Behavioral Pragmatism: No Place for Reality and Truth
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
The Behavior Analyst 2000, 23, 191-202 No. 2 (Fall)
Behavioral Pragmatism:
No Place for Reality and Truth
Dermot Barnes-Holmes
National University of Ireland, Maynooth
The current article begins by reviewing L. J. Hayes's claim that pragmatism relies on a correspon-
dence-based truth criterion. To evaluate her claim, the concept of the observation sentence, proposed
by the pragmatist philosopher W. V. Quine, is examined. The observation sentence appears to
remove the issue of correspondence from Quine's pragmatist philosophy. Nevertheless, the issue of
correspondence reemerges, as the problem of homology, when Quine appeals to agreement between
or among observation sentences as the basis for truth. Quine also argues, however, that the problem
of homology (i.e., correspondence) should be ignored on pragmatic grounds. Because the problem
is simply ignored, but not resolved, there appears to be some substance to Hayes's claim that
pragmatism relies ultimately on correspondence as a truth criterion. Behavioral pragmatism is then
introduced to circumvent both Hayes's claim and Quine's implicit appeal to correspondence. Be-
havioral pragmatism avoids correspondence by appealing to the personal goals (i.e., the behavior)
of the scientist or philosopher as the basis for establishing truth. One consequence of this approach,
however, is that science and philosophy are robbed of any final or absolute objectives and thus may
not be a satisfactory solution to philosophers. On balance, behavioral pragmatism avoids any appeal
to correspondence-based truth, and thus it cannot be criticized for generating the same philosophical
problems that have come to be associated with this truth criterion.
Key words: realism, truth, behavioral pragmatism
The idea that scientists are primarily it helps an individual achieve some
concerned with understanding the nat- practical goal; whether or not the state-
ural world is taken by most to be axi- ment or theory reflects an ontological
omatic. Not all scholars are entirely reality is seen to be irrelevant from the
convinced that this is the case, how- pragmatist's perspective (Barnes &
ever. The philosophical tradition Roche, 1997). In contrast to this view
known as pragmatism, for example, of pragmatism, L. J. Hayes' (1993) has
questions the apparently obvious idea argued that upon close scrutiny prag-
that science is concerned with devel- matists are in fact very concerned with
oping an increasingly accurate picture the nature of reality. The current article
of the universe as it really is (see begins with a detailed summary of her
Goodman, 1995). Pragmatists, it is argument. Subsequently, Quine's con-
commonly believed, are not concerned cept of the observation sentence is ex-
with the nature of reality, but with suc- amined. This "mainstream" pragmatist
cessful working. For a pragmatist, a concept is then used to evaluate the ac-
statement or theory gains truth value if curacy of Hayes's claim that pragma-
tists are concerned with the nature of
This paper is dedicated to Yvonne. I missed reality, and as a result the accuracy of
you all those years, my love. the claim is found to be somewhat am-
An earlier version of the current work was biguous. Quine's concept of the obser-
presented at a Guest Speaker's Seminar in the vation sentence, however, also appears
Department of Psychology, University of Ne-
vada, Reno. I thank Linda Hayes, Steve Hayes, to raise a problem. In the second half
Kelly Wilson, Yvonne Barnes-Holmes, Bryan
Roche, and two anonymous reviewers for their I
In the current article I will be citing both L.
many useful and constructive comments on ear- J. Hayes and S. C. Hayes, but the former will
lier versions of the current work. be cited far more frequently than the latter, and
Requests for reprints may be addressed to thus inserting the initials L. J. for every appro-
Dermot Barnes-Holmes, Department of Psy- priate citation would be rather unwieldy. Con-
chology, National University of Ireland, May- sequently, I will simply cite Hayes in the former
nooth, Maynooth, County Kildare, Ireland (E- case, but always refer to the latter author as S.
mail: Dermot.Barnes-Holmes @may.ie). C. Hayes.
191192 DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES
of the article, therefore, a behavior-an- less, as it actually is. This is the com-
alytic version of pragmatism is offered monsense view of the world, and
that aims to address both the claim Hayes points out that few technical
made by Hayes (vis-a-vis pragmatism's philosophers subscribe to this view.
concern with reality) and the problem The latter, not-so-naive realism, consti-
raised by Quine's concept of the ob- tutes the position to which most tech-
servation sentence. nical philosophers of this genre sub-
scribe. According to this position, the
HAYES ON universe exists independently of the
REALITY AND TRUTH knower, but it cannot be known as
One- and Two-Universe Systems such. According to Hayes, the know-
er's involvement serves to differentiate
According to Hayes (1993), all hu- the many positions falling into this cat-
man enterprises may be divided into egory. In some cases the knower gains
just two categories: one-universe and knowledge from sources other than ex-
two-universe systems. Hayes argues perience or learning (e.g., innate or ex-
that one-universe systems resist de- tranatural sources; Kant). Objective
scription, and that they underlie the idealism is similar in certain respects
mystic traditions. In other words, one- (Plato and Hegel). What unifies these
universe systems may be hinted at or positions, according to Hayes, "is the
implied (e.g., through Buddhist koans), contradictory proposition that we can-
but they cannot be spoken about di- not know the world as it actually is be-
rectly. One cannot speak about another cause our knowledge of the world as it
universe, in a one-universe system, be- actually is does not correspond to what
cause in doing so one creates a two- we know about it" (1993, p. 37).
universe system (i.e., the universe of Hayes also points out that other re-
speaking and the universe about which alists accept that knowledge of the
one speaks). world is gained via contact with the
Beyond the oneness, about which world, and because such contact differs
one cannot speak, there are ways of across knowers, and because no one
talking about the universe; what Hayes has contacted the universe in its entire-
calls conventional two-universe philos- ty, the known world has the stamp of
ophies. Under the rubric of conven- each knower's particular experience
tional philosophy, Hayes lists the ide- and thus differs from the world as it
alisms, including subjective idealism actually exists. From this point of
and solipsism, in which the existence view, knowing is the issue, not exis-
of the knower is not questioned, and tence, and epistemology is the focus,
thus the knower constitutes reality in not ontology.
these positions. Hayes also lists more According to Hayes, if this type of
elaborated or extended forms of ideal- not-so-naive realist assumed that
ism, in which the existence of the knowing was not about anything-that
knower is denied. Instead the knower speaking was not referential-this po-
is considered to be an aspect of some sition might be considered an example
sort of deity. If the deity can be spoken of a one-universe system, and as such
about this constitutes a two-universe ontological concerns would be irrele-
system, but if the deity cannot be de- vant. Hayes argues, however, that for
scribed, such a position may be cate- most realists "knowing is something
gorized as a one-universe system. knowers do with respect to things other
Hayes also lists the realisms as ex- than themselves" (1993, p. 37). Con-
amples of conventional philosophy, sequently, despite the reluctance of the
which she subdivides into naive and not-so-naive realist to deal with onto-
not-so-naive realism. For the former, logical issues, the ontological reality of
the universe exists independently of the universe is implicated whenever
the knower and can be known, more or epistemological issues with respect toBEHAVIORAL PRAGMATISM 193
it are addressed in this way. In effect, power exerted by an entity that is itself
Hayes believes that even for the not- changeless-incorruptible" (Hayes,
so-naive realist, what he or she says 1993, p. 39). As Hayes rightly points
about the universe is judged to be true out, this is not a doctrine that sits easily
to the extent that it corresponds to the with modem science. "There are no
universe as it actually is. At this point, such entities from a scientific perspec-
Hayes fleshes out her thesis by focus- tive; and from a psychological per-
ing on the issue of truth. spective, there is no knowledge in
which knowers do not participate and
Truth which is not colored by that participa-
tion" (Hayes, 1993, p. 39).
Hayes deals first with correspon- 3. Correspondence between obser-
dence-based truth. She argues that vation and description. In considering
there are several problems with corre- this third type of correspondence,
spondence as a truth criterion when in- Hayes points out that what a person
terpreted from a two-universe perspec- observes is not known until some form
tive. Specifically, Hayes considers of report is provided, and that report
three possible types of correspondence, is a description. In effect, an event oc-
and points out fundamental problems curs (e.g., a red light), which is ob-
with each type. served (i.e., an individual notices the
1. Correspondence between ontolog- red light), and a report or description
ical reality and description. Hayes be- of that observation is then made (e.g.,
gins by pointing out that if correspon- the person states "I saw a red light").
dence, as a truth criterion, implies for- Only when the report occurs can we
mal similarity between the words spo- know what the person observed. From
ken and the thing spoken about, this this perspective, it is impossible to
requirement cannot be fulfilled. The compare an observation with a descrip-
word horse, for example, bears no for- tion of an observation because in order
mal resemblance to an actual horse. In to do so, one must first convert the ob-
effect, if the universe is conceptualized servation into a description, with the
as something about which we speak result that one is no longer comparing
and not the speaking itself, correspon- a description with an observation, but
dence, interpreted as formal similarity, a description with another description.
eludes us. Hayes therefore concludes "that the
2. Correspondence between ontolog- only things that can correspond as a
ical reality and observation. In ad- means of determining truth are what
dressing this type of correspondence, we say about the universe and what we
Hayes points out that to observe the say about the universe. What we say
universe as it actually is would require now is true if it corresponds to what
that we contact the universe in such a we have said, or conversely, what we
way that our anthropological, biologi- have said continues to be true if it cor-
cal, cultural, and personal histories do responds to what we say now" (Hayes,
not contribute in any way to what we 1993, pp. 39-40). Clearly, convention-
know about the universe by way of that al philosophy, as Hayes points out,
contact. If these histories participate in would not be satisfied with this partic-
any act of observation they will influ- ular view of truth.
ence how the universe is observed, and Hayes acknowledges that some re-
thus direct or uncontaminated contact alists are clearly aware of the problems
with the universe becomes impossible surrounding the correspondence truth
(e.g., which animal observes the world criterion (i.e., those problems arising
as it actually is-a human, a bat, or a from the three types outlined above),
fly?). To observe the universe as it ac- and have therefore adopted a pragmatic
tually is would require that observing truth criterion in which the truth of a
be considered a power, not an act. "A proposition is based on its usefulness.194 DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES
In short, pragmatists deny any connec- QUINE ON
tion between correspondence and truth. OBSERVATION SENTENCES
Hayes, however, takes issue with this Is Hayes correct in asserting that
denial. pragmatism relies ultimately on corre-
Pragmatism and correspondence- spondence as a truth criterion? In ad-
based truth. Hayes correctly points out dressing this question, some of the
that pragmatists take the view that the- writings of the pragmatist philosopher
oretical statements are deemed true or W. V. Quine (e.g., 1960, 1974, 1990)
false based on demonstrable effects in seem most pertinent. There are, of
the domain of practical affairs. Utility course, many other pragmatist philos-
at the level of practical affairs is re- ophers (see Goodman, 1995), but
quired, Hayes argues, because it is only Quine is generally considered to be
at this level that the truth criterion may mainstream. Furthermore, and perhaps
be applied unambiguously. Hayes asks, more important, Quine's concept of the
for example, "how do we know ... observation sentence is concerned with
when we have achieved the goal of the truth value of statements made
greater understanding? What does about publicly observable events, and
greater understanding look like?" thus this concept bears directly upon
(1993, p. 41). In contrast to the nebu- Hayes's claim that the truth of a state-
lous nature of "greater understand- ment, even for the pragmatist, is con-
ing," Hayes points out that we know firmed by the observation of actual
when our beliefs have served a more events.
mundane purpose by observing a spe- According to Quine, an observation
cific outcome directly. For instance, we sentence is deemed to be true when
know that a spot remover has removed most members of a language commu-
a spot when we see the spot removed. nity could, in principle, compare the
Only in the domain of practical affairs, sentence to a particular event and agree
Hayes suggests, may the usefulness of that it was correctly used in the pres-
a proposition be evaluated, because ence of that event. In Quine's own
only in this domain may we compare words, "A sentence is observational
the correspondence between what we insofar as its truth value, on any oc-
believe and what actually exists. At casion, would be agreed to by just
this point Hayes concludes that utility- about any member of the speech com-
based truth also depends on a corre- munity witnessing the occasion"
(1974, p. 39). For example, the obser-
spondence between what we say about vation sentence, "Spot remover re-
some feature of the universe and that moved the spot," is true in English, if
feature itself. For example, the state- the present situation contains the stim-
ment that "spot remover removes uli that were present when normal
spots" is useful (i.e., true) because the speakers of English learned this ex-
statement is confirmed when we ob- pression. Quine considers observation
serve the actual removal of spots by sentences to be critical for the acqui-
spot remover. sition of language because their appro-
For Hayes, therefore, pragmatism priate use can be easily checked with
surrenders ultimately to correspon- the practices of the verbal community.
dence-based truth, and thus the philo- Furthermore, Quine argues that the se-
sophical problems that Hayes suggests mantical nature of the observation sen-
arise out of this truth criterion also tence means that it can be used by sci-
emerge out of pragmatism. Further- entists to resolve theoretical disagree-
more, insofar as Hayes is correct, there ments. Again, in Quine's own words,
is an inherent verbal inconsistency in Observation sentences are sentences on which
the pragmatist's appeal to both utility scientists can reach agreement when they are
and correspondence as truth criteria. trying to reconcile their theories, and they areBEHAVIORAL PRAGMATISM 195
sentences that can be socially checked against dence simply does not arise. From this
their occasions of utterance when we are picking perspective, therefore, Hayes is incor-
up a language. Because of this semantical trait
of observation sentences it is they that are rect to argue that a utility-based truth
learned most readily, affording the entering relies ultimately on correspondence be-
wedge in the acquisition of one's language. Ob- tween description of the feature and the
servation sentences are the gateway to language, feature itself (or the observation of the
as to science. (1974, p. 40) feature). However, the issue is not so
Because Quine suggests that scien- clear cut. In his treatment of observa-
tists may resolve their theoretical dis- tion sentences, Quine openly admits
agreements by appealing to observa- that "homology" (an issue that arises
tion sentences, one might easily con- when one assumes correspondence be-
clude that Hayes's claim is in fact cor- tween observation sentences and on-
rect (i.e., that utility-based truth tological reality) creates a problem for
depends ultimately on a correspon- his analysis, and it is to this issue that
dence between what the pragmatist we now turn.
says about some feature of the universe As outlined earlier, an observation
and that feature itself). To draw this sentence is deemed true when, on any
conclusion, however, would be to mis- occasion, it would be agreed to by al-
understand Quine's concept of the ob- most any member of the language
servation sentence. Quine deliberately community witnessing the occasion.
combined the separate concepts of ob- As Quine points out, this definition of
servation and description into the sin- the observation sentence relies on what
gle concept of the observation sentence he refers to as "joint witnessing"
so that the issue of correspondence be- (1974, p. 41). In attempting to pin
tween observation and description (i.e., down exactly what this term means, he
Hayes's third type of correspondence) suggests that a more precise definition
could be circumvented: would "speak of witnesses subject to
receptually similar impingements"
I propose that we drop the talk of observation (1974, p. 41). In doing so, however,
and talk instead of observation sentences, the Quine admits that this definition raises
sentences that are said to report observations.
... No matter that sensations are private, and no the problem of homology. This prob-
matter that men may take radically different lem refers to the fact that the physical
views of the environing situation; the observa- receptors of different organisms are far
tion sentence serves nicely to pick out what wit- from homologous, and thus one cannot
nesses can agree on. (Quine, 1974, p. 39)
argue that agreement between two in-
For Quine, therefore, there is no sepa- dividuals occurs only when their re-
ration, conceptually, between the ob- spective receptors are similarly affect-
servation (i.e., the private sensation or ed by the event about which they
the different views of an event) and the agree. Quine summarizes the problem
descriptive sentence; these two ele- as follows:
ments participate in a single conceptual
unit, and thus questions pertaining to Receptual similarity was defined ... in terms of
how close the class of all the receptors that were
the correspondence between the obser- activated in one episode came to matching the
vation and the sentence are rendered class of those activated in another episode. At
meaningless.2 Accordingly, when sci- that point we were thinking of the episodes and
entists employ observation sentences the receptors as all belonging to one subject. But
now we have appealed to receptual similarity be-
as a means of resolving theoretical dis- tween episodes a and a' of two subjects. The
agreements, the issue of correspon- subjects share no receptors, so it is no longer a
question of matching the two classes of recep-
tors on the score of their sharing most of their
2 As an aside, Quine's concept of the obser- members. It becomes a question rather of how
vation sentence bears some similarity to Skin- nearly homologous, anatomically, most of the
ner's (1957) concept of the tact, insofar as both members of one class are with those of the other.
concepts combine the talk and the talked about Vagueness mounts, since the receptors of differ-
into a single analytic unit. ent subjects are far from homologous. Nor is196 DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES
anything to be gained by trying rather to match of correspondence (i.e., between obser-
the distribution of the external forces impinging vation and description) also applies to
on the two subjects; for we would have to re-
quire that the subjects be oriented alike to the Quine's concept of the observation
impingement pattern, and this revives the ho- sentence. Because we cannot identify
mology question. (1974, pp. 23-24) precisely what is being agreed about
Although Quine clearly acknowledges when observation sentences are uttered
that homology presents a problem for appropriately, we are left only with
his concept of joint witnessing, and agreement among such sentences and
thus for his concept of the observation no clear comparison of observation
sentence, he also argues that the prob- sentences with ontological reality.
lem may be approached pragmatically. Truth therefore collapses into little
Continuing directly from the previous more than correspondence between
quotation, Quine states, "In practice, what we say about the universe and
[italics added] of course, psychologists what we say about the universe
find no difficulty in such intersubjec- (Hayes, 1993, pp. 39-40). In Quine's
tive equating of stimulus situations; defense, however, he openly accepts
they simply see that there are no phys- the lacuna created by the problem of
ical differences that are apt to matter homology and offers a pragmatic so-
[italics added]. We shall do well to take lution by suggesting that philosophers,
the same line" (1974, p. 24). By fo- like psychologists, need not concern
cusing on actual practice, and what themselves with homology because in
matters (presumably to the psycholo- practice it does not seem to matter.
gists in question), Quine is clearly ad- Quine's appeal to pragmatism, as a
vocating that the problem of homology means of circumventing the problem of
be ignored on pragmatic grounds. homology, thus appears to undermine
Hayes's criticism that a utility-based
Summary and Synthesis truth relies ultimately on correspon-
To summarize, Quine apparently dence. Nevertheless, the problem of
avoids the problems surrounding cor- homology raised by the concept of
respondence by combining the con- joint witnessing still remains unre-
cepts of observation and description solved within the framework of
into the single conceptual unit of the Quine's analysis. In other words, Quine
observation sentence. However, the def- suggests that the problem may be ig-
inition of the observation sentence re- nored on pragmatic grounds, but he
lies on the concept of joint witnessing, does not offer a pragmatic solution that
and thus the issue of correspondence avoids the problem altogether.
(between observation sentence and on- At this point, therefore, it is difficult
tological reality) reenters the picture to decide whether Hayes is in fact cor-
when Quine attempts to specify exactly rect in claiming that pragmatists rely
what joint witnesses are agreeing ultimately on a correspondence-based
about. Quine admits that they cannot truth criterion. Hayes is correct insofar
be agreeing about receptually similar as Quine's concept of joint witnessing
impingements, because the receptors of raises the problem of homology (and
different individuals are far from ho- with it the issue of correspondence),
mologous. Consequently, Quine cannot but her claim is weakened when Quine
specify in precise terms exactly what chooses to ignore this problem on
joint witnesses are agreeing about (be- pragmatic grounds (note that her claim
cause they do not necessarily possess is weakened only because Quine does
similar receptors). For Quine, there- not avoid the problem). In any case,
fore, the relation between the agree- this lack of clarity has led me to be-
ment and the event agreed about re- lieve that there may be some value in
mains vague. At this point, it seems presenting a behavior-analytic version
that Hayes's criticism of the third type of pragmatism that aims to avoid theBEHAVIORAL PRAGMATISM 197
problems raised by both Hayes and the behavioral pragmatist, however, the
Quine. apple is defined only in terms of its
behavioral functions that emerge in a
BEHAVIORAL PRAGMATISM particular stream of behavioral inter-
In what follows, I will outline a ver- actions
341;
(see Barnes, 1989, pp. 340-
Schoenfeld & Farmer, 1970). The
sion of pragmatism that not only apple, for example, be defined as
avoids the problem of homology but an eliciting stimulus may for
also avoids Hayes's criticism that util- sponse, such as salivation, particular
a
or it may
re-
be
ity-based truth relies ultimately on cor- defined as a discriminative stimulus for
respondence. The form of pragmatism uttering "There's an apple," or it may
to which I refer was laid out in an ear- defined as a reinforcing stimulus for
lier article that I coauthored with Bry- other responses,
an Roche (Barnes & Roche, 1997). In apple or uttering such "Give
as pointing at the
me the apple."
this article, we outlined a solution to For the behavioral pragmatist,
the problem of what we called behav- fore, the apple (or any other part there-of the
ioral reflexivity. This solution was both universe) is always defined or known
pragmatic and behavior analytic, and within a particular behavioral stream
constituted what I now call behavioral Barnes & Roche, 1994).
pragmatism. I will now outline this (see Assumption 2: The activity of each
version of pragmatism and explain organism participates in a separate be-
how it circumvents both the use of a havioral stream. Behavioral pragma-
correspondence-based truth criterion tism does not permit one organism's
and the problem of homology. behavioral stream to overlap perfectly
The Three Basic Assumptions of with a second organism's behavioral
Behavioral Pragmatism stream. Consider, for example, the
sound of a fire alarm in a department
What I call behavioral pragmatism store. The behavioral pragmatist might
may be broken down into three fun- define the alarm as a discriminative
damental assumptions. These assump- stimulus for a shopper who starts to
tions emerge directly out of the epis- exit the store immediately after the
temology of behavior analysis (see alarm is switched on. This discrimina-
Barnes & Roche, 1994), and seem to tive function would be explained in
be completely consistent with the phi- terms of the history of behavioral in-
losophy of radical behaviorism (cf. teractions that established the function.
Chiesa, 1994). I have not labeled what This history of behavioral interactions,
I am about to offer as radical behav- and the functional relation thus ob-
iorism, however, because I am sure that tained between the alarm and the "ex-
at least some individuals will disagree iting" response, constitutes part of the
with part or all of the following and shopper's behavioral stream. Consider
yet consider themselves to be radical now a second shopper who also starts
behaviorists. to leave the store at the sound of the
Assumption 1: What is known is al- alarm. In commonsense terms, we
ways a behavioralfunction. For the be- would likely say that the alarm is the
havioral pragmatist, all events are de- same alarm for both shoppers. The be-
fined or known as behavioral func- havioral pragmatist, however, must de-
tions, instead of physical things that fine two separate discriminative func-
exist independently of behavior (see tions for the two exiting responses.
Skinner, 1938, on the inseparability of Separate functions are defined for two
stimuli and responses; see also Barnes main reasons. First, the history of be-
& Roche, 1994). Consider the simple havioral interactions that established
case of an apple. In commonsense the discriminative function of the
terms, the apple is a physical thing that alarm for the exiting response of one
exists independently of behavior. For of the shoppers cannot be identical to198 DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES the history that established the function as a discriminative stimulus for a par- for the response of the other shopper ticular "scientific" response, such as (e.g., one shopper may have previous "scallop" or "break-and-run," that has experience of the fire alarm in that been differentially reinforced in the store, whereas the other may not). In- presence of that pattern. In short, the sofar as a discriminative function is ex- activity of a particular behavioral prag- plained, in part, by the history of be- matist is always part of that pragma- havioral interactions that produced that tist's behavioral stream. function, then clearly the functions for the two shoppers cannot be considered Truth and Behavioral Pragmatism identical. Second, the discriminative function of the alarm may be manipu- Assumptions 1 and 2 of behavioral lated independently in one or another pragmatism do not directly affect the of the behavioral streams. Imagine, for issue of truth. Assumption 3, however, example, that a security guard says to appears to preclude the possibility, in one of the shoppers, "Ignore the alarm, behavioral pragmatism, of finding a there's a fault in the system." In this scientific truth statement that corre- case, the discriminative function of the sponds to an ontological reality. In ef- alarm may suddenly change in one be- fect, if the scientific activity of the be- havioral stream but not in the other havioral pragmatist is the product of a (e.g., one shopper will remain in the behavioral history, then he or she can store while the other continues to hurry never claim to have found an ontolog- for the exit). As such, there are two fire ical truth, because a different or more alarms, one in each behavioral stream. extended history may have produced a In summary, therefore, Assumption 2 different truth (an ontological truth, by of behavioral pragmatism views the ac- definition, is immutable, absolute, and tivity of each organism as participating final). This is not a problem for the be- in separate behavioral streams. Even havioral pragmatist, however, because when two organisms are responding to truth is defined simply in terms of pre- the "same" event (in commonsense diction and control (i.e., successful terms), they do so from within their re- working). If a scientific statement is spective streams (see also Roche & useful in helping the behavioral prag- Barnes, 1997). matist to achieve the goals of predic- Assumption 3: The activity of the be- tion and control with some degree of havioral pragmatist participates in a scope and precision, then the statement behavioral stream. According to be- is considered true (see Barnes & havioral pragmatism, even the activity Roche, 1994; S. C. Hayes & Brown- of a behavioral pragmatist participates stein, 1986; Skinner, 1974, p. 235). in a behavioral stream, and thus no The correspondence between the sci- special point of vantage is available to entific statement and an ontological re- the pragmatist from which to conduct ality is entirely irrelevant. scientific analyses (Skinner, 1974, p. In adopting the goals of prediction 234). Such analyses, therefore, do not and control, a behavioral pragmatist involve discovering the fundamental may often talk as if "real" events are laws of nature or developing an in- being contacted outside of the behav- creasingly accurate picture of an on- ioral stream. According to the behav- tological reality; instead, scientific ac- ioral pragmatist, however, such onto- tivity itself is subject to scientific anal- logical talk is considered to be a par- ysis (Skinner, 1969, p. 141). From this ticular instance of scientific verbal be- perspective, the output pattern from a havior. Imagine, for the sake of cumulative record, for example, is not argument, that in the course of an ex- a representation of what the rat or pi- perimental analysis a behavioral prag- geon "really" did in the operant cham- matist discovers that whenever he or ber. Instead, the pattern may be defined she arranges for event X to occur,
BEHAVIORAL PRAGMATISM 199
event Y always follows. If the prag- bal behavior (i.e., it involves the dy-
matist then states that, "X produces namic and codefining interaction
goal Y," one may be tempted to as- among stimulus and response func-
sume correspondence between the goal tions). Verbal behavior, technically de-
statement and the X-then-Y event. Ac- fined, does not refer or correspond to
cording to behavioral pragmatism, an external reality. From this behavior-
however, the goal statement and the al perspective, what matters is not cor-
event participate in a behavioral respondence between what the prag-
stream, and thus no correspondence matist says and some aspect of reality,
between the statement and a nonbehav- but whether the pragmatist concludes
ioral, ontological reality need be as- (i.e., states verbally) that a particular
sumed. For illustrative purposes con- analysis (i.e., previous verbal behavior)
sider a more technical description. An led to achieving his or her particular
individual may learn to respond to the goal (which was also verbally stated).
statement "X produces goal Y" and Although behavioral pragmatism may
the observation that X always precedes appear somewhat "autistic" in its em-
Y as being equivalent or coordinated phasis on the personal goals of a single
(see S. C. Hayes & Barnes-Holmes, in pragmatist, such philosophical autism
press). These relations may also be co- is avoided if the pragmatist adopts the
ordinated with other relations that may goal of "getting other individuals to
become functionally related within the communicate and agree." This agree-
individual's behavioral stream. These ment also is always discriminated
functionally equivalent relations do not within a single behavioral stream.
correspond to or refer to one another, By focusing on the personal goals of
they are simply coordinated within a the behavioral pragmatist, truth always
set of contingencies operating on the remains a behavioral issue (i.e., stating
individual's behavior. The issue of cor- a particular goal and trying to achieve
respondence, therefore, is simply irrel- it are behavioral events). Furthermore,
evant.3 the personal or behavioral nature of
For the behavioral pragmatist all sci- scientific goals is emphasized in be-
entific talk participates in a single be- havioral pragmatism because doing so
havioral stream containing (a) the guards against dogmatic or ontological
pragmatist's verbally stated goals, (b) statements concerning the goals them-
the pragmatist's analytic talk about selves (S. C. Hayes, 1993). If a partic-
how to achieve them, and (c) the prag- ular goal is clearly discriminated as
matist's statement as to whether or not participating in the behavioral stream
they have been achieved. Such talk is of a behavioral pragmatist, he or she
a-ontological in the sense that it is ver- has no grounds on which to argue that
the goal is the best or right goal in
3The idea that a behavioral pragmatist is un- some absolute or final sense (i.e., if the
able to say anything that corresponds to an on- goal is behavioral, then it may well
tological reality may be seen by some as an un- change if the contingencies change; see
bearable conceptual or even psychological bur- Leigland, 1993). The only way in
den. In other words, if even scientific statements
are behavioral events, and as such are not on- which goals may be justified, within
tologically true, what is the point in doing sci- behavioral pragmatism, is to point to
ence? Interestingly, Skinner did not appear to be other goals. A behavioral pragmatist
overly concerned with this issue when he wrote, might say, for example, that achieving
"If human behavior is as fully determined as the
behaviorist says it is, why does he bother to prediction and control will be of ben-
write a book? Does he believe that anything efit to the wider culture, in areas such
matters? ... Similar questions might as well be as education and health (i.e., achieving
asked of the author of a book on respiration: 'If prediction and control is justified by
that is respiration, why do you go on breath- pointing to the additional goal of help-
ing?' " (1974, pp. 247-248). Or, more appro-
priately in the current context, "If that is truth, ing the wider culture). If asked to jus-
why do you go on searching for it?" tify this latter goal, then another goal200 DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES
may be identified, such as feeling good lution to the problem of reality and
by helping the wider culture (i.e., help- truth behavioral pragmatism.4
ing others is justified by pointing to the
goal of feeling good). Obviously, if a Behavioral Pragmatism: Implications
behavioral pragmatist argued that he or for Hayes and Quine
she had identified the best or right I will now return to the issues raised
goal, this would clearly undermine the by Hayes and Quine, and consider the
third assumption of behavioral prag- implications of behavioral pragmatism
matism: One cannot escape the behav- for their respective positions.
ioral stream and contact a nonbehav- Hayes. The foregoing description of
ioral event, such as an ontologically behavioral pragmatism allows one to
correct goal. For the behavioral prag- appreciate how easily behavioral prag-
matist, scientific goals are like any oth- matism fits into what Hayes describes
er instance of verbal behavior-they as a one-universe system. Although I
are uttered and are subsequently previously used the phrase behavioral
strengthened, maintained, or weakened stream, I could easily have used the
by the contingencies of reinforcement. phrase behavioral universe. From this
perspective, the activity of the behav-
Behavioral Pragmatism: Conclusion ioral pragmatist constitutes a single
universe in which all events are con-
tained; there is no separation ontolog-
Behavioral pragmatism is an unusu- ically between the pragmatist's talk and
al and perhaps threatening philosophi- the talked about. From this perspective,
cal position. As a philosophy, it leaves a behavioral pragmatist engages in
each of us hanging naked in the wind "spot-removing language" because it
with nothing but our own personal has proven useful in achieving specific
goals for protection against the cold goals in the past, not because it con-
wind of professional and academic life stitutes an appeal to ontology. Thus,
(S. C. Hayes, 1993). This is not a po- when a behavioral pragmatist exhorts,
sition that most scientists or philoso- "Look at the data, it's there in black
phers enjoy. The histories of such in- and white," this is a response that in
dividuals often push them towards sci- the past has produced reinforcing con-
ence and philosophy because they want sequences. Whether the data actually
definite and final answers to the mys- reflect some form of ontological reality
is irrelevant. Consequently, Hayes's
teries of the universe. Furthermore, the claim that pragmatists rely ultimately
wider community often confers upon on a correspondence-based truth crite-
the scientist expert shaman- or priest-
like qualities. Naturally, few of us want
4 The reader may note some similarity be-
to sacrifice this luxury at the altar of tween behavioral pragmatism and the philosoph-
verbal or philosophical consistency. ical pragmatism of Richard Rorty (e.g., 1989).
We appear to have a choice, therefore, In both cases, language is considered to be a tool
between living with the discomfort cre- or behavioral repertoire for achieving certain
ated by there being no absolute or ul- goals, and as such does not constitute a repre-
sentational system for capturing the "true" na-
timate point to science, beyond that ture of "reality." Despite this clear point of con-
provided by our own goal statements, tact between Rorty's philosophy and behavioral
or living with the philosophical prob- pragmatism, the two are quite different. As in-
dicated earlier, for example, the latter is strongly
lems or verbal inconsistencies created rooted in the epistemology of behavior analysis
by the assumption that scientific talk and the philosophy of radical behaviorism, nei-
corresponds (at least potentially) to an ther of which, as far as I am aware, has influ-
external reality. I have chosen to live enced Rorty's work. In any case, a detailed treat-
ment of the relationship between these two
with the discomfort of a pointless, forms of pragmatism is beyond the scope of the
goal-based science, and I call this so- current article.BEHAVIORAL PRAGMATISM 201
rion does not apply to behavioral prag- of a red light). Similarly, that same
matism. class of patterns of receptor activity
Quine. Quine's concept of the ob- may be considered as the first part of
servation sentence is quite acceptable a behavior-behavior relation, if the
from the behavioral pragmatist's per- class was found to be functionally re-
spective, because the concept neatly lated to a particular class of verbal re-
removes the problem of correspon- ports (e.g., "I saw red"). In summary,
dence by unifying observation and de- the question of homology, raised by
scription into a single conceptual unit Quine, becomes a problem only if one
(not unlike Skinner's, 1957, concept of assumes that final explanations for be-
the tact). Quine departs from behavior- havioral events will be found in the
al pragmatism, however, in suggesting structural patterns of receptor activity
that one might look to agreement per se. If the activity of such receptors
among observation sentences as the is incorporated into the functional anal-
basis for truth, rather than to the per- ysis of behavior, the problem of ho-
sonal goals of the individual making mology disappears. In other words, the
the observation sentence. For the be- question of homology is completely
havioral pragmatist, Quine's observa- avoided within the philosophical
tion sentence is a useful tool that sci- framework of behavioral pragmatism.
entists and others often use to achieve
certain goals. One of these goals may SUMMARY AND
be to achieve agreement among the CONCLUSION
members of a particular community
(perhaps because such agreement may The current article began by exam-
help to achieve yet other more long- ining Hayes's claim that pragmatism
term goals). For the behavioral prag- relies ultimately on a correspondence-
matist, therefore, Quine's concern with based truth criterion. In order to eval-
agreement, and the resultant problem uate her claim, Quine's concept of the
of what is actually being agreed about, observation sentence was considered.
are irrelevant and thus the problem of Although the concept appears to re-
homology is completely avoided. On move the problem of correspondence,
balance, I should stress that a behav- it reemerges in Quine's appeal to
ioral pragmatist may well be interested agreement as the basis for truth. Quine
in how stimuli impinge upon the re- therefore suggests that we simply ig-
ceptors of an organism (apparently nore (but not avoid) the problem on
raising the issue of homology). How- pragmatic grounds. Consequently, it
ever, the relevant analyses would have was argued that there may some sub-
to be couched in the language of func- stance to Hayes's claim that pragma-
tion, not structure; the pragmatist tism relies ultimately on correspon-
would not look for key structural sim- dence as a truth criterion. Behavioral
ilarities within or across the receptors pragmatism was then introduced as a
of individual organisms to account for means of circumventing both Hayes's
agreement about stimulating events. claim and Quine's implicit appeal to
Instead, he or she would focus on the correspondence. Although successful
structure of receptual activity only in in achieving these aims, behavioral
terms of its functional relations to other pragmatism does rob science and phi-
stimulating and perhaps response losophy of any final or absolute objec-
events. For example, different patterns tive beyond the pragmatist's own per-
of receptor activity in a particular or- sonal goals. Nevertheless, behavioral
ganism (e.g., excitation of rods and pragmatism cannot be criticized for
cones) may be grouped into one re- generating the same philosophical
sponse class, because they are found to problems that have come to be asso-
be functionally related to a particular ciated with correspondence-based
stimulating event (e.g., the presentation truth, nor can it be criticized for ap-202 DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES
pealing to both correspondence- and native behavioral agenda in language and
utility-based truth. In defining truth be- cognition. Reno, NV: Context Press.
Hayes, S. C., & Brownstein, A. J. (1986). Men-
haviorally, the behavioral pragmatist talism, behavior-behavior relations, and a be-
always appeals to utility, and never havior-analytic view of the purposes of sci-
correspondence, as a truth criterion. ence. The Behavior Analyst, 9, 175-190.
Leigland, S. (1993). Scientific goals and the
context of justification. In S. C. Hayes, L. J.
REFERENCES Hayes, H. W. Reese, & T. R. Sarbin (Eds.),
Varieties of scientific contextualism (pp. 28-
Barnes, D. (1989). Behavior-behavior analysis, 33). Reno, NV: Context Press.
human schedule performance, and radical be- Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and object. Cam-
haviorism. The Psychological Record, 39, bridge, MA: MIT Press.
339-350. Quine, W. V. (1974). The roots of reference. La
Barnes, D., & Roche, B. (1994). Mechanistic Salle, IL: Open Court.
ontology and contextualistic epistemology: A Quine, W. V. (1990). The pursuit of truth. Cam-
contradiction within behavior analysis. The bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Behavior Analyst, 17, 165-168. Roche, B., & Barnes, D. (1997). The behavior
Barnes, D., & Roche, B. (1997). A behavior- of organisms? The Psychological Record, 47,
analytic approach to behavioral reflexivity. 597-618.
The Psychological Record, 47, 543-572. Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and sol-
Chiesa, M. (1994). Radical behaviorism: The idarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University
philosophy and the science. Boston: Authors Press.
Cooperative. Schoenfeld, W. N., & Farmer, J. (1970). Rein-
Goodman, R. B. (1995). Pragmatism. New forcement schedules and the "behavior
York: Routledge. stream." In W. N. Schoenfeld (Ed.), The the-
ory of reinforcement schedules (pp. 215-245).
Hayes, L. J. (1993). Reality and truth. In S. C. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Hayes, L. J. Hayes, H. W Reese, & T. R. Sar- Skinner, B. F (1938). The behavior of organ-
bin (Eds.), Varieties of scientific contextualism isms: An experimental analysis. New York:
(pp. 35-44). Reno, NV: Context Press. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Hayes, S. C. (1993). Analytic goals and the va- Skinner, B. F (1957). Verbal behavior. New
rieties of scientific contextualism. In S. C. York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Hayes, L. J. Hayes, H. W. Reese, & T. R. Sar- Skinner, B. F (1969). Contingencies of rein-
bin (Eds.), Varieties of scientific contextualism forcement: A theoretical analysis. New York:
(pp. 11-27). Reno, NV: Context Press. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Hayes, S. C., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (in press). Skinner, B. F (1974). About behaviorism. Lon-
Relational frame theory: Creating an alter- don: Jonathan Cape.You can also read
