cousin
Ali Majeed conducted air raids on the Kurdish town of Halabja, where armed Iranians and
the Kurdish militia called Peshmergas were located. Ali Majeed used chemical weapons
and large arsenals to attack the town. Saddam did not hesitate to use chemical weapons
against the Kurds. Moreover, he did not distinguish the Kurdish militias from the civilians
(Joost 2008).
In the second wave of the Anfal Campaign, Ali Majeed, by the order of Saddam
Hussain, conducted another attack on the Kurds in Qaradagh, which lies in Sulaymaniyah,
causing 182,000 deaths (Joost 2008).
These attacks intended to force Kurdish civilians to relocate from their villages to
create an insurgency vacancy in northern Iraq. The raids aimed at forcing Kurdish troops to
surrender and pushing the Iranian influence out of the area. The chemical attacks caused
massive extermination of the Kurdish population (Joost 2008). Ironically, the United States
stood in silence without interfering to stop the massacres or imposing any sanctions against
Iraq (PBS 2011). Saddam reportedly showed no remorse for these atrocities (Joost 2008).
In short, Saddam’s political career from the 1950s through the 1980s demonstrated
malignant narcissistic characteristics. He was extremely cruel and ruthless. He was also
egocentric and demanded complete obedience from the Iraqi people. He did not tolerate any
form of dissent. He ruled Iraq with terror, killing anyone or any group whom he perceived
as an enemy or as disloyal to him. The 1979 purge of the Ba’ath leaders and the 1988 use of
chemical weapons against the Kurds are cases in point. These examples show that Saddam was
willing to resort to extreme violence. He was extremely exploitive and reckless. His army
invaded Iran to claim the Shatt al-Arab waterway, but the war prolonged and sapped Iraq’s
wealth.
16The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
The Iran-Iraq War drained the Iraqi economy. Iraq had reached $80 billion of
international debt by the end of the war (Hanish 2013). Iraq attempted to reschedule its loan
payments to the creditor states to rebuild its demolished infrastructure after the war. According
to Long (2004), Iraq’s reconstruction was estimated to cost about $230 billion. However, the
creditor states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia began demanding that Iraq repay its debts
without any delay (Long 2004).
Despite economic difficulties caused by the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam implemented what was
known as the rearmament program. Saddam was concerned about Iran’s aggression because UN
Resolution 589 was designed only for a ceasefire (S/RES/598 1987). The rearmament program
was to protect Iraq from Iran. Also, in Saddam’s view, the program provided a security
umbrella against Iran for the Gulf States (Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997).
Saddam’s rearmament program alarmed Israel, which had destroyed Iraq’s nuclear
reactor under construction in 19811. The Israeli attack was to prevent Iraq from developing
Nuclear weapons. Also, the Iraqi rearmament program drew attention from pro-Israel U.S.
senators who demanded that Iraq be placed under economic sanctions. These senators called
for sanctions against Iraq because Saddam made a threatening statement that if Israel
decided to attack Iraq again, his government would retaliate against Israel by using chemical
weapons (Neff 1991).
1
Saddam’s external relations deteriorated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the war with Iran, Iraq attempted
to build a nuclear reactor in Osirak in 1981. Israel perceived the process of building the nuclear reactor as a threat to
its national security in the region. The Israeli Air Force launched The Operation Opera targeting Osirak nuclear reactor
in Iraq (Feldman, 1982).
Iraq did not respond to the attack, because the country was in the middle of the war with Iran. In the late
1980s, Saddam believed that Israel was attempting to launch another raid on Iraq
17Although the U.S. did not impose any sanctions against Iraq in 1989, U.S. officials were
worried about Saddam’s claim that he was the winner of the Iran-Iraq War. They were concerned
about Saddam’s emergence as the winner in the war and Iraq’s growing influence over other
Gulf States such as Kuwait (Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997).
Tensions began to grow between Iraq and the United States in the late 1980s. While the
Bush administration attempted to promote stability in the Middle East without appearing overly
pro-Israel or anti-Iraq, Saddam became increasingly sensitive to criticisms about him in the U.S.
media. During his visit to Washington, D.C. in October 1989, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz
met with Secretary of State James Baker and expressed Iraq’s dissatisfaction with the coverage
of Saddam’s regime in the U.S. media. Baker reassured Aziz that the U.S. was not hostile to
Iraq, but the tensions between the U.S. and Iraq continued despite the Aziz-Baker meeting
(Khadduri and Ghareeb, 1997).
Saddam expressed his frustration with the U.S. media again when he met with the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly in February 1990. However, Saddam expressed his
intention to re-establish positive relations with the U.S. In Saddam’s mind, he had no option but
to cooperate with the U.S. as the Soviet Union had been significantly weakened by the collapse
of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Saddam also asked Kelly whether the U.S. would
promote peace and stability in the Middle East or whether it would be only interested
in protecting Israel’s interest in the region (Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997).
Due to the Iraqi Rearmament program. Saddam said On April, 1, 1990 “By God, if Israel tries to do anything against
Iraq, we will make the fire eat half of Israel” (Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997, 100). The United States was concerned
that Iraq might use chemical weapons against Israel if the United States and Israel conspired in an Arab affair (Boutz
and Williams, 2015).
18U.S. officials were alarmed again in February 1990, when American reports showed that
six scud missile launchers were detected on the border with Jordan, indicating that they might be
targeting Israel. They were especially concerned because of Saddam’s earlier statement that he
was willing to use chemical weapons against Israel if the latter attacked Iraq. The U.S.
Congress threatened Iraq that it might place an embargo on exporting farm products to Iraq.
Iraqi officials protested, arguing that the launchers were only intended to protect Jordan.
Despite Saddam’s threat, the Bush administration hoped to maintain stable relations with Iraq
and vowed to veto any Congress resolution that would target the country (Khadduri
In May 1990, Saddam hosted an Arab Summit in Baghdad which the Amir of Kuwait
Jabber Al-Sabah attended. During the summit, Saddam expressed that some Arab countries had
overproduced oil and caused the decline of oil prices in the market. The Amir of Kuwait was not
aware that Saddam was referring to Kuwait. When the summit ended, Saddam was full of rage
as witnessed by King Fahad of Saudi Arabia. After the summit, Saddam sent Oil Minister Sa'dun
Hammadi to an OPEC ministerial meeting in mid-March to persuade Kuwait to stop the
overproduction of oil. During the meeting with Arab oil ministers, Hamdi realized that Kuwait
had no intention to abide by an OPEC quota and lower its production level (Khadduri and
Ghareeb 1997).
After the failed OPEC meeting in March 1990, Saddam claimed that Kuwait was
intentionally overproducing oil to slow Iraq’s economic recovery. He angrily sent Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz to submit a memorandum to the Arab League on July 15, 1990. The
memorandum stated that the Arabs should unite. However, the main purpose of submitting
the memorandum was to put pressure on Kuwait to reduce its oil production (Keesing's,
1991).
19The memorandum also accused Kuwait of crossing the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border and drilling
oil in the south of Rumaila oil fields in Iraq (Khadduri and Ghareeb, 1997). The memorandum
demanded that Kuwait forgive Iraq’s debt, which was estimated to be $10 billion. Kuwait was
surprised when it received the memorandum on July 19, 1990. In response, Kuwait reminded
Iraq that without Kuwaiti support during the war with Iran, Iraq would not have endured the war
(Khadduri and Ghareeb, 1997).
On July 21, 1990, Iraq submitted another memorandum to the Arab League responding
to Kuwait's claims. The memorandum stated that Kuwait did not respect Iraq and that Kuwait
did not seek compromise with Iraq. In response, Kuwait claimed that Iraq drilled oil from
Kuwaiti territories during the war with Iran (Neff, 1991). Kuwait decided to bring the dispute to
the United Nations, but Saddam criticized the decision, arguing that it was “inappropriate” to
bring the conflict to the international level (Khadduri and Ghareeb, 1997, 108).
As the tension between Iraq and Kuwait escalated, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
attempted to ease the tension. On July 22, 1990, he held meetings in Alexandria, Egypt, with
foreign ministers from the Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab
Emirates, as well as Jordan. The meetings stressed the importance of easing the tension as
quickly as possible (Khadduri and Ghareeb, 1997).
Following the meeting in Egypt, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Bander Al Saud,
met with Saddam in Iraq on July 22, 1990. During the meeting, the two agreed to hold a meeting
hosted by Saudi King Fahad in Jeddah on July 31, 1990, with Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheik
Sa'ad Al-Sabah and Deputy Chief of the Iraqi Revolutionary Council Izzat al Douri (Al-
Ebraheem, 1991).
20On July 24, 1990, President Mubarak visited Iraq and met with Saddam as the Iraqi leader
had advanced forces towards the Iraq-Kuwait border, but Mubarak thought that Saddam would
not use force against Kuwait because the planned Jeddah meeting was to take place at the end of
the month. Mubarak assured Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that Saddam had no intention to use force
but that the disputes should be resolved as soon as possible (Khadduri and Ghareeb, 1997).
The U.S. government was monitoring the situation in the Gulf region closely and assigned
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie to meet with Saddam to discuss the Iraqi Kuwaiti
disputes. The meeting took place on July 25, 1990. Saddam said that Iraq desired to restore better
relations with the US, but he complained that he was not fully optimistic about American media
attacks on Iraq. Saddam also explained how America's support for Kuwait would hurt Iraq's
economy and diminish its international reputation. During the meeting, Saddam claimed that
Kuwaiti border patrols were near the Iraq-Kuwait border. Saddam also indicated that if the U.S.
applied pressure on Iraq in the disputes, he would use force against Kuwait (Stein, 1992).
The conversation between Saddam and Glaspie later shifted from the Iraqi-Kuwait border
dispute to address OPEC policies and the member states’ oil production. Saddam bitterly
complained about how the oil prices had dropped to $14 per barrel, causing serious economic
losses for Iraq. However, Glaspie did not take sides with Saddam and only said “I understood
this,” referring to Iraq’s financial problems (Ghareeb and Khaddari, 1997, 113). Glaspie also
stated, “We have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflict, like your border disagreement with Kuwait
'' (Ghareeb and Khaddari 1997, 113).
She further expressed US concern about Iraq's military buildup and Saddam's previous
belligerent statements against Israel and Kuwait, but she was pleased to hear from Saddam that
Iraqi Foreign Minister Izzat Al Douri and Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheik Sa’ad Alsabah were
21scheduled to meet in Jeddah on July 31, 1990, and that Iraqi and Kuwaiti delegates were willing
to meet again later in Baghdad to resolve the problem (Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997).
The Jeddah meeting took place on July 31, 1991, with King Fahad as a host. He hoped
that Iraq and Kuwait would reach an agreement and resolve their disputes. Iraqi Foreign Minister
Al Duri complained how Kuwait had intentionally sought to undermine Iraq by drilling on the
South Rumaillah oilfields, overproducing oil, and not allowing Iraqi commercial air flights to
cross the Kuwaiti airspace (Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997).
In response, Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheik Sa’ad said that the Iraqi memorandum
submitted to the Arab League made false claims about the oilfields and that Kuwait would not
lower the oil prices and reduce its oil exports.
Al Duri and Sheik Sa’ad disagreed with each other and the meeting collapsed. However,
after the meeting, Sheik Sa’ad told King Fahad that Kuwait was considering forgiving Iraq’s
debt and even allowing Iraqi army facilities to be placed on the Island of Warba and Bubyan in
Kuwait (Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997).
When Al Duri returned to Iraq from the meeting, he briefed Saddam on what had
happened. Saddam then ordered the annexation of Warba and Bubyan as well as the entire state
of Kuwait. From Saddam's perspective, the annexation of Kuwait would help Iraq gain a tight
grip on the entire Gulf region. If Iraq occupied Kuwait, Saddam thought, Saudi Arabia would
not allow foreign troops to be deployed to Saudi Arabia. Saddam also assumed that the US public
opinion would discourage its government from interfering with foreign affairs in the Gulf region
(Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997).
22On August 2, 1990, Saddam ordered Iraqi troops to invade Kuwait. Within two days,
Iraqi controlled the entire state of Kuwait. The Arab states were surprised as Saddam had told
Mubarak on July 24, 1990, that Iraq would not use force to settle the disputes. King Fahad urged
Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait immediately and seek a peaceful solution to the disputes.
President Bush called Mubarak and told him that the invasion was aggression. Bush said that
Saddam was challenging the United States and that the US was ready to accept the challenge
(Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997).
Bush initiated the process of building a multinational military coalition to force Iraqi troops
out of Kuwait. Bush met with Saudi Ambassador Prince Bander al Saud and asked him to allow
American forces to be sent to Saudi Arabia. Bush told King Fahad that it was necessary to have
the US military in Saudi Arabia to assist Kuwait.
The royal family of Saudi Arabia was concerned that if the US interfered in the Iraq
annexation of Kuwait, Saddam might pose a serious threat to Saudi Arabia. However, King
Fahad agreed to open the Saudi border to allow American forces to be stationed in his country.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney met with King Fahad and provided detailed information
about the U.S intervention plans (Al-Maleki 2020).
23On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 678 giving Iraq the
final warning to withdraw on January 15, 1991 (S/RES/678 1990). Saddam refused to
withdraw, leading the UN to use force against Iraq. The United States, along with 35 nations,
began Operation Desert Storm (Glass and Toosi 2019).
By January 16, 1991, Allied Forces began Operation Desert Storm, defeating Iraq’s
military. Operation Desert Storm lasted 32 days, leading the Iraqi forces to surrender and
withdraw (Patrick, 2020).
Iraqi troops withdrew from Kuwait on February 27, 1991, leaving 10,000 Iraqi soldiers
dead (Heidenrich 1993). As a result of the coalition against Iraq, Saddam agreed to UN
resolution 687 that forced Iraq to accept a permanent ceasefire (S/RES/687 1991).
24Discussion
This case study illustrates how Saddam Hussein's biases affected the way he perceived
the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War. In particular, his personal characteristics influenced how he
saw Iraq’s economic losses since the war. He blamed Kuwait for Iraq’s economic woes. In the
end, he misperceived the intentions of the United States to intervene in the Persian Gulf region
(Stein 1991).
Saddam Hussein's view of the world was distorted (Post 1991). He always refused to take
responsibility for his actions and blamed others for his mistakes. Saddam thought that Iraq was
entitled to loan forgiveness by the wealthy Gulf States, such as Kuwait and the United
Arab Emirates, after the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq had received loans to finance the war from the Gulf
States. He thought that Iraq had fought the war on behalf of the Arab states against Ayatollah
Khomeini’s Iran.
In Saddam’s view, it was unfair that the Gulf States such as Kuwait were repeatedly
demanding that Iraq repay the debts incurred during the war. Iraq’s foreign debts had amounted
to an estimated $80 billion. Kuwait was a major sponsor for Iraq's war; Iraq’s debt to Kuwait
was at least $10 billion (Hanish 2013). He blamed Kuwait and other Gulf States for Iraq’s
economic difficulties, even though it was Saddam who had recklessly started the war with Iran
that lasted eight years and debilitated Iraq’s economy.
Saddam’s belief in international conspiracy affected his decision-making. He always
suspected that others were conspiring against him and that he would have to eliminate his
perceived enemies. After the Iran-Iraq War, he saw Iraq’s economic woes as deriving from
foreign states’ conspiracy. Through his biased lenses, he thought that Kuwait, backed by the
U.S. and Israel, was conspiring against Iraq. Saddam falsely accused Kuwait of violating Iraq’s
25border and stealing an estimated $2.4 billion worth of its oil from the south of Rumaillah oil
field near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border (Nasrawi 1990).
Saddam also claimed that Kuwait was deliberately increasing its oil production and
lowering oil prices to hurt the Iraqi economy. Before the Iran-Iraq War, the price of oil was $25
per barrel, but after the war, it dropped to $14 per barrel (Long 2004). Iraq heavily relied on its
oil production. The oil industry produced 95 percent of its export earnings (Hanish 2013). Thus,
the low price of oil was hurting the Iraqi economy. Saddam thought that Kuwait, together with
the U.S. and Israel, was plotting to destabilize his regime and challenge his leadership role in the
Arab world. In his mind, he was the victim of this conspiracy. He claimed that it was Kuwait
that owed a debt to Iraq because the country was protecting the Gulf States against possible
Persian expansionism (Hanish 2013).
Kuwait appeared to be an easy solution for Saddam’s goal to resolve the economic
problem. Kuwait was wealthy, but it was small with an army of only 20,000 soldiers (Hanish
2013). In his view, Kuwait did not have the political power to effectively refute his claim that
the country had to forgive Iraq’s debt. Saddam threatened Kuwait to yield to his demand in a
similar way that he had done to his political opponents in the 1950s-1980s.
Saddam’s biases and his belief in the international conspiracy in regards to Iraq's
victimhood affected how he interpreted U.S. intentions toward the Kuwait-Iraq disputes. When
he met with U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie on July 25, 1990, she was conciliatory to him
because of the instruction that she had received from the U.S. State Department not to use any
inflammatory words to incite him. During the meeting, he complained to her that Kuwait and
the United States were conspiring against him and told her not to oppose his plan to get
concessions from Kuwait. She did not take sides with Iraq and told him that the U.S. was neutral
on the disputes (Williams and Williams 1990).
26During the meeting with Glaspie, Saddam confirmed his pre-existing belief that the
U.S. would not stop Kuwait from plotting against Iraq and that the U.S. was even approving
Kuwait's action against his country. Glaspie's equivocal statement about the dispute between
Iraq and Kuwait also reinforced his belief that the U.S. would not intervene in their conflict. The
U.S. government had previously tried to temper America's domestic critics of Iraq to maintain
stable relationships with Baghdad.
Based on the experience he had with the U.S., Saddam did not predict that the U.S. and
the international community would take a united stand against his military action against Kuwait.
Although Glaspie expressed American concerns about Iraq's military buildup, he did not take it
seriously (Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997).
Besides, Saddam's narcissistic characteristics and his analogical reasoning affected the
policy option that he chose to solve Iraq's economic problems. He always used violence when he
encountered perceived enemies, as seen in, for example, the 1979 purge, the 1988 genocide of
the Kurds, and the Iran-Iraq War. It was natural for Saddam to choose violence against
Kuwait when he faced economic problems after the war.
In summary, this case study illustrates how a policymaker's perceptions and
misperceptions matter in decision-making. Saddam Hussain's analogical reasoning led him to
believe that the U.S. would not interfere in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Also, his cognitive
abilities were interfered by his personal characteristics, namely narcissism and paranoia.
27Conclusion
This paper compared four major perspectives in international relations: Realism, the
bureaucratic politics model, rational choice theory, and psychological perspectives. Realism
does not appropriately account for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait because it treats domestic politics
as a black box and sees the state as a unitary actor. It pays little or no attention to the impact of
domestic politics on state behavior at the international level. The bureaucratic politics model
stresses the impact of bureaucratic organizational forces and constraints on policymakers, but
this model does not explain policymaking in autocratic states, such as Iraq under Saddam
Hussein. In Iraq, power concentrated on Saddam, and there was no "pulling and hauling" of
bureaucratic politics. The rational choice theory focuses on individual decision-making and
assumes that individuals make rational decisions based on calculation and logic. However, it
does not address an individual’s cognitive framework, ignoring the individual’s cognitive
aspects of decision-making such as beliefs and perceptions.
The psychological approach can best account for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It
focuses on an individual’s cognition. It argues that the individual leader’s perception and
misperception matter in policymaking; they directly affect the leader’s policy choices. The
analysis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demonstrates how Saddam’s conspiratorial beliefs,
albeit irrational and biased, led him to misperceive U.S. intentions on Iraq and miscalculate the
prospect of the U.S. intervention in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict. Saddam's beliefs, derived from
his personal characteristics—narcissism and paranoia—and historical experiences, prevented
him from seeking a peaceful settlement of the dispute.
28Finally, this study has a limitation. It does not consider the concept of bounded rationality. Bounded
rationality recognizes the cognitive limitations of an individual in making decisions (Simon 1957).
Future research on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait should analyze how Saddam’s cognitive limitations
due to factors such as lack of information and knowledge interfered with his ability to think
rationally and resulted in his suboptimal decision to invade Kuwait.
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