HSC Background Guide Historical Security Council - NHSMUN
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NEW YO S MU N
RK NH
202 0
HSC
Historical Security Council
Background Guide
Email: info@imuna.org
Phone: +1 (212) 652-9992
Web: www.nhsmun.org
Secretary-General Dear Delegates,
Vijittra Puckdee
I am so excited to present the Background Guide for the Historical Security Council (HSC) at
Director-General
NHSMUN 2020! My name is Kathy Li and I have the pleasure of serving as your Director of the
Althea Turley
HSC for Session I. Along with my co-Director, Breck, we hope this Background Guide will be a
Chiefs of Staff valuable tool in helping you kick off your research process.
Alex Burr
Walker Heintz This will be my second year on staff and my third year at NHSMUN. I previously served as the
Assistant Director for the HSC at NHSMUN 2019 and attended NHSMUN 2018 as a delegate in
Delegate Experience
Luis González the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Having been so impressed by the quality of debate,
Merve Karakas the caliber of the resolutions, and the exciting dynamic of the HSC last year, I am excited to be a
part of this committee once again. I am currently a sophomore at New York University, where I
Domestic Partnerships
am completing the liberal studies core program. I ultimately intend to pursue a major in politics and
Maura Goss
Odion Ovbiagele minors in economics and journalism. On campus, I am a member of NYU’s MUN club and travel
team, where I have the opportunity to continue the passion I developed for MUN in high school.
Global Partnerships
In my free time, I love exploring the exquisite food, culture, and art that New York City has to offer.
Renata Koch
Salmaan Rashiq The HSC is an incredibly dynamic committee. Delegates have the opportunity to engage in a Se-
Internal Affairs curity Council committee through a historical lens, providing the opportunity to revisit and rewrite
Lia Lee history. Breck and I selected topics that carried significant weight in terms of their complexity, their
Natalie O’Dell relevance to the Security Council mandate, and their importance to the rest of the international
Under-Secretaries- community. Our committee falls in 1986, where we will be discussing “The Iran-Iraq War” and
General “The Situation in South Africa.” These are two topics that had great significance on the world stage;
Michael Beeli they undoubtedly helped shape the future of international affairs and geopolitics. In this com-
Jill Bendlak mittee, with the benefit of hindsight, Breck and I are excited to see nuanced debate on important
Rose Blackwell regional, social, and political aspects of these topics. Moreover, we anticipate how delegates will
Annica Denktas come into their roles as representatives of the 1986 Security Council in addressing the pertinence
Rahul Francis
of these topics.
Omar Mufti
Jonathan Packer As delegates begin their research processes and their preparations for NHSMUN 2020, Breck and
Akanksha Sancheti I will make ourselves as available as possible to any questions or concerns that you may have. We
John Wood
recognize that these are large topics to unpack, so we are more than happy to keep the conversation
Alisa Wong
going via email. Best of luck in your preparations for NHSMUN 2020, and we are so excited to
meet all of you in March!
Kathy Li
kathy.li@imuna.org
Historical Security Council
Session I
Email: info@imuna.org
Phone: +1 (212) 652-9992
Web: www.nhsmun.org
Secretary-General Dear Delegates,
Vijittra Puckdee
Welcome to my absolute favorite committee-- the Historical Security Council! My name is Breck
Director-General
Bowen, and I have the profound honor of being the Session II Director of this illustrious com-
Althea Turley
mittee. My previous experience serving as the Assistant Director for the Council of the European
Chiefs of Staff Union during NHSMUN 2019 showed me why this conference is so revered, and I am ecstatic to
Alex Burr return and experience it all again. I truly mean it when I say I, along with my Co-Director, Kathy,
Walker Heintz are beyond thrilled to present the background guide for NHSMUN 2020’s HSC simulation!
Delegate Experience
Luis González While I let the sheer excitement of that announcement sink in, allow me to introduce myself. I am
Merve Karakas currently a sophomore at Auburn University, where I am pursuing a major in architecture and a
minor in sustainability studies. Just like my parents, you might be wondering what those disciplines
Domestic Partnerships
have to do with Model UN, but the answer is actually quite a lot. Sustainability and the built en-
Maura Goss
Odion Ovbiagele vironment have intricate roots in the hemispheres of social justice, economics, and politics. They
inform our daily sense of safety and stability, and they make up the setting upon which millions of
Global Partnerships
people carry out their lives. I believe that the way to best reorient our world as a more equitable,
Renata Koch
sustainable society is through diplomacy and legislation, and NHSMUN provides the perfect op-
Salmaan Rashiq
portunity to hone those skills.
Internal Affairs
Lia Lee Now that we have been properly introduced, we can get back to the matter at hand. If you are not
Natalie O’Dell yet familiar with the HSC, it is truly a special committee that combines many of the most valuable
Under-Secretaries- elements of MUN. By revisiting some of the most contentious political conflicts to confront the
General international community, you as delegates have the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of
Michael Beeli the events that defined the modern political climate. In addition, this grants you the ability to apply
Jill Bendlak contemporary strategy and theory in order to essentially rewrite history, survey its outcome, and
Rose Blackwell exercise your vision as leaders. It was with these factors in mind that we chose the topics for this
Annica Denktas session: “The Iran-Iraq War” and “The Situation in South Africa,” which both fall in the tumul-
Rahul Francis
tuous year of 1986. These topics reside in our recent past, and we hope that understanding their
Omar Mufti
nuances will help illuminate both modern geopolitical relations and the nature of politics itself. We
Jonathan Packer
Akanksha Sancheti look forward to hearing delegates’ well-researched and expansive debate as representatives of the
John Wood 1986 Security Council and all the fresh and creative ideas that they will bring to the table.
Alisa Wong
It is our sincere hope that the investment we have in this committee will be evident throughout our
research in this background guide and that it may serve as a valuable tool to kickstart your very own
research. However, as delegates embark on their preparation process for NHSMUN 2020, Kathy
and I would also like to extend ourselves as a resource. Should delegates have any questions or con-
cerns about this complex subject matter, please do not hesitate to reach out via email. I wish you all
the best in your preparation and cannot wait to see all your smiling, intellectual faces come March!
Breck Bowen
breck.bowen@imuna.org
Historical Security Council
Session II
HSC 4| Table of Contents Table of Contents Background Guide 1 A Note on the NHSMUN Difference 5 A Note on Research and Preparation 7 Committee History 8 Simulation9 The Iran-Iraq War, 1986 10 Introduction11 History and Description of the Issue 12 Current Status 26 Bloc Analysis 30 Committee Mission 33 The Situation in South Africa, 1986 35 Introduction36 History and Description of the Issue 37 Current Status 47 Bloc Positions 50 Committee Mission 51 Research and Preparation Questions 54 Important Documents 55 Works Cited 57
HSC
A Note on the NHSMUN Difference |5
A Note on the NHSMUN Difference
Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,
Welcome to NHSMUN 2020! My name is Althea Turley and I am this year’s Director-General. Thank you for choosing to attend
NHSMUN, the world’s largest Model United Nations conference for secondary school students. We are thrilled to welcome you
to New York City in March!
As a space for collaboration, consensus, and compromise, NHSMUN strives to help transform today’s brightest thinkers into
tomorrow’s leaders. Our organization provides a uniquely tailored experience for all in attendance through innovative and acces-
sible programming. We believe that an emphasis on education through simulation is paramount to the Model UN experience and this
idea permeates throughout NHSMUN.
Debate founded on strong knowledge: With knowledgeable staff members and delegates from over 70 countries, NHSMUN
can facilitate an enriching experience reliant on substantively rigorous debate. To ensure this high quality of debate, our staff
members produce extremely detailed and comprehensive topic overviews (like the one below) to prepare delegates for the com-
plexities and nuances inherent in global issues. This process takes over six months, during which the Directors who lead our
committees develop their topics with the valuable input of expert contributors. Because these topics are always changing and
evolving, NHSMUN also produces update papers that are intended to bridge the gap of time between when the background
guides are published and when committee starts in March. As such, this guide is designed to be a launching point from which
delegates should delve further into their topics.
Extremely prepared and engaged staff: The detailed knowledge that our directors provide in this background guide through
diligent research is aimed at spurring critical thought within delegates at NHSMUN. Prior to the conference, our Directors and
Assistant Directors are trained rigorously through copious hours of both virtual and in-person exercises and workshops in an
effort to provide the best conference experience possible. Beyond this, our Directors and Assistant Directors read every posi-
tion paper submitted to NHSMUN and provide thoughtful insight on those submitted by the feedback deadline. Our staff aims
not only to tailor the committee experience to delegates’ reflections and research but also to facilitate an environment where all
delegates’ thoughts can be heard.
Emphasis on participation: The UN relies on the voices of all of its Member States to create resolutions most likely to make a
dramatic impact on the world. That is our philosophy at NHSMUN too. We believe that in order to properly delve into an issue
and produce fruitful debate, it is crucial to focus the entire energy and attention of the room on the topic at hand. Our Rules
of Procedure and our staff are focused on making every voice in the committee heard, regardless of each delegate’s country as-
signment or skill level. However, unlike many other conferences, we also emphasize delegate participation after the conference.
MUN delegates are well researched and aware of the UN’s priorities and they can serve as the vanguard for action on the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs). Therefore, we are proud to also connect students with other action-oriented organizations at
the conference to encourage further work on the topics.
Focused committee time: NHSMUN prohibits the use of any electronic devices during committee sessions. We feel strongly that
face-to-face interpersonal connections during debate are critical to producing superior committee experiences and allow for the
free flow of ideas. Ensuring a no-technology policy is also a way to guarantee that every delegate has an equal opportunity to
succeed in committee. We staff a very dedicated team in our office who type up and format draft resolutions and working papers
so that committee time can be focused on communication and collaboration. Please note that the dais is permitted a laptop to
communicate with members of Senior Staff and for other administrative needs.
HSC 6| A Note on the NHSMUN Difference Educational emphasis, even for awards: At the heart of NHSMUN lies education and compromise. As such, when NHSMUN does distribute awards, we de-emphasize their importance in comparison to the educational value of Model UN as an activity. NHSMUN seeks to reward schools whose students excel in the arts of compromise and diplomacy. More importantly, we seek to develop an environment in which delegates can employ their critical thought processes and share ideas with their counterparts from around the world. We always prioritize a dedication to teamwork and encourage our delegates to engage with others in a diplomatic and inclusive manner. In particular, our daises look for and promote constructive leadership that strives towards consensus, as delegates do in the United Nations. Realism and accuracy: Although a perfect simulation of the UN is never possible, we believe that one of the core educational responsibilities of MUN conferences is to educate students about how the UN System works. Each NHSMUN committee is a simulation of a real deliberative body so that delegates can research what their country has actually said in the committee. Our topics are chosen from the issues currently on the agenda of that committee (except historical committees, which take topics from the appropriate time period). This creates incredible opportunities for our delegates to do first-hand research by reading the actual statements their country has made and the resolutions they have supported We also incorporate real UN and NGO experts into each committee through our committee speakers program and arrange for meetings between students and the actual UN Permanent Mission of the country they are representing. No other conference goes so far to deeply immerse students into the UN System. As always, I welcome any questions or concerns about the substantive program at NHSMUN 2020 and would be happy to dis- cuss NHSMUN pedagogy with faculty or delegates. Delegates, it is my sincerest hope that your time at NHSMUN will be thought-provoking and stimulating. NHSMUN is an incredible time to learn, grow, and embrace new opportunities. I look forward to seeing you work both as students and global citizens at the conference. Best, Althea Turley Director-General
HSC
A Note on Research and Preparation |7
A Note on Research and Preparation
Delegate research and preparation is a critical element of attending NHSMUN and enjoying the conference’s intellectual and
cosmopolitan perspective. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your com-
mittee. This document is designed to give you a description of the committee’s mandate and the topics on its agenda. We do not
intend to represent exhaustive research on every facet of the topics. We encourage and expect each of you to critically explore
the selected topics and be able to identify and analyze their intricacies upon arrival to NHSMUN in March. Delegates must be
prepared to intelligently utilize your knowledge and apply it to your country’s unique policy.
The task of preparing for the conference can be challenging, but to assist delegates, we have updated our Beginner Delegate
Guide and Advanced Delegate Guide. In particular, these guides contain more detailed instructions on how to prepare a position
paper and excellent sources that delegates can use for research. Use these resources to your advantage—they can help transform
a sometimes-overwhelming task into what it should be: an engaging, interesting, and rewarding experience.
An essential part of representing a state in an international body is the ability to articulate a given state’s views in writing. Ac-
cordingly, NHSMUN requires each delegation (the one or two delegates representing a country in a committee) to write a posi-
tion paper for both topics on the committee’s agenda. In delegations with two students, we strongly encourage each student to
participate in the research for both topics, to ensure that both students are prepared to debate no matter what topic is selected
first. More information about how to write and format position papers can be found in the NHSMUN Research Guide. To sum-
marize, position papers should be structured into three sections, described below.
I: Topic Background – This section should describe the history of the topic as it would be described by the delegate’s coun-
try. Delegates do not need to give an exhaustive account of the topic background, but rather focus on the details that are most
important to the delegation’s policy and proposed solutions.
II: Country Policy – This section should discuss the delegation’s policy regarding the topic. Each paper should state the policy
in plain terms and include the relevant statements, statistics, and research that support the effectiveness of the policy. Compari-
sons with other global issues are also appropriate here.
III. Proposed Solutions – This section should detail the delegation’s proposed solutions to address the topic. Descriptions of
each solution should be thorough. Each idea should clearly connect to the specific problem it aims to solve and identify potential
obstacles to implementation and how they can be avoided. The solution should be a natural extension of the country’s policy.
Each topic’s position paper should be no more than 10 pages long double-spaced with standard margins and font size. We
recommend 2-4 pages per topic as a suitable length. The paper must be written from the perspective of the country you are
representing at NHSMUN 2020 and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference.
Each delegation is responsible for sending a copy of its papers to their committee Directors via myDais on or before 14 Febru-
ary 2020. If a delegate wishes to receive detailed feedback from the committee’s dais, a position must be submitted on or before
24 January 2020. The papers received by this earlier deadline will be reviewed by the dais of each committee and returned prior
to your arrival at the conference.
Complete instructions for how to submit position papers will be sent to faculty advisers via the email submitted at registration.
If delegations are unable to submit their position papers on time, they should contact us at info@imuna.org as soon as possible.
Delegations that do not submit position papers to directors will be ineligible for awards.
HSC 8| Committee History Committee History The Security Council is first and foremost tasked with maintaining international peace and security, and convening whenever those ideals are threatened. Coming into existence on 24 October 1945, the Security Council has dealt with various issues relating to civil wars, terrorism, natural disasters and more.1 An important objective of the Council is to bring a conflict to an end quickly, fairly, and thoroughly, although regional tensions and diametrically opposed blocs within the Security Council amongst the five permanent members of the council (the P5) can often impede timely progress on topics. Specific powers granted to the Security Council include “setting forth principles for agreements, undertaking investigation and mediation, dispatching missions, appointing special envoys, or requesting the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the dispute.”2 Distinct from all other UN bodies, all resolutions that are passed within the Security Council are binding, leaving countries subject to discipline in the case of noncompliance. During the primary stages of a conflict, the Security Council will “call on parties to seek a solution via negotiation, arbitration, or other peaceful means.”3 If this fails, the Security Council then has the power to use assertive forces to maintain peace within the region at hand, most notably through the use of peacekeeping forces.4 Examples of situations where these forces are used include efforts to guard safe and fair elections within countries, to follow ceasefire agreements, and to protect marginalized civilians within dangerous areas.5 These forces are supplied voluntarily through UN members, and will mostly engage in defensive manners. Another commonly used tactic of the Security Council is the usage of sanctions against belligerent countries. These embargoes are meant to discreetly target “sensitive economic and political matters and specific individuals deemed threats to international security.”6 Members of the SC often times interpret the articles that establish their powers very liberally.7 This allows for members to adjust and change their powers according to shifting and emerging conflicts in the international community.8 During the Cold War period, sanctions were very rarely used, though they would become the main tool of the SC in the following years.9 Liberal interpretation also allows for intervention in issues that do not necessarily fall under their jurisdiction, such as humanitarian cri- ses. Anything from the massive spread of AIDS to human rights violations can now be interpreted as a threat to international security.10 1 “The UN Security Council,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2 September 2015, accessed 29 October 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ un-security-council. 2 “What Is the Security Council?” United Nations Security Council, accessed 29 October 2018, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/. 3 “The UN Security Council.” 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 “Historical Background of the Security Council,” Law Teacher, accessed 29 October 2018, https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/ security-law/historical-background-of-the-security-council.php. 8 Ibid. 9 “The UN Security Council.” 10 Ibid.
HSC
Simulation |9
Simulation
As opposed to most other NHSMUN committees, delegates within the Historical Security Council (HSC) will recreate the
debates that took place in a different time period. The goal of the HSC is not to completely and radically change the course
of history, but rather to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of the Security Council’s approach to conflicts in the past and
strive for a more positive outcome. During our simulation, delegates will not be bound to pursue any solution that the Security
Council historically pursued after the start date of the simulation. It is challenging to address an issue that has already occurred,
while still creating small nuances that could possibly change the outcome. Thus, creativity, yet strict adherence to policy and HSC
rules, will be commended.
Once in committee, delegates will be transferred to 1988, with the timeline thereafter open to change. Only information previ-
ous to the established date in the update paper should be used. This may present a challenge to the delegates with countries who
have not yet developed a stance on the issue. It is encouraged that you find similar or parallel situations that your country has
dealt with previous to the conflict in order to develop a position.
Notably, many of the statistics used throughout the background guide were published after the chosen date, but included due
to their relevance. As these statistics discuss the time before the period of the debate, they remain appropriate and within the
scope of committee. Delegates are encouraged to use the correct terms and names for countries during this time period rather
than their current name, if these names have changed. While some terminology might have changed in the past half-century,
historical accuracy should be prioritized. Delegates should not restrict themselves to existing solutions, instead exploring the
fresh, alternative options that may have been turned down, or never brought up in the real Security Council. A successful debate
will find the balance between historical realism and innovative solutions.
The dais will work with delegates to ensure the smooth flow of debate while also answering any questions delegates have relat-
ing to substantive or procedural matters. Both the Director and Assistant Director will guide the committee in taking motions,
facilitating debate, along with other administrative tasks such as resolution writing.
While the topics of specialized organs such as the HSC are highly controversial, we encourage delegates to balance the task of
firmly standing with their country’s policy, while also using their extensive research to find areas where concessions can be made.
The era chosen was a time of intense gridlock and little political action within the United Nations. In some ways, it is important
to simulate the drivers of this gridlock. For example, our simulation will preserve the veto rules for the P5 countries. However,
we are also looking forward to working with delegates when possible rather than standing off and voting down every resolution
that is entertained. With this in mind, we hope that delegates will use their time at NHSMUN 2019 to the full extent of their
ability in order to enable a thought-provoking and passionate debate.
HSC
NHSMUN 2020
Topic A:
The Iran-Iraq War, 1986
Photo Credit: Khamenei.irTopic A: The Iran-Iraq War, 1986
Introduction |11
Introduction
The date is 4 August 1986 and the Security Council has been tasked with addressing the pressing
situation that continues to spill over in Iran and Iraq. In response to the conflict, the Security Coun-
cil will convene to address this issue on 31 December 1986. Now in its sixth year, the Iran-Iraq War
has become the bloodiest and most destructive military conflict since World War II.1 In the past six
years of conflict, the international community has seen unprecedented violence and uncontainable
animosities from both sides. Since the onset of war, it is estimated that hundreds of billions of US
dollars have been spent in total and the death toll is approaching one million.2 Caught in between are
civilians and communities whose livelihoods have been irreparably damaged. With such intense de-
struction and uncertainty washing over the region, it becomes increasingly critical to understand just
how a conflict of this magnitude has come to be. The explanations for the origins of the conflict are
manifold and it is simply impossible to narrow the exact cause of the conflict down to just one factor.
Iran and Iraq share long histories of interaction that date back to the 14th century and even further
to ancient Mesopotamia; centuries of conflict between the two regimes have sowed bitter seeds.
War officially erupted on 22 September 1980, when Iraq in- Iran and Iraq fell under British and Russian rule for many
vaded the Iranian province of Khuzestan.3 However, earlier years, until Iraq gained independence from the UK in 1932
that month on 4 September 1980, Iran shelled the Iraqi towns and Britain pulled its last troops out of Iran in the 1960s.8
of Khanaqin, Mandali, Naft Khaneh, and Zarbatiyah.4 From The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was one of the most decisive
the Iraqi perspective, the war officially began weeks ago as a events in modern history, dramatically shifting the regional
result of Iranian aggression.5 As one scholar views it, “seen in dynamics of the Persian Gulf, and becoming a critical prede-
a long-term historical perspective, the current Iran-Iraq War cessor to war with Iraq. This revolution, headed by the current
is just another phase in a struggle between the two countries leader of Iran Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini,
that stretches back a millennium or more.”6 Located right at ousted Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who had been serving as
the Persian Gulf, there has been an age-old struggle between the Shah (monarch) of Iran since the early 1950s.9 Seen by his
Iran and Iraq for domination of the gulf. Dating back cen- followers as a leader ordained by Allah, Khomeini has greatly
turies, when Iran was still known as the Persian Empire and altered Iran’s religious and political landscape, abolishing the
Iraq was still a region under the Ottoman Empire, rivalries ran Shah’s secular governance. Since his rise to power, Khomei-
deep between Persians and the Ottoman Arabs for regional ni has restructured Iranian politics by establishing Iran as a
theocracy and emphasizing the need for clerical control over
domination.7
Iran’s secular powers. This massively successful Islamic Revo-
The historical conflict between the two countries is extremely lution has stoked serious concern in the Gulf region, with
important to understanding the more immediate, recent causes many other countries becoming wary of Iran’s new-found re-
of the conflict. Given the rich oil resources in the region, both gional aspirations and the possibility that its Islamic Revolu-
1 Will D. Swearingen, “Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” Geographical Review 79, No. 4 (1988): 405, accessed 27 June 2019, www.
jstor.org/stable/215091.
2 Ibid.
3 Nita M. Renfrew, “Who Started the War?,” Foreign Policy, No. 66 (1987): 98, accessed 6 July 2019, https://www.jstor.org/
stable/1148666?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
4 Ibid., 103.
5 Ibid.,
6 Efraim Karsh, “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” Middle East Journal 44, No. 2 (1990): 256, accessed 5 July
2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328101?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
7 Ibid., 257.
8 Ibid.
9 Ali Ansari, “Iranian Revolution of 1979,” Ethics of Development in a Global Environment, 23 August 1999, accessed 26 July 2019,
https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/war_peace/middleeast/hiranianrev.html.12|TH opic A: The Iran-Iraq War, 1986
istory and Description of the Issue
tion may spread. the conflict.
The issues of competition and regional dominance have been Iraq
a major underlying pillar that constitutes many of the aggres-
sions the international community has seen in recent decades. Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party in Iraq came to power in 1968
With no end of the war in sight, fighting has ballooned into with the goal of making the country a formidable power in the
a massive conflict that seemingly follows no rational lines of Gulf Region.10 Throughout his rule, Saddam has eliminated
explanation. Given the complexity of the war, many views most of his rivals in Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council
of its origins are valid. Historical animosities between the (RCC), the main decision-making body in Iraq.11 Later, Sad-
Persians and Arabs, ethnic and religious tensions, territorial dam formally became Chairman and President of the RCC
disputes, and regional ambitions, among others, are all major in 1979, despite having been de facto head of state for many
causes for the war that will be later explained throughout the years.12 Saddam’s tight rule over Iraq and its political institu-
Background Guide. Clearly, as with any major conflict, geopo- tions have supplemented his efforts to build a personality cult,
litical and social factors are not only deeply entrenched within the excessive, government-ordained adoration of a political
the conflict, but also deeply intertwined with each other. This leader, where Iraq now faces a frightening slippery slope in
undoubtedly makes the conflict an extremely difficult one to which the regime may not have any incentive to hold back on
resolve, given competing interests and claims from so many stringent policies.13
of the parties involved. It is the Security Council’s duty, there-
fore, to unpack the convoluted dimensions of the conflict, Iran
and to recommend conciliatory measures for the parties in-
Having risen to power on a theological and fundamental-
volved in order to bring an end to this conflict.
ist Islam narrative, Ayatollah Khomeini holds extraordinary
power in the country, acting as a figurehead of Islamic faith
History and Description of the Issue and large-scale Islamic revolution. Since his rise to power,
Khomeini has repeatedly called for the overthrow of Saddam
People and Major Parties Involved and the Ba’ath party, stating this as a condition for ending the
war.14 Given the religious undertones that shade many aspects
The war between Iran and Iraq continues to wage and con-
of the conflict, it is conceivable that such personal attacks that
sequently, a convoluted network of divergent interests has
have been used between the two leaders point to deeper ideo-
embedded itself within the violent conflicts that have char-
logical narratives.
acterized this war for years. With the situation between Iran
and Iraq growing increasingly somber, understanding the Post-revolution, the Iranian Armed Forces and Islamic Revo-
people and parties behind the conflict and their subsequent lutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as the Pasradan,
goals is imperative in unpacking the intricacies of the many have operated under Khomeini’s rule.15 Despite the surface-
aspects that have helped originate and continue to fuel the level appearance of unity and coherence within Iran’s lead-
war. Moreover, gaining a firm understanding of major parties ership, there is still a great deal of internal factional politics
who have had a direct hand in escalating the conflict is critical that have contributed to the continuously escalating conflict.
for international organizations like the United Nations Secu- Ultimately, factional rivalries among Islamists, nationalists, the
rity Council to understand the goals of crucial belligerents in IRGC, and Iranian Army are much more ideological than they
10 Ashton and Gibson, The Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives, 117.
11 Heller, “Turmoil in the Gulf,” 17.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Swearingen, “Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 412.
15 Mohammad A Tabaar, “Factional politics in the Iran-Iraq War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 42, No. 3-4 (2019): 481, accessed 25 June 2019,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2017.1347873.Topic A: The Iran-Iraq War, 1986
History and Description of the Issue |13
the course of the war from the lens of factional politics within
Iran, it becomes more apparent that the war has also evolved
from a conflict between the two countries into a political and
ideological weapon between two parties within one country.
Major Insurgent Groups
Aside from internal factional politics that have hindered Ira-
nian unity and effectiveness in the conflict, insurgent groups
that have risen against the government continue to pose sub-
Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) soldiers stantial threats to the Iranian government as well. One of the
are political.16 With Iran’s clerical leaders viewing the Iran-Iraq foremost threats to Iran is the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK),
War as a conflict between secular Iraq and Islamic Iran, divides a controversial Iranian resistance group founded in 1965 by
between religious groups and nationalist ones have polarized leftist Iranian students opposed to the western-backed Shah
the clerically-dominated IRGC and the more nationalist Ira- of Iran.23 While they aided the Islamists in overthrowing the
nian Army along with former Iranian President, Abolhassan Shah during the Revolution, MEK has since violently broken
Banisadr.17 The IGRC and the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), off its alliance with the ruling Islamic clerics.24 With a sharply
also created upon Khomeini’s request, have deployed Islamist different interpretation of Islam than the Khomeini regime,
ideology throughout the war to advance their internal inter- MEK advocates for the overthrow of the Khomeini leader-
ests of using the war as an opportunity to expand the Islamic ship and installing its own government.25 The group gained
revolutionary organizations.18 Although Khomeini’s Islamist international prominence for its alleged involvement in the
disciples and the IRGC initially allied with Iranian nationalists killings of US personnel in Iran during the 1970s, and the
to bring down the Shah during the 1979 Revolution, this co- group has since formed political and armed wings.26 In 1981,
alition soon dissipated into vicious political competition after the group conducted an extensive bombing campaign against
the revolution.19 While the IRP and IRGC dreaded the nation- members of Iran’s Islamic Republic Party, killing more than 70
alists and the army, they were aware that they were no match high-ranking party officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah
for Iran’s Army of 400,000.20 At the same time that they vied Mohammad Beheshti and President Mohammad-Ali Rajai.27
to rid the nationalists, the IRP and IRGC were afraid that the The group was forced into exile in France in 1981 until being
nationalist army would defeat the Iraqi army too quickly, thus expelled from the country and ultimately relocating its base
gaining popularity.21 Unquestionably, while the IRP and IRGC to eastern Iraq in June 1986.28 Since relocating to Iraq and
have viewed Iraq as the country’s external enemy, they view receiving logistical support from the Iraqi government, MEK
the Iranian army as their internal opponent.22 When looking at has lost significant credibility amongst Iranians for fighting
16 Ibid., 483.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 484.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 483.
22 Ibid., 485.
23 Jonathan Masters, “Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)” Council on Foreign Relations, 28 July 2014, accessed 6 July 2019, https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ronen A. Cohen, “The Mojahedin-e Khalq versus the Islamic Republic of Iran: from war to propaganda and the war on propaganda
and diplomacy,” Middle Eastern Studies 54, No. 6 (2018): 1000, accessed 25 June 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0026
3206.2018.1478813.
27 Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, “MEK: When Terrorism Becomes Respectable,” Carnegie Council for Ethics in Interna-
tional Affairs, 17 October 2012, accessed 5 July 2019, https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0074.
28 Masters, “Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK).”14|TH opic A: The Iran-Iraq War, 1986
istory and Description of the Issue
Map of ethnically Kurdish areas as of 1986
against their own homeland.29 citizens, both governments could suffer serious consequences
if a full-out uprising were to occur. As such, Iraq has donated
Both Iran and Iraq have Kurdish minority populations that
to the KDPI, though the KDPI maintains its primary desires
have posed credible threats of secession and autonomy for the
of self-determination within Iran’s legal framework and is less
two regimes. The Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP),
focused on complete secession for Iranian Kurdistan.33 None-
founded in 1946, is the main Kurdish party in Iraqi Kurdistan,
theless, dynamics like these raise real and important questions
while the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), found-
about the situation at hand. The Security Council must eval-
ed in 1945, is the main Kurdish party in Iran.30 The Kurdish
uate how powerful regimes can manipulate minority ethnic
parties in both Iran and Iraq declared a right to self-determi-
problems for political gain, even if it is counterproductive to
nation for the Kurdish people within the framework of their
war negotiation efforts.
respective countries, though the Iraqi Kurdish have clashed
more violently with the Ba’ath government.31 While Iran and
Ethnic and Religious Disputes
Iraq want to pacify their own Kurdish populations, they both
have obvious interests in keeping the Kurdish resistance in Amid the military overtones seen thus far in the Iran-Iraq
the neighboring country alive, as a strong Kurdish rebellion War, it is crucial to consider the more subtle undertones that
movement could severely damage a government.32 Be it losing have built the foundations for this eruption of violence in the
resources to pacifying an uprising, suffering political defeats Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly, this conflict of dramatic territo-
by strong Kurdish political groups, or appearing weak to their rial seizure and violence has manifested in diverse ways and
29 Cohen, “The Mojahedin-e Khalq versus the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 1001.
30 Martin van Brunissen, “The Kurds between Iran and Iraq,” MERIP Middle East Report, No. 141 (1986): 17, accessed 5 July 2019, https://
www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3011925.pdf.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 14.
33 Ibid., 17.Topic A: The Iran-Iraq War, 1986
History and Description of the Issue |15
reaches far beyond animosities between the two countries of instigators of conflict between the countries, but also within
Iran and Iraq. Before the birth of the modern Gulf states of their own internal affairs. The ruling Ba’ath party of Iraq is a
Iran and Iraq, this region was dominated by the Persian and foremost advocate of Arab unity, governing with a pan-Arab
Ottoman Empires. The Persian Empire would later become ideology aimed at promoting the notion that all Arabs consti-
modern-day Iran, while modern-day Iraqis fall under the large tute one nation, opposing the current borders in the region
swaths of land once governed by the Ottoman Empire, which which divide Arabs into more than twenty states.39 Not only
once included other areas in Southeast Europe, Western Asia, does this threaten Iranian unity, but it also upsets Iran’s more
and North Africa. Thus, a more hidden, yet threatening aspect religiously focused pan-Islamic ideology which it successfully
to the conflict lies in centuries of ethnic tensions between catalyzed during the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Clearly, the two
the modern-day Persian Iranians and Arabs, who are generally countries have vastly different approaches to rallying support
those allied with the Iraqis.34 In addition to this centuries-old throughout the Arab world.
ethnic distinction that has persisted since the 14th century,
Ethnically, the two states have also been at odds for centu-
Iran and Iraq have long histories of religious divide.35 With ries. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly characterized the Iran-
two regimes that seem to be polar opposites, it is crucial to Iraq War as a latest encounter in a sequence of ethnic clashes
understand these important factors to explain the origins of between Arabs and Persians.40 The ethnic conflicts between
the war and to understand the stakes of this conflict. Iran and Iraq reach back centuries to the third millennium BC,
The two warring countries are controlled by regimes that when present-day Iraq was still known as Mesopotamia.41 In
hold diametrically opposed ideologies. After the 1979 Iranian speeches, Saddam and other Iraqi officials have consistently
Revolution, Iran began to heavily promote Islamic funda- attributed the roots of ethnic rivalry to the aggressive behav-
ior of the Elamite— a pre-Iranian civilization— towards the
mentalism.36 While the state’s regime is theocratic and univer-
Sumerian and Akkadian peoples who lived in Mesopotamia.42
salist—a universal acceptance of religion—Iraq is secularist
Elamite history spans more than two millennia; within that
and nationalist.37 In other words, the constitution of Iran is
time, there have been countless territorial wars and dynastic
inherently connected to religion, which essentially serves as
struggles with the Sumerian Empire. Iraq has maintained that
the rule of law. On the other hand, Iraq has a secular gov-
these aggressions caused ethnic cleavage and have also laid
ernment, meaning that it keeps politics and religion separate
the foundations for continued Iranian hostility towards Iraq.43
from one another. Thus, the divide between the two coun-
These hostilities have long manifested in rivalling bids for
tries also hinges heavily on religious differences. The regimes
power and domination, such as the age-old struggle between
each represent two major sects of Islam: Shi’ite and Sunni
the Persians and Arabs for domination of the Gulf and the
and while Iran under Khomeini is Shi’ite fundamentalist, the
rich Tigris Euphrates Valley.44
Ba’ath party of Iraq is Sunni.38 The religious tensions between
Iran and Iraq remain major causes of concern, not only as Since the ethnic cleavage between Arabs and Persians, reli-
34 Efraim Karsh, “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” Middle East Journal 44, No. 2 (1990): 256, accessed 5 July
2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328101?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
35 Ibid.
36 Swearingen, “Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 412.
37 Suleiman K. Kassicieh and Jamal R. Nassar, “Political Risk in the Gulf: The Impact of the Iran-Iraq War on Governments and Multina-
tional Corporations,” California Management Review 28, No. 2 (1986): 71, accessed 25 June 2019, http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/
pdfviewer?vid=6&sid=ec7c50b6-12bf-48fe-9001-ffcad70bd82f%40pdc-v-sessmgr06.
38 John H Sigler, “The Iran-Iraq Conflict: The Tragedy of Limited Conventional War,” International Journal, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1986): 431, ac-
cessed 5 July 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40202377?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
39 Ibid.
40 D. Gershon Lewental, “ ‘Saddam’s Qadisiyyah’: Religion and History in the Service of State Ideology in Ba’thi Iraq,” Middle Eastern Studies
50, No. 6 (2014), accessed 25 June 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00263206.2013.870899.
41 Ibid., 430.
42 Lewental, “‘Saddam’s Qadisiyyah’: Religion and History in the Service of State Ideology in Ba’thi Iraq.”
43 Ibid.
44 Karsh, “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 256.16|TH opic A: The Iran-Iraq War, 1986
istory and Description of the Issue
gious divides have also historically been reinforced, further Khomeini’s Islamic rule in Iran has threatened secular Arab
driving a wedge in modern Iran-Iraq relations. For example, nationalist ideology that the Ba’ath party has worked hard to
in 1502, Shah Ismail of the Safavid Persian dynasty forced maintain and has put Iraq’s political stability in peril.51 The Ira-
Shi’ism as the official religion of Persia (Iran) on the largely nian revolution has threatened Iraqi’s internal security on two
Sunni Muslim population.45 It is important to note that for fronts: governmental and civic. Khomeini’s revolutionary gov-
much of history, and even today, the majority of the Muslim ernment has backed Iraq’s Shi’ite party, al-Da’wa, in its efforts
world follows Sunni tradition, whose spiritual leaders have, to overthrow the Ba’ath government, placing extreme pres-
until recently, regarded Shi’ites as heretics, or religious skep- sure on Iraq’s political institutions.52 Indeed, Khomeini has
tics.46 These religious antagonisms stem from greatly differ- stated that “Islamic faith and justice demand that within the
ent interpretations of the Quran by these two major sects of Muslim world, anti-Islamic governments [will] not be allowed
Islam. As the majority of the world practices Sunni Islam, to survive.”53 It seems that Khomeini views any secular gov-
Shi’ite interpretations are often seen as illegitimate and devi- ernment as anti-Islamic and this unfortunately suggests that
ant. These historical ethnic and religious ambivalences have any secular government in Iraq would dissatisfy Khomeini.
set the scene for many contemporary conflicts and have been On a civic level, the Iranian Revolution has induced fears that
used as messaging tools by both countries. Iraq’s Shi’ite majority may rebel against the Sunni minority.54
Ever since Saddam has been projected as a champion of the
While most of the Muslim world is majority Sunni, Iran and
Sunni Muslims, Iraqi Shi’ites have felt threatened under this
Iraq are exceptions with majority Shi’ite populations.47 The
new-found sectarianism.55 The Iranian Revolution can very
1979 Iranian Revolution, which saw the union of state and re-
much be taken as a model or a source of inspiration for other
ligion, was undoubtedly a major turning point and catalyst for
Shi’ites in the Gulf region, thus threatening not only Iraq, but
the war. Post-revolution, Iran successfully united its majority
also neighboring Arab countries including Saudi Arabia.56 Iraq
Shi’ite country under Khomeini’s revolutionary Shi’ite gov-
and its Sunni government has long served as a principal buffer
ernment, but Iraq is much less religiously consistent. Iraq has
of the Arab world, against the Shi’ite religious ambitions of
a 60% Shi’ite Muslim population, but its ruling Ba’ath party
Iran’s regime.57 That balance, however, is increasingly at risk.
is Sunni Muslim, creating a major internal problem for Iraqi
security and national unity.48 Recognizing this dissonance, the In examining the many working parts in this war, it is crucial
Iraqi government has long strategically de-emphasized reli- to look not only at tensions between the two countries, but
gion and instead placed more focus on Arab unity and social- the internal conflicts that play a significant role in the situ-
ism.49 Given Iraq’s secularist government and its nationalist ation. The issue of internal fragmentation along ethnic and
ideologies, it has waged war much more heavily along ethnic religious lines in Iraq is substantial: in Iraq alone, there are
lines rather than religious ones, thus placing more emphasis divides between the Sunnis and Shi’ites as well as ethnic divi-
on negatively painting Iranians as Persians rather than Shi’ite sions between Arabs and the Kurdish minority.58 This crystal-
Muslims.50 lization of a collective Iraqi national identity has an intense
45 Sigler, “The Iran-Iraq Conflict: The Tragedy of Limited Conventional War,” 431.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Swearingen, “Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 412.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Sigler, “The Iran-Iraq Conflict: The Tragedy of Limited Conventional War,” 431.
52 Ibid.
53 Kassicieh and Nassar, “Political Risk in the Gulf,” 72.
54 Swearingen, “Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 414.
55 Lukman Faily, “Reflecting on the Iran-Iraq War, Thirty Years Later,” Atlantic Council, 21 August 2018, accessed 6 July 2019, https://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/reflecting-on-the-iran-iraq-war-thirty-years-later.
56 Ibid.
57 Sigler, “The Iran-Iraq Conflict: The Tragedy of Limited Conventional War,” 430.
58 Karsh, “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 259.Topic A: The Iran-Iraq War, 1986
History and Description of the Issue |17
weakening effect on the country, making it vulnerable to in- economic opportunities given its direct access to the ocean.
ternal and external manipulation. During British rule over As such, both countries have important considerations and
Iraq from 1920-1958, British policy was to use the Kurdish agendas in pursuing control over the waterway. While Iran
non-Arab population, which constituted 15-20% of the Iraqi possesses a long Gulf coastline of some 2,000 kilometers,
population, as a balance against the Arab Sunni-dominant Iraq has much less territorial advantage; being an essentially
government of Baghdad.59 The UK’s intention to use the land-locked country, the Shatt al-Arab waterway is Iraq’s only
possibility of Kurdish nationalism and independence as a access to the Persian Gulf, making the conflict over the river
threat to Iraq’s government persuaded the government to ac- even more pertinent.65 Due to its land-locked geography, Iraq
cept British policies throughout the Middle East.60 Following is much less suited than Iran to host major ports of trade traf-
British withdrawal from Iraq in July 1958, the Kurds’ loss of fic beyond the limited access it would have if it gained control
British protection slowly precipitated into intermittent war- to the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Therefore, controlling the river
fare between the Kurds and the Iraqi government, which has would be a significant economic boost to Iraq.
continued ever since.61 Iraq thus faces the challenging issue of Additionally, since the gradual departure of European pow-
possible Shi’ite rebellion as well as Kurdish secession — both ers from the Middle East following World War II, Iraq has
of which would be devastating blows that could very possi- increasingly faced growing Iranian ambitions for dominance
bly topple the entire regime. Concentrated in northern Iraq, in the region.66 Whether it be territorial advances, religious
the primary oil-producing region of the country, the Kurds propaganda by Khomeini directed at Shi’ite Muslims in the
play an important role as a counterbalance to Iraqi Shi’ites, entire Gulf region, or personal attacks launched against Sad-
who are concentrated in the South.62 Kurdish secession would dam, Iran has proved itself to be a major power to be reck-
significantly skew this balance, and deprive Iraq of major oil- oned with and one with merciless ambitions. For either coun-
producing plants that are vital to its economy. Ultimately, los- try, gaining control over more territory would undoubtedly
ing either the Kurdish or the Shi’ites would be akin to amputa- also mean more leveraging power over the other country and
tion—fatal blows to Iraqi competence. more fuel for propaganda messages. Gaining control over
this coveted territory would be a major victory in terms of
History of Territorial Disputes image and reputation. Thus, aside from practical interests in
obtaining sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab, there exists sig-
A key locality that has long been at the center of territo-
nificant ideological and nationalist claims upon the waterway
rial hostilities is the 105-kilometer-long Shatt al-Arab River,
from both countries, making the region not only an economic
formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers,
stronghold, but a prestigious one too.
on the southern Iran-Iraq border.63 Providing access to the
Persian Gulf, and thus international trade networks, the Shatt In addition to the contentious and pivotal importance of the
al-Arab waterway is an invaluable asset, upon which relations Shatt al-Arab waterway in the territorial disputes between Iran
between the two countries have long been contingent.64 Gain- and Iraq, several other key regions have also added insult to
ing access to this river is a major ambition for both countries, injury, aggravating animosities between the two countries. The
as this would not only mean control over significant terri- southern Iranian province of Khuzestan has been a point of
tory, but possession of it would also open major doors to contention for more than 60 years between the two coun-
59 Robert Olson, “The Kurdish question in the aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and geostrategic chances in the Middle East,” Third
World Quarterly 13, No. 3 (1992): 475, accessed 25 June 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3992197?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Swearingen, “Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 414.
63 Karsh, “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 256.
64 Swearingen, “Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 409.
65 Karsh, “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 259.
66 Joana Dodds and Ben Wilson, “The Iran-Iraq War: Unattainable Objectives,” MERIA Journal 13, No. 2 (2009): 73, accessed 27 June 2019,
http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=19&sid=ecf0e5fb-71bf-4e1a-90e8-c3c0c961b950%40sessionmgr4008.18|TH opic A: The Iran-Iraq War, 1986
istory and Description of the Issue
tries.67 The western portion of Khuzestan originally belonged Treaties and Negotiations
to the Ottomans, although the Ottoman Empire ultimately
The Algiers Accord of 1975 was a major boundary treaty
ceded this territory to Iran after World War I and its demise in
signed between the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein of Iraq
1923.68 This back-and-forth has made Khuzestan a sensitive
which sought to resolve age-old border disputes between the
topic for Iraq, as it regards much of the province as its former
two countries, though its terms have either been violated or
possession. Moreover, Khuzestan is a significant region due
selectively applied, largely favoring Iran in the process.73 Under
to its primarily ethnic Arab composition, unlike the majority the treaty, Iraq agreed to relinquish over half of the Shatt al-
ethnic Persian composition in the rest of Iran. In economic Arab waterway by moving its southeastern border away from
terms, it houses many of the principal oil reserves in Iran.69 the far shore of the waterway to the thalweg, the deepest part
With Saddam’s Ba’ath party ruling with a pan-Arab ideology of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, thereby further exacerbating
of uniting all Arabs in the Gulf region, Khuzestan is most its territorial disadvantage.74 In exchange for Iraqi relinquish-
definitely an area of interest in ethnic terms. In its September ment of this territory, Iran agreed to stop supporting Kurdish
1980 invasion of Iran, which effectively started the Iran-Iraq rebellions that had long been occurring within Iraq.75 Addi-
War, Iraqi forces penetrated deep into Khuzestan and cap- tionally, Iran had promised to return the occupied territories
tured a strip along the western border of the province.70 This of Zain al-Qaws and Saif Saad to Iraq, though these terms
Iraqi territorial incursion had a two-ended effect, both threat- in the Treaty would eventually fall through due to repeated
ening the internal social stability of Iran by rallying up its Ara- violations.76 Deeply opposed to the Shah, Iran’s Khomeini ve-
bic population to support the Ba’ath regime, and threatening hemently denounced the Algiers Accord in 1979 as a Western
conspiracy with the Shah, Saddam, and the “American Satan,”
to seize control over wealth-generating oil reserves.
subsequently citing them as his foremost enemies.77 By 1979,
The Zain al-Qaws and Saif Saad heights — two small areas after Khomeini had risen to power as Iran’s Supreme Leader,
along the Iran-Iraq border — have also been important re- the country still had not returned Zain al-Qaws or Saif Saad
gions at the center of territorial negotiations. They are ap- to Iraq, despite the terms of the Algiers Accord — although
proximately 550 kilometers of strategic heights occupied by it had immediately taken official possession of half of the
Iran which overlook Iraqi plains.71 These strategic territories Shatt al-Arab following the signing of the Accords.78 This was
were also part of the territorial feuds that Iraq sought to re- extremely angering to Iraq, which viewed the 1975 Algiers Ac-
dress. Attempting to justify its invasion of Khuzestan, Iraq cords as a deep source of humiliation. Not only did the loss of
cited Iran’s advantageous control over the Shatt al-Arab wa- the Shatt al-Arab have debilitating effects on Iraq’s ability to
participate in international maritime trade in an age where oil
terway, the Zain al-Qaws, and Saif Saad as primary grievances,
exports were booming, but violation of the Accords by Iran
demanding that Iran return the heights and renegotiate the
caused deep embarrassment and an appetite for vengeance.79
terms regarding the Shatt al-Arab as stipulated under the ma-
jor 1975 Algiers Accord.72 While the Iraqi capture of Khuzestan can be understood as
67 Swearingen, “Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 415.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 406.
70 Ibid.
71 Nita M. Renfrew, “Who Started the War?,” Foreign Policy, No. 66 (1987): 99, accessed 6 July 2019, https://www.jstor.org/
stable/1148666?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
72 Swearingen, “Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 408.
73 Ibid.
74 Renfrew, “Who Started the War?,” 99.
75 Swearingen, “Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 408.
76 Renfrew, “Who Started the War?,” 100.
77 Ibid., 99.
78 Ibid., 100.
79 Swearingen, “geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,” 408.You can also read
