KEY FINDINGS THE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD - The ...
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
ISSUE BRIEF: Special Edi on
THE ROAD TO 9/11
AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
BY ALI SOUFAN
SEPTEMBER 2021
thesoufancenter.org
KEY FINDINGS
• Al-Qaeda could not have developed its • Long before the U.S. withdrawal, al-Qaeda
plans for the September 11 attacks—nor had already returned to Afghanistan, with
selected its operatives, nor trained them, hundreds of members and training camps
nor coordinated their deployment to the in Helmand province and elsewhere.
United States—without a haven in Training at these camps is provided to
Afghanistan from which to operate. Taliban fighters and foreigners, and the UN
has reported that the Taliban and al-Qaeda
• Most trainees in the camps never joined al- “show no indication of breaking ties.”
Qaeda; of the 10,000 to 20,000 who passed
through the camps between 1996 and • Recommendations include: address the
2001, only a few hundred became vacuums created by conflict and instability,
members. The others were supposed to and deploying all levers of government,
gain combat experience in Afghanistan, including development assistance,
Chechnya, or another theater, and the diplomatic tools, and cultural and
heightened terrorist risk in the region in educational support, to address the
the early 2000s has been largely attributed conditions which enable terrorism; not to
to veterans or returnees from the camps. diminish attention to counterterrorism and
Afghanistan to pursue “great power
• When it came to its big attacks, al-Qaeda competition”; strengthen capacities of
planned centrally, using its base in frontline officials, including those who
Afghanistan to bring the main plotters work at borders, financial institutions, and
together under the guidance of Osama bin in communities, to identify potential risks;
Laden. But when it came time for the declassify relevant documents to allow
operatives to head to their target, al-Qaeda survivors and analysts to better understand
for security reasons invariably gave cell the relationships between key players
leaders significant autonomy. leading up to the attacks.
1
tiTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, in the fall of 2001, having o p e ra v e s , n o r t ra i n e d t h e m , n o r
already spent years chasing Osama bin coordinated their deployment to the United
Laden, I found myself near Kabul, standing in States—without a haven in Afghanistan from
one of the al-Qaeda leader’s safehouses—or which to operate. Today, thanks to the
what remained of it. Intense coali on withdrawal of Western combat troops and
bombardment had reduced the building to the resurgence of Taliban power, al-Qaeda
rubble. Together with my fellow inves gators, and its ilk may be poised to retake that
I si ed through the remains, looking for advantage—and, possibly, to grow even
evidence that might lead us to the al-Qaeda stronger than before.
leader or his lieutenants. Toward the end of
our search, I picked up one of the many
bricks lying around and turned it over in my
hands. If this brick could talk, I wondered, DEPARTURE AND RETURN
what could it tell us about how an atrocity on
the scale of 9/11 was conceived, planned, As late as the spring of 1996, it must have
and carried out? seemed that al-Qaeda was well on the road
to defeat. Under interna onal pressure, the
Nearly twenty years later, we know more Islamist government of Sudan, bin Laden’s
about that story—though not all, partly home away from home for the past four-and-
thanks to con nued secrecy around its more a-bit years, had nally expelled him, in the
diploma cally sensi ve aspects. One element process con sca ng prac cally all of his
stands out as crucial: al-Qaeda could not assets in the country. Together with around
have developed its plans—nor selected its 50 followers, bin Laden limped back to the
September 11, 2001 Attack on New York's World Trade Center (AP Photo/ William Kratzke)
2
ft
ti
ti
fi
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
till have The movement took Kandahar in April 1996
him, the country where he had rst made his and overran the capital, Kabul, in September
name as an insurgent commander and of the same year. Mullah Omar had himself
nancier in the war against Soviet occupa on proclaimed Emir al-Muminin—Commander
in the 1980s: Afghanistan. of the Faithful—a tle held by the Islamic
caliphs of old. He took the alleged cloak of
Bin Laden’s fortunes had fallen far since then. Prophet Mohammed from its reliquary in
As if to underline al-Qaeda’s precarious state, Kandahar and donned it, anoin ng himself as
within days of bin Laden’s ight from Sudan, the Prophet’s successor. But the Taliban
one of his most trusted lieutenants, Abu would never control the whole country. In
Ubaidah al-Banshiri, was killed in the M/V par cular, the Northern Alliance—a coali on
Bukoba ferry disaster on Lake Victoria in of ethnic minority mili as under a
Tanzania. charisma c commander, Ahmad Shah
Masoud—would con nue to defy them un l
the end. Only three other countries ever
recognized the Taliban as the government of
Afghanistan: its southern neighbor, Pakistan,
which provided the Taliban with weapons
and cash; Saudi Arabia; and a close Saudi ally,
the United Arab Emirates.
The Taliban welcomed like-minded militants
from across the Muslim world. Between 1996
and 2001, Saudis, Yemenis, North Africans,
Pales nians, Kurds, Pakistanis, Uzbeks,
Uighurs, and others all made their way to
Afghanistan, seeking to rebuild their
fortunes. By 2001, around 14 foreign jihadi
groups were concentrated on Afghan soil,
comprising at least 1,800 ghters. The main
Osama bin Laden, Dec. 1998 (AP Photo/Rahimullah objec ve of all of these militants was the
Yousafzai) same: to train for war in Afghanistan and go
on to ght in theaters around the world—
including at various mes the Balkans,
The USSR’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in Chechnya, Algeria, and Afghanistan itself
1989 had sounded the star ng gun on a (although in the last case some felt queasy
bloody civil war between fragments of the about killing their fellow Muslims in the
mujahideen guerillas who had fought the Northern Alliance). A jihadi entering
Soviet occupiers. One group, called the Afghanistan in the 1990s would nd poten al
Taliban (literally, “pupils”), emerged under a lia ons laid out like a sample pla er.
the leadership of an illiterate village mys c
named Mullah Mohammed Omar who Al-Qaeda’s new problem, therefore, was not
claimed to have had a divine vision calling so much iden fying new members as
him to bring peace to Afghanistan. Mullah direc ng the ood of recruits toward itself
Omar’s version of “peace,” it turned out, was and away from ercely compe ve rival
to kill anyone who stood in his way. organizations. But bin Laden, characteris cally,
3
fi
ffi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
fl
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
fi
fl
ti
ti
ti
fi
fi
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tiso much so that this became one of the
nguishing al-Qaeda from a crowded eld, ideological factors behind the eventual ri
he soon realized, would be to provoke the between al-Qaeda and a rival claimant to
United States into singling him out as public that tle, ISIS.
enemy number one. Thus, within months of
his arrival in Afghanistan, around the me When it came to rela ons with the Taliban,
the Taliban were consolida ng control over the al-Qaeda leader had a few aces in the
Kabul, bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring all- hole. First, his personal charisma and history
out war on America. as a revered mujahideen commander against
the Soviets meant he had to be treated with
At least ini ally, this did not please the the utmost respect, at least publicly. His
Taliban leadership, who felt it would hinder status as an Arab, and especially one from
t h e i r q u e st fo r w i d e r i nte r n a o n a l Saudi Arabia—the Land of the Two Holy
recogni on. A er bin Laden gave a Mosques—garnered him par cular reverence
par cularly bellicose interview to CNN in among non-Arab Muslims. Second, al-Qaeda
March 1997, Mullah Omar insisted that al- members, unlike some foreign ghters, had
Qaeda move closer to the Taliban power base no compunc on about gh ng the Northern
of Kandahar, the be er to keep an eye on Alliance—something that became even more
them. Bin Laden complied, moving from the urgent shortly a er the group’s return to
for ed cave complex at Tora Bora to the Afghanistan, when the Taliban came close to
lea er surroundings of Tarnak Farms—much losing Kabul twice in the span of a few
to the relief of his wives and children. m o nt h s . F i n a l l y, a n d p e r h a ps m o st
importantly, bin Laden was, as always, a
The following year, a er the East Africa U.S. money magnet. His “Golden Chain” of
Embassy bombings and America’s retaliatory wealthy backers—most of them Saudis like
missile strikes on Afghan soil, bin Laden was bin Laden himself—had evidently survived
obliged to placate his hosts further by the ight from Sudan, and bin Laden was
swearing bayat—allegiance—to Mullah Omar willing to share some of the largesse with his
as Commander of the Faithful. Ini ally, he did hosts.
so in secret, and apparently with good
reason. When word got out, it soured al- This support convinced Mullah Omar to
Qaeda in the eyes of some, including bin indulge al-Qaeda. The group’s members were
Laden’s own bodyguard, Abu Jandal, who allowed to travel to Afghanistan; move freely
eventually le the organiza on in part once there; import and export materiel
because he didn’t want to take orders from without restric on; put Afghan government
the Taliban, even if the arrangement was license plates on their vehicles; and, perhaps
mostly symbolic. most importantly of all, establish a number of
training camps. Eventually, bin Laden was
Bin Laden’s oath, however cynically able to convince the Taliban to shut down
mo vated, bound al-Qaeda s ll further to other Arab-run camps in Afghanistan and put
the Taliban and to Afghanistan. A er Mullah him in overall charge of those that remained.
Omar’s death, bin Laden’s successor, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, has renewed al-Qaeda’s bayat to One long me bin Laden associate, Mustafa
each succeeding Taliban leader. Al-Qaeda has Hamid, described al-Qaeda in this period as
held dogma cally to the Taliban’s claim to be “behaving in Afghanistan as if they had an
the only legi mate “Islamic State” on earth— individual state inside Afghanistan: a state
4
ti
ti
fi
ti
ti
fi
fl
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ft
ti
ft
ft
tt
ft
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
ft
ti
fi
ti
ftTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
inside the state.” In early 2000, the sta of Afghanistan, bin Laden spent a great por on
the U.S. Na onal Security Council put it more of his resources on building the group’s
bluntly: “Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is network of training camps. A pipeline soon
not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it developed. Recruits, ferried across the
is a state sponsored by terrorists.” border from Pakistan by the Taliban, would
arrive at a guesthouse, where they would be
sized up, quizzed about their backgrounds,
specialist skills, and prior entanglements with
REBUILDING THE BASE law enforcement or intelligence, and treated
to sermons on discipline and “morals.”
An early turning point for al-Qaeda came at Assuming they passed the sni test—al-
the end of 1996, when a group of Qaeda was always wary of in ltra on by
experienced jihadis known as the “Northern foreign intelligence, and with good reason—
Ba alion” (not to be confused with the the recruits would move on to a 15-day boot
Northern Alliance) arrived at the camp, followed by another 45 days of basic
organiza on’s training camp of Jihad Wal training in military discipline and forma ons,
near the border with Pakistan. Originally small arms, rst aid, naviga on, and so on.
bound for combat in Tajikistan, the group’s This por on would culminate in maneuvers
40 members had been dismayed to nd that involving a staged a ack on a target—o en a
the war there appeared to be winding down. fake U.S. military base al-Qaeda had built out
In a series of sermons over several days, bin in the desert, complete with a agpole
Laden pitched al-Qaeda membership as an displaying the stars and stripes.
alterna ve. Only 17 of the 40 accepted; but
they included some of the most From the cohorts passing through these basic
consequen al members in the organiza on’s classes, a select few would be singled out for
history, among them Walid bin A ash (aka advanced training in skills such as
Khallad), a Saudi of Yemeni origin, who would reconnaissance, hijacking, espionage, and
train in al-Qaeda’s camps, lose a brother and assassina on. Di erent camps had di erent
a leg in ba le against the Northern Alliance, special es; for example, Banshiri Camp
and go on to serve as one of the principal (named for Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, the bin
planners behind the 9/11 a acks. Laden lieutenant killed in the ferry disaster in
Tanzania) specialized in two mainstays of
Planted in Afghan soil, al-Qaeda grew with terrorism: improvised explosive devices and
alarming speed. It established routes for urban warfare. Occasionally, bin Laden
smuggling opera ves through Pakistan and himself would par cipate as an instructor,
Iran, including safe houses in both of those giving inspira onal speeches and training
countries. It developed a complex governing people on night exercises.
structure, with ministerial por olios including
training, military, security, administra on, Most trainees never joined al-Qaeda; of the
and more. It supported the crea on of a 10,000 to 20,000 who passed through the
chemical weapons lab near Jalalabad and a camps between 1996 and 2001, only a few
biological warfare facility near Kandahar. hundred became pledged members. The
others were supposed to gain combat
As be ed his mission of making al-Qaeda experience in Afghanistan, Chechnya, or
t h e p re - e m i n e nt fo re i g n fa c o n i n another theater of war, then return to their
5
tt
fi
ti
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
ti
fi
ti
ff
ti
ti
tt
tt
ti
tf
fi
ff
tt
ti
fi
ti
fl
ti
ff
ft
ti
ti
ti
ff
tiTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
Damaged Hull of the USS Cole at the Yemeni port of Aden, Oct. 2000 (AP Photo/Dimitri Messinis)
home countries in the core of the Muslim established in Afghanistan, however, the
world—notably North Africa, South-East Asia, group could now begin plo ng its own
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. spectacular a acks in-house. Its campaign
began in earnest with the August 1998
A handful of trainees were marked out for bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and
special “external opera ons” on behalf of al- Tanzania, in which more than 200 people
Qaeda itself. During the two months of basic were murdered.
training, the instructors had the opportunity
to assess recruits for the desired combina on In response, the United States launched 66
of fervor and pa ence—the la er being cruise missiles at al-Qaeda facili es in Khost.
necessary given the long planning cycles The Clinton administra on made li le e ort
needed for plo ng large-scale a acks against to determine whether bin Laden was home
the West. The head of al-Farouq camp, Abu at the me, which of course he was not,
Mohammed al-Masri (who would remain a having ordered al-Qaeda facili es evacuated
leader in al-Qaeda un l his eventual as a precau on. Very few al-Qaeda members
assassina on in Tehran in 2020) was said to were killed or wounded, and all of its leaders
be especially adept at spo ng would-be survived unscathed. The missiles destroyed a
suicide bombers. Those singled out for these kitchen, a mosque, and a bathroom block.
so-called “martyrdom opera ons” would be Some even landed intact, without
quietly removed from the mainstream and detona ng; bin Laden allegedly sold them.
placed in a special program.
In the a ermath of this show of force, the
Previously, al-Qaeda had played a suppor ng U.S. may have hoped al-Qaeda would cease
role in a acks on America, such as the and desist. The result was the opposite.
infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident that Being the target of an American a ack made
precipitated U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in bin Laden even more of a hero than before,
1993. With its facili es and structures and recruitment increased concomitantly.
6
ti
ti
ft
ti
tt
ti
tt
tti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tti
ti
tti
tt
ti
tt
tt
tt
ff
ti
tibehind the February 1993 World Trade
cal of al-Qaeda, instead turned Center bombing, and the two had since
their ire on America. Mullah Omar, who prior plo ed together to blow up airliners in
to the a acks had been in talks to hand bin Southeast Asia in a plot codenamed
Laden over to the Saudis, now reneged; the “Bojinka.”
Taliban, he realized, could not be seen as
kowtowing to American “aggression.” Above Now, KSM had something else in mind. He
all, al-Qaeda increased its pres ge in the eyes wanted to train opera ves as pilots and crash
of jihadis in Afghanistan and around the single-engine Cessna planes into the World
world. Evidently, the strategy of pulling the Trade Center in an a empt to nish what
ger’s tail was a good one. Ramzi Yousef had started. KSM brought the
idea to a fellow Afghanistan-based freelancer,
In October 2000, al-Qaeda suicide bombers Abu Zubaydah.
a acked the USS Cole as it refueled in
Yemen, killing seventeen American sailors. At Zubaydah was unimpressed. “Flying Cessna
bin Laden’s direc on, al-Qaeda made a glossy planes into the World Trade Center will only
propaganda video, juxtaposing a break windows,” he said. “At least ll the
reenactment of the a ack with footage of planes with explosives.”
the training camps in Afghanistan. Again the
ow of recruits and money increased. But “That’s a good improvement,” KSM said.
overall, bin Laden was disappointed with the “Will you help me?”
results; partly because, this me, the U.S.
response was prac cally nonexistent. Most Zubaydah demurred, referring KSM instead
gallingly of all, bin Laden s ll had not to bin Laden; and since al-Qaeda was also
managed to unite the foreign terrorist groups based in Afghanistan, KSM had li le di culty
under his banner. securing an audience. In the fall of 1996, KSM
met bin Laden for the rst me and pitched
The lesson bin Laden drew, typically, was that his explosive-laden-Cessnas idea. At rst, bin
he needed to carry out even bigger a acks. Laden told KSM bluntly that his proposed
As Salim Hamdan, bin Laden’s driver and opera on was not feasible. Nevertheless, he
con dant, later told me, “You brought 9/11 invited KSM to join al-Qaeda. KSM refused to
on yourselves; you didn’t respond to the pledge allegiance formally—he always liked
Cole, so bin Laden had to hit harder.” to keep his op ons open—but he stuck
around anyway, helping with administra ve
tasks while con nuing to pitch his
masterplan. (Eventually, a er the East Africa
THE “PLANES OPERATION” embassy bombings, KSM decided that bin
Laden was the real deal and did pledge
allegiance to him.)
In early 1996, a few months before al-Qaeda
was expelled from Sudan, a freelance
Despite his early skep cism, bin Laden found
terrorist named Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
that he could not stop thinking about the
had le Qatar with U.S. intelligence hot on
“Planes Opera on,” as KSM called it. And as
his heels. Like many jihadis at that me, KSM
he thought about the poten al a acks, the
made his way to Afghanistan. His nephew
picture in his mind grew more and more
Ramzi Yousef had been the mastermind
violent—feasibility be damned.
7
ti
fl
tt
tt
fi
ti
ft
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
tt
fi
ft
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
fi
tt
ti
fi
fi
ffi
tt
tiTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
“Why go to war with an ax when you can use Mohammed Atef, pored over the list of
a bulldozer?” bin Laden asked KSM. And the poten al targets, boiling it down from an
al-Qaeda leader proceeded to outline a ini al nine (which was deemed too
nightmare vision: al-Qaeda opera ves would ambi ous) to just four: the White House, the
travel to the United States, hijack passenger U.S. Capitol Building, the Pentagon, and the
jets on coast-to-coast routes—which would World Trade Center.
therefore be fully laden with fuel—and crash
them into the World Trade Center and other As requested, trainers in the specialist camps
targets. If they were lucky, bin Laden said, sent a number of promising recruits to bin
they might even bring down a few upper Laden. Two in par cular caught the leader’s
oors of the twin towers. eye: Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar,
both Saudis from well-to-do Meccan families
From a more prac cal point of view, the not dissimilar to bin Laden’s own Jeddah-
argument that nally won bin Laden around based clan (albeit much less wealthy than the
to the Planes Opera on was the one that bin Ladens with their construc on empire).
aligned most perfectly with his number one He sent Hazmi and Midhar for elite training
priority: a bloody and spectacular a ack at Mes Ayak, a facility built inside an
against the United States would burnish al- abandoned copper mine near Kabul. Their
Qaeda’s brand around the world, bringing course was physical and kine c, involving
muscle and money to Afghanistan. Assuming hand-to-hand combat, general tness, and a
it provoked a big enough backlash, it might spec-ops course taught by a long- me al-
even force unity among the foreign groups in Q a e d a l e a d e r a n d fo r m e r E g y p a n
the country, with bin Laden as their natural commando, Saif al-Adel.
overlord.
From the beginning, the Planes Opera on
Others—among them prac cally all al- was a global one. Most of the training and
Qaeda’s top leadership—warned that a planning took place in Afghanistan, of course.
su ciently large American military response But the main hub for nance, travel, and
might bring down the Taliban and with them other logis cs was the home of Ammar al-
al-Qaeda’s safe haven. Bin Laden sco ed at Baluchi, another nephew of KSM, in the
this. The Americans would not send in United Arab Emirates. Some of the
ground forces; their withdrawal from Somalia coordina on mee ngs would take place in
and their weak responses to the embassy Malaysia. KSM himself operated largely out
and Cole bombings proved it. And if they did of a safehouse in Karachi, a port megalopolis
invade, so much the be er: Afghanistan was in his ancestral home country of Pakistan.
called the grave of empires for a reason: it There, he carried out research, reading
had seen o everyone from Alexander the avia on magazines, watching movies that
Great to the Soviet Union. If the Americans showed hijackings, and playing a ight
came, al-Qaeda would defeat them, and simulator video game.
Osama bin Laden would reach his apotheosis.
In December 1999, Hazmi and Midhar joined
Once bin Laden made up his mind, that was KSM in Karachi for training in avia on, airline
that. By the spring of 1999, the Planes security, Western culture, and basic English
Opera on had been approved and its (KSM having himself studied in the United
planners were at work. At Tarnak Farms, States). In these more cerebral ma ers, the
KSM, bin Laden, and al-Qaeda’s military chief, two proved to be poor students—a trait that
8
fl
ffi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ff
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
fi
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
tt
ti
ff
fl
tt
ti
tiTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
would eventually see them both demoted to Hafs al-Masri, with backgrounds in special
the status of mere “muscle” for the 9/11 plot forces and policing respec vely.
—and they le KSM exasperated by their
inability to pick up even the most A er recording “martyrdom videos,” the four
rudimentary English phrases. were sent back to Hamburg to obtain visas to
a end ight schools in the United States. In
Germany, they laid low, avoided extreme
mosques, and even shaved o their beards.
THE HAMBURG CONTINGENT By mid-2000, three of the Hamburg
& THE MUSCLE Con ngent had obtained the requisite visas.
Only Ramzi Binalshibh’s applica on had been
rejected; as a Yemeni, he was automa cally
No doubt worried by reports of Hazmi and suspected of intending to overstay and
Midhar’s dismal performance, bin Laden was b e c o m e a n u n d o c u m e n t e d w o r ke r.
on the lookout for opera ves who might do Binalshibh instead became an important
be er. At the end of 1999, he suddenly manager in the plot, coordina ng the
received not one but four. hijackers’ training and facilita ng their
movements between Afghan training camps
Mohammed A a, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan and Western ci es.
al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah had all lived as
students in Hamburg, Germany, where they As a result of Binalshibh’s visa failure, bin
bonded over their shared extreme views, Laden was down a pilot; but soon he enjoyed
under the in uence of a local preacher who another stroke of good luck when, out of
had allegedly fought the Soviets in nowhere, a recruit somehow even more
Afghanistan in the 1980s. In long discussions perfect than the Hamburg Four just
at the apartment shared by A a, Binalshibh, happened to show up at the al-Farouq basic
and Shehhi, the four talked each other up to training camp. Hani Hanjour’s applica on
ever-increasing heights of an -Americanism, form showed that he had not only studied
culmina ng in a collec ve decision to travel English in the United States; while there he
to Afghanistan seeking jihadi training. Having had obtained a pilot’s license from the
presented themselves at the Taliban o ce in Federal Avia on Administra on. Almost
Que a, Pakistan, in the fall of 1999, they immediately, Hanjour was sent to KSM.
were escorted over the border and pledged Between the Hamburg Con ngent, the two
allegiance to al-Qaeda in Kandahar. Meccans, and Hanjour, the Planes Opera on
now had six opera ves, all of them poten al
Bin Laden knew a windfall when he saw it. pilots.
These men seemed just as fervent as Hazmi
and Midhar; but unlike the two Saudis, they The plot s ll required “muscle”—hijackers to
also had lived in the West; spoke at least overpower the crews of the targeted planes
passable English; possessed useful technical and keep the passengers at bay. Between
skills; and had poten al as pilots. A a, in summer 2000 and spring 2001, Bin Laden
par cular, was quickly iden ed as a natural and Atef scoured al-Qaeda’s training camps
opera onal leader. Almost at once, bin Laden for likely candidates. Of the thirteen they
had them separated from the other trainees selected, twelve were Saudis and one was
and placed in a special fast-track program run from the United Arab Emirates. This tracked
by two of his top brass, Saif al-Adel and Abu demographics in the camps, in which 70% of
9
tt
ft
tt
ti
ti
tt
ti
fl
ti
ti
fl
ti
tt
ft
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
ff
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ffi
tt
ti
ti
ti
tiTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
recruits were from Saudi Arabia (another assistance. They got it: local contacts helped
20% were Yemeni and thus, like Binalshibh, them with, among other things, opening
unlikely to get U.S. visas). Some of the bank accounts and rent apartments.
“muscle” hijackers had apparently hoped to
ght in Chechnya, only to nd themselves It has long been suspected that some of
turned back by Russian border guards. those who assisted Hazmi and Midhar were,
According to Mustafa Hamid, some were or acted at the behest of, Saudi o cials. In its
poached from Abu Zubaydah’s con ngent at nal report, the 9/11 Commission found:
Khaldan, one of the non-al-Qaeda camps
which the Taliban had ordered closed. While in the United States, some of the
September 11 hijackers were in contact
The muscle were rst sent home to obtain with, and received support or assistance
U.S. visas, which each of them did with li le from, individuals who may be connected
to no trouble. Travel documents in hand, they to the Saudi Government. There is
returned to Afghanistan for specialist informa on, primarily from FBI sources,
training. Alongside hijacking, al-Qaeda’s that at least two of those individuals
instructors taught them other types of a ack, were alleged by some to be Saudi
so that they would not surmise the exact intelligence o cers.
nature of the opera on for which they had
been selected. In a par cularly grisly detail, Even that lukewarm conclusion, however—
the knife skills por on involved slaughtering together with more than two dozen pages
and butchering animals, in prepara on to do summarizing the mostly circumstan al
the same to human beings if necessary. evidence backing it up—was classi ed Top
Secret for thirteen years. Parts remain
Their founda onal training in Afghanistan r e d a c t e d t o t h i s d a y. S u c c e s s i v e
complete, the “muscle” traveled to KSM’s administra ons have kept poten ally
Karachi safehouse, where the mastermind illumina ng documents classi ed on the
put them through a basic version of his basis that to reveal them would risk
Western culture and English course. KSM “signi cant harm to the na onal security”—a
gave each $10,000 and sent them to Dubai, defense that, a er two decades, is wearing
where his nephew Ammar al-Baluchi dis nctly thin.
received them, helped them get acclima zed
to a Western-style city, and arranged for their In a class ac on lawsuit currently pending
onward travel to the United States. against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
survivors of 9/11 and the families of many of
those who were murdered that day allege
that some of those who helped Hazmi and
ARRIVAL IN AMERICA Midhar were, in fact, ac ve agents of the
Saudi Ministry of Islamic A airs, ac ng under
orders from Riyadh. An inves ga on by
Hazmi and Midhar arrived in Los Angeles in ProPublica and the New York Times found
January 2000, both traveling on valid U.S. indirect evidence of such a connec on. We
visas. They spent two weeks in the city must take these allega ons seriously, not
before moving on to San Diego. With their least because they are backed by sworn
shaky grasp of English and unfamiliarity with a davits from former FBI agents who have
Western ways, they needed a great deal of inves gated the ma er. The best way to deal
10
fi
fi
ffi
ti
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ffi
ti
ti
ft
fi
ti
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ff
ti
fi
fi
ffi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
tt
ti
ti
tt
tiTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
with the ma er, of course, would be for the physically gh ng him for the airplane’s
U.S. government to declassify documents controls during lessons. Nevertheless, by the
rela ng to these contacts and allow the end of 2000 all three had obtained their
public to see for themselves. commercial pilot licenses and begun
simulator training for ying big jets.
Following their move to San Diego, Hazmi
and Midhar soon enrolled in ight school, but Aside from a few trips to the Washington, DC
their con nued infacility with English held area, the Hamburg Three stayed in Florida,
them back, just as KSM had predicted. The while Hazmi and Hanjour moved to the
two also displayed a stunning lack of regard suburbs of New York City. At these two East
for opera onal security. At one ying school, Coast bases, they welcomed and assisted the
they told an instructor who happened to muscle hijackers, who arrived from
speak Arabic that they were not interested in Afghanistan via Ammar al-Baluchi’s Dubai
single-engine planes and wanted to y big logis cs hub, singly or in pairs, during the
passenger jets right away. Other instructors rst half of 2001. Khalid al-Midhar arrived on
recalled their obvious lack of interest in July 4. As a result of his having gone AWOL
perfec ng their takeo and landing skills. the previous year, Midhar had failed to
complete his ight training and had wound
Around ve months a er his and Hazmi’s up, like Hazmi, as muscle instead.
arrival, Midhar le the United States and
returned to his wife’s home in Yemen, where Exactly one month later, on August 4,
his rst child had just been born. Hazmi another al-Qaeda member—another Saudi—
stayed in San Diego alone; he was even listed, arrived at the airport in Orlando. Mohammed
under his real name, in the city’s phone book. al-Qahtani had no return cket, no credible
In December 2000, he was joined by Hanjour, reason for being in the United States, and
the quali ed pilot bin Laden had plucked out nearly $3,000 in cash. Qahtani was allegedly
of basic training at al-Farouq. Together, they the missing “twen eth hijacker’; if so, he was
moved to Arizona, intending for Hazmi to the only one to be denied entry to the United
enroll at Hanjour’s old ight school. But States.
Hazmi remained a terrible student; at least
two instructors told him he would be be er Later, when I interrogated Qahtani at
o giving up, which he eventually did; by the Guantanamo Bay, he told me that while he
day of the a acks, Hazmi would nd himself was sojourning with Ammar al-Baluchi in
relieved of pilo ng du es and relegated to Dubai, he would o en go down to the
the status of muscle. waterfront and pray for a sign.
Meanwhile, in early summer 2000, the three “God, if You approve of what I am about to
visa-approved members of the Hamburg do, please facilitate it,” he would say as he
Con ngent had arrived in the United States, stared out over the lapping waters of the
but on the opposite coast. They enrolled in Persian Gulf. “But if you disapprove, please
ight school in Venice, Florida, on the Gulf stop it.”
Coast south of Sarasota. They may have been
be er learners than Hazmi and Midhar, but It might be di cult to imagine a clearer sign
they could be just as problema c when it of God’s disfavor than Qahtani’s failure to
came to secrecy: one instructor remembered enter the United States; but Qahtani
A a and Shehhi being aggressive and evidently chose to ignore it, for he said
11
fl
fi
ff
tt
tt
ti
ti
fi
ti
ti
fi
fi
ti
ti
fi
tt
tt
ffi
fl
ti
ti
ti
ft
ft
ff
fl
ti
ft
fl
ti
fl
fl
fi
ti
fl
ttTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
nothing—indeed, he promptly returned to that, if for any reason they could not reach
bin Laden in Afghanistan, as we will see—and the mark, they were to crash the plane into
the plot went ahead. the ground, killing everyone on board.
In the weeks and months leading up to the
a acks, several hijackers took test ights
FINAL DESTINATIONS domes cally on board similar aircra ,
carrying box cu ers in their carry-on
When it came to its big a acks, al-Qaeda baggage. On no occasion did they have
planned centrally, using its base in trouble ge ng through security; and on
Afghanistan to bring the main plo ers every one of the ights, they observed that
together under the auspices of the ul mate the cockpit doors would be opened ten to
decision-maker, Osama bin Laden. But when een minutes a er takeo . So regular was
it came me for the opera ves to leave this prac ce that A a didn’t even bother
Afghanistan and head to their target, al- guring out a backup plan in case the doors
Qaeda for security reasons invariably gave didn’t open.
cell leaders in the eld a wide margin to
decide when and how to proceed. Thus, once With just six or so weeks le , A a’s Hamburg
all the 9/11 opera ves were in the United colleague Ziad Jarrah came close to
States, it fell to Mohammed A a, the abandoning the plot. On July 25, he ew back
opera onal leader selected from among the to Germany to see his girlfriend—one of ve
Hamburg Con ngent, to gure out the interna onal trips Jarrah made between
details. arriving in the U.S. and carrying out the
a acks. Ramzi Binalshibh, the Yemeni
A a remained in contact with Binalshibh, member of the Hamburg Con ngent who
who was helping to manage the plot from had become one of the plot’s principal
Europe. At one occasion, they met in Spain. managers a er being turned down for a visa,
Binalshibh passed instruc ons to A a from intercepted Jarrah at the airport in
Bin Laden and the leadership in Afghanistan. Düsseldorf and convinced him to see the plot
The two also devised a code for referring to through. Jarrah returned to the United States
ta rg e t s , d i s g u i s i n g t h e i r te l e p h o n e with his resolve renewed. In August, A a
conversa on as a discussion of poten al oversaw coordina on mee ngs in Florida,
elds of study (the principal hijackers were New Jersey, and Las Vegas. He gured out the
ostensibly s ll students). Thus, “architecture” op mal date by cross-referencing four ights
meant the World Trade Center; “law” was the that would be in the air simultaneously, with
Capitol Building; “arts” the Pentagon; and airplane models the pilots knew how to y, at
“poli cs” the White House, which the two the start of long routes (so that the planes
were s ll considering as a possible target as would be laden with fuel), matching
late as August 3. everything up using searches on the website
Travelocity.
A a assigned teams to himself and the other
three remaining pilots, taking care to On August 29, A a called Binalshibh at 3 a.m.
distribute English language skills evenly, so Hamburg me.
that each team would be able to control the
passengers on its respec ve ight. He gave
the pilots their targets and instructed them
12
fi
fi
fi
tt
tt
ft
tt
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tti
ft
ti
ti
tt
ft
fl
ti
tt
ti
fi
tt
ti
ti
ft
ff
ti
tt
fi
fl
fi
ti
tt
ti
fl
tt
tt
ti
fl
fl
fl
tt
fi
ti
tt
ftTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
“One of my friends related a riddle to me,” But bin Laden also had a plan to keep the
A a said. “I cannot solve it… Two s cks, a Taliban on-side. He was going to murder their
dash, and a cake with a s ck down.” most bi er rival, the Northern Alliance
commander Ahmad Shah Masoud. On
11-9. The European standard for September September 9, assassins posing as journalists
11. It took Binalshibh a moment to get it, but detonated a bomb hidden in their camera,
then he said, “Tell your friend he has nothing killing Masoud and themselves. The next day,
to worry about. It’s such a sweet riddle.” bin Laden took to the mountains, telling his
entourage something was afoot that would
In the United States, al-Qaeda’s so-called bring ghters ocking to his banner.
“martyrs” set about enjoying the days le to
them. A a pounded shots of vodka. Others On the morning of September 11, A a,
went to strip clubs. Within days, Binalshibh Shehhi, Hanjour, and Jarrah boarded ights
had packed his bags in Hamburg and set o out of Boston, Newark, and Dulles with their
for Afghanistan to tell bin Laden the good respec ve teams. In each case, the modus
news. operandi was similar: the hijackers used box
cu ers to kill the pilots and pepper spray to
For the al-Qaeda leader, the a acks could not keep the passengers back while the
come soon enough. Earlier that year, Mullah designated pilot took the controls. A a’s
Omar had a empted to se le the squabbling plane hit the North Tower of the World Trade
between the foreign militant groups by Center; Shehhi’s the South Tower; Hanjour’s
pu ng someone in overall charge of all of the Pentagon. Jarrah’s team, down a man
them: not bin Laden but an Uzbek because of Qahtani’s denial of entry to the
commander, Juma Bai. This naturally United States—and further disadvantaged by
dismayed al-Qaeda, as well as the other Arab the plane’s delayed departure, which gave its
groups, whose members always considered passengers the chance to become aware of
themselves a cut above mere Central Asians; the earlier a acks—was overpowered.
but bin Laden himself remained con dent. Following A a’s orders, Jarrah crashed the
Soon, he would pull o the ul mate plane into a eld in Pennsylvania. The plane
provoca on against the United States; the was about 20 minutes out from the U.S.
one that would make him the undisputed Capitol Building.
leader among foreign ghters in Afghanistan.
Only he and a few trusted lieutenants knew In Afghanistan, traveling around with a small
what was about to happen. entourage almost at random so as to avoid
detec on, bin Laden brie y camped by the
In the spring, al-Qaeda had announced its side of the road to watch the news unfold.
long-planned merger with Egyp an Islamic Unable to get a signal on his satellite
Jihad, a group led by the former doctor television, he instead listened on BBC Arabic
Ayman al-Zawahiri. This announcement, radio, silently coun ng o the a acks on his
naturally, was accompanied by renewed ngers. With each crash, his followers
bloodthirsty threats against the United chanted and red their AK-47s into the air in
States. As Mustafa Hamid was to recall years celebra on.
later, bin Laden “prac cally appointed
himself as ruler of Afghanistan. It was some Bin Laden shushed them. “There is more!” he
kind of coup; declaring war on behalf of the said. “Listen!”
Afghan people and their emir.”
13
fi
tt
tt
tti
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
tt
tt
tt
tt
fi
fi
fl
tt
ti
fi
ti
ff
fl
ti
tt
ff
tt
tt
ti
ti
ti
fi
fl
ft
tt
tt
ffTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
In his own quiet way, bin Laden was just as in places like Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and la erly
elated as his bodyguards. One thing irked Syria. A acks by opera ves trained in the
him, however. While Salim Hamdan drove his Afghan camps con nued for a few years a er
boss to yet another secret loca on, bin Laden their dispersal; one example was the London
pointed to a picture of the Capitol Building “7/7” bombings in 2005, whose opera onal
and told his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, how leader, Mohammed Sidique Khan, had
disappointed he was that the fourth plane trained with al-Qaeda. Some of al-Qaeda’s
(which at the me he assumed the American component fac ons sought to inspire “lone-
military had shot down) had failed to “hit wolf” a acks like the Boston Marathon
that big dome.” bombing of 2013, in which the a ackers
learned bomb-making techniques from a
For a brief moment in the a ermath of the magazine published by al-Qaeda in the
a acks, bin Laden nally got everything he Arabian Peninsula. But without its powerbase
wanted. From a base strength of about 400 in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda could not con nue
al-Qaeda members on September 11, the moun ng spectacular, large-scale a acks
a acks drew around 2,000 foreign ghters to against the West.
Afghanistan. And at last, the Taliban placed
all the foreign militant groups under al- Bin Laden’s death in 2011 was a grievous
Qaeda’s leadership—for the purposes of blow to al-Qaeda. Not only was bin Laden a
moun ng a defense against the Americans. magnet for dona ons and recruits;
documents found in his Abbotabad
The U.S. ground invasion came as a shock to compound show that he was in overall
many in al-Qaeda, among them some high- control of the organiza on un l the day he
ranking members like Salim Hamdan, died. But the founder’s death would by no
indoctrinated to believe that America was a means prove fatal to al-Qaeda.
cowardly na on. While Saif al-Adel
coordinated a last-ditch defense of Kandahar,
bin Laden retreated to his cave complex at
Tora Bora, the place he had lived for a me DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN
on rst returning to Afghanistan in 1996. But
he soon realized he could not defend it. Bin Less than two weeks a er 9/11, the Taliban
Laden disappeared into the mountains with a leader Mullah Omar gave an interview to
handful of retainers, leaving a force in the Voice of America. Asked why he did not just
caves to hold o the Americans as long as turn over bin Laden in order to forestall an
possible. One of those apprehended in the American invasion, he replied:
area a er the fall of Tora Bora was the
would-be twen eth hijacker, Mohammed al- I am considering two promises. One is the
Qahtani, who claimed he had only been promise of God. The other is that of Bush.
visi ng Afghanistan to perfect his falconry The promise of God is that my land is vast.
skills—despite having been apprehended If you start a journey on God’s path, you
along with bin Laden’s bodyguards. can reside anywhere on this earth and will
be protected... The promise of Bush is
Al-Qaeda quickly morphed from a that there is no place on earth where you
hierarchical mili a into a decentralized can hide that I cannot nd you. We will
network of local organiza ons, most of them see which one of these two promises is
primarily concerned with gh ng in civil wars ful lled.
14
tt
tt
fi
ti
fi
ti
ti
ft
tt
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
ff
ti
ti
fi
ti
ft
ti
fi
ti
ti
fi
ti
ft
ti
ti
fi
tt
tt
ti
tt
ti
ti
ftTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
In the eyes of jihadis the world over, God has embedded al-Qaeda militants have grown so
now delivered for the Taliban in spectacular essen al to Taliban military opera ons that
style (albeit with assists from Pakistan, which “it would be di cult, if not impossible, to
harbored the Taliban leadership; and from separate [al-Qaeda] from its Taliban allies.”
the Trump administra on, which forced the
Afghan government of former president This con nued alignment should surprise
Ashraf Ghani to release some 5,000 Taliban nobody. Ever since bin Laden’s oath to
prisoners). As the Taliban rolled into Kabul Mullah Omar in 1997—renewed to every
prac cally unopposed, congratula ons subsequent Taliban leader—al-Qaeda has
poured in from militants around the world. been in e ect a component of the Taliban’s
Even Hamas “congratulate[d] the Muslim “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” The Taliban
Afghan people for the defeat of the American refused to give up bin Laden in 2001, when
occupa on.” they were on the back foot. They fought a
war with a superpower for 20 years rather
As of this wri ng, the Taliban control all of than betray al-Qaeda. Today, having won that
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, including all the war, there is no incen ve to break es.
territory held by the Northern Alliance prior
to 9/11. They are the de facto government of As in the 1990s, al-Qaeda is not alone. Other
the country, and unlike last me, they are foreign militant organiza ons present in the
unlikely to face many obstacles to de jure country include groups of Pakistanis, Uzbeks,
recogni on. They are already in talks with a Turkmens, Uighurs, and others. According to
poten al benefactor, China, which among the UN team, there are around 8,000 to
other aspects of its diploma c clout can veto 10,000 foreign ghters in Afghanistan, and
any sanc ons regime proposed through the “although the majority are a liated foremost
UN Security Council. with the Taliban, many also support Al-
Qaida.” (An ISIS o shoot is also present,
Long before the American withdrawal, al- although it frequently nds itself at
Qaeda had already returned to Afghanistan, loggerheads with the Taliban.) The Taliban,
with hundreds of members across the with its new geopoli cal sophis ca on, will
country, training camps and safe houses in likely seek to use sympathe c terrorist
Helmand province, and a lesser presence groups the way Iran does, to further its
elsewhere. The camps are large, and the agenda throughout the region and beyond.
training on o er apparently covers, among America’s defeat in Afghanistan plays
other things, explosives, mine-laying, and the perfectly into al-Qaeda’s narra ve about
use of night vision equipment. One such Western weakness: that the United States is
camp, at Shorabak near the Pakistani border, a cowardly na on with no stomach for the
took 63 airstrikes and 200 U.S. ground troops long war. The West will have a hard me
to dismantle—a bad omen for any U.S. policy countering the resultant propaganda and
that seeks to control the al-Qaeda threat recruitment bonanza. Meanwhile,
using drones and cruise missiles. Afghanistan looks like a propi ous place from
which to (re)start a global jihad, especially
Training at these camps is reportedly being with the demise of the Islamic State’s short-
provided not just to foreigners but to Taliban lived empire in the Middle East and the
ghters, too, and a UN monitoring team has stalemate in Syria. In some ways, in fact, it is
reported that the Taliban and al-Qaeda an even more a rac ve des na on than it
“show no indica on of breaking es.” In fact, was in 1996. Twenty- ve addi onal years of
15
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ff
ff
ti
ti
ti
fi
ffi
tt
ff
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
ti
ti
ffi
fi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tiTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
con ict have ooded the country with yet (The nal phase is to unite the governments
more weaponry, while the United States has into a worldwide caliphate, a goal which s ll
spent $36 billion upgrading its infrastructure seems far o .)
—perfect for moving around recruits, money,
and weapons. At this point, the West faces a lose-lose
situa on. To the extent that Phase Two goes
In June 2021, a UN report warned, not for well, we will face an arc of instability from
the rst me, of al-Qaeda’s habit of “strategic North Africa to South Asia. To the extent that
pa ence”—wai ng un l the me is right to it goes poorly, al-Qaeda has a renewed,
renew opera ons against the West. Today, reinforced base from which to launch more
there would appear to be li le to prevent al- a acks.
Qaeda from re-establishing its external-
opera ons capability. Indeed, as the Star ng in 1996, it took al-Qaeda just ve
compe on for recruits in Afghanistan heats years to build from near-ex nc on to the
up once more, the organiza on may again 9/11 a acks. The crucible for its astonishing
come to view spectacular a acks on the West resurrec on was a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan;
as an existen al necessity. and a crucial ingredient was American
ina en on. The United States was a sleeping
Long before 9/11, we knew al-Qaeda's long- giant, viewing al-Qaeda as li le more than a
term plan. In the mid-1990s, it was neatly nuisance and devo ng so li le a en on to
summarized in a tract called The the problem that the eventual hijackers were
Management of Savagery, based by analogy allowed to pass unhindered through U.S.
on a simplis c concep on of how Germanic border control mul ple mes, even as they
tribes (“savages”) weakened and eventually prepared to murder thousands of American
overran the Roman Empire. civilians. In the months and years to come,
the West will be tempted to repeat its
Phase One was to create power vacuums by mistake, ignoring Afghanistan as a lost cause.
expelling the United States from the Muslim It must resist this tempta on. Especially with
world. That work is now all but complete. its military forces pulled back, its diploma c,
America enjoys li le in uence in Libya, Syria, economic, intelligence, and law enforcement
Yemen, Iran, and now Afghanistan. In fact, 20 apparatus must remain hypervigilant against
years a er the so-called “War on Terror,” and yet another global terrorist reboot.
ve trillion dollars later, the United States
does not even have embassies in any of these
countries. It demonstrably cannot control its
nominal allies in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and
Pakistan. In Iraq, it is forced to tolerate
elected poli cal leaders who aunt their
membership in Iranian-controlled mili as,
some of which Washington has dubbed
terrorist groups.
With the United States in retreat across the
region, al-Qaeda will now move to Phase
Two: eventually lling those power vacuums
with en es based on the Taliban model.
16
fi
tt
ti
tt
fl
fi
ti
ti
fi
ti
tt
ti
ti
ft
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ff
ti
ti
ti
ti
fl
ti
fi
tt
ti
ti
ti
ti
fl
ti
ti
tt
tt
tt
tt
ti
ti
ti
fl
ti
tt
ti
ti
fi
ti
tiTHE ROAD TO 9/11 AND THE DANGERS AHEAD
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Al-Qaeda’s strategy has been to exploit 3. Frontline o cials proved key to
con ict and chaos, and ll the vacuum iden fying and mi ga ng threats. States
le by na onal and interna onal and interna onal organiza ons should
a en on; it is therefore essen al to redouble e orts to strengthen capaci es
deploy all levers of government – of frontline o cials including those who
including development assistance, work at borders, travel and nancial
cultural and educa onal opportuni es, ins tu ons, for example.
diploma c and policy tools – to address
the condi ons in which terrorism thrives 4. Declassifying relevant documents to
and terrorists nd their recruits. allow survivors and analysts to be er
understand the rela onships between
2. The United States should not diminish key players leading up to the a acks,
a en on to counterterrorism and such as those alleged between the
Afghanistan to pursue “great power hijackers and the government of Saudi
compe on”; the two are not mutually Arabia, and hold states accountable for
exclusive and state and non-state their ac ons.
adversaries are likely to bene t from
American ina en on.
Militiamen Loyal to Ahmad Massoud in a Training Exercise in Panjshir Province, Aug. 2021
17
tt
tt
ft
ti
fl
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ff
ti
ti
tt
ffi
fi
ffi
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
fi
ti
fi
fi
ti
tt
ti
ti
tt
tiYou can also read
