Clientelism in Argentina: Piqueteros and Relief Payment Plans for the Unemployed-Misunderstanding the Role of Civil Society
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Clientelism in Argentina: Piqueteros and
Relief Payment Plans for the Unemployed—
Misunderstanding the Role of Civil Society
RAMIRO SALVOCHEA∗
ABSTRACT
Most Latin American countries have overcome military disruptions and are now well-
established democracies. Nevertheless, electoral continuity and fairness is not enough
to guarantee that democratic institutions function properly and fairly. A simple
inquiry reveals the region’s entrenchment of corrupt governments, the growth of
inequality, and the deepening of poverty and unemployment. Argentina is no
exception.
Many authors have argued that civic engagement will solve the struggles new Latin
American democracies are undergoing. In particular, it has been suggested that the
activities of NGOs will lead inexorably to a better democracy. And, without a doubt,
civil society’s role is fundamental for improving government accountability and
strengthening the rule of law.
This paper, however, analyzes certain welfare practices currently in place in Argentina
as an example of civil society actors being overinvolved in public affairs. I show how
their overinvolvement can neutralize the potential for accountability, particularly in
analyzing the case of a civil society group known as the “piqueteros.” Specifically,
improper delegation of authority over certain, widely extended unemployment welfare
benefits has led to inadequate interaction between the State and this group.
NGOs have played an invaluable role as “watchdogs” of civil society. It is clear that
problems (such as the one described above) involve only a few of these non-
governmental organizations. But sometimes—as the example indicates—too much
involvement, especially when extended to what I call management activities, can
generate improper incentives and destroy the potential advantages of action by NGOs.
Furthermore, the overutilization of these actors in developing countries sometimes
turns them into disruptive forces against democracy, and creates mechanisms that
undermine economic growth and social development.
∗ Adjunct Professor of Law, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Business School; Associate Professor of
Law, Universidad de San Andrés, Business School; J.D., Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina,
Buenos Aires, 1996; Master in Law, Universidad de Palermo, Buenos Aires, 2004; LL.M., University of
Texas School of Law, 2006. Linkage Student, Yale University, School of Law, 2003. I would like to thank
my family, particularly my wife Marcela, for their extraordinary support and patience. I would also like to
thank Professor Patricia Hansen for her thoughtful comments and suggestions.
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288 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 43:287
SUMMARY
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................289
II. THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY AND WELFARISM IN ARGENTINA PRIOR TO
1983.......................................................................................................................292
III. THE REESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AND WELFARISM SINCE 1983....295
A. First Crisis: Alfonsin’s Hyperinflation......................................................296
B. Second Crisis: De la Rúa’s Resignation....................................................296
IV. THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY: “PIQUETEROS,” THE POLITICAL
MERCENARIES, AND THE STATE CLIENTELISTIC PRACTICES WITH
SOCIAL PLANS .....................................................................................................300
A. The Rise of Poverty and Inequality: The Palliative Solution of the
PJJHD..........................................................................................................301
B. The Clientelistic Utilization of Social Plans: The Piquetero
Movement.....................................................................................................304
1. The Piquetero Movement....................................................................304
2. Allocation of Social Plans to the Piquetero Movement...................306
C. Black and White of the Piquetero Organizations.....................................310
V. IS THIS AN EXAMPLE OF THE FAILURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS? ...........311
A. Introduction to the Problem .......................................................................311
B. Socioeconomic Requirements for a Functional Third Sector..................311
C. The Failure of Self-Selection in the Developing Countries: Its Failure
in Argentina .................................................................................................314
D. Proposals for Reform .................................................................................317
1. Is Increased Transparency a Proper Solution? .................................317
2. Accountability, Not Direct Participation...........................................319
3. How to Solve the “Piquetero Problem” ............................................321
VI. CONCLUSIONS ON THE PARTICIPATION OF NGOS IN WELFARE POLICY .....322
VII. FINAL WORDS .....................................................................................................322
It is a working day like any other in the City of Buenos Aires. Parked buses
line one of the flanks of 9 de Julio Avenue. In the center of the avenue, hundreds of
people are concentrated, holding signs and flags that identify them with their
respective organizations. Small groups surround their leaders and wait to be called
upon to confirm their attendance. Men and women, old and young, even children
and mothers pushing baby strollers, patiently wait their turns to start marching
towards the Pink House (where the president is). Or maybe today’s destination is
the Congress or the Ministry of Labor. It does not really matter any more.
Most of the people present receive some government relief—what they call the
“plans”—for being unemployed. They are supposed to be working in return, but
there is no work for them to do. Instead they are asked to participate in protests.08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
2008] CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA 289
People who are hungry and destitute but do not have one of these plans hope to get
one. To do so, they know they have to demonstrate their faithful commitment to the
cause. Participation in the protests is crucial. There is nothing better to do,
anyway—they have no jobs to attend. For the younger ones, their schools will not
provide any food for the day; in any case, they wouldn’t want to miss the thrill of
being part of “the people.”
A man in a suit and tie walks by, keeping a respectful distance and stealing
glances at the columns of people. In his hand is a suitcase full of papers; in his eyes,
a mix of fear, pity, and fatigue. In the center of the Avenue, under the shadow of the
“obelisco” monument, a dark column of strong black smoke rises. The stink of
burned tires surrounds the city. There is no traffic and the silence is consumed by
the chants of protesters that have slowly started to march to the rhythm of the
violent and monotonous bang of the drums. At the front of the column, a line of
men marches in a military fashion. They have their faces covered with black
handkerchiefs and they hold menacing canes painted with the desire to strike
frustration away.
The cars, stopped at various intersections, patiently wait for the column to pass.
The police loosely hold the line of waiting cars going nowhere. This is nothing new.
It is a day like any other working day in Buenos Aires.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Most Latin American countries have overcome military disruptions and are
now well-established democracies. Nevertheless, electoral continuity and fairness
are not enough to guarantee that democratic institutions function properly and
fairly. A simple inquiry into the region’s situation reveals the entrenchment of
corrupt governments, the growth of inequality, and the deepening poverty and
unemployment. This is also the case in Argentina.
Many authors have argued that civic engagement is the solution to the
profound crisis the new Latin American democracies are undergoing. It has been
suggested that the activity of nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”)2 leads
inexorably to a better democracy and “to the creation of a vibrant and participatory
civil society in which all groups, including the poor and dispossessed, play an active
role.”3 It has also been argued that NGOs have the advantage of a “close proximity
to the poor.”4 In effect, the continuous activity of NGOs inevitably draws members
into participatory practices, thereby reinforcing democracy. Supporters claim that
NGOs hold a key role in the process of reforming democratic institutions, as they
1. The story does not describe any particular day—it describes many of them. It is based in the
personal experience of the author.
2. I will use the words “NGO,” “nonprofit organizations” and “civil society actors” as synonyms. I
include broadly any group that does not fall under the purview of the Government, and does not pursue
profit in its action.
3. Debora Spar & James Dail, Of Measurement and Mission: Accounting for Performance in Non-
Governmental Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 171, 179 (2002).
4. A. Sat Obiyan, A Critical Examination of the State versus Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) in the Policy Sphere in the Global South: Will the State Die as the NGOs Thrive in Sub-Saharan
Africa and Asia?, 4 AFR. & ASIAN STUD. 301, 311 (2005).08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
290 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 43:287
identify the needs of, and serve as a voice for, the public.5 Some scholars
characterize NGOs as “manifestations” of the community where they are rooted.6
Civil society organizations are similarly described by some as the expression of the
concentrated exercise of political rights by members of society.7 These individual
voices, concentrated in a gigantic public megaphone, gain enough power to be heard
in the spheres of the government and other social actors.
The global influence of NGOs is growing exponentially. NGOs registered in
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) countries
almost doubled between 1980 and 1993, rising from 1,600 to 2,970 during that time.8
Similarly, spending by these groups over the same time period increased from $2.8
billion to $5.7 billion.9 A United Nations report estimated that by 1995 the number
of international NGOs was nearly 29,000, while The Economist estimated that in the
year 2000 there were two million of these groups in the United States alone.10
Similar growth rates are reported in the developing world: Debora Spar and James
Dail have identified that in Nepal, for example, the number of registered NGOs rose
from 220 in 1990 to 1,210 in 1993, and in Kenya a reported 240 NGOs are created
every year.11
Without a doubt, civil society’s role is fundamental in improving government
accountability and strengthening the rule of law. The example described in this
paper, however, shows a situation where civil society actors have failed to show the
miraculous positive effects normally attributed to them. In fact, it illustrates
important negative effects generated by the involvement of these organizations.
In particular, this paper analyzes certain welfare practices currently in place in
Argentina as an example of overinvolvement of civil society actors in public affairs.
It is hoped this analysis will show how these welfare practices neutralize the
potential for holding NGOs accountable. In effect, this paper will describe the
manner in which improper allocation of the management of certain unemployment
welfare benefits has diminished the opportunities for positive interaction between
the state and a particular civil society group known as the “piqueteros” (an
association of various groups of unemployed people). This description will explain
how these civil society groups have been politically manipulated through the
exchange of unemployment benefits for political favors. The situation in Argentina
illustrates how opening up opportunities for manipulation of funding sources can
undermine the impartiality of civil society actors and generate an enormous
incentive for corrupt practices.
But situations like the one described in this paper do not imply that the hope
placed in the role of civil society is an empty one. Particularly in developing
countries, NGOs have played an invaluable role in acting as the watchdogs of civil
5. See Maria Dakolias, Legal and Judicial Development: The Role of Civil Society in the Reform
Process, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 26, 34 (2000).
6. STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN
THE AGE OF CONTRACTING 22 (1993).
7. See Spar, supra note 3, at 179–80.
8. See id. at 171 n. 2 (citing Michael Edwards & David Hulme, NGO Performance and Accountability:
Introduction and Overview, in BEYOND THE MAGIC BULLET: NGO ACCOUNTABILITY AND
PERFORMANCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 3 (Michael Edwards & David Hulme eds., 1996).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 172 n.3 (citing NGOs: Sins of the Secular Missionaries, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at
25).
11. Id. at 171–72.08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
2008] CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA 291
society, alerting others when governments go beyond the limits imposed by law.
They have proven useful for defending human rights and achieving further
governmental accountability, acting as instruments of relief for the problems of
minorities. It is clear that problems, such as the one examined here, involve only a
few NGOs. The valuable role of NGOs in society cannot be disputed. But specific
measures should be taken to ensure they can properly carry out their role.
Otherwise, NGOs can become an incredibly powerful instrument of corruption.
It will also be argued that the utilization of NGOs is not always the best
choice—these organizations do not provide a magic solution. The manipulation of
social benefits in Argentina through the use of NGOs, like the piquetero
organizations, shows the importance of respecting certain limits. Sometimes, too
much involvement, especially when extended to “management activities,” can
generate improper incentives and destroy the potential advantages of action by
NGOs. In these cases, NGO involvement should not be taken further than the role
of guardian. Furthermore, the overutilization of these actors in developing countries
sometimes works against democracy and creates mechanisms that undermine
economic growth and social development. I will try to explain the reasons for these
failures and offer some proposals that would help avoid this deviation from the
NGOs’ proper role in the future.
Sections II and III of this paper analyze the sociopolitical environment in
Argentina in order to set the context of the current piqueteros phenomenon. The
first section covers the period from the beginnings of the nation to the return of
democracy in 1983. The second section covers the period from 1983 to the present.
The purpose of the historical description is to show how Argentina laboriously
returned to a democratic regime in the 1980s, and to present the current
socioeconomic situation of its population. The data provided show the
reestablishment of democratic rule has not provided prosperity and social equality.
In fact, the socioeconomic picture has deteriorated profoundly under the democratic
regime.
Section IV explains how the piquetero movement became the massive force it is
today. This section also discusses how the piqueteros came to manage a number of
unemployment benefits, and how this situation neutralizes and corrupts the
performance of these civil society actors.
Section V tries to provide some answers to the question of how civil society
actors, like the piquetero movement, could fail in their role as democratic enhancers
and otherwise become involved in clientelistic12 and corrupt practices. It will be
argued that this improper involvement in welfare policies could be an additional
factor in the decline of the national psyche. I conclude with some generic proposals
to shift the current incentives in the right direction.
12. “Clientelism” can lead to a particularly negative social dynamic. Trotta describes political
clientelism as a phenomenon. He states that political clientelism creates a social relationship between the
one that holds political power emanating from a bureaucratic, partisan structure (or a public office) and
the citizenry. Trotta also indicates that this phenomenon develops a dual relationship between patron and
client, defined by asymmetric social relationships based in hierarchical arrangements whose objective is the
exercise of social control—exactly the model that can be found in Argentina. MIGUEL E.V. TROTTA, LAS
METAMORFOSIS DEL CLIENTELISMO POLITICO: CONTRIBUCIÓN PARA EL ANÁLISIS INSTITUCIONAL 24
(2003).08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
292 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 43:287
II. THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY AND WELFARISM IN ARGENTINA
PRIOR TO 1983
This first section is intended to provide some historical explanation of the
phenomenon that will be described in the following sections, and gives a summary of
the history of Argentina since its independence.
Argentina, a former Spanish colony, severed its bond with the Spanish Crown
on July 9, 1816, when a party of separatists declared the country’s independence.13 A
bloody civil war followed, with many coups by regional, social, or political factions.
Rule by the strong man, the caudillo, alternated with periods of a weak centralized
government, often beset by disorder.14 Hence, the election of Bernardino Rivadavia
as the first president of the Republic in 1826 did not really mark the beginning of
democratic rule in the modern sense.15 Rather, the dominant political group at the
time controlled the election of governmental officers. Yet a profound division still
existed between the Unitarians, who favored centralization of power in Buenos
Aires, and the Federalists, who resented the oligarchy of Buenos Aires and were
backed by autocratic caudillos with gaucho troops.16
In 1852, victory in the Battle of Caseros by General Justo José de Urquiza over
Juan Manuel de Rosas (a caudillo who had taken the leadership of the country and
governed with a very strong hand for more than 20 years) put an end to the conflict.17
Urquiza called a constituent assembly that adopted a constitution in 1853 based on
the liberal principles enunciated by Juan Bautista Alberdi, and that had its roots in
the U.S. Constitution.18 This constitution established a federal and presidential
republic with a bicameral congress.19
By the beginning of the twentieth century Argentina had become one of the
richest countries in the world, and its population had been boosted by the arrival of
millions of Europeans.20 Argentinean democracy, nevertheless, was weak. Voting
rights were the privilege of an elitist minority, and electoral fraud was common.21
President Roque Saenz Peña introduced an important electoral reform in 1912
making male voting a “universal, secret, and mandatory” right.22
After the relatively stable democratic period from 1852 to 1930, democracy was
disrupted by a military coup by General José Felix Uriburu.23 This coup initiated a
13. FELIX LUNA, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ARGENTINIANS 63–64 (Cynthia Mansfield & Ian Barnett
trans., 2000) [hereinafter LUNA].
14. Id. at 65–71.
15. This may have been due in part to the fact that Rivadavia only served from February 1826 to July
1827. See Jonathan Harris, Bernardino Rivadavia and Benthamite “Discipleship”, 33 LATIN AM. RES. REV.
129, 140 (1998).
16. See LUNA, supra note 13, at 61–70.
17. Id. at 78–80.
18. Id. at 85–86.
19. See Manuel Jose Garcia-Mansilla, Separation of Powers Crises: The Case of Argentina, 32 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 310 (2004).
20. DAVID ROCK, POLITICS IN ARGENTINA 1890–1930. THE RISE AND FALL OF RADICALISM 1, 10–14
(1975).
21. See DANIEL PONEMAN, ARGENTINA: DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 15–19 (1987).
22. Id. at 16.
23. LUNA, supra note 13, at 133–37.08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
2008] CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA 293
long period of political and social instability.24 In the midst of this period of
instability, Juan Domingo Perón rose to political prominence, ultimately becoming
one of Argentina’s most well-known leaders. Perón gained popularity among the
working sector by favoring the growth of labor unions and increased wages.25 The
strong popular support for these policies propelled him to victory in the 1946
presidential election.26
During Perón’s first two administrations (1946–1955), the Peronists expanded
state spending and committed to a dramatic redistribution of wealth through social
policy and labor market regulations.27 Perón’s wife, Eva (later called “Evita”) soon
became a champion of social welfare programs.28 Perón led a populist government
under the flag of wealth redistribution, which was one of the main factors in the
economy’s deterioration.29
The Peronist movement used the idea of a welfare state with the declared
purpose of guaranteeing universal civil rights as an instrument of partisan
propaganda.30 Notwithstanding the propaganda, this welfare movement, conducted
by Eva Perón, was not clientelistic.31 With an evident electoral interest in winning
over the lowest classes under the slogan “Perón cumple, Evita dignifica,” the Eva
Perón Foundation indiscriminately poured public money—plentiful at that
moment—over the less-favored.32
Perón, especially during his first two governments, relied heavily on the use of
labor unions to mobilize this section of society. For the individuals that remained
outside the system, the Eva Perón Foundation practiced direct welfare.33 Its
practices were defined as an “expression of solidarity between the working class and
the ones that do not work.”34 Indeed, David Rock argues that once President Perón
had won over the unions, Eva Perón created lines of communication between the
highest and lowest strata of society.35 In any case, Eva’s charity practices (executed
through the Foundation) were always inspired by the same end: she exchanged
favors and economic benefits for direct electoral support and loyalty.36 This scheme
reproduced some of the typical features of classical welfare strategies: discontinuity
among different groups, a targeted population diffusedly defined as “poor,”
asymmetry in donor-donee relationships, donor discretion in distributions, and the
entrenched dependence of the donees.37
24. See id. at 138.
25. Id. at 159–60.
26. Id. at 162–63.
27. Id. at 165–68.
28. Id. at 173–74.
29. JOSEPH A. PAGE, PERÓN: A BIOGRAPHY, 168–75 (1983).
30. MARTIN DINATALE, EL FESTIVAL DE LA POBREZA: EL USO POLITICO DE PLANES SOCIALES EN
LA ARGENTINA 22 (2004) [hereinafter DINATALE].
31. Id.
32. FELIX LUNA, PERÓN Y SU TIEMPO: LA ARGENTIN ERA UNA FIESTA 1946–1949, 452–62. (1984).
33. DINATALE, supra note 30, at 23.
34. Id.
35. See DAVID ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516–1987: DESDE LA COLONIZACIÓN ESPAÑOLA HASTA
ALFONSÍN 360 (Néstor Míguez trans., 1988) [hereinafter ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516–1987].
36. Id.
37. Emilio Tenti Fanfani, Pobreza y Politica Social: Más alla del Neoasistencialismo, in EL ESTADO
BENEFACTOR: UN PARADIGMA EN CRISIS 118–22 (Ernesto Isuani & Emilio Fanfani eds., 1991).08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
294 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 43:287
As the country’s economic outlook worsened, Perón became increasingly
autocratic.38 His regime became marked by curtailments of the freedom of speech,
imprisonment of political opponents, electoral fraud, and a general transition to a
one-party state.39 In 1946, Perón established the Peronista political party, which was
to become a central actor in the political arena.40 In 1949, the Constitution of 1853
was replaced by one that permitted Perón to be reelected.41 Finally, in 1955, Perón
was ousted by his disillusioned armed forces and forced into exile.42
The interim military government of General Pedro Aramburu, facing a divided
society, attempted to rid the country of Peronism, although he continued the
bureaucratic, centralized practices established by Peronism with regard to welfare
policy.43 Interestingly, until the 1960s and 1970s both democratic and military
governments showed a tendency to decentralize these practices from the federal
government to the provinces.44 Aramburu was replaced in 1958 when Arturo
Frondizi was elected president.45 Frondizi began undertaking a program of austerity
to “stabilize” the economy and check inflation, but his program was prematurely
truncated when he fell into disfavor with the military.46 Frondizi was overthrown in
1962 and José María Guido, as leader of the Senate, assumed the presidency.47 New
elections were held in 1963, in which both Peronist and Communist parties were
banned, resulting in the election of Arturo Illia, a radical.48 Illia faced a serious
economic depression and he recognized the necessity of reintegrating the Peronist
forces into Argentine political life.49
In 1966, a junta of military leaders, unwilling to tolerate another resurgence of
Peronism, seized power and installed General Juan Carlos Onganía in the
presidency.50 The new government dissolved the legislature and banned all political
parties.51 Widespread opposition to the rigid rule of the Onganía regime grew, and
the military deposed him in 1970 and named General Roberto M. Levingston
president.52 Economic problems and increased terrorist activities, however, caused
General Alejandro Lanusse (the leader of the coup against Onganía) to dismiss
Levingston in 1971 and initiate an active program for economic growth, distribution
38. See DAVID ROCK, AUTHORITARIAN ARGENTINA: THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, ITS HISTORY
AND ITS IMPACT 158–61 (1993) [hereinafter ROCK, AUTHORITARIAN ARGENTINA].
39. Id. at 161–62.
40. LUNA, supra note 13, at 171.
41. Id. at 175.
42. Id. at 195–96.
43. Id. at 198–200.
44. DINATALE, supra note 30, at 24. An example of this can be found in the housing campaign
organized by the creation of the FONAVI (National Foundation for Housing) in 1977. In this case, the
central government retained the coordination of the housing campaign, but conducted the operations
through the provinces.
45. LUNA, supra note 13, at 204.
46. See ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516–1987, supra note 35, at 422–26.
47. LUNA, supra note 13, at 204.
48. FELIX LUNA, 10 HISTORIA INTEGRAL DE LA ARGENTINA: EL LARGO CAMINO A LA
DEMOCRACIA 153–60 (1997) [hereinafter HISTORIA INTEGRAL DE LA ARGENTINA].
49. See ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516–1987, supra note 35, at 426.
50. HISTORIA INTEGRAL DE LA ARGENTINA, supra note 48, at 174–78.
51. ROCK, AUTHORITARIAN ARGENTINA, supra note 38, at 202.
52. HISTORIA INTEGRAL DE LA ARGENTINA, supra note 48, at 196.08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
2008] CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA 295
of wealth, and political stability.53 He conducted direct negotiations with Juan Perón
and called for national elections.54
Perón was again elected president in September 1973, with his third wife, Isabel
Martínez de Perón, serving as vice president.55 When President Perón died in July
1974, his widow succeeded him, despite having no prior political experience.56 Her
government faced economic troubles, labor unrest, political violence, and deep
divisions within the Peronist party.57 Moreover, Marxist revolutionaries were
engaged in a bloody guerrilla campaign during her time in office.58
Isabelita, living in the shadow of Evita, never won over the hearts of the people,
and a military junta led by Jorge Rafael Videla deposed her in 1976, installing Videla
as president until 1981.59 During this time, the government suspended political and
trade union activity, dissolved the congress, made alterations to the constitution, and
replaced most government officials.60 The army then embarked upon a violent war
against subversion.61
In 1981, General Roberto Viola succeeded Videla as president, but before the
year ended General Leopoldo Galtieri replaced Viola.62 These changes were
decided unilaterally by the members of the junta—no elections were held.63 In 1982,
however, the failure of the ill-fated invasion of the Malvinas Islands (Falkland
Islands) forced Galtieri’s resignation.64 Lieutenant General Bignone then succeeded
Galtieri in office and quickly called for elections, leading to the victory of the radical
leader Raul Alfonsin in October 1983.65
III. THE REESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AND WELFARISM SINCE
1983
Since 1930, as more fully described in the previous section, Argentina suffered
military coups in 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1976.66 As a result, in the half-century
following 1930, only one civilian elected as president served out a full term in office.67
Argentina swung from civilian to military rule, and from radical to conservative
policies, and economic stagnation closely followed this political instability.68 As the
problems of inequality and poverty became more acute during these years,69 both the
53. Id. at 202.
54. See ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516–1987, supra note 35, at 439–44.
55. HISTORIA INTEGRAL DE LA ARGENTINA, supra note 48, at 203, 225.
56. Id. at 229–39.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 238.
59. See id. at 256.
60. HISTORIA INTEGRAL DE LA ARGENTINA, supra note 48, at 256–62.
61. Id. at 264–70.
62. Id. at 316.
63. See ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516–1987, supra note 35, at 460–61.
64. HISTORIA INTEGRAL DE LA ARGENTINA, supra note 48, at 316, 318.
65. Id. at 343.
66. Id. at 256.
67. Steven Levitsky & María Victoria Murillo, Argentina Weathers the Storm, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 152,
162 (2003).
68. PONEMAN, supra note 21, at 4.
69. Id.08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
296 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 43:287
federal and the state governments steadily raised social welfare expenditures and
increasingly used welfare policy as a political tool.70 The Peronists were arguably the
first Argentinean movement to politicize the idea of a welfare state whose declared
purpose was to guarantee universal civil rights while actually using the issue as an
instrument of partisan propaganda. But President Juan Perón’s welfare movement,
conducted by Eva Perón, was universal, not clientelistic. This paper will show how
this circumstance rapidly changed with the return of democracy.
The return to democracy in 1983 marked the beginning of a period of
democratic stability with competitive elections and effective power alternations in
the national executive. Furthermore, in 1989 and 2001 the country’s democratic
institutions successfully weathered two deep crises.
A. First Crisis: Alfonsin’s Hyperinflation
Under Alfonsin’s rule, starting in 1983, the economy deteriorated and the rise
of poverty and social discontent forced the new democratic government to change its
strategy on welfare. Welfare became less universal as the government’s efforts
became directed increasingly towards particular groups among the population.71
By May, 1989 the socioeconomic situation had become intolerable.
Hyperinflation gripped the country and citizens began to take to the streets,
engaging in riots and looting.72 Popular discontent forced Alfonsin’s resignation,
making him the first leader in nearly half a century to be legitimately replaced via
elections.73 Carlos Saul Menem, the leader of the Peronist party, was elected as his
successor.74
Menem radically changed the course of the economy by promoting freemarket
policies and radical liberalization and privatization.75 Still, the positive attributes of
Menem’s “economic capitalism” were hardly paralleled with sound democratic
action in the political arena.76
B. Second Crisis: De la Rúa’s Resignation
Menem’s dramatic economic transformations also had the effect of deepening
already existing social problems. Arguably, this situation was a consequence of the
70. ROCK, AUTHORITARIAN ARGENTINA, supra note 38, at 158–59.
71. See Georges Midré, Bread or Solidarity?: Argentine Social Policies, 1983–1990, 24 J. LAT. AM.
STUD. 343, 344 (1992). During the government of Raul Alfonsin, the federal government had fifteen
national welfare plans. The Programa Alimentario Nacional (PAN) was by far the most important. It
implemented the handing over of food baskets to the poor. The program was the target of accusations of
corruption, and was discontinued in 1989. See id.
72. Argentina Declares State of Siege Amid Riots over Economic Steps, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1989, at
A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DEEDE1338F933A05756C0A96F948
260.
73. See James Brooke, Dispute Erupts on Argentine Transition, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1989, at A3,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE4DF1E3EF930A25755C0A96F948260.
74. Id.
75. IGNACIO C. M. MASSUN, MENEM: CIRUGÍA SIN ANESTESIA 39–43 (1999).
76. For example, Menem packed the Supreme Court, increasing the number of justices from five to
nine. See Daniel Brinks, Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: The Beginning of a
New Millennium, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 595, 599 (2005).08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
2008] CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA 297
lack of a consistent long-term socioeconomic policy. In any case, Menem continued
the Peronist tradition of using specifically targeted welfare plans as a tool for
political promotion—by 1990, the number of plans had risen to around thirty.77
In the 1990s, two very important changes occurred. First, in 1992, Congress
passed Law 24130 ratifying the “Federal Pact,” a country-wide agreement between
the central government and the provinces that, among other things, decentralized
the execution and management of welfare policies.78 The Pact determined the
allocation of central resources to the provinces for their autonomous
administration.79 Second, Argentina’s population underwent a deep change in the
mechanisms of the social protest; specifically, social activism moved away from
syndicalism-centered protests.80 For example, unions led 75 percent of protests
between 1983 and 1988; but from 1989 through 1994, that percentage decreased to 60
percent.81 But from 1995 on, the dispersion of the protests is notable; other forms of
public protest appeared at this time as well, such as the cacerolazos, which are now
the characteristic form of protest by the middle class.82 Scholars refer to this period
of social activism as a real “politicization” of Argentinean society.83
Menem was re-elected to the presidency in 1995, marking the third consecutive
planned and peaceful election.84 In 1996, the “Plan Trabajar” was created as a
palliative for unemployment.85 Beneficiaries were supposed to work in public
infrastructure projects in exchange for a “salary” paid by the state.86 This relief
structure (hereinafter referred to as the “plans”) became an important tactic against
the unemployment situation.87 In the end, however, the plans were only a subsidy—a
mere welfare payment, and opened the door to massive utilization of this technique
for political gain and manipulation.88
77. Among the most important were the “Programa de Politicas Sociales Comunitarias”
(PROSOCO), and the “Programa Social Nutricional” (PROSONU), which implemented the direct
delivery of food for children and the poor. See WORLD BANK: LATIN AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN
REGIONAL OFFICE REPORT NO. 15132-AR: ARGENTINA-CORDOBA: PUBLIC SECTOR ASSESSMENT:
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 15–16, (1996), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1996/05/15/000009265_3961029230528/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.
78. Law No. 24130, Sept. 2, 1992, B.O. art. 5, available at http://biblioteca.afip.gov.ar/gateway.dll/
Normas/Leyes/ley_c_024130_1992_09_02.xml.
79. Id.
80. NORMA GIARRACCA ET AL., LA PROTESTA SOCIAL EN LA ARGENTINA: TRANSFORMACIONES
ECONOMICAS Y CRISIS SOCIAL EN EL INTERIOR DEL PAIS 41–61 (2001).
81. Id. at 51–52.
82. GRACIELA DI MARCO & HECTOR PALOMINO, MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES EN LA ARGENTINA.
ASAMBLEAS: LA POLITIZACIONS DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL 160 (2003); Adrián Duplatt, Sur, cacerolazos y,
¿después?, PAPELES DE NOMBRE FALSO (2004) at 4, available at http://www.nombrefalso.com.ar/
hacepdf.php?pag=29&pdf=si.
83. DI MARCO, supra note 82, at 11.
84. MASSUN, supra note 75, at 197. His government, however, subsequently began struggling with the
increasingly severe socioeconomic situation. Amid faltering support and allegations of corruption, Menem
stepped down in 1999. See Profile: Carlos Menem, BBC NEWS, Apr. 28, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1376100.stm.
85. See Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, Partisanship and Protest, The Politics of Workfare Distribution in
Argentina, 41 LAT. AM. RES. REV. 122, 126–27 (2006).
86. Id. at 126.
87. MARISTELLA SVAMPA & SEBASTIÁN PEREYRA, ENTRE LA RUTA Y EL BARRIO: LA
EXPERIENCIA DE LAS ORGANIZACIONES PIQUETERAS 88 (2003).
88. Id. at 89.08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
298 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 43:287
The implementation of the social plans slowly formed a net of relationships
between the different social actors and the different levels of the federal and local
governments.89 Maristella Svampa and Sebastián Pereyra describe how Menem’s
government used the well-lubricated clientelistic web, originally created by the
Justicialist Party, for the implementation of the social plans. The relationship
between the government and the social organizations (including the piqueteros) was
established through the municipalities and the provincial governments.90 The
creation of the Plan Barrios Bonaerenses,91 financed by the provincial governments,
was controlled from the Instituto Provincial de Empleo (Provincial Institute of
Labor), which had the last word in the adjudication of the plans.92 The Institute also
decided the appointment of the coordinator, a person with the authority to direct
and execute a project.93 Consequently, a person selected as a coordinator wielded a
great deal of power.
In practice, the Institute’s control allowed the plans to be allocated in exchange
for political and electoral support of the Justicialist partisan infrastructure,94 resulting
in the punteros and manzaneras, political neighbors, acting as activists of the
Justicialist party in their respective zones of influence.95
Despite the mounting financial crises, Menem managed to finish his second
term, but in 1999, an alliance of opposition parties propelled Fernando de la Rúa, a
member of the biggest opposition party—the Unión Cívica Radical—to the
presidency.96 Nonetheless, the persistence of economic problems, along with several
corruption scandals in the Senate, quickly undermined the popular support that De
la Rúa had enjoyed in the elections.97
As the country’s outlook worsened, De la Rúa’s government increased the
budget for welfare programs and expanded the Plans Trabajar to nearly 270,000
people.98 And, because De la Rúa did not hold power with the clientelistic resources
of Justicialism, he changed how the plans were implemented; he switched the
allocation and management responsibilities to the municipalities and the NGOs.99
This strategy permitted some local civil society groups, including the piquetero
organizations, to incorporate as formal NGOs in order to submit projects that would
enable them to receive social plans.100 In spite of these efforts, escalating economic
problems eventually led to a second crisis in December 2001. As a consequence of
several desperate and unpopular measures (such as severe restrictions on the
89. Id.
90. Municipalities are the smallest autonomous political units.
91. “Plan for the neighborhoods of the Province of Buenos Aires.”
92. SVAMPA, supra note 87, at 92.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Levitsky & Murillo, supra note 67, at 153–54.
97. Id. at 154.
98. DINATALE, supra note 30, at 36.
99. See Agustina Giraudy, The Distributive Politics of Emergency Employment Programs in Argentina
(1993–2002), 42 LAT. AM. RES. REV. 33, 36 (2007).
100. See id. at 36–37. This practice and the piquetero organizations will be discussed more extensively
in Section IV.08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
2008] CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA 299
withdrawal of bank deposits), nationwide riots paralyzed the country and De la Rúa
was forced to resign, having only held office for two years.101
Because Vice President Carlos Alvarez had resigned under scandal months
before the riots, the chairman of the senate, Ramon Puerta, succeeded De la Rúa.102
Puerta nevertheless resigned in a matter of days due to a lack of political support.103
When Puerta’s successor Adolfo Rodríguez Saa also stepped down immediately
after taking office, he became the third Argentinean President to resign within two
weeks.104 The Chairman of the Deputies Chamber, Eduardo Camaño, was then
designated and sworn in as interim president for a few days until a Congressional
vote could be held to determine a longer-term replacement.105 Finally, the
Legislative Assembly selected Eduardo Duhalde, former Vice-President and
Governor of Buenos Aires Province, as the new president to govern the country for
a period of two years until new presidential elections would be held.106 Duhalde, a
powerful Peronist, took office in January 2002 and was finally able to stabilize the
political situation, and stop the revolving door of presidents.
To address the financial crisis, Duhalde sent a bill to Congress in January 2002,
which was finally passed as Law No. 25.561. The Act declared a “Public Social,
Economic and Administrative Emergency” until December 10, 2003.107
Based on the powers provided in Law 25.561, Duhalde immediately: (i)
declared the “National Alimentary Emergency” by Decree No. 108/2002;108 (ii)
declared the “Emergencia Alimentaria Nacional;” by Decree No. 165/2002;109 and
(iii) created the “Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogares Desocupados” (PJJHD), also by
Decree No. 165/2002.110 The PJJHD was notable as the biggest subsidy in the
country’s history, and would eventually supplant other welfare plans such as the
Plans Trabajar.111
Under these plans, the terms of the Federal Pact were retained. Thus, the
execution of the national welfare program was still operatively decentralized. The
allocation of benefits was conducted through individual provinces which were
charged with distributing the resources among the municipalities to implement the
101. See Nick Caistor, Profile: Fernando de La Rúa, BBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2001), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1721010.stm.
102. See Profile: Ramon Puerta, BBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2001), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1722840.stm.
103. See Argentina’s Interim President Resigns After One Week, ONLINE NEWS HOUR (Dec. 31, 2001),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/december01/argentina_12-31.html.
104. Id.
105. See Argentina’s new president sworn in, BBC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2002), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1738175.stm.
106. Id.
107. Law No. 25561, Jan. 6, 2002, [29810] B.O. 1. The expiration date of this law has been repeatedly
extended and is currently set to expire on December 31, 2008.
108. Decree No. 108/2002, Jan. 16, 2002, [29817] B.O. 1. Its explicit purpose was to “respond to the
basic alimentary needs of the population in a situation of vulnerability, suffering, and risk to their lives.”
109. Decree No. 165/2002, art. 1, Jan. 23, 2002, [29822] B.O. 2.
110. Id. art. 2.
111. See Estela Grassi & Norberto Alayón, Neo-liberalism in Argentina: social policy, welfare and the
conditions for the development of social work, in GLOBALISATION, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL WORK
23, 35–36 (Iain Ferguson et al. eds., 2005).08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
300 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 43:287
actual welfare program.112 In practice, municipalities with more than 25,000
inhabitants were allowed, by executive decree, to segment the operations by
individual neighborhood.113
In April 2003, new presidential elections were held. The results were close, but
Nestor Kirchner, Peronist leader and former governor of the Santa Cruz province,
was elected over former president Menem and continues to remain in office today.114
In sum, despite many difficulties, the presidential elections held since
Argentina’s return to democracy in October of 1983 have arguably fulfilled
minimum democratic standards. They have been broadly accepted as free,
competitive, clean, and fair, at least at a national level. In fact, the way the crises
(especially the last one in December 2001) were handled is seen by many as a
demonstration of the robust strength of Argentina’s core democratic institutions.
Levitsky and Murillo maintain that
[t]he survival of Argentine democracy is, in any event, one of the most
striking and yet under-appreciated outcomes of the 2001–2002 crisis. Few
democracies in the world have survived such a severe economic disaster.
But notwithstanding extreme levels of social protest and an atmosphere of
chaos, the military refused to repress protesters and made no attempt to
change the government. Nor did presidents engage in extra constitutional
power grabs. Given Argentina’s history of regime instability, this was an
extraordinary achievement. Contemporary Argentine democracy has thus
proven surprisingly robust. It has survived the hyperinflation of 1989–90,
the radical economic reforms of the 1990s, and, most recently, a depression
unparalleled in the country’s history.115
IV. THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY: “PIQUETEROS,” THE POLITICAL
MERCENARIES, AND THE STATE CLIENTELISTIC PRACTICES WITH
SOCIAL PLANS
Notwithstanding the political stabilization described above, Argentina is
undergoing a very difficult moment. The socioeconomic situation is terribly volatile.
Poverty and inequality have risen to dangerous levels,116 and this situation is being
exploited by partisan factors for political gain. The clearest expression of this
situation is represented by the piquetero movement and its cooption of large
numbers of welfare plans under the PJJHD.
112. Pavlina R. Tcherneva & L. Randall Wray, Employer of Last Resort: A Case Study of Argentina’s
Jefes de Hogar Program 12, (Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, Working Paper No. 41,
2005), available at http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp-pdf/WP41-Tcherneva-Wray-all.pdf.
113. Decree No. 565/2002, art. 9, Apr. 4, 2002, [29870] B.O. 1.
114. See Se ha Empezado a Escribir un Tiempo Distinto en la Argentina, INFOBAE, Mar. 5, 2008,
http://www.infobae.com/notas/nota.php?IdxSeccion=0.
115. Levitsky & Murillo, supra note 67, at 162.
116. See infra Part IV.A–B.08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
2008] CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA 301
A. The Rise of Poverty and Inequality: The Palliative Solution of the PJJHD
The World Bank estimates that the poverty rate in Argentina rose from 28
percent of the population in May 1998 to 37 percent in October 2001, and to 58
percent in October 2002.117 The World Bank states that “the number of people living
below the indigence line doubled from 2001 to the end of 2002.118 Independent
estimates put the total number of indigents at around eight million.119
The situation had hardly improved by 2004, with nearly half of the population
still living at the poverty level.120 Moreover, income distribution may have worsened
during the interim years, suggesting that the poorest segments of the population
suffered disproportionately.121 An economic study in December 2003 indicated that
10 percent of the population held 38.6 percent of the GDP.122 And the most recent
data indicate that as of 2005, 51.6 percent of the total economic resources are held by
20 percent of the active population.123
According to the World Bank, the rise in poverty has in large part been the
result of an increase in the cost of food, a major expenditure for the poor. Because
food is an important export in Argentina, its cost spiked with the collapse of
Argentinean currency.124 The World Bank reports, “[t]he break with the
Convertibility Plan [which pegged the peso to the dollar from 1992 to 2002] also
meant that the adjustment in the labor market occurred more through wages, rather
than by an increase in unemployment. Inflation reduced real wages substantially.”125
While the impact of the economic recession has been difficult for many groups, those
among the middle class who have faced declining wages, coupled with the freeze on
bank assets implemented under De la Rúa and continued by Duhalde, have been
forced into poverty for the first time.126 These new poor are thought to have had a
more difficult time adjusting to new circumstances.127
The impact of this situation is the worst in the Northern provinces and the
Cuyo, but the effect is spread throughout the country.128 As mentioned above,
unemployment also rose from 13 percent in 1998, to a peak of 22 percent in May
2002.129
117. WORLD BANK, POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN REGION, REPORT NO. 26127-AR: ARGENTINA: CRISIS AND POVERTY 2003—A
POVERTY ASSESSMENT i, (2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/
WDSP/IB/2003/10/08/000012009_20031008104201/Rendered/PDF/261270AR.pdf.
118. Id.
119. DINATALE, supra note 30, at 32.
120. See Vivian Alonso, POVERTY-ARGENTINA: Children First, IPS NEWS (Aug. 3, 2004),
http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=24925 (stating that the poverty rate had dropped to 46 percent in
early 2004).
121. See WORLD BANK, supra note 117, at 6.
122. El Reparto de los ingresos llegó a su peor nivel en 30 años, CLARÍN, June 28, 2004.
123. See Silvia Stang, El 20% de la GenteRecibe mas de la Mitad de la Renta, LA NACIÓN, Dec. 5,
2005, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/economia/nota.asp?nota_id=762260.
124. See WORLD BANK, supra note 117, at i.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 59–60.
129. Id. at 1.08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
302 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 43:287
On the whole, the economy in 2002 was estimated to have declined by 10.9
percent, bringing the reduction in GDP to over 20 percent between the peak in 1998
and July 2003.130 Moreover, the country suffered significant inflation from 2002 to
2003 for the first time since 1991.131 Between the economic decline and the
currency’s depreciation, per capita GDP fell dramatically to an estimated US$2,695
in 2002 (down from US$8,210 at its peak in 1998).132 As the World Bank points out,
very few countries in the world have ever seen such a sharp rise in poverty—an
increase of more than 50 percent in just a few years.133 The World Bank, citing
Ernesto Kritz’s background work, continues:
[E]very point rise in the price index for the basic food basket
produces 50,000 more indigent poor in the country. Furthermore,
[Kritz] estimates that the decline in real income between May 2001
and May 2002, 30 percent can be explained by the fall in
employment, 20 percent by a decline in nominal wages (including
fewer hours worked), and 50 percent by the increase in prices.134
Poverty is not new in Argentina, but the levels to which it has climbed in the
last twenty years are unprecedented, “resulting in severe social dislocations and a
reduction of welfare by its poorest.”135 The situation described qualifies as a true
“economic involution,”136 triggered by what has proven to be a spectacular increase
in the utilization of and dependence on public welfare policies. For instance, a
report by the Sistema de Información, Monitoreo y Evaluación de Programas
Sociales (SIEMPRO) shows public expenditures on welfare plans escalating from
$29 billion in 1997 to $40.6 billion by the end of 2004.137
Argentina has been a pioneer in the utilization of social welfare policies in the
twentieth century.138 But as shown above, these practices have increasingly moved
from basic universalistic practices to more particularistic plans. The allocation of
resources has become increasingly arbitrary as it has been delegated to different
politically managed public agencies with implicit partisan purposes.
The peak of these particularistic plans was reached with the creation of the
PJJHD. With a yearly budget of more than $3.5 billion and almost two million
beneficiaries, the PJJHD is considered a welfare megaplan.139 Consider that
130. WORLD BANK, supra note 117, at 4.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 4.
134. Id. at 5; see also Ernesto Kritz, Argentina-Crisis and Poverty 2003: A Poverty Assessment,
Poverty and the Labor Market in the Argentine Crisis, 1998–2002 5–6 (World Bank Poverty Reduction and
Economic Management in Latin America and the Caribbean Region Background Paper No. 4, Part II,
2002), available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/lac/lacinfoclient.nsf/d29684951174975c85256735007f
ef12/3d29a0ed02294a8b85256db10058dbdd/$FILE/ArgentinaPABP4.pdf.
135. WORLD BANK, supra note 117, at i.
136. See Carlos Escudé, From Captive to Failed State: Argentina under Systemic Populism, 1975–2006,
30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 125, 125 (2006), available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/ archives/pdfs/30-
2pdfs/escude.pdf.
137. DINATALE, supra note 30, at 37.
138. Id. at 19.
139. The creation of the plan was ratified by decree No. 565/2002, which pretended to extend it to “all
unemployed heads of family,” which later proved to be impossible. In May 2002, the government closed
the list of beneficiaries with a total of 1,987,875. See WORLD BANK, POVERTY REDUCTION AND
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT UNIT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGION, REPORT NO. 25991-
AR: ARGENTINA REFORMING POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY OF PUBLIC08_Salvochea_PUB.doc 5/23/2008 6:05:01 PM
2008] CLIENTELISM IN ARGENTINA 303
Argentina’s total population had not yet reached forty million and that the plan was
extended to nearly five percent of the population.140 It is by far the biggest and most
important welfare plan in the history of the country. In fact, it is the second biggest
plan in Latin America, following the “Plan de Asistencia a Desprotegidos de
México.”141
The explicit objective of the PJJHD is to provide financial assistance to heads
of households with children, in order to guarantee the “Family Right of Social
Inclusion,” which ensures: (1) the school attendance and health of children; (2)
access to formal job training and education; and (3) participation in productive
projects or community services.142 In practice, however, program administrators are
not collecting information on school attendance and heath.143 Likewise, most
beneficiaries participate in traditional workfare activities such as community services
and small construction projects, but very few utilize the education, training, or
private sector employment options.144
The program’s implementation is decentralized and is handled through
municipalities and communes, which collaborate with their corresponding municipal
or communal council.145 These councils must implement and monitor the program as
well as maintain transparency in the process.146 The municipalities, in turn, are
tasked with assigning activities to the program beneficiaries in return for financial
assistance; any public or private nonprofit organization can propose that certain
activities be included in the program.147
The beneficiaries of the plan are intended to be unemployed heads of
households with young (under eighteen years old) or disabled children, or those in
which the female head, spouse, concubine, or cohabitant partner of the male head of
household suffers from serious health conditions.148 To become eligible for benefits,
the household member is supposed to provide certain standard information and
documentation to the municipality and sign a sworn statement confirming that the
information is correct.149 The benefit consists of a monthly payment of
approximately 150 pesos.150
EXPENDITURES 147 tbl. C15 (2003) (prepared by Mateen Thobani et al.).
140. Id. at 116, 147.
141. Corina Rodríguez Enríquez, Labour, Employment and Social Policy: The Case of Argentina,
Engendering Macroecon. and Int’l Econ. (Paper presented at the 8th Int’l GEM-IWG Conf., July 20–22,
2007) at 7–9, available at http://www.econ.utah.edu/genmac/DOC/2007/2007papers/corinaabs.pdf.
142. WORLD BANK, supra note 117, at 31.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. WORLD BANK, supra note 117, at 31.
149. Id.
150. Id.You can also read
