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AK IV
Lessons
Learned
The Treatment of Kosovo’s Non-Majority Communities
During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Mitrovica 2020
Contents I. Introduction .................................................................................... 3 II. Lesson 1 ............................................................................................. 7 III. Lesson 2 ........................................................................................... 17 IV. Lesson 3 ........................................................................................... 28 V. Conclusions and Recommendations.................................. 40
Author’s Note:
The overriding purpose of this paper is to analyse the nature of the
relationship between the government, its institutions, and non-
majority communities in Kosovo in light of the COVID-19 pandemic
and to assess its ability and readiness to ensure the equal treatment
of all citizens, regardless of ethnic or national belonging. In other
words, to describe a set of lessons that this ongoing emergency has
taught us about the position of those communities, and how they are
treated by central authorities. As will be outlined throughout the
course of this document, the pandemic did not, in and of itself, create
a problem but rather served to highlight a range of issues in the
implementation of legislative and constitutional provisions that
regulate the rights granted to non-majority communities. It indeed
exposed the government’s shortcomings in communicating and
providing equal access to information and services to all of its
citizens, something that is problematic in normal circumstances but
that now constitute a very tangible threat to public health and
security.
2
I. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has presented a unique set of challenges
to governments across the world. While the most obvious of these
challenges is the great risk that the virus poses to public health, it
has also served to put a great deal of strain on economies, state
institutions and has had a vast impact on the day-to-day functioning
of governments. Along these lines, a question that has frequently
arisen during the course of this global crisis is how to balance the
need for extraordinary measures to protect citizens from the spread
of this deadly disease while at the same time maintaining respect
for basic human rights and legal and constitutional norms. The
frightening dimensions of the pandemic have demanded a
comprehensive response, one that nonetheless many states have
successfully balanced with a commitment to maintaining their given
constitutional/legal orders: Many, if not necessarily all, have
accepted the necessity for what would normally be objectionable
interruptions to daily life, that is, restrictions on movement, public
(and private) gatherings, lockdown measures and the mass closure
of schools, offices, commercial operations, transport hubs and
borders. The logistics of this challenged even the most advanced
and developed countries, as evidenced by the difficulties faced by,
for example, the United States. This has been yet more arduous for
structurally fragile states to undertake and has served to seriously
strain financial resources and endanger already-weak economies.
The countries of the Western Balkans responded to the COVID-19
pandemic in a similar manner to other European countries; by
passing strict and sweeping measures that included lockdowns,
border/airport closures, and a shuttering of commercial activity. As
3
the first cases of the virus emerged in Kosovo in early March of 2020,
the government passed a series of strict measures (beginning with
the declaration of a state of public health emergency) aimed at
mitigating its effects and slowing its spread.12 The state of public
health emergency was in place until the 6th of May, 2020, when it
was revoked by the Kosovo Assembly, meaning that while some
measures remained in place, curfews and other similar restrictions
were lifted.3 This coincided with a fall in the number of infected and
by early June borders began to re-open for normal traffic.4 All of
these happened more or less in parallel with events in Serbia, where
the government also loosened restrictions in early May of 2020.
Since then, cases have once again begun to rise, but measures
similar to those seen between March and May have not been re-
imposed.
The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic placed the Kosovo Serb
community in a uniquely difficult position: straddled between two
governments, and faced with already-challenging social, political
and economic dynamics, their interests are often lost in the political
crescendo. What’s more, the relative fragility of local institutions
have made responding to a large-scale public health crisis all the
more difficult: Shortly after the lifting of restrictions issued in March
of 2020, cases once again began to rise sharply in Kosovo Serb
communities (at a much higher rate than they did between March
and May) and there were widespread reports of serious strain on
local healthcare institutions in Serbian communities throughout
1
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-kosovo/kosovo-confirms-first-
coronavirus-cases-an-italian-and-a-kosovar-idUSKBN21039A
2
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-kosovo/kosovo-to-declare-state-of-
emergency-to-counter-coronavirus-idUSKBN21445J
3
http://radiomitrovicasever.com/2020/05/06/ukinuto-vanredno-stanje-vanredne-mere-
ostaju/
4
https://kossev.info/kosovska-vlada-potvrdila-ukidanje-mera-o-slobodi-kretanja/
4
Kosovo.56 Furthermore, the crisis served to aggravate pre-existing
issues in the relationship between central governing institutions and
Kosovo Serbs. A lack of integration, poor communication between
Pristina and Serb-majority municipalities, and the uneven
application of legislation governing community/minority rights
were pre-existing, but nevertheless were intensified by the
pandemic. It can be difficult to segregate problems that are faced
by all communities of Kosovo from those that are specific to the
Kosovo Serb community: With its still-developing institutional
structures, this crisis has invariably tested the limits of the ability of
government bodies to adequately respond to the needs of its’
residents. That having been said, the ongoing emergency has shone
light on many deficiencies within Kosovo’s institutions, and in some
cases, exposed an inability to respond to the needs of non-majority
communities.
This paper will attempt to highlight a key number of “lessons
learned” from the pandemic from the point of view of the Kosovo
Serb community. It will not seek to analyse the situation from an
epidemiological perspective, but rather to examine what COVID-19
has taught us about the position of non-majority communities in
Kosovo, and the dynamics of the relationship between them and
centre(s) of political and institutional power. For each ‘lesson
learned’ a set of conclusions will be posited that are based on
research and monitoring carried out by NGO Aktiv between March
and August of 2020. These monitoring activities were expansive,
and included interviews with relevant stakeholders, contact with
5
Based on interviews with healthcare workers in clinics and the Clinical Hospital Center in
North Mitrovica
6
https://www.kosovo-online.com/koronavirus/krizni-stab-km-neophodno-je-striktno-
postovanje-mera-i-odgovornost-gradjana-13-7-2020
5
focal points based in municipalities north and south of the Ibar river,
and close scrutiny of government communiques, public statements
and press releases.
6
II. Lesson 1
Information is Key:
The Kosovo Government failed to communicate effectively with
Kosovo’s non-majority communities, which in turn resulted in the
spread of disinformation and rumour, potentially endangering public
health.
During the course of a public health crisis is it of crucial importance
that the general public is kept abreast of developments and is aware
of steps that can be taken in order to protect itself; a lack of access
to such information is reflective of a systematic failure on the part
of a government to communicate effectively.
Beginning in mid-March 2020, Aktiv began to closely monitor the
flow of information from key public institutions (i.e. the Ministries of
Health, Interior, Foreign Affairs etc.) One of the most glaring
problems that was noted was the lack of translations made available
from Albanian into Serbian.
Something that should be noted here is that, when it comes to
questions of public health, most Serb communities in Kosovo utilize
services provided by healthcare institutions that operate under the
legal framework of the Republic of Serbia, and only in very rare cases
seek care from clinics or hospitals that serve Albanian-majority
areas. That having been said, many Serbs, particularly those who
reside south of the river Ibar, were unable to obtain information on
government measures, restrictions on freedom of movement and
other essential information regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. This
occurred for a number of reasons, chief among them the fact that
the vast majority of government press releases and public
7statements were made in the Albanian language, and it was
therefore left up to local media outlets to seek translations of their
own volition.7Despite the fact that local media transmitted
information that they received from the government to their
readers, the information that filtered through to the general public
was often incomplete8, which fostered a situation where citizens
were forced to separate rumour from fact:
The Government of Kosovo failed to ensure equal access to
information for all of Kosovo’s communities.
The The Kosovo Government, from the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic in March of 2020, did not invest significant effort into
ensuring that members of non-majority communities that speak
Serbian, received consistent and relevant information on the
pandemic and the measures adapted to prevent the spread of the
virus. As has been previously noted, NGO Aktiv recorded a large
number of cases where various public institutions failed to provide
Serbian translations of official instructions, orders and other forms
of communiques and public statements91011. This included
government directives restricting freedom of movement, quarantine
7
Based on interviews conducted with journalists working with Kosovo Serb media outlets
between June and August of 2020.
8
IBID
9
On the 2nd of June, 2020, the National Center for Border Management issued instructions
on procedures for entering Kosovo on its Facebook page which it did not translate into
Serbian http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/lost-in-translation-izgubljeni-u-prevodu-te-
humbur-ne-perkthim
10
Statement on language issues and the package of ’15 measures’ on financial relief
http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/the-ombudspersons-institution-initiates-a-complaint-
based-on-ngo-aktiv-s-memorandum
11
Statement on the issuing of new restrictions on movement without Serbian translations
http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/new-restrictions-of-movement-in-kosovo-entered-into-
force-without-official-translation-into-the-serbian-language
8and lockdown measures as well as rules and procedures for entering
and exiting Kosovo. The lack of information coming from
government institutions available in the Serbian language led to a
situation where the Kosovo Serb community received conflicting
information regarding various measures issued by the government
and found themselves in a position where they can be penalised for
violating rules that they were unable to familiarize themselves with.
As can be illustrated in photos below of SMS alerts sent out to
subscribers of mobile networks in Kosovo, notices disseminated by
the government were not made available in Serbian.
Fig.1 12 Fig. 2 13 Fig. 314
12
SMS message received by an IPKO user on the 23rd of May 2020 from the Ministry of Health.
The message contains numbers for government hotlines for psychological assistance, health
assistance and assistance in cases of domestic violence.
13
SMS message received by an IPKO user on the 6th of May 2020 from the Ministry of Health
with information on psychological assistance/counselling.
14
SMS message received by an IPKO user on the 14th of March 2020 from the Ministry of
Health advising citizens on protection measures and COVID symptoms with a number to
call for advice/assistance.
9The fact that direct communication between the citizenry (general
public) and institutions took place almost exclusively in Albanian
meant that Kosovo Serbs and members of other non-majority
communities were excluded and locked out from receiving
information that was of vital importance. As one local resident in
North Mitrovica stated “we had no idea what was going on, if we
could go to central Serbia, when we could leave our homes, they
kept changing the rules and no one informed us.”15Other
interviews with residents of both municipalities of north Kosovo
and Serb-majority municipalities in the south revealed similar
levels of confusion and lack of clarity. During the course of the
lockdown, the only consistent sources of information regarding
government measures were not state institutions themselves but
rather local Serbian-language media outlets. Despite this, it is
difficult to ascertain the scope and depth of the reach of this kind
of reporting as much of the information in question was most
easily obtained online and via social-media networks, which meant
that many residents (particularly pensioners) who don’t necessarily
have access to the internet or do not use it as a tool to inform
themselves were left largely in the dark.16
This begs an invariable question: What would the situation have
looked like had it not been for the pro-active stance undertaken by
many non-governmental organizations and media outlets?
15
Interview conducted with a resident of Serb nationality of North Mitrovica in July of 2020.
16
Based on interviews conducted between July and August of 2020.
10The failure to provide equal access to information and to
communicate effectively contributed to the spread of
disinformation and fake news.
Research carried about by NGO Aktiv in July of 2020 yielded results
that were reflective of widespread distrust in institutions and a high
degree of weariness towards official information and data regarding
the COVID-19 pandemic.17 While it cannot be argued that the fault
lies exclusively with the Kosovo government and its institutions,
inadequate communication during the state of emergency shed new
light on pre-existing problems between the central government and
Serb-majority areas. In fact, the relatively passive stance taken on
by both Kosovo and Serbian public institutions18 when it comes to
informing the general public has had consequences in terms of how
the danger of the COVID-19 virus is perceived, and on how seriously
the public takes recommendations issued by health authorities.
This is illustrated by the results of the above-mentioned public
opinion research conducted by NGO Aktiv; only around 31% of all
respondents said that they ‘completely’ followed recommendations
issued by relevant (health) authorities, a number that reflects a high
level of mistrust towards ‘official’ information.
17
http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/covid-19-between-reality-and-disinformation
18
This refers to so-called ‘parallel’ or ‘soft’ institutions operating in Serb-majority
municipalities that are financed by the Republic of Serbia.
11Figure 1
Do you abide by the recommendations/measures prescribed
by institutions regarding the COVID-19 virus?
Figure 2
In your opinion, is there a connection between the spread of
the corona virus and 5G networks?
12Figure 3
Do you believe that COVID-19 is as dangerous as the media
and the World Health Organization say it is?
Perhaps even more alarming is the notable number of respondents
who either do not believe that COVID-19 exists (9%) or who believe
that it does not pose the danger that the media claims it does (21%.).
What’s more, as can be seen in Fig. 2, a significant number of local
residents appear to believe that there is a connection between
COVID-19 and 5G networks, indicating a high level of susceptibility
to disinformation currently circulating on the internet, especially on
social media networks such as Facebook.
While these problems cannot be solely attributed to the lack of
consistent communication between local communities and central-
level governing authorities, the fact that neither the Kosovo
government nor Serbian institutions have launched a
comprehensive public information campaign or initiated sustainable
channels of communication have engendered an atmosphere where
13gaps in public knowledge about COVID-19 are filled with rumour,
false or misleading information, and fake news. The fact that many
seem to believe that the virus does not actually exist, or is the
product of 5G networks, has a decidedly negative impact on the
general public’s willingness to abide by the recommendations of
public health authorities: a visible percentage population in non-
majority areas in Kosovo do not heed calls for mask-wearing and
other social distancing measures pushed by public health experts
and epidemiologists, something that does not bode well for those
hopeful that the virus be kept under control.
Serbian-language media outlets have been left with a diminished
ability to inform the public due to restricted access to information
Journalists in Kosovo of Serb nationality have for years faced a kind
of de-facto discrimination in that when try to report on central-level
political developments, particularly in the Kosovo Assembly.1920 They
have related, in the past, that Assembly sessions and meetings of
Assembly Committees frequently take place in the complete
absence of translations.21 Furthermore, journalists have repeatedly
reported that press conferences are held exclusively in the Albanian
language and that public statements and other official
communiques are left untranslated, resulting in a situation where
Serbian-language media outlets in Kosovo do not have equalized
access to information. Throughout the pandemic, Serbian-language
media have faced widespread difficulty in communicating with
19
https://kossev.info/u-kosovskoj-skupstini-prevod-na-srpski-samo-za-poslanike/
20
https://kossev.info/u-skupstini-kosova-bez-prevoda-za-srpske-novinare/
21
Assembly rules state that translations must be provided (during committee meetings)
upon request of an Assembly/Committee member. If no such request is received then no
translation is provided, whether or not a Serbian-speaking journalist is present to observe
the proceedings.
14public institutions (as one journalist put it the communication has
been ‘very limited’)22 and have been frozen out of the possibility to
access information of the same breadth and scope of their Albanian-
speaking colleagues.23 A case in point would be the mailing list for
media created by the Ministry of Health, where information was
sent, for the most part, in Albanian without any form of translation.24
This changed slightly after an intervention from the Office of the
Language Commissioner, however the problem persisted after the
formation of the Avdullah Hoti Government.25 In other instances,
journalists found themselves in a position where they were left
confused as to how government restrictions on movement such as
curfews applied to them.26 In this sense, media freedom has been
restricted by virtue of the government’s lack of readiness to ensure
that access to information is equalized for all journalists, regardless
of their language.
The problems faced by journalists are in fact similar in nature to
those encountered by members of the general public in that they
receive partial or second-hand information. Limited access to
information is of course a challenge in normal circumstances, but
during a pandemic it constitutes a dangerous situation because they
are unable to provide their readers/users with accurate and up-to-
date information on the epidemiological situation.
If it can be argued that a journalist’s primary motive, and indeed duty,
is to inform the public, particularly in times of crisis, then these
22
Interview with a Serbian-speaking journalist in Kosovo on the 28th of July 2020.
23
Based on various interviews conducted with journalists in July and August of 2020.
24
IBID
25
IBID
26
IBID
15circumstances prevent them from performing the most basic functions
of their jobs.
16III. Lesson 2
Safety is paramount:
The pandemic has had a negative impact on public safety and exposed
authorities’ lethargy in responding to security issues in Kosovo-Serb
communities
The following section will analyse the security situation in Kosovo
Serb communities during the pandemic, with a particular focus to
be placed on perceptions of safety and how this has affected the
relationship between law enforcement and local residents. The
Kosovo Police, occupied and perhaps overburdened with enforcing
COVID-19 measures (i.e. curfews) meant that Serbs were left largely
to fend for themselves in dealing with issues of personal and public
security.
The state of emergency has aggravated an atmosphere of
impunity, particularly in many Serb communities south of the
river Ibar.
Security has always been a top concern for members of the Kosovo-
Serb community. Whether that concern stems from the potential
for inter-ethnic or ethnically motivated incidents, or crime that takes
place within the community itself (i.e. organized and/or street
crime), the sense that criminality and delinquency is on the rise has
been widespread for a number of years.27 What’s more, there is a
generalized sense in many non-majority communities that public
27
See: NGO Active Trend Analyses Reports for the years 2019 and 2018, available at:
http://www.ngoaktiv.org/publications
17institutions do not adequately respond to or investigate criminal
acts in a manner that is reassuring to the general public.
With local and central authorities pre-occupied with a growing
public health emergency, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic
seemingly provided additional space for criminal acts to take place:
Between March and June of 2020, NGO Aktiv recorded more than
twenty (20) incidents of a criminal nature that took place in Serb-
majority communities throughout Kosovo.2829 These incidents
targeted, for the most part, more isolated enclaves in Western
Kosovo as well as communities in Vushtrri/Vučitrn and Obiliq/Obilić
municipalities. Furthermore, a significant number of incidents
occurred in returnee villages and settlements, further feeding into a
sense that these communities, otherwise vulnerable, are particularly
susceptible to ethnically motivated violence and intimidation. As
opposed to other regions, Serb-majority municipalities in Eastern
Kosovo remained less affected by the rise in criminal activity.30
This is part of a larger trend that marked a deterioration in security
situation in many Serb enclaves and villages in Kosovo, which began
in November of 2019 and that gradually intensified with the onset
of the pandemic. Local residents in the Gračanica/Graçanicë
municipality began to report a rise in the number of personal thefts
that took place. This was preceded by reports of
vandalism/destruction of property in the village of Černica/Cërnicë
(Gjilan/Gnjilane Municipality) and was followed by similar acts
28
http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/rapid-response-civic-group-incidents
29
This refers to incidents that Active recorded, using its own resources, from March until
August of 2020. This list is not necessarily comprehensive, in that there is a strong
possibility that more have occurred.
30
Based on interviews with residents of Šilovo, Ranilug and Parteš, held in July and August
of 2020.
18recorded to have been committed against ten returnee homes in the
Novake village in the Prizren Municipality. The as-yet-unresolved
case of arson that occurred when a home in JanjinaVoda
(Obiliq/Obilić/) was burnt down constituted the first in a long series
of attacks on the private property of Serbs throughout Central and
Western Kosovo.31 During the months of April and May, the
incidents took on an increasingly aggressive and even violent
nature, with reports of physical attacks taking place in municipalities
such as North Mitrovica, Pejë/Peć, Istog/Istok, Obiliq/Obilić and
Prishtinë/Priština.
As illustrated by the tables below32, incidents can be placed into
three (3) broad categories:
• Graffiti;
• Vandalism/theft (burglaries and robberies);
• Physical assault and/or in intimidation
31
http://ngoaktiv.org/news/empirica-appeal-in-regards-to-recent-incidents
32
A small number of incidents that occurred between January and March of 2020 have been
included
19Graffiti as a form of intimidation33
Location Municipality Date Source
Pasjane/Pasjan Parteš/Parteshi 07.01.2020. Kosovo
Onlajn
Preoce/Preoc Gračanica/Graçanicë 18.02.2020. KosSev
Preoce/Preoc Gračanica/Graçanicë 08.03.2020. Radio KiM
Gojbulja/Gojbul Vushtrri/Vučtrn 29.04.2020. Radio KiM
ë
Gojbulja/Gojbul Vushtrri/ Vučitrn 30.04.2020. Kosovo
ë Onlajn
Gornje Kusce/ Novo Brdo/Novobërdë 10.05.2020. Kosovo
Kufcë e Epërme Onlajn
Ljubožda/Luboz Istok/Istoku 25.06.2020. Kosovo
hda Onlajn
Klinë/Klina Klinë/Klina 26.07.2020. Radio
Mitrovica
Sever
Incidents of Physical Violence or Intimidation34
Location Municipality Type Date Source
Heavy bodily
injury inflicted on
02.02.2020
North Mitrovica North Mitrovica a Serb youth by a KosSev
.
group of
Albanians
33
Compiled by Igor Marković, Researcher, NGO AKTIV.
34
IBID
20Grizime/ Serb attacked by 26.02.2020 Radio
Kamenica
Grizimë an Albanian . KIM
A group of
Albanians attacked
Suvi Do/ a Kosovo police 17.03.2020 Kosovo
North Mitrovica
Suhodoll officer of Serb . Onlajn
nationality with an
excavator
Bošnjacka A group of
Albanians attacked
Mahala/ 10.05.2020
North Mitrovica two minors of Serb KosSev
Lagjja e .
and Bosniak
Boshnjakëve nationality
Attack/threats
made against a
Radio
Drenovčić/ returnee – 26.05.2020
Klina/Klinë Kontakt
Dranashiq resolved after .
Plus
intervention from
Kosovo Police
Drenovac/ Physical attack on 27.05.2020 Kosovo
Klina/Klinë
Drenoc a returnee . Onlajn
An Albanian
blocked a car
driven by a Kosovo
Serb and verbally Radio
16.05.2020
Pejë/Peć Pejë/Peć insulted him – The Goražde
.
police intervened vac
successfully, and
the perpetrator
was fined
Donja
Five Albanians
Gušterica/ Gračanica/Graça 31.05.2020 Kosovo
attacked a group
Gushtericë e nicë . Onlajn
of three Serbs
Ulët
Radio
Opraške/ A returnee was 12.06.2020
Istok/Istogu Goražde
Oprashka beaten .
vac
21According to
unconfirmed
reports, two Serbs
suffered bodily
injury inflicted by
28.06.2020 Radio
Gazimestan Pristina officers of the
. KiM
Kosovo Police in a
combi (after being
arrested during
Vidovdan
celebrations)
A group of 6
Albanian youths
Babin Most/ 29.08.2020 Kosovo
Obiliq/Obiliq physical attacked a
Babimoci . Onlajn
group of 4 Serb
youths
Attacks on private and public property
and cultural heritage sites35
Location Municipality Type of Incident Date Source
Obiliq/Obilić Obiliq/Obilić Branko Radičević 09.01.2020. KosSev
Primary School
burgled
Cernica/Cërnic Gnjilane/ Unlawful 18.02.2020. Kosovo
destruction of Onlajn
ë Gjilan
private property
Žač/Zallçi Istok/Istogu Desecration of 22.02.2020. Kosovo
headstones in local Onlajn
graveyard
Novake/Novak Prizren Ten homes 23.03.2020. KosSev
burglarized in
u
returnee village
35
IBID
22Novake/Novak Prizren Three homes 25.03.2020. Radio KiM
burglarized in
u
returnee village
Banja/Bajë Skenderaj/Sr Burglary of a 27.03.2020. Radio
private home Goraždevac
bica
Osojane/Osoja Istok/Istogu Theft of an
automobile
n
Janina Voda Obiliq/Obilić Home set on fire 16.04.2020. Gračanica/Gr
(arson) açanicë
Onlajn
Babin Most/ Obiliq/Obilić Theft of agricultural 24.04.2020. KosSev
equipment
Babimoci
Novake/Novak Prizren Home set on fire 25.04.2020. Radio
(arson) Kontak Plus
u
Crkolez/ Istok/Istogu Burglary of a 26.04.2020. KosSev
private home
Cerkolezi
Gojbulja/ Vučitrn/ Attempted burglary 27.04.2020. Radio KiM
of local church
Gojbulë Vushtrri
Cernica/Cërnic Gjilan/Gnjilan Home set on fire 28.04.2020. KosSev
(arson)
ë e
Gojbulja/ Vučitrn/ Window at primary 29.04.2020. Radio KiM
school broken
Gojbulë Vushtrri
(vandalism)
Berkovo/ Klinë/Klina Returnee home set 23.05.2020. Gračanica/Gr
on fire (arson) açanicë
Bërkovë
Onlajn
Sušica/Shushic Gračanica/ Electro-Technical 24.05.2020. Gračanica/Gr
school burglarized açanicë
ë Graçanicë
(computers stolen) Onlajn
Ljubožda/ Istok/Istogu Returnee home 26.05.2020. Radio
stoned Goraždevac
Lubozhda
Orahovac/ Orahovac/ Youths of Albanian 28.05.2020. Radio
nationality remove Kontakt Plus
Rahovec Rahovec
a street sign
23Ljubožda/ Istok/Istogu Returnee home 31.05.2020. Jedinstvo
stoned
Lubozhda
Crkvena Obiliq/Obiliq A total of 85 31.05.2020. Kosovo
chickens stolen Onlajn
Vodica/
from various
Caravodicë households
Home burglarized
Osojane/Osoja Istok/Istogu Two house 02.06.2020. Radio KiM
burglarized
n
Оrahovac/ Orahovac/ House set on fire 14.06.2020. Kosovo
Onlajn
Rahovec Rahovec
Belo Istok/Istogu Home of a returnee 22.06.2020. Radio KiM
burglarized
Polje/Bellopojë
Veliko Klina/Klinë Agricultural 23.06.2020. Kosovo
equipment stolen Onlajn
Kruševo/
from a returnee
Krushevë e family
Madhe
Dubrava/ Istok/Istogu Home of a returnee 25.06.2020. Kosovo
burglarized Onlajn
Dubravë
Gračanica/ Gračanica/ Burglary 27.06.2020. Kosovo
Onlajn
Graçanicë Graçanicë
Gračanica/ Gračanica/ Burglary 02.07.2020. Gračanica/Gr
açanicë
Graçanicë Graçanicë
Onlajn
Prilužje/ Vučitrn/ Agricultural 04.07.2020. KosSev
equipment stolen
Prelluzhë Vushtrri
Lipljan/Lipjan Lipljan/Lipjan Two pensioners 17.07.2020. Kosovo
robbed Onlajn
Vidanje/Videjë Klina/Klinë Shots fired at a 04.08.2020. Kosovo
returnee home Onlajn
Ljubožda/ Istok/Istogu Incident of 28.08.2020. KosSev/OEB
unknown nature S
Lubozhda
(successful police
intervention)
24Požaranje/ Vitina/Vitia Electric cables 21.08.2020. RTV Puls
stolen from private
Pozharan
property
Sredska/ Prizren Damage to the 22.08.2020. Gračanica/Gr
Church of the açanicë
Sredskë
Assumption of the Onlajn
Blessed Virgin
What should be noted here is that it is difficult to ascertain the
specific motives behind such acts, and it is impossible to ascribe
intent in the absence of a criminal trial or investigation. That having
been said, the fact that they took place in isolated communities,
often without prosecution and during a state of emergency, gives
the impression that authorities not take seriously public safety in
those areas.
Of the incidents listed above, only a relatively small number have
seen successful police interventions.36 To local residents in areas
where these incidents occurred, this appeared to be the result of a
certain level of indifference on the part of local authorities.37
Whether or not this is true is a matter of discussion, but the reality
of the situation is that the spike in vandalism, physical assaults and
other similar violations is reflective of a wider pattern that was made
worse by the pandemic; with other, more pressing issues at hand,
institutions were simply unwilling and/or unable to mount a
comprehensive response. This lack of political will to address the
matter is not merely the result of COVID-19 but rather an echo of
pre-existing obstinance when it comes to questions of public safety
in Kosovo Serb communities. Taking this into consideration, and
36
In a limited number of instances, the police reacted immediately and successfully
apprehended or penalized
37
Based on interviews conducted with residents of municipalities in western Kosovo.
25from the perspective of local residents, it is not completely
unreasonable or unrealistic to come to the conclusion that this
provides a certain amount of space for perpetrators to carry out the
acts without having to worry about an aggressive response from the
police or legal system.
That having been said, a number of state institutions have
responded to the rise in incidents. On a number of different
occasions, the Ministry of Communities and Returns issued
statements condemning specific episodes of violence and took
steps to raise the matter both at the central level (Office of the Prime
Minister), the Kosovo Police as well as with international missions
such as KFOR.3839 During a meeting held in June of 2020, the Ministry
took steps to ensure that both KFOR and Kosovo Police were aware
of the security situation and there was general agreement that there
exists a need for greater coordination between the three bodies in
order to address the situation.40 Furthermore, Ministry
representatives have expressed an interest in increasing the scope
and depth of their cooperation with other institutions and the non-
governmental sector in order to respond to the rise in incidents in a
more effective and holistic manner.41 Despite this, the response
from many political actors has been tepid, with no consensus
emerging as to how to move forward or even on how to formulate
a common response.
38
http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/574-cernica-na-udaru-paliku%C4%87a.html
39
http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/545-reagovanje-ministra-na-kra%C4%91u-u-
babinom-mostu.html
40
IBID
41
Interview held with a representative of the Ministry of Communities and Returns in July of
2020.
26Notwithstanding a certain amount of readiness to identify ways of
improving the situation, prosecutions and investigations have
yielded only very limited results. The atmosphere of fear and
perception of impunity have not dissipated and will only worsen if
the state is not able to effectively address the concerns of local
residents. Furthermore, it would be optimistic to think that this issue
will go away when COVID-19 begins to recede – it will undoubtedly
remain a source of great apprehension and distress for many of
Kosovo’s most vulnerable communities unless the government
shows a willingness to act.
27IV. Lesson 3
Access to Services is Unequal:
The Government is not in a position to provide equalized access
to public services to all of Kosovo’s communities.
The situation in terms of the provision of social and other public
services (welfare, healthcare, schooling etc.) in Serb-majority areas
in Kosovo is complicated and mostly handled by institutions that
operate under the legal and financial frameworks of the Republic of
Serbia. The COVID-19 pandemic fostered a situation that strained
service providers and created conditions in which those who were
already vulnerable were left exposed to a worsening of their socio-
economic status. It therefore changed local dynamics to the extent
that, for the first time, Kosovo Serbs sought economic/social
assistance from the Kosovo government in numbers not previously
seen.
This section will analyse the state of public services and the provision
of public assistance during the pandemic, starting from the
healthcare sector.
The pandemic severed essential links between Kosovo and Serbia –
without provision of alternatives. The confusing manner in which
border closures were carried out and the lack of clear information
provided on exceptions to rules applied to border crossings had, at
the beginning of the pandemic, a de-facto effect of blocking access
to healthcare services.
28Healthcare in particular is a domain that is very nearly exclusively
handled by so-called ‘soft parallel’ institutions, and only in relatively
rare instances do Serbs seek treatment from providers in Albanian-
majority areas. This institutional duality has meant that the link(s)
(both institutional/political and geographical) between Kosovo and
Serbia are an essential aspect of public life for Serb communities.
This is particularly true when it comes to the provision of healthcare;
patients are frequently sent for treatment in Serbia, something that
is handled and financed exclusively by the Serbian state. As was
seen when the Government of Kosovo levied a 100% tax on goods
from Serbia, any interruptions to these links can prove to have
drastic and indeed very negative effects on local socio-economic
and political dynamics. Serbs in Kosovo who find themselves in
need of treatment for more serious or chronic illnesses (such as
cancer), or who need care and/or procedures that hospitals and
clinics in Kosovo are not equipped to provide, they are sent for
treatment in cities such as Belgrade, Kraljevo, Kragujevac and Niš. As
will be illustrated in the passages below, border closures and
restrictions on movement can have potentially-life threatening
consequences:
In mid-March of 2020, Kosovo closed its border crossings and
airports to international traffic as part of a set of measures designed
to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.4243 This made the flow of
persons between Kosovo and Serbia practically impossible and
posed immediate problems for patients seeking treatment in Serbia
as well as for medical personnel and ambulance drivers. Among the
requirements introduced when borders were shut was a
42
https://prishtinainsight.com/kosovo-govt-responds-following-first-confirmed-cases-of-
coronavirus/
43
https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/13/balkan-countries-close-border-crossings-to-stop-
coronavirus/
29requirement for anyone entering Kosovo to spend fifteen (15) days
in quarantine44, but no specifications were made as to who would be
exempt from this. At some point after this, it was clarified that this
would not apply to ‘drivers’ and diplomats.45 Nevertheless, the
situation remained confused, and a number of Serb drivers were
nevertheless allegedly placed in various quarantine sites in
Prishtinë/Priština.46
This resulted in a potentially dangerous situation for many residents
of Kosovo, particularly those living in and around Gjilan/Gnjilane
(Eastern Kosovo), who are, due to their geographical location,
particularly reliant on healthcare services provided to them in Serbia.
It was reported that approximately twenty (20) Kosovo Serbs from
that area regularly receive dialysis due to kidney ailments in the
southern Serbian city of Vranje two-to-three times per week.47 As
travel between Kosovo and Serbia became virtually impossible, they
found themselves in a situation where they were (at least
temporarily) unable to access dialysis, something that had the
potential to greatly endanger their health. It was stated by the
Director of the Clinic in Pasjane/Pasjan that while they had managed
to avoid placing the patients in question in quarantine, they were
unable to reach Vranje due to the fact that their drivers who
normally transported them to the hospital there had been placed in
quarantine by Kosovo authorities.48 It was also reported that Kosovo
44
http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a579991/KoSSev-Putnici-sa-Jarinja-kazu-da-moraju-u-Pristinu-
u-karantin.html
45
http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a580495/Karantin-15-dana-za-svaki-ulazak-na-Kosovo-
izuzetak-vozaci-i-diplomate.html
46
http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a579991/KoSSev-Putnici-sa-Jarinja-kazu-da-moraju-u-Pristinu-
u-karantin.html
47
https://www.kosovo-online.com/koronavirus/problem-bubreznih-bolesnika-iz-kosovskog-
pomoravlja-20-3-2020
48
https://www.radiokontaktplus.org/vesti/bubrezni-bolesnici-sa-kosova-moraju-na-dijalizu-
a-njihovi-vozaci-u-izolaciju/24831
30authorities did not work with local institutions in Kosovo-Serb
communities to identify potential alternatives, such as the provision
of treatment in healthcare centres operating under Kosovo’s
institutional framework. While this situation was later rectified, it was
nonetheless reflective of the insufficient level of communication and
the weak institutional links between Serb communities and central-
level governing authorities.
It must also be mentioned here that access to healthcare services
was unclear due to alleged practices pursued by providers in Kosovo
Serb communities. It was reported that clinics and hospitals began
to accept patients only if they presented with symptoms of the
COVID-19 virus:49 Widely circulated among media outlets in Serbia
was the story of a medical student from Kenya (resident in Belgrade)
who died after complaining of stomach pains but was denied
treatment there due to the fact that he did not have COVID
symptoms.50 Although there seems to be no written policy that
instructed healthcare institutions (run and financed by the Republic
of Serbia) to delay or refuse assistance for problems other than
COVID-19, it appears that there was an assumption circulating
among some of the general population that this was the case.51 In
the absence of more concrete and comprehensive research, it is
difficult to determine whether or not this had a serious effect on
public health, but the fact that many were under the impression that
such a practice existed does speak to the level of strain under which
healthcare providers operated.
49
Based on interviews held between June and August of 2020. No official information was
provided that can confirm this, but anecdotal evidence suggests that a number of persons
seeking assistance for other ailments were turned away. It is difficult to confirm how
widespread this practice was.
50
https://nova.rs/vesti/drustvo/tragicna-sudbina-studenta-iz-kenije-ceka-se-uzrok-smrti/
51
Based on interviews held between June and August of 2020
31Economic aid/relief was not distributed equally.
In late-March of 2020, the newly formed Kurti government passed a
package of measures52 (known as ‘Measure 15’) aimed at alleviating
the negative socio-economic effects of the lockdown and the
ensuing cessation of most commercial activity.53 This foresaw the
doubling of social welfare payments, individual payments of €170
for the months of April and May (to cover lost or reduced salaries),
as well as additional supplemental payments of €100 for employees
in food shops (including bakeries), pharmacies and higher payments
of €300 for workers who are exposed to the risk of infection.54 On
top of this, the package included monthly payments of €130 to
those who lost their jobs as the result of the pandemic.55 These
monthly financial assistance payments (for April and May) were
geared at citizens in difficult social conditions, who are registered by
relevant institutions as being unemployed and who are not
beneficiaries of any monthly welfare payments from Kosovo’s
budget. The then-government (Kurti) budgeted a total of €3,000,000
(three million) for this aid.56
The Ministries and government charged with distributing this aid
launched an online platform through which potential beneficiaries
can apply and be approved for assistance, depending on their
52
https://www.danas.rs/politika/vlada-kosova-usvojila-15-mera-za-prevazilazenje-
ekonomskih-posledica-pandemije/
53
i.e. the shutting down of restaurants, cafes, shops, shopping centers and other commercial
enterprises and businesses.
54
https://kossev.info/kosovska-vlada-usvojila-veci-novcani-paket-pomoci-za-gradjane-
zbog-posledica-pandemije/
56
Information compiled by AndjelkaĆup, Gračanica Online
32individual circumstances and eligibility. Soon after this happened, a
large number of problems were noted that included a lack of or low-
quality information in the Serbian language that was distributed
across a confusing array of websites of ministries and government
agencies.57 In other words, there were long delays in the translation
of information and instructions on the technical details of
application procedures (from Albanian into Serbian), making it
difficult for potential beneficiaries in Kosovo-Serb communities to
seek and apply for payments envisaged as part of Measure 15.
Furthermore, it was reported that social welfare centre(s) in Serb-
majority municipalities were unable to offer assistance.58 Although
it should be noted that the system in place was confusing and
numerous technical problems were reported by members of all
communities, the fact that the low quality of information provided
in Serbian language to Serbian residents and Serbian media outlets
meant that non-Albanian speakers found themselves at a very
distinct disadvantage. These issues were not limited to the Serbian
communities: numerous complaints were also reported from the
Gorani and Bosniak communities, whose representatives reported
that their members faced widespread difficulties in submitting
applications for economic assistance.59
57
http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/issues-of-non-majority-communities-with-the-
implementation-of-a-package-of-measures-to-counter-the-economic-impact-of-the-
coronavirus
58
IBID
59
Information compiled by NGO Aktiv
33Timeline of Events60:
- On the 30 March, 2020, the government led by Albin Kurti
(which had already fallen after a vote of no-confidence),
launched a financial aid package geared those who were left
most vulnerable due to the COVID-19 pandemic’s economic
consequences, which envisaged: monthly financial
assistance payments to the tune of €130 in April and May to
citizens in difficult social conditions, who are registered by
relevant institutions as being unemployed and who are not
beneficiaries of any monthly welfare payments from
Kosovo’s budget. The then-government budgeted a total of
€3,000,000 (three million) for this aid.
- A statement made to the media was not made available
in Serbian until the 3rd of April, which contained
information that instructed citizens that forms and data that
is sent by e-mail or that is delivered physically must be clear
and complete and that all applications that are not will be
denied.
- On the 21st of May the Kosovo Postal Service announced to
Albanian-language media outlets that it had begun
distributing payments of €130 to beneficiaries. However,
Serbian-language media were not informed directly but
were forced to translate texts from Albanian-language
outlets in order to transmit this information to their
readers or listeners.
- On the 22nd of May 2020, the Ministry of Finance and
Transfer announced that they had launched a hotline (080
044 440) where those who applied for assistance can track
60
Information compiled by Andjelka Ćup, Gračanica Online
34the status of their request/application or to appeal a
decision. As was stated, appeals will be reviewed by an
Appeals’ Commission and the deadline for their submission
is the 15th of June. An e-mail address (ankesa.mft@rks-
gov.net) was also opened for the receipt of appeals to
rejected applications.
- The Kosovo Finance Minister, HikmetaBajrami, stated on the
29th of June that payments within the framework of Measure
15 had been made to ‘families that do not have a single
member currently employed.’ On her Facebook profile, she
added that those whose requests for financial assistance had
been approved would be able to access funds the following
day. Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti confirmed this, adding that
funds could be withdrawn until the 12th of August.
- In Mid-August some citizens began receiving SMS alerts that
they can withdraw the money from any branch of the Kosovo
Post, which were immediately followedby notifications that
the alerts in question had been sent erroneously.6162
61
Message 1 reads: “Dear Sir or Madam: We’d like to inform you that in accordance with
Measure 15, you are a beneficiary of 130 EUR in monthly support for June of 2020. Funds
can be withdrawn starting from the 12th until the 20th of August at the nearest branch of the
Post Office.
62
Message 2 reads: “Dear Sir or Madam: The SMS that you received on 11.08.2020 was
technical mistake in the lists of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. We’d like to inform
you that your application for 130 Euros in monthly assistance under Measure 15 is denied
and it is therefore unnecessary that you visit a post office branch. We apologize for this
oversight.”
3536
- A new statement that was issued shortly thereafter only in
the Albanian language by the Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare informed citizens (if they didn’t receive an SMS) that
they can file an appeal to municipal social welfare centres
until the 31st of August.
- Payments of €130 were made beginning on the 12th of
August for May and June. While no final deadline was
specified by the Kosovo Government for the withdrawal of
funds, the Finance Ministry informed beneficiaries via SMS
messages that payments would be made by the 21st of
August. However, that same day, the Director of the Kosovo
Treasury, Ahmet Ismaili, made a statement (that was only in
Albanian) the deadline had been pushed back until the 28th
of August.
- As of the 12th of September 2020, there is no official
statement available in Serbian that clarifies whether or not
the payments covered by Measure 15 have been completed,
how much money has been paid, or how many applications
for assistance were rejected.
As is illustrated in the above timeline, the Kosovo Government did
not make a concerted effort to ensure that non-majority
communities in Kosovo were fully aware of the technical procedures
necessary for access to economic assistance. This is perhaps the
37result of already-weak channels of communication between various
communities as well as between central institutions and Serbian-
language media outlets. This resulted in a situation where access
to relief measures was unequal and uneven and where there was
de-facto favoring Albanian-speaking citizens due to linguistic
and other similar issues.
Many Kosovo Serb communities are overly reliant on aid and
assistance from international organizations and the Republic
of Serbia.
Due to weak institutional linkages and inadequate communication,
many Kosovo Serb communities, particularly more isolated ones,
have found themselves in a position during the COVID-19 pandemic
where they are heavily reliant on assistance provided to them by
international organizations and the government of Serbia. Although
often facilitated by the Ministry of Communities and Returns, the aid
packages that were distributed in various communities scattered
throughout Kosovo were largely financed either by international
organizations or NGOs (such as International Organization for
Migration and the European Union) or by Serbian government
agencies. These initiatives included:63646566
63
http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/584-podeljeno-253-prehrambenih-i-higijenskih-
paketa.html
64
http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/527-dopremljeni-lekovi-i-insulin-za-istok-i-
klinu.html
65
http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/572-najugro%C5%BEenijima-na-severu-kosova-
uru%C4%8Dena-pomo%C4%87.html
66
http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/584-podeljeno-253-prehrambenih-i-higijenskih-
paketa.html
38- 300 hygiene and 300 food packets were distributed in April
of 2020 throughout the four municipalities of northern
Kosovo;
- Hygiene and food packets were distributed to 253 families
living in thirteen (13) municipalities in Kosovo (as part of the
EU-funded project ‘Return and Reintegration in Kosovo – 5th
Phase);
- Distribution of medicine to residents of the Istog/Istok and
Klinë/Klina municipalities;
39V. Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper attempted to provide a broad overview of the challenges
faced by the Kosovo Serb community during the COVID-19
pandemic and to analyse what the crisis has taught us about the
relationship between non-majority communities and central-level
governing authorities and institutions. As has been stated on a
number of occasions in this text, the emergency has not created but
rather highlighted a range of pre-existing problems in that
relationship. It also shed light on those issues in a very stark manner
because in times of crisis the health and wellbeing of the citizenry
hinges on their ability to seek essential information and, when
needed, assistance from state institutions. If this ability is hindered,
and lines of communication are not established, then the level of
risk faced is ever greater. In this sense, the Kosovo Serb community
faces a situation where they are faced with a form of de-facto
discrimination in that they do not receive the same treatment that
the majority does: Their media does not receive information in their
language, institutions do not follow the law and issue instructions in
the absence of official translations, aid is distributed unevenly and
the legal system and law enforcement agencies do not invest the
time and energy into addressing questions of public safety. All of
these feed into a widely held perception that Kosovo Serbs are
ignored and that the challenges they face are not taken seriously. If
this is not addressed in a comprehensive, structural and holistic
manner there is potential for long-term damage to be done to for
the overall future of Serbs in Kosovo.
40Recommendations:
Communication
1. The Government of Kosovo needs to adopt clear principles
for communication with non-majority communities and to
respect constitutional and legal provisions for the use of the
Serbian language as one of Kosovo’s official languages. All
written statements and decisions must be available to the
media and wider public in both official languages and press
conferences should have simultaneous translation available.
Government agencies must also improve their bi-lingual
presence on social media, using as an example the Ministry
of Local Self-Government, whose social media posts are
almost always translated into Serbian;
2. For the Office of the Language Commissioner to fully utilize
all mechanisms at its disposal to monitor communication
between the general public through major channels such as
social media and SMS messaging. It should immediately
draw attention to failures to disperse information in Serbian
language, and indeed be proactive in alerting institutions to
these failures and in identifying those responsible in order to
generate additional impetus to respect language rights,
particularly in emergency situations where the provision of
pertinent information is key;
413. Taking into consideration the fact that the vast majority of
the adult population is in possession of a smartphone, the
government should, as soon as possible, launch a bi-lingual
Android/iOS application that would act as an
information/resource hub. This would streamline
communication from all state agencies and act as a means
of creating institutional linkages. This application should be
created and made available before winter of 2020-2021.
4. The Government of Kosovo and its Ministries need to
establish clear and sustainable channels of communication
with Serbian-language media outlets in order to ensure that
they receive the same information that their Albanian
counterparts do. Having this in mind, a permanent liaison
mechanism should be established to facilitate effective
and fruitful communication. This should take place by
November of 2020, in advance of any potential ‘ next
wave’ of infections;
5. For public institutions to, as soon as is feasible, organize
a public information campaign through traditional and
social media that will be developed based on common
misconceptions about the COVID-19 virus. This campaign
should directly address unverified rumours, and work to
encourage citizens to respect and follow measures
recommended by public health authorities. This group
should also include representatives of healthcare institutions
operating in Kosovo Serb communities. Any public
information campaign needs to be tailored to the
specificities of Kosovo’s multi-ethnic context with a specific
focus on the most-used social media platforms (Facebook,
Twitter etc.) ;
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