FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN UKRAINE: ASSESSING POTENTIAL RISKS - Egle E. Murauskaite Vilnius institute
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FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN
UKRAINE: ASSESSING
POTENTIAL RISKS
Egle E. Murauskaite
Vilnius
institute
for policy analysis
Vilnius
institute
for policy analysis
© 2020 Vilnius institute for policy analysis
www.vilniusinstitute.ltEgle E. Murauskaite is a senior researcher and simulations designer for the ICONS Project with Maryland University. Presently based in Lithuania, she is responsible for high-level political-military crises simulations in Europe, alongside academic research and government consulting projects. Egle has been working with unconventional security threats for the past 9 years – from gray zone warfare to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Egle is also a senior non-resident fellow with the Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis, where she is currently exploring the issue of foreign fighters in Ukraine. She is a co-author of a monthly podcast “NYLA Update”, where she explores the long-term geopolitical trends and challenges, and also a regular commentator on security issues in national and international media. Egle holds a Master’s degree from Sciences Po Paris (International Security) and a Bachelor’s degree from SSE Riga (Economics and Business Management); her professional experience spans the Netherlands, Australia, Egypt, France, and the U.S.
Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
Abstract
This study analyzes the profiles of foreign fighters, who have joined the conflict in Ukraine on
either side, and assesses the risks of radicalization as these fighters are increasingly returning
home. With considerable attention given to potential terrorism risks posed by foreign fighters
of the Islamic bent returning from Syria and Iraq, foreign fighters in Ukraine receive relatively
little coverage - and when they do, this faulty analogy at play risks making the potential
radicalizing factors worse. The study systematizes extensive foreign fighter profile case studies,
and draws on several interviews with returning fighters from the Caucasus, Eastern Europe
and Scandinavia. Far from uncovering a budding network of violent extremists, it suggests that
the conflict in Ukraine is becoming the grounds for many strongly right-wing and left-wing
bent men to settle the scores of historic injustices. This cluster of fighters disappointed in the
global system, Western way of life, and increasingly ideologically hardened (perhaps less by
battle and more by the surrounding political realities) is cause for serious socio-political concern,
in terms of breathing enthusiasm, resources, and know-how to extremist movements. This is
especially problematic, given that Europe is already struggling to pose a credible alternative to
these socio-political trends in many of its corners.
Introduction
The 2014 conflict in Ukraine1 has often been stagnant conflict has continued well into
noted as a wake-up call for Europe, in terms the 2019, with the influx of foreign fighters2
of the severity of the looming Russian threat, gradually slowing down or changing in profile.
the source of renewed relevance of tactical In contrast to the early arrivals, the interviews
nuclear weapons in military planning, as well conducted for this study, as well as interviews
as the new wind under the wings of NATO published in the media, indicate that those
- as the alliance had been struggling to find fighters continuing to serve after 2018 seem
relevance and maintain cohesion in the face increasingly kept by their lack of alternative
of rising non-state actor threats. Following prospects at a livelihood at home.
growing Russian pressure on Europe - from
cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 to With Europe witnessing the rise of violent
the incursions into Georgia in 2008, - the extremism - including Islamic fundamentalism
Ukrainian side enjoyed considerable support fuelled by the ongoing wars in Syria and
in Europe (particularly Lithuania) where fears Iraq - there were concerns that the conflict
mounted that one of the Baltic countries in Ukraine might spur it on, as Europeans
could be next. While the fighting has been who had joined the fight started to return
somewhat reduced in intensity, following home. After all, the MENA region had seen
the signed yet frequently broken Minsk-2 consecutive waves of violence unfold in the
ceasefire agreements in February 2015, the 1990s, as fighters from all over the region
1 For a more detailed recap of the conflict, see the Background section.
2 For a more detailed discussion of who is generally considered a foreign fighter, and the ap-
proach adopted in this study, see p. 4
1Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
previously involved in the war in Afghanistan, Legiec 2017), and additionally enhanced by
started to return home and, finding it difficult in-depth interviews with returning fighters
to reintegrate into civilian life, founded or from the Caucasus (one of the largest sources
joined violent movements. Looking at Ukraine, of arriving fighters), Eastern Europe (a region
there were particular concerns over the rise where state-level political support for Ukraine
of violent neo-Nazis - helped in no small is among the strongest), and Scandinavia (a
part by Russian information campaigns, and region particularly concerned with the conflict
lack of independently verifiable information in Ukraine as one of the sources fuelling the
about the extent of ongoing radicalization. domestic rise of neo-Nazism). Due to the
Europe is only starting to deal with fighters dearth of reliable information, and primarily
returning from this conflict – with considerable a European focus, the nature and particular
controversy concerning the appropriateness challenges of the numerous fighters “native” to
of treating them the same way as Islamic the conflict, i.e. hailing from Ukraine or Russia,
militants returning from the wars in Syria are discussed only in passing, and mostly as a
and Iraq, regardless of whether they fought comparative contextual background.3
for Russian- or Ukrainian-backed forces.
Far from uncovering budding network of
This study seeks to better understand the violent extremists, this work suggests that
types of foreign fighters who have joined the conflict in Ukraine is becoming the
the conflict in Ukraine on either side, and grounds for many strongly right-wing bent
compare these developed typological profiles men to settle the scores of historic injustices
with the known risk factors for radicalization - committed by or against Russia. Some do
and violence. It is important to note that with seek to gain combat experience, or engage
all the policy and academic attention to the in conflict cruising, having recently gone
fighters of the Islamic bent as a potential to battle elsewhere. But this pooling of
terrorism risk in Europe, to date, the matter anti-systemically inclined European youths,
of foreign fighters in Ukraine has primarily disappointed in the West, and increasingly
been traced through investigative journalists ideologically hardened - perhaps less by battle
reporting in-depth fighter profiles, or law and more by the surrounding political realities
enforcement agencies keeping tabs on recent - is cause for serious socio-political concern,
returnees. The edited volume by Rekaweck in terms of breathing enthusiasm, resources,
(2017) has been the only academic study thus and know-how to right-wing movements.
far to consider the issue of foreign fighters This is especially problematic, given that
in Ukraine - but even there the attention is Europe is already struggling to pose a credible
equally split between, and parallels are drawn alternative to such movements in countries
to, the conflict in Syria. This study, focused like Hungary or Poland. Moreover, as the
exclusively on Ukraine, systematizes 49 publicly Balkans are experiencing increasing political
available detailed case studies on fighters tensions and teeter on the verge of violence,
from various European countries, looking at the influx of fighters from that region risks
their backgrounds and motivation, outcomes having a particularly destabilizing influence.
upon their return. These insights are further
complimented by trend analysis of available This paper is organized as follows. The
battle deaths and injuries data (compiled by background section briefly recaps the origins
3 Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the fault lines and risks of the returnees identified here
are only felt worse in those countries due to significantly more limited state capabilities to monitor,
absorb, and assist.
2Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
and the current status of the conflict in returning foreign fighters. The fourth part of
Ukraine. The first part outlines the overall the study recaps some of the types of destiny
background of foreign fighters in Ukraine, and that the returning foreign fighters have met
discusses their four generalizable archetypes. across the globe – although the data on this
The second part discusses some of the common subject is particularly limited in terms of scope
concerns regarding the returnees, based on and reliability. The paper closes with a brief
research on radicalization, and relates a few discussion of the likely security and socio-
common historical analogies and logic chains political implications of the foreign fighters
that have developed, in no small part, due returning from Ukraine, potentially in ever
to the lack of reliable information. The third larger numbers if the conflict starts drawing
part discusses some of the emerging practices closer to resolution over the next few years.
in states’ legal approaches to dealing with
Background
Before delving deeper into the analysis, it in that capacity. Namely, the Russian armed
might be helpful to briefly recap a few of forces have invaded and seized the Ukrainian
the key developments of the highly complex Black Sea port of Crimea (without too much
and nuanced conflict in Ukraine. However, resistance), and following a show referendum
as there is no shortage of high quality held in March, the territory was annexed by
analysis of multiple aspects of the conflict Russia. Subsequently, local pro-Russian and
– from fighting techniques to accompanying foreign Russia-backed protesters, militants,
information campaigns – the purpose of this and other violent and/or political elements
study is only to plug one of the remaining gaps: have started taking over government buildings
understanding the roles of individual foreign in eastern Ukraine (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv,
fighters (i.e. persons not native to Ukraine or Mariupol, and other cities) demanding that
Russia, who have not come as part of one of similar types of referenda be held to decide
the mercenary regiments). their status. In July 2014, a commercial airplane
carrying a large number of Dutch passengers
Ukraine had gone into the initial internal crisis was shot over Ukraine by a Russian-supplied
in November 2013, when the pro-Russian surface-to-air missile, and soon thereafter the
president Viktor Yanukovych retreated from EU and the U.S. have instituted economic
the EU trade partnership negotiation and sanctions against Russia. In summer 2014,
swung an agreement with Russia instead. several units of Russian armed forces have
With the Ukrainian population being divided entered the Donbas region – in addition to the
between pro- and anti- Russian sentiments, previously mentioned smaller units, privateers,
this political turn brought about a wave of and individuals. As the fighting continued
protests. However, the government security with no swift outcome in sight for either side,
forces have brutally dealt with them, sparking in September, the first truce agreement was
even more massive protests and starting the signed in Minsk, and Putin had started to
Maidan phase of this still domestic, albeit withdraw some of the Russian troops from
foreign influenced, crisis. Amidst the internal Eastern Ukraine.
turmoil, in February 2014 the crisis turned into
an international conflict – one fought through During this most violent conflict phase, the
thinly veiled proxies, mercenaries, and state- absolute majority of the fighters involved
sponsored or state-sanctioned troops rather were Russian and Ukrainian. While there was
than official state armies facing one another some international presence in the crisis early
3Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
on (e.g., protesters, medics, NGO workers, rounds of sanctions against Russia. In 2018,
journalists, expert advisers etc.), the foreign NATO has held a large military exercise in
fighters that are the focus of this analysis had Western Ukraine, and the country has been
mostly started to arrive later, as the conflict receiving military assistance in the form of
wore on and stagnated. fighting equipment and fighter trainers. In
September 2019, the newly elected Ukrainian
International powers have struggled to president Volodymyr Zelensky has agreed
broker a peace agreement between Ukraine to exchange prisoners with Russia, and the
and Russia since February 2015 through European powers had once again attempted
several iterations of the Minsk accords, but to broker a peace agreement, but as of January
the sporadic fighting continued. The U.S. and 2020, the conflict remains politically stagnant,
EU have maintained subsequent new annual if not particularly militarily active.
I. Fighter profiles
By various estimates between 1,500 and in Ukraine is very modest. Nevertheless, it
2,000 foreign fighters from 54 different is important to understand that no small
countries have come to take part in the number of these foreign fighters were
conflict in Ukraine on either side of the ethnic Russians and/or Russian-speaking
battle between 2014 and 2019 (Metodieva citizens of the foreign countries – this may
2019, Rekawek 2017)4. Most of the fighters imply that the numbers provided here are
interviewed or featured in the media seem underestimated, if the arriving foreigners are
to have come during or after 2015, with the able to sufficiently blend in with the locals.
brokering of the first – ineffective – ceasefires. While all of these conflicts seem numerically
But because of their typically regular rotation dominated by amateurs using old or
in and out of Ukraine every few months, makeshift weaponry, military experts suggest
and porous borders facilitating unchecked that in Ukraine the individuals fighting for
access, it is somewhat difficult to tell whether both conflicting parties are somewhat better
that constitutes the majority, or whether trained and equipped – despite the fact that
the bulk of those who had come prior to Ukraine is not receiving nearly as much
2015 had been killed, or were unwilling to financial support or publicity (Mil.Today
raise publicity about their activities. Mares 2015).
(2017) also suggests that the largest influx
of foreigner fighters had started in the 2015, Still, active social media campaigns seem
with the main wave arriving as the conflict to have been the number one recruitment
increasingly stagnated – although there was technique that helped most foreign fighters
considerable presence of foreign extreme on both sides find their way to the conflict zone
right-wing protesters during the Maidan – from fighter Youtube videos and Instagram
phase. or Facebook posts to media profiles featuring
either prominent hero fighters or appealing
Compared to the estimate that over 20,000 to the nobility of the cause at stake. It has
foreign fighters are engaged in Iraq and been suggested that the pro-Russian side has
Syria (Barber 2015), the number of fighters been recruiting softball players, trained in
4 For fighter affiliations by country see Figure 1; for units that include foreign fighters, see
Table 1.
4Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
Russia
Ukraine
Number of fighters
FIGURE 1. Number of Foreign Fighters in Ukraine by Country 2014-2016
Source: Legiec 2017
historic battle tactics and already delighted individual fighter narratives). In this study
to spend their free time operating as armed I attempt to group the fighters into larger
units – but neither personal interviews nor categories based on the self-identified key
publicly available information could confirm underlying sentiments bringing them to
this definitively. It is also worth noting that the battle, accompanying these categories
many known foreign fighters have previously with examples from different ideologies and
been involved with nationalist groups of nations within these groupings. Because most
some kind ranging the full spectrum of countries had nationals fighting on both
right-wing movements. This varies from sides of the conflict – though sometimes in
persons espousing white supremacist and different proportions, – national realities
anti-Muslim sentiments to members of better serve as contextual background
nationalist political parties and organizations rather than the key distinguishing feature.
(formal or informal), from movement leaders Grouping the fighters by the key motivating
to youth branch members or non-active / no- factors helps sift through the core differences
longer active supporters. and highlight the potential risks associated
with each group, which often are non-
Reporting on the conflict in Ukraine and country-specific – even though many tend to
the foreign fighters involved has typically exhibit several prominent traits rather than
categorized them either by country, by being clear-cut single category examples.
battalion, or by the side they were fighting Still, it is important to recognize that
for (and has generally tended to spotlight within the categories, personal interviews
5Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
often constitute samples of convenience, so the UN Security Council voted to include
extrapolation about other members of such a non-combatant and support functions into
group should be approached with caution. It is the definition of foreign terrorist fighters;
interesting to note that financial rewards did many governments have subsequently chosen
not play a significant, if any, role in attracting to treat everyone who travelled to the fight
foreign fighters to the pro-Ukraine side (the (including the fighters’ wives and children) as
standard monthly pay seemed to be around foreign terrorist fighters and prosecute them
$300), even though on the pro-Russia side, accordingly. However, with returnees from
some of the poorer fighters were lured by Ukraine the legal practices are currently in
the rewards that were said to be in excess of formation, and while they are informed by
$1,000. Among most foreigners, this marks the Syria precedents, so far Belarus has been
a clear distinction from mercenaries and the only state to prosecute returning non-
private contractors, where financial reward is combatants, with most states choosing to
the prime motivation pulling fighters into a focus on combatants only (so far, mostly on
conflict they are otherwise unrelated to. the pro-Russian ones).
A final note of caution applies to the This study identifies four major categories of
definition of a foreign fighter: this paper foreign fighters, based on the key sentiment
is squarely concerned with combatants, i.e. bringing them to the battlefields in Ukraine,
persons actively wielding weapons – weather listed in the order of prevalence: (1) veterans
in battle, in guarding the supplies or providing with historical grievances, (2) disillusioned
armed protection to convoys moving through ideologues, (3) armed opposition, and (4)
the disputed territories. This focus has been battle chasers. The next four sections discuss
chosen despite the recognition that a large each category in detail, noting the specific
number of support personnel (e.g., doctors, backgrounds characteristic to different
psychologists, NGO and aid workers), as well nationals in that type. Each category – except
as journalists have also been exposed to, and for the armed opposition - contains both,
some have been profoundly affected by the pro-Russian and pro-Ukraine fighters, and
conflict in Ukraine – so much so as to possibly more generally, people with left-wing and
share some of the risk factors attributable right-wing political convictions of varying
to the returning fighters. Trying to address levels of extreme.5
concerns stemming from the foreign fighters
travelling to, and returning from Syria and Iraq,
5 As the next four sections explain, political ideology greatly varies in importance from one
category to another – from being central to hardly relevant. In the categories where it is considered
significant, the pro-Russian fighters would generally identify with left-wing beliefs, and pro-Ukraine
– with right-wing beliefs. However, it is important to understand that the political left and right each
involve a much broader spectrum of ideas (e.g. role of a nation in general or in particular, relation of a
state apparatus to the citizens, attitudes towards market regulation and property ownership etc.) that the
clash of ideas specific to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
6Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
TABLE 1. Military Units in Ukraine That Include Foreign Fighters
Pro-Russia Pro-Ukraine
Vostok Battalion Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion
Wagner Brigade* (it is not clear if this is a private
Sheikh Mansur Battalion
contractor company, or a unit reporting to Russian MoD)
Bryanka SSR Battalion Georgian Legion
International Brigade Azov Battalion^ (under the National Guard of Ukraine)
7th Brigade Aidar Battalion’ (under Ukrainian Ministry of Defense)
Ural Unit Pravyi Sektor (includes Tactical Group Belarus)
Serbian Hussar Regiment
1st Slavic Unit
Ryazan Unit
Batman Unit
Rusich Unit
1. Veterans with Historical Grievances prominent veteran of both Chechen wars,
It seems that the largest number of fighters and mostly consists of men who have also
have been drawn into Ukraine by historic fought in one or both of those wars. They
experiences of conflict involving their had been scattered in the West in exile, and
homeland and one of the warring parties. have come to Ukraine explicitly to continue
Significantly, these men came not only with this fight against Russia. Many men in the
general military or paramilitary skills, but other, Sheikh Mansur battalion, are Chechen
were familiar with the particular enemy they Muslims who claim to have come to avenge
were facing. Imperial Russia’s 18th century conquests of
their lands. In addition, prominent Chechen
Among the pro-Ukraine fighters, many have war veterans can be found in other units,
lived through, or held strong family and/or e.g., the ferocious Aidar battalion defending
ethnic narrative memories about, conflicts Eastern Ukraine – they come driven by an
with Russia, and were keen to fight to prevent oft-repeated sentiment of refusing to “bend
another country from falling victim to the over for Putin” ( Jackson 2014). Similarly,
regime. For some the desire to continue the the Georgian Legion (as well as other units
fight was mainly colored by anti-Russian accepting Georgians) has attracted many war
sentiment, while for others it was more veterans hardened by the country’s lasting
broadly about defending the principles of confrontations with Russia. Some were
state sovereignty. drawn in by strong anti-Russian sentiments
(Legiec 2017), while others claim that “love
Many Georgians and Chechens, who for Ukraine is what brought us here, not our
comprise by far the largest number of supposed hate for Russia” (Euromaidan Press
fighters present (an estimate of about 100 2017). In addition, as a more pro-Russian
in each ethnic group), fall into this category. government took over in Georgia, many
Consider, for instance, the two Chechen of the veterans of the Georgian war found
fighter units discussed by Racz (2017). The themselves out of work and under pressure
Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion is led by a – feeling cornered, to them it seemed natural
7Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
to bring the fight back to Russia in another constituted a sizeable portion of foreign
theater. fighters supporting Russia’s efforts in Crimea
(Mares 2017). In terms of the driving factors,
Moldova’s Transnistrian territory is another some cite this as a favor they have to return
prominent source of this type of foreign for Russia’s support to Serbia against Kosovo’s
fighters – though far less numerous (an bid for independence (in confrontation with
estimate of 40 fighters), they mostly come NATO). Others seem motivated to support
to fight for the pro-Russia side, driven by the pan-Slavic and/or pan-Orthodox unity
anti-Ukrainian sentiment that dates back (DFRLab 2016, Metodieva 2019). Indeed,
to the Transnistrian war in 1990. Ukrainian on national policy level Serbia has refused
volunteers and Cossacks had come to fight to join the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions, and
against the Moldovan government forces Ukraine’s pleas for Serbia to stem the flow
– and alongside Russian forces – in support of its fighters have largely fallen on deaf ears
of independence claims of the Transnistrian (Coynash 2019). Unsurprisingly, Croats have
enclave (which had a large ethnic Ukrainian been coming to the pro-Ukraine, and anti-
population). These sentiments and narratives Serbian, side of the fight. Interestingly, a
were deliberately further stoked by Russian French veteran of the Balkan war who had
information campaigns in the Transnistrian fought on the Croat side and subsequently
territory and among Moldovans living in stayed in Croatia, Gaston Besson, has formed
Russia (Secrieru 2017). These volunteers saw a strong network and became a prominent
the conflict in Ukraine as payback time, and recruiter for the pro-Ukraine Azov battalion
those who came seem to have joined the ( Jackson 2014, Scimia 2015). Although he
battalions known for their particular brutality may be more appropriately categorized in
– such as Bryanka SSSR. Nevertheless, there the battle-chaser category below, his example
were some individual stories of Moldovan helps highlight the extent of the presence
veterans coming to fight on the pro-Ukraine of Balkan wars’ grievances in the Ukrainian
side – seemingly driven by the increasing conflict.
Russian pressure in the country. Moldovans
fighting on this side seem to also have In a similar vein, dual-nationals from the
chosen some of the most brutal battalions, West have been attracted to the conflict out
like Shakhtersk (Secrieru 2017). It is worth of historic sentiment. It is worth mentioning
noting that the particularly brutal pro- the American-Ukrainian Mark Paslawsky,
Ukraine battalions, including Shakhtersk, who became the first foreigner to die in this
were subsequently officially disbanded. conflict – a West Point graduate – he enlisted
soon after the conflict broke out driven by
The Balkan, or more precisely Serbo-Croat, Ukrainian patriotic sentiment (DFR Lab
conflicts are also getting an increasingly 2016). Another example are two Italian-
intense replay of historical hostilities in the Russians: Vladimir Verbitsky of Moldovan
Ukrainian theater. Up to 300 Serbs – many descent and Oli Krutany of Albanian
with combat experience from the nineties – descent – both had previous experience
have flocked to support the Russian cause, with with the Russian military, and Krutany had
some joining the Wagner mercenary group, reportedly fought in Chechnya, and both
and others spread among the following eight were drawn to fight on the pro-Russia side
units: the International Brigade, the Seventh (Wesolowsky and Kreshko 2018). The desire
Brigade, the Serbian-Hussar Regiment, the to right historical wrongs has also brought
Ural Unit, the Batman Unit, the First Slavic several members of the “Essence of Time”
Unit, and the Ryazan Unit (Zivanovic 2018). international communist movement from
Serbian nationalists, known as “Chetniks”, Spain to fight on the pro-Russian side –
8Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
they claimed to see it as a way to repay for conflict in Ukraine for an opportunity to
the USSR’s support to the left-wing forces resettle old battle scores with either Ukraine
fighting against Gen. Franco in between the or Russia. It is important to fully appreciate
World Wars (DFRLab 2016, Jackson 2014, the geographic, temporal, and ideological
Mares 2017). breadth of the scope of appeal of these
historic injustices.
Overall, a significant portion of experienced
individual foreign fighters have come to the
Armed
Opposition
Adventurous Left-wing
Civilians
Battle chasers Disillusioned
Idealogues
Trained
Veterans with Right-wing
fighters
Historical
Grievances
FIGURE 2. Fighter Types Scheme
2. The Disillusioned Ideologues to stop the freedom-seeking people from
The second-most-prevalent type of foreign being slaughtered en-masse. The pro-Russia
fighters in Ukraine are men generally fighters described their mounting anxiety as
disappointed with the state of the Western NATO and the West increasingly encroached
world in reaction to emerging global on Russia’s traditional sphere of interest with
challenges – particularly those posed by increasingly bold war-mongering. Both
confrontation with alternative world views, types subsequently took it upon themselves
such as that of Russia or China. This is the to address the situation, often reluctantly,
broadest and perhaps the most complex as somebody had to finally do something.
category to analyse. The pro-Ukraine fighters Present in this segment was also a number of
in this segment describe watching with armchair preachers of the great clash – e.g., of
growing frustration as governments of their capitalists and the simple people, of the U.S.
country, and other Western institutions, and Russia, of the dictatorship and freedom.
helplessly admonished tyrannical regimes Seeing the conflict in Ukraine unfold, they
– of Syria or Russia – while doing little were moved to join it as a symbolic partaking
9Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
in the advancement of their cause. Many get involved (Allen 2015).
disillusioned ideologues had at least some
military, police, or paramilitary training Similarly, a few fighters from Poland could be
(though most have not seen an actual battle), found on either side of the conflict, with those
and some had pondered joining the war in supporting Russia espousing strong anti-
Syria as a symbolic cause but were deterred NATO and anti-globalization sentiments,
by its perceived brutality and/or the fact that while those who supported Ukrainian rebels
it was primarily dominated by Arab political cited diametrically opposite need to defend
narratives. liberal democracy ( Jackson 2014).
This category seems to fit the few Baltic Among the well-known albeit arguably less
fighters present. Those fighting on the extreme examples in this category is Chris
Ukrainian side seem to see this as the Garett - a British veteran volunteer de-miner
final frontier to be defended from Russian and fundraiser for the pro-Ukraine Azov
expansion – or their country might be next – battalion – who claims to have been moved
while those supporting Russia see Ukraine as to action by Ukrainian Facebook posts
the final pro-Russian frontier to be defended calling for help from experienced fighters in
from NATO’s encroachment. Historically, defending the country’s sovereignty (Allen
Lithuania has been actively advocating 2015, DFR Lab Nov 2016). A sentiment
the EU to pay more attention to Ukraine of rejection of the Western-decadence has
and to offer assistance to Ukraine once the prompted men to different types of non-
conflict started. It is thus hardly surprising violent albeit more ideologically colored
that of all the Baltic states Lithuania had the action. For instance, the American Russell
highest number of fighters involved (up to Bentley came to fight on the pro-Russia
20), and most of them were on the side of side; he identifies as a communist and has
Ukraine. With Latvia’s large ethnic-Russian called the U.S. government fascist – he runs
population and a quieter political stance on a podcast, a Youtube channel, and a website
the issue, the balance seemed to favor the covering the battles in Ukraine (DFR Lab
pro-Russian side. But it seems somewhat Sep 2016). Interestingly, another young
surprising to that the 2014-2016 statistics American Santi Pirtle claims to have come
captured no Estonians backing Ukraine, and to Ukraine driven by similar contempt for
only a few fighting on the Russian side (see the overly frivolous U.S. culture – but chose
Figure 1 on page 7). to fight with the pro-Ukraine Pravyi Sector
(Clapp 2016). Colombian Alexis Castillo
Among the 20-or-so estimated French fighters Idodeai, who came to fight on the pro-
flocking to both sides of the battle, many can Russia side with the Vostok battalion, was a
be categorized as disappointed ideologues member of the communist “Essence of Time”
as well. France’s historical sympathies for movement and was prompted to action by
communism are well known, and a number of the perceived atrocities against the Russians:
young French fighters with previous combat “we could not sit on our hands while Nazis
experience in Afghanistan came to defend from Right Sector bombed peaceful cities
the Russian side, as to them it represents “the and killed civilians” (DFR Lab Sep 2016).
final bulwark against liberal Anglo-Saxon
globalism and the decadent West” ( Jackson The significant right-wing presence from
2014). But the Frenchmen who had joined Scandinavia, as well as Italy, Austria, and
the right-wing Azov battalion to fight for Germany have found they could channel
Ukraine also point to the primarily political their nationalist and/or white-supremacist
and ideological drivers behind their choice to sentiment into the battlegrounds in Ukraine.
10Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
The widely known Swedish far-right veteran curious part is that oftentimes men with
Mikael Skillt claims to have joined the pro- the same (or very similar) sentiments, such
Ukraine Azov battalion to fight for the as the disappointment with the consumerist
“survival of white people” ( Jackson 2014). society or the lack of response to other global
Fighters from Italy seem to have been drawn conflicts, have ended up on the opposites
to the more extreme left-wing and right- fighting sides in Ukraine.
wing factions in Ukraine – reportedly, these
were mostly unemployed males with some 3. Armed opposition
military training and criminal records, and In addition to the foreign fighters coming to
a history of participating in radical political get another chance to refight their historic
movements (Scimia 2015). Those joining the conflicts with either Russia or Ukraine, a
pro-Russian Vostok battalion felt they were faction has come driven by the desire to
helping “resistance against the “fascist” and turn their political opposition to Putin and
“repressive” government in Kyiv”, while those his cadre into an armed struggle, despairing
supporting Ukraine tended to join the Pravyi about the hapless political processes at home.
sector – but most fighters from Italy seemed Many ethnic Russians fighting on the pro-
to share a disdain for the U.S., NATO and Ukraine side could be found in this category
the EU (Scimia 2015). (Euromaidan Press 2017), but because of
the primary focus on foreign and European
While there has been no shortage of in- parties involved, they will not be discussed
depth profiles of extreme right-wing fighters, here in greater detail, although this by no
gloating over their cause and proud to means reduces the significance of their
take part in the battle, that is but the most struggle or their presence, which spotlights
intense shade of the ideologically-driven the fighters from Belarus – one of the
foreign fighters – it ought not lead one to most numerous single-nation presences in
infer that all ideologically-driven fighters are Ukraine (similar in scope to the Georgians
extremists. Many men in this category seem and Chechens).
to emphasize and value their ideological
convictions and the shaping of a desired Most of these men come to Ukraine with no
world order – and shaping it through battle prior military training or experience. Some of
is but one and the most extreme way. Indeed, them are dissidents running from persecution
many seem to have come to fight in Ukraine by the FSB and its supporting structures
reluctantly, out of perceived necessity – in – they or their families having either
contrast to the extremist elements, who seem experienced that already, or where certain
to prioritize collective action, often violent, persecution would come if their activities
over ideological nuance. It is also important became any more visible. For instance, one
to recognize that most men with the more young man has come to fight in the Ukraine
extreme views have held them before joining after being sentenced to prison for posting
this conflict, and some were even on the law “No fear” stickers in Minsk: “For Lukashenka,
enforcement radar for that reason. I’m a terrorist. Our families are constantly
harassed by the KGB” (Legiec April 2017).
Overall, the conflict in Ukraine has Other illustrative examples come from an
attracted no small number of individuals interview with a Latvian fighter, where he
from abroad, who are convinced the world recalled “A Belarusian computer specialist
is about to fall apart and somebody has to who was unable to withstand the captivity in
do something. They have actively chosen to Belarus”, as well as a Russian veteran, who
be that somebody, with the range of actions “is by nature a democrat, wants to overthrow
spanning both violent and non-violent. The the Putin regime, but he thinks the fight
11Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
inside Russia is pointless” (Vikmanis 2015). A fighter from Sweden interviewed for
Most of the Belarusian men have joined the this study recalled receiving around 50
Tactical Group Belarus – part of the pro- requests from people willing to join the
Ukraine right-wing Pravyi Sector battalion, battle, of which no more than 5 had military
although some also blend in Azov and Aidar experience – 2 of them ended up finally
battalions. showing up in Ukraine, but one soon got
killed in a car accident while the other could
Nevertheless, a large portion of Belarusians not handle the reality of trench warfare and
come to fight on the pro-Russia side – they left without seeing any battle in the end. A
would be captured in the disillusioned Lithuanian NGO worker regularly present in
ideologues category above, as they seem to Ukraine similarly reported receiving dozens
be deeply convinced of the narrative about of Facebook requests by inexperienced
Russia being under siege by the West, and adventurous youths, and turning them down.
the need to defend pan-Slavic unity. However, there seems to be no shortage of
battle chasers elsewhere in the Western world
Overall, the conflict in Ukraine has provided a – countries unshaken by conflict for decades.
theater to settle not only lasting international,
but also intra-national struggles. This armed A known Austrian fighter Ben Fischer,
political opposition ranges from Russians, accused of war crimes in Ukraine, is one of
who have come to symbolically fight Putin’s the examples in this category: a military man,
regime, to Belarusians, who came to fight who had deliberately rotated through Kosovo
against a local repressive regime supported and Iraq looking for a battle experience
by Putin. (unsuccessfully), attempted to enlist in the
French Foreign Legion (also unsuccessfully)
and was finally glad to join the pro-Ukraine
4. Battle Chasers right-wing Pravyi Sector fighters (Clapp
Any on-going conflict in the world inevitably 2016). Nevertheless, Fischer also claims to
attracts a number of fighters mostly seeking have been “disillusioned by the war and the
the battle itself, rather than a particular cause enforcement of the Minsk agreement,” and
– and Ukraine is no exception. This category claimed to support an armed overthrow of
includes experienced individual foreign the current hapless government in Kiev (DFR
fighters, who come to join one conflict after Lab Nov 2016) – showing characteristics of a
another6, as well as inexperienced civilian disillusioned ideologue.
adventurers, curious about tasting the battle.
Of the latter type, most get turned away by In 2016, an Australian veteran came to fight
the fighters they reach out to, but a few such with the Pravyi Sector attracted by action
inexperienced adventurers have nevertheless Facebook posts by American fighters he
made it to the Ukrainian battlefield. knew (Rubinsztein-Dunlop et al. 2018). A
6 The experienced individuals here are not considered mercenaries – many have other professional
experience and none report being primarily motivated by financial rewards. Nevertheless, it is important
to note reportedly substantial presence of private military contractors, who usually arrive and operate
in units, rather than single individuals – and thus fall outside the scope of this analysis. Often these are
nationals of one of warring parties, i.e. Russia or Ukraine, and thus would fall outside of the geographic
scope of this paper’s analysis – but given their exposure to the same risk factors and reportedly limited
access to post-conflict reintegration support mechanisms, this category of returnees could pose a potential
risk of violent radicalization.
12Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
year later, a young Australian neo-Nazi and above, can also be classified as battle chasers.
gun owner reported searching the internet These few are supporters of the Islamic State,
for weeks looking for battalions that take and have fought in its ranks in Syria and/or
in volunteer foreign fighters – he had Iraq (Racz 2017).
considered going to fight ISIS in Syria first,
but the fear of terrorism charges led him to Overall, the conflict in Ukraine has inevitably
go to fight with the pro-Ukraine battalion attracted some battle chasers – including a
instead (Rubinsztein-Dunlop et al. 2018). very small number of adventurous civilians,
Two Americans, who had come to fight on who either managed to withstand the scrutiny
the pro-Ukrainian side, reportedly got bored of recruiters, or simply showed up on the
with the lack of action and subsequently left battlefield. However, the analysis of available
to seek more intense combat experiences in data and the in-depth interviews suggest
South Sudan and Venezuela (Meger 2019). that the number of such battle chasers is
much smaller, and their fates often much less
It is also important to note that, in addition glorious (and rather short-lived) compared to
to experienced Western fighters and what the media accounts might lead one to
adventurous youth, some of the men of the believe.
Chechen Sheikh Mansur battalion, discussed
II. Concerns and Lessons (Not) Learned
Most of the current academic understanding the one Islamic battalion of Sheikh Mehsud
about the typical behavioral patterns of, and in Ukraine). Furthermore, despite numerous
potential risks associated with, the returning arrests and charges of acts of terrorism brought
foreign fighters rest on the extensive research against the returnees, discussed in the section
about conflicts in the Arab world – from Iraq on State Approaches below, it is important to
and Somalia to Yemen and Libya, as well as note the lack of – at least publically identified
Syria and the international terror campaigns – presence of known international or regional
linked with Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The different terrorist organizations in Ukraine. Instead,
cultural and political background of the the fighter motivational profiles described
conflict in Ukraine means that while some above suggest that fighters arriving in Ukraine
of these insights might still apply, they ought tend to already hold more extreme political
to be re-examined with care against the views and possess at least some military
particular local context. training. They are often already on the local
law enforcement radar, and so it is less about
The most common concern is that the battle capable young men getting radicalized and
hardened fighters will come back radicalized equipped to fight, and more about radicals
by the combat and ideas they fought for, and getting better trained and networking among
put their skills to use locally – establishing the like-minded. Indeed, there seemed to be
domestic chapters of international extremist no shortage of foreign fighters who, upon
organizations or founding new extremist encountering the broad spectrum of fighters
groups. However, the tactics adopted by on their, as well as the enemy side, have come
foreign fighters in Ukraine – on either side of out with a more moderate worldview, akin
the conflict – seem to mimic guerilla warfare to the sentiment described by a pro-Russian
more closely, rather than suicide bombings fighter self-identifying as anarchist “I got
more common in the extremist Islamic bored with it, all this opposition of right wing
circles (and this seems to hold true also for and left wing people. I found friends among
13Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
the enemies and I got to understand that it media, without any direct personal contact
was all just a game” (Meger 2019). seems sufficient to inspire self-radicalization
in individuals so inclined. A noteworthy
A common related concern is that the example here would be the Christchurch
returnees will serve as heroic examples and shooter – an Australian extremist, who claims
recruit, or help the recruiters attract, new to have visited Ukraine (although does not
fighters for the cause. This seems to be a appear to have participated in the fighting)
somewhat valid risk in Ukraine, albeit it and references the conflict in the infamous
seems to be most pronounced while the manifesto he distributed as justification
fighters are still on the battlefield rather for shooting up a mosque in New Zealand
than upon their return. Namely, the absolute in 2019. With the growing international
majority of foreign fighters claim to have prevalence of lone-wolf terrorism (as opposed
been inspired by social media posts by other to organized terrorist groups), the concerns
fighters on the battlefield, and have found about self-radicalization are justifiably on the
their way to Ukraine through social networks rise – but it seems yet again that radicalism is
– reaching out to the fighters they knew or feeding into the conflict in Ukraine more so
approaching unfamiliar prominent fighters. than the other way around: the Christchurch
Thus far, there are only a few publicly known manifesto has been promptly translated into
cases of returnees serving as a recruitment Russian, Ukrainian, and other less-common
point to attract new fighters (in Italy and languages and was reportedly making the
Czech Republic), potentially because by the rounds among the far-right fighters, including
time these fighters may make the decision to the Azov battalion (Bellingcat 2019).
return they might be experiencing the fatigue
and/or loss of faith in an armed solution to It is further worth considering the latent
the conflict. Nevertheless, there might be threat posed by returning foreign fighters.
another long term risk – as some of the Through time spent in the conflict new
returning foreign fighters are sentenced and networks of relationships are forged that
jailed for their activities, they could contribute share a particular worldview, and the fighters
to radicalization in their homeland’s prisons. tend to keep in touch after returning home.
Subsequently, such networks can be used
Nevertheless, through no additional active to collect and/or share intelligence about
effort on their part, the foreign fighters the situation in the home country. More
may become inspirational examples for significantly, they could be used as a latent
others to take violent action – through self- spearhead for disruptive action, or as a
radicalization. For instance, Malet (2015) has transformational agent operationalizing
found that the heroic effect of foreign fighters domestic supporters of a particular cause.
serving as inspiration to others through social One example shedding light on the
media is much greater while they are still active disruptive potential of returning fighters was
in the conflict, compared to when they return the foiled 2016 coup in Montenegro: the
home. In another example Mares (2017) has plot to murder the prime minister on the
found that the heroic coverage about a pro- day of election involved several right-wing
Russian Czech soldier killed in combat in extremists, who have fought in Ukraine, as
Ukraine mobilized both, the right- and left- well as two Russia’s GRU agents (Beslin and
wing, political extremists in the country. It Ignjatijevic 2016; Bellingcat 2018). In this
is difficult to assess whether and how much regard, returning fighters in the disillusioned
additional risk there might be associated ideologues category would be of particular
with the physical return of the fighters, as concern – sufficiently dissatisfied with the
observing their combat actions on social state of the world to risk their life in a foreign
14Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
country, now better trained and networked see; and many of those potentially bent on
such cadre could likely be convinced to assist bringing the armed fight back home still
in anti-government / anti-minority / white- lack the competence to do so alone and/or
supremacist activities. The returning ethnic do not receive international support for their
Russian fighters supportive of the Putin intended local cell activities. In Ukraine,
regime, who are citizens of other countries, the death rate would not be anywhere
would be of particular concern in this regard. near that high, as suicide bombing is not a
prevalent tactic, and most of the foreign
Following the discussion on the potential fighters have arrived in the last, and the less
security risks that returning foreign fighters violent and intense, stages of the conflict.
could pose, it is worth also presenting some Continued battle seeking certainly seems to
of the mitigating factors that have thus be channeling fighters from that category
far prevented some of the international towards more violent conflicts elsewhere in
concerns about radicalization and terrorism the world, rather than back home. However,
from coming to fruition. Hegghammer and disillusionment with fighting as a solution
Nesser (2015) estimate that in Islamists seems much discussed, but it is difficult to
circles, approximately only 1 in 360 (i.e., judge its prevalence among the fighters. Based
0.28%) returning foreign fighters proceed to on the personal interviews with the returnees
bring the fight back home and plot attacks and the open source literature, disillusionment
against their homeland. Drawing, again, on applies to some of the ideologically motivated
the literature on Islamic fighters in Iraq and individuals with prior military training who
Syria, Byman (2015) offers a summary of did not hold extreme views prior to coming
the key explanations: approximately half of to combat, and also to many of the battle
the foreign fighters – often the most radical chasers without prior military experience.
and enthusiastic – end up dying on suicide These individuals seem more inclined to
missions or the front lines of combat; some return, give up the fight, and publicly discuss
continue moving from conflict to conflict their experiences, but this would only mean
without spending much time in their a higher remaining concentration of radical-
homeland; others become disillusioned with minded foreign fighters in Ukraine, who will
fighting as a solution to the problems they not be able to stay there indefinitely.
III. State Approaches to Returnees
Effective functioning of the state security the alternative routes – various re-education
apparatus is often mentioned as key to and re-integration mechanisms. However,
preventing the returning foreign fighters it is necessary to acknowledge that both
from engaging in violent extremism – and of these approaches inherently isolate the
it seems that in all the nations from which returning foreign fighters from the rest of
fighters have flocked to Ukraine, the national society, and – by design or in case of failure –
security services have kept tabs on them can exacerbate the feeling of “otherness” and
since, for better or worse. Since many states risk sharpening their antagonism. Essentially,
approach returning fighters as a potential the “more positive othering” that singles out
security risk and choose to deal with this a person to be re-educated or monitored, or
risk through criminal prosecution, this the “more negative othering” that prosecutes
section starts by reviewing the different law and imprisons or fines them, risks amplifying
enforcement approaches the states have the very core factors in radicalization that
adopted to this end. It proceeds to present these measures are designed to reduce.
15Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks
The concern about the potential for violent approach, the implementation differed
extremist activities conducted by foreign significantly – from a formalized political
fighters who return from Syria and Iraq, has led slap on the wrists, to serious prison sentences.
a growing number of countries to adopt laws Of the countries discussed in this study as
that allow them to put these returnees on trial originators of foreign fighters in Ukraine, the
for terrorist activities abroad. Hegghammer UK, Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, Belarus,
and Nesser (2015) suggests that pre-emptive Latvia, and Serbia would fall within this
arrests geared towards minimizing this threat primarily punitive category.
were by far more extensive than anything
related to previous conflicts, and that they The first EU citizen to face punishment
have contributed to reducing the potential for fighting in Ukraine was Ben Stimson
threat of acts of terrorism. However, only a from the UK – his fighting for the pro-
few countries have used this new legislation Russian side was termed as assisting acts of
designed to counter terrorism at home and terrorism, and he was given a 5 year prison
abroad to charge fighters returning from the sentence (Coynash 2019). Following this
conflict in Ukraine. The present variety of conviction, there were serious considerations
punitive approaches is such that the states given to the equivalence of treatment
dealing with this issue do not lend themselves of fighters on the pro-Russian and pro-
neatly into categorization, and ought to be Ukrainian sides. The UK’s official position
considered in small groups by verisimilitude, on the matter remains that each case is to be
according to their current practices (see assessed individually, depending on the acts
Table 2 below). Most of those caught in the committed by individuals on the battlefield,
prosecutorial net were pro-Russian fighters – but establishing the reliability of evidence
officially unacknowledged, but nevertheless has been problematic. Subsequently, some of
sometimes saved from prosecution by the interviewed fighters lamented that Chris
the Russian state. The legal status of pro- Garrett (the abovementioned British de-
Ukrainian fighters seems more diverse and miner fighting with the pro-Ukraine Azov
complex: some have served in battalions that battalion) was also repeatedly picked up for
are under the official command of the state questioning by the police for his involvement
of Ukraine (like Azov or Aidar), others were in acts of violence – although he was not
part the Pravyi Sektor movement that grew formally prosecuted, and official accounts on
political and social branches in addition to the the matter are scant.
fighting capability, while others still fought in
independent units (like most Chechens and In addition, in Czech Republic in 2019, 10
Georgians). fighters were under criminal investigation
for their participation in the pro-Russian
In the elusive categories of state approaches separatist campaign, and one Czech
to returning fighters from Ukraine, the first army veteran had been charged with acts
one could be considered as primarily punitive. of terrorism for fighting to support the
Within it, the punitive measures would breakaway republics – facing 5-20 years in
vary, as some states chose to treat this as an prison (Coynash 2019). This might be the
act of terrorism (or support for one), using strictest punitive measures brought against
Iraq and Syria as a precedent, while others a foreign fighter returning from Ukraine to
chose to apply criminal measures (usually date.
for possession of arms or illicit funds), and
still other states have turned to their special Spain was another early prosecutor of its
legal provisions prohibiting foreign fighting citizens fighting on the pro-Russian side,
in general. Regardless of the formal punitive arresting eight young men in 2015 on
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