Fighting Terrorism The need for multi-level intervention and EU interoperability - Finabel
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Food for thought 04-2020
Fighting
Terrorism
The need for multi-level intervention
and EU interoperability
AN EXPERTISE FORUM CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN
ARMIES INTEROPERABILITY SINCE 1953
Written by
Alessia Cornella, Linda Zamengo,
European Army Interoperability Center Alexandre Delepierre, Georges Clementz
This paper was drawn up by Alessia Cornella, Linda Zamengo, Alexandre Delepierre
and Georges Clementz under the supervision and guidance of Mr Mario Blokken,
Director of the Permanent Secretariat.
This Food for Thought paper is a document that gives an initial reflection on the
theme. The content is not reflecting the positions of the member states but consists
of elements that can initiate and feed the discussions and analyses in the domain of
the theme. All our studies are available on www.finabel.org
Cover picture – Source : EEAS https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/counter-terrorism/75936/remembering-victims-terrorism-growing-stronger-together_en
INTRODUCTION
Counter-terrorism action has been a signifi- Already on 11 January 2015, the EU Member
cant national and European concern for years. States’ interior and justice ministers signed a
Pivotal moments leading to a stronger focus joint statement called “Paris Declaration”, soon
on terrorism in the 2000s included the 2004 followed by the Council laying out its anti-ter-
Madrid train bombings, killing 193 people rorism priorities in the “Riga Joint Statement”
and injuring more than 2,000, and the 2005 on 29 January (Bigo et al., 2015: 6; Council of
London bombings, killing 52 people and injur- the European Union, 2015b). The EU’s response
ing more than 700. These terrorist attacks led addressed various aspects of the fight against ter-
the Council to adopt in 2005 the EU coun- rorism, such as enhancing the EU’s legal com-
ter-terrorism strategy in order to “combat ter- petence on the matter, preventing radicalisa-
rorism globally while respecting human rights, tion and terrorist content online, improving
and make Europe safer” (Council of the Euro- the effectiveness of border controls, information
pean Union, 2005). sharing, and the use of a firearms database (Bigo
et al., 2015). The watchwords to tackle these
Nevertheless, it was the terrorist attacks in Paris issues are the following: improving the coopera-
on 7-9 January, 2015 on Charlie Hebdo offices tion and coordination between Member States.
and a Jewish supermarket that accelerated the
need and the will of stronger EU involvement The actions taken by the EU led to a better per-
in combating terrorism. The spring 2016 Euro- ception of the involvement of the EU in the
barometer survey indicated that 39% of citi- fight against terrorism. Indeed, as stressed by
zens viewed terrorism as being one of the two the 2019 Eurobarometer survey, the number
most important issues facing the EU (European of European citizens considering terrorism as
Commission, 2016). The same year, a survey the main issue facing the EU went down to
for the European Parliament show that 69% 18% (European Commission, 2019a). How-
of EU citizens considered EU action on ter- ever, together with the economic situation and
rorism insufficient, and 82% wanted the EU the state of Member States’ public finances,
to take more action (European Parliament, terrorism was still seen in 2019 as the third-
2016). Since then, EU structures and Member most important issue facing the EU (Euro-
States have redoubled their efforts to address pean Commission, 2019b). Consequently, fur-
terrorism and act jointly on an EU-wide scale, ther EU action is needed, especially given that
rather than only fighting terrorism and radi- Europeans view the issue as rather a European
calisation nationally. than a national one: only 6% of citizens cited
2
terrorism as one of the two most important cooperation with international organisation
issues facing their countries, which is twelve and third countries is still a delicate matter as
percentage points lower than those who found it raises issues regarding the respect of interna-
the issue important at an EU level (European tional norms and principles by the EU (Her-
Commission, 2019b). lin-Karnell & Matera, 2014: 13).
Interoperability is crucial in strengthening the In sum, at present there are a myriad of Euro-
EU’s and its Member States’ measures against pean tools, instruments, programmes, struc-
terrorism. In 2019, the EU adopted two pieces tures aiming to address different types of issues
of regulation to improve the interoperability related to terrorism. These initiatives illustrate
of information systems concerning borders a clear need for more interoperability in order
and visas, police and judicial cooperation, and to enable more effectiveness in EU counter-ter-
asylum and migration (European Parliament, rorism policy.
2019a: 1). These shared structures are set to be
fully functional around 2023 (Immenkamp et The study proceeds as follows. The first section
al., 2019: 8). Meanwhile, the EU’s Entry-Exit sheds light on the interoperability potential of
System (EES) for non-EU nationals, and the the EU defence structures related to the fight
European Travel Information and Authorisa- against terrorism. The second section discusses
tion System (ETIAS) that specifically concerns the European responses to terrorism when the
non-EU nationals with visa-free travel to the terrorist menace was at its peak in Europe. The
EU, are expected to be launched in practice third section focuses on border security tech-
in 2020 and 2021, respectively (Immenkamp nology, a crucial facet of EU counter-terror-
et al., 2019: 7-8). Nevertheless, information ism policy, linked with the notion of European
gaps still exist between European schemes as interoperability. In the last section, the study
well as between European and third countries takes stock of the current situation regarding
or international structures fighting against ter- jihadist terrorism before looking into new forms
rorism (Immenkamp et al., 2019: 7). However, and sources of terrorist threats.
TERRORISM IN EUROPE AND THE INTEROPERABILITY
POTENTIAL OF THE EU DEFENCE STRUCTURES
The scourge of terrorism as a grave challenge to the EU
The European Union needs to protect soft tar- Among others, OSCE (2019) has found that
gets from terrorist attacks. Though the term ‘soft terrorists have increasingly used ‘soft’ targets in
targets’ has no universally agreed definition, it recent years in order to “maximise civilian casu-
can be used to refer to “places with high con- alties, chaos, publicity and economic impact”.
centration of people and low degree of security In order to tackle this issue, capabilities to com-
against assault, which creates an attractive target, bine and analyse large volumes of heteroge-
especially for terrorists” (Kalvach, 2016: 6). neous data have to be improved, and the link
As such, the definition includes places such as between existing EU databases also needs to
schools, public transport, museums, religious be strengthened.
sites, or shopping centres (Kalvach, 2016: 7).
Fighting Terrorism
The need for multi-level intervention and EU interoperability
3
accentuated by the EU treaties
themselves: for example, Arti-
cle 83 of the TFEU lists terror-
ism amongst the serious crimes
(https://twitter.com/eu_eeas/status/1105118396142796801)
with a cross-border dimension for
which provision is made for the
possibility to establish common
minimum rules, and Article 222
of the TFEU incorporates the sol-
idarity clause which states that the
Twitter official account
EU “shall mobilise all the instru-
ments at its disposal, including
the military resources made avail-
able by the Member States, to
prevent the terrorist threat in the
Cooperation between EU Member States’ agencies is key to combat the threat territory of the Member States”
effectively. Source: European External Action Service (Article 222 TFEU, 1.a.).
As a consequence, such a com-
Consequently, the 2015 European Agenda plex and sensitive issue requires a pragmatic
on security and the 2016 Communication on approach from the EU by involving and gath-
the Security Union both called for “innovative ering experts and appropriate stakeholders to
detection tools and technology in protection of fight, jointly, against terrorism.
these targets” (European Commission, 2017: 4).
The Commission emphasised that two aspects
needed to be improved in this realm: the shar- Existing EU initiatives
ing of best practice between Member States in
“developing better tools to prevent and respond Aware that the fight against terrorism needs
to soft target attacks”, and improving public a comprehensive approach and a long-term
security and safety as well as a better coopera- commitment, European institutions started
tion and exchange of information and relevant to take measures since the beginning of the
data (European Commission, 2017). As one 21st century. After the 2004 Madrid bomb-
example of the Commission’s will to address ings, the EU took the decision to establish
this area, it has funded a pilot project estab- a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) to
lishing a Centre of Excellence on law enforce- monitor the implementation of a counter-ter-
ment special interventions between Belgium, rorism strategy implementation. Gilles de Ker-
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (European chove was appointed as the first CTC in 2007.
Commission, 2017: 5). (Consilium, 2020a).
Thus, one can perceive from the measures taken The seriousness and constancy of the menace
to respond to attacks on soft targets that there is over time forced the EU to enhance their
a clear will from the European institutions, led responses to fight against terrorism, whose
by the Commission, and the Member States to implementation was accelerated since the Paris
work hand in hand. Indeed, the fight against attacks in 2015. The month following these
terrorism is definitely a matter that needs to be attacks, the European Council agreed on a
tackled at the European level. This assertion is “statement to guide the work of the EU and the
4
member states in the coming months” (Con- annual turnover; however, filtering uploaded
silium, 2020b). The latter is based on three content is not set to become a requirement,
pillars: security of citizens, radicalisation pre- and the one-hour deadline is set to be more
vention and safeguard of EU values, as well as lenient for small platforms (European Parlia-
international cooperation. ment, 2019b; European Parliament, 2020).
In April 2017, the Council adopted a direc- Finally, in 2017, the Council amended the
tive on control of the acquisition and posses- Schengen borders code by requiring systematic
sion of weapons, reviewing and complement- checks on individuals crossing the EU’s external
ing the previous directive on that matter, whose borders. The measure was intended to address
objective was to “enhance traceability of fire- security risks like terrorist fighters returning to
arms and to prevent the reactivation or con- Europe. (Council of the EU, 2017b).
version of firearms” (Consilium, 2020b). The
directive also aimed at implementing “stricter Talking about legal aspects, the issue of defining
rules for the acquisition and possession of the terrorism continues to put the brakes on the full
most dangerous firearms” and banning “civilian effectiveness of EU initiatives as it has always
use of the most dangerous semi-automatic fire- caused divergences in the international commu-
arms” (Council of the EU, 2017a). Finally, in nity. Over the last decades, EU has undergone
tune with the will to improve the link between various security threats from politically unstable
existing EU databases, the directive enables the countries (i.e. Libya) (Dankert, 2017). Due to
Member States to better exchange information the freedom of movement through the Euro-
about the firearms in circulation. A month ear- pean Member States, it has become easier to
lier, the Council had adopted a directive on com- plan a terrorist attack in one state and act upon
bating terrorism which criminalised training it in a second state while hiding in a third one.
and travelling for terrorist purposes, as well as As aforementioned, following the implemen-
providing or collecting funds linked to terror- tation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
ist organisations (Council of the EU, 2017b). the Solidarity Clause was adopted in December
2007 and, in July 2015, Europol has created
Another outcome of European cooperation was the European Union Internet Referral Unit.
the creation of a unit dedicated to tackle ter- Nevertheless, all the attempts to join forces
rorist propaganda online. Established in July on a European and international level can be
2015, the EU Internet Referral Unit helps to deemed void when a common legal definition
“identify terrorist and violent extremist con- of terrorism is missing.
tent online”, and makes information available
for criminal investigators (Consilium, 2020b; Consequently, the need to legally define terror-
Europol, 2020). The EU has also put pressure ism should be analysed. Greene (2017) points
on online platforms to increase its efforts to out that the labeller plays a key role when it
detect and remove terrorist content: the pro- comes to “who or what is terrorist”, thus being
posed regulation on ‘preventing the dissemina- able to control the term. Moreover, there have
tion of terrorist content online’ would oblige always been divergences between States when it
platforms to remove illegal content within a comes to distinguishing between terrorist and
one-hour notice after an order by law enforce- freedom fighters (Friedrichs, 2006).One should
ment authorities (European Parliament, 2020). also remember that the absence of a universally
If companies consistently fail to comply with accepted definition is driven by political and
the orders, they could be fined up to 4% of their ideological motives of each State. For instance,
Fighting Terrorism
The need for multi-level intervention and EU interoperability
5
due to the dissensions with the Irish Repub- In sum, cooperation between EU institutions
lican Army (IRA), UK advocated for no dif- and EU bodies in charge of security, such as
ferentiation between freedom fighters and ter- Europol, as well as with third countries and
rorists (ibid). Therefore, one of the challenges third organisations fighting against terrorism,
to improve the EU's fight against terrorism is is needed in order to address this multi-fac-
to agree on and enforce a common definition eted and global issue. The programmes and
of terrorism. initiatives described above show that the EU is
enhancing its legal arsenal and financial meas-
In addition to the various pieces of legislation, ures in an effort to close any security gaps and
the priority that the EU places on combat- loopholes that terrorists might exploit. How-
ing terrorism is illustrated by the emphasis it ever, the difficulty to apply a common defini-
received in both the 2015-2020 EU Internal tion of terrorism between Member States con-
Security Strategy (Council of the EU, 2015a), tinues to be a challenge limiting the impact of
and the 2016 EU Global Strategy. the fight against terrorism.
The EU’s main financial instrument for the fight
against terrorism is the Internal Security Fund Interoperability of databases: A key
(ISF), whose budget was €3.8 billion for the element of EU counterterrorism policy
2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework
(Immenkamp et al., 2019: 6). The ‘ISF Police’ In terms of information systems, interopera-
that received over €1 billion of funding from bility should be understood as “the ability of
the budget had a mandate to combat terrorism information technology (IT) systems and of
and other organised crime (ibid.). The fund was the business processes they support to exchange
also used to finance bodies such as Europol’s data and to enable the sharing of information
European Counter Terrorism Centre, and the and knowledge” (Dumbrava, 2017: 2).
Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of
Excellence (ibid.). The 2015 Paris attacks made clear that the lack
of interoperability regarding information sys-
In addition to focusing on the internal security tems was a serious concern. Before the trag-
threat, the EU combats terrorism on a global edy, several terrorists had used false identities
scale. For example, the EU together with its to move from one Member State to another
Member States is a non-military partner of the without being arrested. For instance, Mohamed
Global Coalition to counter Daesh launched in Belkaïd and Najim Laachraoui, involved in the
2014, participating in a wide range of projects attacks, were controlled on an Austrian motor-
on domestic and border security, and radicalisa- way, but avoided arrest because they travelled
tion (Global Coalition, n.d.) In another example, under false identities (Seelow, 2016). Before
the EU funded the G5 Sahel Joint Force with the attacks, the 2015-2020 EU Internal Secu-
€100 million to fight against terrorism and sup- rity Strategy had already highlighted database
port security in the region (EEAS, 2018). One interoperability through information sharing
example of international cooperation between and accessibility as one priority area to address
European countries is the Takuba Task Force, (Council of the EU, 2015: 9).
supported by 11 countries, which assists the
Malian military and other international part- Later, in response to this major problem, the
ners with neutralising terrorist groups in Mali Commission’s April 2016 communication on
and the Sahel region more broadly (Ministère ‘Stronger and smarter information systems for
des Armées, 2020). borders and security’ identified problems such
6as “gaps in the EU’s architecture data of man- the records will include photographs, addresses,
agement”, and the “complex landscape of differ- names and fingerprints (ibid.). The data in the
ently governed information systems”, resulting CIR will incorporate and encompass the data
in fragmentation and information gaps (Euro- holding up in five different systems, not exclu-
pean Commission, 2016b: 3; European Com- sively related to terrorism (ibid.). Nonetheless, in
mission, 2017: 2). The need to fix the defi- reducing the complexity of the data infrastruc-
ciencies in information management and the ture, the CIR also facilitates the data access of
interconnectedness of the various information European authorities fighting against terrorism.
systems was also addressed in the Commission
President’s September 2016 State of the Euro- As described in the regulation, the cluster of
pean Union speech, and the December 2016 the ESP, shared BMS, CIR and MID ensures
European Council conclusions (European Com- the interoperability of a number of EU infor-
mission, 2017: 3). mation systems. The systems included are the
Entry/Exit System (EES), the Visa Information
In 2016, the Commission launched a ‘High System (VIS), the European Travel Information
Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Authorisation System (ETIAS), Eurodac,
and Interoperability’, bringing together EU the Schengen Information System (SIS), and
agencies, Member States and other relevant the European Criminal Records Information
stakeholders (European Commission, 2017: System for third-country nationals (ECRIS-
3). The group’s interim findings from Decem- TCN)” (European Union, 2019, Regulation
ber 2016 proposed creating a ‘European Single (EU) 2019/818: Article 1.1). The underlying
Search Portal’ (ESP), which would enable all logic is that freedom of movement and the
existing EU information systems and data- Schengen Area per se are not hindering the
bases to be searched simultaneously (ibid.). fight against terrorism, but that the problem
The ESP is one component of the ‘Regulation is rather the fragmentation and inaccessibility
on establishing a framework for interopera- of security data between Member States and
bility between EU information systems in the European authorities fighting terrorism (Euro-
field of police and judicial cooperation, asylum pean Commission, 2017: 3; Berthelet, 2017).
and migration’ (European Union, 2019). The The chosen approach to reinforcing coopera-
‘framework’ established by the directive also tion was a “networked approach” that focuses
encompasses a shared biometric matching ser- on connecting national authorities and struc-
vice (shared BMS), a common identity repos- tures, rather than creating new super-structures
itory (CIR) and a multiple-identity detector that might be perceived to threaten state sov-
(MID). The inclusion of these elements into a ereignty (Berthelet, 2017).
common framework, enhancing interoperabil-
ity, aims at improving the prevention, detec- One can also observe that these information
tion and investigation of terrorism and other systems mostly concern national border officials
serious crimes (ibid.: 5). and law enforcement authorities, and involve the
strengthening of coordination between them.
The common identity repository is an innova- As such, it seems that these developments do
tive element. This new centralised database is not imply significant evolutions for the coop-
intended to hold biometric and biographic data eration and coordination of the armed forces.
about nearly every non-EU citizen in the Schen- Thereby, the optimisation of the contribution
gen Area, as well as some EU citizens (Chandler of armed forces in the fight against terrorism
& Jones, 2019). The information contained in remains a national question. For instance, the
Fighting Terrorism
The need for multi-level intervention and EU interoperability
7against them. Consequently, it
was just after the Paris attacks that
French authorities and Europol
discovered the Abdeslam brothers’
schengen-information-system-security-eu/)
previous criminal activities (De
La Baume and Paravicini, 2015).
ETIAS (https://www.etias.info/
Formed in 1998 to handle crimi-
nal intelligence and fight interna-
tional organised crime and terror-
ism by cooperating with Member
States’ authorities, Europol has
The interoperability of EU databases as a key element to enhance seen its counterterrorism man-
EU fight against terrorism date further enhanced in the wake
of the September 11 attacks in
2001. A 2002 Council decision
French action plan against terrorism disclosed made it mandatory for Member States to share
on July 2018 called for optimising French armed relevant information with Europol regarding
forces in field missions, as part of the “Sent- terrorism (Council of the EU, 2003).
inelle” operation, enhancing their “comple-
mentarity with internal security forces” (French In 2015, the European Counter Terrorism Centre
Government, 2018: 24). was launched within Europol, as a hub for infor-
mation sharing between Member States about
terrorism, by providing “analysis for ongoing
Europol as a criminal intelligence hub? investigations and contributing to a coordinated
reaction in the event of a major terrorist attack”
After major terrorist attacks in Europe from (Bureš, 2016: 58). The Centre particularly put
2015 onwards, the need of an enhanced intel- the emphasis on investigating “foreign terrorist
ligence sharing across Europe was highlighted, fighters and the trafficking of illegal firearms
as there was a clear lack in information sharing and terrorist financing” (Consilium, 2020b).
between national agencies regarding terrorists
that previously committed criminal activities. Nevertheless, there are several obstacles to the
For instance, in addition to the aforemen- strengthening of Europol’s counter terrorism
tioned cases of Mohamed Belkaïd and Najim coordination. Though Europol does not have a
Laachraoui, the Abdeslam brothers, involved supranational authority and executive powers,
in the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, and cannot conduct its own investigations, the
were known by Belgian authorities as running organisation plays a key role in combating inter-
“a café in Brussels that was notorious for drug national organised crime and terrorism, notably
peddling” (Bureš, 2016: 58). Moreover, they by enhancing its collaboration with competent
had been questioned by Belgian authorities Member States’ authorities fighting against ter-
regarding their fail attempt to travel to Syria. rorism. However, given that in some Member
Given that neither other Member States’ security States, police agencies are in charge of counter-
agencies nor Europol were informed about it, terrorism whereas in others intelligence services
when Dutch authorities controlled and fined the are dealing with the matter, national authori-
Abdeslam brothers for possession of prohibited ties’ priorities differ and information sharing
substances, no additional measures were taken is therefore not optimal: while police prioritise
8specific information useful for arrest and pros- Despite this, Europol’s success and effectiveness
ecution, intelligence agencies seek to collect a are unquestionable. While counter-terrorism
large general body of information (Bureš, 2016: policy was for a long time seen as a national pre-
61). Additionally, cultural differences and lan- rogative, the European Union is now a genuine
guage barriers between the member states, as actor in this field, notably embodied by Europol.
well as competition and reluctance to share Europol reported in 2016 that between 2011
information among and amongst hierarchical and 2015, the number of arrests of terrorist
levels and between services hinder coordination suspects multiplied by more than five (Berthe-
within Europol (Archick, 2002: 9; Bureš, 2016). let, 2017). The work of the European Counter
Terrorism Centre (discussed in the below sec-
Finally, the fear that sensitive data could be com- tion), and Europol’s Emergency Response Team
promised is also a barrier (ibid.). One way to which supports Member States in investigations
address suspicion towards hierarchical struc- after attacks, are examples of Europol’s contri-
tures is flexible, informal horizontal cooperation bution to the fight against terrorism (ibid.).
arrangements, which tend to be viewed favour- Europol’s databases have grown remarkably in
ably among practitioners (Bureš, 2016: 63). In the past few years: while in the past, Member
any case, the process of trust-building will take States were wary of sharing sensitive data with
a long time. That is why, according to Bureš the institution, information-sharing increased
(2016), the idea of turning Europol into a ‘Euro- substantially after the 2015 Paris attacks (ibid.).
pean FBI’ seems unrealistic in the short-term.
Nevertheless, one should remember
Europol (https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/
that these issues are not solely a con-
european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc)
cern for Europol. The reluctance from
national agencies to share informa-
tion, language and cultural barriers,
hierarchical issues and the lack of a
supranational nature of the structures
generally concern european structures
fighting against terrorism and may
weaken EU measures.
MILITARY RESPONSES TO TERRORISM SINCE 2015
After the London attack in July 2005, the imme- combat terrorism inside and outside the EU
diate response of EU member states was to borders containing four new pillars: Prevent,
accelerate the work on the existing defence Protect, Pursue and Response (Council of the
framework. At the same time, member states’ European Union, 2005).
governments increased the pressure on the
European Union to discuss individual meas- Preventing is the most challenging pillar of the
ures such as the European Evidence Warrant Counter-Terrorism Policy, and it represents
(EEW). The EU Counter-Terrorism strategy the main aim of all the intelligence agencies:
was adopted in December 2005, and its legal to prevent threat on a country. Since Decem-
framework produced a long-term strategy to ber 2005, the EU Counter-Terrorism Action
Fighting Terrorism
The need for multi-level intervention and EU interoperability
9Plan implemented more than 25 measures includes preventing travel planning, incepting
based only on the Prevention Pillar (Consil- the terrorist communication, infiltrating terror-
ium, 2020c). The purpose of the new measures ist support networks, blocking terrorist fund-
and key approaches was to limit the radicali- ing, and bringing suspected terrorists to jus-
sation of people and the probability of them tice. The EU Action Plan have adopted now
turning into Al-Qaeda, ISIS or any other the- more than sixty measures to counter terrorist
ologically inspired terrorist group. The newly activities, and eight of these are a strict priority
adopted pillar also served to combat the causes for this Action Plan. These highly prioritised
of terrorism, radicalisation and recruitment, measures include strengthening the EU capa-
and to prevent the “justification” of terrorism bilities for counter terrorism; blocking both
(Consilium, 2020c). terrorist financing and money laundering, as
well as terrorist access to weapons and explo-
Protecting the infrastructure and strengthening sives, or chemical, biological and radiological
the defence strategy against terrorism is the main materials; and reinforcing the law enforcement
objective of the Protection Pillar. The pillar aimed and changing the information between the EU
at reducing the impact of terrorist attacks and member states and non-EU countries. In addi-
improving the cooperation between EU internal tion, the Action Plan comprised steps regarding
and external borders. Moreover, it promoted effi- the evaluation of the current legislation and the
cient exchange of information between the police ratification of international treaties, as well as
and the judiciary inside EU member states. Even the facilitation of police and judicial cooper-
though the EU Action Plan listed thirty meas- ation between EU countries through Europol
ures that Counter-Terrorism needed to achieve and Eurojust (Consilium, 2020c).
into the Protect pillar, information exchange
between EU member states is still one of the Finally, the objective of the Response Pillar was
main obstacles of this Action Plan. When the to improve military capability cooperation and
strategy was adopted, the key priority of the EU police and judicial coordination between EU
was to protect efficiently the infrastructure pro- member states in order to minimise the conse-
gram introduced by the EU Council, as well as quences of a terrorist attack (Consilium, 2020c).
improving the exchange of passenger data (includ-
ing the identity, the biometric information and The attacks in Paris in January and Novem-
the passport details of the passengers). As stated ber 2015, as well as the subsequent high-pro-
by the Pillar, at the international level, the EU file attacks in Brussels, Berlin and Barcelona
member states must collaborate and exchange heightened the urgency of countering terrorism.
information about travellers through both civil Weeks after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris,
aviation and sea travel, while at the same time the ‘Riga Joint Statement’ by the Council’s Jus-
evaluating the existing legislation and imple- tice and Home Affairs configuration in January
menting the Action Plan measures. The newly 2015 laid out a set of anti-terrorism priorities
created Euro Border Agency (FRONTEX) pro- (Bigo et al., 2015). Bigo et al. (2015) argued
vides risk management to protect the EU external that the EU’s response at the time presented
borders, while the EU also introduced new civil challenges to both free movement and citizen-
aviation rules and changed many regulations in ship, and rule of law. The challenge to free move-
the matter (Consilium, 2020c). ment arose from the tension between surveilling
citizens’ travel information, and the principle
The main objective of the Pursue Pillar of the of unrestricted travel that goes against the idea
EU Counter-Terrorism strategy is combating of systematic checks that mechanisms like the
around the world and within EU borders. This Passenger Name Record directive – adopted in
10(https://epthinktank.eu/2019/04/10/eu-policies-delivering-for-citizens-the-fight-against-terrorism-policy-podcast/)
Sean K – stock.adobe.com
The cooperation between the EU and international stakeholders is needed to address the issue globally.
2016 – and the Schengen Information System partners as one priority area, alongside ‘prevent-
II represent (Bigo et al., 2015: 1-2). Regarding ing radicalisation and safeguarding values’, and
rule of law, the authors pointed to the Euro- ‘ensuring the security of citizens’ (De Kerchove
pean Parliament and European Court of Jus- & Höhn, 2019). Specific measures called for by
tice’s concerns about whether large-scale sur- the European Council included combating ter-
veillance mechanisms meet the requirements rorist financing, checks of EU citizens at external
of necessity, proportionality and compliance borders, tackling terrorist content online, and
with fundamental rights (ibid.). promoting cooperation with third countries to
address crises and conflicts. Later the same year,
In January 2015, the foreign affairs ministers of the Council also adopted conclusions concern-
EU Member States agreed to exchange security ing the strengthening of measures to fight fire-
information with partner countries in the EU’s arms trafficking. (Consilium, 2020c)
neighbourhood in order to fight terrorism. The
EU’s key partners in managing ongoing conflicts Early in 2016, the European Union launched
and countering radicalisation include countries the Europol’s European Counter Terrorism
across the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, Centre (ECTC), following a decision from the
in North Africa, the Gulf and the Sahel (Con- Justice and Home Affairs Council of 20 Novem-
silium, 2020c). The next month, a counter-ter- ber 2015. The ECTC is a platform through
rorism strategy adopted by the European Coun- which member states can increase informa-
cil highlighted cooperation with international tion sharing and operational cooperation with
Fighting Terrorism
The need for multi-level intervention and EU interoperability
11regard to the monitoring and investigation of Travel Information and Authorisation System
foreign terrorist fighters and the trafficking of (ETIAS) to the Council. ETIAS allowed for
illegal firearms and terrorist financing. After the advance checks and, if necessary, deny entry
Brussels terrorist attack on 22 March 2016, the to visa-exempt travellers. Ministers considered
Justice and Home Affairs Ministers adopted a that the system proposed will strengthen the
Joint Statement calling for urgent adoption EU's security and border management policy
of the PNR directive by the European Parlia- and they tasked experts to start examining the
ment in April 2016, swift completion of legis- proposal (Consilium, 2020c).
lation under discussion and full implementa-
tion of agreed measures, particularly in respect In 2018, after a number of new terrorist attacks
of firearms and precursor chemicals used in the especially in France and Belgium, the Coun-
manufacture of explosives, as well as increasing cil adopted new rules to strengthen the previ-
the feeding and use of European and interna- ously adopted Schengen Information System.
tional databases in the fields of security, travel The new rules will address potential gaps in the
and migration and finding ways to secure and system and introduce several essential changes
obtain more quickly digital evidence, improv- to the types of alert entered. This will contrib-
ing early detection of signs of radicalisation. ute to strengthening the fight against terrorism
and serious crime while ensuring a high level of
In November 2016, The Commission pre- security across and within the European Union
sented its recent proposal on the European (Consilium, 2020c).
BORDER SECURITY TECHNOLOGY AND EUROPEAN
INTEROPERABILITY
Questions of terrorism, homeland security and group members across poorly controlled bor-
migration have become politically highly con- ders, and the EU has been involved in shaping
tentious in the past years (Quintel, 2019). As the a global response to border management issues
above discussion on the EU’s response reveals, (UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2020a). The
one key overall objective has been rearranging growing volume of international travel further
and harmonising European databases, in an calls for effective border management strategies
effort to improve authorities’ ability to “sort (UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2020b). The
the unwanted from the welcomed” (Quintel, European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Fron-
2019). The information gaps manifest both at tex) has been a key European actor in coopera-
the EU’s external borders and within the EU: tion and information-sharing with third coun-
the examples of perpetrators of attacks travel- tries with a view to reforming border control
ling within Europe using false identities is an practices in Europe’s neighbourhood (Lavenex
example of the latter. and Kunz, 2008; Chou and Riddervold, 2015).
This section focuses on the Eu’s external border In Europe, one key measure adopted was the ‘tar-
management techniques, and discusses the con- geted revision’ of the Schengen Borders Code from
tribution these technologies make to combat- 2017, which brought about a number of anti-ter-
ting terrorism. rorism reforms (European Parliament, 2019d).
Border management strategies around the world Regarding the existing instruments, the Schen-
have sought to stop the movement of terrorist gen Information System (SIS) is a large-scale
12and centralised European information system. Exit System (EES), scheduled to become opera-
(European parliament, 2019). The system con- tional in 2022 (European Commission, 2020a),
tains millions of alerts on missing and stolen will be used to monitor the cross-border move-
objects, individuals subject to discreet surveil- ments of temporary visitors to the Schengen
lance and checks, and individuals barred from area and to automatically estimate the period
entering the Schengen Area. (Picum Platform, of time they are permitted to stay. The EES
2019) National border control, police, customs, system will also be used to facilitate the auto-
visa and vehicle registration authorities, and mation of border controls, through the stor-
when it is necessary for their work, national age of biometric data and the use of ‘e-gates’
judicial authorities, can access the SIS data- at border crossings – although the feasibility
base; of EU-level actors, Europol and Eurojust of using such technology at all border cross-
have limited access to the database (Atanassov, ing points remains to be seen. Data held in the
2017: 4) Member States are obliged to insert EES will also be available to law enforcement
information on return decisions of irregular authorities under certain conditions (Eu-Lisa,
migrants which work as a back door for ter- 2019). Thirdly, national authorities have access
rorists and on the enforcement of these deci- to the European dactyloscopy database (Euro-
sions into the SIS, while in the past this had dac), which helps to apply the Dublin Regula-
been dependent on national law. tion. This Regulation establishes the criteria and
the structure for determining a Member State
The EU Visa Information System (VIS) is responsible for examining an asylum applica-
intended to ascertain that individuals staying tion lodged in one of the Member States by a
or entering into the EU’s territory have the right third-country national. (unhcr.org)
to do so. At the same time, one of the stated
purposes of the system is to ‘prevent, detect But the Schengen Information System remains
and investigate terrorist offences’ (European the most important one concerning border
Commission, 2020b). Relatedly, the Entry/ control. However, these systems were not often
internal-border-controls-within-the-sche/product-details/20200508CAN55041)
Source: European Union (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/fr/
Fighting Terrorism
The need for multi-level intervention and EU interoperability
13used to report and alert on foreign terrorists, for Member States to provide alerts on people
the information recorded were incomplete and linked with terrorism (European Parliament
the absence of biometric identifiers allowed ter- Briefing, 2017) to improve the interoperabil-
rorists to travel under false identities. Moreo- ity between the states.
ver, definitions and standards regarding with
regard to foreign terrorist differed from one In sum, optimal prevention of terrorism requires
country to another. In order address these prob- interoperability between European information
lems the Commission made legal and techni- systems related to external border management,
cal improvements with regards to informa- given risks such as identity fraud. The EU has
tion exchange. It also created a common risk recognised the need to address any ‘blind spots’
indicator to be used at border checks (Euro- in EU border management, and new develop-
pean Commission, 2016). And, in December ments such as the Entry/Exit System can be
2016, the Commission made it mandatory anticipated in the near futur
THE THREAT OF TERRORISM IN EUROPE: STATE OF PLAY
The persistent threat of jihadist networks and pro-IS media outlets” (Europol,
terrorism 2019: 9), its territorial presence has dimin-
ished, in particular following their recent mil-
In its 2019 Terrorism Situation and Trend itary defeats in Syria and Iraq. With its terri-
Report (Europol, 2019), Europol highlighted torial defeats, the Islamic State lost its major
that Europe has experienced a decrease in the propaganda assets and currently only publishes
number of people killed and injured by jihadist a weekly newsletter, called Al-Naba. Moreover,
attacks compared to 2017. In 2018, 13 people the apparent ideological unity shown by the IS
died as a result of jihadist attacks and 46 were these past months hides strong inside divisions
injured, while in 2017, a total of 62 people had between its more and less radical supporters
died in ten attacks (Europol, 2019: 9). Moreo- regarding the question of takfir, that is, whether
ver, Europol observed a decreasing number of other Muslims should be declared as unbeliev-
travels for terrorist purposes, with the figures ers (Europol, 2019: 36). This dispute notably
remaining rather low. Nevertheless, the threat led the central IS Media Department to come
is still topical in Europe: when one takes into back to its previous radical posture.
account not only completed, but also failed or
foiled attacks, the number of attacks reported However, the decline of ISIS does not signify a
by EU Member States in 2018 alone was 129, decline of all jihadist organisations. On the con-
of which 24 were jihadist (Europol, 2019: 12). trary, it led to a resurgence of Al-Qaeda. Out-
511 out of the 1,056 arrests made on suspicion side Europe, Al-Qaeda continues to be influ-
of terrorism in 2018 were related to jihadism ential in conflict areas, by exploiting political
(Europol, 2019: 15). Jihadist organisations grievances at local and international level and
mainly financed themselves via Hawala bank- building alliances with local tribes (Europol,
ing, while the misuse of credit systems, non- 2019: 8). Its nominal head, Ayman al-Zawa-
profit and charity organisations also played an hiri, insisted several times on the importance
important role (Europol, 2019: 9). of jihad in Africa, especially in Western-Af-
rica, and called for an “uprising against West-
While the online presence of the Islamic State ern occupying powers in the region”, who are
(IS) remains high due to “unofficial supporter considered as “an occupying force corrupting
14Islam” (Europol, 2019: 37). Notably, the jihad- actions and connect their terrorist attacks to
ist organisation can locally count on AQIM (Al a genuine and sophisticated form of strategic
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and Jama’at communication (Koehler, 2019: 10). Finally,
Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM, ‘group there is no such thing as a unique or univer-
in support of Islam and Muslims’) (ibid.). Fur- sal right-wing terrorism in Europe but various
thermore, Al-Qaeda continues to exploit West- forms of it coexist amongst and between coun-
ern news agendas in order to promote its ide- tries, according to local, regional and national
ology. For instance, it presented the French specificities, and even overlap (Ravndal, 2015;
“Gilets jaunes” movement as a consequence Koehler, 2016; Koehler, 2019: 10).
of an expensive French neo-colonialism and
neo-imperialism respectively in Africa and in Europol (2019: 60) finds that “the right-wing
the Middle East (Europol, 2019: 37). Groups extremism scene varies significantly between
splintered from Al-Qaeda also contribute to and within EU Member States”. In its 2017
the terrorist threat; a notable example of these Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-
is Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which became Syr- SAT), Europol attributed only 3 percent of
ia’s most prominent jihadist group in 2018 failed, foiled or completed terrorist attacks to
(Europol, 2019: 38). the extreme right (Europol, 2017). Moreover,
in 2018, only one right-wing terrorist attack
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, was reported in the EU, happening in Italy
jihadist groups have strengthened their apoc- (Europol, 2019: 60). However, despite this
alyptic discourse. Meanwhile, there have been low number of attacks, the threat is real in
fears that the repatriation of troops from Iraq Europe, and far-right extremist terrorism has
and Syria could facilitate the spread of jihad- been an increasingly serious concern recently.
ist groups. (Costa, 2020) 44 arrests related to right-wing terrorism were
made in the EU in 2018, of which 32 were in
France and 8 in Germany; additionally, Slova-
Right-wing terrorism: An increasingly kia charged fifteen individuals with right-wing
topical threat? extremist activities (Europol, 2019: 60-62). In
2017, thirty right-wing extremist attacks were
Right-wing terrorism, which draws from fears reported in Europe, an increase of 43% from
related to Islam and a perceived loss of national the 21 attacks reported in 2016 (Jones, 2018).
identity (Europol, 2019: 60), has developed
into a prominent threat in the past years. While Koehler (2019: 1, 7) argues that extreme-right
it uses some of the same methods as jihadists, violence risks being under-classified, as it is rarely
Koehler (2019: 1) writes that far-right terrorism prosecuted as terrorism. He notes terrorist threat
is unique in certain key aspects. For instance, assessments that exclude extreme-right violence
while jihadist terrorism more specifically targets risk being incomplete, which would undermine
the foundations of Western civilisation, right- the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies
wing terrorism focuses on fundamental aspects (Koehler, 2019: 7). As such, Koehler advocates
of democratic culture, namely tolerance and for revising the legal definitions of terrorism, and
pluralism. Moreover, it tries to weaken trust clarifying the relationship between the concepts
in democratic states’ rule of law and monop- of ‘terrorism’ and ‘hate crime’.
oly on violence (Koehler, 2019: 12). In addi-
tion, contrary to jihadists, right-wing terror- However, after the February 2020 shootings in
ists infrequently claim responsibility for their two shisha bars in Hanau, Germany that followed
Fighting Terrorism
The need for multi-level intervention and EU interoperability
15other right-wing acts of violence in Germany topical question of what to do with the prison-
in recent years, the country’s Minister of Jus- ers related to ETA has contributed to renewed
tice Christine Lambrecht called ‘far-right terror’ tensions in the Basque Country. Indeed, around
“the biggest threat to our democracy right now” 250 ETA-linked prisoners are dispersed across
(Eddy, 2020). German security officials say that Spain, with very few of them are imprisoned
12,000 German citizens are known right-wing in the Basque Country, and in France (The
extremists (ibid.). Subsequently to the attacks, Local, 2019).
German authorities decided to enhance police
presence in sensitive areas such as airports and The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) commit-
mosques (ibid.). ted no attacks within the EU in 2018, but the
PKK apparatus in Europe organised logistical
In fact, the 2019 and 2020 right-wing attacks and financial aid to HPG, the military wing of
in Germany are in line with the trend observed the PKK; moreover, recruitment activities took
during the previous years. In 2018, for the third place (Europol, 2019: 54). Within the EU, one
year in a row, the number of people arrested related security threat is tension between Kurd-
for reasons of right-wing terrorist activities in ish and Turkish nationalists, which has led to
Europe has slightly increased: 12 in 2016, 20 acts of violence especially in Germany (ibid.).
in 2017, and 44 in 2018 (Europol, 2019: 70).
Regarding left-wing and anarchist terrorism,
19 failed, foiled or completed attacks were
Other threats reported in the EU in 2018, with each of these
being in either Greece, Italy or Spain (Europol,
83 attacks by ethno-nationalists and separatists 2019: 56). Extremists groups linked to left-
were recorded in Europe in 2018, representing wing and anarchist groups usually try to per-
by far the largest proportion of failed, foiled or petrate attacks during big events that are highly
completed attacks in the EU (Europol, 2019: 12). covered by the media in order to gain atten-
However, this type of attacks has decreased com- tion (ibid.).
pared to 2017, when 137 attacks were commit-
ted. The UK, France and Spain have historically Finally, to complete the circle regarding the
faced the largest number of ethno-nationalist different forms of terrorism that the EU and
and separatist attacks, which also was the case its Member States have to address, one should
in 2018, with 56, 20 and 7 attacks committed, not forget ‘lone wolfs’, whose acts are much
respectively (Europol, 2019: 68). more difficult to anticipate and predict. How-
ever, as stressed by Europol in its 2019 report,
The UK still experiences a threat presented by “single-issue activism continued to be largely
republicans in Northern Ireland, with groups limited to online campaigns and nonviolent
such as the New Irish Republican Army (NIRA), demonstrations by decentralised groups” (p. 63)
or the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) and only one attack of this form of terrorism
opposing the Northern Irish peace process and was classified in the EU in 2018.
striving for a united Ireland. In Spain, separa-
tist terrorist activities have been comparatively In sum, the terrorist threat is multifaceted, which
scarce in the past few years: for example, the makes it more challenging for European author-
Basque separatist group ETA has committed no ities to face it. Even though Europol showed
terrorist attacks since August 2009, and in May that the number of attacks and victims of ter-
2018 it declared that its structures would be dis- rorism on EU soil “dropped significantly” from
banded (Europol, 2019: 54). Nevertheless, the 2017 to 2018 (Europol, 2019b), the menace is
16UNIÓN
still topical and threatens
Member States’ security, as
Source: Europol: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019 (https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/
it has lately become more
complex and thus more
difficult to apprehend. This
was underlined by Kristian
DEFENSA,
Bartholin, Deputy Head of
Counter-Terrorism at the
O Council of Europe, who
stated that “there are fewer
a UEattacks
se hizo that are success-
fully conducted but that
doesn't mean there are
main-reports/terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat)
fewer attempts. There are
ando una
a numbergran of attacks that
miembros de la being foiled”
are constantly
(Davies, 2019). There-
nas e hirieron a
fore, in the fight against
mero dethisarrestos
diverse, cross-border
nque todavía
threat, thees interoperabil-
as de orientación
ity of databases discussed
olenciaincomo un is one key
this paper
racióninstrument
con 2017, for gaining
UE disminuyó
success.
e conspiraciones
as aumentó Terrorist attacks and arrests in EU Member States in 2018.
e amenaza del
e ha vuelto más El Informe de Situación y Tendencias del Terrorismo de la
UE de 2019 de Europol (TE-SAT), un producto solicitado por
el Parlamento Europeo y publicado este mes, proporciona una
CONCLUSION
The European Union has responded to the inter-
national terrorist threat by updating its coun-
rising higher on the EU’s political agenda (De
Kerchove and Höhn, 2019). In turn, the coun-
4
ter-terrorism strategy, and seeking to improve ter-terrorism initiatives launched are an impor-
synergies between the different criminal and tant driving force of European integration in
border management databases. The EU’s main the field of security (ibid.).
function in addressing terrorism is harmoni-
sation and coordination, although it has also Reinforced cooperation between EU countries
provided financial support for counter-terror- and information sharing between Member
ism activities (Immenkamp et al., 2019: 1). States’ law enforcement authorities have helped
to prevent attacks within EU borders, or at
The several high-profile attacks that have struck least they have limited their impact. While the
Europe in the recent years have contributed to threat of terrorism remains high, information
counter-terrorism and security more generally sharing and other elements of the European
Fighting Terrorism
The need for multi-level intervention and EU interoperability
17counter-terrorism response reduce Europe’s to measure the terrorist threat by the number
vulnerability. The many new rules and instru- of attacks carried out, as security officers say. To
ments adopted since 2015, addressing subjects understand the scale and nature of the threat
such as harmonising definitions of terrorist we must not only study successful attacks, but
sanctions, information management between also look at the plots hampered by counterter-
border officials, and firearms regulation, rep- rorism efforts.
resent a significant progress in the fight against
European terrorism (De Kerchove and Höhn, While toughened European counterterrorism
2019). Still, a lot of challenges to be addressed efforts may have weakened the capabilities of
remain. the radicalised networks, this is not yet above
suspicions. Indeed, the decrease since the 2015
Many of the recent measures are due to be imple- attacks was followed by a dramatic peak in 2017,
mented during the term of the current Euro- with the highest number of plots since jihadists
pean Commission: for example, the Entry/Exit began attacking Europe more or less 25 years
System is expected to be operational in 2022, ago. Compared to any given year before 2015
and the current Commission’s tenure also sees and in spite of massive spending by European
the implementation of the 2019 ‘Regulation governments to reduce terrorist activity, the
on establishing a framework for interoperability number of plots in Europe is still high.
between EU information systems in the field
of police and judicial cooperation, asylum and The activities of radicalised attackers and
migration’. Among other challenges ahead, De would-be attackers in 2018 show that the ter-
Kerchove and Höhn (2019) list the improved rorist group Islamic State remains highly inclined
use of biometric data, and the need for stronger on assaulting their enemies in Europe in any
Europol support for Member States in coun- way possible. In fact, most terrorist’s perpetra-
ter-terrorism investigations. Accordingly, they tors are linked to the group, or active support-
call for sufficient investment in counter-terror- ers of it. Moreover, most of them also have ties
ism in the EU budget. to domestic extremists and foreign fighters, and
typically chat with members of the Islamic State
A major challenge in the fight against Euro- on social media apps.
pean terrorism will be to develop and imple-
ment an ambitious vision on mobilising disrup-
tive technologies to a greater extent for security
and justice matters, while fully assessing the
threats they might pose. Securing a sufficient
budget, as well as creating an adequate govern-
ance adapted to the fast-moving environment
of new security technologies, will be surely key
to the EU success in counter terrorism. And
beyond that, these measure seem also neces-
sary to achieve increased European interoper-
ability and cooperation in the realm of secu-
rity and defence.
Despite some “comforting” data on the reduc-
tion of terrorism attacks in respect of the years
between 2015 and 2018, it’s a common mistake
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