Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa: Emerging Trends and Enduring Challenges

Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa:
   Emerging Trends and Enduring Challenges
               Prepared by: Alex Simon

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In recent years, civil society organizations (CSOs) have played an increasingly central role in
advancing political, social, and economic progress throughout the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region. The Foundation for the Future (FFF) is proud to work alongside these groups as
they continue to grow and develop. As part of this mission to foster an active, vibrant civic space
across the region, FFF has emphasized the importance of systematic, scholarly research to
stimulate informed discussion on how best to support MENA civil society at this critical juncture
in its history. The goal of this research is to generate knowledge regarding the rapidly changing
dynamics of MENA civil society, and use that knowledge to engage domestic, regional, and
international stakeholders in an informed dialogue regarding how best to solidify civil society as
a force for change in the region.

With that in mind, FFF has carried out or supported a number of research studies over the past
four years. In 2011, FFF partnered with FRIDE, a Spanish think tank, to produce reports on
“Assessing Democracy Assistance” in Jordan, Palestine, and Pakistan. Between 2011 and 2013,
it carried out detailed mapping studies in Algeria, Jordan, Libya, and Tunisia in order to evaluate
the current dynamics of civil society in those states. In 2012 FFF conducted a study on
networking and cooperation among MENA CSOs. These reports focus on action-oriented, policy
relevant analysis, providing recommendations for CSOs, donors, and MENA governments. FFF
seeks to disseminate this research to all relevant stakeholders in order to bridge the gap between
scholarship and implementation.

In addition to these projects, FFF provided support for research projects executed by partner
organizations, including a study on Jordanian civil society by al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center
(UJRC) in 2010 and a 2013 study by the al-Badeel Center for Studies and Research that explored
the growth of Jordanian youth movements following the 2011 Arab uprisings. Moreover, many
of the CSOs that FFF supports across the region have undertaken their own research campaigns,
producing 17 publications in 2012. By supporting such projects, FFF aims to equip MENA civil
society with the tools to cultivate a self-sustaining, knowledge-generating dialogue that will
strengthen the efforts of CSOs and their supporters to enhance civil society’s position in the
region.

The purpose of this report is to draw on this body of research (particularly FFF’s mapping
studies, networking study, and UJRC’s study on Jordan) to identify key trends that have emerged
in civil society across the MENA region. The ultimate goal is to provide all relevant
stakeholders—including MENA governments, the international community, and CSOs
themselves—with a brief overview of the most pressing issues facing MENA civil society today;
comparative insight into the trajectory of civil society in different MENA states; and concrete
recommendations to strengthen civil society throughout the region.

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FFF’s mapping studies employed written questionnaires and interviews with CSO leaders to
evaluate the state of civil society in each of the four countries under study, emphasizing the shifts
that have taken place since the popular uprisings of 2011. These studies focused on CSOs active
in the field of advocacy, in keeping with FFF’s mandate to work with groups promoting a more
democratic and open civic space throughout the MENA region. The UJRC study had a similar
purpose, although it was undertaken in 2010. With support from FFF, CIVICUS, and the United
Nations Development Program, UJRC evaluated Jordanian civil society on the basis of the
CIVICUS Civil Society Index, distributing a survey to 121 CSOs from different sectors and all
12 Jordanian provinces.

                          Table 1. Background on FFF Mapping Studies

                Period of Study             Launch Date       Sample
FFF Algeria     February 2012 - July 2012   December 2012     40 CSOs in human rights advocacy

FFF Libya       July 2012 - February 2013   September 2013    40 CSOs in diverse advocacy fields

FFF Jordan      April 2012-June 2012        September 2012    19 CSOs active in political reform

FFF Tunisia     July 2012-December 2012     January 2013      30 CSOs in human rights and
                                                              democratization advocacy

This report seeks to bridge a longstanding gap in systematic, scholarly research on MENA civil
society by synthesizing FFF’s own field-based studies with other elements of the existing
literature to provide, to the fullest extent possible, a three-dimensional portrait of key trends in
MENA civil society. This synthesis focuses on four states with diverse political trajectories, and
thus offers comparative perspective into the various dynamics in play across the region. Tunisia
and Libya both underwent regime change in 2011, and both have embarked on large-scale
processes of political restructuring. Jordan did not undergo regime change, but witnessed a surge
in activism and widespread calls for reform, resulting in a number of changes to the country’s
political landscape. Algeria was the least affected of the four, with its political fabric remaining
largely intact.

That being said, it should be noted that this report is not intended as a comprehensive study of
civil society across the MENA region, but rather as a starting point from which to approach
future research and policy discussions. A few limitations are worth mentioning. First, the report
focuses on four MENA states, three of which are in North Africa; further research is thus
required to gain a more geographically diverse picture. Second, the individual mapping studies
are limited in their sample sizes, partially as a result of FFF’s focus on advocacy-oriented
groups. Third, the country-specific studies are not standardized, either in their timeframes or
their substance. And finally, some of the issues addressed by these studies—such as

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organizational capacity and indicators of internal governance—are difficult to measure, and
require more in-depth study.

In addition to stimulating discussion around general trends in MENA civil society, this report
aims to highlight areas in need of further exploration. As noted above, issues such as
organizational capacity and internal governance demand more detailed study, as they are both
difficult to quantify and critically important to the strength of civil society. FFF hopes to initiate
a new round of research geared toward filling in such gaps, and toward this framework to civil
society in other MENA states, such as Egypt and Yemen, in order to add further depth to the
conversation on regional dynamics.

                             The Changing Fabric of MENA Civil Society

Civil society in the Middle East and North Africa has undergone profound changes since the
popular uprisings that began in December 2010. Before that point, much of the region was
characterized by a tradition of weak civil society, as restrictive legal frameworks and a
widespread culture of silence prevented the emergence of robust civic spheres. There were, of
course, exceptions to this trend: some states, such as Morocco and Lebanon, had active civil
sectors prior to 2011. The overall pattern, however, was one of enforced weakness. As one
analyst put it: “In Tunisia and in authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the region, civil society
groups were heavily regulated, restricted and often banned. Regimes will often tolerate, contain,
control and even co-opt the remaining CSOs for their own purposes.”1

Following the 2010-2011 uprisings, however, a number of states witnessed both an opening of
the legal environment and an upsurge in popular support for CSOs, leading to a rapid
proliferation in civil society groups. One key factor was increased legal space, as some states
made significant changes to the legal frameworks governing civil society. This was
complemented by a wave of revolutionary spirit throughout the region, marked by surging
optimism and a desire to effect real, long-term policy changes, which led to an increased
eagerness to participate in community organizations. Moreover, CSOs played a key role in the
protest movements in some MENA states, and this further fueled the desire for participation.

In addition to this numerical expansion, MENA CSOs have also undergone substantive
transformations in their compositions and functions. Perhaps most notably, many MENA CSOs
have been departing from their traditional focus on service provision and moving toward more
pronounced roles in the field of advocacy. This is a critical shift, as it reflects these CSOs’
increasing willingness to assert themselves in the political arena. This move toward greater

1
 Shelley Deane, “Transforming Tunisia: The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia’s Transition,” International Alert,
February 2013, 8.

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advocacy has been accompanied by an increasingly prominent role for women and youth, and a
growing emphasis on empowering these historically disempowered demographics.

Tunisia

Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the transformation of Tunisian civil society over the past
three years has been among the most dramatic in the region. Even before the revolution, Tunisia
had, at least numerically, a formidable CSO presence, with roughly 10,000 groups registered
nationwide before 2011. FFF’s research found, however, that this number presented a somewhat
distorted image of Tunisia’s civic sector, as many—if not most—of these groups were inactive
and served primarily to enhance the Ben Ali regime’s claims of supporting community life. 2

This weakness was due, in part, to the country’s restrictive legal framework governing CSOs.
Tunisia’s Associations Law of 1959 required that any new CSO obtain a visa from the Ministry
of the Interior, which was entitled to reject any organization’s application without offering
justification. Even groups that were granted visas were subject to a 4-month waiting period
before they could begin operations. The law was particularly restrictive with regards to foreign
organizations or organizations run by foreigners. Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior was
given the power to dissolve those groups found in violation of the law, and to fine or imprison
their members. Human Rights Watch stated in 2012 that this law “had been used to imprison
thousands of opposition party activists.”3

Following the revolution, however, Tunisia witnessed a marked opening of its legal space,
replacing the previous associations law in September 2011 with a much more progressive
alternative (discussed in more detail below). This, combined with surging community spirit and a
widespread desire to achieve lasting change, produced a rapid proliferation of Tunisian CSOs,
with some 5,000 new groups established within two years of the uprising. 4

Perhaps even more important than this numerical explosion were the qualitative shifts observed
among Tunisia’s CSOs. These groups emerged at the forefront of the revolution, which helped
ensure that the new generation of CSOs would be more heavily involved in shaping Tunisia’s
political sphere than their predecessors. These groups quickly began to assert themselves in the
field of advocacy, espousing a range of causes such as human rights, democracy and citizenship,
social development, and gender equality. As one analyst put it, the “corporatist CSOs of Ben
Ali’s adaptive authoritarian regime have been replaced with a network of CSOs assisting with
Tunisia’s transformation.” 5

2
  “Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia,” Foundation for the Future, January 2013, 12.
3
  “World Report 2012: Tunisia,” Human Rights Watch.
4
  “Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia,” 7.
5
  Deane, 21.

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To understand the importance of this shift, one need look no further than Tunisia’s ongoing
national dialogue. In the past several months, there have been mounting strains within Tunisia’s
political transition, marked by the assassination of two secular opposition leaders and increasing
polarization between the secular opposition and the Islamist ruling party, al-Nahda. Against this
tense backdrop, four CSOs—led by the Tunisian General Labor Union, long at the forefront of
Tunisian civil society—have stepped in to broker a broadly inclusive national dialogue process;
this has led one analyst to remark that “the lesson from Tunisia is that a stronger civil society is a
guarantor of progress.”6

Tunisian civil society also reflects a larger regional trend toward increasing representation of
women and youth, and toward an increasing focus on empowering these groups. Even before the
revolution, Tunisia was home to a number of groups with a focus on women’s rights, most
notably the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women and the Association of Tunisian Women
for Research and Development. The number of such groups has increased rapidly since the
revolution, with 68 new CSOs focused on women’s rights established in the first two years since
the revolution.7 This growing women’s movement includes a current of religious women
“publicly advocating for women’s rights on the basis of a religious scholarly perspective,”
pushing back against an emergent Islamist current whose views are often at odds with women’s
empowerment.8

Libya

Throughout the reign of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, Libyan civil society was anemic—even
by regional standards. The late dictator once summarized his thoughts on this subject, declaring
that civil society was “a bourgeois culture and an imitation of the West that has no place here.” 9

This attitude was institutionalized in Libya’s draconian associational laws, which presented
almost insurmountable obstacles for Libyans wishing to establish CSOs. The most recent
iteration of this legislation was Law 19 of 2001, which required that new organizations have their
own headquarters and at least 50 founding members, that they gain approval from the security
forces, and that they include government officials within their leadership. It also outlawed
cooperation with foreign organizations and required government signoff for all foreign
donations. 10 The result was that, under Qaddafi, Libyan civil society was virtually nonexistent;

6
  Hassan Mneimneh, “Tunisia’s National Dialogue is a Post-Arab Spring Success Story,” German Marshall Fund,
October 22, 2013.
7
  “Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia,” 12.
8
  “The End of the Beginning: Tunisia’s Revolution and Fighting for the Future,” The International Civil Society
Action Network, April 2012, 4-5.
9
  “Gaddafi Says No to NGOs,” News 24, January 29, 2010.
10
   Barah Mikail, “Civil Society and Foreign Donors in Libya,” AFA, FRIDE, and HIVOS, 2013, 2

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Mercy Corps found that there were only 22 CSOs registered in Libya before the revolution, and
it was impossible for them to operate effectively. 11

Libyan civil society underwent a particularly dramatic transformation during the country’s
uprising and subsequent civil war. In the early days of the National Transitional Council (the de
facto government established in February 2011 and lasting until August 2012), Libyans were
allowed to form new CSOs simply by submitting their contact information to the Ministry of
Social Affairs. Meanwhile, the toll of the uprising and ensuing conflict stimulated an increased
demand for humanitarian and charitable organizations, and—as discussed above—revolutionary
fervor spurred Libyans toward greater participation. The result was that, by July 24, 2011, there
were 250 registered CSOs in Benghazi alone—over 10 times the number nation-wide from 6
months before.12 By August 2013, over 3,000 Libyan CSOs had been established, though not all
remained active following their foundation. 13

These CSOs initially focused on service provision, meeting the demands generated by a
revolution-turned-civil war; they provided medical and humanitarian assistance as well as
psychological treatment. Increasingly, however, Libyan CSOs have been setting their sights on
advocacy, pushing the government for progress in areas such as women’s and minority rights. 14
This remains an uphill battle in a country largely dominated by militias, but Libyan CSOs’
increasingly ambitious role in effecting political change is nonetheless reflective of a broader
trend toward more assertive CSOs throughout the MENA region.

Libya, like Tunisia, has also witnessed increasing participation by women and youth, and an
increasing focus on women’s rights. While this phenomenon is still in its early stages and Libyan
women have not yet achieved equal representation in civil society, the very presence of
organizations such as the Voice of Libyan Women—a group dedicated to empowering Libyan
women and combating gender-based violence—is indicative of a fundamental shift away from
the absolute repression of the Qaddafi era.

Algeria and Jordan

While the cases of Libya and Tunisia are instructive, they cannot be viewed as representing the
region as a whole. As two of the four states that underwent regime change in 2011, Libya and
Tunisia’s expanding civil sectors represent the far end of the spectrum; other states witnessed
more modest civil society growth, and some experienced little or no real progress.

11
   “Beyond Gaddafi: Libya’s Governance Context,” Mercy Corps, August 2011, 7.
12
   Ibid., 7.
13
   Fadil Aliriza, “Libya’s Unarmed Revolutionaries,” Foreign Policy, August 16, 2013.
14
   Ibid.

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A study of Algeria and Jordan provides insight into the trajectory of civil society in those states
that did not undergo regime change in 2011. Algeria, for its part, reflects the fact that some
MENA states experienced little concrete change during 2011 despite the regional upheaval. In
2004 Algeria’s Ministry of the Interior estimated the presence of some 5,000 active associations
throughout the country, but these organizations have traditionally been—and remain today—
limited in their capacity and impact, partly as a result of the legal framework in which they
operate. These circumstances have remained relatively consistent; indeed, the Algerian
government passed a new Associations Law in January 2012 that is widely considered even more
repressive than previous legislation.

Jordan represents an intermediate case between the relative stasis of Algeria and the upheaval in
Libya and Tunisia. The Hashemite Kingdom witnessed a surge in popular protests beginning in
2011; these never approached the revolutionary scale of events in Libya and Tunisia, but they
nonetheless sparked an increasingly vocal debate about the need for reform in Jordan. This
ongoing dialogue has widened the arena for Jordanian CSOs to influence the country’s politics.
There were not, however, any basic structural changes capable of precipitating the sort of
fundamental transformation witnessed in Libya and Tunisia.

The events of 2011 came against the backdrop of over two decades of rapid civil society
expansion in Jordan, with the number of CSOs doubling since 1989. In its 2010 report, URJC
pointed to some 5,700 organizations with over 1.5 million members. 15 These groups, however,
had limited practical impact, owing in part to a restrictive legislative framework and habitual
interference by the Jordanian security services.

In addition to these external challenges, Jordanian CSOs generally suffered from internal issues
such as opaque, non-democratic governance and a lack of professionalism. Jordanian lawyer and
activist Sameer Jarrah has argued: “The fact that NGOs themselves are not necessarily
democratic and lack transparency and good governance practices, such as oversight, has eroded
their credibility and blunted the impact of their work and advocacy.” He thus claimed that the
“existence of a large [Jordanian] civic sector is...a façade that is merely part of the regime’s
survival strategy.”16

That being said, one area in which Jordanian CSOs have, in recent years, been more effective
than their peers in many MENA states is in advocating for women’s rights. URJC found that
women’s organizations “have achieved remarkable successes in the last two decades such as
allocating a quota for women in parliament and municipal councils, and enhancing women's
representation in government among other prominent organisations.” 17

15
  “The Contemporary Jordanian Civil Society,” Al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, 2010.
16
  Sameer Jarrah, “Civil Society and Public Freedom in Jordan,” The Brookings Institution, July 7, 2009, 10
17 “The Contemporary Jordanian Civil Society,” 29

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Key Challenges Confronting MENA CSOs

There can be no doubt that civil society has made important strides in a number of MENA states.
It is also clear, however, that Arab societies face significant obstacles in overcoming a history of
political exclusion and developing robust civil sectors. In addition to the persistence of
problematic association laws, the relative novelty of civil society in most MENA states means
that a large proportion of CSOs lack the knowledge and capacity needed to concretely impact
their communities.

While it is difficult to accurately assess an organization’s impact in a given field, FFF’s research
has conveyed a general sense that MENA CSOs are not making as meaningful a difference as
they would like. In Jordan, only half of the surveyed groups said they were having even a
moderate impact on their societies. The UJRC study produced virtually identical data, with
49.6% of surveyed groups reporting that Jordanian civil society had an average or high impact in
improving quality of life, while the remaining respondents said it had a limited impact.18 In
Tunisia, FFF numerically evaluated “Impact of activities on targeted population” based on
standardized criteria, and the average organization scored only 0.5 out of 5 (although
organizations in Tunis were more effective). These are, of course, imperfect measurements based
on limited samples, but it is generally acknowledged—even by the organizations themselves—
that there is much work to be done before CSOs begin to fulfill their potential as forces for
change in MENA states.

Below are outlined some of the principal challenges that MENA CSOs face in reaching this
potential, as researched in Algeria, Libya, Jordan, and Tunisia. Again, this discussion is not
comprehensive, but rather is meant to provide some indication of current trends while
highlighting areas in need of greater investigation.

Restrictive Legal Frameworks

Among the most glaring challenges confronting MENA CSOs today is the persistence in many
countries of legal frameworks that do not meet international standards for the protection of civil
society. These standards, and the rights that they prescribe for CSOs worldwide, are set down in
a host of international agreements, including, but not limited to, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. The International
Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) has outlined a number of key principles that these
covenants mandate. Among the most important are the “Right of Entry,” which prescribes
transparent and efficient mechanisms for the registration of groups, tolerance for a wide-range of
organizational purposes, and broad eligibility for an organization’s founders, even if they are

18
     “The Contemporary Jordanian Civil Society,” 45.

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non-citizens; “The Right to Operate Free from Unwarranted State Interference”; and “The Right
to Seek and Secure Funding.” 19

As discussed above, MENA governments have a long tradition of flouting these international
standards. A number of states have made improvements in recent years, but major concerns
remain. In particular, many governments still maintain barriers to group formation, including
vague restrictions on organizational purposes, long wait times, and unreasonable standards for
the organization’s resources (i.e. requiring a certain number of founders); prescribe criminal
punishments for membership in unregistered groups; exert control over organizations’ funding,
particularly that coming from foreign donors; and retain the ability to dissolve organizations on
the basis of vague, easily manipulated criteria.

Algeria

In January 2012, the Algerian government passed a new Law on Associations—Law 12-06 of
2012—replacing the previous law from 1990. A broad spectrum of domestic and international
actors have denounced this law, arguing that it is actually more repressive than the 1990
legislation. The law grants the government broad discretion in both registering and suspending
organizations, specifying that it can refuse registration to any association whose activities are not
“in the general interest” or are “contrary to public order, good morals and provisions of the laws
and regulations in force”—highly ambiguous terms granting the government wide latitude in its
treatment of groups.20 The law also specifies that any individual involved with an unregistered
organization can be punished with a fine of up to 4,000 USD and a prison sentence of up to 6
months.

The law further complicates the process of founding an organization by requiring a minimum
number of founders ranging from 10 to 25—based on the type of organization—and demanding
that the founders provide personal information such as marital status, address, and police records.
It places particularly stringent restrictions on foreign organizations, authorizing the government
to suspend any foreign group whose activities “violate national sovereignty, the established
institutional order, national unity, the integrity of the national territory, public order and
morality, or the national values of the Algerian people.” Any CSO with even one founding
member from outside of Algeria is considered foreign, greatly expanding the range of which
organizations that are subject to these vague criteria.21 ICNL thus argues that the law seems
“specifically designed to discourage associations and civil society in general,” 22 a critique that

19
   “Defending Civil Society,” International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, September 2012.
20
   “NGO Law Monitor: Algeria,” International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, last updated September 12, 2013.
21
   Ibid.
22
   Ibid.

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has been echoed by a wide range of international actors including Amnesty International 23 and
United Nations human rights chief Navi Pillay. 24

Jordan

Jordan’s legal framework for civil society has likewise drawn criticism for granting the
government broad discretion to interfere with the work of CSOs. In 2008, the Jordanian
government passed a new Law on Associations, replacing a law in force since 1966. The new
law was viewed as an improvement over its predecessor, but was still problematic in a number of
areas; the law was thus amended in 2009, but domestic and international actors remained
unsatisfied with the changes. Indeed, Human Rights Watch insisted that the amended law of
2009 was in fact more restrictive than the original 2008 statute.25

The law requires that any new CSO register with the Council of the Societies Register, and
grants this body wide discretion in choosing which groups to accept. Groups are forbidden from
pursuing “political objectives” or objectives that contradict the “public order”—neither term
defined—and the Council may reject any group’s application without stating a reason. The
Council is given 60 days to review an application and 15 days to complete registration, such that
even those groups accepted face a waiting period of 75 days before they can commence
activities. As of January 2013, the Council had reviewed 150 applications and approved 98,
rejecting over a third of applicants. And, while the Associations Law itself does not stipulate a
penalty for non-registration, the Jordanian penal code states that members of unregistered groups
may be punished with prison sentences of up to two years.

The Jordanian law also grants the government significant power to intervene in the affairs of
registered CSOs. Groups are legally obligated, for instance to inform the Council of Societies
Register at least two weeks ahead of their general assembly meeting, and to allow government
officials to sit in on these meetings. Organizations are also required to submit internal documents
for government review, including their general assembly resolutions, annual plans, and an annual
report detailing achievements, activities, and funding sources. Regulations are, again,
particularly stringent in the realm of foreign financing: the law requires groups to obtain
government approval before receiving any funds from non-Jordanian organizations. In view of
these shortcomings, Sarah Leah Whitson, MENA Director for Human Rights Watch, charged
that the Jordanian “government’s attempts to exert excessive control over NGOs deprives
Jordanians of the benefits of open discussion about public policies and services.”26

23
   “Algeria: New Law on Associations Used to Stifle Civil Society,” Amnesty International, May 7, 2013.
24
   “UN Human Rights Chief Calls on Algeria to Review Laws on Civil Society, Freedom of Assembly,” UN News
Centre, September 19, 2012.
25
   “Jordan: Replace Law on Associations,” Human Rights Watch, May 17, 2009.
26
   Ibid.

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Tunisia

It is not altogether surprising that Tunisia, which underwent regime change in 2011, has made
more tangible progress than Algeria and Jordan in broadening the legal space for CSOs. In
September 2011, the Tunisian legislature passed Decree-Law No. 88, which eliminated the
previous law’s visa requirement and waiting period, allowing new CSOs to simply declare their
own establishment. The new law included other improvements such as removing obstacles to
foreign participation, including as founding members, and eliminating the criminal penalties for
participation in non-compliant organizations. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
(CIHRS) does warn, however, that the new law still gives the government too much discretion in
dissolving organizations. Nonetheless, CIHRS declares that, overall, Tunisia’s new law
“represents a major milestone and is currently the best law governing associations in the region,
which should serve as an example for other countries.”27

Libya

Libya, like Tunisia, has made strides toward greater openness, as the National Transitional
Council (NTC) quickly set aside the restrictive laws that had long handicapped Libya’s civil
sector. Unlike Tunisia, however, Libya has yet to institutionalize this shift through any formal
law governing the formation and activities of Libyan CSOs. A draft law was put forward to the
NTC in 2012, but was never adopted and is still being debated by Libya’s General National
Congress today. Given this lack of any established legal framework, it is unsurprising that FFF
received confused, contradictory answers when it asked 40 CSOs to identify the authority
responsible for registering organizations; 48% of surveyed groups correctly responded that it was
the Ministry of Culture and Civil Society, while the remaining 52% were split between a number
of different bodies.

That said, CIHRS described Libya’s draft law as “very positive.”28 It would, for instance, allow
organizations to receive funding from international donors, requiring only that this foreign
funding be publicly disclosed in a Libyan newspaper and on the organization’s website.
Similarly, it would allow international NGOs to open branches in Libya, but require that these
branches be managed by Libyans. 29

Weak Internal Governance

Another central challenge facing MENA CSOs today is the persistence of weak or undemocratic
structures of internal governance. In a region where many states’ political structures have long

27
   “Freedom of Association in North Africa,” Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, May 2013.
28
   Ibid.
29
   Mikail, 4.

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lacked even the most basic of democratic practices, it is not altogether surprising that many
MENA CSOs have failed to establish democratic governance internally, whether this means
electing—rather than appointing—governing members, or maintaining high levels of financial
and organizational transparency.

This lack of internal democracy is a challenge that MENA CSOs must overcome in order to
effectively represent their communities. According to a 2013 report by the Finnish Institute for
International Affairs, “many Arab CSOs have traditionally been characterized by weak internal
governance structures and a lack of transparency and funding… This lack of internal democracy
and transparency has considerably hampered the ability of Arab CSOs to fulfill a ‘civic
education’ function and weakened their credibility in the light of domestic and outside
observers.”30 This weakened credibility contributes to the fact that most MENA CSOs have
struggled to form strong relationships with donors, an issue that will be discussed in greater
detail below.

Through its research in Jordan and North Africa, FFF has identified some basic trends in the
internal governance of MENA CSOs. Generally speaking, CSOs will benefit from
institutionalizing democratic procedures, electing rather than appointing organization officials;
establishing greater financial and organizational transparency, based on institutionalized
processes of public information sharing; and publishing guiding documents to regulate
organizational. One further weakness that CSOs should seek to address is the fact that, despite an
overall improvement in women’s representation in civic life, there is a lingering disparity in the
representation of men and women in MENA CSOs. This is particularly striking given the fact
that, worldwide, women comprise the majority of CSO staff.

It should be noted, however, that indicators of internal governance are inherently difficult to
measure, and that this subject formed a relatively minor portion of FFF’s research. In the case of
Algeria, FFF’s research addressed questions of internal governance only tangentially, and as
such no conclusions are offered regarding internal governance among Algerian CSOs. The
findings below are thus intended only as an introduction to certain key topics, which can provide
a starting point for stakeholders to begin grappling with the issue of internal governance.

Tunisia

FFF found significant room for improvement in Tunisian CSOs’ internal governance. Based on
indicators such as management transparency and the publication of governing documents,
Tunisian CSOs scored, on average, 2.8 out of 5. While this score suggests that Tunisian CSOs—
particularly those in the Greater Tunis region—are performing well in some areas, it also reflects

30
  Timo Behr and Aaretti Siitonen, “Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? Civil Society Engagement After the
Arab Spring,” Finish Institute of International Affairs, January 2013, 13.

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important weaknesses that must be addressed in order for Tunisian CSOs to maximize their
impact on their communities.

For one, few organizations had, at the time of the study, established formal governing principles
beyond the obligatory statutes. That is, they had not produced a formal mission statement, vision,
or charter of values, all documents that play an important role in ensuring an organization’s
coherent and consistent governance. Organizations were also lacking in the field of transparency,
oftentimes failing to share information such as accounting documents.

These issues were compounded by weaknesses in CSOs’ decision-making practices. On the one
hand, FFF found that 87 percent of organizations implemented collegial, participatory decision-
making processes within their steering committees. Beyond the steering committees, however,
democratic practices were lacking. Only 62% of organizations involved their general
membership in decision-making processes, and only 53% encouraged members to express their
opinions and engage in dialogue with the steering committee. Finally, women continue to be
underrepresented in Tunisian CSOs, accounting for less than a quarter of the membership in 9 of
the 30 organizations that FFF studied.31

Libya

FFF found still more acute problems with the internal governance of Libyan CSOs. Lack of
democratic procedures was one outstanding issue: 94% of the 40 organizations surveyed reported
that their General Assembly was appointed, not elected, while 81 and 44% (respectively)
reported that their Constituent Body and Board of Directors were appointed rather than elected. 32
Moreover, FFF found that, on average, women made up less than a third of each CSO’s work
force, and held less than one in five managerial positions.

Meanwhile, many Libyan CSOs, like their Tunisian counterparts, have thus far failed to establish
and make public formal governing documents. Less than 20% of the organizations surveyed
reported having adopted an official code of conduct, while only half of the organizations
reported that they had adopted any sort of operational plan. CSOs have performed poorly in
publishing those documents that they do have; despite the fact that a majority of groups reported
having such documents as organizational rules and regulations, these documents were rarely
made public, such that roughly 70% of surveyed CSOs failed to publish any internal
information. 33

31
   “Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia,” 46.
32
   “Mapping and Participatory Needs Assessment of Civil Society in Libya,” Foundation for the Future, September
2013, 25
33
   Ibid., 58

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The most glaring problem, however, was Libyan CSOs’ severe lack of financial transparency—
an issue closely related to the dearth of basic fiscal competency, which will be discussed in the
following section. Only 25% of Libyan CSOs reported having an annual budget plan, while only
15% make their budget publicly available. Similarly, only a quarter of surveyed organizations
reported a system of preparing financial reports for auditing. Overall, roughly three quarters of
the CSOs in FFF’s study appeared to lack any institutionalized financial practices, transparent or
otherwise; this is an issue that must be further studied for CSOs to play a more active role in
Libya’s public sphere.

Jordan

The 2010 UJRC study on civil society in Jordan produced mixed conclusions regarding
Jordanian CSOs’ internal governance. Jordanian CSOs demonstrated a certain baseline of
democratic practices, but still have significant room for improvement. For instance, UJRC found
that, although 59% of surveyed organizations had chosen their governing bodies through
elections, the period from 2000-2010 had witnessed an increase “in the selection of governing
bodies by recommendation instead of election,” and warned that “this practice indicates a failure
of internal systems…and declining standards of good governance and democratic norms. The
tendency could lead to stagnation and the undermining of participation.”34 Corruption is also
cause for concern, as 47% of respondents to the UJRC survey reported that incidences of
corruption were frequent or very frequent within their organizations.

UJRC found, moreover, that Jordanian CSOs must make greater efforts to develop “methods of
self-regulation,” particularly codes of conduct, which only 48% of respondents reported having
published. UJRC notes: “Limited attempts have been made to develop codes of conduct for best
practice in the area of governance and transparency, but these initiatives did not become
institutionalized, despite an urgent need for the promotion of trust among CSOs and between
them and their social partners,” adding that “CSOs face repeated attacks in the press and among
political and social classes because of their partial reliance on external financial support,
requiring them to be able to prove the fairness and transparency of their financial dealings.”35 In
view of these issues, it is unsurprising that, in FFF’s survey, 57% of respondents reported that
their organization was in need of internal reform.

Weak Human and Financial Resources

Perhaps the most fundamental challenge that MENA CSOs must overcome in order to increase
their impact is a basic lack of human and financial resources. Just as the relative novelty of civil
society in most MENA states has led to a steep learning curve in developing strong, democratic

34
     “The Contemporary Jordanian Civil Society,” 35.
35
     Ibid., 42.

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internal governance, it has also meant that many, if not most, MENA CSOs are faced with a
shortage of financial resources and human capital.

This subject, like that of internal governance, is both under-studied and inherently difficult to
quantify, and thus requires further research. Again, the goal here is to initiate a discussion
regarding certain general trends. Based on the research conducted by FFF and by UJRC, we can
identify several primary issues in the area of human and financial resources, specifically: lack of
professionalism among staff, and over-reliance on untrained volunteers; lack of training in
management and fundraising; and inadequacy of financial resources, partially due to limited
funding opportunities but also as a result of a pervasive lack of fundraising competency. These
shortcomings have a severe, sometimes crippling impact on CSOs’ effectiveness.

Algeria

In discussing FFF’s findings regarding CSOs’ human and financial resources, it is important to
bear in mind that most of the Algerian organizations that FFF studied have been operating for at
least 10 years, and may thus have greater resources at their disposal than their newer counterparts
in Algeria and elsewhere in the region.

That said, FFF’s research produced mixed results regarding Algerian CSOs’ resource
mobilization. The mapping study found, for instance, increasing levels of professionalization
among the CSOs under study, with a number of organizations having successfully implemented
fundraising programs and acquired funding from donors including the United Nations, various
embassies in Algeria, and other international organizations. Moreover, 9 of 10 CSOs surveyed
reported having their own headquarters, although some of these included home addresses. 36

Yet despite the improvement in professionalization, FFF found that only a handful of groups had
actually received professional training in the field of human rights, despite the fact that this study
focused exclusively on human rights organizations. The study also found a heavy reliance on
volunteers, as only two organizations reporting 20 or more full-time employees.37

Similarly, Algerian CSOs are struggling with limited financial resources, despite the finding that
a number of groups have managed to procure funding from major international donors. Many
groups lack training in project and associational management, and lack information on potential
funding opportunities. This, combined with the fact that funding opportunities from the Algerian
government are generally sporadic, has resulted in intermittent, ad hoc programming rather than
sustained, continuous activities. This dynamic limits organizations’ impact while further
undermining their ability to appeal to donors.

36
     “Mapping of Civil Society Organizations in Algeria,” Foundation for the Future, September 2012, 31.
37
     Ibid., 32.

                                                                                                           16

Libya

Of the four countries where FFF conducted research, Libyan CSOs are perhaps the most acutely
strained in terms of the resources available to them; this is to be expected, given that virtually all
of these groups have existed for under 3 years, and that Libya, more than the other countries
under study, has virtually no history of effective civil society. FFF found a severe lack of
professionalization among Libyan CSOs, with 83% of surveyed groups reporting that they had
no salaried employees, and only 10% reporting that they had any full-time employees. This has
led to extreme reliance on volunteers with little professional background or training; 84% of
respondent groups stated that they had at least 11 volunteers, and 43% stated that they had at
least 31.38

Libyan CSOs also face significant financial challenges, with 58% of surveyed organizations
operating on no more than 6,000 Libyan dinars (roughly 4,900 USD) annually. This is due, in
large part, to CSOs’ failure to acquire funds from major donors: only 12.5% of those surveyed
said they had received funding from international organizations, and 2.5% had received funding
from the transitional government. Instead, groups were largely reliant on membership fees and
support from local councils and the Libyan private sector.39 Moreover, as discussed in the
previous section, Libyan CSOs currently have extremely poor practices in the field of fiscal
management and reporting, and this will inevitably reflect upon their ability to fundraise.

It is thus unsurprising that, when asked about their top two priorities for the future, 70% of
respondents listed the development of project management skills as their first or second priority,
and 50% listed building financial systems.40 The Libyan case illustrates the close connection
between human and financial resources, as groups reliant on poorly trained employees or
volunteers will lack the capacity to effectively appeal to donors. This represents a problematic
cycle, as groups will likewise struggle to build their human capacity if they cannot procure
funds; this speaks to the importance of intervention by domestic and international actors who can
provide much needed training and financial support.

Jordan

Jordanian CSOs, too, have faced their share of challenges in building the resources necessary to
make an impact. In its 2010 report, UJRC identified significant shortcomings in Jordanian CSOs’
human resources. Specifically, it found that only 9.1% of surveyed organizations had what the
CIVICUS Index deems a sustainable staff base: at least 75% paid employees rather than

38
   “Mapping and Participatory Needs Assessment of Civil Society in Libya,” 57.
39
   Ibid., 59-60.
40
   Ibid., 62.

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volunteers. Indeed, just under half of CSOs reported having between zero and two paid
employees, and roughly three-quarters had ten or fewer. UJRC also highlighted the marginal
efficacy of volunteer labor: only 18% of CSOs expressed the view that volunteer contributions
led to a significant increase in productivity, while 46% reported a moderate increase and 20%
said that volunteer labor yielded no economic return.41

FFF found that financial hurdles similarly hinder CSOs activities. Of FFF’s sample, a majority of
groups reported a budget of under 50,000 Jordanian Dinars per year, 42 while focus group
discussions and interviews suggested that a lack of funding was among the most prominent
obstacles faced by these organizations. Groups specifically emphasized a lack of buy-in from the
Jordanian private sector, a heavy focus on groups within the capital, and a large degree of
interference by donor organizations seeking to promote their own agendas. 43 Fundraising was
further complicated by the fact that some groups—particularly youth organizations—are
distrustful of foreign funding, and thus eschew funding opportunities from non-Jordanian
donors.44

Nonetheless, UJRC found that almost 80% of CSOs surveyed reported that their revenues for
2009 were greater than their expenditures, suggesting that, despite challenges, a significant
number of Jordanian CSOs have managed to achieve fiscal sustainability.

Tunisia

In its research on Tunisia, FFF found that shortcomings in human and financial resources were
significantly hampering Tunisian CSOs abilities to impact their communities. The organizations
themselves appeared to reach the same conclusion, with a majority of groups emphasizing the
need to improve their project and financial management.

In FFF’s quantitative evaluation of Tunisian CSOs’ human resources, which was based on
indicators of staff mobilization and training, the average organization scored only 2.2 out of 5.
Tunisian CSOs are, like their counterparts in Algeria, Libya, and Jordan, heavily reliant on
volunteer labor, with only half of the surveyed organizations reporting any wage-earning
employees. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Tunisian CSOs, by and large, have
demonstrated little in the way of structured efforts to motivate volunteers—whether this means
incorporating them into meetings, providing them with networking opportunities, etc. This

41
   “The Contemporary Jordanian Civil Society,” 38.
42
   Musa Shteiwi, “The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Political Reform in Jordan,” Foundation for the
Future and the Center for Strategic Studies, July 2012, 26.
43
   Ibid, 48-49
44
   Ibid, 34

                                                                                                                   18

means that they are truly relying on the goodwill of individuals who, in almost all cases, lack
substantive experience in community life. 45

Financial resources, and particularly fundraising, also pose significant challenges for Tunisian
CSOs. In FFF’s evaluation of organizations’ fundraising capacity, the average CSO ranked only
0.9 out of 5 based on criteria such as understanding of funding mechanisms and relationships
with donors. Only 2 of the 30 organizations said they had received training in fundraising, and no
organization was able to describe the ingredients of a successful funding application. As a result,
CSOs’ fundraising efforts are generally ad hoc, based on trial and error rather than on a well
established fundraising strategy. Fundraising difficulties are compounded by the fact that donors
rarely discuss their reasons for declining an application, so organizations are unable to learn from
their failures. It is thus unsurprising that only 2 Tunisian CSOs reported that they had
successfully funded all of the projects that they had initiated.46

Weak Networking Between CSOs

Another key determinant of CSOs’ impact is their level of cooperation with other likeminded
organizations. CSO networks are important because these groups are generally small and have
limited resources, and can thus benefit greatly from sharing information and otherwise
coordinating with groups that share their values and goals. This need is particularly acute in the
MENA region, because, as discussed above, MENA civil society has long been underdeveloped
and most groups are lacking in capacity. These networks often emerge as a pragmatic, time-
specific response to a collective need, and are marked by inter-group communication and the
exchange of information.

In its 2012 study, FFF found that networking among MENA CSOs has improved in recent years,
but remains relatively weak. Generally speaking, MENA civil society has yet to establish a real
culture of networking or cooperation, to the extent that inter-group relations are often marked by
competition and distrust. Within those CSO networks that have been established, FFF found a
need for greater institutionalization. By taking steps such as the establishment of internal
regulations and charters, networks can promote predictability and uniform expectations and thus
ameliorate distrust and competitiveness. FFF also found that training within CSO networks
would benefit from greater institutionalization: it is generally undertaken on a project-by-project
rather than ongoing basis, limiting networks’ ability to build capacity.

One area where networks’ capacities are particularly lacking is in communication; sharing
information is a central component of networking, and MENA CSOs have not yet developed the
tools to do so effectively. Most organizations lack IT staff and thus lack innovative strategies of

45
     “Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia,” 45.
46
     Ibid., 47

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information sharing, primarily communicating via email and during meetings, rather than
employing, for instance, an online forum to facilitate the flow of information.

Jordan

In its study on Jordan, FFF found at least an ad hoc inclination toward networking. Of the 19
groups surveyed, 18 reported having partnerships with other CSOs, and 14 reported having
formed some type of coalition or partnership union with other organizations. 47 UJRC’s research
confirmed this trend, with over 80% of respondents to the UJRC survey stating that they
belonged to an umbrella organization or support network.48

Despite the fact that participation in networks was widespread, both FFF and UJRC found that
the actual coordination within these networks was relatively weak. Among respondents to
UJRC’s survey, roughly 40% of CSOs were not able to provide a definite answer when asked to
determine the number of organizations with which they held coordination meetings, suggesting
poor communication, lack of investment, or both. Of those organizations that provided a number,
56% said meetings took place between four or fewer partner CSOs. Similarly, 55% of
organizations did not respond when asked how many groups they had information sharing
arrangements with; of the groups that did respond, a plurality (18%) reported exchanging
information with four or fewer organizations. 49 FFF found similar weaknesses, with respondents
expressing the need for greater cohesion and the idea that isolation and inter-group competition
was a serious barrier to effective networking, due in part to Jordan’s entrenched tribal
divisions.50

Tunisia

FFF reached similar conclusions in its research on Tunisia. Although cooperation among
Tunisian CSOs has been on the rise in recent years, the concept of networking is generally
limited to the joint implementation of individual projects rather than any ongoing, systematized
relationship of cooperation and information sharing. A March 2012 study by the European Union
elaborated upon this issue, identifying “Gaps in communication, exchange, cooperation,
synchronization, and collaboration among associations,” and, at times, “rivalry and competition”
between groups.51 These gaps are due, in part, to the fact that CSOs generally lack knowledge of
opportunities to coordinate with like-minded organizations, even those operating within the same
city.52

47
   Shteiwi, 30.
48
   “The Contemporary Jordanian Civil Society,” 36.
49
   Ibid., 36.
50
   Shteiwi, 48.
51
   See Shteiwi, 24.
52
   Ibid., 64.

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Algeria and Libya

While FFF’s research in Algeria and Libya did not address the networking issue in depth, it did
find indications that coordination between CSOs in these countries generally mirrors the
situation in Jordan and Tunisia. In Libya, 90% of respondents said that their organizations
worked with other CSOs in some capacity or another, but 87.5% also said that it was “Very
Important” to improve their coordination with other CSOs, clearly indicating that current
networking efforts are not as effective as they could be. 60% of respondents described the level
of coordination among CSOs as intermediate, while 20% described it as strong and 20% as
weak.53

Meanwhile, FFF observed the emergence of networks among Algerian CSOs promoting human
rights agendas, but many of these partnerships were marked by conflict over leadership, or
conflict between secular and conservative elements. 54

Conclusion

The past three years have brought seismic changes throughout the Middle East and North Africa,
and civil society has been among the areas most fundamentally affected by these shifts. In the
MENA region overall, there has been a general trend toward greater numbers of CSOs that are
increasingly assertive in the field of advocacy and political life, and that are increasingly
representative of a broad cross section of MENA societies.

In countries like Tunisia and Libya, popular revolutions have produced both an upsurge in
popular enthusiasm for civic life and an opening of the legal environment for CSOs. Other
countries, such as Jordan, have witnessed somewhat less dramatic but still tangible changes in
their civic spheres, as demands for political reform have pushed Jordanian civil society toward
greater involvement in public life, despite the lack of any major structural changes.

Despite this broader regional trend toward greater openness and civil society engagement,
MENA CSOs continue to struggle with both restrictive environments and internal weaknesses.
Some countries, such as Algeria and Jordan, have witnessed little or no substantive change in
civil society’s legal status over the past several decades, and even those states whose legal
frameworks have been revised since 2011 have further work to do before these frameworks fully
meet international standards.

53
     “Mapping and Participatory Needs Assessment of Civil Society in Libya,” 60.
54
     “Mapping of Civil Society Organizations in Algeria,” 35.

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