A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond: JANUARY 2021 U.S. Institutional Commitments in a New Geo-strategic Environment
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JANUARY 2021 A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond: U.S. Institutional Commitments in a New Geo-strategic Environment
Acknowledgments “A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond: Advancing Institutional Commitments in a New Geostrategic Environment” was a virtual workshop, sponsored in part by Carnegie Corporation of New York, and co-convened by the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House and the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. The workshop was held over two half days on October 15-16, 2020. Report Author William Burke-White, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, Inaugural Director, Perry World House (2014- 2019), Non-Resident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Perry World House is a center The Foreign Policy program at
for scholarly inquiry, teaching, Brookings is a leading center
research, international exchange, of policy-relevant scholarship
policy engagement, and public exploring the rapidly re-
outreach on pressing global ordering geopolitics of the great
issues. and major powers, and the
Perry World House’s mission is to bring
disordering relations among
the academic knowledge of the University states and transnational actors.
of Pennsylvania to bear on some of the
world’s most pressing global policy Our scholars provide concrete policy
recommendations for how U.S. strategy, the
challenges, and to foster international international security architecture, and key
policy engagement within and beyond allies should adapt to changing threats and
the Penn community. opportunities.
Located in the heart of campus at 38th America’s conduct of foreign policy demands
Street and Locust Walk, it draws on the that, as a nation, we address the dual realities
expertise of Penn’s 12 schools and of new threats and opportunities in a world
numerous globally-oriented research that is more connected and interdependent,
centers to educate the Penn community where technology has eclipsed traditional
and prepare students to be well-informed, understandings of borders and security. The
contributing global citizens. At the same Foreign Policy program, under the direction of
Vice President and Director Suzanne Maloney,
time, Perry World House connects Penn has two goals:
with leading policy experts from around
the world to develop and advance 1. To understand the dynamics of world affairs
innovative policy proposals. and the challenges they pose to the
international community.
Through its rich programming, Perry
World House facilitates critical 2. To influence policies and institutions in the
conversations about global policy United States and abroad that promote
challenges and fosters interdisciplinary sustainable peace, security, and prosperity
research on these topics. It presents around the world.
workshops and colloquia, welcomes The Foreign Policy program conducts its
distinguished visitors, and produces research through its 18 centers, projects, and
content for global audiences and policy initiatives, housing a team of independent
leaders, so that the knowledge developed experts with expertise ranging from military
at Penn can make an immediate impact reform to the geopolitics of energy.
around the world.
Perry World House—its programs and the
building itself—builds on Penn’s strengths
in teaching, interdisciplinary scholarship,
and policy-relevant research. By doing so,
it cultivates the broad worldview, critical
thinking, and leadership required to
address the most urgent issues of global
affairs.
@perryworldhouse @BrookingsFP
facebook.com/perryworldhouse facebook.com/brookings
@perryworldhouse @brookingsinstContents Background 5 Executive Summary 5 Part I: The New Landscape of U.S. Multilateral Policy 6 The United States as an Outsider in the Multilateral Space 6 China’s Emergence as a Global Institutional Influencer 7 A Divided America 8 Part II: “The Philadelphia Principles for Multilateral Policy” 9 I. Global Principles 9 II. Partnerships and Cooperation Principles 11 III. Domestic and Bureaucratic Principles 13 Part III: Action Items for the Biden Administration 16 Part IV: Conclusion 17 Annex I: List of Participants 18 Annex II: List of International Institutions 19 Endnotes 20
A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
Background bureaucratic context of multilateral
engagement. Two principles operate at the
global strategic level. First, the United States
On October 15 and 16, 2020 the University of must recognize that the multilateral order is
Pennsylvania’s Perry World House and the now defined by great-power rivalry, particularly
Foreign Policy Program of the Brookings with China, and respond in kind. Second,
Institution jointly convened a virtual, non- addressing transnational threats, especially
partisan workshop to assess the state of U.S. climate change, must be the fundamental goal
multilateral policy and develop strategic of U.S. multilateral strategy. The next two
recommendations for U.S. reengagement with principles shape how the United States builds
the international order under the next and stewards alliances. First, multilateral
administration. This report draws on those approaches should start with the countries
conversations, taking into account the that share U.S. values and commitment to
subsequent outcome of the 2020 U.S. democracy. Second, successful multilateralism
presidential election, to assess the shifting requires the strategic use of multiple
global landscape of multilateralism, develop a institutions, including informal processes,
set of principles to guide U.S. multilateral club-models, and non-binding commitments.
efforts going forward, and offer concrete The final two principles guide bureaucratic
action items for a new administration seeking reform and domestic political engagement.
to re-engage the international order. While the First, multilateral priorities must be integrated
report includes inputs and insights from the into overall U.S. diplomatic strategy, especially
range of substantive academic and policy by leveraging the strengths of bilateral
experts listed in the appendix, it is not intended relationships. Finally, multilateral objectives
to reflect the consensus view of participants must align with the values the United States
nor does it carry their endorsement. embodies at home and the interests of the
American people.
Executive Summary While the implementation of these principles
As the Biden administration takes office, it is critical to the effectiveness of U.S.
confronts a radically transformed global multilateralism over the long term, the new
landscape in which it must advance a range of administration must also take a series of
U.S. priorities through multilateral policy tools, concrete steps to re-engage the multilateral
including international institutions, order early in the new term. In substantive
international law, and multilateral diplomacy. areas including national security, international
Neglect of the international order and exits economics, and transnational threats, there
from international commitments under the are politically viable, substantively meaningful,
Trump presidency have positioned the United and symbolically powerful actions that can
States as a relative outsider in the multilateral advance U.S. interests and enhance the U.S.
policy space, decreasing its leverage and position in the international order. The report
influence. Simultaneously, a rising China has proposes several key early steps, some of
become far more effective and assertive in which the Biden administration has already
shaping international norms and setting the begun, including continuing the processes of
agendas of international institutions. Even rejoining the Paris Agreement and the World
with unified Democratic control of the U.S. Health Organization (WHO), and negotiating
government, the new administration’s policy an extension to the New Strategic Arms
options are severely constrained by deep Reduction Treaty (New START). Over the
political divisions over America’s role in the course of the next four years, the Biden
world and the value of the international order. administration must also build the foundation
This new landscape demands fresh approaches for even more significant multilateral moves,
to how the United States works with its including ratifying the United Nations
partners, confronts its rivals, and advances its Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
interests multilaterally. reforming the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and strengthening the global
The six “Philadelphia Principles” proposed in architecture of climate governance. Operating
this report can guide the United States toward consistently with these six principles and
more effective multilateralism and involve taking significant but politically feasible steps
shifts to its global strategic approach, changes toward reform and reengagement will ensure
to how the United States builds and stewards that multilateral policymaking can advance
partnerships and alliances, and a renewed the well-being and security of the American
focus on the domestic political and people.
5A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
Part I: The New Landscape The United States as an
of U.S. Multilateral Policy Outsider in the Multilateral
As the United States begins to re-engage the Space
international order under new presidential
leadership in 2021, it faces a drastically Despite the fact that the United States served
reorganized geopolitical landscape for as the primary architect of the international
multilateral policymaking.1 Three significant institutional order some 75 years ago,2 today it
shifts characterize this new multilateral finds itself as a relative outsider in the
environment. First, the United States finds multilateral policy space. For much of the Cold
itself an outsider in the multilateral policy War era, U.S. leadership involved security
world. During the Trump administration, the commitments to broad coalitions of aligned
United States has exited numerous states. In the post-Cold War era, U.S. leadership
international organizations, stepped back focused largely on the provision of public
from leadership roles within others, and goods. As the United States has retreated
withdrawn from numerous international legal from both of these functions over the past
commitments. Second, China has emerged as four years, its allies and adversaries alike have
a rival in multilateral affairs. Under President Xi doubted, questioned, and even challenged its
Jinping, China has meaningfully enhanced its leadership. Going forward, to reassume a
prominence in the multilateral system both by leadership role in the international system, the
virtue of its increasing geopolitical power and United States will have to find ways of both
strategic efforts to set the agenda within offering security and backstopping the global
multilateral institutions. Third, multilateral provision of public goods.
policy has become politically divisive at home. The United States’ new outsider status stems
Growing skepticism of international institutions in part from a long history of under-investment
and commitments in both political parties will in the very institutions that the United States
require the new administration to carefully championed after World War II but has been
steward political capital. While President markedly exacerbated during the Trump
Biden has committed to “restor[ing] [U.S.] administration.3 Over the past four years, the
credibility and influence” on the world stage, United States has exited an unprecedented
he will have to develop strategies that are able number of international institutions and legally
to operate in this significantly altered global binding commitments. Specifically, the United
landscape. States has withdrawn or begun the withdrawal
U.S. Initiated Exits U.S. Threatened Exits
Institutions Treaties Institutions
• UN Human Rights • Paris Climate Accord • World Trade Organization
Council (UNHRC) • Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (WTO)
• World Health • Open Skies Treaty • North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (WHO) Organization (NATO)
• Joint Comprehensive Plan of
• UN Economic, Social Action (JCPOA) • Universal Postal Union
and Cultural (UN)
Organization • Intermediate Nuclear Forces
Treaty (INF) • United Nations (UN)
(UNESCO)
• UN Relief and Works • Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Agency (UNRWA) Convention on Diplomatic
Relations
• Global Compact on Migration
6A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
process from four key institutions: The UN and international institutions that the United
Human Rights Council,4 the World Health States does not prioritize its commitment to
Organization,5 the United Nations Economic, the international order and may no longer be
Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),6 a reliable partner. As a result, the United
and the United Nations Relief and Works States finds itself isolated in the multilateral
Agency.7 So too, the United States has policy environment, looking in on institutions
terminated, withdrawn from, or indicated that it was once a part of, watching as alternate
it will not ratify a number of significant leadership patterns emerge, and receiving,
international treaties including the Paris rather than setting, global agendas.
Climate Accord,8 the Trans-Pacific
Partnership,9 the Open Skies Treaty,10 the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA/ China’s Emergence as a Global
Iran Deal),11 the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty,12 the Optional Protocol to the Institutional Influencer
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,13 Concurrent with a U.S. retrenchment from the
and the Global Compact on Migration.14 multilateral architecture, China has assumed
Beyond these actual exits, the Trump global prominence in multilateral diplomacy.
administration at times threatened to China’s newfound role results from both its
withdraw from several institutions, a few of increasing economic and political weight and
which comprise the bedrock of the from a strategic effort under President Xi
international order including the World Trade Jinping to assert influence in international
Organization (WTO),15 the North Atlantic institutions. Addressing the UN General
Treaty Organization (NATO),16 the Universal Assembly in 2020, Xi called on the UN to
Postal Union,17 and even the UN itself.18 Not all recognize China’s political clout: “The global
of these exits or threatened exits are of equal governance system should adapt itself to
consequence, of course, but many—the WHO, evolving global political and economic
the WTO, and NATO among others—have real dynamics.”21 This demand for recognition has
significance. Collectively, they symbolize a translated into concerted campaigns for
distinct turn away from the international Chinese leadership within and beyond the
institutional order. These exits were part of UN. Chinese nationals now lead four of the
Trump’s “America First” strategy that fifteen UN Specialized Agencies—far more
systematically sought to reduce U.S. than any other country—including the UN
multilateral commitments. In the words of Food and Agriculture Organization,22 the
then Secretary Pompeo: “Our mission is to International Civil Aviation Organization,23 the
reassert our sovereignty, reform the liberal International Telecommunications Union,24
international order ... Our administration is and the UN Industrial Development
thus lawfully exiting or renegotiating outdated Organization25 and previously led the World
or harmful treaties, trade agreements, and Health Organization26 and INTERPOL.27 In
other international arrangements that do not 2020, China ran a significant campaign for
serve our sovereign interests…”19 one of its nationals to lead the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
While these exits comprise but a which was only thwarted by last minute U.S.
small slice of the U.S. overall and European diplomacy.
portfolio of institutional and legal While many of the organizations China leads
commitments, they are may not be household names, they have
considerable influence in shaping rules,
substantively and symbolically norms, and policies. China is now actively
significant. asserting its newfound influence to steer
multilateral institutions towards its own
Substantively, across a range of policy interests. For example, under the leadership
domains from arms control to global health, of Margaret Chan, the WHO significantly
trade to climate, the United States has scaled back disease surveillance efforts,
relinquished its voice in multilateral which became readily apparent in the
institutional settings, sacrificing its ability to organization’s COVID-19 response.28 At the
influence and shape institutions and policy International Civil Aviation Organization,
trajectories from within in favor of what China has pushed to exclude and marginalize
Secretary Pompeo described as an effort to Taiwan.29 Taking advantage of its seat in the
“reassert our sovereignty.”20 Symbolically, UN Human Rights Council, China has sought
these exits signaled to foreign governments
7A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
to limit the roles of UN Special Rapporteurs the incoherence of Trump’s “America First”
“to shield Beijing from scrutiny of its abuses.”30 foreign policy, it created political space within
At the International Telecommunications the Republican party to question the value of
Union, China has endeavored to generate international institutions, the utility of
support for its own Digital Silk Road initiative31 multilateral policy, and the benefits of a global
and backed Huawei in its disputes with the order.38 Within the Democratic party, populist
United States.32 Beyond these individual policy and progressive voices alike have questioned
shifts, China’s expanding multilateral the alignment of the international order with
leadership sends a powerful signal that China’s America’s values and whether that order
position and interests must be respected. benefits the American people. Senator Bernie
Sanders, for example, has denounced
Over the past decade, China has built the international trade agreements as “threat[s]
capacity and shown the willingness to link its to our democracy”39 and progressive thinkers
bilateral diplomacy with its multilateral policy have urged the party to focus more on how
objectives. The vast financial commitment of foreign policy impacts “economic inequality
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has given at home” than on the stability of the
China significant new leverage over individual international order itself.40
countries across the globe and China is now
showing a willingness to tie these financial These political divides reflect—and are
commitments to support in multilateral policy reflected in—the American people’s shifting
settings.33 In its campaign for leadership of the views of international organizations and
Food and Agriculture Organization and in the cooperation. In the 2020 election, more than
above-mentioned race for the directorship of 74 million Americans voted for Donald Trump,
WIPO, China directly linked major economic at least tacitly backing an “America First”
and development commitments for countries approach to foreign policy. Pew Research
such as Uganda and Cameroon to their Center data from 2020, suggests that while
support of its candidates,34 and China has 62% of Americans view the UN favorably, 31%
used its power within the UN, particularly at view it unfavorably.41 The divisions on party
the UN Industrial Development Organization, lines are stark: while only 35% of Republicans
to cloak its Belt and Road Initiative in the guise believe the “UN advances the interests of
of international development, encouraging countries like ours,” 77% of Democrats do.42 A
more than 30 UN agencies to sign memoranda 2020 report from the Carnegie Endowment
of understanding in support of the BRI.35 China for International Peace underscored the
has built mutually reinforcing synergies skepticism of many middle class Americans
between its bilateral and multilateral diplomacy that the international system advances their
that cement its new global leadership and interests and the need to correct “for the
threaten U.S. influence. overextension that too often has defined U.S.
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.”43 In
short, there is no domestic political consensus
A Divided America that the United States can or should invest
significantly in the international order itself or
For most of the past 75 years, the basic U.S. that it can best advance its interests through
commitment to, investment in, and leadership multilateral action. While the 2020 election of
of the international order has stood strong.36 President Joe Biden signals a shift away from
Of course, successive American governments Trumpism and “America First, divides within
have differed on exactly how that commitment the American government and people remain.
should translate into policy, but the These divides and the growing politicization
commitment itself remained firm. Today, of international commitments will constrain
however, the United States finds itself deeply the new administration and circumscribe U.S.
divided—both across party lines and within multilateralism.
the Democratic and Republican parties—as to
whether leadership of the international order
remains in the U.S. national interest. In his
inaugural address, President Trump directly
questioned the value of operating through the
multilateral system, noting, “We’ve made other
countries rich while the wealth, strength and
confidence of our country has disappeared
over the horizon … From this moment on, it’s
going to be America First.”37 Notwithstanding
8A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
Part II: “The Philadelphia I. Global Principles
Principles for Multilateral Principle 1: The multilateral order
Policy” is now defined by great power
Collectively, the U.S. position as an outsider in competition, especially with China.
the multilateral policy space, China’s
emergence as a global institutional influencer, Going forward, the United States must
and an America divided over its own role in recognize that the multilateral order has
the world have fundamentally altered the become a geopolitical space of great power
geostrategic context of U.S. engagement with competition, notably with China but also with
the multilateral order. This is not the other competitors such as Russia. China’s far
environment President Obama operated in in more assertive approach within multilateral
2009, much less the one President Clinton institutions and its quest for leadership roles
inherited in 1993. Rather, this new landscape within those institutions, as outlined above,
requires a new approach involving decisive will continue and accelerate.44 The contestation
shifts in the U.S. strategic and tactical approach over institutional leadership recently seen in
to the international institutional system. The both the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
Perry World House and Brookings Foreign and the World Intellectual Property
Policy workshop developed a new set of Organization is indicative of challenges China
guiding principles, referred to here as “The will present in the years and decades ahead.45
Philadelphia Principles”, that should inform China and Russia will continue to use
the U.S. approach to multilateral and multilateral fora both to advance their own
international legal policy at three distinct interests and to disrupt U.S. leadership
levels within the international system: globally, efforts.46 Recent examples, such as China’s
among U.S. key partners and allies, and in exploitation of its seat on the UN Human
domestic and bureaucratic politics. Rights Council, to which it was reelected in
I. Global Principles
• 1. The multilateral order is now defined by great power competition,
especially with China.
• 2. Addressing transnational threats, especially climate change, must
be a fundamental goal of U.S. multilateral policy.
II. Partnerships and Cooperation Principles
• 3. Multilateral approaches should start with the countries that share
U.S. values and commitment to democracy.
• 4. Successful multilateralism requires the strategic use of multiple
institutions, including informal processes, club-models, and non-
binding commitments.
III. Domestic Political and Bureaucratic Principles
• 5. Multilateral priorities must be integrated into overall U.S. diplomatic
strategy, especially by leveraging the strengths of bilateral
relationships.
• 6. Multilateral objectives must align with the interests of the American
people and the values the United States seeks to embody at home.
9A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
October 2020, to block criticisms of its actions advance its own agenda through complex
in Xinjiang and Hong Kong47 and Russia’s strategies across multiple institutions.
effort to disrupt U.S. leadership of UN working
groups on cyber-norms likely foreshadow Finally, the United States must develop new
future power competition.48 To an ever greater approaches to working with competitors
degree, the functioning of multilateral where interests align.50 Such issue-specific
institutions will be defined by great power cooperation remains essential to the
rivalry and contestation. functioning of the international architecture as
a whole and to advancing U.S. interests.
For the United States to effectively advance Similarly, international legal agreements,
its interests in this context of multilateral great especially with great power rivals, can bound
power competition, it too must engage in competition in ways that make the United
great power contestation in these multilateral States more secure and prosperous.51 The
institutions. To do so, the United States must need for cooperation, particularly as it relates
recognize that the ability to shape the rules of to transnational threats is urgent. However,
the international order is critical and that the that need must not blind the United States to
mere fact that the United States was the underlying great power competition
instrumental to the establishment of that playing out within international institutions
order does not ensure long-term leadership or nor can the United States be seduced into
influence. The United States must invest believing the international environment is
political and economic capital in the fundamentally one of cooperation.
maintenance and reform of the international
institutional order, even where such investment
may not yield short term benefits. Principle 2: Addressing
transnational threats, especially
So too, the United States must climate change, must be a
continue to earn its voice within— fundamental goal of U.S.
and leadership at—the multilateral
table by ensuring its own conduct at multilateral strategy.
home and abroad conforms with Transnational threats, including climate
international norms and rules such change, human movement, and pandemic
disease, present growing and potentially
that it is viewed as a consistent and existential threats to the United States and the
committed shepherd of the system.49 globe. The scientific evidence on the risks of
global warming to human welfare and
In its multilateral strategy and diplomacy, the wellbeing is not new.52 If anything, the risks of
United States must be vigilant of and prepared catastrophic impacts of climate change are
to check (where appropriate) competitors’ accelerating.53 The refugee crises of past
efforts to alter norms or assert authority within decades underscore the human and security
the full range of multilateral institutions. Those risks posed by unmanaged migration.54 The
competitors have taken advantage of both COVID-19 pandemic has shown all too clearly
U.S. exits from some institutions and a narrow the economic and human cost of pandemic
U.S. focus on highly visible institutions, such as disease.55 The potential interplay of climate
the UN Security Council, to gain influence change, population displacement, and
within lesser known institutional settings and pandemic disease could increase these risks
outside the UN system. Similarly, the United exponentially. Multilateral policy coordination
States must begin to see the connections is indispensable to any effective approaches
among institutions in the system which its to mitigating, managing, and preventing these
rivals may use to drive policy and influence. and other transnational threats.
The multilateral policy space is no longer a set
of individual institutions in issue-specific silos While bearing in mind the environment of
but rather a single chess board on which gains great power competition in which multilateral
in one institution can have consequences in policy now operates, the United States must
others. Competitors will use influence in one focus its multilateral efforts to an ever-greater
institutional context or issue domain as degree on collective global responses to
leverage across the broader multilateral transnational threats. It is essential to
architecture. The United States must be cooperate through international institutions
prepared to respond to these moves and to and legal agreements in responding to these
10A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
threats to U.S. security and prosperity.56 Such commitment to a core set of common values,
efforts must establish and affirm basic norms including democratic governance and human
and rules to govern transnational issues, rights.58 Partnerships built on such shared
encourage deeper commitment and values will be more robust than mere interest-
compliance by broad coalitions of states, and based alliances. They are far more likely to
strengthen institutional architectures for stand firm in the face of competition from
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. rivals who do not share them.59
To do so, the United States must make
meaningful (and potentially costly) Even where interests may not align
commitments of its own, invest politically and
economically in critical institutions, and in the short-term, shared values
exercise targeted global political leadership offer a strong foundation from
that expands consensus in advancing effective
solutions. which to identify commonalities,
look over the time horizon at
Transnational challenges may present
opportunities for alignment of interests, even
broader interest conversion, or even
among great power rivals, in international shift preferences that ultimately
institutional settings. U.S. diplomatic strategies align policies.60
must seek to identify, accentuate, and act on
those potential interest synergies, building Building coalitions of states that share U.S.
coalitions that, where possible, include even values is ultimately the best way to confront
allies and rivals alike.57 At times, the imperative great-power rivals and to advance collective
to address transnational threats through multilateral goals in the face of great power
collective multilateral policy may be in tension competition. The primary great-power rivals
with the need to check great-power rivalry in to the United States—China and, to a lesser
multilateral settings. In such cases, the United extent, Russia—espouse very different values
States will need to find ways of advancing and governance structures. Our very
collective goals without ceding institutional commitment to rights and democracy may in
advantages or allowing rivals freedom of and of itself threaten and check non-
action. In some circumstances, it will be democratic rivals.61 Even where potential
necessary to identify and operate through partners of the United States—from Europe to
alternative institutional arrangements that India, South Africa to Australia—may find
circumvent uncooperative rivals. Ultimately, common economic interests with China or
the success of U.S. multilateral policy and U.S. Russia, a values-based partnership with the
collective security for decades to come will United States will help ensure that they stand
turn on the efficacy of U.S. response to with us when it matters. Such partnerships
transnational threats through the full range of can significantly increase our leverage in
multilateral tools. multilateral institutions, as demonstrated by
the recent rejection of the Chinese candidate
II. Partnerships and to lead WIPO after a concerted U.S. diplomatic
effort to court countries that share our values.62
Cooperation Principles Coalitions based on shared values can also
offer a strong foundation for new initiatives,
Principle 3: Multilateral institutions, and clubs that address both
transnational threats and political challenges.
approaches should start with the Through such new initiatives, a group of states
countries that share U.S. values bound together by shared values and
commitments to democratic governance may
and commitment to democracy. be able to build redundancies into the
international institutional architecture to step
Effective multilateralism requires working with in where universal institutions are gridlocked
other states to advance common interests. As or ineffective. Their mere existence may
the United States considers which states to pressure traditional, global institutions to
work with in various contexts, shared interests reform and deliver results. So too, such a
and values will, no doubt, be critical. In building group may be able to tackle issues that rivals
coalitions, establishing cooperation, or like China or Russia are unwilling to address or
designing club governance models, U.S. would stymie. Political objectives with
multilateralism should start first with a countries such as Iran or North Korea that
11A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
require multilateral policy coordination may China’s unfair trade practices or Russia’s
be better addressed through such values- cyber-operations.
based coalitions than through global
institutions that have repeatedly failed to act.
Ultimately, these new initiatives can make the Principle 4: Successful
international order more resilient and more multilateralism requires the
effective.
strategic use of multiple
Values-based partnerships, however, require
consistent stewardship that has been all-too-
institutions, including informal
lacking over the past four years. That lack of processes, club-models, and non-
stewardship may well explain the willingness
of Europe—a natural values-based partner—to binding commitments.
enter into a new investment agreement with
China at the end of December 2020.63 To Traditionally, the United States has advanced
consistently encourage values-based policies multilaterally through formal
partnerships, the United States must first international institutions, including the UN
recommit to its own democracy at home. U.S. Security Council, certain subsidiary bodies
commitment to values and democracy with the UN, the World Trade Organization,
appears weak after four years of a Trump the International Monetary Fund, and the
presidency and, particularly, after the January North Atlantic Treaty Organization, among
6, 2021 attacks on the U.S. Capitol.64 others.72 This is not surprising given the
preferential position the United States holds in
several of these organizations, their structural
In restoring its commitment to powers, and their ready availability. Yet, these
rights and democracy, the United institutions are becoming less effective due to
political gridlock,73 lack of policy consensus,
States also clearly signals to the and the growing influence of U.S. rivals.74 Many
global community that it lives and of these traditional institutions require
stands by the values it expects of its significant reform and even reimagination to
regain their effectiveness. Over the long-term
partners, thereby enhancing U.S. the United States must be committed to
credibility at a time when many are meaningful reforms of these organizations
that rejuvenate their political energy,
beginning to doubt the long-term reestablish their effectiveness, and realign
reliability of American leadership.65 their policies with the interests of the American
people.75
Beyond its borders, the United States must
invest significantly in building values-based While the United States cannot ignore these
partnerships. President-elect Biden’s proposed traditional international institutions,
Summit of Democracies66 is a potentially multilateralism today demands a more creative
promising first step, provided it is not mere and flexible approach. Where traditional
window-dressing.67 Cultivating values institutions appear ineffective, the United
partnerships requires deeper and more States must be ready to turn to or even build
sustained engagement beyond what any new institutional structures, just as U.S. rivals
summit alone can provide, including have done.76 Among the most effective of
connections across and throughout networks these alternate international structures may
of government and civil society.68 A range of be ad hoc coalitions, informal processes, and
mechanisms must be employed, from Boris issue-specific partnerships. Such initiatives
Johnson’s nascent proposal to invite a broader offer numerous benefits including the potential
group of democracies to the G-7 annual to build a coalition with the will and capacity
meeting,69 to a proposed D-10 democracies to act on a particular issue, the possibility of
forum,70 or an alliance framework for excluding rivals or spoilers where necessary
democratic technology policy.71 Once strong and including them where appropriate, the
values-based relationships are built, the United ability to prioritize shared values in building a
States will need to turn to like-minded partners coalition, and the capacity to take on politically
first in its multilateral diplomacy to develop a divisive global issues. The United States must
policy consensus and a common approach. recognize that a range of less prominent
Only then can the collective values-based existing institutions may be effective venues
partnership confront rivals on issues such as for norm generation, policy coordination, and
12A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
implementation. For any given issue the hoc partnerships and issue-specific
United States must carefully and strategically cooperation.
select the institution(s) most likely to advance
its transnational interests in the context of When the United States seeks to formalize
great power rivalry.77 structures for international cooperation or
lock-in international commitments, it usually
Within this variable geometry of international turns to the tools of international law,
institutional engagement, the club model particularly international treaties.82 Of course,
offers perhaps the most attractive yet the formal mechanisms of international law
underutilized opportunity. In a club-model, still have an important role to play in U.S.
states are given the opportunity to join an foreign policy, but the United States must also
exclusive group based on their own be more creative in the use of non-binding
commitments and policies on a relevant agreements, voluntary commitments, “soft
issue.78 Other criteria, such as upholding rights law,” and informal mechanisms of rulemaking.
and democracy, can also be considered. Critically, these approaches to international
Benefits adhere to those within the club and agreement avoid the notorious political
are denied to those outside. Correctly difficulty of treaty ratification by the U.S.
designed, the pull of club membership may Senate.83 They can be structured to allow more
expand the pool of participating states.79 The politically palatable individualized
club model offers particular promise in the commitments, as illustrated by the voluntary
climate space, where a like-minded “coalition commitments of the Paris Climate
of nations [could] commit to strong steps to Agreement.84 They can evolve overtime to
reduce emissions and mechanisms to penalize reflect shifts in U.S. interests, global norms,
countries that do not participate.”80 Similar scientific innovation, or geostrategic context,
clubs could help address a range of as exemplified by the evolution of the Tallinn
transnational challenges in which limited Manual on the International Law Applicable to
public-good resources must be shared and Cyber Operations.85 Finally, such rules can
managed. more effectively engage non-state and sub-
state actors, whose participation in rule-
The United States should become a making and implementation is of growing
urgency, through instruments such as the
leader in the establishment and Chicago Climate Charter.86
operation of such clubs on key
transnational challenges, alongside III. Domestic and
or—where necessary—instead of Bureaucratic Principles
traditional international
institutions. Principle 5: Multilateral policy
To operationalize this more flexible and varied must be better integrated into U.S.
approach to multilateral diplomacy, the United
States must become far more strategic and global diplomatic strategy.
creative in how it maps particular multilateral
policy priorities with existing and potential Within the U.S. government, multilateral policy
institutional architectures. Within the U.S. has long operated in its own bureaucratic and
government bureaucratic restructuring must diplomatic silo, walled off from—and usually
facilitate a holistic vision of the overall secondary to—bilateral diplomacy. That silo-
international institutional architecture, ing limits the effectiveness of both U.S.
whether such capacity is built within the multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. In today’s
Bureau of International Organizations at the more competitive global landscape, effective
State Department or at the National Security multilateralism requires deeper integration of
Council (NSC).81 In U.S. diplomatic practice, these two co-equal pillars of diplomacy. More
multitasking is needed to work numerous specifically, bilateral diplomacy must be
issues simultaneously in overlapping understood as a cornerstone of multilateral
institutions. So too, the United States must policy action. Relationships must be developed
commit the political will and diplomatic capital and issues must be worked both in national
to engage and steward a larger number of capitals and at institutional headquarters in
international institutional structures. Finally, New York, Geneva, and beyond. Only when
this approach demands strong bilateral that groundwork is laid can allies and partners
diplomacy that can lay the foundation for ad be called upon to join the U.S. in advancing
13A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
collective interests multilaterally. Multilateral foreign policy work better for America’s
diplomacy can and must be part of U.S. middle class.”91 Trump’s “America First”
bilateral diplomacy, assisting allies and rhetoric has exacerbated this growing
checking adversaries in multilateral arenas. perception of a disconnect between U.S.
While the United States should not adopt foreign policy on one hand and American lives
China’s transactional approach to these and livelihoods on the other. The result is a
linkages, it must be prepared to operate in a widening partisan divide over whether the
world in which competitors make explicit United States should support and work
bargains that leverage bilateral and multilateral through the UN and other international
diplomacy.87 institutions.92 American skepticism of global
engagement and a stark partisan split within
Various initiatives have suggested reforms to the U.S. government undermine the
enhance U.S. multilateral diplomatic capacity effectiveness of U.S. multilateral diplomacy.
and better link multilateral and bilateral The political lift to pass legislation relating to
efforts.88 Given the urgency of transnational international organizations, much less ratify a
threats, and the growing multilateral treaty, is enormous. Political efforts at global
capabilities of U.S. rivals, the time for such leadership and financial investments in
reform is now. While it is beyond the scope of international institutions are rarely rewarded
this report to fully detail the needed changes at the ballot box. U.S. allies and partners are
in bureaucratic capacity, several common ever more doubtful that U.S. engagements
elements emerge. First, at a strategic level, and commitments will be durable beyond a
multilateral and bilateral diplomacy must be given presidential administration.93
understood as equally critical to advancing
U.S. interests.89 On any issue, U.S. foreign Ultimately, for U.S. multilateral diplomacy to
policy strategy must consider both bilateral effectively advance U.S. interests and respond
and multilateral action and the potential to pressing transnational threats, the American
synergies between them. Second, the United people and the U.S. government as a whole
States must invest in training Foreign Service must come to see such efforts as beneficial,
Officers and civil servants in multilateral even indispensable, to U.S. security and
diplomacy.90 Third, multilateral diplomacy prosperity.
must be elevated in stature and respect, such
that it is no longer viewed as a step-child to The purpose of multilateralism is to
bilateral diplomacy. Fifth, the International
Organization Bureau at the State Department advance the interests of the
and the multilateral affairs directorate at the American people. That requires,
NSC must be vested with a broader remit to
coordinate engagement across a wider array first, listening to and understanding
of international institutions, including those those interests and, second,
outside the UN system. Finally, Deputy advocating for those interests
Assistant Secretary-level leadership on
multilateral engagement is needed in both through multilateral diplomacy.
regional and functional bureaus at the U.S.
Department of State. At times, particularly in the international trade
and economic sphere, U.S. multilateral policy
has diverged from the immediate interests of
Principle 6: Multilateral objectives average Americans. On issues such as trade
and investment, meaningful policy realignment
must align with the interests of the and institutional reforms will be needed to
American people and the values ensure the international order serves
Americans’ interests.94 In other domains, such
the United States seeks to embody as human rights and security, the United States
at home. must ensure that multilateral policy priorities
truly reflect the values that define America.95
Economic and political shifts of the past On issues such as climate change and
decades have led many Americans, particularly pandemic disease, the U.S. must ensure that
the middle class, to conclude the international international institutions and multilateral
order does not serve their interests or advance efforts, such as the WHO and the UNFCCC,
their livelihoods. A recent Carnegie actually work to counter transnational threats
Endowment report observes that “middle that endanger American wellbeing.96
class Americans … stressed how prior
administrations had not done enough to make A second critical component of restoring the
14A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
Transnational Threats Global Economics International Security
Immediate The United States
should continue the
The United States
should recommit to the
The United States
should re-enter security
Steps processes launched on
day 1 of the Biden
World Trade
Organization by:
treaties that had been
allowed to terminate or
administration to rejoin were exited, including:
institutions that address 1. Allowing for the
transnational threats, appointment of 1. Renegotiate and
including the Paris Appellate Body Judges. rejoin the Joint
Agreement and the Comprehensive Plan of
World Health 2. Institutionalizing Action (JCPOA)
Organization, and U.S.-China trade
demonstrate tangible disputes through the 2. Negotiate extension
commitment to these WTO. to the New START
organizations. treaty.
Longer-term 1. Strengthen the
UNFCCC climate
1. Transform the
international trade
1. Build political support
to ratify for UNCLOS
Goals negotiations through
active U.S. leadership.
system to better serve
the interests of the 2. Develop stronger
American people. cyber governance
2. Develop alternate structures (e.g. through
club-style governance 2. Steward domestic 2015 GGE norms list).
models on climate and international
change. political capital toward
a new pacific-trade
3. Renew domestic agreement/club that
human rights and racial reflects America’s
justice commitments interests.
and reflect these values
in international actions.
confidence of the American people in with the American people demands that our
multilateralism is better communication of the government and our diplomats truly hear and
positive impacts multilateral leadership and understand their interests, needs, and
international institutional engagement has for aspirations.
the American people. Too often, the
contributions of multilateral efforts to ***
American wellbeing go unseen. The chorus of
voices criticizing multilateralism is loud and The Philadelphia Principles offer a broad
persistent.97 A new approach to communication roadmap for a new U.S. approach to
must emphasize that multilateralism is not an multilateralism that responds to a starkly
end in and of itself, but a critical toolkit to altered geopolitical landscape. These
advance specific interests and priorities of the principles seek, first, to recognize that
American people. Such a strategy must multilateral arenas are now a space of global
directly link tangible outcomes that benefit competition and to respond to the increasing
Americans with our investments in, dangers posed by transnational threats. They
commitments to, and leadership of serve as a reminder that shared values can
international institutions. Such a strategy must motivate effective policymaking and refocus
demonstrate why collective action through attention on the potential value of alternative
multilateralism is absolutely essential both to institutional structures. Finally, they highlight
addressing transnational threats, like climate the importance of both building synergies
change and global pandemics, and to between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy
protecting American security in light of a and better understanding Americans’ interests
growing Chinese threat. While better and values. Collectively, they frame a set of
messaging capabilities will be needed within strategic and tactical changes to U.S.
the U.S. government, better communication
15A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
multilateral policy, institutional engagement, The Biden administration’s day 1 actions,
and international legal commitments that will including launching the process of rejoining
better prepare the United States to operate in the Paris Climate Agreement98 and halting the
the competitive multilateral environment that withdrawal from the World Health Organization
lies ahead. were important first steps.99 Now the United
States must demonstrate tangible
Part III: Action Items for commitments to these processes through
international engagement and domestic
the Biden Administration implementation. The United States should use
any leverage it can gain from its reentry to
push for needed reforms of both the climate
The Philadelphia Principles outlined in Part II and health governance architectures.
offer a broad reframing of how the United
States should approach multilateral affairs in
light of a new geostrategic environment. While Over the course of the next four
these principles chart a path toward greater years, the new administration must
effectiveness of multilateral policy over the
medium-term, tangible steps must be taken significantly strengthen the capacity
early in the Biden administration to re-engage and resilience of the international
the international order, reverse where
appropriate detrimental exists over the past
institutional architecture to respond
four years, and restore U.S. credibility in the to transnational threats.
eyes of U.S. allies and partners. Over the
longer-term, political capital must be built and To do so, the Biden administration should
shepherded for urgently needed issue-specific strengthen the UN climate process through
multilateral actions throughout the next four active leadership within the United Nations
years. Given the pressing nature of many Framework Convention on Climate Change
transnational challenges and the relative U.S. while simultaneously pursuing new club based
absence from the multilateral scene under models for climate governance.100 The United
President Trump, the institutions and issues States must also reaffirm its commitment to
calling for U.S. attention are nearly endless. universal human rights by first advancing
Yet, the new Biden administration is highly human rights and racial justice at home and
constrained with limited financial resources, a then reflecting those values in its foreign
deeply divided domestic polity, a tenuous policy.
majority in the Senate, and a depleted
bureaucracy. In addressing global economics and trade, the
new administration must move quickly to
In light of those constraints, careful strategic recommit to the World Trade Organization
choices must be made about where and when both by facilitating the appointment of judges
to deploy political capital. The Perry World to the WTO Appellate Body (which were
House and Brookings Foreign Policy workshop blocked under the Trump administration)101
developed a set of priority action items in and by institutionalizing its trade disputes,
three broad issue domains: transnational particularly with China, in the WTO system.
threats, global economics, and international Ultimately, a strong WTO serves U.S. interests
security. In each issue area, workshop and concerted efforts at the WTO with its
participants identified one to two immediate allies will increase U.S. leverage against
steps and several longer-term goals for the China.102 Over the longer term, the United
new administration, as indicated in the table States will be well served to champion a
below. These proposed actions seek to meaningful reform of the WTO system and the
maximize restoration of U.S. leadership and rules of international trade to better align with
credibility in the international order, the interests of the American people, rather
contribution to addressing pressing than letting its rivals write rules that serve
transnational threats, and the reimagination of their interests.103 Only once such reform efforts
the international order to better serve the bear fruit visible to the American people, can
interests of the American people in light of the United States advance a new version of
real political and financial constraints. the Trans-Pacific Partnership that will secure
U.S. economic and political interests in the
Given the critical role multilateral action must Asia Pacific and counter China’s Regional
play in addressing the growing risks posed by Comprehensive Economic Partnership
transnational threats, U.S. multilateral policy (RCEP).104
must prioritize these collective challenges.
16A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond
Finally, in the international security space, the shift global norms and rewrite the rules of the
new administration must prioritize using the road. The American people’s confidence that
multilateral framework and international legal multilateral engagement advances their
commitments to buttress the safety of the interests and values could soon be irreparably
American people from both traditional and broken.
new threats. As an immediate matter, that
demands renegotiating and rejoining the Joint To avoid this dangerous world in which
Comprehensive Plan of Action to prevent the America’s influence has been squandered,
development of an Iranian nuclear weapon105 other powers can unilaterally write the rules of
and negotiating an extension to the New the global order, and collective responses to
START treaty with Russia.106 Over the longer- transnational threats prove illusive, the United
term, the Biden administration must both States needs a bold new approach to
build the political support necessary for the multilateralism.
ratification of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which will Such an approach requires new
significantly increase U.S. leverage in
addressing China’s growing naval capacities,107 thinking in our global strategy,
and lead a process toward the development of changes to how partnerships and
more effective and enforceable cyber security
norms to address the threat of cyber conflict.108
alliances are built and stewarded,
and renewed attention to domestic
The need for re-engagement, reform, and politics and bureaucratic structures.
restoration of the international order and U.S.
engagement with that order is overwhelming. The Philadelphia Principles can
As the Biden administration begins that effort guide U.S. multilateral policy in that
in light of a new geostrategic environment, a
series of early steps, ideally within the first one direction.
hundred days of the new administration, must Globally, the United States must recognize
reverse the most counterproductive moves of that international institutions are now defined
the past four years, signal to its partners and by great power competition and respond in
allies that the United States is returning to the kind. Simultaneously, the United States must
multilateral table, and begin to show the work zealously to advance solutions to
American people that the multilateral system pressing transnational challenges—notably
can serve their interests. Other key priorities climate change. In building partnerships and
require a longer-term effort that builds support alliances, the United States must put values
with allies and partners, with the American first and prioritize working with countries that
people, and within the legislative branch. Small share common commitments to human rights
steps now, a concerted effort to build strong and democracy. To an ever-greater degree the
values-based partnerships, and meaningful United States must adopt a variable approach
engagement with the American people can to the institutions it uses, focusing efforts both
pave the way for those bolder moves in the in traditional fora and on a broader array of
years to come. informal institutions and non-binding
commitments. In domestic political and
Part IV: Conclusion bureaucratic processes, U.S. policymakers
must better integrate multilateral and bilateral
The United States is at a critical juncture in its diplomacy strategically and structurally so
engagement with the global institutional and that these two pillars of U.S. diplomacy are
international legal order. In light of a radically mutually reinforcing. Finally, and perhaps most
changed geostrategic and domestic political critically, the U.S. government must ensure
landscape, the U.S. ability to effectively that multilateral policy objectives actually
advance its interests through the international serve the interests of the American people.
institutions it created 75 years ago is waning. Collectively, these principles can make
Longstanding underinvestment in international multilateralism an effective tool to advance
institutions and recent exits from international American interests and ensure lasting U.S.
commitments could leave the United States a influence in a more competitive global
permanent outsider in the multilateral policy landscape.
space. Rival powers, notably China, could soon
cement leadership roles and lasting influence With the Philadelphia Principles guiding a new
in international institutions that allow them to U.S. approach, the Biden administration must
take immediate steps to re-engage the
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