Going it Alone? By Steven Philip Kramer and George Topic - Wilson Center
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Going it Alone?
By Steven Philip Kramer and George Topic
F
or three-quarters of a century, a These assumptions are no longer broadly
highly developed continent com- shared for many reasons. But most impor-
posed of sovereign nations put its tant has been the impact of Donald Trump
defense in the hands of someone and his presidency. Its “America First” pro-
else. In practice, European defense depend- nouncements raised the question of wheth-
ed on the United States, although this rela- er the United States would always remain
tionship, as embodied in the North Atlantic committed to defending Europe (although
Treaty Organization (nato), was supposed congressional support for nato remained
to be mutual. One has to go back to the strong). It was not uncommon to hear peo-
time of the Delian League to find a histori- ple in the Atlantic security community say
cal precedent. The relationship was based that a second Trump administration would
on several assumptions shared on both sides mean U.S. withdrawal from nato. The
of the Atlantic: Trump administration made Europeans
• That the Soviet Union was an exis- question whether the United States and Eu-
tential threat to Europe and that Rus- rope shared the same values. Certainly, the
sia remained a serious threat. election of Joe Biden was hailed by most
• That Europe was vulnerable and Europeans, but who can be sure that the
could not defend itself alone. political movement embodied by Trump
• That the United States and Europe would not return? The Republican Party
constituted an Atlantic community still seems to be the party of Trump, and
that shared basic liberal democratic it’s not clear whether or not it will stay that
values. way. How long are European leaders and
• That the United States could be populations willing to live with the pos-
trusted to defend Europe. sibility that a “Trumpist” government will
return? Even if this does not happen, the
Steven Philip Kramer is a Global Fellow at legacy of the last administration’s policies
the Woodrow Wilson International Center and the perceived need for Republicans to
for Scholars. support them to avoid primary challenges
George Topic is Vice Director of the Center has left a significant impact. Americans
for Joint and Strategic Logistics at National may not fully appreciate how much dam-
Defense University. age the Trump administration did to faith
This article represents only the opinions of and trust in America—not only on the part
its authors and should not be construed as of European leaders but also on European
reflecting the position of National Defense publics.
University, the Department of Defense, or The result of the last four years has been
the U.S. government. a return of the idea that Europe needs to
36 The National Interest Going it Alone?
be capable of defending itself in case the migrant problem requires only small, spe-
United States can no longer be counted cialized military forces and, of course, a
on—an idea promoted by French president much broader collection of actions across
Emmanuel Macron. Shouldn’t Europe have governments, individually and collectively.
its own grand strategy and the means to China also poses a variety of serious secu-
pursue it? In other words, why shouldn’t rity challenges to Europe. It is not clear to
Europe, an economic “superpower,” be a Europeans whether it is just a robust com-
superpower in all respects? If the world is petitor or constitutes a security threat as the
not prepared to follow Europe’s example debate over 5g demonstrates. China is not
as a new form of post-modernist political a military problem for Europe in the tradi-
organization, shouldn’t Europe accept the tional sense: no one fears a Chinese army
need to play in the league of global super- sweeping across the steppes like Genghis
powers and develop its own self-reliant sys- Khan or Tamburlaine. But the risks associ-
tem of defense? ated with key acquisitions of ports, critical
infrastructure, and advanced technology
M
ost of the great security issues firms may be even more dangerous—and
Europe faces do not require vast difficult to defend against. Finally, the ris-
armed forces; the industrial age ing tensions between the United States and
military capabilities that have served as ef- China make Europeans question whether
fective deterrence may still be necessary but they share the same strategic interests as
certainly are not sufficient. Some issues call the United States. Does Europe want to be
for solutions that do not involve armored caught up in a new Cold War between the
brigades. For example, the significant United States and China?
Image: French president Emmanuel Macron attends a press conference at the end of an Informal Meeting of EU
Heads of State and Government in Porto, Portugal. May 8, 2021. Jose Coelho/Pool via Reuters.
Going it Alone? September/October 2021 37
The principal defense risk Europe faces demographic bell tolls for Russia with its
is Russia, no longer the ussr but still a low birth rates and high mortality (but
serious problem. Without a threaten- higher birth rates for Muslim minorities).
ing Russia, there would be little need for Recent protests over Alexei Navalny and
nato, at least not in anything like its cur- the roiling discontent in Belarus offer omi-
rent form. Therein lies a paradox: with nous portents for harnessing the power and
the end of Communism, it would seem potential of younger Russians.
that Russia’s interests lay in a close and For Putin, weakening eu cohesion, un-
cordial relationship with Europe, which dermining its members, paralyzing Ukraine
would facilitate its economic development and Moldova through frozen conflicts, and
and strengthen its social keeping Belarus under dicta-
and cultural resurgence. But Europe would not need torship substitute for a real
Russian president Vladimir strategic vision. Now Putin
NATO if it were not for
Putin seems to have returned has even been able to insert
to the vision of Nicholas Russia’s self-defeating Russian forces into Arme-
I—“Orthodoxy, Autocracy, policies. Ironically, nia and Azerbaijan. Many
and Nationality”—with the of these schemes may serve
difference that Putin is far if Putin wanted to Putin’s near-term interests,
more interventionist than destroy (or at least but ultimately bring risk,
Nicholas. Russia’s appeal is suffering, and retaliation to
once again Slavophilism and transform) NATO , he the Russian people. All this
religion—although that is could do so by ending seems truly self-defeating in
a multi-edged sword since the long term. Europe as a
Russia contains significant Russia’s hostility post-modern entity has trou-
Muslim minorities—and Pu- to the West and ble understanding an atavis-
tin’s aura as a defender of the
“White Race.” Putin is thus
deciding on a policy of tic ruler like Putin. But Rus-
sia and Putin—including
a supporter of tin-pot dic- rapprochement with h i s s u p p o r t e r s — c a n n o t
tators like Belarussian presi- Europe. That almost be ignored; Russia remains
dent Alexander Lukashenko, a threat because of its vast
a model for potentates like happened under if aging nuclear arsenal and
Hungarian prime minister Mikhail Gorbachev its newly acquired skills at
Viktor Orban, the darling of projecting its limited power
the European Far Right. and could happen after in clever and unpredictable
Russia’s great economic re- Putin. ways. It is also important to
sources are gas and oil, whose recognize that if Putin’s re-
days are numbered. The pace of develop- gime feels seriously threatened, that there
ment of alternative energy sources, and are few limits to what it might do to retain
particularly the adoption of clean energy power.
in Europe, will have striking implications Europe would not need nato if it were
for Russia as well as other oil producers. not for Russia’s self-defeating policies. Iron-
Putin has allied Russia to China, defy- ically, if Putin wanted to destroy (or at least
ing the basic rules of geopolitics. Surely a transform) nato, he could do so by ending
border separating a thinly populated Rus- Russia’s hostility to the West and deciding
sian Asia from a densely populated China on a policy of rapprochement with Eu-
should give Russia pause. Additionally, the rope. That almost happened under Mikhail
Image: Russian president Vladimir Putin attends the Navy Day parade in Saint Petersburg, Russia. July 25, 2021.
Sputnik/Aleksey Nikolskyi/Kremlin via Reuters.
38 The National Interest Going it Alone?
Gorbachev and could happen after Putin. are currently available and others that are
Thus, Russia constitutes an anomalous but under development appear to be effective
real problem for Europe. For Europe to against armor, air defense systems, and
have a common defense, it must be able to other major equipment at a small fraction
defend itself collectively against Russia. of the cost of their targets and could cause
significant disruption to attacking forma-
O
ne of the central questions for tions. They offer the possibility that Europe
European nations and Europe and its small frontline states can impose an
as a whole is whether the de- unacceptable cost on a conventional invad-
velopment of inexpensive weapons and er. But they do not eliminate the need for
associated capabilities offer a satisfactory key combat enablers such as strategic lift;
opportunity for deterrence and/or defense command control, communications, and
against Russia. This includes not only the intelligence; and logistics that are essential
threat of invasion or significant incursion for victory in a major kinetic war. If the
as witnessed in Georgia and Ukraine, but Americans who play a key role in so many
other forms of aggression such as cyber- of these areas are not available, can Europe
attacks, information warfare, and energy deter conflict without them?
blackmail as well as assassination and sab- There is no question that European tech-
otage. Will changes in military technol- nology is every bit as advanced as Ameri-
ogy reduce the relevance of industrial age can; in some cases, owing to the lengthy
forms of defense such as massed combined and cumbersome U.S. acquisition process-
arms warfare? Some weapons systems that es, some of the newest technology is more
Going it Alone? September/October 2021 39readily available from non-U.S. sources. Ukraine is purchasing Turkish drones—to
At the same time, there is also significant Russia’s consternation. The development
reliance on U.S. equipment systems, in part of these new technologies raises the ques-
because of the formidable development ex- tion of how wise it is to focus investment
penses and cost of maintaining repair parts primarily in the conventional defense of
and maintenance capabilities. Additionally, Eastern Europe.
some countries perceive political pressure Another aspect of the strategic invest-
to “buy American.” These are challenges to ment calculus for Europe and the United
the idea that Europe could reduce its depen- States is a sober assessment of the viability
dence on American military and techno- of what can be called industrial age deploy-
logical support or even go it alone. ment and sustainment concepts. Almost
National Defense University scholar T.X. every assessment of nato’s ability to deploy
Hammes has written extensively on the and defend against a major Russian incur-
potential damage and disruption that these sion into the Baltics comes to the stark con-
weapons can cause. For example, the Turk- clusion that our current capabilities are not
ish Bayraktar TB2 drone, reported to sell adequate; the alliance would be presented
for under $2 million, can loiter for up to with a fait accompli before it could emplace
twenty-four hours and can be used for spot- traditional defensive forces to meet the ob-
ting or direct engagement against targets— ligations of Article V of the nato charter.
and no pilots are put in harm’s way. Long- At the present moment, the United States
range precision missiles can be procured and Europe together are not in a good posi-
for $1 to $1.5 million and could easily be tion to accomplish this mission; Europe
hidden in cargo containers on commercial alone is even less equipped to do so.
ships. In addition to the cost advantage, Are new technologies and innovative de-
the range and precision of drones, missiles, fensive capabilities sufficient to make it
and larger unmanned aerial craft are already possible that Europe could realistically de-
changing the strategic calculus of future fend itself from a Russian invasion or major
warfare. The efficacy of cheap armed drones incursion without significant U.S. support?
against various types of equipment in the There will always be a need for convention-
recent conflict between Armenia and Azer- al ground forces to take and retain territo-
baijan is certainly sparking recalculation by ry; the issue is how to balance investments
military leaders worldwide. Several years in future defensive capabilities or threaten
ago, inexpensive Russian drones armed with retaliatory effects that will provide deter-
grenades executed a devastatingly successful rence. If forward-positioned drones, low-
attack on a Ukrainian ammunition storage cost and highly dispersed missiles, and even
facility that destroyed a significant portion unmanned combat fighter-bombers can
of its inventory. The potential damage and inflict major damage at an acceptable price
disruption that these weapons can possibly tag, perhaps spending many billions of dol-
make combat as we have known it unten- lars or euros on enabling the movement of
able. The opportunity to attack logistics equipment into eastern Europe is a poor
resources—ammunition storage/distribu- strategic option. It may be that there are
tion activities and petroleum, oil, and lu- more effective deterrence investments and
bricant storage facilities are obvious targets, ways to reapportion tasks across European
but airfields, control towers, road junc- nations and the United States and Canada.
tions, train stations, and bridges can impact Moreover, some modern security capabili-
military operations. It is noteworthy that ties could also represent better economic
40 The National Interest Going it Alone?opportunities and assist other nations in stage of the Cold War, France has been the
enhancing stability, security, and progress major proponent of European rather than
for their people. Atlantic defense cooperation, what one of
It is easy to answer the question of us has called the “French thesis on Eu-
whether Europe can defend itself against a rope.” The initiator of this idea was Charles
determined Russian invasion of the Baltics de Gaulle. Fearing that the United States
or other nato allies in eastern Europe—the would use its role in European defense to
answer is no. As noted above, geography dominate Europe, de Gaulle talked about a
and the current correlation of mili- “European Europe” and European defense
tary power favor a successful attack. The cooperation. Above all, he worked to con-
cost of mounting a counterattack to re- vince Germany to follow him. At the same
claim and secure the territory time, de Gaulle torpedoed
would be tremendous for all In short, new the possibility of a more fed-
concerned—and catastrophic technologies may be eral Europe. In some ways, the
for the nations and people in postwar represented a dialogue
the areas where kinetic warfare necessary but not of the deaf between de Gaulle
would actually occur. Beyond sufficient to mount and Jean Monnet. Monnet ad-
that, the destruction of infra- vocated a federal United States
structure and other enabling an adequate defense of Europe but supported an At-
capabilities—obvious targets in Europe. They lanticist approach to European
in such a war—would have
massive impacts on both sides.
might increase the defense, de Gaulle a Europe of
Fatherlands coupled with Eu-
This is all without including chance that Europe ropean defense.
the possibility of nuclear esca- could defend itself A major reason for the failure
lation. Even the limited use of to create a synthesis of these
tactical nuclear weapons would in case of attack, two ideas was the debacle of
have devastating consequences. but it would be the European Defense Com-
In short, new technologies munity (edc). After the out-
may be necessary but not suf- imprudent to break of the Korean War, the
ficient to mount an adequate think that they United States decided that Eu-
defense in Europe. They might rope needed to rearm to face a
increase the chance that Eu- would render potential threat from the ussr.
rope could defend itself in American support That, in turn, required rearm-
case of attack, but it would be ing Germany, an idea which
imprudent to think that they
unnecessary. was anathema to France and
would render American support unneces- not very popular in Germany. French
sary. And it is equally questionable whether prime minister René Pleven came up with
Russia would consider a purely European the idea of the European Defense Com-
defense—even with nuclear weapons—a munity, which would constitute a Euro-
sufficient deterrent. A purely European de- pean pillar of nato. Germans would be
fense would be an extremely risky venture rearmed, but not Germany, since German
indeed. forces would be dispersed under the edc
command. There would be a European
I
t’s not surprising that President Ma- minister of defense under the European in-
cron of France has been the advocate stitutions that were being created thanks to
of “strategic autonomy.” Since the early the Schuman Plan. But the French military
Going it Alone? September/October 2021 41would lose its autonomy. This proved unac- umbrella. The French force de frappe was
ceptable to France and after years of con- no substitute. Not that de Gaulle was will-
troversy, the edc failed ratification by the ing to extend the French nuclear deter-
French National Assembly in 1954. Ger- rence to the rest of Europe. After the end
man rearmament took place under nato. of the Cold War, with the Russian threat
From that time on, defense was not within briefly gone, the French espoused the Eu-
the purview of European institutions until ropean Security and Defense Policy (esdp),
after the Cold War ended; the Treaty of which was seen by the United States as
Maastricht gave the eu a mandate for issues threatening nato. Even if little tangible
pertaining to security and defense. was accomplished, the French thesis on
Especially after the defeat of the Euro- Europe gave France a leadership role in Eu-
pean Defense Community, few supported rope since it embodied the ambivalence of
combining federalism and European de- many states towards the United States. The
fense cooperation. During the Cold War, British opposed esdp, and Germany was
de Gaulle’s efforts to create a European de- schizophrenic, supporting both esdp and
fense arrangement failed; this was an offer nato. But esdp was never intended to have
that the rest of Europe could easily refuse, warfighting capabilities, and its ultimate
especially the Germans. They wanted— implementation (with British involvement
they needed—the American nuclear following the St. Malo declaration) was
42 The National Interest Going it Alone?never as earth-shaking as its proponents just like presidents of the United States or
hoped nor its opponents feared. In 2003, France can do for their respective armed
President Jacques Chirac went far beyond forces. Strategic autonomy thus requires
de Gaulle by taking on the United States a fundamental restructuring of the Euro-
over its invasion of Iraq. The result was a pean Union—virtually impossible within a
virtual cold war between the Bush admin- reasonable time frame. Any change would
istration and France and Germany. The rift require an intergovernmental conference
was repaired when Chirac’s successor (and to amend the treaties undergirding the eu,
political rival) Nicholas Sarkozy brought unanimous approval of all governments,
France back into nato’s integrated mili- approval by their parliaments, in some
tary command. France became a “good” cases popular referenda and in others like
American ally but thereby lost some of its Belgium, passage by sub-national parlia-
influence as representing an alternative to ments. Recalling the fate of the Treaty of
American policy. This happened around Lisbon, this approach seems doomed to
the time of the Great Recession, which failure or at the very minimum long delay.
tipped the balance of the Franco-German Another approach could be the creation of
relationship against France. At a time a totally new organization for European
when economic and financial defense including such mem-
power counted most and when Strategic autonomy bers as choose to join. Again,
French leaders were ineffec- thus requires a a difficult and unlikely project.
tive, Germany was clearly the It makes more sense to fi-
dominant power in Europe. fundamental nesse the problem by basing
Macron’s European activism, restructuring of the European defense on nato.
in general, and his proposals nato already provides a recog-
on strategic autonomy, in par- European Union— nized and legitimate command
ticular, serve to restore France’s virtually impossible structure and a decisionmak-
position as a European leader. ing process. It also provides
They also mark a return to
within a reasonable the possibility of undertaking
the French thesis on Europe, time frame. various forms of actions like
this time based not on fears of peacekeeping without U.S.
American dominance but on loss of trust participation. Returning to the old idea
in an enduring American commitment to of a European pillar in nato, which could
Europe. act jointly with the United States or on its
But let’s assume that strategic autonomy own, might simplify the process. This ap-
implies some form of self-reliant European proach would combine the advantages of
defense. Could it take place under the aus- common defense together with the United
pices of the eu? That seems highly improb- States while providing for the alternative
able. First, there would need to be a robust of independent European action without
mutual defense pact of eu nations. Sec- it. But for this to work, a “European deter-
ondly, there would have to be a European rent” would have to be credible. To be sure,
rapid response force that can move quickly a European deterrent would be more cred-
before a fait accompli is established. That, ible if it included the British, but a post-
in turn, requires the existence of a Eu- Brexit Britain is unlikely to participate in
ropean command structure. But such a a purely European enterprise. Cooperation
structure requires a European executive within nato would be more probable than
authority that can give orders on its own cooperation outside of it.
Image: A cameraman stands in front of a screen ahead of a NATO summit, at the press center in Brussels, Belgium.
June 13, 2021. Reuters/Yves Herman.
Going it Alone? September/October 2021 43The main obstacle to European defense the United States—but that would mean
is Germany. For decades, Germany has potentially putting French nuclear forces
given French initiatives rhetorical support under a European command, which is not
but little more, just enough to maintain the at all likely. Alternately, there would have
appearance of Franco-German cooperation. to be a firm promise that the Europeans
But European defense would require signif- could count on the French nuclear deter-
icant German commitment and an increase rent becoming a European deterrent; this
in the German military budget, which Ger- would always be an extremely sensitive
many has resisted, not only to maintain its question, and if there was any equivoca-
sacred balanced budget but also to mini- tion, possibly born of political disagree-
mize its role in global security. It’s a politi- ments, the impact would be devastating.
cal, not an economic, choice. To paraphrase Weakening this cohesion/resolve would
the old saw, Americans (and French) come of course become a major objective of
from Mars, Germans from Venus. Other Russian diplomacy, disinformation, and
European states can hide behind Germany. economic incentivization. A German gov-
Is Germany (and Europe) too poor to af- ernment led by the Greens or a coalition in
ford both drones and butter? Hardly. which they play a major role might well be
The trump card is of course the nuclear more critical of Russia than the Merkel re-
calculus; with the departure of the United gime yet even less willing to support a Eu-
Kingdom from the eu, the issue of French ropean army. And the significant support
nuclear deterrence and/or retaliation is for Marine Le Pen’s candidacy in the 2022
critical. Having a European nuclear deter- French presidential elections indicates that
rent to balance the Russian nuclear capac- France itself might abruptly change course.
ity would be essential in the absence of Would the concept of European defense
44 The National Interest Going it Alone?and even the eu survive a Le Pen presi- A gradual shift to more self-reliant ca-
dency unscathed? pabilities could even ease the pressure on
America to reduce defense expenditures
I
t is clear to us and almost everyone without accepting unreasonable risk. As
that a continued U.S.-Europe security discussed earlier, there would not be a lot
partnership is in everyone’s best inter- of time to react or adjust to a significant
est, and we do not advocate any attempt by American retrenchment.
Europe to “go it alone.” At the same time, a Today, discussion of strategic autono-
significant reassessment of roles, missions, my seems to be taking place in a rarefied
and resources could actually strengthen atmosphere, as a largely theoretical issue
Euro-Atlantic security and make it both with little urgency. After all, the debate
more stable and cost-effective. Much of has been going on in one form or another
what would be needed to strengthen nato for seventy years, and talk about European
is also what would be necessary to create a defense may have diminishing returns. Cer-
self-reliant European defense. tainly, the election of Joe Biden as president
While it is beyond the scope of this piece indicates that at least for the time being,
to offer a “solution” to the challenging se- American guarantees to European security
curity environment that Europe faces, there still stand. That situation could change rap-
are two areas where the constituent nations idly if in 2022, the Republicans, still the
and collective political bodies would do party of Trump, gain control over both the
well to focus. The first is to look hard at Senate and House, presaging Trump’s re-
what capabilities offer the most credible turn to the White House in 2024. The sub-
deterrent to Russian “adventurism” and ject of strategic autonomy would no longer
other threats that may be on the horizon. be theoretical. Recognizing that Trump
The remarkable economic and technologi- might pull the United States out of nato
cal development across the continent over or remain in the alliance without being
the last several decades—along with sig- willing to respond militarily to Russian
nificant societal changes—make a fresh as- provocations, Europe would have two years
sessment a reasonable undertaking. A shift to cobble together an alternative plan for a
in emphasis from industrial age warfare to purely European defense. Then the ques-
the effective use of technology and more tion would be whether Europe could act—
cost-effective weapons might well enhance and whether it would act.
the security of the region and reduce the In 1939, an infamous newspaper head-
economic burden. Simply using a two per- line asked whether the French were willing
cent of gdp yardstick as a sole metric makes to “die for Danzig.” After 2024, the issue
very little sense and can be destabilizing or could be whether Europeans would be will-
counterproductive in its own right. ing to die for Vilnius. Faced with such an
There may be some cost-effective capa- unprecedented situation, a post-modern-
bilities that would provide a credible deter- ist Europe could choose to morph into
rent against a kinetic attack without the a complete superpower—at great cost—
support of U.S. forces being deployed to transforming itself and changing global
eastern Europe. Even with the full support dynamics. Or else, Europe would have to
of the United States through nato, it is come to terms with Russia from a posi-
possible that these capabilities—and oth- tion of inferiority. Ironically, a weak Russia
ers that will be developed—might still be a might succeed where the mighty Soviet
better investment for European nations. Union failed. n
Image: A U.S. Army soldier sits atop an M1A1 Abrams tank during exercise Steadfast Defender 2021.
Courtesy of NATO.
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