Syria & Iraq Conflict Futures - Report sample Tate Nurkin & Richard Evans IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security

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Syria & Iraq Conflict Futures - Report sample Tate Nurkin & Richard Evans IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security
Syria & Iraq Conflict
Futures
Report sample
Tate Nurkin & Richard Evans
IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security

WWW.IHS.COM
Syria & Iraq Conflict Futures - Report sample Tate Nurkin & Richard Evans IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security
Introduction & Scope

On 6 February 2015 IHS held a one-            In addition to developing specific
day Iraq-Syria Conflict Futures               scenario pathways, analysts also
Workshop, bringing together a                 developed insights into the uncertainties,
combination of subject matter experts         tensions and unresolved issues shaping
to develop and discuss a range of             each scenario category and implications
scenarios for the future trajectory of        of each scenario.
the linked Iraq and Syria conflicts
                                              They also addressed a series of
over the next two to five years.
                                              questions about the implications of these
Participating subject matter experts          alternative future worlds on regional
drawn from across IHS included analysts       political geography and state stability;
focused on the study of regional              Islamist extremism; regional geopolitics;
geopolitics, politics and security, as well   pathways for contagion; and threats to
as extremist movements and sub-state          and challenges for Western states, their
armed groups operating in Iraq and            homeland security and regional interests
Syria.                                        among other scenario specific questions.
Over the course of the event IHS              In order to ensure the broadest range of
analysts used input from intelligence and     creative thinking about these scenarios
security communities to discuss drivers,      and mitigate the pitfalls associated with
develop specific scenario pathways and        group think and cognitive bias, workshop
investigate branches of these pathways        participants were divided into two teams,
in three distinct categories of scenarios.    each of which was asked to develop
Each of the categories was designed to        distinct scenario pathways within each
isolate and explore a specific dynamic:       category of scenario. Teams would brief
                                              their scenario pathways and discuss their
                                              analysis of scenario dynamics and
     The increasingly complex nature
                                              implications in a plenary session
      of the extremist landscape and
                                              including all Workshop participants.
      threat in Syria and Iraq
                                              The scenarios included in this report are
     The role that increasing Western
                                              amalgamations of the insights and
      and extra-regional actors’
                                              pathways briefed in the plenary
      involvement in the region can play
                                              discussions.
      in either containing or escalating
      these conflicts                         The resulting report incorporates
                                              scenario pathways and analysis
     The intersection of the Iraq-Syria
                                              generated by IHS analysts during these
      wars (and IS in particular) with
                                              events, and seeks to capture both the
      overlapping, complex regional
                                              prevailing narratives and the analysis, as
      geopolitical rivalries—and the
                                              well as interesting or provocative minority
      implications for Western
                                              viewpoints and counter-narratives
      intelligence, security and policy
                                              developed during the two workshops.
      communities

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Introduction & Scope

The report is divided into five separate      This sample provides excerpted content
sections:                                     from Scenario 1 of the report.
         Executive Summary                   To purchase the full, unabridged report
                                              or to learn more about IHS non-state
         Preface: Scenario Planning, Why?
                                              armed group intelligence resources visit
          What?
                                              shop.ihs.com or contact us:
         Scenario 1: Arc of Extremism
                                              AMERICAS
         Scenario 2: Western Overreach
          and Disengagement                   Tel: +1 844 301 7334
                                              E-mail
         Scenario 3: Turkish Intervention.
                                              ASIA-PACIFIC
                                              Tel: +604 291 3735
                                              E-mail

                                              EUROPE & AFRICA
                                              Tel: +44 (0) 1344 328 155
                                              E-mail

                                              MIDDLE EAST
                                              Tel: +971 4 363 5858
                                              E-mail

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Scenario 1: Arc of Extremism

This scenario explores the potential          Idlib province and neighbouring Aleppo
future trajectory of Islamist extremist       province across north-central and north-
influence in the Iraq-Syria conflict          Eastern Syria. These extremist proto-
across the next two to five years.            states represent an ‘arc of extremism’ in
Whilst it considers in detail some of         Syria, and engage in a competition for
the factors that might shape the              influence over the Sunni populations
development of Islamic State, it also         under their control.
attempts to situate the group among a
                                              The most significant entity to threaten the
broader range of Islamist and
                                              survival of IS becomes Jabhat al-Nusra
extremist actors seeking greater
                                              (JN) and a coalition of Islamist militant
influence and territorial control in
                                              and extremist allies. With external
Syria, and thus to examine the impact
                                              support from Turkey and Qatar, this
of Islamist extremism as a whole on
                                              coalition gains control over most of Idlib
the conflict.
                                              province, Aleppo province and crucially
Scenario                                      Aleppo city, which becomes the de facto
                                              capital of a rival JN-led Islamic Emirate
Islamic State (IS) endures as a               of ash-Sham.
territorially-contiguous entity, sustaining
a proto-state largely in the ar-Raqqah        Our scenario assumes that JN will
and Deir ez-Zour provinces of Syria that      continue to prove successful in fostering
outlasts a sustained counter-offensive by     collaboration with other Syrian insurgent
the International Coalition. Unable to        groups, and in the pursuit of its model of
precipitate complete collapse of IS, and      co-governance under Sharia. It further
potentially distracted by other regional or   assumes that this coalition does not
international security concerns, support      fracture after the battle for Aleppo and
for a seemingly open-ended low intensity      that the US and regional partners are
conflict with IS begins to decline among      unsuccessful in peeling away insurgent
new political administrations in Western      groups from JN’s influence through
members states, except for punitive           funding, training, and
strikes. As these states slowly scale back    weapons/equipment.
their support and increasingly leave the
                                              Sample Assumption: NATO’s Crowded
fight to regional partners, remaining
                                              Threat Environment
member states then pursue varying
policies of targeted counterterrorism,        One of the core assumptions of the Arc
containment or confrontation through          of Extremism scenario is that Western
non-state proxy forces.                       governments scale back military
                                              involvement in Iraq and Syria, relying on
However, IS survives as only one of a
                                              ‘policies of targeted counterterrorism,
number of Islamist militant / extremist
                                              containment or confrontation through
actors that will cumulatively control
                                              proxy groups.’
territory stretching from most of northern

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Scenario 1: Arc of Extremism

While political or fiscal realities could       militias—a strategic victory for the
certainly drive this disengagement,             military and the al-Abadi government that
especially if current efforts are viewed as     precipitates further recapture of territory
having minimal effect on the situation on       in Nineveh and Anbar provinces--is the
the ground, so too may other security or        first major event in our base scenario.
geopolitical exigencies that lead to a de-      The ability of the Iraqi military to achieve
prioritization of the IS threat, even if low-   victory in Mosul in 2015 remains
level terrorist operations linked to IS in      uncertain; whilst the United States is
Western states persist.                         reportedly accelerating transfers of small
Indeed, a central feature of ongoing IHS        arms and other ordnance to the Iraqi
NATO Futures initiative involves analysis       army, some military capabilities
of the exceptionally complex and                assessments have suggested that the
crowded threat landscape facing NATO            army in particular remains insufficiently
and, critically, its member and partner         prepared for the prospect of difficult
states and the varying perceptions              urban operations against an entrenched,
among these states of how to prioritize         highly-motivated and experienced
these threats. A significant Russia             adversary. Indeed, IHS analysts noted
contingency, an escalation of fighting in       on multiple occasions that IS must be
North Africa, and a Western Pacific             considered more skilled in the
security crisis or several crises               operational art of urban combat, having
simultaneously could stretch already thin       had the benefit of significant institutional
resources in a way so as to diminish the        knowledge gained from combat since
interest and capacity to support                2003.
continued presence and Coalition                The failure to evict IS from Mosul, via
operations in Iraq and Syria.                   military action or brokered withdrawal,
                                                would inflict a political shock on the
Sample Insight: The Importance of               government of Haider al-Abadi and
Mosul                                           further damage the already low morale of
Exercise discussions frequently centred         the formally constituted ‘national’ Iraqi
on the tactical, operational and strategic      security forces. The ability of IS to fend
importance of driving IS from Mosul, and        off an assault on the city would also be
how the loss of Mosul might shape the           trumpeted by the group as a major
future of Islamic State and extremism in        strategic victory buoying its confidence,
the region as both a trigger for the Arc of     driving new recruits and indicating
Extremism scenario and as a wildcard,           enhanced prospects for longer-term
the result of which could drive the future      survival and, plausibly, expansion and
of IS along a vastly different trajectory       growth.
than that posed by the scenario.                But the outcome of the battle for Mosul is
The recapture of Mosul by the Iraqi             only one of the many drivers shaping the
military and, importantly, allied Shia          operational environment on the ground.

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Scenario 1: Arc of Extremism

Of equal importance in this scenario is       Strategic narratives
the nature of the retaking of Mosul,                ‘We will wear down the enemy,
should it occur. Whilst the Iraqi military           then recover and attack’
may initially seek to minimize civilian
casualties and collateral damage, fearing           ‘We will wear down the economy
a public backlash, a persistent failure to           of the West and their willingness
recapture the city might see them resort             to support Apostate Arab
to more indiscriminate tactics. IS may               governments’
seek to leverage rising civilian casualties         ‘Dawlat ul-Islam baqiyah’—‘we will
to position itself as defender of Sunni              remain and then expand’
residents from an intended massacre by
                                              Impact
the Shia-led government, strengthening
local public support for the group.                 ‘Bombing hurts the population, not
                                                     our capabilities’
The possible involvement of Shia militias
is also likely to be a contentious issue            ‘The Coalition destroys—we help
among Sunni communities in and around                rebuild’
Mosul. As one IHS team member                       ‘Air strikes alone will not defeat
asserted, use of these militias to help              us—the enemy has to face us on
take Mosul will “guarantee another round             the ground’
of atrocities, making enduring solutions
                                              Consistency and themes
impossible.”
                                                    Messaging is consistent between
This would also place Western powers,
                                                     official media units, fighters and
which have been backing the Iraqi
                                                     activists and reflects a shared
military with air strikes, in a much more
                                                     view of Sunni victimization.
difficult position and may lead to a
downturn in the tempo of strikes so as              ‘Coalition strategy doomed to fail’
not to be seen as offering air cover for            ‘Civilians are the targets—but the
Iraqi army and militia atrocities.                   State endures’

Sample Insight: Major IS Narratives                 Coordination among IS enemies
Relating to Coalition Air Strikes                    (Iran - US; Syria - US, for
                                                     example)
Religious narratives
                                                    ‘Faith defeats aggression’
         ‘Assembly of a Coalition proves
          the righteousness of our cause’
         ‘Righteous always targeted by the
          unjust’
         ‘Faith defeats arrogance and
          aggression’

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