Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Part I Substantive Articles, Art.6 Procedural Safeguards ...

 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
         Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
         Part I Substantive Articles, Art.6 Procedural
         Safeguards During the Preliminary Investigation
         Phase
         Roland Schmidt

         From: The United Nations Convention Against Torture and its Optional
         Protocol: A Commentary (2nd Edition)
         Edited By: Manfred Nowak, Moritz Birk, Giuliana Monina

         Previous Edition (1 ed.)

         Content type: Book content
         Product: Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL]
         Series: Oxford Commentaries on International Law
         Published in print: 19 December 2019
         ISBN: 9780198846178

  Subject(s):
  Torture — Treaties, interpretation — Jurisdiction of states, nationality principle — Jurisdiction of states,
  territoriality principle — Jurisdiction of states, universality principle

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(p. 249) Article 6 Procedural Safeguards During the
  Preliminary Investigation Phase
             1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available
             to it, that the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in whose
             territory a person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in
             article 4 is present shall take him into custody or take other legal
             measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other legal
             measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may be
             continued only for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or
             extradition proceedings to be instituted.
             2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the
             facts.
             3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article shall
             be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest
             appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national, or, if
             he is a stateless person, to the representative of the State where he
             usually resides.
             4. When a State, pursuant to this article, has taken a person into
             custody, it shall immediately notify the States referred to in article 5,
             paragraph 1, of the fact that such person is in custody and of the
             circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes
             the preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this article
             shall promptly report its findings to the said States and shall indicate
             whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.

             1. Introduction 250
             2. Travaux Préparatoires 250

                  2.1 Chronology of Draft Texts 250
                  2.2 Analysis of Working Group Discussions 252

             3. Issues of Interpretation 253

                  3.1 Article 6(1): Obligation to Ensure the Presence of the Alleged
                  Torturer 253

                        3.1.1 Examination of Information Available 253
                             3.1.1.1 HBA et al v Canada 254

                        3.1.2 Custody or Other Legal Measures to Ensure Presence 257
                             3.1.2.1 Almatov Case (Germany) 258
                             3.1.2.2 Ely Ould Dah Case (France) 259
                             3.1.2.3 Al-Duri Case (Austria) 260

                        3.1.3 ‘Only for such time as necessary’ 261

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3.2 Article 6(2): Obligation to Make a Preliminary Inquiry Into the Facts 261
                  3.2.1 The Habré Case before the ICJ-Questions Relating to the Obligation
                  to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) 262
                  3.3 Article 6(3): Obligation to Assist in Communicating with
                  Representative of the State 263
                  3.4 Article 6(4): Obligation to Notify Other States of the Measures Taken
                  and Intended to Be Taken 264

                        3.4.1 Application to All Forms of Jurisdiction under Article 5 264
                        3.4.2 ‘Has taken a person into custody’ 264
                        3.4.3 ‘Immediately notify’ 265
                        3.4.4 ‘States referred to in Article 5(1)’ 265
                        3.4.5 Duty to Promptly Report Findings of Preliminary Inquiry 265

  (p. 250) 1. Introduction1
  1 Articles 6 to 9 are closely linked to the obligation of States parties under Article 5 to
  establish jurisdiction over the offence of torture in accordance with the territoriality, flag,
  nationality, and universal jurisdiction principles. Although Articles 6 to 9 are particularly
  relevant to universal jurisdiction, these provisions in principle apply to all types of
  jurisdiction laid down in Article 5.
  2 Most of the procedural safeguards provided for in Article 6 are fairly self-evident. If the
  suspected torturer is present in the territory of the State which initiates criminal
  proceedings (the presence is a legal requirement only for exercising universal jurisdiction
  under the Convention against Torture), its authorities shall take him or her into custody or
  take other legal measures to ensure his or her presence. The cases of Al-Duri2 and Almatov3
  illustrate that Governments are not always aware of their obligation to arrest any suspected
  torturer present in their territories or, for diplomatic or political reasons, choose not to take
  the measures required under international law. The Ould Dah4 case shows that non-
  custodial measures may not be sufficient to ensure the presence of a suspected torturer.
  3 After having taken the necessary measures to ensure the presence of the suspected
  torturer, the criminal investigation authorities shall make a preliminary inquiry into the
  facts, and report the findings of such an inquiry to other States which may be interested or
  obliged under the Convention to exercise jurisdiction, such as the territorial State or the
  States of which the suspected torturer or the torture victims are nationals. The suspected
  torturer shall also be granted the right to communicate with consular or diplomatic
  representatives of his or her State. The immediate obligation to notify other States parties
  of any custody and inquiries serves the purposes of protecting the rights of the accused as
  well as of facilitating possible extradition requests in accordance with Articles 7 and 8.

  2. Travaux Préparatoires
  2.1 Chronology of Draft Texts
  4 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Hijacking
  Convention 16 December 1970)5

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Article 6
             1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting
             State in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is present,
             shall take him (p. 251) into custody or take other measures to ensure his
             presence. The custody and other measures shall be as provided in the law of
             that State but may only be continued for such time as is necessary to enable
             any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.
             2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry into the facts.
             3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
             assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate
             representative of the State of which he is a national.
             4. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person into custody, it
             shall immediately notify the State of registration of the aircraft, the State
             mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 1(c), the State of nationality of the detained
             person and, if it considers it advisable, any other interested States of the fact
             that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his
             detention. The State which makes the preliminary enquiry contemplated in
             paragraph 2 of this Article shall promptly report its findings to the said States
             and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.

  5 United States Draft (19 December 1978)6

             1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in
             whose territory an alleged offender under article 1 or article 2 is present shall
             take the appropriate measures under its internal law so as to ensure his
             presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition. Such measures shall
             be notified directly or through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to:
             a) the States referred to in article 8(1)(a) and (b); and
             b) all other States concerned.
             2. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of
             this article are being taken shall be entitled:
             a) to communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative
             of the State of which he is a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect
             his rights, if he is a stateless person, which he requests and which is willing to
             protect his rights; and;
             b) to be visited by a representative of that State.
             3. The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall
             immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts and promptly report to
             the States specified in article 8(1)(a) and (b) these facts and whether it
             intends to exercise jurisdiction.

  6 Revised Swedish Draft (19 February 1979)7

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Article 6
             1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in
             whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any offence referred to
             in article 4 is present, shall take him into custody or take other measures to
             ensure his presence. The custody and other measures shall be as provided in
             the law of that State but may (p. 252) be continued only for such time as is
             necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.
             2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry into the facts.
             3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
             assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate
             representative of the State of which he is a national.
             4. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person into custody, it
             shall immediately notify the States referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1, of the
             fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his
             detention. The State which makes the preliminary enquiry contemplated in
             paragraph 2 of this Article shall promptly report its findings to the said State
             and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.
             5. Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in
             connection with any of the offences referred to in Article 4 shall be
             guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings.

  2.2 Analysis of Working Group Discussions
  7 Article 6 was inserted in the revised Swedish draft on the basis of a proposal by the
  United States and on informal consultations. It has no equivalent in the original Swedish
  draft.8 In written comments on Article 14 of the original Swedish draft the United States
  had proposed a new article, based on similar articles in the Hijacking, Sabotage and
  Protection of Diplomats Conventions, designed to establish procedural safeguards during
  the preliminary investigation phase. Article 6 would require the apprehending State to
  notify other concerned States of the results of its preliminary investigation, and its intention
  regarding prosecution or extradition, as well as guaranteeing the accused the right to
  communicate with the State entitled to protect his or her rights.
  8 During the 1980 Working Group several delegates pointed out that the word
  ‘preliminary’ used in Article 6(2) might give the impression that the actions described in
  paragraph 1 had been carried out without the necessary examination.9 It was suggested
  that paragraph 2 should be incorporated into paragraph 1. Some delegates proposed the
  insertion of the words ‘preliminary enquiry’ into paragraph 1 and the substitution of the
  words ‘further’ or ‘formal’ for the word ‘preliminary’ in paragraph 2. It was agreed that the
  proposed phrase ‘after an examination of information available to it’ should be added after
  the word ‘satisfied’ in paragraph 1.
  9 One view was that the phrase ‘other measures’, contained in paragraph 1, might be
  interpreted too widely. It was suggested that it be replaced by ‘other legal measures’.
  Similarly in the French text, it was suggested that the word ‘légales’ be replaced by the
  word ‘juridiques’.
  10 One representative, referring to a similar paragraph in the New York Hostages
  Convention, proposed to extend the scope of paragraph 3 to stateless persons by adding the

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phrase ‘or, if he is a stateless person, to the representative of the State where he usually
  resides’ after the word ‘national’.
  11 It was decided that discussion on paragraph 4 would be suspended until after
  consideration of the question of jurisdiction in Articles 5 and 7 since there was no clear link
  (p. 253) between paragraph 4 dealing with notification to States having jurisdiction under
  Article 5(1) and Articles 5 and 7.
  12 Article 6(1), (2), (3), and (5), as adopted by consensus by the Working Group, read as
  follows:

             1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available to it,
             that the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in whose territory a person
             alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is present, shall
             take him into custody or take other legal measures to ensure his presence.
             The custody and other legal measures shall be as provided in the law of that
             State but may be continued only for such time as is necessary to enable any
             criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.
             2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry into the facts.
             3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article shall be
             assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate
             representative of the State of which he is a national, or, if he is a stateless
             person, to the representative of the State where he usually resides.
             4. [When a State, pursuant to this article, has taken a person into custody, it
             shall immediately notify the States referred to in article 5, paragraph 1, of the
             fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his
             detention. The State which makes the preliminary enquiry contemplated in
             paragraph 2 of this article shall promptly report its findings to the said States
             and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.]
             5. Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in
             connexion with any of the offences referred to in Article 4 shall be guaranteed
             fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings.

  13 The 1981 Working Group examined paragraph 4.10 No decision was taken because this
  paragraph was connected with the question of universal jurisdiction and certain members
  considered that Articles 5 and 7 should be adopted first. It was decided that paragraph 5 of
  Article 6 should be transferred to Article 7 when the remainder of Article 7 had been
  adopted.11 The Working Group decided to retain Article 6 as drafted and to revert to it later.
  14 In 1982 the Working Group again concluded that Article 6(4) should not be considered
  separately from Article 7.12 At the conclusion of the discussion on Article 7, it was noted
  that those delegations which could support the provisions of Article 7 could accept
  paragraph 4 of Article 6. The decision of the previous year’s Working Group to include
  paragraph 5 of Article 6 in Article 7 after adoption of that article as a whole was confirmed.
  15 In 1984, the Working Group eventually achieved consensus on and adopted Article 6(4)
  as it stood.13

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3. Issues of Interpretation
  3.1 Article 6(1): Obligation to Ensure the Presence of the Alleged
  Torturer
  3.1.1 Examination of Information Available
  16 Article 6(1) stipulates that as soon as a State party’s authorities have credible
  information that an alleged torturer is present in its territory, they shall take him or her (p.
  254) into custody or take other legal measures to ensure his or her presence during the
  preliminary phase of the investigation, which might lead to formal criminal or extradition
  proceedings.
  17 The obligation to ensure the presence of the alleged torturer arises only once the State
  party has been ‘satisfied, after an examination of information available to it, that the
  circumstances so warrant’. This introductory phrase of Article 6(1) makes clear that States
  parties have a ‘wide degree of freedom to assess whether or not the circumstances warrant
  such a measure’,14 including in their evaluation of the information submitted by eg victims,
  relatives, or non-governmental organizations.
  18 While this discretion is meant to provide the necessary investigatory and prosecutorial
  flexibility required by the details of each individual case, it also risks being abused by
  States wishing to avoid their responsibility to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with
  Articles 5 and 7. By resorting to an excessive interpretation of Article 6(1) States might try
  to justify their decision not to investigate an alleged torturer, for example due to political
  considerations, by simply asserting that the information available was not credible or did
  not provide enough evidence to warrant an investigation. Although relevant for all
  jurisdictions stipulated in Article 5, the provision is particularly relevant for universal
  jurisdiction cases in which a few days or even only hours of delay may suffice for an alleged
  torturer to leave the country and hence enjoy impunity.
  19 Against this background, it is important to emphasize that under Article 6(1) the
  information provided to the State party is merely required to raise the suspicion to a level
  that a further investigation by the competent authorities is warranted. The ‘information
  available’ to which Article 6(1) refers is not required to live up to any evidentiary standards
  as demanded in a criminal trial. Furthermore, when considering the available information
  at this stage, the State party is also not required to do so as part of a full-fledged
  investigation, but as part of an initial, critical analysis which is suitable to assess the
  allegation’s credibility and decide whether there is enough suspicion that warrants further
  scrutiny. Hence, under Article 6(1) the State authorities are not yet tasked to decide
  whether to initiate a formal criminal investigation into the case and put the alleged
  perpetrator in pre-trial detention. The purpose of Article 6(1) is first and foremost to
  ensure, if the allegations have been considered sufficiently credible, that the alleged
  perpetrator cannot abscond while the authorities facilitate the initiation of a preliminary
  investigation as required under Article 6(2) at the end of which the authorities will decide
  whether or not to charge the alleged perpetrator.
  3.1.1.1 HBA et al v Canada
  20 Although eventually ruled inadmissible, the discretion of a State party regarding its
  obligations under Article 6(1) was at the core of the allegations raised in the case HBA et al
  v Canada before the Committee against Torture in 2013.15 In 2011, the counsel of the four
  complainants sought to initiate the prosecution of former US President George W. Bush
  under universal jurisdiction at the occasion of his upcoming trip to Canada. The four men
  alleged to have been tortured in secret places of detention by or at the acquiescence (p.
  255) of US officials in the context of the so-called ‘war on terror’. In anticipation of Mr.
  Bush’s visit, the men’s counsel submitted a comprehensive dossier to the Attorney General
  of Canada and called upon him to launch a criminal investigation into the role of the former

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President in authorizing and overseeing the US administration’s torture programme. In the
  absence of any reply from the Attorney General,16 the counsel attempted to initiate a
  private prosecution as provided under Canadian law. The responsible Justice of Peace,
  however, refused to receive the pertaining complaint on the grounds that Mr. Bush was at
  that point not yet present on Canadian territory. Eventually, two days later on 20 October
  2011 and with Mr. Bush present in Canada, the counsel was able to submit the complaint
  seeking private prosecution. The Justice of Peace scheduled a hearing for January 2012 in
  order to verify the allegations, by which point Bush would already have left Canada.
  However, still on 20 October, the Attorney General of British Columbia used his authority to
  intervene in private prosecutions and directed a stay of the proceedings against Mr. Bush.
  The stay of the private prosecution was argued to be warranted since the required consent
  from the Attorney General of Canada was expected not to be granted. Consequently, Mr.
  Bush was able to visit Canada without ever being approached by the Canadian authorities
  in relation to the torture allegations.
  21 Against this background, the complainants argued before the Committee that Canada
  had breached its obligations under Article 6(1) as well as Articles 5(2) and 7(1). Regarding
  Article 6(1), the complainants argued that Canada would have been required, following an
  examination of the information dossier provided to the authorities, to ensure the continuing
  presence of Mr. Bush and to initiate an investigation.17 In response, Canada argued that the
  obligation under Article 6(1) to take measures to ensure the continuing presence of the
  alleged perpetrator is not absolute, and that there may be occasions when the
  circumstances do not warrant ensuring the presence for the purpose of criminal
  proceedings.18 The decision not to arrest or to ensure the presence of Mr. Bush by non-
  custodial means was, according to the State party, within its investigative and prosecutorial
  discretion, which allows to not follow up on a complaint.19
  (p. 256) 22 Since the Committee against Torture ruled the case inadmissible as it would
  not fall within the scope of Article 22,20 no authoritative decision on the merits of the case
  is available. Notwithstanding this caveat, the substantive arguments put forward by the
  State party warrant some critical remarks.21 As correctly raised by Canada, Article 6(1)
  grants the State party some discretion when it comes to deciding whether to ensure the
  continuing presence of the alleged perpetrator on its territory. Obviously, this discretion has
  however its limits.
  23 Article 6(1) states that a State party’s decision whether to ensure the continuing
  presence of an alleged perpetrator must be preceded by an examination of the ‘information
  available’. In relation to the information submitted by the complainants’ counsel to the
  Attorney General about a month prior to the visit of Mr. Bush, the State party stated that
  the timing and volume of the submission would not have permitted a ‘thorough
  investigation’.22 Furthermore, the State party argued that

        [w]here an alleged perpetrator is in transit through a State or a temporary visitor
        rather than someone resident in the State, it is unlikely that the forum State will
        have undertaken an investigation in advance, proprio motu, in the hope or
        expectation that the alleged perpetrator might transit through or make a short
        visit.23

  Consequently, the case HBA et al v Canada would be different than the Habré case in which
  the Committee found Senegal to have violated its obligation under Article 6(1).
  24 Canada is correct when it refers to Nowak and McArthur (2008) who state that the
  decision not to initiate a prosecution does not amount to a violation of Article 7(1), if the
  competent authorities are of the view that there is insufficient evidence to obtain a
  conviction.24 The State party, however, ignores that this discretion is premised on the
  competent authorities having already conducted an investigation which was implemented in

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such a way that it had indeed the potential to produce such evidence, if it exists. For an
  investigation to be possible, however, Canada would have been required under Article 6(1)
  to arrest or take other measures to ensure the presence of Mr. Bush. By the State party’s
  own admission, however, such investigation has never taken place since it was considered
  that ‘there was no realistic prospect [ … ] that sufficient evidence to support a charge
  against Mr. Bush could have been assembled so as to justify detention’.25
  25 By taking the lack of a ‘realistic prospect’ as a foregone conclusion the State implicitly
  argues to have no further obligations under the Convention and hence does not violate it.
  Whether there was indeed no ‘realistic prospect’ to prosecute is questionable, since an
  investigation was never started, cooperation of the US authorities was never sought, and
  potential avenues which would not have required cooperation of the US were never (p. 257)
  pursued. Furthermore, and somewhat circularly, the State party argues that it would
  require the results of an investigation in order to decide whether to ensure the presence of
  Bush, but at the same time acknowledges that no investigation was initiated since it was
  unlikely to obtain the cooperation of the US authorities.
  26 The State party’s claims suggest that it considered it as necessary to conduct a full and
  in-depth review of the dossier submitted by the counsel, before being in the position to
  decide whether to ensure the continuing presence of the former US President. This reading
  is misguided. While the State party obviously has to disregard unsubstantiated allegations,
  the information available at this stage does not have to conclusively prove the raised
  allegations, let alone live up to evidentiary standards as required in a criminal trial. The
  purpose of the examination required under Article 6(1) is to establish whether the raised
  allegations are credibly substantiated to such a level that the initiation of a formal criminal
  investigation is warranted.
  27 The interpretation of Article 6(1) put forward by Canada in the HBA et al v Canada case
  would result in a considerable weakening of the Convention regarding its intent to close
  safe havens. This would be particularly the case when the suspected torturer is present only
  for a brief period on the territory under the jurisdiction of the State party. Put together, the
  limitation to initiate an investigation only from the moment when the alleged perpetrator is
  present, on the one hand, and the requirement of the availability of results of a thorough
  criminal investigation before being able to ensure the alleged perpetrator’s presence, on
  the other hand, would de facto result in a ‘blind spot’ in the obligation to prosecute
  torturers. Cases, in which the alleged perpetrator is only briefly on the territory under the
  jurisdiction of the State party would become unlikely to be ever prosecuted.
  3.1.2 Custody or Other Legal Measures to Ensure Presence
  28 Since torture is a serious crime that, according to Article 4(2), shall be punishable by
  appropriate penalties which take into account its grave nature, the measures necessary to
  ensure the presence of the alleged torturer usually mean arrest and detention that is police
  custody up to a few days followed by pre-trial detention and/or detention pending
  deportation.
  29 On the other hand, States should take into account that, by virtue of Article 9(3) CCPR,
  it ‘shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody’.
  Article 6(1) CAT therefore also provides for the possibility to make use of ‘other legal
  measures’ to ensure the presence of the alleged torturer, including house arrest, release on
  bail, the confiscation of travel documents, an obligation to report regularly to the police,
  and similar restrictions on freedom of movement.26 Whether or not custodial measures are
  necessary depends on the particular circumstances of the case, such as the likelihood that
  the suspected torturer might flee from the jurisdiction of the State, (p. 258) abscond, or

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destroy evidence.27 If the person is detained, he or she must enjoy all the rights of detained
  persons, above all habeas corpus rights.
  30 The original US draft did not mention ‘custody’ but only the general obligation of States
  parties to ‘take the appropriate measures under its internal law so as to ensure his
  presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition’.28 The revised Swedish draft
  replaced this formulation by ‘custody and other measures to ensure his presence’ and
  deleted the explicit reference to the purpose of such measures. During the discussions in
  the Working Group, the word ‘legal’ was added before ‘measures’. This means that States
  parties are expected to take the same measures as are provided for in their domestic law in
  the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature. This principle is expressed in the last
  sentence of Article 6(1) and reaffirmed in Article 7(2) for the next phase of decision-making.
  3.1.2.1 Almatov Case (Germany)
  31 The visit of then Uzbek Minister of Interior Zokir Almatov to Germany and the failure of
  the German authorities to secure Almatov’s presence is another instructive example for the
  challenges to ensure the implementation of Article 6.29 Almatov visited Germany in late
  2005 on the basis of a humanitarian visa in order to receive medical treatment. In
  December, eight Uzbeks living in Germany filed complaints with the German Federal
  Prosecutor in which they accused Almatov of being criminally responsible for torture and
  torture as a crime against humanity perpetrated in Uzbekistan’s places of detention as well
  as for crimes against humanity in relation to the Andijan massacre.30 The complaints were
  supported by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Furthermore, the UN
  Special Rapporteur on Torture called upon the German authorities to initiate criminal
  proceedings against Almatov.31 However, soon after reports about the complaints were
  published in the German news, Almatov left Germany without ever being questioned by the
  German authorities.
  32 Under the Convention Germany has an obligation to exercise its jurisdiction under
  Article 5(2) and to ensure the presence of alleged torturers on its territory as required in (p.
  259) Article 6(1). Confronted with the question why it failed to do so in the case of Almatov,
  Germany submitted in its fifth periodic report to the Committee against Torture that

        [t]he German criminal prosecution authorities had become aware that Mr. Almatov
        was staying in Germany when a first complaint of an offence was brought against
        him on 5 December 2005. He had, however, already left Germany at that point. For
        that reason the Public Prosecutor General decided not to institute investigation
        proceedings against Mr. Almatov.32

  33 Although Germany’s failure to secure the presence of Mr. Almatov was never subject of
  a complaint to the Committee against Torture and the Committee did also not take up the
  issue when considering Germany’s fifth periodic report, and hence no authoritative
  evaluation of the matter is available, a few critical remarks are in order. Article 6(1) obliges
  States parties to secure the presence of alleged torturers on their territory ‘upon being
  satisfied, after an examination of information available to it …’. The wording ‘information
  available to it’ does not imply that either the presence of an alleged torturer on the State
  party’s territory or the related incriminating information must be raised by complainants
  and submitted as a formal complaint for the State party’s authorities being obliged to act.
  This would be an impermissible restrictive reading of Article 6(1).33 Whenever the State
  party’s authorities know about the presence of an alleged torturer they are obliged to act.
  In the case of Almatov, these requirements were—in all likelihood—fulfilled. The German
  authorities knew about Almatov’s presence already prior to the complaint of 5 December
  since they issued him with a humanitarian visa on 14 November to facilitate his medical
  treatment. Furthermore, the German authorities must have also had sufficient information
  on Almatov’s alleged role in the Andijan massacre as well as in the systematic abuse of

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persons held in Uzbekistan’s places of detention since the visa was issued as an exception
  to an EU-wide travel ban imposed on persons considered to be responsible for the Andijan
  massacre.34 Almatov was on top of this list and the German authorities had consulted with
  the EU Commission and Presidency prior to issuing the visa.35 While it cannot be expected
  from a State party to check for every visa request whether the applicant is an alleged
  torturer, it seems reasonable to argue that in cases as high profile and well documented as
  the one of Almatov, the State party’s authorities would be obliged to act on their own
  initiative.
  3.1.2.2 Ely Ould Dah Case (France)
  34 There can be cases in which the application of non-custodial measures to ensure the
  presence of the alleged torturer eventually turn out to be insufficient. In the French case of
  Ely Ould Dah,36 the army commander was alleged to have committed acts of torture in 1990
  and 1991 in a military camp in Mauritania. Triggered by a complaint of Mauritanian exiles
  living in France, Mr. Ould Dah was arrested by French authorities (p. 260) in 1999 while
  undertaking training at a French army school, and taken into custody. Following an appeal
  with the French judicial authorities, Mr. Ould Dah was released and placed under judicial
  control, ie, under house arrest with his passport confiscated. However, these measures
  eventually proved insufficient to ensure his presence. In April 2000, Mr. Ould Dah
  absconded and returned to Mauritania, where he continued to serve in the national army.
  Irrespective of his flight, the French authorities continued to prosecute Mr. Ould Dah, with
  the participation of his legal representatives in the proceedings. Eventually, in July 2005 the
  Nîmes Assize Court (Cour d’assises) sentenced Mr. Ould Dah in absentia to the maximum
  penalty of ten years of imprisonment for having directly committed, ordered, and organized
  acts of torture. While welcoming the sentencing of Mr. Ould Dah, the Committee against
  Torture expressed regret of France’s failure to have taken the necessary steps to keep Mr.
  Ould Dah in its territory, and to indeed ensure his presence for his trial, in conformity with
  its obligation under Article 6.37
  3.1.2.3 Al-Duri Case (Austria)
  35 A prominent and politically sensitive case highlighting a State party’s failure to perform
  its obligations under Article 6 relates to the presence of Izzat Ibrahim Khalil Al-Duri38 in
  Austria in 1999. Al-Duri, then Deputy Chair of the Revolutionary Council of Iraq and Deputy
  of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, had travelled to Vienna for medical treatment. Based on
  evidence collected in an Austrian and a Swedish court, a Vienna city councillor submitted a
  complaint with the Public Prosecutor alleging that Al-Duri was criminally responsible for
  the torture of two Iraqis as well as other citizens. Furthermore, the Public Prosecutor was
  requested to ‘arrange the arrest of the accused Izzat Ibrahim Khalil Al-Duri and to
  commence with the investigation of the facts of the case’.39 Reportedly, the Public
  Prosecutor subsequently instituted investigations.
  36 While the politically charged public discussion partly focused on the question, why a
  visa had been granted to Al-Duri in the first place, the Austrian Minister of Justice
  erroneously argued that Austria would not be in the position to prosecute under universal
  jurisdiction in the absence of an extradition request by another State. Eventually, Al-Duri,
  who had not been arrested during the prosecutor’s investigations or subject to any other
  measures restricting his freedom of movement, was able to leave the country. Although the
  conduct of the Austrian authorities was never legally challenged, for example before (p.
  261) the Committee against Torture, there is little doubt that the Austrian authorities failed
  to perform their obligation under Article 6(1) to take Al-Duri into custody or take other legal
  measures to ensure his presence, as well as in the absence of an extradition request, to

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submit the case to the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution in accordance
  with Article 7.
  3.1.3 ‘Only for such time as necessary’
  37 According to the last sentence of Article 6(1), the custody or other legal measures ‘may
  be continued only for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extradition
  proceedings to be instituted’. This phrase, while intended to be a ‘general indication’,40
  which does not appear in the US draft and was inserted by the revised Swedish draft, is
  somewhat misleading. The word ‘custody’ and its restriction until the ‘institution’ of
  criminal or extradition proceedings might lead to the narrow literal interpretation of police
  custody, which should never last longer than a few days. The purpose of this provision goes,
  however, beyond this initial stage of the proceedings. Even after criminal or extradition
  proceedings have been instituted, the suspected torturer might be kept in detention, if the
  circumstances of the particular case require such a measure. Detention and other measures
  to ensure the presence of a suspected torturer during the criminal and/or extradition
  proceedings might be maintained until his or her conviction or deportation.41

  3.2 Article 6(2): Obligation to Make a Preliminary Inquiry Into the
  Facts
  38 Once the State party decided under Article 6(1) to ensure the presence of an alleged
  perpetrator, paragraph 2 obliges it to ‘immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the
  facts’. Such criminal investigation is based on the information made available by victims
  and other sources as indicated in Article 6(1), but also requires active measures of evidence
  gathering, such as interrogation of the alleged torturer, taking of witness testimonies,
  inquiries on the spot, or searching for documentary evidence. If the alleged act of torture
  was committed on the territory of the investigating State, its authorities can apply all usual
  methods of criminal investigation. If the investigating State intends to exercise its
  jurisdiction on the basis of Article 5(1)(b), (c), or (2), it needs the cooperation of the
  territorial State and possibly also other States.42 For this reason, Article 9 explicitly
  establishes an obligation of States parties to provide mutual judicial assistance.
  39 The purpose of the preliminary inquiry in Article 6(2) is to enable the investigating
  State to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction by means of criminal prosecution or to
  extradite the alleged torturer to another State. The discussions of the words ‘preliminary
  inquiry’ during the 1980 Working Group, which led to the insertion of the phrase ‘after (p.
  262) an examination of information available to it’ in Article 6(1) show that the inquiry in
  Article 6(2) goes already beyond the available information on the basis of which the State
  party has to decide whether it is warranted to ensure the presence of the alleged torturer.
  The preliminary inquiry under Article 6(2) has to include information actively gathered by
  the competent authorities. It does not end, as the last sentence of Article 6(1) might
  suggest, with the ‘institution’ of criminal or extradition proceedings, but with the decision
  whether to prosecute or to extradite the suspected torturer.
  40 In those cases in which the alleged torturer is arrested on the basis of an international
  arrest warrant and the custodial State is requested to extradite, it is the requesting State
  which primarily makes an inquiry into the facts and provides the custodial State with the
  information necessary to justify extradition.43 However, this does not absolve the custodial
  State from conducting his own investigation in order to verify whether the arrest warrant
  and extradition request are indeed sufficiently substantiated. Furthermore, as part of this
  investigation the custodial State has also to assure itself that the requesting State is indeed
  willing and able to prosecute the alleged torturer and that extradition is not facilitating
  impunity. Similarly, the custodial State is also required to seek information on whether an
  extradition to the requesting State would violate the non-refoulement principle. Should it

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turn out that this is the case the custodial State itself has to prosecute or, if present,
  extradite the alleged torturer to another State requesting extradition.
  3.2.1 The Habré Case before the ICJ-Questions Relating to the Obligation to
  Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal)
  41 The duty to immediately make a preliminary inquiry under Article 6(2) was also
  adjudicated in the Habré case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).44 In its
  judgement the Court elaborated on the nature as well as the timing of the investigation
  required under Article 6(2).
  42 The Court submitted that the intention of the inquiry stipulated in Article 6(2) is to
  ‘corroborate or not the suspicions regarding the person in question’.45 While the ‘choice of
  means for conducting the inquiry remains in the hands of the State’,46 the inquiry has to be
  conducted by the competent authorities which are tasked to draw up case files and collect
  facts and evidence, including witness statements. The obligation under Article 6(2) would
  have therefore required Senegal inter alia to actively seek evidence, including contacting
  Chadian authorities. However, no such steps were taken. The questioning of Mr. Habré by
  the investigative judge in 2000 in order to establish Habré’s identity and to inform him of
  the accusations brought forward against him ‘cannot be regarded as performance of the
  obligation laid down in Article 6, paragraph 2, as it did not involve any inquiry into the
  charges against Mr. Habré.’47
  (p. 263) 43 Instructively, the Court also elaborated on the required timing of an
  investigation under Article 6(2). In general, it held that ‘steps must be taken as soon as the
  suspect is identified in the territory of the State’.48 This requirement is an important
  difference to the State party’s obligations under Article 12 and 13 which have to be
  performed irrespective of whether the suspect is present or known.49 In the Habré case, the
  obligation to initiate a preliminary investigation arose ‘immediately’ as soon as the Senegal
  authorities had reason to suspect Mr. Habré, who was in their territory, of being responsible
  for acts of torture. This point was reached ‘at least since the year 2000, when a complaint
  was filed in Senegal against Mr. Habré’.50
  44 The Court’s finding is insofar noteworthy as it concluded Senegal to be in violation of
  Article 6(2) irrespective of the performance of its obligation under Article 5(2). While the
  ICJ had not considered whether Senegal violated Article 5(2),51 it is implicit in the Court’s
  reasoning on Article 7 that Senegal had failed to establish the required jurisdiction under
  Article 5(2) until the legal amendments in 2007 and 2008.52 Consequently, the Court’s
  ruling implies that the absence of the required legal framework under Article 5(2), or any
  other required jurisdiction under Article 5, does not absolve the State party to perform its
  obligations under Article 6(2).
  45 Senegal’s breach of Article 6(2) continued also after 2008 when it eventually had
  amended its legal framework following the Committee against Torture’s decision in the
  Guengueng et al case.53 Although the required jurisdiction under Article 5 would have been
  available from then on, Senegal continued to fail initiating a preliminary inquiry, even after
  the submission of a further complaint to its authorities in 2008.54

  3.3 Article 6(3): Obligation to Assist in Communicating with
  Representative of the State
  46 Article 6(3) requires the State party to assist the alleged torturer to communicate with
  the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he or she is a national, or, if a
  stateless person,55 with the representative of the State where he or she usually resides.
  Importantly, it remains at the discretion of the detainee, whether he or she indeed wants to
  contact eg its local embassy or consulate. The State party is only obliged to assist, for
  example, by providing a phone and the relevant phone number, and cannot (p. 264) invoke
  the alleged perpetrator’s right under Article 6(3) against his or her will. This also means the

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custodial State cannot grant the authorities of the detainee’s country of nationality or
  residence the right to communicate with the detainee, if he does not want so.56 The US
  proposal to include into the Convention the explicit right to be visited by a representative of
  the State of nationality or residence did not find its way into Article 6(3). Nevertheless, this
  right derives from Article 36(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.57

  3.4 Article 6(4): Obligation to Notify Other States of the Measures
  Taken and Intended to Be Taken
  3.4.1 Application to All Forms of Jurisdiction under Article 5
  47 Article 6(4) is addressed to all States parties which exercised their jurisdiction under
  Article 5 and hence not limited to universal jurisdiction cases. Although the article was kept
  in square brackets for several years during the drafting process because of its connection
  with the question of universal jurisdiction,58 and irrespective of its reference to Article 5(1)
  in the first sentence, its systematic interpretation shows that Article 6(4) applies to all
  grounds of jurisdiction stipulated in Article 5. Hence, the safeguards of Article 6(4) are
  pertaining to cases in which the custodial State seeks to exercise universal jurisdiction as
  well as to cases in which a State seeks to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the territorial,
  active or passive nationality principle.59
  3.4.2 ‘Has taken a person into custody’
  48 The wording of the first sentence of Article 6(4) refers only to those cases in which the
  alleged torturer was taken into custody under Article 6(1). This limitation, with its apparent
  exclusion of suspected torturers whose freedom of movement has been restricted with non-
  custodial measures, seems surprising. On the one hand, a potential explanation for this
  limitation could be that the first sentence was intended to provide an additional safeguard
  to persons held in custody by informing their State of nationality. Although Article 6(3)
  already facilitates suspects to communicate with their representatives, Article 6(4)
  contributes further safeguards by requiring the custodial State to inform the alleged
  torturer’s country of origin (Article 5(1)(b)). However, it is not clear why a notification of
  States which may have no direct link with the alleged perpetrator (such as States with
  territorial or passive nationality jurisdiction) should be informed in order to safeguard the
  alleged torturer’s rights. On the other hand, if the purpose of Article 6(4) is to inform other
  States with potential jurisdiction over the case so that they can make a decision on whether
  to request extradition or not, the exclusion of cases in which the presence of the (p. 265)
  alleged perpetrator is ensured by non-custodial measures appears to constitute a gap. In
  practical terms, this gap however is likely to be marginal since securing the presence of the
  alleged torturer by non-custodial measures represents the exception rather than the norm.
  Considering the severity of the alleged crime as well as the danger of the alleged torturer
  absconding, custody will be in most cases the required choice.
  3.4.3 ‘Immediately notify’
  49 As stipulated in the first sentence of Article 6(4), the custodial State is obliged to notify
  States with jurisdiction under Article 5(1) ‘immediately’. This is generally interpreted to
  mean within a few hours.60
  3.4.4 ‘States referred to in Article 5(1)’
  50 If the custodial State is identical with the territorial State, it only must notify other
  States if the alleged torturer and/or victims are nationals of another State. If the custodial
  State exercises jurisdiction based on the active nationality principle under Article 5(1)(b), it
  must notify the territorial State and possibly also States whose nationals were tortured by
  the person concerned. If the custodial State exercises jurisdiction based on the passive
  nationality principle under Article 5(1)(c), it must notify the territorial State and, if

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20 September 2021
different, the State whose national the alleged torturer is. If the custodial State exercises
  universal jurisdiction, it must notify all States having jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(1).
  51 The obligation to notify States with jurisdiction under Article 5(1) is of ‘a general
  character’61 meaning it must be performed even if the custodial State has from the outset
  the intention to prosecute and not to extradite the alleged torturer.62 Indirectly, this
  requirement also arises by the duty of the custodial State to contact as part of its
  investigation other States which may possess relevant information pertaining to the case.
  As required by Article 9(1), all States parties shall afford another the greatest measure of
  assistance in relation to criminal proceedings, including the supply of all available
  evidence.63
  3.4.5 Duty to Promptly Report Findings of Preliminary Inquiry
  52 The second sentence of Article 6(3) refers to the preliminary inquiry under Article 6(2).
  The custodial State which is normally tasked to conduct such an inquiry, must promptly
  report the findings of the inquiry to States with jurisdiction under Article 5(1). In such a
  report, the State shall also indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.
  53 The word ‘promptly’ illustrates that such preliminary inquiries shall be conducted
  speedily, if possible within a few weeks. The length of criminal investigations depends on
  the complexity and the particular circumstances of each individual case. The purpose of this
  reporting obligation is again primarily to enable all States with a possible interest in
  prosecuting the alleged torturer to decide whether or not to request extradition.64 Even if
  the custodial State indicates its intention to exercise jurisdiction, other States, above all the
  territorial State, might request the extradition of the person concerned. For the (p. 266)
  custodial State, such extradition request may be of assistance in its decision on prosecution
  or extradition as required by Article 7. Since Article 5 does not contain any hierarchy as to
  the different grounds of jurisdiction, it is finally up to the custodial State to decide whether
  to exercise jurisdiction and to prosecute the suspected torturer or to extradite him or her.
  Roland Schmidt

  Footnotes:
  1
    For in depth analyses of national legislations and jurisprudence, particularly in relation to
  universal jurisdiction, see Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Universal Criminal Jurisdiction over Torture: A
  State of Affairs’ (2005) KU Leuven Faculty of Law, Institute for International Law, Working
  Paper No 66 (revised); Karen Janina Berg, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction as Mechanism
  and Part of the Global Struggle to Combat Impunity with Particular Regards to the Crime of
  Torture (Studienreihe des Ludwig Boltzmann Instituts für Menschenrechte, NWV, Neuer
  Wissenschaftlicher Verlag 2012); Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and
  Municipal Legal Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2003); Wolfgang Kaleck, ‘From
  Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998–2008’ (2009) 30 Mich J Int’l L
  927; TRIAL International/FIDH/ECCHR/Redress/FIBGAR, ‘Make Way For Justice #3.
  Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2017’ (March 2017).
  2   See below §§ 35–36.
  3
      See below §§ 31–33.
  4
      See below §§ 34.
  5
    Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (adopted 16 December
  1970, entered into force 14 October 1971) 860 UNTS 105 (Hague Hijacking Convention).

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6
    Summary by the Secretary-General in Accordance with Commission Resolution 18
  (XXXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights (1978) UN Doc E/CN.4/1314, para 92.
  7
    Revised Text of the Substantive Parts of the Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
  Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Submitted by Sweden (1979) UN
  Doc E/CN.4/WG.1/WP.1.
  8
       See above § 5.
  9
    Report of the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights (1980) UN Doc E/CN.
  4/1367.
  10
     Report of the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights (1981) UN Doc E/CN.
  4/L.1576.
  11
        See below Art 7 §§ 85–87.
  12
        E/CN.4/1983/L.40.
  13
     Report of the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights (1984) UN Doc E/CN.
  4/1984/72.
  14
     J Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A
  Handbook on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
  Treatment or Punishment (Martinus Nijhoff 1988) 134.
  15
     HBA et al v Canada, No 536/2013, UN Doc CAT/C/56/D/536/2013, 2 December 2015; see
  below Art 22, § 33.
  16
     The counsel sent the letter to the Attorney General of Canada on 19 September, a month
  prior to the expected visit of Mr. Bush. The Attorney General’s reply was dated with 7
  November and merely acknowledged the receipt of the letter. Mr. Bush had left the country
  by then. See HBA et al v Canada, No 536/2013 (n 15) para 9.2.
  17
        The complaint also raised violations of Arts 5(2) and 7(1): ibid, para 3.4.
  18
        ibid, para 4.2.
  19
      ibid, para 4.3. With a view to corroborate its decision, the State party asserted that no
  prosecution could go forward on the basis of the information package received by the
  complainant’s counsel, since it did not meet the evidentiary burden required to lay charges
  or obtain a conviction. The State party also alleged that the timing and volume of the
  information provided to the Attorney General would not have permitted a thorough
  investigation within the few weeks prior to Bush’s visit to Canada. Furthermore, according
  to the State party, the timing was also inadequate for the Attorney General to make a
  properly informed decision on the necessary consent in relation to the intended private
  prosecution (ibid, para 4.7.). With regard to its obligation to ensure the continuing presence
  of Mr. Bush, Canada argued that since the complainants’ allegations referred to executive
  acts of a US president, pertaining evidence would be only available in the US. In the
  absence of a reasonable expectation to obtain assistance from the US authorities, however,
  the State party allegedly had no basis on which it could take Bush into custody. Hence,
  according to Canada, the detention of Bush for the purpose of Article 6 was not warranted
  (ibid, para 4.3.). The State party further submitted that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
  did not conduct an investigation, since there would have been no realistic prospect in
  October 2011, that sufficient evidence to support a charge against Bush could have been
  assembled so as to justify detention (ibid, para 4.17.). It concluded that it neither possessed
  key evidentiary elements nor were it likely to obtain them. Hence, the State party argued,
  the Royal Canadian Mounted Police did not launch an investigation, and maintained that it
  was an entirely reasonable conclusion (ibid, para 4.18.). The State party further argued that
  any decision to detain an alleged perpetrator in transit through Canada would require a
  consideration of the results of a criminal investigation. Only if an investigation reveals

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20 September 2021
reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence has been committed the alleged
  perpetrator can be put under arrest. Should charges not be laid within twenty-four hours,
  detention cannot continue (ibid, para 4.17.).
  20
       See below Art 22, § 33.
  21
      See also the submissions of the complainants and their counsels to the CAT Committee:
  CCR/CCIJ, ‘Hassan Bin Attash, Sami El-Hajj, Muhammed Khan Tumani, and Murat Kurnaz v
  Canada, Communication presented to the Committee against Torture, Pursuant to Article 22
  of the Convention against Torture for Violation of Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention’ 14
  November 2012; CCR/CCIJ, ‘Re: CAT/536/2013, Hassan bin Attash et al, Communication
  against Canada, Reply to Supplemental Submission (Alleged Violation of Articles 5(2), 6 and
  7 of the Convention against Torture)’ 17 July 2014.
  22
       See HBA et al v Canada, No 536/2013 (n 15) para 4.7.
  23
       ibid, para 4.16.
  24
     ibid, para 4.18; see also Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, The United Nations
  Convention against Torture: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2008) 361.
  25
       HBA et al v Canada, No. 536/2013 (n 15) para 4.17.
  26
     See Burgers and Danelius (n 14) 134; Chris Ingelse, The UN Committee against Torture:
  An Assessment (Kluwer Law International 2001) 327; see also Berg (n 1) 264. Similar
  provisions are also included in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
  Aircraft (n 5) Art 6; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
  Civil Aviation (adopted 23 September 1971, entered into force 26 January 1973) 974 UNTS
  177 (Montreal Convention) Art 6; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
  against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (adopted 14
  December 1973, entered into force 20 February 1977) 1035 UNTS 167 Art 6; International
  Convention against the Taking of Hostages (adopted 17 December 1979, entered into 3 June
  1983) 1316 UNTS 205 Art 6.
  27
     On the interpretation of Art 9(3) CCPR see Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and
  Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edn, NP Engel 2005) 230ff.
  28
       E/CN.4/1314 (n 6). See above § 5.
  29
     For details on the case see Wolfgang Kaleck, ‘German International Law in Practice:
  From Leipzig to Karlsruhe’ in Wolfgang Kalek and others (eds), International Prosecution of
  Human Rights Crimes (Springer 2007) 109–10; see also above Art 5 § 180.
  30
     See AI, ‘Urgent Action in Focus: November 2005: Blood on the Streets: The Aftermath of
  the Killings in Andizhan’ (1 November 2005)  accessed 11 December 2017; HRW, ‘ “Bullets Were Falling Like Rain”.
  The Andijan Massacre, May 13, 2005’ (6 June 2005)  accessed 11
  December 2017; HRW, ‘Burying the Truth: Uzbekistan Rewrites the Story of the Andijan
  Massacre’ (September 2005)  accessed on 11 December 2017; AI, ‘Uzbekistan: Lifting The Siege on
  the Truth about Andizhan’ (19 September 2005)  accessed 11 December 2017; UNSRT (van Boven), ‘Report of the
  Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Theo van Boven, submitted in accordance
  with Commission resolution 2002/38, Addendum Mission to Uzbekistan’ (2003) UN Doc E/
  CN.4/2003/68/Add.2.

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