The Resistible Rise of Vladimir Putin - Russia's Nightmare Dressed Like a Daydream
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Competing interest groups abound, but
The Resistible Rise there is no rival center of power. In late
October 2014, after a top aide to Russia’s
of Vladimir Putin president told the annual forum of the
Valdai Discussion Club, which brings
together Russian and foreign experts, that
Russia’s Nightmare Dressed Russians understand “if there is no Putin,
Like a Daydream there is no Russia,” the pundit Stanislav
Belkovsky observed that “the search
Stephen Kotkin for Russia’s national idea, which began
after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, is finally over. Now, it is evident
Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin that Russia’s national idea is Vladimir
BY FIONA HILL AND CLIF FORD G. Vladimirovich Putin.”
GADDY. Brookings Institution Press, Russia is classified as a high-income
2013, 400 pp. $29.95. economy by the World Bank (having a
per capita gdp exceeding $14,000). Its
Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? unemployment remains low (around five
BY KAREN DAWISHA. Simon & percent); until recently, consumer spend-
Schuster, 2014, 464 pp. $30.00. ing had been expanding at more than
five percent annually; life expectancy
Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and has been rising; and Internet penetration
Out of Love With Vladimir Putin exceeds that of some countries in the
BY BEN JUDAH. Yale University Press,
European Union. But Russia is now beset
2013, 400 pp. $22.00. by economic stagnation alongside high
inflation, its labor productivity remains
H
ow did twenty-first-century dismally low, and its once-vaunted school
Russia end up, yet again, in system has deteriorated alarmingly. And
personal rule? An advanced it is astonishingly corrupt. Not only the
industrial country of 142 million people, bullying central authorities in Moscow
it has no enduring political parties that but regional state bodies, too, have been
organize and respond to voter preferences. systematically criminalizing revenue
The military is sprawling yet tame; the streams, while giant swaths of territory
immense secret police are effectively in lack basic public services and local vigi-
one man’s pocket. The hydrocarbon sector lante groups proliferate. Across the
is a personal bank, and indeed much of country, officials who have purchased
the economy is increasingly treated as their positions for hefty sums team up
an individual fiefdom. Mass media move with organized crime syndicates and use
more or less in lockstep with the com- friendly prosecutors and judges to extort
mands of the presidential administration. and expropriate rivals. President Vladimir
Putin’s vaunted “stability,” in short, has
STEPHEN KOTKIN is Professor of History and turned into spoliation. But Putin has been
International Affairs at Princeton University and
the author of Stalin, vol. 1, Paradoxes of Power, in power for 15 years, and there is no end
1878–1928. in sight. Stalin ruled for some three
140 f o r e i g n a f fa i r sThe Resistible Rise of Vladimir Putin
decades; Brezhnev for almost two. Putin, hopeful scenario would require yet
still relatively young and healthy, looks another act of personal rule.
set to top the latter and might even outdo
the former. FROM LENINGRAD TO MOSCOW
In some ways, observers are still trying Putin was born in Soviet Leningrad in
to fathom how the revolt against tsarist 1952, the only surviving child of parents
autocracy in 1917—the widest mass who had lived through the Nazi siege of
revolution in history up to that point— the city a decade earlier. He grew up in a
culminated in a regime unaccountable to rough section of Peter the Great’s show-
itself, let alone to the masses. Now, after case, took up martial arts, graduated with
the mass mobilizations for democracy that a degree in law from Leningrad State
accompanied and followed the 1991 Soviet University, and begged his way into the
collapse, a new authoritarianism has taken kgb, eventually being posted to Dresden,
shape. Of course, Putin’s dictatorship East Germany, in 1985.
differs substantially from the Soviet In 1990, after the fall of the Berlin
communist version. Today’s Russia has Wall, the kgb recalled him to Leningrad
no single ideology and no disciplined and assigned him to his alma mater, where
ruling party, and although it lacks the rule his former law professor Anatoly Sobchak
of law, it does allow private property and still taught part time. Sobchak eventually
free movement across borders. Still, the became chair of the city council and then
country is back in a familiar place, a mayor, and Putin served as his top deputy,
one-man regime. responsible for difficult assignments,
The methods Putin used to fix the including feeding the city’s large popula-
corrupt, dysfunctional post-Soviet state tion during the years of post-Soviet
have produced yet another corrupt, dys- economic depression. He discovered that
functional state. Putin himself complains Leningrad’s self-styled democrats could
publicly that only about 20 percent of his get almost nothing done and that he could
decisions get implemented, with the rest embezzle money both to help address the
being ignored or circumvented unless he city’s challenges and to enrich himself and
intervenes forcefully with the interest his cronies. When Sobchak lost a bid for
groups and functionaries concerned. But reelection in 1996, Putin found himself
he cannot intervene directly with every unemployed at 43. But a year later, through
boss, governor, and official in the country connections (notably Alexei Kudrin,
on every issue. Many underlings invoke another official in the Sobchak mayoralty
Putin’s name and do what they want. who had become deputy chief of staff to
Personal systems of rule convey immense Russian President Boris Yeltsin), Putin
power on the ruler in select strategic moved to Moscow and obtained a series
areas—the secret police, control of cash of positions in the presidential adminis-
flow—but they are ultimately ineffective tration, the successor to the old Soviet
and self-defeating. central-party apparatus.
Russia just might be able to get out of There are indications that Putin might
this trap, in part because of the severity have coveted the lucrative, powerful ceo
of the various crises currently besetting job at Gazprom, Russia’s monopoly gas
Putin’s regime. But perversely, even that behemoth, but if so, it eluded him. Then,
March/April 2015 141year appointed him first acting prime
minister of the Russian Federation and
then acting president. So the simplest
answer to the question of how Putin came
to power is that he was selected.
Yeltsin’s inner circle, known as “
the Family”—in particular, Valentin
Yumashev (the ghostwriter of
Yeltsin’s autobiographies) and
Yumashev’s future wife,
Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana—
picked Putin over others
who failed their auditions. He
had shown a basic competence
in administration
and had demon-
strated loyalty
(having arranged in 1997 for Sobchak,
then under threat of arrest, to escape to
France without submitting to Russian
passport control). It was hoped that he
in July 1998, lightning struck: Yeltsin would protect the Family’s interests,
appointed the former lieutenant colonel and maybe those of Russia as well. Putin
above hundreds of higher-ranking secured victory in the March 2000
secret police officers to head the fsb, the presidential election through control of
successor to the kgb—and the following the country’s main television station,
142 f o r e i g n a f fa i r sThe Resistible Rise of Vladimir Putin
Channel One (thanks to Boris Berezovsky, patriotism, and the humbling of some
a secondary member of the Family); oligarchs. Some fear of authority was
ruthless manipulation of the Chechen necessary to tame the utter lawlessness
terrorist threat; and access to all the perks into which the country had sunk. Putin
of incumbency. Some fraud, too, cannot instilled that fear, thanks to his own
be excluded. In the reported results, history and persona and some highhanded
Putin received nearly 40 million votes, political theater, such as the arrest of
53 percent of those cast, a majority that Khodorkovsky, who was taken right off
enabled him to avoid a runoff. Second his private jet, which was shown again
place (29 percent) went to the Commu- and again on Russian tv. But Putin’s
nist Party candidate-bogeyman. Nine transformation into a dominant political
other candidates split the rest of the votes. figure required more than a widely shared
Interestingly, when Putin took office, appreciation that he was saving the
he had little effective power. His chief Russian state. It also took a surprise
of staff, Alexander Voloshin, was a core economic boom.
member of the Family and would remain From 1999 through 2008, Russia’s
in his commanding position for two more economy grew at a brisk seven percent
years. Berezovsky continued to control annually, thereby doubling its gdp in
Channel One, and the second most ruble terms. Real individual income
important station, privately owned growth was even brisker, increasing by
ntv, belonged to the independent actor two and a half times. In dollar terms,
Vladimir Gusinsky. The mammoth cash because of the ruble’s appreciation over
flow generated by the state gas monopoly time, the increase in gdp was exception-
had been largely privatized into the ally vivid: from a nadir of around $196
hands of a cabal led by Rem Vyakhirev billion in 1999 to around $2.1 trillion in
(a protégé of the former Soviet gas 2013. A new, grateful Russian middle class
minister, later the Russian prime minister, was born, some 30 million strong, able to
Viktor Chernomyrdin), and much of the travel and shop abroad easily. More
oil industry had been formally privatized, broadly, Russian society was transformed:
a lot of it into a huge new company, cell-phone penetration went from zero
Yukos, controlled by Mikhail Khodor- to 100 percent, unemployment dropped
kovsky. Russia’s then 89 regions were in from 12.9 percent to 6.3 percent, and the
the hands of governors who answered to poverty rate fell from 29 percent to 13
no one. Chechnya had de facto indepen- percent. Wages rose, pensions were doled
dence. The Russian state was floundering. out, and the immense national debt that
Bit by bit, however, using stealth and had been accumulated by previous leaders
dirty tricks, Putin reasserted central was paid off early. Foreign investors reaped
control over the levers of power within rich rewards, too, as Russia’s stock market
the country—the tv stations, the gas skyrocketed, increasing 20-fold.
industry, the oil industry, the regions. It Many analysts have attributed the
was a cunning feat of state rebuilding, Russian boom to luck, in the form of
aided by Putin’s healthy contrast to the plentiful fossil fuels. Yet although oil and
infirm Yeltsin, hyped fears of a Russian gas have generally brought in approxi-
state dissolution, well-crafted appeals to mately 50 percent of the Russian state’s
March/April 2015 143Stephen Kotkin
revenues, they have accounted for no and software, driven by increased domes-
more than 30 percent of the economy at tic demand and global outsourcing. Many
large—a high number, but significantly of the Soviet legacy industries, such as
lower than Middle East petrostate coal and steel, underwent significant
proportions. Even adding in all the rationalization, as unprofitable mines or
knock-on effects around hydrocarbons, plants were phased out. (Agriculture,
the most sophisticated analyses of Russian however, was never really revived, let
economic growth credit oil and gas with alone rationalized, and Russia became
at most 40 to 50 percent of gdp during dependent on food imports.)
the boom. An immense amount of other Skeptics take note: oil prices during
value was created during these years as Putin’s first presidential term, when
well, and Putin was partly responsible. growth was robust, averaged only around
As president, Putin delegated handling $35 a barrel; during Putin’s second term,
of the economy to Mikhail Kasyanov, the average grew to around $65 a barrel.
his prime minister; German Gref, the In recent years, with oil prices consis-
minister of economic development and tently at or above $100 a barrel, Russia’s
trade; and Kudrin, then the finance economy has stagnated.
minister, who introduced a raft of anti- China’s rise, the ruble’s devaluation,
inflationary and liberalizing measures and a pent-up wave of structural reforms
(Gazprom excepted). Tax cuts increased were critical to the Russian boom, but as
incentives to work and reduced incentives the man in charge, Putin took the lion’s
to hide income. Simplification of business share of the credit. His critics refuse to
licensing and reduced inspections led to acknowledge his contribution, and some
a burst of entrepreneurialism. Financial have improbably made him out to be a
reforms and sensible macroeconomic nonentity. In her 2012 biography, The
policy facilitated investment. And land Man Without a Face, for example, the
became a marketable commodity. Russian American journalist Masha
The impact of these pro-market Gessen offers the ultimate portrait of
reforms, which Putin supported and Putin as an accident. A well-written,
signed, was magnified by favorable trade impassioned compendium of facts,
winds. Russia had undergone a searing hearsay, and psychologizing about Putin’s
debt default and currency devaluation in life and career, Gessen’s book makes Putin
1998, and most commentators thought out to be a mere thug and self-dealer, a
the country would be devastated. But in murderer but ultimately a small man.
fact, the devaluation unintentionally made Yet accidents and nonentities do not
Russian exports cheaper and thus more stay in power this long.
competitive. At the same time, China’s Mr. Putin, by Fiona Hill and Clifford
ongoing rise lifted global prices for Gaddy, two Russia hands at the Brookings
Russian products, from fertilizer and Institution, offers less drama but more
chemicals to metals and cement. Insa- balance. It characterizes Putin as moving
tiable Chinese demand brought Soviet back and forth among six different
legacy industries back from the dead. personas: the Statist, the History Man
Brand-new sectors surged as well, such (celebrating tsarist Russian statesmen),
as retail, food processing, biotechnology, the Survivalist, the Outsider (not a
144 f o r e i g n a f fa i r sThe Resistible Rise of Vladimir Putin
Muscovite, not an apparatchik, not even of Rosoboronexport, Yuri Kovalchuk of
a typical kgb officer), the Free Marketeer Bank Rossiya, Matthias Warnig of Nord
(actually, crony capitalist), and the Case Stream pipeline, and many more. Al-
Officer (who wins people’s confidence though a few of these individuals rose to
through manipulation, bribery, and power during the last decade and a half,
blackmail). It is a nicely rounded portrait. most got to know Putin early, during his
It is not, however, an intimate one. St. Petersburg years. (Warnig’s relation-
Refreshingly, Hill and Gaddy refrain ship with Putin dates back to Dresden.)
from imputing motives to Putin. They Dawisha details how they all got filthy
have met with him briefly in a large group rich thanks to the noncompetitive privati-
but rely mostly on many of the same few zation of state assets, no-bid government
voices that are quoted in Gessen’s book, contracts, dubious loans, fake bankruptcies,
as well as in foundational biographies by phantom middleman firms, tax “refunds,”
Oleg Blotsky and Alexander Rahr, and patriotic megaprojects (such as the Olym-
on a published interview with the former pics), and other favors. She maintains that
Kremlin insider Gleb Pavlovsky. In their Putin, too, is a thief, and, calling attention
best chapters, Hill and Gaddy delineate to the $700,000 worth of watches publicly
the self-defeating cross-purposes among spotted on his wrist, she repeats guessti-
the six Putin personas, along with Putin’s mates that put his personal wealth at
limitations when it comes to public $40 billion.
politics. They rebut the prevalent Ameri- A political scientist at Miami Uni-
can narrative about a tragic Putin betrayal versity in Ohio, Dawisha has, for the
of a Yeltsin-era trajectory toward democ- most part, not uncovered new informa-
racy, bending over backward to make tion but assembled in one place nuggets
understandable the alternative Russian from the diplomatic cables published
narrative of a Putin-led rescue from a by WikiLeaks, investigative reportage,
1990s “time of troubles.” But they do old Stasi files, comments made by an
not advance their own explicit, systematic important Russian defector, and other
explanation for how it was possible, in sources, all of which she has posted
such a vast country, to establish what they online. Her prose is workmanlike, and
dub a “one-boy network” political system. not all the disparate materials fit easily
into her simple storyline.
FOLLOW THE MONEY Particularly striking is the fact that
Western sanctions levied against Russia most of the book is devoted to the
over its actions in Ukraine have targeted period before Putin first became president.
not economic sectors but individuals. Dawisha reminds us that the kgb’s role
Putin’s Kleptocracy, by Karen Dawisha, in private business began even before the
shows why such an approach makes sense. Soviet collapse, and she argues that these
It offers a comprehensive catalog of are the roots of Putin’s kleptocracy—
Putin’s cronies: Arkady and Boris Roten- challenging the conventional wisdom in
berg of gas pipeline construction fame, which the 2003 arrest of Khodorkovsky
Gennady Timchenko of the Gunvor and the confiscation of his private oil
Group, Igor Sechin of Rosneft, Alexey giant, Yukos, marked a key turning point.
Miller of Gazprom, Sergey Chemezov “Like other scholars of Russia, I have
March/April 2015 145Stephen Kotkin
spent a significant portion of my career happened to them? She concedes that
thinking and writing about how the under Putin, “not everything went as
post-Communist states might make planned,” but her telling of the story
a transition toward democracy,” she makes it seem otherwise. This misses
confesses, but says that eventually she the fact that Putin and his cronies, as
got wise, concluding that Russia was well as his mass base, were largely losers
not “an inchoate democratic system under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Notwith-
being pulled down by history, accidental standing its private-sector and offshore
autocrats, popular inertia, bureaucratic machinations, the former kgb was initially
incompetence, or poor Western advice.” cut out of the really big money in oil,
Rather, “from the beginning Putin and gas, metals, diamonds, and gold. A
his circle sought to create an authoritar- strong continuity argument obscures
ian regime ruled by a close-knit cabal the shifts and contingencies that have
with embedded interests, plans, and occurred, as well as the progressive
capabilities, who used democracy for radicalization in the kleptocracy that
decoration rather than direction.” Putin’s has taken place over time—not only
nasty tendencies, in other words, cannot after 2003 but even over the last two
be blamed on external factors, such as years. Dawisha also overlooks any
nato expansion. dynamic beyond Putin. Property is
Questions about her analysis can be continually being expropriated by
raised. Dawisha never really clarifies, for regime loyalists because that is a major
example, the extent to which sincerely way they mark their relative status in the
held beliefs bind the Putin kleptocrats pecking order—and how they survive,
(as they did, say, the old Brezhnev clique, warding off attacks from others by
who also were said to be a bunch of going on offensive raids themselves.
cynics). She quotes Nikolay Leonov, the Dawisha’s portrait of Putin’s supposed
former head of analysis for the kgb, as primordial will to enrichment leads her to
saying of Putin and his kgb associates dismiss not just his first-term structural
back in 2001, “They are patriots and reforms and the vision behind them but
proponents of a strong state grounded also the four-year presidential term of
in centuries-old tradition. History his junior crony, Dmitry Medvedev—an
recruited them to carry out a special episode that followed Putin’s decision to
operation for the resurrection of our great respect, at least formally, the constitutional
power, because there has to be balance in limit of two consecutive presidential
the world, and without a strong Russia terms. The dismissal may be understand-
the geopolitical turbulence will begin.” able: Medvedev was (and is) derisively
So is the enrichment an end in itself or known as “the Teddy Bear” (Medvezhonok).
a means to an end? He was picked for a reason. And yet
Most fundamentally, Dawisha’s throughout his tenure, Medvedev was
assertions about near-total intentionality— urged by his own entourage and various
kleptocracy by “intelligent design”— powerful interest groups to dismiss Putin
strain credulity. Russia has known lots from the prime ministership.
of designs, including those of Mikhail One can debate the seriousness of the
Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and what Medvedev-approved investigation of the
146 f o r e i g n a f fa i r sThe Resistible Rise of Vladimir Putin
Kremlin’s own Khodorkovsky prosecution, 1990s had been a criminal, dangerous
the pressure campaign against Sechin and time. I hoped for something different.”
other Putin cronies serving on the boards The something different turned out to
of private companies, the timid moves be a personal dictatorship.
toward economic diversification and Judah has actually written two books.
redemocratization, and the improved One is about what he calls Putin’s “tele-
relations with the United States. One populism,” in which he discusses the
could even implausibly assume that all Kremlin’s spin doctors and puppeteers,
of that was brilliant manipulation by such as Vladislav Surkov, and how the
remarkably clever and effective puppet George W. Bush administration’s aggres-
masters in order to fool the Russian sions and transgressions proved to be
people and the West. But the fact remains a gift to their manipulations. But the
that Medvedev had full authority to concept of the Putin regime as a
dismiss Putin, to deny him access to state “videocracy” dead ends, because, as
resources in a campaign, and to declare Judah himself demonstrates, the propa-
his own intention to run for reelection. ganda is not always so effective and
That the Teddy Bear did not make a Putinism is more than mere show; it is
move does not mean he couldn’t have. a society. Judah details how Russian
state spending on security, law, and
EMPEROR WITHOUT CLOTHES order went from $2.8 billion in 2000 to
In Fragile Empire, the journalist Ben Judah $36.5 billion by 2010. More than 40
sees Putin’s return to the presidency for a percent of the new middle class works
third term as a severe blow to the regime. for the state, and therefore they are not
His punchy book can be flip, but he talked independent people. The regime’s social
to so many people, and lets their voices base, in other words, is itself.
be heard, that his own snark and con- The other book is a vivid portrait of
tempt are somewhat offset. “You see this Moscow as an oppressive colonial power
man had good qualities, too,” Alexander in its own lands. Judah travels out to
Belyaev, the former head of the St. remote locales and finds the little Putins,
Petersburg city assembly, tells him of the feudal lords presiding over near
Putin. “He was an expert at making statelessness and profound despair. He
friends, of being loyal to those friends. makes it to desolate Tuva, once part of
He is a brilliant observer of human Mongolia, in southern Siberia, where
nature, and he is very good at tactics.” Putin is said to have posed topless for
Similarly, Sergei Kolesnikov, a member the cameras on a faux hunting expedition.
of Putin’s St. Petersburg clique who had “Putin?” a villager from Erjei says to the
been helping finance a palace for Putin author. “He never did anything good for
in the south before choosing to expose the country. He just took all the money
his corruption and then going into exile from oil and gas production and took it
in Estonia, tells Judah, “I was surprised for himself and his mates. . . . Why the
when Putin became president. Of course hell would we support Putin?” Judah also
I was surprised, everyone was surprised. travels to Birobidzhan, the improbable
At first I really wanted to support him Soviet Jewish homeland on the border
and help him in any way I could. The with China, and finds no sign of a feared
March/April 2015 147Stephen Kotkin
Chinese demographic invasion. “Are you was the only part of the economy where
worried that in the future the land will to be a player and to be a winner you
not be Russian and will be controlled needed no political connections, no
by China? That there will be no more United Russia membership card, and
motherland here?” he asks mushroom no visits to the Kremlin.” All that has
sellers in a Russian area leased to Chinese been changing, however, since the
farmers who grow soybeans. “Who gives book was written.
a fuck about the motherland,” the mush- Judah rips into the Internet-savvy
room sellers answer. “There is no fucking opposition to Putin for being out of touch
motherland.” with the common people. He describes
How representative such interviews Alexei Navalny, the blogger who rose to
are remains unclear. Judah apparently fame as a critic of corruption, as a xeno-
spent little time in Russia’s many bustling phobe and a “pure product of Putinism.”
provincial cities, such as Yekaterinburg, Judah heaps disdain on the tens of
Novosibirsk, or Lipetsk, which are clearly thousands of Muscovites who risked
better off today than they were even just going out into the streets in 2011–12 to
a few years ago. His reporting is designed protest the regime, calling them “the
not to offer a full picture of Russia but to demographic in Russia . . . most accus-
show how the lawlessness Putin sought tomed to skiing in France” and asserting
to fix is worse than ever. He finds the that “the protests failed because Moscow
predominantly Muslim North Caucasus, is not Russia.” (Protests occurred in many
a place where Putin pays colossal tribute cities.) His condescension descends into
for a sheen of loyalty, nearly fully de- incoherence when he writes of Pussy
Russified. Whereas previously it was Riot, the punk band that carried out an
the Chechens who wanted out of Russia, ill-fated performance act in an Orthodox
Judah writes, now many Russians would church, that they “captured the vanity
not mind seeing Chechnya go, since they and, ironically, the unpolitical nature of
detest the massive budget transfers to the radical art scene. They were interested
the region ($30 billion for nine million in protest, not politics.” Readers are
inhabitants between 2000 and 2010). likely to find this an often engaging
Judah has some smart things to say book marred by an excess of attitude.
about the Russian Internet, pointing out Still, Judah offers one of the best
that “unlike in other Eastern European accounts of how Putin built his personal
countries, the platforms that hosted it regime out of the mundane process of
were largely indigenous because of the addressing the pathologies of the Russian
Cyrillic script, allowing it to become a state he inherited. To clean things up,
‘pole’ in the emerging online world, an undertaking for which Putin had
like China, which also uses home-grown wide support, he had to acquire ever
platforms.” Russian equivalents for more power. All the while, a bogeyman
Google and Facebook, moreover, have served him well—not a return to com-
operated largely beyond the suffocating munism, Yeltsin’s scarecrow, but the
regime. “The Internet grew in Russia chaos of Yeltsinism. “The power to
in a kind of utopia—where there was no control the Russian nightmare of total
state,” one interviewee tells Judah. “This collapse brought [Putin] to power
148 f o r e i g n a f fa i r sThe Resistible Rise of Vladimir Putin
and has kept him in power,” Judah change in Russia had always failed
succinctly summarizes. because they had not altered the country’s
But none of this unfolded automati- underlying system of norms, which rested
cally; the construction of such a regime on a deeply ingrained preference for
required certain skills and real work. informal rules. “Modernization reinforced
Putin seized an opportunity provided by archaism,” Hedlund grimly concluded,
historical contingencies, and he proved quoting the historian Geoffrey Hosking;
up to the task. He made himself indis- “increasing state control meant entrench-
pensable to all factions and interests, their ing personal caprice.”
guarantor—or not—in a system in which Hedlund’s attention to values yielded
uncertainty besets even the richest and exceptional insight, but he overempha-
most powerful. He shamelessly mon- sized the institutional continuities sup-
etized his political position, but he also posedly at work from ancient Muscovy
turned out to be dedicated to the cause onward and underplayed the power of
of Russian statehood, in his own kgb way. Russia’s relations with the outside world.
Certain kinds of leaders do seem to fit Not just a preference for informal rules
certain moments in a country’s history. but also Russia’s quest for great-power
Putin only looks like an accident. And it status, and especially its perennial diffi-
is precisely because he is not a nonentity culties competing with stronger powers,
that he has been a calamity. has produced both the collapses and
the trying aftermaths, during which an
THE LONELY POWER imperative to revive national greatness
Remarkably, this pattern keeps repeating comes to the fore. “Russia was and will
itself in Russia. About a decade ago, remain a great power,” announced Putin’s
Stefan Hedlund, an expert on Russia at original presidential manifesto, posted
Uppsala University, in Sweden, wrote online in late 1999. “Russia is in the
an impressive overview of 12 centuries middle of one of the most difficult
of Eastern Slavic history in an attempt periods in its history. For the first time
to explain Putin’s authoritarianism. He in the past 200–300 years, it is facing
pointed out that Russia had essentially a real threat of sliding into the second,
collapsed three times—in 1610–13, possibly even the third, echelon of
1917–18, and 1991—and that each time, states.” In response, he offered an abiding
the country was revived fundamentally vision of Russia as a providential power,
unchanged. Despite the depth of the with a special mission and distinct
crises and the stated intentions of would- identity. Exceptionalism has been the
be transformative leaders, Russia handmaiden of personalism.
reemerged with an unaccountable govern- Putin resembles a villain out of
ment, repression, and resistance to the central casting. He has repeatedly
imposition of the rule of law. Hedlund’s revealed himself as cocksure, patroniz-
impressive tome was titled Russian Path ing, aggrieved, vindictive, and quick
Dependence, but rather than complete with a retort for Western critics. But he
determinism, he perceived choices—albeit is hardly the first Russian leader to make
choices heavily conditioned by culture. demonization of the West a foundation of
He noted that efforts at institutional Russia’s core identity and its government’s
March/April 2015 149Stephen Kotkin claim to legitimacy. Moreover, today’s continue to possess the advanced Russia is significantly more ethnically technology Russia needs, especially in homogeneous and nationalist than was energy exploration and drilling. Over the old Soviet Union, and Putin has the long term, realizing the ambitions perfected the art of moistening the eyes Putin and his supporters have articu- of Russian elites assembled in opulent lated would require new and deeper tsarist settings, plucking the strings of structural reforms, a dramatic cutback mystical pride in all things Russian and in bureaucracy and state procurement of ressentiment at all things Western. shenanigans, and the creation of an They see reason where critics see mad- environment supportive of entrepre- ness. From the Kremlin’s perspective, as neurialism and investment. Medvedev Washington engages in stupid, hypo- made gestures in such a direction, but critical, and destabilizing global behavior, Putin has ridiculed those, choosing the Moscow shoulders the burden of serving path of least resistance in the short as a counterweight, thereby bringing term and thus risking possible long- sanity and balance to the international term stagnation or worse. A revival of system. Russian lying, cheating, and Russia’s latent Soviet-era industrial hypocrisy thus serve a higher purpose. capacity was a trick that could happen Cybercrime is patriotism; rigging only once. elections and demobilizing opposition Emotive nationalism and social are sacred duties. Putin’s machismo conservatism have long been present in posturing, additionally, is undergirded post-Soviet Russia, but they have intensi- by a view of Russia as a country of real fied in state propaganda since 2012. This men opposing a pampered, gutless, and was due partly to the outbreak of street decadent West. Resentment toward U.S. protests in the winter of 2011–12 chal- power resonates far beyond Russia, and lenging Putin’s announcement that he with his ramped-up social conservatism, would return to the presidency. But more Putin has expanded a perennial sense of fundamentally, it was also because the Russian exceptionalism to include an other possible way forward—a second alternative social model as well. round of structural reform—would have Paradoxically, however, all of this has been incredibly hard to carry out, not only helped render Russia what the least because it might have threatened to analyst Lilia Shevtsova has aptly called a undermine the current elite’s suffocating “lonely power.” Putin’s predatory politics grasp on power. As it happened, the mass at home and abroad, his cozying up to Ukrainian uprising against misrule that right-wing extremists in Europe, and began in late 2013 and culminated in his attempted engagement of a powerful President Viktor Yanukovych’s cowardly China hardly add up to an effective abandonment of Kiev in February 2014 Russian grand strategy. Russia has no reconfirmed the long-standing Kremlin actual allies and has damaged its most line of a scheming West committed to important relationship, that with Ger- encircling and overthrowing the regime many. Winning domestic plaudits at in Russia. Putin’s seizure of the southern Western powers’ expense is politically Ukrainian region of Crimea, in turn, useful, but those countries, as always, strongly reinforced the trend in the 150 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
The Resistible Rise of Vladimir Putin
Kremlin away from facing the tough the population. So what happens now,
policy choices that would actually bolster especially given that the Russian leader
Russia’s great-power status. has managed to trap himself in the latest
Given the West’s imposition of and largest of his so-called frozen con-
sanctions and dropping world oil prices, flicts, enraging the West and setting
it might be tempting to write Putin off. himself on a path toward isolation and
Authoritarian regimes often prove to be creeping autarky?
at once all-powerful and strikingly brittle,
and Judah, for one, sees Putin’s rule as A WAY OUT?
almost on its last legs. And yet, despite Neither Putin nor his Western counter-
the Russian population’s seething anger parts planned to get embroiled in a
over its predatory state and educated prolonged standoff over Ukraine. Russia’s
urbanites’ despondency over the absence seizure of Crimea and support for sepa-
of a modernizing vision for the future, ratist rebels in eastern Ukraine violated
much of the elite retains a strong sense of international law and, following the
mission and resolve. Dawisha concludes downing of a civilian airliner (almost
that “Putin will not go gentle into the certainly by Russian-assisted rebels),
night,” and she is probably correct. Judah provoked the imposition of significant
underestimates the ways this new kind Western sanctions. But the crisis is not
of flexible authoritarianism has found to simply about Russian aggression, nor
adapt to often self-created challenges, and can it be solved simply by trying to force
his book is bereft of any discussion of Moscow to retreat to the status quo ante.
foreign policy, a vital instrument in the Even an unlikely retreat, moreover, would
tool kit of authoritarianism. not necessarily last.
Putin’s Russia possesses powerful Ukraine is a debilitated state, created
resources as a potential international under Soviet auspices, hampered by a
spoiler, including the ability to apply difficult Soviet inheritance, and hollowed
economic pressure, buy off or co-opt out by its own predatory elites during two
powerful foreign interests, engage in decades of misrule. But it is also a nation
covert operations, wage cyberattacks, that is too big and independent for Russia
and deploy a modernizing military force to swallow up. Russia, meanwhile, is a
that is by far the strongest in the region. damaged yet still formidable great power
Ironically, Russia’s greatest source of whose rulers cannot be intimidated into
leverage might be the fact that the West, allowing Ukraine to enter the Western
especially Europe, needs its neighbor’s orbit. Hence the standoff. No external
integration into the international order. power or aid package can solve Ukraine’s
Managing such integration would be a problems or compensate for its inherent
lot less difficult if Putin were just a thief, vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Russia. Nor would
à la Dawisha, or a cynic, à la Judah. But sending lethal weaponry to Ukraine’s
he is actually a composite, à la Hill and brave but ragtag volunteer fighters and
Gaddy—a thief and a cynic with deeply corrupt state structures improve the
held convictions about the special quali- situation; in fact, it would send it spiraling
ties and mission of the Russian state, further downward, by failing to balance
views that enjoy wide resonance among Russian predominance while giving
March/April 2015 151Stephen Kotkin
Moscow a pretext to escalate the conflict Nagorno-Karabakh, part of Azerbaijan;
even more. Rather, the way forward must Transnistria, a sliver of Moldova;
begin with a recognition of some banal Abkhazia and South Ossetia, disputed
facts and some difficult bargaining. units of Georgia; and now Donetsk and
Russia’s seizure of Crimea and inter- Luhansk, parts of Ukraine—each entails
vention in eastern Ukraine do not chal- a story of Stalinist border-making.
lenge the entire post-1945 international The European Union cannot resolve
order. The forward positions the Soviet this latest standoff, nor can the United
Union occupied in the heart of Europe Nations. The United States has indeed
as a result of defeating Nazi Germany put together “coalitions of the willing”
were voluntarily relinquished in the to legitimize some of its recent interven-
early 1990s, and they are not going to tions, but it is not going to go to war over
be reoccupied. But nor should every Ukraine or start bombing Russia, and
detail of the post–Cold War settlement the wherewithal and will for indefinite
worked out in 1989–91 be considered sanctions against Russia are lacking.
eternal and inviolate. That settlement Distasteful as it might sound, Wash-
emerged during an anomalous time. ington faces the prospect of trying
Russia was flat on its back but would to work out some negotiated larger
not remain prostrate forever, and when territorial settlement.
it recovered, some sort of pushback was Such negotiations would have to
to be expected. acknowledge that Russia is a great power
Something similar happened follow- with leverage, but they would not need
ing the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, to involve the formal acceptance of some
many of the provisions of which were special Russian sphere of interest in its
not enforced. Even if France, the United so-called near abroad. The chief goals
Kingdom, and the United States had would be, first, to exchange international
been willing and able to enforce the recognition of Russia’s annexation of
peace, their efforts would not have Crimea for an end to all the frozen
worked, because the treaty had been conflicts in which Russia is an accom-
imposed during a temporary anomaly, plice and, second, to disincentivize such
the simultaneous collapse of German behavior in the future. Russia should
and Russian power, and would inevita- have to pay monetary compensation for
bly have been challenged when that Crimea. There could be some federal
power returned. solutions, referendums, even land swaps
Territorial revisionism ensued after and population transfers (which in many
World War II as well, of course, and cases have already taken place). Sanc-
continued sporadically for decades. Since tions on Russia would remain in place
1991, there have been some negotiated until a settlement was mutually agreed
revisions: Hong Kong and Macao under- on, and new sanctions could be levied if
went peaceful reabsorption into China. Russia were to reject negotiations or
Yugoslavia was broken up in violence and were deemed to be conducting them in
war, leading to the independence of its bad faith. Recognition of the new status
six federal units and eventually Kosovo, of Crimea would occur in stages, over
as well. Unrecognized statelets such as an extended period.
152 f o r e i g n a f fa i r sThe Resistible Rise of Vladimir Putin
It would be a huge challenge to devise nor the two in conjunction have altered
incentives that were politically plausible Russia’s behavior, diminished its potential
in the West while at the same time as a spoiler, or afforded Ukraine a chance
powerful enough for Russia to agree to a to recover.
just settlement—and for Ukraine to be Whether they acknowledge it or not,
willing to take part. But the search for a Western opponents of a negotiated
settlement would be an opportunity as settlement are really opting for another
well as a headache. long-term, open-ended attempt to contain
Nato expansion can be judged to have Russia and hope for regime change—a
been a strategic error—not because it policy likely to last until the end of Putin’s
angered Russia but because it weakened life and possibly well beyond. The costs
nato as a military alliance. Russia’s elites of such an approach are likely to be quite
would likely have become revanchist even high, and other global issues will continue
without nato’s advance, because they to demand attention and resources. And
believe, nearly universally, that the United all the while, Ukraine would effectively
States took advantage of Russia in 1991 remain crippled, Europe’s economy would
and has denied the country its rightful suffer, and Russia would grow ever more
place as an equal in international diplo- embittered and difficult to handle. All of
macy ever since. But nato expansion’s that might occur no matter what. But if
critics have not offered much in the way negotiations hold out a chance of some-
of practicable alternatives. Would it really how averting such an outcome, they are
have been appropriate, for example, to worth a try. And the attempt would hold
deny the requests of all the countries east few costs, because failed negotiations
of Germany to join the alliance? would only solidify the case for contain-
Then as now, the only real alternative ment in Europe and in the United States.
was the creation of an entirely new It is ultimately up to Russia’s leaders
trans-European security architecture, to take meaningful steps to integrate
one that fully transcended its Cold War their country into the existing world
counterpart. This was an oft-expressed order, one that they can vex but not fully
Russian wish, but in the early 1990s, overturn. To the extent that the Ukraine
there was neither the imagination nor the debacle has brought this reality into
incentives in Washington for such a heavy sharper focus, it might actually have
lift. Whether there is such capacity in been useful in helping Putin to see
Washington today remains to be seen. some light, and the same goes for the
But even if comprehensive new security collapse of oil prices and the accompa-
arrangements are unlikely anytime soon, nying unavoidable devaluation of the
Washington could still undertake much ruble. After the nadir of 1998, smart
useful groundwork. policy choices in Moscow, together with
Critics might object on the grounds some lucky outside breaks, helped
that the sanctions are actually biting, Russia transform a crisis into a break-
reinforced by the oil price free fall—so through, with real and impressive steps
why offer even minimal concessions to forward. That history could replay
Putin now? The answer is because neither itself—but whether it will remains the
the sanctions, nor the oil price collapse, prerogative of one person alone.∂
March/April 2015 153You can also read
