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STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS - SAR A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO - US Department of State
SAR
               STABILIZATION
               ASSISTANCE REVIEW

     A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO

STABILIZE CONFLICT-
  AFFECTED AREAS
                     B
                    2018
STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS - SAR A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO - US Department of State
FOREWORD FROM SECRETARY OF STATE, USAID
ADMINISTRATOR, AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I
  ncreasing stability and reducing violence in conflict-affected areas are essential to realize
  America’s national security goals and advance a world in which nations can embrace their
  sovereignty and citizens can realize their full potential. The United States and our allies face an
increasingly complex and uncertain world in which many of our adversaries sow instability and
benefit from it. Protracted conflicts provide fertile ground for violent extremists and criminals to
expand their influence and threaten U.S. interests. These conflicts cause mass displacements
and divert international resources that might otherwise be spent fostering economic growth
and trade.
The U.S. Armed Forces and our allies and partners are defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist groups on battlefields in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, but we are
entering a new phase in this struggle. We must consolidate security gains, reduce levels of local
instability, and work with local partners to peaceably manage change and provide legitimate
and responsive governance. Our national experience over the past two decades has taught us
that it is not enough to win the battle; we must help our local partners secure the peace by
using every instrument of our national power.
At the same time, we must resist the temptation to throw more money at these complex
problems. American taxpayers are right to demand tough scrutiny of such investments.
Transitioning too quickly to large-scale reconstruction and longer term development efforts can
backfire without a clear strategic and political approach. Our organizations must more rigorously
define stabilization missions based on national security interests and undertake institutional
reforms based on hard-learned lessons. We must press our international partners to share the
costs for these efforts, and hold our local partners accountable for demonstrating sustained
leadership and progress.
To meet these imperatives, our Departments and Agency are recommending steps to maximize
the effectiveness of U.S. Government efforts to stabilize conflict-affected areas. This report
outlines a framework to systematically apply lessons from the past; to strategically and selec-
tively direct our resources; to increase burden-sharing with key international partners; and to
improve the efficiency and impact of our efforts.
We have approved this report as the first step in a process to position the U.S. Government’s
defense, diplomatic, and development capabilities to meet strategic stabilization requirements.
We are committed to advancing this process together. Reducing armed conflict is a perennial
challenge, and there are many factors that are outside of our national control. By refining our
respective organizational roles and capabilities and institutionalizing discipline and learning
in our approach, we will increase our likelihood of success and improve accountability to the
American taxpayer.

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STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS - SAR A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO - US Department of State
CONTENTS
FOREWORD.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  I

ABOUT THE REVIEW.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . III

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1

INTRODUCTION.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2

THE IMPERATIVE FOR A REVITALIZED APPROACH TO STABILIZATION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4

LESSONS FOR EFFECTIVE STABILIZATION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 6
     Set realistic, analytically-backed political goals .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 6
     Establish a division of labor and burden-sharing among international donors and local actors that
     optimizes the strengths of each.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 6
     Use data and evaluation systems to assess strategic progress and hold partners accountable.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 6
     Forward deploy U.S. Government and partnered civilians and establish local mechanisms that enable
     continuous engagement, negotiation, targeted assistance, and monitoring.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7
     Start with small, short-term assistance projects and scale up cautiously.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7
     Prioritize, layer, and sequence foreign assistance to advance stabilization goals .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8
     Link subnational engagements with national diplomacy to advance stabilization.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8
     Reinforce pockets of citizen security and purposefully engage with security actors.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8
     Seek unity of purpose across all lines of effort .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 9
     Employ strategic patience and plan beyond stabilization for self-reliance.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 9

LOOKING AHEAD: A FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. STABILIZATION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 10
     Establish Strategic Engagement Criteria and Priorities to Guide Stabilization.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10
     Pursue a More Purposeful Division of Labor and Burden-Sharing with Multilateral Bodies,
     While Mobilizing Other Bilateral Donors on Stabilization.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  11
     Define Department and Agency Roles and Responsibilities for Stabilization to Improve Performance.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11
     Build the Capacity of a U.S. Expeditionary Civilian Workforce to Meet Stabilization Objectives and
     Establish Policies to Allow for Co-Deployment .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  12
     Leverage Flexible Funding to Enable Sequenced, Targeted Approaches to Assistance .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 13
     Promote Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Justice and Security Sector Assistance .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  14
     Institutionalize Learning, Evaluation, and Accountability in Our Approach.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  15

CONCLUSION.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  15
     Stabilization Assistance Review Leads .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  16
     Contributing Writers/Analysts.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  16
     Acknowledgements .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 16

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STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS - SAR A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO - US Department of State
We will give priority to strengthening states where state weaknesses or failure
      would magnify threats to the American homeland…Political problems are at
      the root of most state fragility.
                      —National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 2017)

                        ABOUT THE REVIEW
The Stabilization Assistance Review was led by the Department of State’s Of-
fice of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F) and the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations (CSO); the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Office
of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), and Bureau of Policy, Planning,
and Learning (PPL) in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID);
and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and
Humanitarian Affairs (SHA), and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Op-
erations Institute (PKSOI).
The Review was conducted through several research methods, including:
1. Literature review of more than                     4. Qualitative questionnaire
   300 articles and reports;                             completed by six DoD combatant
2. Analysis of eight cases of current                    commands;
   or past U.S. engagements in                        5. Quantitative survey of more than
   conflict-affected areas;*                             125 U.S. Government experts; and
3. Interviews of more than 250                        6. Quantitative analysis of U.S.
   experts inside and outside                            foreign assistance spending in
   of government, including key                          conflict-affected areas from Fiscal
   international partners;                               Year (FY) 2009 to FY 2017.

*Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Somalia

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

T
        he United States has strong      Over the past year, the Department        ◆◆ Promote a fair, purposeful division
        national security and eco-       of State (State), the U.S. Agency            of labor with national partners
        nomic interests in reducing      for International Development                and international donors.
levels of violence and promoting         (USAID) and the Department of             ◆◆ Clarify agency roles and respon-
stability in areas affected by armed     Defense (DoD) have reviewed the              sibilities to improve performance
conflict, especially to consolidate      significant lessons learned from             and reduce duplication.
security gains against the Islamic       past stabilization efforts. The princi-
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and       ples for effective stabilization have     ◆◆ Improve the capacity of our
other non-state armed groups. At         been widely studied, but they have           civilian workforce to address
the same time, there is no appetite      not been systematically applied              stabilization needs in tandem
to repeat large-scale reconstruction     and institutionalized. The review            with the U.S. military and part-
efforts, and therefore our engage-       has shown that the performance               ner forces; and
ments must be more measured in           of U.S. stabilization efforts has con-    ◆◆ Sequence and target our assis-
scope and adaptable in execution.        sistently been limited by the lack           tance to conflict-affected areas
The United States must be more           of strategic clarity, organizational         in a more measured fashion.
selective and targeted about how         discipline, and unity of effort in        Now is the moment to focus
we define stabilization missions,        how we approach these missions.           and revitalize how the United
deploy our limited resources,            In response, this report outlines         States approaches stabilization.
burden-share with local and inter-       how the United States can improve         Stabilization is a critical part of how
national partners, and ultimately
produce more tangible, long-term
outcomes for our taxpaying public.
                                             This report defines stabilization as a political endeavor to
Stabilization is an inherently
political endeavor that requires
                                             create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and
aligning U.S. Government efforts             systems can peaceably manage conflict…
—diplomatic engagement, for-
eign assistance, and defense
—toward supporting locally legit-        the outcomes of our stabilization         the United States seeks to address
imate authorities and systems to         efforts through more efficient and        conflict-affected states, as part
peaceably manage conflict and            disciplined bureaucratic structures,      of a spectrum that also includes
prevent violence. Stabilization          processes and engagement with             both conflict prevention and longer
requires adaptive and targeted           international partners. Specifically,     term peacebuilding and reconcili-
engagement at subnational and            our proposed framework includes           ation. Through these reforms and
national levels. More important          steps to:                                 sustained leadership, the United
than dollars spent is having a           ◆◆ Establish a U.S.-Government            States can avoid mistakes of the
singular, agreed-upon, strategic            wide definition of stabilization.      past and better advance America’s
approach to unify efforts in sup-                                                  national security interests in con-
port of a consolidated local impact      ◆◆ Develop and evaluate political         flict-affected environments.
executed through sequenced and              strategies based on evidence
contextual assistance.                      and rigorous analysis.

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STABILIZE CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS - SAR A FRAMEWORK FOR MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO - US Department of State
SAR: STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

D
        espite global gains in
        prosperity, armed con-
        flicts in many parts of the
world remain as complex and
intractable as ever. Continued
gains are by no means guar-
anteed. An increasing trend in
internationalized and non-state
conflicts (reflected in Figure 1)
has resulted in crises that are
more protracted, violent, and
difficult to solve. According to
data from the Uppsala Conflict
Database, unresolved griev-
ances and often a failure to            Figure 1: Number of violent conflicts per year (at least 25 fatalities per year). Source:
                                        Uppsala Conflict Data Project
address political reform mean
that more than one-half of
armed conflicts that achieve           These persistent armed con-                   resources spent outside our
peace lapse back into vio-             flicts directly affect the security           borders. Our taxpaying public
lence—at a median of seven             interests of the United States                is demanding greater account-
years—often introducing                and our allies by creating insta-             ability of our resources and
new grievances and actors to           bility that terrorist and criminal            their impact. Moving forward,
perpetuate bloodshed. More             organizations and competitors                 our stabilization efforts must
recently, the conflict landscape       exploit. Recognizing this threat,             be better prioritized and mea-
is increasingly exacerbated by         the United States and our                     sured and our partners must
the rise of ISIS and competing         Coalition partners are actively               carry their fair share of the
networks of non-state armed            working in Iraq, Syria, Libya,                burden. New ways of think-
and extremist groups.                  Nigeria, and elsewhere around                 ing and operating are needed
These armed conflicts have dire        the world to defeat ISIS and                  to reduce dependencies on
consequences for the people            other transnational terrorist                 U.S. Government assistance,
residing in affected countries         groups. As the Coalition makes                increase cost-sharing, and
and impose a significant secu-         security progress against ISIS,               scope realistic outcomes for
rity and financial burden on           it is essential to consolidate                stabilization efforts. We cannot
American and international             operational gains through                     continue to employ the same
taxpayers as well as the global        strategic political engagement                approaches or tools in these
economy. Over the past decade,         and targeted assistance to                    endeavors and expect different
the U.S. Government has con-           establish basic security and                  results.
sistently provided more than           restore responsive, legitimate                To this end, the Department of
one-third of its foreign assis-        governance.                                   State (State), the U.S. Agency
tance to countries with ongoing        At the same time, there is no                 for International Development
violent conflicts [see Figure 2].      public appetite to repeat the                 (USAID) and Department of
Similarly, these same countries        large-scale reconstruction                    Defense (DoD) have reviewed
account for the vast majority of       efforts of the past. The United               past stabilization efforts in
the peacekeeping budget of the         States and other countries are                conflict-affected areas and iden-
United Nations (UN).                   scrutinizing and reducing the                 tified steps to more effectively

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                                                      UKRAINE

                                                                SYRIA
                                                                                            AFGHANISTAN
                                                                        IRAQ

                                                                                              PAKISTAN
                                   LIBYA

                                                                                                               MYANMAR

            MALI
                                                 SUDAN                     YEMEN

                                                                                                                                     PHILIPPINES
                    NIGERIA                                                SOMALIA
                                                  SOUTH
                        CAMEROON
                                                  SUDAN

                                        DEMOCRATIC
                                         REPUBLIC
                                       OF THE CONGO

Figure 2: Map of select countries with more than 1000 battle-related deaths over the last five years (Source: Uppsala Conflict Data
Project) where internationally-supported “stabilization” efforts have been active.

leverage the U.S. Government’s                              with related ongoing processes                 essential for addressing today’s
diplomatic, defense, and for-                               at the UN and World Bank.                      challenges and advancing U.S.
eign assistance resources in                                This report outlines findings                  national security. The second
these difficult environments.                               from the Review and presents                   section describes the core prin-
The Stabilization Assistance                                consolidated approaches to                     ciples and lessons learned for
Review (“the Review”) built on                              maximize the impact of U.S.                    the U.S. Government’s stabiliza-
many of the findings from the                               engagement as well as reduce                   tion. The third and final section
“2016 Department of Defense                                 inefficiencies and wasteful                    outlines a proposed framework
Biennial Assessment of Stability                            spending. The first section                    for the U.S. Government’s
Operations Capabilities.” The                               outlines why a narrowed, revital-              efforts to advance stabilization
Review was also coordinated                                 ized approach to stabilization is              in conflict-affected areas.

  We will work to consolidate military gains against ISIS, al Qa’ida, and other
  terrorist organizations and stabilize liberated areas by supporting local partners
  that can reestablish the rule of law, manage conflict, and restore basic services.
                                                                                     —State and USAID Joint Strategic Plan, FY 2018-2022

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THE IMPERATIVE FOR A REVITALIZED
APPROACH TO STABILIZATION

T
        he United States and           selective and targeted about          access to dispute resolution,
        our partners need a new        how we engage in stabilization        deliver targeted basic services,
        and more disciplined           environments to maximize the          and establish a foundation for
approach for conducting sta-           value of American and interna-        the return of displaced people
bilization in conflict-affected        tional taxpayer resources.The         and longer term development.
areas. This approach includes          revitalized approach to stabili-      Stabilization is distinct from
analyzing risks and focusing our       zation outlined here can help         humanitarian assistance, which
efforts on what is absolutely          target diplomatic engagement          the U.S. Government provides
necessary to achieve stability,        in these environments toward          impartially on the basis of need,
rather than pursuing disparate         advancing a strategy connected        from longer term reconstruction
agendas all at once. A critical        to stabilization outcomes,            and development activities.
first step toward more harmo-          enable greater sequencing and         Although context-dependent,
nized stabilization efforts is         layering of assistance to sup-        stabilization is intended to be
agreeing on the core tenets            port locally legitimate actors,       short-term in nature (typically
of the concept itself. Despite         achieve cost-saving efficiencies,     between one and five years).
significant international experi-      and foster a better division          Without first achieving legiti-
ence over recent decades, the          of labor between the U.S.             mate political stability, longer
concept of stabilization remains       Government and international          term development efforts are
ill-defined and poorly institution-    donors and institutions.              unlikely to take root and can
alized across government and           With these lessons in mind,           even exacerbate lingering
multilateral structures. This lack     State, USAID, and DoD have            conflict dynamics. Stabilization
of standardization in definition       developed a refined definition        starts to set the conditions for
and process leads to repeated          of stabilization that can guide       building legitimate societal and
mistakes, inefficient spending,        our efforts in this regard. We        governing institutions. USAID
and poor accountability for            define stabilization as a political   defines these as institutions
results.                               endeavor involving an inte-           that are inclusive, responsive,
Now is the moment to refo-             grated civilian-military process      and accountable to all groups,
cus and revitalize the U.S.            to create conditions where            including minority and marginal-
Government’s approach to               locally legitimate authorities        ized populations. The nature of
stabilization. There is a clear        and systems can peaceably             relations among identity groups,
imperative from policymakers           manage conflict and prevent           the capacity of civil society to
to consolidate security gains          a resurgence of violence.             engage government, and the
in ISIS-affected areas through         Transitional in nature, stabili-      extent of economic opportu-
stabilization. At the same time,       zation may include efforts to         nity all affect the legitimacy of
policymakers want to be more           establish civil security, provide     state-society relations.

We define stabilization as a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military
process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably
manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. Transitional in nature, stabilization
may include efforts to establish civil security, provide access to dispute resolution, and
deliver targeted basic services, and establish a foundation for the return of displaced
people and longer term development.
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                 U.S. Army civil affairs forces provide veterinarian assistance to Iraqi communities following
                 successful operations against ISIS. Photo: USASOC

In the past, there has been a
rush to initiate high-cost, sec-
toral programming before there
is a foundation of inclusive polit-          3.0

ical systems, basic security, and            2.8
a reliable and legitimate partner
government at the national                   2.6
                                                                                                      Economic Policy
level. A deliberate approach
                                             2.4
focusing planning and opera-                                                                                            Education
tions on stabilization outcomes              2.2

can ensure the right condi-                                                                           Economic Performance
tions are in place for broader               2.0

development resources to be                  1.8
                                                                                                    Peace & Security
well-spent. At the same time,
it is imperative that stabilization          1.6                                     Democracy, Human Right & Governance
efforts incorporate transition
                                             1.4
plans to economic growth,                          2005    2006       2008   2008   2009     2010    2111        2012    2013   2014

private sector vibrancy, and              Figure 3: The State/USAID “Country Data Analytics” index average scores for the 16
responsive governance, with               conflict-affected countries identified in the previous map over the past 10 years. This
an end state of self-sufficiency,         figure shows a measurable decrease in peace and security scores, while health and
lest any progress achieved by             education have improved.
those activities is not sustained
and lost.

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                        USAID is helping to bring community leaders together in northeastern
                        Nigeria to build trust and restore stability in areas affected by Boko Haram
                        and ISIS-West Africa. Photo: USAID

LESSONS FOR EFFECTIVE STABILIZATION

D
       esigning and pursuing            about which specific legitimate               donor’s comparative advantage.
       stabilization are com-           political systems and actors                  Multilateral approaches to sta-
       plex tasks involving             we will support, why and how,                 bilization, particularly by the UN
many context-specific factors           and associated tradeoffs. This                and World Bank, can mobilize
that are outside of a single            strategy should be based on a                 contributions by other bilateral
actor’s control. Our approach           clearly articulated and achiev-               partners. Multilateral partners
must be flexible and adjust as          able political end state. It should           bring different strengths and
non-state armed groups adapt,           include a realistic assessment                weaknesses, and the U.S.
and address the political chal-         of the level of commitment and                Government should engage
lenges of possible spoilers to          risk tolerance required to imple-             when they have a comparative
stabilization. Yet even as we           ment the strategy. With a clear               advantage. For example, the
remain agile, we must apply             political strategy and defined end            World Bank has mobilized funds
evidence-based lessons to               state, we can delineate a phased              for Yemen, but turned to the UN
increase the chances of suc-            approach to target and sequence               for implementation.
cess. The Review identified the         our engagement and assistance
following set of core principles        programs—as well as those of                  Use data and evaluation systems
that undergird effective stabili-       others— in a unified fashion.                 to assess strategic progress and
zation efforts.                                                                       hold partners accountable
                                        Establish a division of labor                 Although stabilization requires
Set realistic, analytically-backed      and burden-sharing among                      flexible and adaptive mecha-
political goals                         international donors and local                nisms, teams should identify
                                        actors that optimizes the strengths
Stabilization is inherently politi-                                                   clear strategic-level political
                                        of each
cal, which means it must focus                                                        objectives at the outset to track
on local, national, and/or regional     There needs to be a clear                     and analyze impact on an itera-
societal and governing dynam-           understanding at the outset                   tive basis. This approach should
ics, agents, and systems that           of a stabilization effort of what             comprise metrics to ensure that
lead populations toward inclu-          the partner nation govern-                    the host-nation partner is follow-
sive, non-violent settlement and        ment is willing and expected                  ing through on commitments
agreement. Its success depends          to deliver in terms of political              and fully embracing mandated
on having a goal-oriented political     and financial commitments.                    anti-corruption and transpar-
strategy that aligns with local         There should also be a clear                  ency efforts. Tying diplomatic
interests. Through analysis and         division of labor among inter-                engagement and assistance
deliberate iterative planning,          national donors, based on                     to local qualitative impacts
stabilization requires decisions        analysis that accounts for each               rather than solely quantitative

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activity outputs and using stra-
tegic level analysis will enable                                                    Conflict
senior policymakers to consider                                                   Mitigation &
                                                                                  Stabilization
whether policy adjustments are
required to achieve objectives.                                Humanitarian        13%         Other
                                                                                              Peace &
The Review’s case study in                                        26%                         Security

Afghanistan found that using                                                                   11%
consistent data tied to specific                                                         Governing Justly
political objectives­—and sharing                              Economic                  & Democratically
relevant information across U.S.                                Growth
                                                                              Investing       15%
Government Departments and                                      15%           in People
                                                                            (e.g., Health,
Agencies—would have enabled                                                  Education)
better review and analysis by                                                  20%
policymakers.
                                       Figure 4: State/USAID foreign assistance to the 16 conflict-affected countries identified
Forward deploy U.S. Government         in the previous map from Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to FY 2016, by designated program goals/
and partnered civilians and            areas. Analysis of spending trends in case-study countries reinforced the need for
establish local mechanisms that        greater flexibility, sequencing and/or integration of non-humanitarian assistance in
enable continuous engagement,          conflict-affected areas.
negotiation, targeted assistance,
and monitoring                         programs and strategy to keep                 achieve local outcomes and
                                       pace with the evolving politi-                build momentum. Smaller proj-
Deploying civilian stabilization       cal dynamic. For example, the                 ects driven by host-government
experts on the ground to work          Review’s case study analysis                  and communities in support of
with and alongside deployed            showed that State and USAID                   a unified political strategy and
military elements is essential         have worked closely with the                  diplomatic engagement are
to success because it enables          UN and third-party contractors                best suited to achieve short-
a unified approach and helps           in Somalia and Syria to improve               term stabilization objectives
ensure the overarching political       our monitoring of local dynam-                and to set the stage for even-
strategy is driving all mission        ics that informs and connects                 tual management, financing,
components. The “2016 DoD              programming to overall politi-                and ownership by national
Biennial Assessment of Stability       cal objectives. Still, significant            governments or regional
Operations Capabilities” cited         security limitations on U.S.                  administrations. For exam-
as a critical shortfall the lack       Government civilian presence in               ple, the Review’s case study
of institutionalized DoD mech-         conflict and post-conflict areas              showed that in northeastern
anisms to enable regular               impede our ability to identify                Nigeria, the U.S. Government
collaboration with interagency         and respond to emergent polit-                has worked effectively at the
and international partners. It is      ical opportunities and quickly                community level to develop
imperative to have civilians with      adapt our programs.                           a nuanced village-by-village
the appropriate knowledge and                                                        understanding of stabilization
skill sets on the ground and able      Start with small, short-term                  challenges and political dynam-
to engage with citizen groups,         assistance projects and scale up              ics fueling violent extremists.
analyze local dynamics, iden-          cautiously                                    Such a focused understanding
tify the right local partners to                                                     enables the United States to
                                       According to multiple studies,
advance the political strategy,                                                      target assistance to support
                                       targeted and smaller programs
and routinely monitor and adjust                                                     stability and diminish the appeal
                                       are better at the outset to

If we are to achieve our strategic objectives in a conflict, American policymakers must accept that the
political dimension is indispensable across the spectrum of conflict.
             —Dr. Nadia Schadlow, Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States, War and the Art of Governance:
                                                             Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory (2017)
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of extremists. Operating within        of development and security           study of Mali showed that fail-
and in cooperation with local          sector assistance should be           ure to achieve a durable political
communities allows increased           considered through that lens.         settlement at the national level
local support and the ability to       In some cases, certain types          can undermine local stabiliza-
build legitimacy from the bot-         of assistance should be delayed       tion efforts. Assistance targeted
tom up by strengthening local          or sequenced if they cannot be        at the subnational level is most
political and social systems. This     accountable or implemented            effective when it is informed by
approach is true not only of bilat-    successfully without adequate         national-level policy reforms.
eral funding, but multi-donor          stability.This process includes       However, in other cases such as
efforts as well. Large-scale proj-     being deliberate and precise          Syria today, subnational engage-
ects run a higher risk of creating     about how and when we seek            ment will need to begin first,
perverse incentives, distorting        to promote private sector             while national-level dynamics
the local economy, and being           investment, taking into account       are still being resolved. This
manipulated by corrupt actors          the risks and challenges.             process requires a flexible
who benefit from the conflict.         Greater consideration of the          approach, recognizing that
Often a country’s absorptive           exact role of the private sector      subnational dynamics can vary
capacity after conflict remains        as well as the appropriate ratio      radically from one geographic
low and realistic expectations         for immediate versus long-term        region to another.
are needed about the time it will      funding needs (including inter-
take to strengthen local and/or        national donors) is necessary. If     Reinforce pockets of citizen
national ownership.                    engaged effectively, the result       security and purposefully engage
                                       would be cost-savings in the          with security actors
Prioritize, layer, and sequence        short-term and enable better          Stabilization is most likely to
foreign assistance to advance          overall development outcomes          be successful where there is
stabilization goals                    in the long run. Unfortunately, in    basic security on the ground.
If stabilization is a top goal for     many cases, this lack of prioriti-    Basic security is defined as
international engagement in a          zation has resulted in disparate      minimum conditions where
country, then the full range of        and competing assistance              U.S. assistance partners can
non-humanitarian assistance            efforts that made engagement          operate and monitor activities,
the U.S. Government allo-              ineffective.                          access appropriate local stake-
cates to that country should                                                 holders, and where security
be considered in terms of how          Link subnational engagements with     actors can engage in building
it can advance the established         national diplomacy to advance         trust with local communities.
political and diplomatic strategy      stabilization                         Furthermore, focusing on pre-
without creating dependency.           Both national and subnational         cise subnational areas where
Stabilization assistance is not        engagements are needed to             there are pockets of security is
an entitlement, and continued          advance stabilization, and need       more likely to succeed because
U.S. Government assistance             to be eventually nested together      there will be an ability to work
should depend on results.              to achieve optimal effect. For        consistently with local actors,
Program planning and design            example, our Review’s case            including local security forces.

  Stability gains are not sustainable without citizen-responsive governance. Early
  transition work lays the foundation for long-term development by promoting
  reconciliation, jumpstarting local economies, supporting emerging independent
  media, and fostering lasting peace and democracy through innovative
  programming and evidence-based approaches.
                           —USAID Administrator Mark Green, speaking to the House Appropriations
                                                                  Committee, November 1, 2017
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                       Young activists attend a peace rally in Ansongo in northern Mali where
                       local actors demanded rebels to sign the Algiers Peace Deal. Photo: USAID

The Review’s case study of            operations may have destabiliz-             generalizable to all cases, but
Afghanistan showed that most          ing effects. Stabilization cannot           in no case should it be open-
experts, including the U.S.           be an afterthought. Rather, it              ended. While stabilization
Special Inspector General for         needs to be fully integrated                efforts are intended to create
Afghanistan Reconstruction,           and elevated across lines of                targeted short-term effects, it
concluded that prioritizing           effort. It should be incorpo-               usually requires time to achieve
U.S. stabilization programs in        rated into campaign planning                durable and legitimate political
areas without local-level com-        as early as possible to help                settlements at local and national
mitments to reduce violence           shape operational design and                levels. Strategic and resource
and increase physical security        strategic decisions. The “2016              planners should take this reality
negatively affected overall           DoD Biennial Assessment                     into account to build realistic,
momentum toward stability.            Operations Capabilities” rec-               flexible, and achievable mile-
Alternatively, tailored place-        ommended that civil-military                stones and enable consistent
based assistance strategies           annexes be drafted for all                  funding. Effective stabiliza-
that marry violence-reduction         Combatant Command con-                      tion efforts also intentionally
and citizen security efforts with     cept plans and operations                   incorporate linkages to longer
targeted law enforcement have         plans, with interagency input.              term development efforts into
proven successful in stabilizing      Close civilian-military planning            planning. Multilateral develop-
some of the most at-risk locales      and coordination has been a                 ment banks, other donors, and
in Central America.                   key determinant in effective                the private sector should be
                                      stabilization outcomes across               part of the process as early as
Seek unity of purpose across all      all cases examined. For                     possible, while being realistic
lines of effort                       example, in Pakistan, close                 about the challenges and risks
One of the greatest challenges        synchronization of stabilization            in post-conflict investment cli-
to stabilization is that different    programming with security                   mates. Stabilization should also
U.S. Departments and Agencies         operations facilitated targeted,            include strategic communica-
have different priorities, and        impactful programming.                      tion strategies that emphasize
regional and international actors                                                 host-nation ownership from the
often have other agendas that         Employ strategic patience and               outset to avoid creating depen-
work at competing purposes.           plan beyond stabilization for self-         dencies or local resentment.
                                      reliance
Counterterrorism operations
are prioritized in many conflict      There is no single set time
environments today, but some          frame for stabilization that is

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LOOKING AHEAD: A FRAMEWORK FOR
U.S. STABILIZATION

A
        revitalized approach to       regions, and then conduct

                                                                               89%
        how the United States         deliberate strategic planning
        works to stabilize rel-       to contend with stabilization
evant conflict-affected areas         challenges. Key criteria for
—an approach that takes into          determining whether, when,                 of surveyed USG experts
account the current imperatives       and how to pursue a stabiliza-         Support development of a
and past lessons—needs orga-          tion mission should include the        defined interagency strategy and
nizational structures, budgets,       assessed U.S. national interest;       implementation plan for places
processes, capabilities, and          national and local partner own-        where U.S. policymakers determine
personnel that are fit for this       ership; risks, constraints and         that the U.S. has a vital national
purpose. Most of the above            opportunities in the operating         interest in pursuing stabilization.
findings are not new, but they        environment; the level of risk
have not been systematically          we are willing to assume; and         a political strategy for the sta-
applied or institutionalized in       the level of sustained resources      bilization mission.
how we approach stabilization         we are willing to commit.             Key elements to address in the
in conflict-affected areas. State,    As noted above, success-              political strategy include: part-
USAID, and DoD have identified        ful stabilization begins with         ner nation goals and capacity;
the following areas to improve        developing an outcome-based           the defined U.S. Government
how our Departments and               political strategy that outlines      interests and areas in which
Agency work individually and          our core assumptions and              interests may compete; map-
together to advance stabiliza-        achievable end states and             ping key actors; desired political
tion goals.                           guides all lines of effort—dip-       end states and objectives; the
                                      lomatic engagement, defense,          interests and goals of partners;
Establish Strategic Engagement        foreign assistance, and private       anticipated resource require-
Criteria and Priorities to Guide
                                      sector engagement where               ments; the role of different U.S.
Stabilization
                                      appropriate­—to ensure unity          Government actors and inter-
The U.S. Government should            of purpose within the U.S.            national donors; mechanisms
institutionalize a process by         Government. In those places           for civil-military coordination;
which we identify conflict-af-        of highest priority for stabiliza-    assessment of risks; and stra-
fected countries/regions that         tion, State, USAID, and DoD           tegic analytics to track over
warrant increased attention,          should work with the relevant         time and measure progress.
assess the U.S. interests and         U.S. Embassy, regional bureau,        The strategy must then be insti-
priorities for advancing sta-         Combatant Commands, and               tutionalized into Department
bilization in these countries/        other stakeholders to develop         and Agency plans and reviewed

  A wise approach to reform [of stabilization and reconstruction operations] would
  aim at producing a unified system that plans and executes operations integratively,
  averts significant waste, increases the likelihood of tactical success, and better
  protects U.S. national security interests.
                                     —Final Report of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,
                                                                        Learning from Iraq, March 2013

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on a regular basis to assess its      missions. Similarly, the United       Define Department and Agency
effectiveness and make adjust-        States should actively engage         Roles and Responsibilities
ments as needed.                      with the World Bank and the           for Stabilization to Improve
                                      regional development banks as         Performance
Pursue a More Purposeful Division     it considers significant expan-       Clear lines of authority
of Labor and Burden-Sharing           sions in its engagement and           between and within U.S.
with Multilateral Bodies, While       funding in conflict-affected          Government departments and
Mobilizing Other Bilateral Donors     areas.                                agencies would improve effec-
on Stabilization
                                      At an operational level, we           tiveness, reduce duplication
Engaging in stabilization             should continue to engage             and confusion, enable greater
missions means the U.S.               pooled donor mechanisms in            accountability, and fully opera-
Government must advocate              some cases to mobilize other          tionalize a whole-of-government
that our partners co-invest with      partner resources. We should          approach. The U.S. Government
purpose in line with mutually         press that donor coordination         should formally define lead
agreed strategic outcomes.            bodies approach these pooled          agency roles for stabilization
Developing coordinated donor          financing mechanisms strategi-        missions, with State as the over-
approaches toward fragile and         cally, building on best practices     all lead federal agency for U.S.
post-conflict contexts based on       for risk-mitigation, local govern-    stabilization efforts; USAID as
lessons learned has increased         ment support, accountability          the lead implementing agency
significantly over the past           and monitoring, as well as            for non-security U.S. stabiliza-
decade and spurred new inter-         flexible structures. We should        tion assistance; and, DoD as a
national frameworks such as           also actively engage with these       supporting element, to include
the New Deal for Engagements          pooled funding mechanisms             providing requisite security and
in Fragile States, but these          to ensure they reinforce our          reinforcing civilian efforts where
efforts have not yet resulted         political objectives, and mobi-       appropriate. DoD is refining its
in standardized or efficient          lize donors to take on greater        stabilization policy to incorpo-
approaches adaptable across           costs. The U.S. Government            rate the concept of “Defense
conflicts. Effective donor coordi-    and international community           Support to Stabilization.” Other
nation includes pressing donor        should be clear on our expec-         Departments and Agencies,
partners to develop systematic        tations of the financial and          including members of the
approaches and share the bur-         political responsibilities of each    Intelligence Community, can
dens and risks of stabilization.      partner-nation government.            also play critical supporting
At a policy level, State and          Financing mechanisms should           roles.
USAID should seek dedicated           reflect the capacity level at the     With clear roles, State, USAID,
dialogues with the Organization       outset with clear guidance on         and DoD should then ensure
for Economic Cooperation and          measuring progress over time.         that we each have the appro-
Development (OECD), UN,               In some cases, other donors           priate structures and staff in
World Bank, and other regional        could want to build on our            place to perform these roles in
and international organiza-           implementation mechanism.

                                                                               86%
tions to press for coordinated        Through targeted agreements
reforms in how they approach          bilateral donor funding can
and invest in conflict-affected       flow through existing U.S.
areas. The U.S. Government            Government procurement
should encourage the UN                                                          of surveyed USG experts
                                      mechanisms. One example is
to adopt a single common              the United Kingdom’s recent            Are not clear which U.S. Government
approach to stabilization that                                               agencies have lead responsibility for
                                      contributions to a USAID-led
can integrate efforts across                                                 different elements of stabilization.
                                      stabilization program in Libya.
its peacekeeping and political

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an efficient, coordinated fash-         Build the Capacity of a U.S.          deploy and have the support
ion. For example, State should          Expeditionary Civilian Workforce      systems to do so.
institutionalize a structure that       to Meet Stabilization Objectives
                                                                              Specifically, the START frame-
can lead and coordinate inter-          and Establish Policies to Allow for
                                        Co-Deployment                         work for both Washington and
agency stabilization analysis,                                                abroad should streamline roles
policy formulation, and strategic       To advance stabilization suc-         and procedures; establish an
planning as well as diplomatic          cess, the United States requires      enduring human resources,
engagement. At the same time,           a mechanism to rapidly deploy         training, and operational sup-
USAID should designate and              civilian-led stabilization teams      port platform; provide expanded
empower an entity to serve as           into conflict-affected areas to       authorities to deploy civilians
its technical lead for stabilization    assess local conditions, engage       with and alongside DoD oper-
to engage with the interagency          local authorities, and direct         ational and tactical elements;
and support relevant regional           and monitor programs. We              and, when necessary, recruit
bureaus and Missions in coordi-         have faced delays in the past         and deploy further qualified
nating, planning, implementing,         in deploying civilian experts         surge personnel. The teams can
and monitoring non-security             alongside U.S. military ele-          be tailored to specific planning
stabilization assistance in con-        ments —despite overwhelming           and implementation objectives
flict-affected environments.            policy consensus—because of           based on the directive and
This process would help ensure          a lack of standing authorities        needs of the relevant Chief of
coherent management and                 and structures, missing critical      Mission.
implementation of this type of          opportunities to address over-
U.S. assistance. DoD should             lapping civilian and security         Establishing interoperable,
assign stabilization planners           objectives. State, USAID, and         co-deployable capabilities
throughout the Department,              DoD should work together              depends on instituting more
especially at the Geographic            to develop a framework for            flexible security and risk-man-
Combatant Commands, and                 Stabilization, Transition, and        agement standards and making
ensure professional military            Response Teams (START) that           strategic investments in human
education prepares future lead-         can support Chiefs of Mission         resources and training. State
ers to operate effectively with         and Combatant Commands to             and USAID should review and
civilian partners at the strategic,     coordinate, plan, and implement       adapt existing risk-management
operational and tactical levels.        a U.S. Government stabiliza-          standards and processes to
Recognizing the interlinkages           tion response in conflict areas.      provide leaders and employees
between our organizations,              This approach would build on          with accepted approaches to
these respective entities must          lessons from, and address             defining and making decisions
be prepared to train, exercise,         shortcomings of, the previous         in the face of challenging, fluid,
and work closely together to            Civilian Response Corps, by           and unclear circumstances.
advance integrated stabilization        setting up a much smaller and         These mechanisms must
efforts before a contingency            dedicated set of stabilization        take into account the central
occurs.                                 specialists who can rapidly           issue of Departments’ and
                                                                              Agencies’ unique authorities

If you take good people and good ideas and you match them with bad processes,
the bad processes will win nine out of ten times.
                                —General James N. Mattis USMC (ret.) interview with Peter Robinson
                                                           at the Hoover Institution, March 6, 2015

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U.S. Special Operations Forces engage in Shura discussion with Afghan elders about security and governance. Photo: DoD

and regulations governing secu-           bolster these efforts, DoD is              State and USAID to assess
rity responsibility.                      reviewing whether to request               and respond to emergent sta-
At the same time, State, USAID,           new authorities to support the             bilization requirements, while
and DoD should pre-identify and           deployment of civilian advisors            bilateral and regional funds can
prepare a pool of civilians with          for stabilization on a non-reim-           provide consistency over time.
requisite experience who can              bursable basis.                            The new Counter-ISIS Relief
deploy on short notice to sup-                                                       and Recovery Fund provided
port joint stabilization missions,        Leverage Flexible Funding to Enable        by Congress is another good
                                          Sequenced, Targeted Approaches             example of the kind of flexible
drawing heavily from existing
                                          to Assistance                              funding that is useful. The U.S.
State staff with experience
working in conflict environ-              Stabilization does not require             Government should continue to
ments and incorporating lessons           extremely high funding levels;             engage with Congress to build
from their experience. State              rather, stabilization depends              confidence and support for this
and USAID will need to max-               on consistent, flexible funding            goal to increase our flexibility to
imize and expand agile hiring             accounts unencumbered by                   respond quickly to stabilization
mechanisms of non-tenured                 Congressionally-directed ear-              needs.
staff to fill critical gaps that          marks, that can enable agile,              State and USAID should also
can incentivize expeditionary             targeted, and sequenced                    engage with other donors to
missions and enhance reten-               approaches to stabiliza-                   better coordinate their dedi-
tion. State, USAID, and DoD               tion programming. Existing                 cated funds for stabilization
should reinforce and formalize            funding accounts, such as                  and associated efforts in con-
existing joint training efforts to        “Peacekeeping Operations”                  flict-affected areas. The UN
meet minimum and prerequi-                and “Transition Initiatives,”              Peacebuilding Fund and World
site deployment standards. To             provide critical authorities for           Bank’s State and Peacebuilding

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                                                                                  throughout all efforts. A sim-
                                                                                  ilar effort is needed to align
                                                                                  and adapt justice and security
                                                                                  sector assistance programs
                                                                                  in these environments. In
                                                                                  support of counterterrorism
                                                                                  objectives, the international
                                                                                  community is providing high
                                                                                  volumes of security sector
                                                                                  training and assistance to many
                                                                                  conflict-affected countries, but
                                                                                  our programs are largely discon-
                                                                                  nected from a political strategy
                                                                                  writ large, and do not address
                                                                                  the civilian-military aspects
                                                                                  required for transitional public
USAID is supporting communities in the wake of Colombia’s civil war to solidify   and citizen security. More focus
the peace process and promote reconciliation PHOTO. Photo: Juan Carlos
Sierra/USAID
                                                                                  needs to be placed on helping
                                                                                  security forces to secure pop-
                                                                                  ulation centers and restore
Fund as well as the United                   function in challenging environ-     trust with local communities.
Kingdom’s Conflict, Stability,               ments. Where we are pursuing         This approach is true not only
and Security Fund are important              stabilization programming in         for U.S. programs, but also for
models for operational reform                conflict-affected areas, State       other donor efforts.
in support of stabilization.                 and USAID should work to             In addition, more efforts and
We should seek to promote                    adapt and align procurement          resources need to be tailored
greater alignment and ratio-                 tools for security and non-se-       to address trauma and psy-
nalization of how these funds                curity assistance and delegate       chosocial well-being within
are deployed along with the                  authorities closer to the field.     conflict-affected communities,
relevant U.S. accounts, based                                                     promote local justice and the
on their respective strengths                Promote Conflict-Sensitive           rule of law, and address local
and limitations.                             Approaches to Justice and
                                                                                  grievances related to access
                                             Security Sector Assistance
At the same time, State,                                                          to justice and corruption con-
USAID, and DoD need to put                   The U.S. Government and              cerns. The ability of the state
in place appropriate structures              other donors need to carefully       to re-establish order, security
and mechanisms to better use                 tailor all assistance and training   and the rule of law will greatly
our existing flexibilities and               programs in conflict-affected        influence the extent of popular
resources. We should be more                 environments to ensure they          support for stabilization and
disciplined in assessing the                 mutually advance stability and       longer term reform. USAID
risks of prematurely providing               do not inadvertently exacer-         experience in conflict-affected
certain types of assistance in               bate conflict dynamics. Over         environments suggests that
conflict-affected environments               the past decade, USAID has           three areas are paramount
before there is a foundation                 developed important guidelines       for immediate engagement:
of legitimate political order,               for conflict-sensitive democracy     access to justice, particularly
basic security, and appropriate              and governance, education, and       for marginalized populations;
anti-corruption controls. Flexible           economic growth programming          mechanisms that promote
and adaptive procurement                     in conflict-affected areas, which    peaceful, fair, and transparent
mechanisms are also crucial to               the Agency should streamline

                                                                 14
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management of disputes; and           and accountability. Likewise,         the conflict environment and
transitional justice.                 we should take a balanced             track them consistently over
Justice sector programming            approach in our reaction to           time, while also allowing for
in conflict-affected areas often      and willingness to work with          flexibility to adjust indicators
focuses heavily on promoting          informal and formal systems.          based on what we are learning.
formal national and criminal          The U.S. Government should            This process can facilitate more
justice-focused institutions          expand and strengthen its insti-      rigorous reviews by policy-
based on Western domestic             tutional capabilities to undertake    makers to determine whether
experiences, missing oppor-           this critical local rule of law       adjustments are needed in our
tunities to advance local and         programming where needed              political strategy and objectives.
civil solutions in more fluid         and ensure longer term rule of        As part of this effort, we should
environments. It is critical to       law and justice programming           use evidence and analytics to
build the legitimacy of formal        is coordinated and aligned with       rigorously assess our polit-
institutions over time, but in        stabilization efforts.                ical strategy and the political
many conflict-affected areas,                                               interests of our national and
much of the population looks to       Institutionalize Learning,            local partners. If they are not
                                      Evaluation, and Accountability in     living up to their commitments,
local, tribal, religious, or other
                                      Our Approach                          we should be prepared to
non-government justice insti-
tutions to resolve disputes and       Finally, to be successful, sta-       change course. If our political
assert legal rights. We should        bilization requires a regular         objectives are infeasible due
work with international partners      feedback loop that involves           to misalignment with local
to deepen our understanding           experimentation, learning,            political interests, we must
of local needs in these envi-         adaptation, and accountabil-          be willing to adjust political
ronments and consider local           ity. This approach is critical at     objectives. Accordingly, stabi-
precedent regarding adminis-          both the program and strategic        lization will ultimately not be
tration of justice, particularly      levels. We should identify indi-      successful if our partners are
with respect to reconciliation        cators to measure changes in          not fully invested in a collective
                                                                            undertaking.

CONCLUSION

A
         dvancing the United          and international partners to         area. The challenge today is to
         States’ top foreign pol-     achieve a fair division of labor      apply that experience, talent,
         icy priorities requires      and burden-sharing, and pro-          and learning in a systematic
a revitalized approach to how         mote conditions to maximize           fashion. With sustained lead-
we work to stabilize con-             our assistance resources and          ership and dedicated, efficient
flict-affected areas. We cannot       promote long-term self-suffi-         organizational structures and
continue to take the same             ciency. This approach is not easy     frameworks, we can achieve
approach and expect different         to get right, but our Review          that and thereby avoid costly
results. We need a disciplined        has affirmed that there is tre-       mistakes, increase our likely
approach to how we set our            mendous talent, expertise and         dividends, and do right by our
strategic goals, maintain priori-     willingness to succeed across         taxpaying public.
ties, engage with local, national,    the U.S. Government in this

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STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW LEADS
Kristen Cordell                                        Sara Reckless
Senior Advisor (USAID/PPL)                             Transition Advisor (USAID/OTI)
Peter Quaranto                                         Kelly Uribe
Senior Advisor, Peace and Security (State/F)           Senior Policy Advisor (OSD/SHA)
Patrick Quirk, Ph.D.
Senior Policy Advisor (State/CSO)

CONTRIBUTING WRITERS/ANALYSTS
COL Charles Anderson                                   Kevin Melton
Stability/Security Advisor (PKSOI)                     Transition Advisor (USAID/OTI)
Monica Azimi                                           LtCol Daniel O’Connor
Foreign Service Officer (USAID/CMM)                    Marine Corps Fellow (State/F)
Melissa Duell, Ph.D.                                   MAJ Wes Wilhite
AAAS Research Fellow                                   Army Fellow (State/F)
(State/CSO)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Stabilization Assistance Review would not have been possible without the generous time and
support of many individuals and organizations. Several people from the lead organizations provided
research and analytic support in the form of case studies, literature reviews and other contributions,
including Toshiro Baum, Annie Bird, Jessica Bryant, Lisa Campbell, Audra Dykman, Benjamin
Fisher, Tammy Fitzgerald, Bill Flavin, Jason Fritz, Lani Fuata, Kendra Helmer, Bruce Hemmer, Joel
Hirst, Stephanie Hurter, Dara Katz, Amanda Kelly, Angie Kochukudy, Shadrach Ludeman, Kaleigh
MacLaughlin, Adam Mausner, Nicholas Marinacci, Carolyn Mattick, Ryan McCannell, Raymond
Millen, Adam O’Brien, Patrick Olson, Keith Proctor, Ian Reese, Col. Aaron Reisinger, and Ken Spear.
In addition, inputs from across the U.S. Government were critical to scope the study and refine its
core findings and recommendations. Special thanks go to State’s Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs and Bureau of Near-Eastern Affairs, the Office of the U.S. Special
Envoy to the Counter-ISIS Coalition, USAID’s Bureau of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, Bureau
of Middle Eastern Affairs, and Office of Civil-Military Cooperation, and U.S. Special Operations
Command, and the Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction for critical contributions
to shape the content of this report. Special thanks also go to Frances Brown and Tess McEnery
for providing critical support for the Review at the National Security Council. Representatives from
multilateral organizations, international organizations, and partner government stabilization units
also provided essential inputs, especially Australia, the European Union, Germany, the OECD,
the World Bank, the United Kingdom, and the UN. Countless stabilization experts from academic
institutions, civil society groups, and non-governmental organizations provided inputs through
interviews and roundtables. The SAR team is especially grateful to the Alliance for Peacebuilding
(Melanie Greenberg and Elizabeth Hume), Brookings Institution (Bruce Jones and Tarun Chhabra),
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Melissa Dalton), the Empirical Study of Conflict
Project (Jacob Shapiro and Radha Iyengar), the Heritage Foundation (James Carafano), RAND
(Rebecca Zimmerman, Seth Jones and Charles Ries), and U.S. Institute of Peace (Beth Cole and
Rusty Barber) for convening roundtables with top experts to offer insights for the Review.

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