Iran's Influence in Iraq - Countering Tehran's Whole-of-Government Approach Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali
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Iran’s Influence in Iraq Countering Tehran’s Whole-of-Government Approach Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali Policy Focus #111 | April 2011
Iran’s Influence in Iraq Countering Tehran’s Whole-of-Government Approach Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali Policy Focus #111 | April 2011
All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2011 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2011 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad at an official meeting in Tehran, August 2007.
Contents About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 | Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 | Tehran’s Political Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 | Support for Militias and Insurgents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4 | Soft Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5 | A Balance Sheet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6 | Policy Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Appendix | Tehran’s Iraqi Partners. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
About the Authors
Michael Eisenstadt is director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute. His
recent publications include Iran’s Islamic Revolution: Lessons for the Arab Spring of 2011? (INSS Strategic Forum,
2011), “Should I Stay or Should I Go? What the United States Can Leave Behind in Iraq” (Foreign Affairs, 2010),
and The Missing Lever: Information Activities against Iran (Washington Institute, 2010).
Michael Knights is a Lafer fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of
Iraq, Iran, Libya, Yemen, and the Gulf Arab states. His recent Washington Institute publications include Kirkuk
in Transition: Confidence Building in Northern Iraq (with Ahmed Ali, 2010). Dr. Knights earned his doctorate at
the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, with a dissertation on the U.S. no-fly zones and air opera-
tions against Iraq.
Ahmed Ali is a Marcia Robbins-Wilf research associate at the Institute, with a focus on the political dynamics of
Iraq. In addition to Kirkuk in Transition, he is the coauthor, with David Pollock, of “Iran Gets Negative Reviews
in Iraq, Even from Shiites” (PolicyWatch #1653). Mr. Ali is a frequent commentator on Iraqi affairs in U.S. and
international media, and his work has been featured by various Iraqi, Arab, and Kurdish media outlets.
n n n
The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vAcknowledgments T H E AU T H O R S WO U L D like to thank Patrick Clawson, Lt. Col. Jason Hanover, Mehdi Khalaji, David Pol- lock, and Rend Rahim for their extraordinarily useful insights and suggestions in preparing this report. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vii
Executive Summary
T H E O V E RT H R OW O F T H E R E G I M E of Saddam Guard Corps (responsible for covert operations
Hussein in 2003 provided the Islamic Republic of Iran abroad), underscoring the role Iran’s security services
with a historic opportunity to transform its relation- play in formulating and implementing policy in Iraq.
ship with Iraq—formerly one of its most implacable These security services have sometimes used Arabic-
enemies. Iran has used the long, porous border with speaking Lebanese Hizballah operatives to facilitate
Iraq, longstanding ties with key Iraqi politicians, par- support for insurgent groups and militias.
ties, and armed groups, and its soft power in the eco- The formation in December 2010 of the second
nomic, religious, and informational domains to expand government of Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki
its influence and thus establish itself as the key external marked a milestone in Tehran’s efforts to unify its Shi-
power broker in Iraq. ite political allies in Iraq. This government, however,
may well prove unstable, as it combines various parties
Political Allies that have engaged in violent conflicts in the not-too
Iran has tried to influence Iraqi politics by work- distant-past. It therefore remains to be seen whether
ing with Shiite and Kurdish parties to create a weak Tehran will finally succeed in forging its fractious Shi-
federal state dominated by Shiites and amenable ite clients into a sustainable, unified political front
to Iranian influence. It has encouraged its closest or whether its efforts to do so will ultimately be frus-
allies—the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), trated. Regardless, the present situation ensures Iran a
the Badr Organization (ISCI’s former militia), the role as political mediator should fissures emerge in the
Islamic Dawa Party, and more recently the Sad- ruling coalition.
rists—to participate in politics and help shape Iraq’s The post-2003 period has shown the limitations
nascent institutions. of Iran’s influence over its Shiite clients in Iraq, who
Tehran’s goal is to unite Iraq’s Shiite parties so that will accept Iranian support when self-interest dic-
they can translate their demographic weight (some tates they do so and seek support elsewhere when it
60 percent of the country’s population) into political does not. Recent years have also shown that Tehran’s
influence, thereby consolidating Shiite control over activities in the Iraqi political arena have frequently
the government. To this end, Iran attempted to influ- been poorly coordinated with its other activities in
ence the outcome of the 2005 and 2010 parliamentary Iraq—such as support for militant groups—indicat-
elections as well as the 2009 provincial elections by ing a lack of coherence to Iran’s whole-of-government
funding and advising its preferred candidates, and by approach to Iraq.
encouraging its Shiite allies to run in a unified list, to
prevent the Shiite vote from being split. Additionally, Militias and Insurgents
to ensure that its interests are secured no matter who While Iran, since 2003, has encouraged its Iraqi polit-
comes out on top, Tehran has hedged its bets by back- ical allies to work with the United States and partici-
ing a number of Shiite parties and movements. It has pate in the nascent democratic political process, it has
also sought to preserve its traditionally good relations also armed, trained, and funded Shiite militias and
with the major Kurdish parties to secure its influence Shiite—and, on occasion, Sunni—insurgents to work
in parts of northern Iraq. toward a humiliating defeat for the United States
Tehran exercises its influence through its embassy that would deter future U.S. military interventions in
in Baghdad and consulates in Basra, Karbala, Irbil, the region.
and Sulaymaniyah. Both of its post-2003 ambassadors Iran may have also used its Shiite militant prox-
served in the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary ies to stoke sectarian tensions and to foment political
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ixMichael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali Iran’s Influence in Iraq
violence, only to then step in diplomatically to resolve Soft Power
these conflicts—thereby ensuring for itself a role as Iran has woven soft-power activities into its whole-
mediator in Iraq. These armed groups also provide of-government approach to projecting influence in
Tehran with an alternative source of influence should Iraq. To this end, it has enacted protectionist mea-
its political allies prove unreliable, and the means sures and trade policies to Iraq’s disadvantage, tried
to retaliate against U.S. forces in Iraq should Iran’s to co-opt the transnational Shiite clerical network
nuclear infrastructure be attacked by the United States based in Najaf, and attempted to influence Iraqi pub-
or Israel. lic opinion through information activities. While U.S.
After 2003, Iran initially focused its resources on and Iraqi military officials have fretted that the Iraqi
its traditional allies in ISCI’s Badr Corps, but it soon military will be unprepared to secure the country’s air-
expanded its aid to include the Sadrists’ Mahdi Army, space and territorial waters when U.S. forces leave by
associated special groups, and even some Sunni insur- the end of 2011, Iranian soft power probably consti-
gent groups. As these groups joined the political pro- tutes the greater long-term threat to Iraqi sovereignty
cess, Iran splintered off radical elements to form new and independence.
covert special groups, a technique first used when it
formed the radical Lebanese Hizballah organization in Economic ties. Iran has strengthened trade and eco-
the early 1980s. nomic ties with Iraq for financial gain and to achieve
By 2010, Iran had narrowed its support to three leverage over its neighbor. Trade between the two
armed Shiite groups: Muqtada al-Sadr’s Promised countries reportedly reached $7 billion in 2009,
Day Brigade—the successor to the Mahdi Army— although the balance is skewed largely in Tehran’s
and two special groups: Asaib Ahl al-Haqq (League favor. In dumping cheap, subsidized food products and
of the Righteous) and Kataib Hizballah (Battalions consumer goods into Iraq, the Islamic Republic has
of Hizballah). But Iran’s support for the Mahdi Army undercut its neighbor’s agricultural and manufacturing
has proved particularly problematic, since the mili- sectors, and generated resentment among Iraqis. Iran’s
tia’s radical agenda and its competition for power damming and diversion of rivers feeding the Shatt al-
within the Shiite community soon brought it into Arab waterway has undermined Iraqi agriculture in the
conflict with both ISCI and the Iraqi government, south and hindered efforts to revive Iraq’s marshlands.
thereby undermining Iranian efforts to unify the Shi- And while Iran has made up for Iraq’s electricity short-
ite community. ages by supplying about 10 percent of its needs (the
Following the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, percentage is actually much higher for several prov-
Tehran may use its support for these Shiite militias inces that border Iran), many Iraqis believe that Iran
and insurgent groups to press the Iraqi government manipulates these supplies for political ends.
to curtail its relationship with the United States and
as a source of leverage on other issues. Emulating Export of revolutionary Islam. One of the Islamic
Hizballah in Lebanon, some Iranian-sponsored spe- Republic’s foremost objectives since the Islamic Revo-
cial groups may also attempt to leverage their influ- lution has been to secure the primacy of its official
ence on the street and previous resistance activities ideology in Shiite communities around the world. By
against the United States as an entree into politics. backing Iranian clerics trained in Qom and steeped in
Should this occur, Tehran is likely to once again split the official ideology of clerical rule rather than clerics
off radical elements from these organizations to form trained in the quietist tradition of the religious semi-
new special groups—contributing to the further frag- naries of Najaf, Iran may now be poised to achieve this
mentation of the Shiite community and, ironically, goal, aided by the lavish use of state monies to fund
undermining its own efforts to politically unify its the activities of its politicized clerics. Furthermore, the
Iraqi allies. 2010 death of Grand Ayatollah Hussein Fadlallah, an
x Policy Focus #111Executive Summary Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali
influential Lebanese cleric trained in Najaf, and the Relations among its Iraqi clients have frequently been
advanced age and poor health of Grand Ayatollah Ali fraught with tensions and violence, and Iran has spent
al-Sistani, the foremost member of the Najaf school much time and effort in a mediating role, managing
and marja, or source of emulation, for perhaps 80 per- problems it helped create. Tehran’s meddling in Iraqi
cent of all Shiites worldwide, renders the Najaf school politics has frequently been a political liability for its
vulnerable to Iranian influence. local allies.
Iraq has also become a major destination for Ira- Tehran failed to block the signing of the Security
nian religious tourists. Each month, some 40,000 Ira- Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement
nians visit Iraq’s holy cities, with an estimated three to between Iraq and the United States, though it did suc-
four million visiting during the annual Ashura com- ceed in obtaining a provision in the Security Agree-
memorations. Najaf, a traditional center of the Shiite ment ensuring that Iraq would not be used as a spring-
world and emerging as an important Iraqi political board for an attack on Iran.
center, perhaps second to Baghdad, has become the Finally, some of Tehran’s policies have stoked anti-
focus of Iranian investment that disproportionately Iranian sentiment in Iraq. Alongside the dumping
benefits Tehran’s local political allies. In this way, Iran of subsidized products on the Iraqi market and the
buys influence in Iraq. diversion of rivers feeding the Shatt al-Arab, occa-
sional artillery strikes on northern Kurdish villages
Information, propaganda, and public opinion. Along- and provocations such as the temporary occupation
side its other efforts, Iran has been vying for Iraqi hearts in December 2009 of an oil well in the Fakka oil field
and minds through Arabic-language news and entertain- in Maysan province have done little to endear Iran to
ment programs that reflect Tehran’s slant on news relating the Iraqi populace.
to Iraq and the region. These propaganda efforts, however,
have met with only limited success and have been unable Policy Recommendations
to compensate for Iranian actions that have produced an Iran’s attempts to wield its influence in Iraq have thus
anti-Iran backlash, even in Shiite regions. far yielded only mixed results, though the formation of
Polling data since 2003 have consistently shown a new government that incorporates many of Tehran’s
that large numbers of Iraqis (including Shiites) believe closest Iraqi allies, and the impending U.S. military
that Iran has had a predominantly negative influ- withdrawal from Iraq, will present new opportuni-
ence on Iraqi politics and do not consider Iran’s form ties for Iran to extend its reach. Such a move is likely
of governance a viable model for Iraq. Despite Iran’s to generate further Iraqi pushback, though it remains
information activities, this perception has remained to be seen whether Iranian influence will continue
fairly constant since 2003. to be “self-limiting” or whether this emerging real-
Public opinion in Iraq has its limits, however. Iraqi ity will create new opportunities for Tehran to trans-
politics on the national level involve a small elite form Iraq into a weak client state via a gradual process
engaged in dealmaking and horsetrading behind closed of “Lebanonization.”
doors, where public opinion plays a marginal role and Over the long run, the nature of the relationship
Iran is able to act behind the scenes. Iraqi attitudes, between Iraq and Iran will depend largely on the
however, explain why Tehran will continue to lean security situation in Iraq, the political complexion
heavily on soft power, its security services, and covert of the Iraqi government, and the type of long-term
action to project influence in Iraq. relationship Iraq builds with its Arab neighbors and
the United States. Moreover, Iraq’s reemergence as a
Limits of Iran’s Influence major oil exporter, likely at Iran’s expense, will almost
Despite investing significant resources to expand its certainly heighten tensions between the two oil-
influence in Iraq, Iran has achieved only mixed results. exporting nations.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy xiMichael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali Iran’s Influence in Iraq
Thus, while assessments of Iran as the big “winner” If the post-2011 level of U.S. engagement with Iraq is
in Iraq are premature, they may yet prove prescient if modest, Iran—which enjoys closer, more varied, and
the United States does not work energetically to coun- more extensive ties with Iraq than does the United
ter Iranian influence there in the years to come. For States or any state in the region—will almost cer-
these reasons, Washington needs to continue to tainly seek to expand its influence to confirm its posi-
tion as the paramount outside power in Iraq, with
■■ support stabilization efforts by the Iraqi Security adverse consequences for U.S. influence throughout
Forces, the region and U.S. efforts to deter and contain an
increasingly assertive Iran.
■■ press for marginalization of Sadrists and other Such an eventuality can be averted, and U.S. inter-
extremists in the new government, ests in Iraq advanced, only if the United States con-
tinues to engage Iraq on a wide variety of fronts—dip-
■■ build the kind of relationship described in the U.S.- lomatic, economic, informational, and military—and
Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, and to counter Iran’s whole-of-government approach
to Iraq with a whole-of-government approach of
■■ aid in the development of Iraq’s oil and energy sectors. its own.
xii Policy Focus #111Introduction
T H E O V E RT H R OW O F T H E R E G I M E of Saddam between Iraq and Iran, even as it must also ensure
Hussein in 2003 provided the Islamic Republic of Iran that Iraq remains a key U.S. regional partner not
with a historic opportunity to transform its relation- beholden to Iranian interests. U.S. and Iraqi interests
ship with Iraq—formerly one of its most implacable are therefore ill served by Iranian policies that foment
enemies. Iran has used the long, porous border with instability in Iraq, that subvert the state’s democratic
Iraq, longstanding ties with key Iraqi politicians, par- process, or that seek to establish unhealthy trade and
ties, and armed groups, and a burgeoning economic energy-sector dependencies that Tehran can use as a
relationship to weaken the central government, expand source of leverage over provincial governments or
its own influence, and establish itself as a key power over Baghdad.
broker in Iraq.1 If the post-2011 level of U.S. engagement with Iraq
Despite possessing numerous sources of leverage, is modest, Iran—which enjoys closer, more varied, and
Iran has thus far achieved only mixed results. Like more extensive ties with Iraq and Iraqis than does the
Washington, Tehran has discovered that its influence in United States or any state in the region—will almost
Iraq has limits. However, the formation of a new gov- certainly seek to expand its influence to become the
ernment under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that paramount outside power in Iraq, with adverse con-
incorporates many of Tehran’s closest allies, and the sequences for U.S. influence throughout the region
impending U.S. military withdrawal, will present new and for U.S. efforts to deter and contain an increas-
opportunities for Iran to further expand its influence in ingly assertive Iran. Such an eventuality can be averted,
Iraq. Thus, while assessments of Iran as the big “winner” and U.S. interests in Iraq advanced, only if the United
in Iraq are premature, they may yet prove prescient if States continues to engage Iraq on a wide variety of
the United States does not work energetically to coun- fronts—diplomatic, economic, informational, and
ter Iranian influence there in the years to come. military—and to counter Iran’s whole-of-government
The United States has a compelling interest in the approach to exerting influence in Iraq with a whole-of-
establishment of a peaceful, constructive relationship government approach of its own.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 11 | Historical Background
rival empires ruled the terri-
I N A N C I E N T T I M E S , its Islamic Revolution to Iraq, the newly established
tories that constitute modern-day Iraq and Iran. The Islamic Republic provided Saddam Hussein with a pre-
Assyrian and Babylonian empires held sway in Meso- text for invading Iran in 1980. By doing so, he aimed
potamia, while the Median and Achaemenid Empires to strike a fatal blow against his main regional rival, to
dominated the Iranian plateau. However, for much of seize its oil wealth, and to gain unrestricted access to
the 2,500 years since Cyrus the Great conquered Bab- the Gulf. Instead, the action led to a long, bloody, and
ylon in 539 BCE, Iraq and Iran have formed a single inconclusive eight-year war that killed and wounded
political unit, though Iraq at times marked a contested well in excess of a million people.
border, whether between the Roman and Sassanid The toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 by U.S.
empires or between the Ottomans and the Safavids. and coalition forces thus constituted a historic oppor-
The Treaty of Qasr Shirin, signed in 1639 CE by the tunity for Iran to weaken Iraq and expand its influence
Ottoman and Safavid empires, ceded Mesopotamia to over its neighbor. But it also posed a number of risks
the former, establishing a border that has been remark- for Tehran: that Iraq might emerge as a well-armed
ably stable ever since, despite several intervening wars.2 ally of the United States, completing the U.S. military
Iraq has held special significance for Iran ever since encirclement of the Islamic Republic; that a success-
the Safavids made Shiism the state religion in the six- ful democracy in Iraq might undermine the legitimacy
teenth century. Shiite Islam was born in Iraq, and the and appeal of the Islamic Republic; and that the qui-
Iraqi cities of Najaf, Karbala, Samarra, and Kadhimi- etistic model of Islamic jurisprudence taught in Najaf,
yah are traditional destinations for religious pilgrims freed from Saddam’s repressive shackles, could threaten
from Iran and elsewhere, and centers of Shiite learning. the Islamic Republic’s efforts to impose its form of
For this reason, a strong Persian presence existed in politicized Islam on the broader Shiite world. Clearly,
Najaf and Karbala through the latter part of the twen- the removal of Saddam represented a moment of both
tieth century.3 promise and danger.
Because of the long history of common rule and Since the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, Iran has
because of the Shiite connection, Iran views southern tried to influence developments in Iraq by working
and central Iraq as parts of its historic sphere of influence. with Iraqi Shiite parties with which it has longstand-
Conversely, given that southwestern Iran has a large Arab ing ties, as well as with emergent Shiite forces and the
population (many of them Sunni Muslims) and consti- Kurds, to create a weak federal state dominated by the
tutes a geographic extension of the plains of southern Shiites and amenable to Iranian influence. Iran has
Iraq (set off from the Iranian plateau to the north and likewise supported Shiite (and occasionally Sunni)
east), this area has often been closely tied to Iraq. insurgent groups and militias, and has sought to
The rivalry of recent centuries has intensified con- enhance its soft power in the economic, religious, and
siderably in recent decades. In attempting to export informational domains.4
2 Policy Focus #1112 | Tehran’s Political Strategy
is to unite Iraq’s Shiite
I R A N ’ S P O L I T I C A L G O A L groupings, such as Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyah coalition,
parties so that they can translate their demographic whose political base includes many Arab nationalists
weight (approximately 60 percent of the country’s and former regime supporters who strongly oppose
population) into political influence, thereby consoli- Iranian influence in Iraq. Iran’s vision for Iraqi politics
dating Shiite control over the government. As part is thus by default, if not by design, heavily sectarian,
of its long-term strategy to exercise influence in Iraq, and in diametrical opposition to the U.S. vision of an
Tehran has sought leverage through Shiite political Iraqi government that is inclusive and representative.
parties that it helped establish and has supported for The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA)—the joint Shiite
more than three decades. It has also acted to preserve list that competed in the January 2005 and Decem-
its traditionally good relations with the major Kurdish ber 2005 parliamentary elections—included ISCI,
parties to secure its influence in parts of northern Iraq. the Badr Organization, Dawa, the Sadrist Trend, the
Islamic Fadhila Party, and other small Iraqi Shiite par-
Electoral Politics ties that have enjoyed varying levels of support from
Iran has encouraged its closest allies in Iraq—the Iran. The UIA was able to garner the majority of the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (or ISCI, formerly vote in both elections, and consequently played a
SCIRI, which it helped found), the Badr Organization major role in framing the Iraqi constitution, and in the
(ISCI’s former militia), the Islamic Dawa Party, and, governments that were formed following these elec-
more recently, the Sadrists—to participate in the post- tions. The UIA was also backed in the January 2005
2003 political process and to compete in every election elections by Iraq’s most revered Shiite religious author-
on a single list, in order to prevent the Shiite vote from ity, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, despite his differences with
being split among several competing parties. the Qom-based religious establishment regarding the
Moreover, Tehran has hedged its bets by back- doctrine of clerical rule (velayat-e faqih).
ing a number of Shiite parties and movements, rather The UIA-led governments always had the tricky
than putting all its eggs in one basket, to ensure that task of balancing their own interests with those of their
its interests are secured, no matter who comes out Iranian patron. For instance, Iran opposed a security
on top.5 And it has supported an alliance between agreement between Iraq and the United States. By
its Shiite allies and key Kurdish parties with which it contrast, the Iraqi government clearly believed that an
also has longstanding ties, in order to ensure a viable agreement was in its interest. In the end, Iraq signed a
governing coalition. security agreement with the United States in Novem-
Tehran’s allies played a key role in shaping the 2005 ber 2008, though the deal included language ensuring
constitution and Iraq’s nascent political institutions,6 that Iraq would not be used as a springboard or cor-
and Iran reportedly tried to influence the outcome of ridor for attacks on Iran and established a timetable
Iraqi parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2010, and for a U.S. military withdrawal, in accordance with
provincial elections in 2009, by funding and advising Iranian demands.8
its preferred candidates.7 Perhaps the first major action by the Iraqi govern-
Iranian support to Iraq’s Shiite political lists stems ment to check Iranian influence was the crackdown
not only from shared ideological affinities and reli- in April–June 2008 by Prime Minister Maliki on the
gious solidarities and a common past opposition to the Mahdi Army and special groups in Basra and Baghdad.
regime of Saddam Hussein but also from the recogni- Coined Operation Charge of the Knights, the effort
tion that these Islamist groups offer Iran a better poten- caused considerable damage to Iranian-backed groups
tial outcome than that offered by secular nationalist as well as a breach in Maliki’s relationship with Qasem
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 3Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali Iran’s Influence in Iraq
Soleimani, Iran’s point man in Iraq and commander of Iraqi National Alliance (INA). During the electoral
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force campaign, Iran’s closest ally, ISCI, attempted to secure
(IRGC-QF).9 By the time intensive Iranian diplomacy votes by patronage extended through the Shahid al-
ended the operation, a range of Iranian-influenced mili- Mihrab Foundation, which, inter alia, underwrites the
tant and criminal leaders had been run to ground in Iraq wedding costs for young Iraqis and distributes assis-
or had fled to Iran. (Since the summer of 2010, however, tance to needy families.13
these groups have been allowed some breathing space Some of Iran’s actions in the run-up to elections
and begun to reestablish their presence in Iraq.) further harmed its allies. In December 2009, Iranian
In this and other cases, Iran has been confounded forces took over an oil well in the Fakka oil field located
by the contradictions in its own policy. Tehran has on the Iran-Iraq border in Maysan province. The Iraqi
often supported the Iraqi government on the one government responded timidly, despite popular sen-
hand while, on the other, backing violent militias that timent highly critical of Iran, even in largely Shiite
undermined Iraqi government authority. A telling case regions. The takeover placed Dawa and the INA in a
played out from mid-2006 through mid-2007 when difficult spot, as they tried to balance their ties with
IRGC-QF paramilitary support to an expanded range Tehran with the need to avoid being seen as weak in
of Shiite militant factions resulted in an escalation of dealing with a foreign threat only a few months prior
intra-Shiite violence that was eventually reined in by to elections.
Soleimani after Iraqi Shiite politicians démarched Teh- In the March 7, 2010, national elections, Iraqiyah, a
ran.10 (More recently, the October 1, 2010, decision by more secular and nationalist cross-sectarian list headed
the Sadrists to support a second Maliki premiership by former prime minister Ayad Allawi, won a plural-
brought about an immediate reduction in the then- ity of seats (91 of 325). Iran’s immediate postelection
escalating rocketfire by Iran-backed Shiite militants policy centered on preventing Allawi from forming
against the International Zone, providing an example a government. To that end, all the major Shiite lists
of Iran’s ability to scale back violence when the inter- were invited to Tehran for meetings, where the SLA
ests of its allies and proxies are aligned.11) and INA were encouraged to form a single coalition—
The unified front that the Iraqi Shiite parties pre- an effort that bore fruit with the formation of the
sented on the national level in 2005 could not be sus- National Alliance (NA) in May 2010.
tained, however, and the UIA parties ran separately in In August 2010, Tehran quietly floated the idea of a
the January 2009 provincial elections. While Maliki’s second Maliki premiership, even though previously he
State of Law Alliance (SLA) list performed well in had not been its preferred choice.14 Remarkably, Iran’s
the central and southern provinces, its main competi- longstanding ally, ISCI, rejected this idea, at one point
tor, ISCI, experienced a collapse in public support, indicating it might even back an Iraqiyah-led bloc. After
despite running a well-organized and well-resourced Tehran finally succeeded in pressuring the Sadrists to
campaign. Many attributed ISCI’s poor showing to its support Maliki for a second term, and after several addi-
widely publicized ties to Tehran. Some of ISCI’s com- tional rounds of negotiation, ISCI, and then Iraqiyah,
petitors tried to portray themselves as “one hundred agreed to accept a second term for Maliki, enabling him
percent Iraqi,” implying that ISCI was otherwise, given to finally put together a new government.
its close ties to Iran.12 The second Maliki government, however, may well
Realizing the potentially harmful implications of a prove unstable, as it combines various parties that have
split in the Iraqi Shiite vote, Iran encouraged the UIA engaged in violent conflicts in the recent past. It there-
to resurrect itself for the March 2010 parliamentary fore remains to be seen whether Tehran will finally suc-
elections. Maliki, however, formed his own list (SLA) ceed in forging its fractious Shiite clients into a sustain-
and won more votes and seats than the other Iraqi Shi- able, unified political front, or whether its efforts to do
ite parties, which competed under the umbrella of the so will once again be frustrated.
4 Policy Focus #111Tehran’s Political Strategy Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali
The experience of the last several elections has leader, Nouri al-Maliki, was selected by the more pow-
shown the limitations of Iran’s influence over its Shiite erful ISCI and Sadrists as a compromise choice for
clients in Iraq, who will accept Iranian support when prime minister in April 2006, but he has since used
self-interest dictates they do so, and seek support else- this position to build a power base in the government
where when it does not. Recent years have also shown and the army—with parts of the latter now function-
that Tehran’s activities in the Iraqi political arena have ing as a personal and party militia.19
frequently been poorly coordinated with its other While Maliki shares a general affinity with Tehran’s
activities in Iraq—such as its support for militant Shiite Islamist worldview (though not its doctrine of
groups or its handling of border disputes—indicating clerical rule) he has been mindful of his dependence
a lack of coordination in Iran’s whole-of-government on Washington for survival and has thus tried to tread
approach to Iraq. a middle path between the two powers, avoiding both
open embrace and criticism of Tehran. This may change
Political Allies in the future, however, with U.S. forces set to withdraw
ISCI was established in Tehran in 1982 by expatriate from Iraq by the end of 2011.20 Dawa commanded
Iraqis, and continued to base itself in Iran until mov- only thirteen seats in the last parliament; Maliki’s SLA
ing to Iraq in 2003. The organization’s cofounder and holds eighty-nine seats in the current parliament.
head, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, was killed The Sadrists have emerged as a major force in poli-
in August 2003 by an al-Qaeda car bomb in Najaf, tics and on the Iraqi street since 2003. Their leader,
after which ISCI was led by his brother Abdulaziz Muqtada al-Sadr, has played on his family name as the
al-Hakim until the latter’s death in August 2009. It is sole surviving son of the revered Ayatollah Muhammad
now led by his nephew Ammar al-Hakim. In the previ- Sadiq al-Sadr, who was murdered in 1999 by agents of
ous parliament, ISCI held more than 30 seats out of a Saddam Hussein’s regime. He has also employed popu-
total of 275; it now holds only 8 seats in a parliament list, anti-American rhetoric, and tapped the muscle
with 325 seats. and patronage offered by his Mahdi Army militia
ISCI’s militia, the Badr Organization (formerly (a.k.a. Jaish al-Mahdi, or JAM) to gain support among
Badr Corps), was trained and controlled by the Islamic the Shiite urban poor for his political organization,
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and fought the Office of the Martyr Sadr. The Mahdi Army was
alongside Iranian forces during the Iran-Iraq War.15 deeply involved in sectarian cleansing and looting dur-
After 2003, thousands of Badr militiamen entered ing Iraq’s civil war of 2006–2007.
southern Iraq from Iran to help secure that part of the Religious in orientation, the Sadrist movement
country.16 Many were subsequently integrated into the embraces a variant of Iran’s doctrine of clerical rule.
Iraqi Security Forces, particularly the army and the Sadr’s sights are fixed on long-term dominance of the
Ministry of Interior’s intelligence and special forces Iraqi clerical establishment and the creation of a system
organizations.17 Badr has demonstrated increasing of government in southern and central Iraq that fuses
independence with each successive leadership transi- elements of Hassan Nasrallah’s charismatic leadership
tion in ISCI since 2003, perhaps reflecting diminish- of the Lebanese Hizballah with the Iranian model of
ing confidence in ISCI’s younger, less experienced clerical rule—albeit with an Iraqi cleric, presumably
current leadership.18 Badr controls nine seats in the Sadr himself, atop the structure.
current parliament. While aligned politically with ISCI and Dawa,
The Islamic Dawa Party, founded in 1957, enjoyed the Sadrists have had a contentious and violent rela-
the support of the Islamic Republic during the lat- tionship with both groups. Sadr fled to Iran in 2007
ter phases of its underground existence in Iraq. After to avoid being targeted by U.S. and Iraqi forces under
2003, Dawa joined the political process, but its lack the control of Prime Minister Maliki, though he
of an armed militia limited its potential. The party’s claimed his stay was to burnish his religious leadership
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 5Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali Iran’s Influence in Iraq
credentials by studying to become an ayatollah.21 He despite their political setbacks in 2008–2009, giving
returned to Iraq briefly in January 2011 and again members a very effective means to undermine the hesi-
in February. Likewise, his relationship with Iran is tant beginnings of a cross-sectarian nationalist agenda
anything but straightforward, with Sadr reportedly in Iraqi politics by steering the debate back to sectari-
threatening to leave Iran for Lebanon if the Islamic anism and the Baathist past of many Iraqi politicians.
Republic continued to pressure him to accept Prime In effect, Iran’s allies identified a fulcrum where they
Minister Maliki for a second term. Eventually, how- could use their temporarily limited political influence
ever, Sadr relented.22 to produce a strategic outcome—the scuttling of a
One Iranian lever over Sadr has been Ayatollah nationalist alliance of Maliki and Allawi supporters,
Kadhim Hussaini al-Haeri, a claimant to the leader- which would have been a disaster for ISCI, the Sad-
ship of the Sadrist Trend.23 The Qom-based Haeri has rists, and Iran.
functioned as Sadr’s mentor and marja since the death Finally, Iran has longstanding ties with Iraq’s main
of Sadr’s father, and at one time Sadr served as Haeri’s Kurdish parties—the Kurdistan Democratic Party
representative in Najaf, although their relationship has (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
been strained in recent years as a result of Sadr’s radi- Kurdish peshmerga guerrillas fought with Iran against
cal stances on a number of issues. Sadr is rumored to Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq War, and Tehran
have continued his studies under Haeri during his stay armed the PUK during its fighting with the KDP
in Iran between 2007 and 2011.24 from 1994 to 1998.27
The Sadrists held 32 seats in the outgoing 275-seat Iran continues to enjoy close ties with the PUK and
parliament, and have roughly maintained this share KDP and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
with 40 seats in the new 325-seat parliament. This based in Irbil, although relations are strained regularly
is a significant achievement in light of the backlash by Iranian cross-border artillery strikes and incursions
against the Sadrist movement in the 2009 provincial into northern Iraq against guerrillas from the Iranian
elections, when Iraqi Shiites punished the movement Kurdish Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK).
for empowering religious vigilantes and criminals in Although the KDP and particularly the PUK have
the ranks of the Mahdi Army. The Sadrist movement’s benefited from Iranian support, a certain measure of
comeback appears to be due, at least in part, to careful Tehran’s influence over Kurdish leaders is rooted in
Iranian coaching on electoral strategy, including advice the fear and intimidation the Iranians exert. Iran is
from Iranian political scientists regarding the optimal also rapidly developing bilateral economic ties with
selection and placement of candidates.25 The support the KRG that suit the needs of both Tehran and Irbil;
appears to have paid off, with the Sadrists displacing the landlocked and cash-strapped KRG gains access to
ISCI as Prime Minister Maliki’s main Shiite partner markets, while Iran can obtain refined fuel products
(or rival) within the political system, securing seven and technology through the KRG, thereby circum-
ministries in the new government (albeit some of the venting international sanctions.
less significant ministries).
Another aspect of Iran’s political influence was Vectors of Influence
exposed in the lead-up to the March 7, 2010, elections Iran formally exercises its influence through its embassy
in the actions of the Accountability and Justice Com- in Baghdad, along with consulates in Basra, Karbala,
mission (AJC), the successor to the De-Baathification Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah. Both of its post-2003 ambas-
Committee. This evolving entity has, since 2003, been sadors—Hassan Kazemi-Qomi and Hassan Danaifar
dominated by the Shiite politicians Ahmed Chalabi (the latter was born in Iraq, but his family was expelled
and Ali al-Lami, two veteran interlocutors between by Saddam Hussein)—are officers in the IRGC-QF,
Iran and the Iraqi Shiite factions.26 The AJC proved reflecting the central role played by this critical institu-
to be a forum in which Iran’s allies still dominated, tion in formulating and implementing policy in Iraq.28
6 Policy Focus #111Tehran’s Political Strategy Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani report- predawn raid on the house of Badr Organization head edly played a key role in negotiations to form an Hadi al-Ameri, in a Baghdad compound belonging Iraqi government in 2005, and to broker ceasefires to ISCI chief Abdulaziz al-Hakim.33 Five more Qods between ISCI and the Mahdi Army in 2007 and Force officers posing as diplomats were detained by between the Iraqi government and the Mahdi Army U.S. forces in Irbil in January 2007 (though the appar- in 2008.29 More recently, Iranian Majlis speaker Ali ent target of the raid, IRGC-QF Brig. Gen. Muham- Larijani participated in negotiations to encourage mad Jafari, was reportedly staying at Kurdish leader ISCI, Dawa, and the Sadrists to run as a unified bloc Massoud Barzani’s guesthouse at the time).34 And in in the 2010 elections and to form a governing coali- September 2007, a Qods Force sector commander, tion thereafter.30 Mahmoud Farhadi, posing as a visiting businessman, Iranian proxies within the security forces are was detained by U.S. forces in Sulaymaniyah. He was another key vector of influence. Between 2003 and reportedly in Iraq to arrange the transfer of arms to 2005, sixteen thousand militia personnel were incor- insurgent groups.35 These incidents highlight the close porated into the nascent Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). ties between the IRGC-QF and prominent Iraqi poli- These so-called dimaj (direct accession) personnel lack ticians and officials and underscore the ease with which any formal professional education as soldiers or police- Qods Force personnel operate in Iraq. men. The Shiite Islamist parties, and particularly the A crude but important vector of Iranian power Badr Organization, provided most of the personnel involves the distribution of money through a net- incorporated into the ISF in this way.31 work of Iranian and Iraqi agents. Financial assistance These recruits included many Iraqi Shiites who is a simple and effective way to literally buy influence lived in exile in Iran throughout the 1980s and 1990s, in Iraq because, as one Iraqi commented in reference who fought on the Iranian side during the Iran-Iraq to some of his countrymen, “They hate Iran, but they War, and who either have dual Iraqi-Iranian citizenship don’t hate money.”36 In some cases, Iranian government or who were born in Iran and only received their Iraqi funds are used to support political proxies in Iraq, con- citizenship post-2003. The Badr recruits were often tributing to the costs of operating political offices and assigned to Iraqi army intelligence, Ministry of Inte- social foundations such as ISCI’s social and religious rior special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, and organization, the Shahid al-Mihrab Foundation.37 In the ministry’s National Information and Investigations other cases, Iran has granted large sums of money to its Agency. Because, prior to 2003, Badr personnel were Iraqi proxies so that they can buy property or invest in trained and controlled by the IRGC-QF during their privatized state-owned enterprises, with the end goal stay in Iran, their integration into the ISF since then of helping these proxies provide jobs and housing for has produced a serious counterintelligence challenge.32 potential supporters. The business interests of the Ira- Iranian Qods Force operatives have also been nian regime are supported by collaborative schemes directly implicated in efforts to arm, train, and finance involving Iraqi businessmen, often former or current militias and insurgent groups in Iraq. In December Badr members or Sadrists, who collude to dominate 2006, U.S. forces detained two senior IRGC-QF offi- the cross-border business in religious tourism and the cers (including the senior Qods Force operations offi- award of contracts by the federal government and pro- cer in Iraq) linked to attacks on American forces in a vincial councils.38 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 7
3 | Support for Militias and Insurgents WHILE ENCOURAGING ITS Iraqi political allies to post-2003 support for overt organizations like ISCI work with the United States and to participate in the and the paramilitary Badr Corps as well as under- nascent democratic political process since 2003, Iran ground special groups.44 Likewise, many Iraqis who has also armed, trained, and funded Shiite militias appeared in the 1970s as underground antiregime and Shiite (and, on occasion, Sunni) insurgents, in activists in Iraq and in the 1980s as exiled anti-Saddam order to provide its political allies with the means to insurgents in Iran have emerged in the past decade as undermine or eliminate political rivals, and to bring politicians or anti-American leaders of special groups about a humiliating and chastening defeat for the in post-Saddam Iraq.45 United States that would deter future U.S. military Following the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in interventions in the region. Indeed, according to U.S. April 2003, Iran initially relied on its traditional allies ambassador James Jeffrey, Iranian-supported Shiite in ISCI’s Badr Corps, which had conducted covert militias and insurgent groups may have been respon- paramilitary operations in Iraq during the 1980s and sible for up to one quarter of all U.S. combat casual- 1990s under orders from the IRGC-QF.46 As Badr ties in Iraq.39 joined the political process and became an overt orga- Iran has also apparently used its Shiite militant nization, Iran expanded its proxy networks by splinter- proxies to stoke sectarian tensions and to foment polit- ing off radical figures from Badr, such as Abu Mustafa ical violence, only to then step in diplomatically to al-Sheibani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, as well as resolve these conflicts—thereby burnishing its image radical figures from Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army as an indispensable partner for Iraq.40 These armed militia, such as Qais al-Khazali and Ismail al-Lami groups also provide Tehran with an additional source (a.k.a. Abu Dira—the notorious “Shiite Zarqawi”47), of influence should its political allies prove unreliable, to form covert special groups.48 This technique was and the means to retaliate against U.S. forces in Iraq first used by Iran in Lebanon to woo radical members should Iran’s nuclear infrastructure be attacked by the of the more moderate Lebanese Shiite Amal Party to United States or Israel.41 form the radical Hizballah movement.49 Following the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, In creating these special groups, Iran also hoped to Tehran may use its support for these Shiite militias develop alternatives to the out-of-control Mahdi Army and insurgent groups to press the Iraqi government to that it could more easily use to advance its interests. curtail its relationship with the United States and as a However, the boundaries between these groups are source of leverage over the government on other issues. sometimes blurred. Thus, Badr personnel who have And some Iranian-sponsored special groups may seek been integrated into Iraq’s security forces are believed to draw upon their record of resistance against the to regularly provide tip-offs and targeting advice to United States and their influence on the street as an “fellow travelers” in the special groups to facilitate entree into politics, much as Hizballah in Lebanon their activities.50 and Muqtada al-Sadr have done.42 Iran has supported its militant proxies using Qods The Islamic Republic has been sponsoring Iraqi Force operatives, both Iranian and Iraqi, supported paramilitary proxies for nearly the entire span of its by Arabic-speaking Lebanese Hizballah operatives.51 thirty-year existence.43 And many of the techniques It has transferred large quantities of weapons, explo- used by Iran during the 1980s remain in use to this sives, and specialized equipment to militia and insur- day. Thus, Iraqi government reporting on Iranian gent groups in Iraq since 2003, through official ports proxy operations from before 2003 noted a reliance of entry and smuggling routes in Basra, Maysan, on both overt and clandestine entities, foreshadowing Wasit, and Diyala provinces, and the KRG, paying off 8 Policy Focus #111
Support for Militias and Insurgents Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali
tribesmen and border guards to facilitate these activi- Following the July–August 2006 war between Hizbal-
ties.52 Iran’s armed forces support border smuggling lah and Israel, the IRGC-QF sought to build on and
activities by various means, including unmanned aerial replicate the perceived success experienced by Hizbal-
vehicles, helicopters, visual surveillance, signals intel- lah by providing large numbers of advanced explosively
ligence, and gunfire to intimidate and chase off Iraqi formed penetrator (EFP) roadside bombs to a wide
border patrols.53 range of Shiite militant groups in Iraq. Some of these
Several thousand Shiite militia members are bombs were used for score settling, including the assas-
believed to have received training from the IRGC-QF sination of two provincial police chiefs and two pro-
and Lebanese Hizballah in Iran and Lebanon dur- vincial governors from rival parties in southern Iraq in
ing this time.54 Evidence suggests that Iranian-backed the latter half of 2006. This escalating violence culmi-
facilitators fund attack cells lavishly, building up large nated in a bloody gunfight between armed ISCI and
arms caches in Iraq and paying thousands of dollars for Mahdi Army personnel in the shrine city of Karbala in
individual attacks against U.S. forces—sums that many late August 2007.58 After this incident, Iran scaled back
young unemployed Iraqis are loath to refuse.55 its support for militant proxies in Iraq in order to pre-
While Iran has focused most of its efforts on Shi- vent further bloodshed.59
ite groups, it is also believed to have provided indirect By 2010, Iran had narrowed its military support to
military support to Sunni insurgent groups, including just three groups: the Sadrist movement’s Promised
local al-Qaeda affiliates, though few details are avail- Day Brigade (PDB), Asaib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), and
able.56 Salafi jihadist groups such as Ansar al-Islam Kataib Hizballah (KH).60 The PDB was created to
have long utilized Iran as a transit route to and from replace the Mahdi Army as the armed wing of Muqtada
Afghanistan, and as an operational base for attacks al-Sadr’s movement, with its formation announced
into the KRG and northern Iraq. Some senior KRG in June 2008. The group’s inception resulted from a
officials believe that Iran can adjust the level of threat compromise among the militant cadres in the Sadrist
posed by these groups and that the IRGC-QF has movement, allowing a select group of Sadrist fighters
some measure of awareness of and perhaps even con- to remain under a clear chain of command and strict
trol over the activities of Ansar al-Islam within Iraq, discipline to avoid the decentralization that caused the
possibly using this group to pressure the KRG to rein Mahdi Army militia to fracture and run out of con-
in anti-Iranian PEJAK operations.57 trol. The PDB is believed to retain some independence
from the IRGC-QF and has not been very active
Challenges for Iran’s Proxy Strategy recently, though some PDB members have apparently
Iran’s support for the Mahdi Army quickly became collaborated with KH and AAH organizers in attacks
problematic with the movement’s dramatic expansion on U.S. forces.61 PDB took credit for a January 1, 2011,
after 2003, its incorporation of numerous criminal ele- attack on Camp Echo in Diwaniyah, possibly presag-
ments, and the Sadrist movement’s own fragmentation ing a ramp-up in activities in the wake of Sadr’s return
owing to disagreements over strategy, tactics, and Sadr’s to Iraq. 62
leadership. Moreover, the Mahdi Army’s radical agenda Asaib Ahl al-Haqq is led by Qais al-Khazali, who
and its competition for power within Iraq’s Shiite com- served as Sadr’s chief spokesman until his dismissal
munity repeatedly brought it into conflict with ISCI during the summer uprising in 2004.63 While AAH is
and the Iraqi government, thereby undermining Iranian an independent group that has pursued its own agenda
efforts to unify the Shiite community. relative to the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) and
An unintended consequence of the IRGC-QFs the Mahdi Army/PDB, it still belongs to the Sadrist
support for a range of Shiite militia and insurgent movement, and some of its members and sympathizers
groups (Badr, the Mahdi Army, and the special groups) may participate in mainstream Sadrist organizations.
was to contribute to internecine violence among them. AAH has drawn on Iranian support to undertake
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 9Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali Iran’s Influence in Iraq
complex ambushes and to kidnap coalition forces, veteran terrorist (and former member of parliament)
most notably the January 2007 abduction and killing Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. KH was formed in early
of five U.S. soldiers from the Provincial Joint Coordi- 2007 as a vehicle for the IRGC-QF to deploy its most
nation Center in Karbala, and the May 2007 kidnap- experienced operators and most sensitive equipment.
ping of British accounting consultant Peter Moore, and Since then, it has developed into a compact, disci-
his four bodyguards (who were subsequently killed).64 plined movement of fewer than four hundred men
On March 20, 2007, Khazali was captured by Brit- under IRGC-QF control. Improved Iranian advice
ish forces along with his brother Laith and Hizbal- and training have produced recent modest improve-
lah operative Ali Musa Daqduq in Basra.65 In time, ments in tactical performance.70 Money for KH is
Khazali was transferred to Iraqi custody and released in believed to be routed from Iran to militant recruits
exchange for Moore in January 2010.66 During Khaza- via mosques and husseiniyahs (Shiite religious spaces)
li’s detention, AAH tried to balance its desire to obtain in Wasit, Maysan, and Basra provinces.71 Iranian advi-
the release of its leader against the desire of many AAH sors reportedly returned to Iraq in mid-2010 with
members to continue attacks on U.S. forces. KH operatives trained in Iran to conduct attacks on
As part of its efforts to facilitate Khazali’s release, departing U.S. forces, to create the impression that the
AAH ultimately agreed in August 2009 to renounce United States was forced out of Iraq by the Shiite resis-
violence and to participate in the political process.67 tance organizations, supported by Iran.72
However, some members of AAH have continued to Mortar and rocket attacks against U.S. bases are a
engage in violent activities in Baghdad and Maysan signature tactic of the special groups. In 2010, an aver-
province, including the January 2010 kidnapping of age of twenty-two indirect fire attacks a month were
U.S. military contractor Issa Salomi in Baghdad to conducted by special groups on U.S. bases. The attacks
pressure the Iraqi government to release AAH detain- usually entailed 107-millimeter rockets fired singly or
ees. Salomi was released in March 2010. in pairs, though Iranian-made 122-millimeter rockets
As happened to the Mahdi Army, AAH may be are increasingly launched from improvised multiple-
evolving into an umbrella organization for a wide rocket-launcher trucks in salvos of as many as sixteen
range of militants who seek to engage in violence to twenty. Very large Iranian-made 240-millimeter
based on a host of ideological, sectarian, commercial, rockets are also used occasionally, as are improvised
or criminal motives. While Khazali is still believed to rocket-assisted munitions (IRAMs).73
be in Iran, where he traveled immediately following Throughout the summer of 2010, special groups’
his release, other notorious special group command- rocket attacks on the U.S. embassy compound in Bagh-
ers such as Sadrist breakaway Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani dad and Basra Air Station became more regular and
and former Badr member Ismail al-Lami (a.k.a. Abu more accurate, in part owing to declining U.S. aerial
Dira) reportedly returned from Iran in summer 2010 surveillance and ground and river patrolling. Dur-
to help replenish the ranks of AAH and perhaps spear- ing 2010, 148 mortar and rocket attacks hit Baghdad,
head its transformation into a political organization including 49 during a three-month period in late sum-
with a militia wing, à la Lebanese Hizballah.68 The mer.74 And while most of these attacks were not lethal,
competition between OMS and AAH to be seen as one U.S. soldier and three U.S.-contracted security
the authentic voice of “resistance” by the urban and guards were killed by indirect fire in the International
rural Shiite poor who make up the popular base of the Zone and Basra between June and August 2010.75
Sadrist movement has sparked bitter rivalry between Significantly, indirect fire on the International
the two organizations.69 Zone slackened immediately after the October 1, 2010,
As AAH has generally ramped down its militant announcement that the Sadrist bloc had endorsed the
activities, Iran seems to have shifted its support toward reappointment of Maliki as prime minister, dropping
the even more hardline Kataib Hizballah, headed by from over a dozen attacks per month to three or four
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