Hegemony in question? Euro 2012 and local politics in the city of Poznan Małgorzata Kowalska - Adam Mickiewicz University Poznan
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Hegemony in question? Euro
2012 and local politics in the
city of Poznan
Małgorzata Kowalska
Adam Mickiewicz University
Poznan
Kick It !
The Anthropology of European Football
FREE Conference
University of Vienna, October 2013
1This paper is a work in progress.
Please do not quote without
explicit written permission of the author.
2Hegemony in question? Euro 2012 and local politics in the city of
Poznan
Małgorzata Kowalska
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan
“It is very rare that a really serious citizen
would think that all these [infrastructure] is unnecessary.”
Ryszard Grobelny, the Mayor of Poznan,
an interview in July 2012, a few days after the end of Euro 2012
“[T]he moment that any set of values, meanings and material forms
comes to be explicitly negotiable, its hegemony is threatened;
at that moment it becomes the subject of ideology or counterideology.”
Jean and John Comaroff: 1992, p. 28-9
Beyond hegemony
This working paper is part of ongoing research for my PhD thesis on the legacy of
Euro 2012 in Poznan, one of the Poland’s four host cities for the Championships. The
research is based on longitudinal ethnographic fieldwork in Poznan, but, as
anthropology is more than just grounded theory, my study is being done from what
Gavin Smith calls “the perspective
of historical realism”, which “partly reflects the need to understand society entirely in
historical terms, and partly… to emphasize the realness of history over its
constructedness.” (Smith 1999: 15; see also Williams 1973; Thompson 1968; Wolf 1982;
Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 2012) Characterising the historical context of the fieldwork
is therefore not just a question of describing ‘cultural background’, it is a crucial element
of anthropological research. Moreover, it means
a constant, dialectical shifting between two levels, between individuality and the system,
i.e. people’s self-understanding and particular historical conditions, which influence this
self-understanding, as well as between the local and global settings. This is the
background of my research, which is not really about football per se: rather, I use Euro
2012 as a window
to scrutinise the Foucauldian (Rabinow 1991) relations of power and knowledge in
contemporary Poznan. Hopefully, this short paper will enable me to show how we can
look at football mega-events, or sports mega-events in general, as lenses to study local
negotiations of meanings and priorities.
In my paper, I first argue that Euro 2012 has been used by the elites as a tool to
secure
3the existent hegemony, and second, I ask an overall research question whether the
Championship could be seen as one of the triggers, albeit an involuntary one perhaps,
for a certain change in the official discourse both at the regional and national level.
Defining this hegemony and changes in relation to the global economy are the
subsequent research problems of my scholarship.
The Gramscian definition of hegemony puts emphasis on how it is perceived as
common sense, as something natural. In the words of Raymond Williams, it is “a lived
system of meanings and values – constitutive and constituting – which as they are
experienced as practices appear
as reciprocally confirming” (Williams 1977: 110). One of the crucial features of the notion
is the role of dominant groups in securing the hegemony, but rather than thinking of it
as of a way of indoctrinating those less powerful by those in power, we should bear
in mind that in hegemony all groups are equally mistaken about the fundamental
processes
of capitalist reproduction and that “in any actual society there are specific inequalities in
means and therefore in capacity to realize [one’s own will]” (Williams 1977: 108; see also
Smith 1999: 246-7; compare Butler 2001 on governmentality and critique). This is
precisely what attracted me
to the anthropology of political economies and to ‘studying-up’ (Hess 1996), and I
remain curious of how different people justify their actions towards and against the
system they live in.
Image is everything
The cities of today are affected by global competition for investment, whether they
are located at the centre or on the peripheries of the global capitalist world. Poznan
participates
in a process of constant scaling and rescaling of cities (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011; see
also Brenner 2011; Buchowski and Schmidt 2012), hence in order to attract globally
mobile capital, it has to focus on promoting the “brand” of the city worldwide.
The image of a European city with a strong entrepreneurial drive and spirit plays
a crucial role in Poznan's the urban growth strategy, where attracting global capital has
been understood as attracting business, and usually big business at that. Traditionally
considered to be politically liberal, middle-class and with strong merchant traditions
(my interviews; see also Mergler and Pobłocki 2010; Znaniecki and Ziółkowski 1984;
compare also national elections and political sympathies), having experienced the
process of ‘decommunization’ (on implementation of free market in Poland see, for
example, Wedel 1992, 2001; Dunn 2004; Buchowski 2006), Poznan has developed its
strategy as a supposedly business-friendly city. For instance, the 2009 international
campaign with a new logo and motto partly in English – Poznan. Miasto know-how, the
city of know-how – was coupled with a free advertisement of all business brands which
had their headquarters or branches in the region. This image, or an aspiration, also
underpinned
the decision to organise Euro 2012, which has become a ‘promotional vehicle’ for the city
(Lowes 2002).
4Despite the increasing volume of literature and study on ‘the performance
paradox
of megaprojects’ (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter 2003), Poland made a bid for
organizing Euro 2012 without the proper risk assessment. When the world was facing
the biggest economic crisis in decades, and sports stadiums in Portugal and Greece were
already known to be ‘white elephants’, UEFA Euro 2012 was considered by the political
elites to be a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to create the city’s image as a ‘truly
European metropolis’, and to reinforce
its position in the global competition for attracting profitable investments and affluent
visitors –
a chance which could not be wasted. In 2007, when the Championship was awarded to
Poland and Ukraine, newspapers and politicians all around the country were celebrating
the future benefits of organizing the event, which, here in Poznan, was presented as a
key component
of the process of turning the city into an even more business-friendly environment.
The event ostensibly aimed to boost the international city’s image, enable Poznan
to obtain EU funding for necessary infrastructure, and subsequently attract more
business
and tourism to the city, create new jobs and so on. This idea met with a sympathetic ear
among local business elites and media, and the official promotional campaign began;
a campaign, which, in the words of Kimberley Schimmel, was “designed to legitimate the
actions
of urban growth coalitions by expressing them as being necessary for the betterment of
the community-as-a-whole… a campaign that not only seeks to promote the interests of
the dominant class but also seeks to legitimise political solutions to urban ‘problems’ by
symbolically constructing consensus…behind the banner of pro-growth”. (Schimmel
1995, after Lowes 2002: 82-3). Wszyscy jesteśmy drużyną narodową, We all are the
national team, which implied not only
support for the football team, but, maybe more importantly, a ‘civic obligation’ for all
Poles
to create the ‘positive image’ of the host and, consequently, a ‘good business climate’.
This also applied to the city level. Those who were opposed to the common wisdom and
pointed to the fact that the city cannot afford the Euro nor the welfare obligation were
disregarded and discredited as ‘irrational’, as in the above quote from the Mayor of
Poznan; ‘lacking basic economic knowledge’, especially when asked to answer the critics,
as in two examples below:
It is… completely unjustified. Very original. It must have been said by someone
who cannot count at all. It is not that I can build something whenever I want or
wait to start
it whenever I want! It is classic, inflation and deflation… Neither Euro, nor
European budget would have waited. (civil servant_1)
Let’s just agree that I won't comment on these accusations. I really do not
understand these arguments. They are below any standard. That we have nothing
left but loans to pay... What kind of argument is it? It is not supported by any
facts…
5any knowledge. I do not want to forbid them to speak their minds, but they should
get some knowledge before they make all those judgments; (civil servant_2)
or even as ‘socialists’:
Those socialists always lay claim to something.. I also see a lot of poverty, a lot of
evil, but I am not going to do anything about it. My priority is my happiness. I am
a liberal,
I do not want anything from the government. I believe in myself and I do not want
anything from anyone… everyone should take care of themselves and do their job.
(civil servant_3)
The city of Poznan spent 24.8 million PLN (ca. 6 million €) on the preparation
and promotion of the event (Deloitte 2012), excluding approx. 750 million PLN spent on
renovating the city’s stadium1 and loans taken out for the city’s own contribution to
infrastructural projects funded by the EU. The main benefits of Euro 2012 were
promotion of the city2 and acceleration of infrastructural modernisation (Deloitte 2012;
see also the report of the Ministry of Sport and Tourism 2012). On the national level, the
impact of Euro 2012 has been called “the Polish effect”, and the Ministry of Sport and
Tourism claimed that: “Already today the experts determine the impact of the Euro 2012
preparations and organisation in Poland as the Polish Effect, whose influence on the
economy, image and national development is greater than in [the] case of the Barcelona
Effect. The Polish Effect consists, above all, of such elements as considerably faster
infrastructure modernisation and [an] increase in the productivity of the economy,
[a] strengthening of the image of Poland abroad, or [a] greater than expected increase in
foreign tourism and revenue on that account. Another significant element of the Polish
Effect is the establishment of a major social capital. The Polish Effect includes also the
acquirement of the very valuable know-how regarding the management of complex,
large and difficult projects.” (Ministry of Sports and Tourism 2012) You do not have to
do any particular research to notice that Polish football, apparently, has not benefited
from ‘the boost’ (Przegląd Sportowy 2013). Consultancies and companies engaged in the
preparation and promotion of the event, however, were highly praised for outstanding
1
Modernisation of the stadium cost more than 750-800 million zlotys (approx. 200 million €), of
which 30 million was a state subsidy. According to the Financial Times, the Polish government invested
approx. 30 billion US dollars in Euro (including 4 stadiums for 4.5 billion Polish zlotys, 2 billion of which
was allocate to building the National Stadium in Warsaw).
2
The promotional effect of the Championships was measured by using Advertising Value
Equivalency which in Poznan was estimated for 231 million PLN (57 million €). Advertising Value
Equivalency is an index used to measure PR efficiency by estimating the amount of money one would
have to pay for editorial, Internet, radio or TV coverage if it was an advertisement. AVEs have been
criticised by both professionals and scholars as irrelevant, yet the tool was considered as a measure of
international success of the promotional strategies of the host cities and on the national level. Nobody
asked if anyone actually remembers what cities in Austria and Switzerland hosted the Championships just
four years before Euro 2012.
6service in building a ‘modern Poland’, as one can read on the award granted to the
Chairman of the municipal company Euro Poznan 2012 for his work.
Privatising profits and socialising losses
This rhetoric, however, has not been bought by everyone. Initially questioned only
by the few, it has now been more broadly criticised in Poznan. Of course, several other
factors at the local and higher levels have influenced the change, such as the crisis of
2008, which, by the way, is used by the authorities to justified some non-deliveries, or
cuts in welfare in the city, the emergence of urban movements, public discussion on
public space and urban planning etc., and it is still difficult to decide where this change
will lead us, but ‘a sort of ferment’, as one of the city activists told me, has seemed to
shake the foundations of the system. It is not that the general opinion on Euro 2012 has
changed dramatically in the last year (CBOS 2013). I argue, however, that contrary to the
presumptions and expectations of those who decided to organise it, at least on the Polish
side, Euro 2012 had the (unexpected) effect of countering the hegemony which had been
hardly ever challenged in the official city discourse for the last 20+ years. Instead of
being commonly perceived as a “gargantuan civilisational jump”, as Joanna Mucha, the
Minister of Sport and Tourism of the Republic of Poland said 6 months before the
Championship (Euro to boost economy 2012) an, a view repeated by many of the local
civil servants I interviewed, the Euro has been questioned, for example, as a “new five-
year plan” used by the power bloc as a “superstructure” to legitimise its activity (Pobłocki
2012), which still follows the belief that “a rising tide lifts all boats”. In Poznan, this
activity has been based on the assumption that nothing is more important than
transforming the city into a place which is attractive for big business, which implies the
need to build a very specific type of infrastructure and to cut budgets of anything deemed
not to be relevant. Such policies will supposedly be beneficial to everyone, as these
extracts from my interviews with three civil servants show:
Euro was beneficial to all citizens, the quality of life is higher now because of all
investments. We have new buses and trams, and roads, and all those investments which
would have not been built if it was not for the Euro. This new infrastructure will attract
more new investment to the city. It all gives us a chance for growth. I believe there is a
group of people contesting everything that was done, but myself, I cannot see any
minuses. (city servant_2)
We did not make Euro for education… Nowhere in the world are public finances on such
a level that they could be spent on anything you want. In general, if a city wants to
develop, it must invest. If we stop investing, of course we have more money in the wallet,
but we stop developing. (city servant_1)
Development is only possible when a city attracts new resources: capital, people and
ideas… and it is possible when a city broadens its offer and changes in order to attract
these three types of resources. If it does not change, if it is not growing, it is not
developing. Of course, it all affects the citizens, because it is they who are the
beneficiaries of this development. The more the city is developing in terms of growing
and attracting new resources, the richer it is. And the market will settle anything. (city
servant_3)
7Poznan can therefore be called an ‘entrepreneurial city’, which aims for “socio-
economic development… rather than the provision of welfare services to the inhabitants
of the city; thus [it is] growth-oriented rather than concerned with the income
distribution.” (Çağlar 2010: 119) This seems to be the ultimate goal of all civic activities
of many civil servants I talked to.
So we may focus on improving living conditions in the city, we can build kindergartens
and nurseries.. playgrounds, but in my opinion they will not attract new resources to the
city and they will not keep people in the city, now when they are moving to suburbs. I
make this point because this is precisely what was discussed when the City Council was
voting against the Youth Olympic Games 2018, the event on one hand and budgetary cuts
on the other, we experienced the same situation with Euro 2012 and kindergartens - first
we should build new kindergartens and then we could think of the Games… I am not
saying this is not important, but I am not sure if kindergartens are more important than
promoting the city and attracting new resources. It is always a question of what results
this will bring. We have to remember we are under constant pressure, we take part in a
competition, we have our five minutes and we have to make a good use of it. (city
servant_1)
Yet when in the autumn of 2012, during a very special session of the City Council
mentioned by the interviewee above, when the Mayor of Poznan asked the City to
support him
in the bid to organise the 2018 Youth Olympic Games, and in borrowing 77 million PLN
for this purpose, he was supported only by four councillors. Twenty-seven voted against
the YOG.
The voting was preceded by a heated discussion on the city's debt and the rationale
behind organising another sporting mega-event. The atmosphere was very different to
that which preceded Euro 2012. Why such change? Let me suggest the two most
important reasons behind it, both based on my research.
First, the question has been raised whether the city's investment strategy has
been at all successful: whether attracting business depends only on infrastructural
change in the city, or should Poznan be not only business-, but also more citizen-
friendly. With money accumulated in new roads, a new railway station, which is, by the
way, another shopping mall
in the city, built by a private investor and with a smaller and not particularly functional
railway station attached to it, an airport and, last but not least, a stadium, renovated
primarily using public money, and in contrast budgetary cuts for education, culture and
public transportation, the city's politicians have been accused of acting in favour of
affluent citizens and of destroying Poznan's cultural and social capital.
This is the best city in the country but it is permanently wasting its potential. It is
frustrating to observe how it is being destroyed by the short-sighted policies of its
authorities. We all lose by budgetary cuts and this place is slowly becoming a ghost city.
(journalist_1)
8We cannot jump from one event to another, we have to have a plan… a new vision which
will enable us to create a city that is more friendly to its citizens. No business will be
attracted to a place with no municipal life and unhappy people. (city councillor_1)
Second, the authorities have been called into question for being authoritative and
not consulting their decisions with citizens. Again, some people are concerned with the
fact that current developments pave the way for capital investment and consumption,
but can cordon off space to regular users of the city. How hallmark events and
investments reorganise the urban space around lifestyle consumption sites and turn
citizens into consumers is another important dimension of the problem (Lowes 2002: xi,
xv). Here, however, I would like to draw attention to the link between the city's growth-
oriented promotional strategy and lack of interest in politics among the general public.
None of these irrational decisions were consulted with the public. Nobody told the people
what they would lose, nobody explained them that Euro 2012 means certain costs. We
were told we would make big money and eventually open to Europe, and we are stuck in a
traffic jam with the same problems which we used to have. (city activist_1)
The rationale behind sports mega-events was questioned from various
perspectives: that of the media, of city activists and of taxi drivers. What was presented
as an obligation and common sense was not necessarily perceived as such by everyone.
As a result, not only did the Championships change the infrastructure and promote the
city brand, it engendered a discussion on its future shape and character.
xxx
The question remains, however, whether this discussion has the power to counter
the hegemony, or ideology, as it might be called now following Jean and John Comaroff’s
quote above, or on the contrary, will the system readjust by incorporating certain
elements in its PR strategies, such as the ideas of public consultation or civic activism, or
revitalisation plan. Will a new language emerge out of this disappointment, beyond the
current meaning of terms such as ‘growth’, ‘image’, ‘investment’ and ‘modernisation’, or
should we rather speak of ‘selective hegemony’ (Smith 2012) of adaptable capitalism:
this is a topic for another discussion, on whether we can “pose the question of the limits
of our most sure ways of knowing, which [Raymond] Williams referred to as our
uncritical habits of mind”. (Butler: 2001)
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