Strategic Surprise in the Ukraine Crisis - Agendas, expectations and organizational dynamics in the EU Eastern Partnership until the annexation of ...
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Swedish National Defence College Strategic Surprise in the Ukraine Crisis Agendas, expectations and organizational dynamics in the EU Eastern Partnership until the annexation of Crimea 2014 Magnus Christiansson
Abstract
This thesis deals with the problem of how to understand and explain strategic surprise in
relation to the crisis in Ukraine 2013-2014. It describes the events that triggered surprise and
identifies the EU Vilnius Summit, the Maidan square massacre and the annexation of Crimea
as focus points. Using a theoretical framework based on surprise theory, the thesis examines
the agenda of the EU Eastern Partnership, the psychology of Foreign Ministers Carl Bildt and
Radek Sikorski before the identified focus points, and the organizational dynamics of the
European Council throughout the crisis. The conclusion is that the Eastern Partnership
agenda provided a toolbox with limited usability in a crisis, that the overconfidence of Bildt
and Sikorski meant they failed in turning registered warning signs into a rethinking of policy,
and that procrastination by the European Council led to a reactionary pattern that
contributed to recurring surprises.
Key words: Ukraine crisis, Eastern partnership, surprise theory, warning-response problem
1Table of contents
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ 3
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 4
Introducing the research problem ...................................................................................................... 4
Overview of the study ......................................................................................................................... 6
I. Methodological considerations ...................................................................................................... 8
The limitations of studying an ongoing seminal event ....................................................................... 8
The Ukraine crisis as a case of strategic surprise .............................................................................. 12
A time of surprises: from Vilnius to Simferopol ............................................................................. 13
An aggregated and accumulated surprise .................................................................................... 18
Strategic surprise theory and the warning-response problem ......................................................... 20
Signals and noise, coping and relevant actors .............................................................................. 21
Operationalizing the analytical framework................................................................................... 24
II. The Ukraine crisis from an Eastern Partnership perspective ...................................................... 29
The agenda-political cut: oblique strategy ........................................................................................ 30
“We will not accept new divining lines in Europe”: introducing the Eastern Partnership ............. 30
On the road to nowhere ................................................................................................................ 34
The psychological cut: interpretive ambiguity .................................................................................. 38
The visions for Vilnius .................................................................................................................... 39
The message from Maidan ............................................................................................................ 43
On the cliff of Crimea ..................................................................................................................... 45
The organizational cut: the power of the carrot ............................................................................... 47
Avoidance (European Council Summit 24-25 October 2013) ........................................................ 48
Procrastination (FAC 10 and 20 February 2014) ........................................................................... 49
Passive-aggressive procrastination (FAC 3 March and the extraordinary meeting 6 March 2014)
....................................................................................................................................................... 51
Response (FAC 17 March 2014) ..................................................................................................... 55
III. Concluding analysis: Facets of a crisis ...................................................................................... 57
The Eastern Partnership in perspective ............................................................................................ 57
The policy entrepreneurs for Zwischeneuropa ................................................................................. 60
Final reflections: “Events, dear boy, events” .................................................................................... 62
References............................................................................................................................................. 63
2Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Professor Jan Hallenberg of the Swedish National Defence College for
his advice and comments on the first draft of this thesis. Dr. Dan Hansén and Dr. Fredrik
Doeser gave me positive feed-back on a paper describing the main ideas for this work. Dr.
Jacob Westberg read a draft of the first two chapters and gave me many useful comments.
Mr. Keith Farr and Ms. Edessa Ünesi corrected many of my language errors. This thesis was
written during summer 2014, when I learned from Morrissey’s Autobiography, for the very
first time, the value of poetry in prose.
Finally, I would like to mention Dr. Hans Agné of the Department of Political Science,
Stockholm University. Without him, this thesis would never have been written.
Karlberg Palace
22 August 2014
3Introduction
Introducing the research problem
At the Third Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, 28-29 November 2013, EU leaders
gathered to witness the signing of Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Areas (AAs/DCFTAs) with, among others, Ukraine. Ahead of the Summit Russia
declared that it was willing to impose trade sanctions, energy supply interruptions, and
security reprisals against states choosing to sign new agreements with the EU. The EU policy
aimed for a Ukrainian accession, but the pro-Russian Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych
decided not to sign the association agreement at the Vilnius Summit.
On 18 February 2014 the police and security forces of Yanukovych clashed with violent and
war like result on Kiev’s Maidan square. The event was preceded by large scale protests and
dissent in Kiev. Many clear and visible signs of increased repression and authoritarianism in
Ukraine under Yanukovych had been available before the bloody events on Maidan square.
The EU policy aimed to prevent the Yanukovych regime from using violence.
On the 26 February Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a military drill in the Western
and Central military district, officially involving around 150.000 troops and heavy support
assets, close to the Ukrainian border. It was a snap exercise and Western leaders aimed to
stop Russia from intervening into Ukraine. On the 28 February Russia invaded the Crimean
peninsula, and took control over its strategic locations. On 18 March Russia signed a treaty
to incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation.
From a policy perspective this sequence represents a series of Western foreign policy
failures. On neither of these occasions did Western leaders from the EU or the US achieve
their stated objectives. Yanukovych did not sign the AAs/DCFTAs, there was a violent clash at
the Maidan square and Russia did invade Ukraine. From a policy perspective this chain of
events has led to a crisis for the entire European security system, or as NATO Secretary
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it: “Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine is the most
serious crisis in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall.” 1 It is likely to have great
1
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “A Strong NATO in a Changed World” Speech at the Brussels Forum 21 March 2014
(http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_108225.htm), accessed on 10 June 2014.
4repercussions for the transatlantic security system for many years to come. Therefore, a
study that covers this process holds a great deal of strategic and political relevance.
From an analytical perspective the Ukraine crisis qualify as a case of strategic surprise. In the
following I show that Western political leaders were overwhelmed by the development and
tended to act in response to Russian actions rather than proactively. The main puzzle for this
thesis is how we should understand and explain this surprise. In the years before the Ukraine
crisis there were many explicit warnings about a possible Russian aggression. Already before
the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, the late Ron Asmus, who served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs under US President Bill Clinton, warned that: “Many
suspect that Crimea could be the next target if Moscow subjugates Georgia and then shifts
its sights to Ukraine.”2 Several senior scholars and analysts followed in these geopolitical
footsteps.3 In order to understand this puzzle, I will use the theories of strategic surprise and
the warning-response problem.
However, as much as the Ukraine crisis represents a strategic surprise, it also presents a
challenge for parts of the theories about strategic surprise. The theory relies heavily on
historical examples like Pearl Harbor, Yum Kippur and 9-11, which are related to individual
countries and situations that meant a step-level change from the status quo over the course
of a few hours. Though the Ukraine crisis certainly could be seen as part of “the era of
undeclared wars”4, as author Julian Critchley put it, it is also an example of an accumulated
and aggregated surprise. Not only can it be regarded as a recurring concern related to three
significant events, the surprise had a multinational dimension as well. It was a surprise for
individual governments in Europe and the US, but also for the collective efforts of the EU
2
Ron Asmus, “A War the West Must Stop” in The Washington Post 15 July 2008
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/14/AR2008071401845.html), accessed on
18 June 2014.
3
Examples include Stephen Blank of the American Foreign Policy Council and author Anne Applebaum. In
October 2013 Blank warned that Russia could “press for a fragmentation of Ukraine” and that it was delivering
arms to Sevastopol, see Stephen Blank, “Russia’s Ukrainian Hostage” in The Wall Street Journal 17 October
2013 (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304520704579125452524781122), accessed on
18 June 2014; Appelbaum warned in February 2014 about a Russian aggression: “In 2008 when the Russians
had a conflict with Georgia, they resolved the conflict by occupying a part of Georgia. And there have been
some hints that there could be military action in the Eastern part of the Ukraine, it could be in Crimea. That is
all possible.” on Swedish radio show Konflikt, 15 February 2014
(http://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/324246?programid=1300), accessed on 16 February 2014.
4 th
Julian Critchley, Warning and Response. A Study of Surprise Attack in the 20 Century and an Analysis of its
Lessons for the Future (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1978). Perhaps Leo Trotsky’s expression “neither
war nor peace” is even more to the point.
5Eastern partnership policy. As we will see, the accumulated and aggregated character of the
crisis is the reason why I single out the EU’s Eastern Partnership as the focal point for the
inquiry, in order to get a primary actor suitable for the scope of this thesis.
Thus, the research question is how we can understand and explain the accumulated and
aggregated strategic surprise experienced by the central actors of the EU’s Eastern
Partnership. It should be underlined that the outline and character of the study limits the
ability to generalize the results of the study. Further generalizing must be complemented
with comparative research on other cases.
Overview of the study
The inquiry is divided into three chapters. The first chapter introduces the method used to
answer the research question. I create an analytical framework in order to explain and
understand an outcome (strategic surprise). I define the Ukraine crisis more specifically and
motivate why it is a case of strategic surprise. This is crucial as the search for explanatory
factors is based on the claim that the outcome is known. An empirical overview of the events
makes it easier to identify relevant actors for the analysis, and I argue that an analytical
construction of the Ukraine crisis, based on focus points, deals with the methodological
problem connected with the study of an ongoing crisis. I identify five phases of the crisis,
separated by three focus points. The case is distinguished by the fact that it represents an
accumulated (chronologically) as well as aggregated (organizationally) surprise. This is why
the EU and its Eastern Partnership is identified as suitable for the study.
Finally, the first chapter presents and refines the theoretical factors that are used in the
analysis of the case. I briefly describe the main features of strategic surprise and warning-
response theory, and make a few modifications to the established theory, in order to
capture the special circumstances created by an accumulated and aggregated surprise. I re-
use the notion of three explanatory cuts (agenda-political, psychological, and organizational)
to organize the explanatory factors, structure the case study and link different sets of
sources in the inquiry. I define and operationalize the relevant explanatory factors and
sketch a few empirical indicators and criteria in each cut, which relates to the Eastern
Partnership Summits, the expectations of foreign ministers Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski as
well as the deliberations and actions of the European Council.
6The second chapter is an empirical analysis of the Ukraine crisis from an Eastern Partnership
perspective. This chapter has three parts, and they all tell the story about the Ukraine crisis
from different perspectives. The first cut deals with the agenda of the Eastern Partnership
(as part of the EU’s foreign relations agenda), before the Vilnius Summit. I describe and
analyze this process and find that shifting priorities, competition and possibly overcrowding
led to a compromise which indirectly led to de-securitization of the Eastern Partnership,
misguided expectations as well as limited options for policy.
The second cut covers the psychological factors that influenced the key actors Bildt and
Sikorski during the first three phases of the crisis. I deal with their expectations, assessments
and declarations on blogs, Twitter and interviews in the process leading up to the invasion of
Crimea. I analyze and relate these statements to psychological distortion factors that could
contribute to our understanding of the gap between expectations and outcome during the
crisis. In this cut I find that Bildt as well as Sikorski were overconfident of the existing policy
and remained ambiguous about the development.
The third empirical cut deals with the organizational perspective. It focuses on the
deliberations and actions of the European Council before and during the crisis. I describe the
relevant Council meetings and identify the main tendencies in the organizational dynamic
within the EU. The main conclusion is that the EU avoided the problems in the Eastern
Partnership before the Vilnius Summit and was unable to act proactively due to the German
elections and fixation on issues like Syria and immigration. Furthermore, the EU delayed the
decision to use sanctions because of internal differences and stakes in the crisis. The effect
of this procrastination was that the EU acted reactively throughout the crisis.
The third chapter synthesizes the conclusions of the thesis. I do this by relating the findings
of the three cuts to each other as well as the theoretical framework introduced in the first
chapter. This thesis makes three main points: the Eastern Partnership agenda featured a
limited toolbox which did not match the conflict, procrastination led to a reactionary pattern
that contributed to recurring surprises and the overconfidence of Bildt and Sikorski
regarding the EaP meant they failed in turning registered warning signs into a rethinking of
policy.
7After this introduction of the thesis, I now turn to the methodological concerns and develop
an analytical framework for the Ukraine crisis.
I. Methodological considerations
The function of this chapter is to create, in the words of Alexander George, an analytical
“framework for a discriminating analysis”5, that could be used for a single case study of the
Ukraine crisis. In order to do that, the following needs to be done: present the method for
how the research question will be answered; define the Ukraine crisis more specifically and
show that it really is a strategic surprise (an outcome); present and refine the theoretical
factors that are used in the inquiry, how they relate to the sources in the study, and how
they can be used to explain the outcome.
The limitations of studying an ongoing seminal event
To start an inquiry with a dramatic episode in history reminds us of Graham Allison and
Philip Zelikows much quoted study of the Cuban missile crisis. The very first sentence in their
book is about the relevance of the case: “The Cuban missile crisis stands as a seminal
event.”6 Thus, the case (Cuban missile crisis) is given by its strategic relevance, and the
puzzle concerns the different factors that could feed into an explanation of the outcome
(Soviet and US decisions). Allison and Zelikow base their study on three models for
explaining decision making in this seminal event.
In methodological terms Allison and Zelikow are “consuming” theory, to use an expression
used by a group of Swedish political scientists.7 It is sometimes difficult to distinguish this
method from the outright testing of theory. Theory testing is primarily about finding out
whether a specific theory can explain one or more cases that must be carefully motivated by
the scholar. The principal difference concerns the motive of the study. In theory
“consumption” the central methodological concern is the case; in theory testing the central
methodological concern is which theory that is to be tested. In other words, this thesis is not
5
Alexander L. George, “Warning and Response: Theory And Practice” in Yair Evron (ed.), International Violence:
Terrorism, Surprise and Control (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1979), p. 12.
6
Graham Allison & Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaning the Cuban Missile Crisis Second Edition (New
York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999), p. 1. Allison was the author of the first edition. I refer to Allison and
Zelikow.
7
Peter Esaiasson, Mikael Gilljam, Henrik Oscarsson, Lena Wägnerud, Metodpraktikan. Konsten att studera
samhälle, individ och marknad Tredje upplagan (Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 2009), p. 42.
8a theory testing, but a “consumption” of theoretically motivated factors that could be used
for understanding and explaining surprise in the Ukraine crisis.
Though Allison and Zelikow “consume” theory, they actually start their inquiry with the
observation that the dominating “rational actor model” for explanation is not entirely
satisfactory, and that it needs to “be supplemented by frames of reference that focus on the
governmental machine”8. In other words, the “consumption” of theory is not just a matter of
ordering a fixed menu, but could be something of a buffet dinner created by the scholar.
However, this selection of explanatory factors must be done in a careful and elaborated
process, especially as the term “the Ukraine crisis” must be constructed as well. The first
concern is that when one makes up a story to fit the described outcome, it is easy to adjust
data to get a certain pattern. Ultimately, one might create a convincing story of the
outcome, only to discover that the explanatory value for other cases might be limited. This is
the curse of a “single case theory”. To avoid a motley set of factors in the analysis, it is
important that factors brought into the analysis must be commensurable with each other,
i.e. not based on competing foundational assumptions.
An example of theory “consumption” similar to that of Allison and Zelikow is Charles Parker
and Eric Stern’s analysis of the 9-11 attacks 2001.9 Based on the premise that the events of
9-11 “should be regarded as a strategic surprise”10 Parker and Stern try to “understand more
systematically what went wrong”11, “seek to better understand what happened”12, and
understand “the responsiveness of the system to more generalized warnings”13. Like Allison
and Zelikow’s account of the Cuban missile crisis, their study features three cuts to explain a
seminal event. The same methodological tools are used in the twin study about the policy
failure associated with hurricane Katrina in the US14 This latter article examines the policy
failure to deal with a natural disaster in the US. Thus, the somewhat conventional wisdom
that “the Katrina disaster could have been prevented with more federal attention and earlier
8
Allison & Zelikow, Essence of Decision, p. 5.
9
Charles Parker & Eric K. Stern, “Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the
Origins of Strategic Surprise” in Foreign Policy Analysis (2005), p. 301-331.
10
Ibid., p. 301.
11
Ibid., p. 302.
12
Ibid., p. 303.
13
Ibid., p. 304.
14
Charles F. Parker, Erik K. Stern, Eric Paglia and Christer Brown, ”Preventable Catastrophe? The Hurricane
Katrina Disaster Revisited” in Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Vol. 17, No. 4, 4 December 2009.
9action”15 proves to be misleading. It would certainly be tempting to examine why the West
failed in its foreign policy objectives in the Ukraine crisis and identify the factors that
prevented Western leaders from responding more adequately. However, unlike the analysis
of 9-11 and the Katrina disaster, this study will not elaborate on the issue of policy failure as
such. The reason is quite obvious: the Ukraine crisis is a two-sided and dynamic conflict, in
which we currently have very limited insight into the Russian side. Without relevant sources
for the Russian behavior it becomes impossible to determine failure, at least in a positivist
manner, as we simply cannot know exactly why objectives were not reached. Thus, it
becomes impossible to identify the causal mechanisms for a policy failure. Furthermore, our
interest is not counterfactual (“could there have been better preparations”).
Rather, the research question in this thesis is in line with what political scientist Alex Hybel
calls the “victim’s school” of thought on surprise.16 This means that we will try to take the
vantage point of some of the key European leaders and institutions in order to explain “the
causes of their failure to anticipate the initiation of hostilities.”17 Just like the studies of the
Cuban missile crisis, 9-11 and Katrina, we will have to supplement our study with
organizational as well as psychological factors in order to interpret the actions of the victim
during the course of the crisis. This is why explanation also requires understanding.
This thesis is bold only in one sense of the word: it attempts to write a history of the present.
As concluded, this means that it deals with a strategic event that is ongoing. Indeed, the
situation in Ukraine has mutated into a low-intensity war. That is why it is too early to
conclude whether the Ukraine crisis best could be studied as a critical juncture (an important
moment in history) or a formative moment (an important moment in history where
institutions are reshaped).18 This might seem contradictory to the fundamental assumption
behind the design of the inquiry, namely that we know the outcome of a process. I claim to
make a post mortem analysis, but do I have a corpse?
15
Ibid., p. 206.
16
Alex Roberto Hybel, The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict (Massachusetts/Toronto: Lexington Books,
1986), p. 3.
17
Ibid., p. 2.
18
For the distinctions between formative moment and critical juncture, see Bo Rothstein, “Explaining Swedish
Corporatism: The Formative Moment” Scandinavian Political Studies Vol. 15 – No. 3 1992.
10However, from an epistemological perspective one could argue that it is a challenge to find
objective criteria to dissociate any political process. Rather, they seem to be constructed
either socially or analytically. An example of a socially constructed political process is an
election: the political system is constructed in electoral cycles, which makes it possible to
identify the beginning and end of a process. An example of an analytically constructed
political process is the Cuban missile crisis as described by Allison and Zelikow. In this case
the different stories of the crisis are shifting depending on the theoretical perspectives
employed. The content of the crisis is dependent on the employed analytical framework. The
only thing that unites the three explanatory cuts in Allison and Zelikow are the three known
decisions (the Soviet decision to base missiles on Cuba, the US blockade of Cuba, and the
Soviet withdrawal from Cuba). This means that it would be possible to analytically construct
the Ukraine crisis around a few known focus points. In turn this means that we have to
identify and motivate these points as well as relevant actors and institutions in the event.
Having done this, the factors we should use to make sense of the surprise must be identified
and motivated from the theoretical literature. Finally, the inquiry would then reconstruct the
deliberations or processes at these focus points, which could then be interpreted on the
basis of the theoretically motivated factors.
As noted in methodological literature, there are no limitations to the source material that
could be used in such reconstruction.19 The most common sources include diary notes,
memoirs, PM:s, protocols, directives, reports, white papers, as well as interviews. Basically
any source that could be used to track and interpret the reasons for strategic surprise could
be used. This is helpful, as the ongoing character of the process means that no academic
monographs on the subject seem to be available. As of summer 2014, three major research
reports are available, both concerned with policy recommendations and neither concerned
with strategic surprise.20
19
See for example Esaiasson, et al., Metodpraktikan, p. 145.
20
Granholm, Niklas, Johannes Malminen and Gudrun Persson (eds.), A Rude Awakening. Ramifications of
Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine (Stockholm: FOI, 2014); Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, Lars Bangert Struwe,
Rune Hoffmann, Flemming Pradhan-Blach, Johannes Kidmose, Henrik Breitenbauch, Kristian Søby Kristensen,
Ann-Sofie Dahl, The Ukraine Crisis and the End of the Post-Cold War European Order: Options for NATO and the
EU (Centre for Military Studies: Copenhagen, 2014); Henrik Boesen Lindbo Larsen, Great Power Politics and the
Ukraine Crisis. NATO, EU and Russia after 2014 DIIS Report 2014:18.
11A skeptical reader might suspect that the theoretical factors that explain surprise is expected
to be a part of the story about the Ukraine crisis, and that the inquiry will be less interesting.
However, the research question is actually a serious and difficult one. We could not expect
to find an open and frank discourse among surprised and overwhelmed senior politicians,
simply because it would be a sign of weakness and unpreparedness. To write the history of
Western surprise and find explanations for it even when it might not be openly admitted,
represents a genuine research task and the very rationale for the rest of this thesis. It should
be noted that the results must be tested in other cases (comparative research) in order to
find the specific weight of each explanatory factor, and also to test the validity to other
cases.
To summarize: this thesis is an example of a theory “consuming” study, where the outcome
is known and several factors must be used to explain the outcome. Thus, the next step in our
inquiry is to get a grip on the fundamental assumptions about strategic surprise in the
Ukraine crisis. A closer look at the selected case will allow us to clarify the relevant actors
and institutions that are to be examined. In methodological terms, this means to specify the
outcome. In turn, the description of the outcome highlights the relevant theoretical domains
for the inquiry.
The Ukraine crisis as a case of strategic surprise
It is time for our first visit to the empirical domains. The purpose is to define the Ukraine
crisis and make the case that some of its central Western actors and institutions were
subject to strategic surprise. I identify three focus points in the crisis, and from them I
distinguish four key phases that are separated by events that created surprise for European
and US leaders. Based on this analysis I identify the key actors and institutions related to
these four phases.
A surprise means that “an act or development has taken place contrary to our
expectations”21. It should be noted that it is impossible to use official and unclassified
material to have informed knowledge about the emotional status of Western political
leaders. However, it is possible to use the term surprise related to two circumstances: when
actors and institutions express a relatively large gap between expectation and outcome of a
21
Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack. The Victim’s Perspective (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press,
1988), p. 7.
12political process or event, or when expressions of actors or institutions regarding two
political events are so incoherent that the assumptions about the first must have been
revised regarding the second. The crucial expectations are related to the actions of the
Yanukovych regime and Russia. Surprise becomes strategic when it affects actors and
institutions on a strategic level or scale.
A time of surprises: from Vilnius to Simferopol
As noted in the introduction the West (defined as the United States and the European
Union) failed to reach all or most of their stated objectives for Ukraine between summer
2013 until March 2014. In the EU case this policy failure is related to the partnership strategy
for the region, which was established in 2008-2009. At the Vilnius Summit in November
2013, Ukraine was expected to finalize years of negotiations and sign the Association
Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AAs/DCFTAs) with the EU. The
US case is more related to the “reset policy” that was launched by President Obama’s
administration in 2009, and later abandoned during summer and autumn 2013. In both
cases, arguably, the term “failure” could be related to a lack of results in the policy towards
Yanukovych and Putin.
As pointed out by many policy papers and commentaries during this period, the failures to
reach objectives were accompanied by a lack of understanding of what happened and an
inability see the crisis coming.22 For example, on the eve of the Russian military invasion of
Crimea 27-28 February 2014, Carnegie analysts Dimitri Trenin and Andrew Weiss concluded
that “the situation in Ukraine has already surprised many experienced observers.”23 A few
weeks later, following the Geneva negotiations between top officials John Kerry, Sergey
Lavrov, Andriy Deshchytsia and Lady Catherine Ashton on 17 April, the general view in
Western media was that it had resulted in a “surprise deal” between Russia and the West
over Ukraine.24 This represents an interesting shift in expectations: at the Vilnius Summit
22
To quote only one of a great many examples, John Robson of the Toronto Sun concluded that “Western
leaders seem to have been astoundingly unprepared”, John Robson, “Ukraine crisis surprised no one – and
everyone” Toronto Sun 5 March 2014 (http://www.torontosun.com/2014/03/05/ukraine-crisis-surprised-no-
one----and-everyone), accessed on 16 June 2014.
23
Dimitri Trenin & Andrew Weiss, ”Keep a lid on Crimea” (http://carnegie.ru/2014/02/27/keep-lid-on-
crimea/h1yd), accessed on 1 March 2014.
24
See for example Roland Oliphant & Damien McElroy, “Russia and West reach surprise deal on Ukraine crisis”
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10774084/Russia-and-West-reach-surprise-
deal-on-Ukraine-crisis.html), accessed on 18 April 2014.
13escalation was surprising; at the Geneva negotiations de-escalation was surprising. Put
simply, after the Russian annexation of Crimea not many observers seemed to be surprised
by Russian aggression anymore. This motivates a closer look into the period between the
stalled negotiations between Ukraine and the EU to the Russian annexation of Crimea. This is
the period when we are likely to find surprised actors, and suitable focus points.
Indeed, when Yanukovych decided not to sign the AAs/DCFTAs, many Western leaders were
shocked, taken by surprise or failed to anticipate the event. Immediately after the decision
to stop the negotiations with the EU, on 21 November 2013, one of the leading architects of
the Eastern Partnership policy (EaP), Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt Twittered “Ukraine
government suddenly bows deeply to the Kremlin”25 in what he described as “Ukraine’s
black Thursday”26. It is fair to interpret this as a surprise as he described the Ukrainian
decision, in a Financial Times article the next day, as “a surprise U-turn”27.
But Bildt was far from alone. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, the other main architect
of the EaPs, first made the estimate in a speech in September 2013 that Ukraine was “on the
last lap”28 towards signing the AA, while after the Vilnius Summit he was reported to find it
“strange” that Ukraine expected economic development in its relationship with Russia.29
While the EU-commissioner for the EaPs Štefan Füle’s official reaction that Ukraine’s
decision was a “disappointment”30 is perhaps in line with expected rhetoric, the message in
25
Carl Bildt on Twitter 21 November 2013(https://Twitter.com/carlbildt/status/403521513342898176),
accessed on 1 December 2013.
26
Carl Bildt, ”Ukrainas svarta torsdag” on Alla dessa dagar
(http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/ukrainas-svarta-torsdag/), accessed on 1 December 2013.
27
Carl Bildt, “Ukraine has postponed an opportunity to prosper” in Financial Times 22 November 2013.
28
Radek Sikorski, “The Vilnius Summit -- Creating Wider Europe?” speech at the Yalta Europe Strategy
Conference, September 2013. In an interview in the Spring of 2013 Sikorski even said that “geopolitically,
[Poland] are having the best time in 300 years”, Foreign Affairs, “The Polish Model. A conversation with Radek
Sikorski” Foreign Affairs May/June 2013 (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/the-polish-
model), accessed on 5 June 2014.
29
Giancomo Manca, “Four Years of Partnership. Time for a balance sheet”,
(http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/962-four-years-of-partnership-time-for-a-balance-sheet),
accessed on 5 June 2014.
30
Štefan Füle, “Association agreements with Eastern Partners: Opening new doors to investment and trade”
Speech at the 2nd Eastern Partnership Business Forum in Vilnius, 28 November 2013
(http://www.eu2013.lt/en/news/statements/speech-by-stefan-fule-on-2nd-eastern-partnership-business-
forumin-vilnius-association-agreements-with-eastern-partners-opening-new-doors-to-investment-and-trade),
accessed on 5 December 2013.
14a private conversation from Chancellor Angela Merkel to Yanukovych that the EU “expected
more”, is an indicator of the unexpected outcome of the negotiation process.31
Just a day before Yanukovych decision to cancel the negotiations, the president of the EU
Parliament Martin Schulz stated that Russia was doing the same thing as the EU in Ukraine,
namely gaining influence.32 This rhetoric normalized Russian behavior, and the surprise
effect became clear when after the Vilnius Summit the Russian behavior of “external
pressure” was said to have led to a “deep disappointment” with Ukraine’s decision not to
sign the AAs/DCFTAs.33 A few weeks later Schulz own representative in the EU Parliament
monitoring mission to Ukraine, former Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski, openly
admitted that “the West underestimated the Russian determination”.34 One Member of the
European Parliament remarked in early December 2013 that “the strong Russian influence in
Ukraine came as somewhat of a surprise to the EU and, as a consequence, resulted in what
you could call a shock as the EU was quite unprepared for this Ukrainian decision.”35 In short,
the Vilnius Summit had come as a “bitter surprise for Brussels”36 as analyst Tomislava
Penkova put it.
After Yanukovych’s decision not to pursue the EU track and the AAs/DCFTAs, there were
massive protests in Kiev. Already before the Vilnius Summit, on 24 November 2013, some
200.000 protestors gathered around Kiev’s Maidan square. These protests escalated and on
30 November-1 December there was a clash between police and protesters as well as an
occupation of Kiev City Hall. The official EU policy was to keep the offer of the AA open for
Yanukovych. Around this period there were signs that the evolving crisis started to get top
31
Ian Taylor & Oksana Grytsenko, ”Ukraine aligns with Moscow as EU Summit fails”
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/29/ukraine-yanukovych-moscow-eu-Summit), accessed on 1
December 2013.
32
RFE/RL, “EU’s Schulz Not Losing Hope For Ukraine, Yet” (http://www.rferl.org/content/schulz-yanukovych-
strategy/25174242.html), accessed on 25 November 2013.
33
AFP, “EP president disappointed by Ukraine's, Armenia's refusal to sign association agreements with EU”
(http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/ep-president-deeply-disappointed-by-ukraines-armenias-refusal-
to-sign-association-agreements-with-eu-332538.html?flavour=mobile), accessed 5 December 2013.
34
Jan Puhl & Christian Neef, “'Brussels Was Naïve': Ex Polish Leader on Failed Ukraine Talks”
(http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/spiegel-interview-with-aleksander-kwasniewski-on-ukraine-
talks-a-937964.html), accessed on 20 December 2014.
35
See for example Justina Vitkauskaite Bernard & Vira Ratsiborynska, The Vinius Summit’s geopolitical games:
Lessons learnt (http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/vilnius-Summit-geopolitical-game-analysis-532306),
accessed on 1 April 2014.
36
Tomislava Penkova, “Ukraine and the Vilnius Summit: Time for bitter-sweet illusions
(http://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/ukraine-and-vilnius-Summit-time-bitter-sweet-illusions-9512),
accessed on 5 December 2013.
15level attention also in the US. Following the police storming of the protestors on 9
December, Secretary of State John Kerry issued his first official remarks about the crisis, and
soon after Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland as well as Senator John McCain both
made visits to Kiev.37 On 19 December there were once more violent clashes with around 10
casualties between security forces and protestors in Kiev. On 25 January 2014 Yanukovych
made an offer to protest leaders Arseny Yatsenyuk and Vitaly Klitschko, with negative
response, to lead a government. After this, there were a few relatively calm weeks in Kiev. At
the EU-Russia Summit on 28 January EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso still
planned for a deeper partnership relation with Russia, to be signed at a June Summit in
Sochi.38
On 18 February following the clash between protestors and the security forces of the
Yanukovych regime, there was an international outrage and shock. It has been estimated
that over the following days between 70-100 protestors were killed. To many Western
leaders it was simply incomprehensible how a political leader of a European country could
use massive force on protesters.39 While it might be expected to find the UN Secretary
General among the “shocked”40, it is somewhat more interesting to notice the use of the
same word from Barroso in his official statement. 41 The bloody events triggered a
condemnation and diplomatic response from the EU in the form of a negotiation mission
consisting of the Foreign Ministers Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Germany), Laurent Fabius
37
John Kerry, “Statement on Events in Ukraine”
(http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218585.htm), accessed on 5 June 2014; CBS/Wire service,
“Top US official visits protesters in Kiev as Obama admin.ups pressure on Ukraine president Yanukovich”
(http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-victoria-nuland-wades-into-ukraine-turmoil-over-yanukovich/) accessed
on 5 June 2014;Guardian staff and agencies, “John McCain tells Ukraine protesters: 'We are here to support
your just cause'” (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/15/john-mccain-ukraine-protests-support-
just-cause), accessed on 5 June 2014. It is interesting to note that there were no questions or comments on
Ukraine at the President’s press conference before the Christmas holidays 2013, see
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/20/press-conference-president, accessed on 5 June
2014.
38
European Union, Statement by President Barroso following the EU-Russia Summit
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-66_en.htm), accessed on 5 June 2014. It is worth noting that
NATO had prepared an ambitious cooperation plan with Russia for 2014, see NATO, “NATO-Russia Council
approves ambitious cooperation plan for 2014” (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_105502.htm),
accessed on 6 August 2014.
39
Valentina Pop & Walter Rettmann, “Ukraine violence catches EU by surprise”
(http://euobserver.com/foreign/123186), accessed on 5 June 2014.
40
UN, Use of violence in Ukraine “unacceptable” Secretary-General reiterates, expressing shock, grave concern
over escalation (https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sgsm15650.doc.htm), accessed on 1 April 2014.
41
See for example, European Union, Statement by President Barroso on Ukraine
(http://www.euinjapan.jp/en/media/news/news2014/20140219/180152/), accessed on 5 June 2014.
16(France) and Sikorski (Poland). In turn, this paved way for an “Agreement on the Settlement
of Crisis in Ukraine” on the 21 February. This agreement aimed at a national unity
government, a return to Ukraine’s 2004 constitution, a presidential election before the end
of the year, an investigation of the violent acts led by the Council of Europe, and a promise
from the Ukrainian authorities not to impose a state of emergency. The signatories were, on
the one hand Yanukovych, on the other hand Yatsenyuk, Klitschko and opposition leader
Oleh Tyahnibok.42 At the time this was regarded by the negotiators as a compromise, but
just hours later Yanukovych left Ukraine and exiled into Russia. A few days after Sikorski
reflected upon the sequence in a CNN interview, and said that “what happened was
something really strange.”43
Just a few days after the departure of Yanukovych, Russia started its annexation of Crimea.
When masked soldiers without insignia appeared on the Crimean peninsula, there was
confusion in the Western camp. The Russian military operations run parallel to the creation
of political unrest in, among other places, the region’s capital Simferopol. Over the course of
a few days Russia was regarded as violating the UN charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the
Charter of Paris, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and the Black Sea
basing agreement. As a recent study noted, in the Crimea operation, “the key element was
surprise” 44 . NATO diplomats even asked themselves if the event was possible. 45 The
operation triggered a swift response from the White House, and on 1 March Obama had a
90 minute phone call with his Russian colleague.46
In a radio interview on 1 March Carl Bildt, who during the crisis until then had visited Ukraine
more often than any other foreign minister in the EU, confessed his surprise over the
Russian behavior: “It has escalated very quickly. The Russian behavior has come to surprise
42
The Guardian, “Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine - full text”
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text),
accessed on 5 June 2014. The agreement was witnessed by Steinmeier, Fabius, Sikorski and Russian envoy
Vladimir Lukin.
43
CNN, Ukraine peace deal negotiator and foreign minister Radek Sikorski on Fareed Zakaria’s GPS
(http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/23/ukraine-peace-deal-negotiator-foreign-minister-of-poland-
radek-sikorski-on-fareed-zakaria-gps/), accessed on 6 August 2014.
44
Johan Norberg (ed.), Ulrik Franke & Fredrik Westerlund, “The Crimea Operation: Implications for Future
Russian Military Interventions” in Niklas Granholm, Johannes Malminen, Gudrun Persson (eds.), A Rude
Awakening. Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine (Stockholm: FOI, 2014), p. 44.
45
Annika Ström Melin, “Krisen stärker bandet mellan EU och Nato” in Dagens Nyheter 11 July 2014.
46
The White House, “A readout of President Obama’s phone call with President Putin”
(http://ukraine.usembassy.gov/statements/obama-call-03012014.html), accessed on 5 June 2014.
17many, no doubt about that. I think there are few analysts, including myself I should add, who
had expected that Russia would have gone as far as it has done./…/It is surprising and deeply
worrying.”47 In an interview the next day on CBS “Face the Nation” John Kerry regarded the
annexation as a stunning act of aggression, not worthy of a G-8 country in the 21st century.48
At a press conference when Kerry was told that Putin denied the existence of Russian troops
in Crimea, he reacted with amazement (“He really denied there were troops in Crimea?”49).
After her telephone conversations with Putin, Angela Merkel made a similar conclusion that
the Russian leader lives “in another world”.50 A common policy position among Western
leaders was that it was not in anyone’s interest to split Ukraine.51
In a reflection a few weeks after the invasion of Crimea, Anders Fogh Rasmussen admitted
that the events represented a “geopolitical game changer”.52 A major study of the Ukraine
crisis concluded: “the Ukrainian crisis came as a surprise in terms of the depth and severity
of Russia’s objections to a growing EU influence in the common neighborhood.” 53 The
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey summed up the surreal
mood that seemed to dominate the Western leadership: “Russia’s actions remind us that the
world today remains unpredictable, complex and quite dangerous/…/The world will continue
to surprise us, often in unpleasant ways.”54
An aggregated and accumulated surprise
We can conclude that we have clear indications that Western leaders, in a broad and general
sense, were surprised by the events that developed into a crisis in Ukraine. The empirical
47
Carl Bildt on “Studio 1”, 1 March 2014 (http://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/340252?programid=1637),
accessed on 2 March 2014.
48
US Department of State, Interview
(http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/03/20140302295200.html#axzz33ljZ8NgV),
accessed on 5 June 2014.
49
Embassy of the United States to Kiev, Remarks by Secretary at a Solo Press Availability in Kyiv
(http://ukraine.usembassy.gov/statements/solo-03042014.html), accessed on 5 June 2014.
50
Peter Baker, “Pressure Rising as Obama works to Rein in Russia”
(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/world/europe/pressure-rising-as-obama-works-to-rein-in-
russia.html?_r=2), accessed on 5 June 2014.
51
See for example Tara Brady & Amanda Williams, “US warns Russia it would be a 'grave mistake' to send its
military into Ukraine as its new leader says it wants to integrate with Europe”, Daily Mail 23 February 2014.
(http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2565961/As-Ukrainian-parliament-names-new-acting-president-
country-finally-pulled-apart-bitter-divide-20-years-making.html).
52
Rasmussen, “A Strong NATO in a Changed World”.
53
Boesen Lindbo Larsen, Great Power Politics and the Ukraine Crisis., p. 8.
54
Cheryl Pellerin, “Hagel, Dempsey Outline US, Partner Approach to Ukraine
(http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121774), accessed on 5 June 2014.
18account so far “demonstrates that governments, organizations, and individuals often fail to
detect or adequately adjust quickly enough to crucial changes in their external
environment”.55 Thus, so far we have established a chain of events that represent a known
outcome of a process. The first signs of surprise seem to have appeared when Yanukovych
decided to drop out of the negotiations with the EU on 21 November 2013, even if some
actors maintained some hope for Ukraine to sign the AAs/DCFTAs. The actors involved seem
primarily to have been European. It is also possible to detect a second cluster of amazement
following the Maidan massacre 18-20 February 2014. This event seems to have activated top
level attention also in the US. Finally, the sequence of annexation of Crimea in February-
March 2014 also triggered a wave of surprise among Western leaders. The chronology of the
crisis is illustrated below:
Figure 1: The chronology of the Ukraine crisis
This chronology provides us with three focus points for our inquiry. A closer look at the focus
points makes it possible to identify five analytical phases of the crisis. The first is the road to
the Vilnius Summit, the second is the Vilnius Summit and its aftermath, the third is the
Maidan square massacre, the fourth is the Crimean invasion and annexation and the fifth is
the ongoing development of the crisis, which is considered to be a phase after strategic
surprise. At none of these stages, in what developed into a strategic crisis, did Western
leaders seem to have comprehended which political, strategic and economic risks Vladimir
Putin and Viktor Yanukovych eventually were willing to take. It is interesting to note that the
phases include surprised actors over a period of several months. We can conclude that it is a
case of an accumulated surprise. This is of interest as it concerns the character of surprise.
Furthermore, these focus points have implications for the actors and institutions suitable for
the study. The first event that triggered surprise was related to an EU-partnership
negotiation process, which means that as surprise is the outcome to be understood and
explained, a suitable choice for a closer inquiry is the EU as an institution. As we have seen,
55
Parker et. al., “Preventable Catastrophe?”, p. 207.
19this does not mean that only EU leaders were surprised, only that it is an institution that is
relevant for all three focus points that has been identified as surprising.
Thus, we must note that the Ukraine crisis is a case of aggregated surprise. The outcome
could not be reduced to one specific level of governance, as the EU features policy-making
and policy-shaping at member state level as well as supranational level. This makes it
aggregated in an organizational dimension. Furthermore, this empirical circumstance is
something of a challenge to surprise theory. Surprise theory is almost exclusively related to
single states, while the partnership policy of the EU is a result of foreign policy coordination
between several states. As we will see later on, this is not a challenge for the theoretical
claims as such, but rather the operationalization of indicators in a case that involves a
different political environment.
Thus, a methodological conclusion is to study the crisis on several analytical levels, as it
concerns the EU, and to include theoretical factors that could cover the whole sequence of
the first four phases of the crisis.56 In other words, reasons for surprise could be found in
history and on many levels of government. The final section of these methodological
considerations will be devoted to the theoretical aspects needed when studying an
aggregated as well as accumulated strategic surprise.
Strategic surprise theory and the warning-response problem
This far the thesis has established an outcome, based on an empirical account of official
confessions and mistaken assumptions. We must note that these accounts are indications
and not explanations of strategic surprise. This distinction is vital, as it would be next to a
tautology to contend that someone was surprised because of mistaken assumptions. The
final part of this chapter is dedicated to strategic surprise theory, the warning-response
problem, and how to use these concepts to understand and explain strategic surprise. In this
part I describe the main theoretical features and supplement them with factors that are
motivated by the specific circumstances in the Ukraine case.
56
As concluded in one of the major reports on the Ukraine crisis, the events in this sequence “demonstrated
that Russia and the EU were the main external actors affecting political developments in Ukraine.”, see Boesen
Lindbo Larsen, Great Power Politics and the Ukraine Crisis, p. 10.
20Signals and noise, coping and relevant actors
The definition of strategic surprise used in the previous section is from the victim’s
perspective, and relies on a broad understanding of the concept: an act or development has
taken place contrary to the expectations of actors and/or institutions on a strategic level or
scale. The empirical indications of a surprise could either be outright admittance of surprise
or changing assumptions displayed by actors and institutions.57
Since the 1962 publication of one of the first systematic attempts to study strategic surprise,
Roberta Wohlstetter’s path-breaking book on Pearl Harbor58, one of the most common
perspectives has focused on the failure of the victim to utilize the warnings to prevent
surprise. Incoming information are either “signals” (accurate and relevant) or “noise”
(inaccurate and irrelevant), and the former seem to be vastly outnumbered by the latter.
Thus, an explanation of strategic surprise is guided towards the signals and why they were
not discovered before the surprising event.59 This is the core of the warning-response
problem.
The explanatory cuts, inspired by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, and expanded in the
studies on 9-11 and hurricane Katrina by Parker and Stern, provide a method of grouping
different explanations for why signals were not discovered and/or misinterpreted.60 The
theoretical meaning of a cut is related to a cluster of explanatory factors of a particular kind.
One cut is related to the agenda-setting (securitization and de-securitization related to the
EU’s Eastern Partnerships) that precedes a conflict. A second cut is based on cognitive
structures (receptivity failures) that constitute psychological explanations (related to
individual decision-makers). A third cut is based on the inner life of organizations (in this
case the European Council). The term “cut” is appropriate as the analysis in many cases is
likely to feature recurring episodes. The point is that it systematizes the explanatory factors,
even if they are inter-related and cross-disciplinary.
57
Abraham Ben-Zvi puts its very well: “strategic surprise stems from inadequate assumptions – explicit and
implicit”, see Abraham Ben-Zvi, “Surprise: Theoretical Aspects” in Evron (ed.), International Violence, p. 93.
58
Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).
59
Examples of this approach includes Michael Handels study of the Yom Kippur case, see Michael Handel,
Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems
(Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1976). The notion of “signals” could be ontologically
challenged and modified. However, in this thesis the purpose is not to develop theory.
60
The article by Parker & Stern and Parker, et al. feature a comprehensive overview of the theoretical
literature, see Parker & Stern, “Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure?”; Parker, et al., ”Preventable
Catastrophe?”.
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