HOW WOULD THE EU ACCESSION PROCEDURE REALLY IMPROVE?
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HOW WOULD THE EU
EUIROPE, POWER OF
VALUES
ACCESSION PROCEDURE
POLICY BRIEF
MARCH 2020
#ENLARGEMENT REALLY IMPROVE?
COMPARING THE PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE
▪ ANDREAS EISL Introduction ▪ Ahead of the European Council (26-
Research fellow, Jacques 27.03.2020) and the EU-Western Balkans
Delors Institute, Paris. Following its veto of the opening of acces- Summit in Zagreb (05.-07.05.2020), the EU
sion talks with North Macedonia and Albania Member States now need to find a com-
in October 2019, the French government cir- promise among these different reform
culated a non-paper proposing an overhaul of proposals that can, on the one hand, allow
the EU accession procedure1. Partly respon- the French government to rethink its veto
ding to sharp criticism from other Member and, on the other hand, provide a renewed
States on the French No, the document impetus for the EU integration of the Wes-
outlined a comprehensive reform based on tern Balkans. If the EU wants to be a credible
a reinforced 'carrot & stick' approach. In res- partner for the countries of the Western
ponse, nine EU Member States led by Italy, Balkans and give pro-European parties a
Poland, Austria and Slovenia shared their chance in upcoming elections (North Mace-
own vision of a reformed accession pro- donia votes in mid-April), it has to rapidly find
cess in December 20192, less ambitious in a consensus on the reform of the accession
terms of scope and retaining more flexibility. procedure and show unanimous support for
Drawing on these reform options, the Euro- further integration efforts.
pean Commission designed its own reform
plan for the EU accession talks, integrating This policy brief looks at the three diffe-
elements from both non-papers3. rent reform proposals for the EU accession
procedure in more detail. It provides a com-
1. HERSZHENHORN D.M. & MOMTAZ R. 2019. « France outlines proposal to overhaul EU accession process ». Politico, 17.11.2019.
2. BARIGAZZI J. 2019. « 9 EU countries push back on French enlargement revamp ». Politico, 13.12.2019.
3. European Commission. 2020. « Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans ».
COM 2020/57.
1 ▪ 12parison of the key elements of each reform sures based on these principles are (1)
option and discusses expected improve- the reorganisation of the thirty-five acces-
ments as well as potential problems for the sion chapters into seven policy blocks, (2)
accession process. Based on this analysis, their completion in a sequential order, (3) a
the policy brief will also highlight a number revamped ‘stick & carrot’ approach, allowing
of (possibly unintended) broader conse- for reversible progress in negotiations but
quences of the individual reform directions, also for more concrete benefits ahead of
such as the risk for candidate countries to EU accession, and (4) the reinforcement of
get stuck in half-in/half-out EU membership the political dimension of the accession pro-
limbo. cess.
Building on this assessment, the policy First, the French proposal sets out to bundle
brief argues that the Commission pro- the different accession chapters that contain
posal is a sensible compromise between the EU acquis into so-called blocks (see
the French and nine-country approaches. also Table 1 and the Annex)4. The plan for-
It is ambitious enough to be considered a mulates a possible organisation into seven
‘real’ reform while not unduly changing the blocks, beginning with a transversal block on
existing logic of the accession procedure. the rule of law, fundamental rights, the legal
The Commission’s reform approach should system and security. Other blocks would
thus be taken as the basis for negotiations deal, for example, with economic and finan-
among the EU Member States ahead of the cial matters or external affairs. In the view of
consequential Council Meeting of March the French government, this bundling is sup-
2020. posed to create more visibility for ongoing
negotiations in specific policy fields.
1 ▪ The three reform proposals for the EU Second, a unique feature of the French
accession procedure reform approach is the requirement to
complete policy blocks in a sequential
With the French, nine-country and Commis- order. To reinforce the long-term preser-
sion proposals, three main reform options vation of the rule of law, the transversal
are on the table for a revision of the EU policy block must be completed success-
accession process. The following sub-sec- fully first, before any other negotiation
tions discuss the key elements of each blocks are opened. Subsequently, according
proposal which are subsequently summa- to the French proposal, there can always be
rized in Table 1 (see page 6), allowing for only one block opened (prohibiting the simul-
a direct comparison between the different taneous negotiation of different blocks),
approaches. which creates a very rigid system for the
EU accession process. The plan suggests a
certain order for the different blocks, but as
1.1. The French proposal there is no ‘natural’ sequence for the indivi-
dual policy fields, the final approach would
The reform approach of the French govern- be open to political discussion and prioriti-
ment, which was shared in November 2019, sation.
lays out a comprehensive set of reforms to
the existing accession procedure. The four Third, to make this sequential approach more
main principles of the non-paper are “gradual palatable, the French proposal wants to link
accession”, “rigorous conditions”, “concrete the completion of specific policy blocks in
benefits”, and “reversibility”. Concrete mea- the accession process with the partial or full
4. European Commission. 2020. Chapters of the acquis.
2 ▪ 12access of candidate countries to the corres- rigid than the former, and a less ambitious
ponding policy fields and EU programmes departure from the existing methodology.
even before EU membership. In addition, pro-
gress in the adoption of the acquis should It states that “internal EU reform cannot be a
be further incentivized through increased precondition for enlargement”, opposing one
financial help. At the same time, the French of the arguments given by the French autho-
reform approach puts a lot of emphasis on rities to justify their veto on the opening
the reversibility of the accession process if of accession talks5. Underlining the more
candidate countries do not comply with the incremental reform direction taken by the
accession requirements, particularly with nine EU countries, the proposal stresses that
the rule of law. Allowing for gradual res- the ‘enhanced approach’ should be compa-
ponses from the EU, the French plan would tible with the already existing negotiating
also allow to reduce or cut back previously framework for EU accession.
granted benefits or even move back down
the sequence of blocks to the very start of In principle similar to the French vision, the
negotiations. nine-country approach wants to put funda-
mentals first (the rule of law) and reinforce a
Fourth, the French non-paper calls for a rein- merit-based approach through strict but fair
forced political governance of the accession conditionality. It puts, however, a stronger
process. This includes at the same time more focus on the broader political situation in
rigorous benchmarking (including more and the Western Balkans, also urging to foster
better indicators), regular evaluations by the regional cooperation and good neighbourly
Commission of the realized progress by can- relations among the region’s countries
didate countries even after the completion of through deepened political exchange.
individual policy blocks, and the possibility
for Member States to review these evalua- Picking up on the French government’s idea
tions afterwards. The French proposal also to bundle the accession chapters into blocks,
strengthens the role of the Council regar- the nine EU countries want to group them by
ding the accession of candidate countries to main policy areas and propose to base them
specific sectoral policies and wants to insti- on the existing sub-committees of the Stabi-
tutionalise more annual high-level meetings lisation and Association Agreements (SAAs)
between the political leaders of EU member the EU has with the Western Balkans states.
states and the Western Balkans countries. Existing sub-committees are focusing, for
example, on (1) customs, (2) trade and sus-
tainable development, (3) economic and
1.2. The nine-country proposal financial issues and statistics, (4) transport,
energy, environment, climate change and
Responding to the French non-paper on regional development, and on (5) agriculture,
the reform of the EU accession procedure, fisheries and food safety. The nine-country
nine EU countries (Austria, Czech Republic, proposal, however, does not discuss these
Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland different policy fields nor the final composi-
and Slovenia) provided their own vision for tion of the blocks in more detail.
a revamped negotiation format. Partly in
line with the French approach, particularly In contrast to the French vision, there is no
regarding a greater degree of ‘politicisation’ requirement for a sequential ordering of
of the accession process, the nine-country negotiation blocks. The nine EU countries
proposal is nevertheless considerably less explicitly allow for the possibility to nego-
5. See EISL A. 2019. « France’s questionable arguments against EU enlargement. Why the French government should rethink its veto on
the EU accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania, while pushing for reform of the accession procedure ». Blogpost, Paris: IJD.
3 ▪ 12tiate several blocks in parallel. Importantly, and visibility would help facilitate the eva-
however, the chapters related to the rule of luation of reform progress and could thus
law should be reinforced by becoming more help to shape “a broader consensus on the
central to the negotiation talks, also through assessments of reforms and ensure advan-
clearer recommendations and more tho- cements”.
rough benchmarking. Regarding a possible
reversibility of accession progress, the nine- Finally, there should be a more pronounced
country proposal merely calls for the better communication strategy explaining the
use of existing instruments such as the benefits of EU accession among Wes-
so-called ‘imbalance’ clause6. tern Balkan countries and their citizens to
improve the acceptability of reforms.
Partly mirroring the ‘carrot & stick’ approach
of the French authorities, the nine-country
vision also wants to increase benefits, and 1.3. The Commission proposal
thus incentives, for the candidate coun-
tries of the Western Balkans, including both Reflecting on these two different reform
financial and non-financial support. The proposals, the European Commission publi-
‘enhanced approach’ wants to introduce shed its own vision for a revamped EU
“effective and targeted financial incentives accession process in February 2020. Overall,
that reward as well as facilitate progress”, it integrates key elements of both (non)-
e.g. through gradual participation in the EU’s papers, nuancing the rigid French approach,
Single Market and specific EU programmes. while also going beyond the nine-country
It also aims at increasing EU support to fight proposal. Picking up the framing of the diffe-
organised crime and corruption. rent national proposals, the Commission
argues that the accession processes “has
The nine-country proposal puts a particular to become more predictable, more credible
emphasis on a strengthening of the political – based on objective criteria and rigorous
dimension of the accession process, to be positive and negative conditionality, and
achieved through more high-level political reversibility – more dynamic and subject
exchange and the integration of Western to stronger political steering”. The Commis-
Balkans countries into European confe- sion proposal is also the most detailed and
rences, committees and working groups. applied one, moving from rather general
It wants to give more importance to inter- reform ideas to more practical implementa-
governmental conferences, establish annual tion options.
meetings of the European Council with Wes-
tern Balkans leaders (as the French proposal Following the previous reform visions, the
suggests) as well as regional ‘Europe Confe- Commission also suggests reorganising the
rences’ to improve the dialogue between the accession chapters into blocks, calling them
region’s countries. ‘thematic clusters’. While also referring to the
sub-committees of the SAAs (like the nine-
Another key element of a reinforced poli- country proposal), it provides a bundling of
tical dimension is to provide (similar to the chapters into six blocks: (1) fundamentals
stance of the French authorities) a “more (rule of law), (2) internal market, (3) com-
measurable, easily communicable and petitiveness and inclusive growth, (4) green
comparable” presentation of the level of agenda and sustainable connectivity, (5)
EU acquis implementation in each policy resources, agricultures and cohesion, and
block by the Commission. In the view of the (6) external relations. In principle similar
nine EU countries, this heightened clarity to the French proposal, the Commission’s
6. See MAJSTOROVIĆ S. 2019. « To be or not to be – the case for Serbia’s European integration ».
4 ▪ 12aggregation of chapters seems to make for process, also suggesting a detailed annual
thematically more coherent policy blocks policy cycle for the negotiation talks.
(see Table 1 and the contents of the current
accession chapters in the Annex). In this policy cycle, the Commission’s annual
enlargement package is supposed to take on
Finding a compromise between the rigid a central role, providing better guidance for
sequential approach of the French autho- candidate countries on the reform priorities
rities and the more flexible one of the nine and alignment criteria as well as the broader
EU countries, the Commission suggests EU expectations, while also checking the
that “negotiations on the fundamentals compliance of candidate countries with
will be opened first and closed last, and the EU acquis. Recommendations of the
progress on these will determine the ove- EU can also include proposals for correc-
rall pace of negotiations”. This clearly puts tive measures. Following the publication of
a stronger focus on the rule of law dimen- the enlargement package, the Commission
sion of accession talks. At the same time, proposal suggests country-specific inter-
the Commission approach does not forbid governmental conferences which serve to
to open the negotiations of several blocks in discuss the contents of the package and to
parallel. shape the reform agenda through political
dialogue.
Mirroring the reform trajectories of the two
previously circulated papers, the Commis- In terms of broader political exchange, the
sion also wants to reinforce a conditionality Commission proposal includes a compre-
and incentive logic for the accession talks. hensive set of new or revamped meetings
It proposes “accelerated integration and between leaders of the EU (Member States)
‘phasing-in’ to individual EU policies, the EU and the Western Balkans countries. Next to
market and EU programmes, while ensuring intergovernmental conferences, it calls for
a level playing field”. In addition, it foresees the holding of regular EU-Western Balkans
more financial support both in the form of Summits, the inclusion of national public
direct funding and loans. officials as observers in EU meetings and
committees, and a stronger “focus of SAA
The Commission proposal is largely in line bodies on key political issues and reforms”.
with the French non-paper on “the need for
more decisive measures proportionally sanc- Going beyond the – at times – vague sug-
tioning any serious or prolonged stagnation gestions of the French and the nine-country
or even backsliding in reform implementa- proposal for a better inclusion of EU Member
tion and meeting the requirements of the States in the negotiation process, the Com-
accession process”. It lays out a number of mission proposal is more concrete. It invites
sanctions such as reducing financial sup- Member States to contribute to the acces-
port, cutting the access to EU programmes, sion process through direct input to the
putting negotiations in certain policy areas annual reports on the progress of negotia-
on hold or to suspend them altogether. Also tions, the provision of sectoral advice by
already closed chapters/blocks could be national policy experts, and their monitoring
re-opened or reset following an assessment of reform progress on the ground in the
by the Member States. candidate countries. Through the proposed
reinforced policy cycle, Member States
Even more so than the nine-country proposal, should also have more and better oppor-
the Commission puts a particular focus on tunities to review the overall progress of
the political dimension of the accession accession talks.
5 ▪ 12Table 1 ▪ Key elements of the three different reform options for the EU accession procedure
FRENCH PROPOSAL NINE-COUNTRY PROPOSAL COMMISSION PROPOSAL
Publishing date November 2019 December 2019 February 2020
Negotiations in blocks Yes (in 7 blocks) Yes (along the lines of the 8 SAA sub-commit- Yes (in 6 blocks)
tees)
Blocks (areas, clusters) and Block 1 (Rule of law): Grouping of negotiation chapters along the Block 1 (Fundamentals):
included chapters • 23, 24 lines of the eight SAA sub-committees • 5, 18, 23, 24, 32
(see Annex for description
of chapters)
Block 2 (Education, research, youth, culture, Examples of sub-committees from existing Block 2 (Internal market):
sport, environment, transport, telecommunica- SAAs are: • 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 28
tions, energy: • Customs
• 14, 15, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27 • Trade and sustainable development Block 3 (Competitiveness and inclusive
• Economic and financial issues and statis- growth):
Block 3 (Employment, social policy, health tics • 10, 16, 17, 19, 20, 25, 26, 29
policy, consumers, competitiveness): • Transport, energy, environment, climate
• 5, 7, 8, 19, 20, 28 change and regional development Block 4 (Green agenda and sustainable con-
• Agriculture, fisheries and food safety nectivity):
• Block 4 (Economic and financial affairs): • Sanitary and phytosanitary sub-committee • 14, 15, 21, 27
4, 16, 17, 18, 32 • Migration issues
• Geographical indications Block 5 (Resources, agriculture and cohesion)
Block 5 (Internal market, agriculture and • 11, 12, 13, 22, 33
fisheries):
• 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13 Block 6 (External relations)
• 30, 31
Block 6 (Foreign affairs):
• 30, 31
Block 7 (Others):
• 33, 34, 35
Sequential negotiations Yes No Partly
• No parallel negotiations of different blocks • Allows explicitly for parallel negotiations • Rule of law block is opened first and closed
allowed • More importance given to the rule of law last
• Rule of law as the first block block • Parallel negotiations are possible
Reversibility (linked to Yes No Yes
conditionalities) • Possibility of gradual withdrawal of (or at least not discussed explicitly) • Possibility of gradual withdrawal of financial
financial support and participation in EU support and participation in EU programmes
programmes • Possibility of reopening of closed blocks or
• Possibility of reopening of closed blocks or even restart of negotiation process
even restart of negotiation process
Incentives • Financial support • Financial support • Financial support (funds and loans)
• Gradual access to the policy fields and EU • Gradual access to the policy fields and EU • Gradual access to the policy fields and EU
programmes linked to completed blocks programmes linked to completed blocks programmes linked to completed blocks
• Support to fight organised crime and
corruption
Role of Member States • More rigorous benchmarking which facil- • Better presentation of EU acquis implemen- • Direct input to annual reports on the negoti-
itates evaluation of progress by Member tation for evaluation by Member States ation progress
States • Provision of sectoral advice by national
• Strengthened role of Council regarding the policy experts
accession of candidate countries to specific • Monitoring of reform progress in the candi-
sectoral policies date countries
Political institutions & • Institutionalisation of more annual high-level • Intergovernmental conferences • Intergovernmental conferences
processes meetings between EU Member States and • Annual meetings of the European Council • EU-Western Balkans Summits
Western Balkans countries with Western Balkans leaders • Inclusion of national public officials as
• Regional Europe conferences observers in EU meetings, committees
• Integration of candidate countries into Euro- • Refocusing of SAA sub-committees
pean committees and working groups • Introducing a strengthened policy cycle
centred around the Commission’s annual
enlargement package
Sources: Own summary based on the three proposals for a reform of the EU accession processMore broadly, the Commission proposal elements of the French vision such as the
calls for increased transparency and very rigid sequential approach to the diffe-
communication activities to improve the rent policy fields.
public’s understanding of the accession
process and to create more support for EU From the nine-country-proposal, the Com-
integration. And finally, the document also mission adopted many suggestions for the
explicitly discusses what a revamped acces- political dimension of the accession talks,
sion process would mean for the ongoing including the better integration of candi-
negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro. date countries into existing EU bodies and
Rather than imposing a new model on them, the creation of more platforms for political
the negotiating framework can be amended dialogue, also on the regional level. In some
but only if the two candidate countries agree regards, the Commission approach goes
to this. even further than what was suggested by
the nine countries, detailing a reinforced
role of Member States in the accession
1.4. Commonalities and differences of talks across the policy cycle.
the three reform options
In terms of financial and non-financial incen-
Following the analysis of the three reform tives, all three proposals largely agree, calling
proposals for the EU accession process, for more financial support, expert help and
Table 1 summarizes their most important the gradual accession of candidate coun-
elements along a number of key dimensions, tries into EU policy fields and programmes.
which allow for a better comparison across
the different reform approaches. They
include (1) the bundling of accession chap- 2 ▪ Expected improvements and
ters into policy blocks, (2) the parallel and/ potential problems with the different
or sequential negotiation of these blocks, (3)
the possibility for reversibility mechanisms,
reform options
(4) the forms of incentives and conditiona- The different reform options entail a number
lities, and (5) the political institutions and of expected improvements but also potential
processes to be created and/or utilized. For problems for the future EU accession pro-
all of the following comparisons it should, cess in comparison to the status quo. The
of course, be acknowledged that informally analysis of these anticipated outcomes is
circulated non-papers and an official com- based on the following underlying assump-
mission proposal do not have the same tions and premises.
status nor are they subject to the same
amount of scrutiny ahead of publication. First, a reorganisation (and simplification) of
the existing 35 accession chapters is seen
As visible from a comparison of the diffe- as an advancement in comparison to the
rent reform proposals, the Commission status quo by raising political visibility and
proposal has integrated key elements of thus supporting broader reform efforts. A
both the French and nine-country proposals. reinforcement of the rule of law dimension of
The Commission paper borrows from the the negotiation talks is also deemed positive
French approach particularly concerning the as it raises the likelihood that basic tenets
bundling of accession chapters into blocks, of the rule of law will be better anchored
the reversibility of negotiation progress and in candidate countries in the medium- to
accompanying sanctions and more rigorous long-term, drawing lessons from past enlar-
benchmarking to facilitate the evaluation gement rounds.
of accession-related reforms. The Com-
mission, however, also attenuates some
7 ▪ 12Second, gradual and proportional sanctions Giving it different names (blocks, areas, clus-
and incentives are viewed as positive, as ters), the individual reform visions improve
they help to steer the negotiation progress, the visibility of the actual reform agenda,
additionally supporting reforms while deter- creating broader (and generally coherent)
ring faulty implementation or step-backs in policy blocks, which can help to improve
the accession process. reform efforts, by raising the stakes and
linking them with clearer benefits. Among
Third, reforms of political institutions, pro- the three reform visions, the Commission’s
cesses and participation are regarded suggestions for the new negotiation blocks
in a favourable manner, if they allow for seem to be the most coherent one, making it
more political exchange among the EU, its slightly preferable to the other ones.
Member States and candidate countries, a
better integration of candidate countries into Also concerning the rigidity of the procedure
EU fora, and if the role of Member States in of accession talks and the reinforcement
the accession process is fostered in a way of the rule of law dimension, the Commis-
that makes them stakeholders rather than sion proposal probably provides the best
outsiders in a largely technocratic process. overall package, mixing a refocused negotia-
In addition, increased transparency and tion process based on a central rule of law
clearer benchmarking would also constitute block while retaining sufficient flexibility for
an improvement to the current situation, negotiations to move forward even if there
allowing for a better monitoring of the nego- are blockades in particular policy areas. In
tiation talks and reform agendas. comparison to the French proposal, which
demands the completion of the rule of law
Fourth, and more broadly, reform propo- block before any other block can be opened,
sals are assumed to be sensible if they do the Commission wants the rule of law block
not undermine the general objective of the to be opened first and closed last, as men-
EU accession process, which is that candi- tioned above.
date countries will become full EU Member
States if they fulfil all the requirements set In terms of reversibility, two aspects make
out by the European Union at the start of the Commission approach preferable to
the negotiations. Approaches which make the French one. First, the Commission plan
it more likely that negotiation progress can seems more practical, as it is politically
be blocked due to political reasons beyond easier to simply not close an opened policy
the actual accession obligations are thus block rather than reopening an already com-
viewed as negative. pleted one. Second, the French model is not
clear about how to deal with problems in
Based on these assumptions and premises, the rule of law block while other blocks are
the different elements of the three reform already finalised. Given the sequential logic,
proposals are evaluated and ranked with would all other completed policy blocks also
+ (positive), ~ (neutral), and – (negative) in be invalidated if one of the blocks on the
comparison with the existing EU accession lower steps of the accession ladder are not
process. Table 2 (see page 9) summarizes implemented correctly? This is a potential
the anticipated outcomes of the French, shortcoming, at least in the current version
nine-country and Commission proposals, of the French proposal, making the Commis-
also allowing for a comparison across the sion proposal a clearer choice.
different reform visions.
On the issue of better incentives all three
Common to all three reform proposals is the reform options contain improvements by
move towards a reorganisation and simpli- wanting to provide more financial support
fication of the different accession chapters. and gradual access in EU policy fields and
8 ▪ 12Table 2 ▪ Evaluation of expected improvements and potential problems
of the three reform proposals for the EU accession process
FRENCH PROPOSAL NINE-COUNTRY COMMISSION PROPOSAL
PROPOSAL
Negotiations in + Blocks make the + Blocks make the + Blocks make the
blocks accession process more accession process more accession process more
accessible accessible accessible
~ Aggregation of chapters ~ Does not provide an + Aggregation of chapters
for the individual blocks explicit proposal for the for the individual blocks
not particularly intuitive aggregation of chapters rather coherent
Sequential + Clear order of ~ Proposal for strength- + Gives a more important
negotiations negotiations ened rule of law block, but role to the rule of law
- Rigidity of the sequential no special role in negotia- block
order of negotiation talks tion organisation + Possibility of parallel ne-
might be counter- + Possibility of parallel ne- gotiations of blocks
productive for the gotiations of blocks allows for more political
negotiation progress allows for more political flexibility
flexibility
Reversibility (linked + Clear and proportional ~ No explicit information + Clear and proportional
to conditionalities) sanctions on reversibility given sanctions
~ Lack of clarity
concerning the conse-
quences of a sequential
order for reversibility
Incentives + Better financial support + Better financial support + Better financial support
+ Gradual access to EU pol- + Gradual access to EU pol- + Gradual access to EU pol-
icy fields and pro- icy fields and pro- icy fields and pro-
grammes grammes grammes
Role of Member + Better benchmarking of + Better benchmarking of + Strengthened participa-
States negotiation progress negotiation progress tion of Member States in
~ Strengthened participa- ~ Role of Member States the monitoring, evaluation
tion of Member States in not particularly strength- and guidance of acces
deciding gradual ened sion reforms
accession of candidates
to EU policy fields and
programmes
Political institu- + More high-level political + More high-level political + More high-level political
tions & processes dialogue between the dialogue between the dialogue between the
EU, its Member States EU, its Member States EU, its Member States
and candidate countries and candidate countries and candidate countries
~ Remains rather vague + Inclusion of candidate + Inclusion of candidate
about the political countries as observers in countries as observers in
dimension of a reformed EU bodies EU bodies
accession process ~ Increased complexity ~ Increased complexity
through creation of sever- through creation of sever-
al new exchange plat- al new exchange plat-
forms forms
+ Inclusion of a detailed
policy cycle to analyse
and foster negotiation
progress
Broader conse- - Rigid structure of acces- ~ Reform proposal does + Comparatively ambitious
quences sion process could lead not differ very much from reform, which retains nev-
to the risk of candidate the existing accession ertheless a certain degree
countries getting stuck in process in terms of setup of flexibility
negotiation talks
Sources: Own analysis
9 ▪ 12programmes if there is adequate reform pro- negotiation setup and the planned increased
gress. The French proposal links this with a role for Member States in deciding on can-
bigger say for Member States in the Council didate countries’ participation in specific EU
for the concrete participation of candidate policy fields and programmes seem proble-
countries, which, on the one hand, would matic in this regard.
make the process less technocratic, but, on
the other hand, could also lead to blockades Difficulties in implementation limited to indi-
from particular Member States for domestic vidual policy blocks could potentially derail
political reasons rather than European the whole accession process. While aimed
concerns. This point should be taken into at ensuring consistent reform efforts and
consideration for the upcoming negotiations sincere implementation of the EU acquis, the
on the reform design. French plan for the organisation of acces-
sion talks and the inbuilt logic of reversibility
More broadly, the Commission proposal of negotiation progress could actually under-
contains the most concrete and com- mine such efforts on the side of candidate
prehensive suggestions for a reinforced countries. The peculiarities and the functio-
participation of Member States in the acces- ning of national political arenas have to be
sion process. Beyond the general call for taken into consideration when assessing
clearer benchmarking and thus easier moni- reform trajectories, which an overly rigid
toring of reform progress, the Commission approach might not be able to integrate.
wants to make Member States stakehol-
ders of the negotiations from the provision At the same time, giving Member States a
of national expertise, over the monitoring more political say over the participation of
on the ground, to the co-writing of annual candidate countries in EU programmes and
reports. policy fields could go beyond the general
idea to make EU members stakeholders
Regarding additional and strengthened of the accession process. It could rather
political exchange and institutions, the Com- ‘over-politicize’ the accession process, as
mission and nine-country proposals are the national parties could use such situations
most ambitious ones, suggesting the inclu- to block accession progress to appeal to
sion of candidate countries as observers in domestic audiences and to win electoral
existing EU fora. In addition, the Commission battles on the national level.
provides a detailed and operational vision
for a reinforced annual policy cycle centred In the end, while containing several clear
around the annual enlargement package. improvements to the status quo, the French
Again, this makes the Commission proposal reform proposal thus entails the potential
the best starting point for the upcoming risk for candidate countries to get stuck in
negotiations between the Member States a half-in/half-out EU membership limbo due
and the EU institutions. to domestic political factors among both
the candidate countries and the EU Member
All three reform proposals for the EU acces- States.
sion process stress that its final objective
remains ‘full and complete’ EU membership. In comparison, the nine-country proposal
But how do these promises match with the differs significantly less from the cur-
actual reform plans put forward? rently existing accession process. Its most
ambitious reform elements are about
Especially the French proposal entails the creating additional political exchange
potential risk that candidate countries could and participation, which are supposed to
get stuck in the accession process. Parti- increase a stakeholder logic to the nego-
cularly the rigid structure of the sequential tiation talks. There are considerably fewer
10 ▪ 12risks for candidate countries to get stuck in even impossible under the veil of a progres-
the accession process following the nine- sive reform. The Commission plan excludes
country reform option, but as their vision most of the inbuilt rigidities and eventual
does not depart considerably from the pitfalls of the French plan, which should
status quo, it might not be enough to over- give more enlargement-friendly EU Member
come a French veto and existing problems States confidence in the actual reform direc-
in the accession process and thus could tion.
seem like an insignificant reform.
The coming weeks will show how the nego-
The Commission proposal finally has an tiation positions of the different EU Member
ambitious reform objective but allevia- States and the European Commission will
ting some of the potentially unintended evolve. On the French domestic level, the
consequences of the French reform plan. passing of the local elections in France (15th
The reorganisation of the accession pro- and 22nd of March) should give the national
cess should allow for a renewed impetus government more leeway to agree to a
for the advancement of negotiation talks reform compromise and to simultaneously
and the planned increased stakeholder role end its veto for the opening of accession
of Member States seems to find a good talks with North Macedonia (and potentially
balance between a technocratic and political with Albania as well). With a reform largely
governance of the process. in line with the Commission proposal, the
French authorities could also claim that their
veto was successful in bringing about consi-
3 ▪ The Commission proposal as a derable change to the existing EU accession
sensible foundation for the upcoming process. A lifting of a veto could thus be jus-
tified to the domestic electorate while being
negotiations potentially able to limit the damage done to
Based on the analysis and comparison of the national political sphere particularly in
the French, nine-country and Commission North Macedonia.
proposals on a reform of the EU accession
process, this policy brief believes the latter
proposal to constitute a very good point of ▪
reference for the negotiations amongst EU
Member States ahead of the Council Meeting
in late March 2020. It is a sensible compro-
mise between the different reform visions
laid out by France and the nine countries led
by Italy, Poland, Austria and Slovenia.
The scope of the Commission plan should
be able to convince the French authorities
that it is a significant reform going beyond
the creation of additional fora for political
dialogue among Member States and can-
didate countries. At the same time, the
Commission’s suggestions for a revamped
accession process should also weaken
the concerns of other EU Member States
that saw the French reform proposal as a
potential ‘poison pill’, rendering future EU
accession considerably more difficult or
11 ▪ 12Annex ▪
List of accession chapters
1 Free movement of goods
2 Freedom of movement of workers
3 Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
4 Free movement of capital
5 Public procurement
6 Company law
7 Intellectual property law
8 Competition policy
9 Financial services
10 Information society and media
11 Agriculture and rural development
12 Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
13 Fisheries
14 Transport policy
15 Energy
16 Taxation
17 Economic and monetary policy
18 Statistics
19 Social policy and employment
20 Enterprise and industrial policy
21 Trans-European networks
22 Regional policy and coordination of structural instru-
ments
23 Judiciary and fundamental rights
Managing Editor: Sébastien
Maillard ▪ The document may be 24 Justice, freedom and security
reproduced in part or in full on the 25 Science and research
dual condition that its meaning is 26 Education and culture
not distorted and that the source is 27 Environment and climate change
mentioned ▪ The views expressed
are those of the author(s) and 28 Consumer and health protection
do not necessarily reflect those 29 Customs union
of the publisher ▪ The Jacques 30 External relations
Delors Institute cannot be held res- 31 Foreign, security and defence policy
ponsible for the use which any third
32 Financial control
party may make of the document
▪ Original version ▪ Proofreading : 33 Financial and budgetary provisions
Barbara Banks ▪ © Jacques Delors 34 Institutions
Institute 35 Other issues
Source: European Commission (2020): Chapters of the acquis.
Institut Jacques Delors
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