In Scotland's Defence? - An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy By George Grant Foreword by Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford - Henry Jackson Society
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In Scotland’s
Defence?
An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
By George Grant
Foreword by Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford
In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
About the Author
George Grant is a non-resident Associate Fellow at The Henry Jackson Society. He
has written widely on issues relating to foreign policy and defence, with major
publications including Succeeding in Afghanistan (September 2010); The Tipping Point:
British National Strategy and the UK’s Future World Role (July 2011); and Shocks and
Disruptions: The Relationship Between Food Security and National Security (April 2012).
George has also worked extensively on the conflict in Libya and the country’s subsequent
post-Gaddafi transition. He moved to Tripoli full-time in May 2012 to become deputy
editor of the country’s first post-Gaddafi English-language newspaper, the Libya Herald,
as well as Libya correspondent for The Times.
He provides regular analysis for national and international newspapers – including
The Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian, and the Wall Street Journal Europe – as
well as on TV and radio news outlets, including the BBC; Al Jazeera; Channel 4 News;
and Sky News. A frequent speaker on foreign-policy and defence issues, George has
provided briefings to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office; the Ministry of Defence;
the Stabilisation Unit; and the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.
George holds Masters degrees in History from the University of Edinburgh, and in
Investigative Journalism from City University, London.
Acknowledgements
I owe a debt of thanks to a large number of people for their help in producing this
report. First, I should like to thank Dr Alan Mendoza and The Henry Jackson Society
(HJS) for commissioning me to write the report. My thanks also to all those at HJS,
in particular Mark Fergusson; Elizabeth Lee; Davis Lewin; and Hannah Nomm, who
assisted in the report’s production and launch at various stages. This analysis would
have been very much poorer without the expert insights of all those interviewed for
the report, as well as those who offered comments on the draft, and my thanks also
goes out to them.
Finally, I should like to extend particular thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford,
who has not only written the Foreword, but has also been an invaluable support.
Stuart is universally respected for his efforts to provide clarity and depth to this issue,
having authored the first serious assessment of how an independent Scotland might
structure its Armed Forces. A former SNP parliamentary candidate who remains
ready to provide a non-partisan assessment, Stuart is additionally valuable as a voice
of balance in this most divisive of debates. It only remains for me to say that any
errors or omissions contained within this publication are mine alone.
3
In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
About The Henry Jackson Society
Contents
The Henry Jackson Society is a cross-partisan, British think-tank. Our founders and
supporters are united by a common interest in fostering a strong British, European,
and American commitment towards freedom; liberty; constitutional democracy;
human rights; governmental and institutional reform; and a robust foreign, security, About the Author 3
and defence policy and transatlantic alliance.
The Henry Jackson Society is a registered charity (no. 1113948). Acknowledgements 3
For more information about Henry Jackson Society activities; our research About The Henry Jackson Society 4
programme; and public events, please see:
Foreword 8
www.henryjacksonsociety.org
Acronyms 10
Executive Summary 12
Introduction 17
Chapter I – Defending What, Exactly? 21
The Foreign Policy of an Independent Scotland 21
Potential Risks to Scottish National Security 22
Chapter II – Joining NATO 27
Would Scotland Remain within NATO, or Have to Reapply? 30
Joining a Nuclear-Armed Alliance whilst Making Scotland
Nuclear-Free 31
- Allowing Nuclear-Armed Vessels to Dock in Scottish Ports 33
- WANTING TO MAKE THE RUK NUCLEAR FREE? 34
The Case against NATO Membership for a Nuclear-Free Scotland 34
- Divisions on NATO Membership within the SNP 37
The Geostrategic Importance of Scotland in NATO 37
The Potential Impact of NATO Membership on Foreign and Defence Policy 38
Chapter III – Establishing a Scottish Defence Force 43
The SNP’s Proposed Defence Budget 43
Securing Scotland’s “Share” of UK Military Assets 45
The Scottish Regiments 46
Would the SNP’s Proposals Result in an Imbalanced Defence Force? 47
The SNP’s Aspirations for Defence Equipment 48
- Submarines 49
- Frigates 49
- Remaining Scottish Navy 50
- Fast Jets 51
- Maritime Patrol Aircraft 53
- Remaining Scottish Air Force 54
- Scottish Army 54
Special Forces 55
4 5
Contents In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
Choosing between the British Armed Forces and the
Scottish Defence Force 56
‘Smart Defence’ and the Specialisation of Scotland’s Armed Forces 58
Defence Cooperation with the rUK 59
Chapter IV – Removing Trident 63
How Quickly Could Trident be Moved in an Emergency? 66
The Job Implications of Trident Removal 68
Moving Trident – The Realistic Scenario 70
Chapter V – Intelligence and Cyber Security 73
Intelligence Sharing with the rUK and Other Countries 74
- The Third-Party Rule 77
- Multilateral Intelligence-Sharing Relationships 78
Establishing Scottish Security and Intelligence Services 78
- The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) 79
- The Security Service (MI5) 79
- Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 81
Cyber Security beyond GCHQ 82
Developing an Integrated National Cyber Security Strategy 83
Scaling the Cyber Security Problem: The Challenge for Scotland 85
Chapter VI – The Future of the Scottish Defence Industry 89
The Importance of the MoD for Scotland’s Defence Industry 90
- The Article 346 exemption 93
The Future of the Type 26 Global Combat Ship 93
The Future of the Queen Elizabeth-Class Aircraft Carriers 94
The Mood amongst the Defence Industry in Scotland 95
Conditions for the Success of the Scottish Defence Industry 95
Open Procurement 98
Joint Procurement 99
Conclusion 101
End Notes 105
Appendix 119
Bibliography 121
6
Foreword In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
Foreword Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford intelligence gathering, it is clear that
an independent Scotland could not
people and contribute around £1.8 billion
per annum to the country’s economy.
realistically hope to replicate the current Much of this – think of the Clyde
As the referendum on Scottish report; but, I thought it appropriate to UK triad of the Security Service (MI5); shipyards and the Faslane/Coulport naval
independence – to be held on 18 comment on some of the main topics the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6); base – relies on orders from the MoD and
September 2014 – looms ever closer, how which he has covered. Whilst everyone and Government Communications hosting on the Trident submarine fleet.
an independent Scotland might define its will have their own ideas on what the Headquarters (GCHQ). Even attempting
to produce a scaled-down version of the With the best will in the world, if –
defence policy and raise; organise; and most important aspects might be, for me following Scottish independence – the
deploy its own Armed Forces has become there are only three: NATO membership, latter would appear to be well beyond the
likely resources of a fledgling independent MoD were to place future equipment
one of the major topics du jour of the which is inextricably tied to the question orders elsewhere in the UK, under the
debate. And yet, surprisingly little has of the future prospects of Trident-armed nation of some 5 million souls.
EU Article 346 exemption, then the
been published on it to date. submarines based at Faslane on the So, an independent Scotland would be Scottish defence industries would be in
Clyde; cyber security and intelligence reliant, in the short-to-medium term trouble. Similarly, if the Trident fleet was
George Grant’s assessment of the gathering; and Scottish jobs dependent
defence strategy of the Scottish National at least, on the rest of the UK (rUK) for forced to leave the Clyde, then there
on the defence industry. most of its intelligence. Whether the would undoubtedly be job losses (the
Party (SNP), who are the prime movers
in the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign for The SNP conference in October 2012 rest of the UK would be willing or able SNP’s proposal to base both the Scottish
Scottish independence, is accordingly saw the party reverse its long-held policy to share its intelligence with Scotland is Navy and Joint Headquarters there
both appropriate and timely. As he so on NATO, which had been – up until another thing altogether, tied in as it is notwithstanding). This is something the
rightly points out, “precious little has then – to withdraw from the alliance with the US; Canada; Australia; and New SNP need to acknowledge and deal with,
been said by either the SNP or the upon independence, as it is a “nuclear- Zealand via the ‘Five Eyes’ arrangement no matter how bitter a political pill it may
British Government” about the potential led alliance”. This made neither military for sharing signals intelligence (SIGINT). be to swallow.
defence implications of the referendum; nor political sense, and the party However, without the rUK, Scotland will
be exceedingly vulnerable to the cyber I could go on, but I would only be
the British Government refuses to leadership had long acknowledged it. repeating what George Grant has already
speculate, and the SNP refuse to give any Post conference, the SNP position is – attacks and terrorism which are the
most likely future risks for the newly visited in this admirable report. His study
detail. and I paraphrase here – to remain within asks these – and many other – basic and
NATO, but to work towards the removal independent state. This is an important
He sets out in this study not to suggest matter for the SNP to address. important questions of SNP defence
of nuclear weapons from Scottish soil at policy, all of which must be addressed
a defence blueprint for an independent the earliest opportunity.
Scotland, but rather to look in some detail And lastly, jobs. As I have said oftentimes and answered before the referendum
at current SNP defence policy, such as it This position is ambivalent at best and before: you don’t predicate a defence vote. We can only hope that the party’s
is. His investigation is based on the SNP’s downright contradictory at worst. Nuclear policy on the number of civilian jobs defence White Paper, to be published in
Foreign, Security and Defence Policy deterrence is the bedrock of NATO’s it might support, no more than you the autumn of 2013, will provide at least
Update, dated October 2012, which is military posture. On leaving the UK, most would build a hospital just to provide some of the answers.
hardly a detailed exposition of the party’s commentators agree that Scotland is employment for doctors and nurses.
Of course they are an important To quote George one last time: “that
plans, and which has been criticised in unlikely to have the status of ‘continuing Scottish voters should be presented with
some quarters as “veneer thin.” state’, and so would have to apply for consideration, but they are of second-
order importance to the primary purpose a clear and truthful picture of what it is
NATO membership. It would need the they are voting for is surely something on
In doing so, he has produced the most agreement of all current members, of guaranteeing the safety and security of
detailed and comprehensive examination the nation. which we can all agree.” Amen to that.
in order to be admitted to this most
of SNP policy so far, casting his net far successful military alliance, and the strong Stuart Crawford
and wide to take the views of most of the Currently, it is claimed that Scotland’s
message coming out of Washington, DC defence industries employ some 12,600 Gullane, East Lothian
commentators who will be prominent in is that, if Scotland persists in its demand 20th June 2013
the debate. The breadth and depth of his for removal of nuclear weapons from its
research demands his report be treated territory, then its accession to NATO will
with the gravitas it deserves. either be blocked or delayed for many
It would be churlish of me to attempt years. This the SNP need to resolve.
to précis what he has discovered in this In terms of cyber security and
8 9
Acronyms In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
Acronyms
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS)
Denial-of-Service (DoS)
European Union (EU)
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
Her Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB)
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
Mine Countermeasures (MCM)
Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Mixed Fighter Force Operations (MFFOs)
Multi Role Brigade (MRB)
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE)
Partnership for Peace (PfP)
Quick Reaction Alert (QRA)
Research and development (R&D)
Royal Air Force (RAF)
Royal Naval Armaments Depot (RNAD)
rUK (rest of the UK, minus Scotland)
Scottish Defence Force (SDF)
Scottish National Party (SNP)
Signals intelligence (SIGINT)
Special Air Service (SAS)
Special Boat Service (SBS)
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK)
United Nations (UN)
United States of America (US)
10 11
Executive Summary In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
Executive Summary Joining NATO
The SNP’s position that Scotland should from Scotland, without agreement
“maintain NATO membership subject from other NATO allies; its opposition
This report provides the first At the heart of the problem with the to an agreement that Scotland will not to nuclear-armed vessels docking in
comprehensive assessment of the SNP’s defence strategy is the fact that host nuclear weapons” would make Scottish ports, a position held by no
Scottish National Party (SNP)’s proposed it appears to be more concerned with negotiations for entry to the alliance, other NATO country; and the possibility
defence strategy for an independent helping win the 2014 independence which would not be automatic, very of its demands resulting in the unilateral
Scotland. Covering six main areas, it referendum, than with actually difficult. There is a fundamental disarmament of another NATO member:
finds significant shortcomings in the defending Scotland. Political – as inconsistency between the SNP’s non- the UK (or, after independence, the ‘rUK’
SNP’s policy as presently construed. opposed to strategic – considerations nuclear policy and NATO’s Strategic – rest of the UK, minus Scotland).
The chapters for this report examine: look to have driven policy formulation Concept, which states that as “long as
foreign policy and risks to national in many areas, including the future of nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain Nuclear weapons aside, there are
security; joining NATO; the funding and the Scottish regiments; where to base a nuclear alliance”. clear geostrategic reasons why an
constitution of the proposed Scottish the Scottish Navy; and the commitment independent Scotland might wish to join
Defence Force (SDF); Trident removal; to joining NATO whilst simultaneously Unlike the anti-nuclear stance of some NATO, and why the alliance might wish
intelligence and cyber security; and the removing Trident from Scotland. existing NATO members (such as Norway, to have Scotland as a member. Careful
future of the Scottish defence industry. whose stance is held largely in principle), thought should be given, however, as to
the SNP’s policy would have very whether the potential commitments of
real practical implications. Especially membership would be compatible with
Defending What, Exactly? problematic are: the SNP’s commitment Scotland’s other foreign and defence
to the unilateral divestiture of Trident policy objectives.
The SNP’s defence strategy does not it is not clear how they would go about
articulate a foreign policy based on the achieving Scotland’s international
priorities of an independent Scotland; objectives; nor is it clear what emphasis Establishing a Scottish Defence Force
nor is there an assessment of the risks to they would place on involvement in
national security and Scottish interests international humanitarian operations. The SNP have proposed a defence Scottish soldiers will be able to choose
– a necessary requirement to enable budget of £2.5 billion per annum. This whether to join the SDF or remain
defence planners to envisage the role of The SNP have provided no real figure appears to have been chosen with the British Armed Forces. The
Scotland’s defence forces. assessment of the risks to Scottish arbitrarily since it does not match the overwhelming consensus of service
national security. This report finds that commitments envisaged by the SNP personnel consulted for this report
SNP policy envisages a Scotland with a an independent Scotland would likely for their defence force. Moreover, the was that the majority of soldiers would
predominantly regional focus centred on be confronted with many of the same Scottish Finance Secretary has privately prefer to remain with the British Armed
the northern European neighbourhood threats as face the UK now, such as cyber warned his party’s defence planners Forces, which, they believed, would
in which it is situated, in comparison crime; instability overseas; disruption to that “a much lower budget must be offer greater opportunities.
to the more global posture of the oil and gas supplies; and international assumed”.
UK. Scotland would also emphasise terrorism. It should not be assumed that The SNP have provided very limited
its influence through multilateral disassociation from UK foreign policy SNP commitments will create significant detail on what equipment their defence
organisations, including the UN; the EU; would automatically lower the threat personnel difficulties. The SNP propose force would require, and many of the
and, if possible, NATO. However, the towards Scotland from hostile actors. a defence force of 15,000, including all platforms which they have singled
SNP make no attempt at prioritisation: “current Scottish raised and restored UK out would be either impractical or
regiments”. The commitment is likely unworkable. The commitment to
more political than strategic, and would procure “conventional submarines”
leave Scotland with a heavily Army- and “new frigates” would be extremely
centric defence force when, strategically, expensive, while most experts believe
a greater focus on maritime and air that a Scottish Navy would have greater
defence would be preferable. use for smaller vessels. Despite a
commitment to inherit Scotland’s share
Furthermore, the SNP have said that
12 13
Executive Summary In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
of fast jets from the UK, none of the what capabilities the SDF would seek Intelligence and Cyber Security
Royal Air Force (RAF)’s three jet types to deliver in line with the NATO concept
would be suitable. The Eurofighter of ‘Smart Defence’. This approach is The SNP have provided little information of a Scottish equivalent of the UK’s
Typhoon would likely be too expensive sensible, but the SNP have gone further on establishing Scottish security and Government Communications
and complex, and the ageing Tornado by advocating “shared conventional intelligence services. The Deputy First Headquarters (GCHQ), although all are
GR4 lacks an air-to-air capability. The basing” and “sharing conventional Minister has said that she “envisage[s] agreed Scotland’s would not be on the
last option, the Hawk trainer (endorsed military capabilities”. Whilst it would Scotland having independent domestic same scale. Moreover, GCHQ is central
by the SNP’s defence spokesman), be sensible to allow the rUK to make intelligence machinery”, with an to the British Government’s efforts to
is comparatively slow, with no radar use of facilities north of the border, overseas-intelligence service being counter the threat of cyber warfare –
and only limited offensive capability. sharing bases is another matter entirely, “one option available to Scotland”. an increasing, global threat, to which
Therefore, it would be unable to fulfil and sharing military capabilities still While experts agree that the country the current international peacekeeping
the air-defence function envisaged by more so. Such an arrangement would could develop a small domestic service framework is not configured to respond
the party. As a result, if the SNP wanted almost certainly be unworkable since modelled on MI5, only a handful of appropriately. The experience of Estonia,
a fast jet for its Air Force, it would need it would give one nation a de facto countries possess international services in 2007, demonstrates that smaller
to be procured elsewhere. veto over the foreign policy of another – the equivalent of MI6. As such, Scotland countries cannot rely on the protection
nation if disagreements arose as to how would rely on domestic intelligence; of large alliances, such as NATO, when
The SNP have said Scotland would seek shared assets should be used at a given
to coordinate its defence policy with the on defence attachés abroad; and on targeted by cyber attacks.
moment. liaison with other nations’ security and
rUK and other allies, and to prioritise Cyber security extends more broadly
intelligence services.
than cyber warfare, however:
Removing Trident The extent to which an independent approximately 80 per cent of the
Scotland could expect other countries, in Internet lies in the private sector, with
Removing the UK’s Trident nuclear to obtain a favourable settlement on a particular the rUK, to share intelligence is threats ranging from cyber crime,
deterrent from Scotland is a pivotal number of other issues, Trident removal one of the most serious misassumptions to non-malicious damage caused by
plank of the SNP’s bid for independence. will likely be central to independence made by the SNP. No country shares careless data storage. While Scotland
The pertinent issues are timing and negotiations. intelligence without full confidence in could utilise existing private companies
cost, as well as the impact on regional the security of the service receiving that to develop effective policies and systems
unemployment. Trident removal has serious implications information; nor would the rUK have an to help counter such threats, the most
for regional job losses: 6,700 are automatic interest in intelligence sharing serious challenge would be one of scale.
The SNP have not articulated a time presently employed at Her Majesty’s purely on the basis of shared geography Recruiting cyber-security specialists
frame on Trident removal, committing Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde, a figure set and other commonalities. remains a challenge in both the public
only to “the speediest safe transition to increase to 8,200 by 2022. While and private sector, especially for smaller
of the nuclear fleet from Faslane”. In the SNP propose stationing the Scottish Opinions vary regarding the feasibility countries.
theory, Admiral Lord Alan West believes Navy in place of the Trident fleet, that
that Trident could be re-established and would be unlikely to generate more than
operational south of the border within a 1,000 jobs. Placing the Scottish Navy in The Future of the Scottish Defence Industry
matter of months; in practice, however, the southwest of the country also raises
given its high financial and political strategic questions, given that Scotland’s The Scottish defence industry employs potential investors of their commitment
cost, a realistic time frame would be main maritime assets, and many of the in excess of 12,600 people, and has in this area.
years – and perhaps even decades. potential threats, are located to the annual sales in excess of £1.8 billion.
The SNP have said that this industry The SNP have repeatedly emphasised
Furthermore, as Scotland would be north and east. the importance of Ministry of Defence
dependent on goodwill from the rUK would continue to have “a healthy order
book” post-independence. However, an (MoD) contracts for the Scottish
independent Scottish defence industry defence industry. Post-independence,
would likely depend on producing however, MoD contracts for more
specialist components for use in defence complex weapons systems would likely
systems, and the party has yet to be dramatically reduced. Orders for
develop a coherent strategy to reassure the Type 26 Global Combat Ship, for
example, would almost certainly be
14 15
Executive Summary In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
cancelled, and – in time – most of the
shipyards would likely close.
to mitigate the potential for these
arrangements to increase costs and Introduction
delay delivery when not properly pre-
The SNP have expressed an interest in planned, as exemplified by the ‘Future
joint procurement with other countries European Fighter Aircraft’ programme.
to acquire assets not inherited from Joint-procurement programmes
the UK. This is a sensible approach both The central purpose of this report is to precious little has been said by either
also only tend to be entered into by help advance the public debate about the SNP or the British Government about
financially, in terms of cost-sharing, and countries which share not only common
also for securing work for domestic the defence implications of Scottish the potential defence implications of
commercial interests, but also common independence. In so doing, it does not that decision. Given that defence is the
industries. The SNP, however, will need strategic and political goals. seek to provide a defence blueprint for first duty of government, and should
an independent Scotland, but rather to therefore be an absolutely central feature
analyse what the Scottish National Party in the independence debate, this is
(SNP) have said on the matter, and to problematic.
see if their proposals stand up to serious
scrutiny. Extraordinarily, perhaps, current UK
Government policy is explicitly not to have
Besides the SNP, there are – needless a policy on what the potential defence
to say – several political parties and implications of Scottish independence
other groups advocating Scottish might be. Whilst the Government has
independence. Nevertheless, it is the provided specific assessments of existing
SNP who are overwhelmingly the most defence arrangements north of the
significant drivers of the movement. border, and how – in its view – they benefit
Moreover, as things presently stand, none both Scotland and the UK as a whole, it
of the other main pro-independence has decided against speculating on what
groups have put forward any significant could happen to those arrangements in
proposals on defence whatsoever.i As the event of a ‘Yes’ vote next September.
it is the SNP who presently govern at
Holyrood, it will be their vision for an In an October 2012 submission to the
independent Scotland which will inform House of Commons Defence Select
most voters on 18 September 2014; thus, Committee, the Ministry of Defence
it is their policies which merit the most (MoD) made it plain that the “UK
scrutiny. As a result, all references in Government’s position is clear: Scotland
this report to ‘an independent Scotland’ benefits from being part of the UK and
imply one following the SNP’s current the UK benefits from having Scotland
independence ambitions. within the UK. The UK Government is
confident that the people of Scotland will
With little more than a year to go before choose to remain part of the UK, and is
a vote on the future of one of the most not planning for any other outcome. It
significant political unions of all time, is for those advocating independence to
it was a major concern to find that explain the nature and implications of an
independent Scotland”.1
i. In their most recent Westminster manifesto, the Scottish Whilst this position is understandable on
Greens restricted themselves to pledges to do away with
the Trident nuclear deterrent; cut military spending;
one level, not least because Westminster
and scrap the “redundant Typhoon fighter aircraft” and has no interest in helping do the SNP’s
“strategically pointless new aircraft carriers”. job for them, it undoubtedly impedes
The defence proposals of the Scottish Socialists, efforts to provide voters in Scotland with
meanwhile, extended to just two points: “the removal of
all nuclear weapons from Scotland”, and for “Scotland’s a clear and accurate picture of what the
overall military budget to [be] brought into line per capita consequences of their decision might
with that of the Republic of Ireland”.
16 17
Introduction In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
be. In lieu of this, and aware of the The report is broken down into six to base their entire Navy and their Armed might actually be, before they enter the
importance of thinking through these chapters analysing the SNP’s positions on: Forces’ headquarters on the Clyde; and to polling booths on 18 September 2014.
issues before the vote (and not just 1. The foreign policy of an independent join NATO whilst simultaneously divesting
negotiating the outcome afterwards), Scotland of nuclear weapons. Finally, it is impossible to conclude
Scotland, and the risks to national without remarking upon an extraordinary
several Parliamentary select committees security
have taken it upon themselves to provide The Scottish fighting regiments are and wholly unintended feature of this
their own assessments. Amongst them 2. Joining NATO undoubtedly amongst the most iconic in report: the vastly disproportionate
have been the Defence Committee; 3. Establishing a Scottish Defence Force the British Armed Forces, and any hint number of Scots interviewed as part of my
the Scottish Affairs Committee; the (SDF) by the SNP that they might be reduced research. These individuals were chosen
Foreign Affairs Committee; and the Lords or even dismantled in an independent by virtue of their relevance to the issue,
4. Removing the Trident nuclear Scotland would be politically toxic. much of the time as a result of holding –
Economic Affairs Committee. This report deterrent from Scotland
has benefited from the insights provided Nevertheless, on the proposed budget or having held – a significant office in the
5. Intelligence and cyber security in an and personnel count for an SDF, as put world of defence and security at the UK
by many of the expert witnesses for those independent Scotland
inquiries, in addition to the more than forward by the party, this commitment and international level, and nothing to do
two dozen experts interviewed separately 6. The future of the Scottish defence would almost certainly leave Scotland with their nationality.
as part of my own research. industry with an Army-heavy and equipment-
light Armed Forces when – strategically They include former NATO Secretary
For its part, the centrepiece of the SNP’s Each chapter begins by providing as much speaking – a greater focus on maritime General Lord George Robertson; former
published thinking on how to defend an detail as possible on what the SNP have and air defence would be required. MI6 operative Baroness Meta Ramsay;
independent Scotland is contained within proposed for these areas, before moving defence-industry chief Ian Godden;
its Foreign, Security and Defence Policy on to the views of experts from the Likewise, the commitment to base the leading defence experts Professor Sir
Update, a 768-word document released political; military; academic; and defence- Armed Forces’ headquarters and the Hew Strachan and Professor Malcolm
shortly after the party conference in industrial fields. The opinions come from Scottish Navy on the Clyde seems to be Chalmers; former Defence Secretary Liam
October 2012.2 ii The policy positions both sides of the debate, and – combined as much about assuaging concerns over Fox MP; and former Foreign Secretary,
contained within that paper (combined with my own assessment – examine the potentially massive job losses incurred and current chair of Parliament’s
with other published statements viability of the SNP’s positions, and what by removing Trident (which is currently Intelligence and Security Committee,
and submissions by the SNP and its the alternative outcomes may be. based there) as it is about meeting the Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP. Others, such as
leadership, and my own interviews) in challenges of the security environment Angus Robertson; Bill Kidd MSP; Jackie
As research for this report progressed, in which an independent Scotland would Baillie MSP; Edinburgh University’s Dr
turn form the basis of what this report what quickly became apparent is that,
seeks to scrutinise. find itself. The Clyde is based in the Colin Fleming; and Lieutenant Colonel
if one is being objective on this subject, southwest of Scotland, whilst both the Stuart Crawford (who has kindly penned
it is almost impossible not to arrive at potential threats and the major offshore the Foreword to this report), were – of
the conclusion that – as things currently assets are located in the north and east. course – chosen by virtue of their direct
ii. It is worthy of note that the full and updated version of
this resolution – meant to be the cornerstone of the SNP’s
stand – defence policy is one of the SNP’s relevance to these issues within Scotland.
foreign and defence policies – is not available anywhere on weak points. As for the NATO commitment, the SNP’s
the SNP’s website or, it appears, online. The full document defence spokesman, Angus Robertson Looking down this list of names, I could
was obtained by this report directly from the office of Angus This is not because they have attempted MP, is on record telling party delegates not help but recall the observation of
Robertson MP and is included as the Appendix to this report.
The nearest available version online was reproduced by The to put forward a fully thought-through (those who are sceptical that a deeply the Saudi prince who, when asked what
Scotsman shortly before the October conference. The two defence strategy that nevertheless held anti-nuclear position is compatible he thought of Scottish independence
resolutions are identical, save for a 27-word addition to
the final paragraph, regarding NATO membership, which is
appears to have some deficiencies, but with joining a first-strike nuclear alliance) replied, “Maybe the Scots want to rule
missing from The Scotsman’s copy. The section in question rather because their strategy appears that 75 per cent of Scots want in, and that Scotland but why that is preferable to
follows here, with the additional text italicised: to be predicated more on how not to the SNP have got a referendum to win. ruling England as well, I don’t know.”3
“An SNP Government will maintain NATO membership
subject to an agreement that Scotland will not host nuclear
alienate voters, than on how to actually
weapons and NATO takes all possible steps to bring about defend Scotland. None of this is to suggest that an Irrespective of whether or not readers
nuclear disarmament as required by the Nuclear Non independent Scotland could not defend agree with the conclusions arrived at in
Proliferation Treaty of which all its members are signatories, Three of the most glaring examples of this itself; but, it is to say that many of the this report, I nevertheless hope that, as
and further that NATO continues to respect the right of
members to only take part in UN-sanctioned operations” (my
are found in the SNP’s commitments to SNP’s policies on defence need serious an extensive and varied compilation of
emphasis). retain all the current Scottish regiments, work, and that voters deserve to have expert insights, it will serve as a useful
a clear and credible picture of what the contribution to this vitally important
potential ramifications of their choice debate.
18 19In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
Chapter I
Defending What, Exactly?
The Foreign Policy of an strong emphasis on working through
Independent Scotland formal and informal alliances (principally
Before any useful attempt can be with the UN; the EU; and NATO, if
made at establishing what the defence possible) to enhance its influence
priorities and requirements of an abroad, and to protect itself from
independent Scotland should be, there stronger powers in turn. An independent
must first be a clear sense of what its Scotland would not be pacifist, but the
foreign-policy objectives and interests SNP are explicit that, under their rule, it
would be, and – in turn – what sort of would “only take part in UN-sanctioned
risks to national security and Scottish operations”. An independent Scotland
interests would likely be faced. would therefore be likely to contribute to
UN peacekeeping operations from time
Although brief, the SNP have given to time, or partake in UN-authorised
some indication of their foreign-policy NATO missions, if it joined the alliance;
aims in their recent Foreign, Security but, it is almost inconceivable that
and Defence Policy Update. It appears an independent Scotland would ever
that they envisage an independent seek to exert itself militarily beyond its
Scotland operating with a regional focus borders on its own.
(as opposed to the global ambitions of
the UK), necessarily centred around The dual possibilities of the militarisation
Scotland’s location in the northern of the Arctic and the opening up of
European neighbourhood: new trade routes (both as a result of
the thawing of the ice caps) are two
“Scotland is [a] maritime nation with specific examples of areas in which an
more than 11,000 miles of coastline, independent Scotland would wish to
including nearly 800 islands, critical focus. Counter-terrorism, in particular
under-sea and offshore infrastructure the protection of its offshore oilfields,
and an area of responsibility extending constitutes a third obvious area of
far into the North Sea and Atlantic concern.
Ocean. The SNP recognises our national
responsibilities as a northern European Unfortunately, however, the Foreign,
nation to work with our neighbours Security and Defence Policy Update is
to fulfil current defence and security very light on specifics and, as importantly,
responsibilities and improve collective prioritisation. For instance, whilst it is
regional arrangements. Environmental clear that a Scottish foreign policy (at
changes to the High North and Arctic least with regard to its defence and
Region raise major regional challenges security arrangements) would broadly
and responsibilities which Scotland be regional in focus and informed by
shares.”4 Scotland’s geographical location in the
north Atlantic, the SNP have provided
As with many other Small Powers, an scant indication of exactly what sort
independent Scotland would place a of role they might wish the country to
20 21Defending What, Exactly? In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
play in the area. Would Scotland adopt fully formed idea of an independent • isk of major overseas instability;
R Looking down this list, it is immediately
a full-spectrum approach to defence Scotland’s foreign-policy ambitions. insurgency; or civil war, creating an apparent that an independent Scotland
in the region? Or would it adopt a environment which terrorists can would very likely be confronted with
more specialist stance, focusing on the That being said, it is possible to hazard a exploit in order to threaten the UK. many of the same risks, and to at least
provision of certain capabilities, and few logical assumptions based on what as great an extent, which it faces as part
allowing its regional neighbours to fill in is currently known (not least regarding • significant increase in the level of
A of the UK.
the gaps? the broader geopolitical context in organised crime affecting the UK.
which Scotland would sit), and to This certainly includes the risk from
Likewise, whilst it is possible to deduce consider whether the risks likely to face • S evere disruption to information cyber crime and natural hazards, in Tier
that an independent Scotland might an independent Scotland would differ in received; transmitted; or collected One; the knock-on effects of instability
wish to contribute, as part of a coalition, any meaningful way from those which it by satellites, possibly as the result of overseas and organised crime, in Tier
to UN-mandated operations further already confronts as part of the UK. a deliberate attack by another state. Two; and an increase in the level of
afield, it is much less clear how much Tier Three illicit cross-border activity, disruption
of a priority an independent Scotland In its 2010 National Security Strategy, the to oil and gas supplies, and disruption
might afford to humanitarian operations, UK Government identified the main risks • large-scale, conventional military
A to international supplies of resources
and what level of resources they would to which it felt Britain was vulnerable – attack on the UK by another state essential to the country, as well as a
accordingly need to set aside for them. looking forwards – and prioritised them (not involving the use of CBRN major release of radioactive material, in
into three tiers, taking account of both weapons), resulting in fatalities and Tier Three.
Would Scotland attempt to seriously likelihood and potential impact. They damage to infrastructure within the
pursue a ‘values-led’ foreign policy, were as follows: UK. Several of the other risks on this list
providing assets to humanitarian could also be included (but perhaps
missions on a regular basis? Or would Tier One • significant increase in the level of
A requiring some qualification), primarily
it only contribute to the most serious • International terrorism affecting the terrorists, organised criminals, illegal relating to the widely held assumption
crises? Would an SDF focus only on UK or its interests. Threats include a immigrants, and illicit goods trying that a more ‘passive’ Scottish foreign
peacekeeping missions? Or would it chemical; biological; radiological; or to cross the UK border to enter the policy would reduce the risk posed by
contemplate participation in more nuclear (CBRN) attack by terrorists, country. hostile actors wishing to do the nation
militarily robust ‘peace-enforcement’ and/or a significant increase in • isruption to oil or gas supplies
D harm. Amongst the most severe and
operations as well? Alternatively, would the levels of terrorism relating to to the UK, or oil and gas-price obvious dangers to fall into this category
it steer clear of both, and focus only on Northern Ireland. instability, as a result of war; is the threat of terrorism.
disaster relief? accident; major political upheaval;
• ostile attacks upon UK cyber space
H This was essentially the conclusion that
Without answers to questions such as by other states, and large-scale or deliberate manipulation of supply the Jimmy Reid Foundation reached in
these, it is exceedingly difficult to paint cyber crime. by producers. a report published in October 2012 (No
a clear picture of what an independent • major release of radioactive
A Need To Be Afraid: An assessment of
SDF would – or should – look like, and • major accident or natural hazard
A possible threats to Scotland’s security
which requires a national response. material from a civil nuclear site
the SNP certainly have a responsibility within the UK, affecting one or more and how they should be addressed).
to the Scottish public to provide more Examples of major hazards are The top three factors identified by the
severe coastal flooding affecting regions.
detail ahead of next year’s referendum. report as “likely to increase the threat
The remit of this report, however, three or more regions of the UK, or • conventional attack by a state on
A to Scottish security” are: “[a]ssociation
is to scrutinise whatever SNP policy an influenza pandemic. another NATO or EU member, to with UK foreign policy”, “[p]resence of
there is already available, and to draw • n international military crisis
A which the UK would have to respond. nuclear weapons on Scottish soil”, and
conclusions accordingly. between states, drawing in the UK; • n attack on a UK Overseas Territory
A “[m]embership of military alliances with
its allies; and other states and non- as the result of a sovereignty dispute policies of aggression or retaliation, such
Potential Risks to Scottish as NATO.”6
National Security state actors. or a wider regional conflict.
As to the kind of risks Scotland would Tier Two • S hort-to-medium term disruption to In its assessment of the threat of
likely face, the SNP have given no international supplies of resources terrorism in an independent Scotland,
• n attack on the UK, or its Overseas
A the report concludes that it is “[h]ard to
detailed assessment at all, and a clear (e.g. food, minerals) essential to the
Territories, by another state or proxy assess but certainly real, though probably
picture cannot be drawn without a UK.5
using CBRN weapons. lower than [for the] UK as a whole”.
22 23Defending What, Exactly? In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
The implications of independence on year assessed at the time of writing.10 the whole of Western Europe is in their the UK), would necessarily exclude an
this threat, it continues, would be “[s] This puts them as the two highest-ranked sights,” Baroness Meta Ramsay, formerly independent Scotland.
omewhere between ‘no difference’ and European nations; yet neither country is a senior operative with MI6, said in
‘likely decreased threat resulting from known internationally for its provocative an interview for this report. “If you Indeed, any sensible assessment of
detachment from UK foreign policy’”.7 overseas foreign policies. Norway was want to create a world caliphate, you the potential risks to an independent
sent spiralling up the index as a result of certainly include Scotland in that, and, in Scotland, and how they should inform its
The former head of MI5, Baroness Eliza the atrocity perpetrated by the far-right many ways, Scotland is a soft target.”14 defence posture, would recognise that
Manningham-Buller, also drew the link extremist Anders Behring Breivik, whilst According to Ramsay, Glasgow airport the world in 10; 20; or 50 years’ time
between foreign policy and the threat of Greece was hit primarily by domestic was chosen as the site for the attempted may – and most likely will – look very
terrorism when she said that the 2003 groups angered at the government’s bombing in 2007 because the attackers different to the world of today.
invasion of Iraq “showed very clearly stringent austerity measures.11 It is also deemed it to be an easier target than
that foreign and domestic policy are A good national security strategy must
notable that, looking globally, from 2002 comparable sites south of the border.15 also take account of the need for a
intertwined – actions overseas have an to 2011, North America was the region
impact at home. And our involvement in The attackers’ motives appear to have country to respond effectively not just
least likely to suffer from terrorism.12 to predetermined, definable threats,
Iraq spurred some young British Muslims been a mixture of hatred for the UK’s
to turn to terror.”8 Similar conclusions can be drawn foreign policy, primarily its involvement but also to strategic shocks that can
from Europol’s most recent “Terrorism in Iraq, as well as a more general disdain materialise without warning, at any
Most recently, the horrendous murder Situation and Trend Report”, TE-SAT for the West and what it represented. The place and at any time. It is worthy of note
of Drummer Lee Rigby on the streets of 2012, which stated that, in 2011, “[n] day before the Glasgow attack, the two that none of the main military conflicts
London on 22 May 2013 was, claimed ot one religiously-inspired [sic] terrorist conspirators – Bilal Abdulla and Kafeel in which the UK has been involved
Michael Adebolajo (one of the two men attack […] was reported by Member Ahmed – had been in London and had since 1945 were predicted beforehand;
allegedly responsible for Rigby’s death, States, nor were any single-issue terrorist planted bombs (which failed to detonate) the lesson from that is clear: sovereign
and a convert to Islam), directly related attacks registered. […] Of all specified near a bus stop and near the Tiger Tiger nations serious about their defence
to the UK’s military presence overseas: affiliations, the majority of attacks were nightclub. After Abdulla’s prosecution, need to retain armed forces with a good
“The only reason we have killed this committed by separatist groups.”13 the judge stated that the choice of a degree of flexibility and resilience, and
man today is because Muslims are dying nightclub was symbolic, as it represented must resist the slide towards a bare-
daily by British soldiers. And this British Whilst complaints about foreign policy all that the attackers despised about bones defence specialised for scenarios
soldier is one. It is an eye for eye and a are often cited by individuals convicted of “Western culture: drink, association that may not – and probably will not – be
tooth for a tooth. By Allah, we swear by religiously motivated – and, specifically, between the sexes, and music.”16 the ones that are actually faced.iii
the almighty Allah, we will never stop Islamist – terrorism, such grievances
fighting until you leave us alone.”9 often extend more broadly than the Similarly, it would not be inconceivable Finally, it is important to note that
foreign policy of one particular nation. to envisage how Scotland may well be several of the risks highlighted above
However, whilst foreign-policy grievances In most cases, they tend to be subsidiary no freer from several of the other risks would not necessarily fall within the
help motivate some terrorists, it would to the primary ideological objective of affecting the UK which, at first glance, remit of defence forces at all, but rather
be highly unwise to calibrate the overall advancing an agenda incompatible with could be construed as being directly the police; emergency services; and
terrorist threat to a state on that basis the democratic values of every state in linked to foreign-policy posture. other specialist outfits. Many of these
alone, or – indeed – to conclude that Europe, irrespective of their foreign- agencies are already devolved, and are
foreign-policy grievances constitute the policy posture. Moreover, it should go For instance, whilst the rUK (rest of not the focus of this report; but, it is
sole, or even the primary, motivator for without saying that to argue for any the UK, minus Scotland) would almost worth appreciating how broad the risks
many who go on to commit terrorist nation’s foreign policy to be altered, certainly retain military capabilities are to national security, and how often
offences. in order to assuage the grievances that were greatly superior to those of they fall outside what might commonly
(real or imagined) of individuals who an independent Scotland, and a more be thought of as conventional security
Data from the Global Terrorism Index ‘activist’ foreign-policy posture when it domains.
produced by the Institute for Economics intentionally deploy violence against
civilians for political purposes, is a very came to overseas military deployments,
and Peace appears to bear this out. that does not mean that an international
Designed to systematically rank the dangerous – and morally ambiguous – iii. See Jenkin, B. & Grant, G., The Tipping Point: British
road indeed. military crisis between states (one of
nations of the world according to the four Tier One risks which threaten
National Strategy and the UK’s Future World Role, The
Henry Jackson Society, London, July 2011
terrorist activity, it placed Norway and “Some people seem to think the Scots
Greece 21st and 26th (respectively, out of are not in [the Islamists’] sights, but
a total of 116) in 2011 – the most recent
24 25In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
Chapter II
Joining NATO
Amongst the most important issues The vote was certainly controversial;
that will help shape the sort of foreign however, it came on the back of
policy and defence posture that an discussions (with officials from other
independent Scotland would have is NATO members) that highlighted why
whether or not it would be in NATO. Of a Scottish exit from the alliance would
all the big questions surrounding the be problematic, and after a realisation
independence debate, this is also one of amongst the SNP leadership that an
the most contentious. independent Scotland outside NATO
could be left dangerously exposed.
On 19 October 2012, following one
of the most heated discussions in the The SNP’s Foreign, Security and Defence
party’s 78-year history, the SNP narrowly Policy Update, released shortly after the
voted to reverse their decades-long conference, has this to say about the
opposition to NATO membership for an party’s new stance on NATO:
independent Scotland.
“Security cooperation in our region
The resolution (proposed by the SNP’s functions primarily through NATO, which
defence spokesman, Angus Robertson, is regarded as the keystone defence
together with Angus MacNeil MP) said: organisation by Denmark, Norway,
“On independence Scotland will inherit Iceland and the United Kingdom.
its treaty obligations with NATO. An The SNP wishes Scotland to fulfil its
SNP Government will maintain NATO responsibilities to neighbours and allies.
membership subject to an agreement On independence Scotland will inherit
that Scotland will not host nuclear its treaty obligations with NATO.
weapons and NATO continues to respect
the right of members to only take part in “An SNP Government will maintain
UN-sanctioned operations.”17 NATO membership subject to an
agreement that Scotland will not host
A total of 426 delegates voted in favour nuclear weapons and NATO takes all
of the change, with 332 opposed, after possible steps to bring about nuclear
an amendment to reject the motion disarmament as required by the
altogether was defeated by just 29 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of
votes.18 Four days later, MSPs John which all its members are signatories,
Finnie and Jean Urquhart announced and further that NATO continues to
their decision to stand down from the respect the right of members to only take
party, in protest against the vote. Finnie part in UN-sanctioned operations. In the
later explained that the pair could not absence of such an agreement, Scotland
“continue to belong to a party that will work with NATO as a member of the
quite rightly does not wish to hold Partnership for Peace [PfP] programme
nuclear weapons on its soil, but [then like Sweden, Finland, Austria and
also] wants to join a first-strike nuclear Ireland. Scotland will be a full member
alliance.”19 of the Common Security and Defence
26 27Joining NATO In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy
Policy (CSDP) of the European Union and In his interview for this report in March with benefits that PfP membership angle – that Robertson used at the
the Organisation for Cooperation and 2013, Robertson elaborated further on could not, citing maritime patrol and October conference, when closing his
Security in Europe (OSCE).”20 the argument which he had previously air defence as examples. “If a plane flies case for revising the party’s NATO policy.
put forward at the October conference: towards Scotland from the north, it is Following a battering raft of strongly
Addressing delegates at the October “For quite some time the SNP [have] first spotted by a NATO communication worded, and enthusiastically received,
conference to debate the motion, Angus had a formal position for wishing to centre in Jutland, under the command speeches of opposition from a number
Robertson explained the proposed be a member of NATO’s ‘Partnership of a Norwegian, and that information of senior SNP members, he said:
change by calling upon Scotland’s for Peace’ programme.”24 However, is then passed on to the UK. If Scotland
strategic obligation to be a responsible he said, meetings with neighbouring were no longer in NATO, that key air- “I’m very honoured to have been the
player, internationally, at a time states, including Norway and Denmark, policing; advance-warning; collaborative campaign director of the SNP in the two
when its “region in northern Europe had brought home to him that PfP approach is not possible – similarly in national Scottish Parliament-election
is facing considerable challenges and membership alone might not be maritime patrol, and, indeed, air policing victories that we have won; but do not
opportunities”. enough, and that the strategic benefits in northern Europe.”27 kid yourself, our best ever result has
offered to small European states by been 44 per cent of the vote, not ‘50
“For the last ten years,” he said, “the Shortly before the October conference, per cent plus one’ – and that is what
SNP has had a policy of supporting NATO membership were not to be taken
lightly: “it became apparent to me that Robertson said that a question had been we require in the referendum in 2014 to
‘Partnership for Peace’, which is: put to him, whilst accompanying Alex secure our independence.
associate membership of NATO. I am there was a significant gap between what
the ‘Partnership for Peace’ provides, and Salmond MSP on a fact-finding trip to
proposing that, given the information we neighbouring countries, about whether “This debate, this vote, is about much,
now have from our neighbours, we must what NATO membership offers – both to much more than carrying a conference
individual countries [and] collectively – the Scottish Government understood
fulfil our treaty obligations – including how important NATO air cover was to hall; this is about carrying the country,
mutual defence guarantees and in security terms”. and we need the country to vote ‘Yes’. Do
North Sea security:
conventional cooperation. Sovereignty Launched in January 1994, the PfP is not disregard the evidence. When asked,
for Scotland means that we can have described as “a programme of practical “I asked what the impact would be of 75 per cent of respondents said they
the optimal conventional defence bilateral cooperation between individual Scotland not being in NATO. The answer would wish an independent Scotland
policy, and we should make sure that we Euro-Atlantic partner countries and came that the simplest way to describe to remain [boos from the audience]...
continue to have the best relations with NATO.”25 The PfP is presently comprised it is pulling the plug on the radar. you can boo, you can boo, but do not
our neighbours.”21 of 22 members – ranging from former Everything that is around Scotland turns disregard the evidence.”30
states of the Soviet Union (including into a black hole where we have no idea
Supporting his colleague, Angus MacNeil what’s going on, and that worries our Criticism of the SNP’s new stance on
reiterated the point, arguing that “the Russia and Uzbekistan), to various EU NATO, both from inside the party and
member states (such as Ireland, Austria, neighbours intensely.”28
independent-together group of 28 outside, has centred on the perceived
nations who’re in NATO [are] natural and Sweden) which, for various historical Whilst strategic considerations such incompatibility of the commitment to
allies, and people sympathetic to reasons, have opted out of becoming as these will undoubtedly have played remove nuclear weapons from Scottish
Scotland […] Scotland in NATO is good fully fledged NATO members. a part in informing the revised stance soil whilst simultaneously seeking to join
defence, good for our neighbouring Given the breadth of its membership, of the SNP leadership, there does also a first-strike nuclear alliance.
nations who are looking for historical the PfP has adopted an avowedly seem to have been a more political
continuity in defence.”22 concern at play: namely, the acute need It is important to re-emphasise,
loose mandate, whereby members however, that, should the SNP’s stance
can choose “their own priorities for for the SNP to minimise the number of
Presenting an argument that elicited reasons Scots might find to vote ‘No’ to on nuclear weapons prove an obstacle
strong objection from many delegates, cooperation”. This extends across most to NATO membership for whatever
fields of NATO activity, including defence independence in 2014.
Alyn Smith MEP re-emphasised the reason, then the party has stipulated
message put forward by Robertson reform; civil-military relations; military- As the party leadership has reminded it will forfeit membership in favour of
and MacNeil: “Robert Burns said it to-military cooperation and planning; its membership on more than one its commitment to making Scotland
best: ‘to see ourselves as others see civil-emergency planning; and disaster occasion, fully 75 per cent of Scots are nuclear-weapons free. As the Foreign,
us’ is a pretty harsh rigour, and – in my response.26 reckoned to support an independent Security and Defence Policy Update
considered, regretful, professional view According to Robertson, there are Scotland being part of NATO, a position makes clear:
– our present policy makes us look odd, several specific areas in which full NATO also held by 70 per cent of SNP voters.29
hopelessly naive and idealistic at best, Perhaps tellingly, it was this argument “An SNP Government will maintain
membership would provide Scotland NATO membership subject to an
not ready for the big league.”23 – as opposed to the military-strategic
28 29You can also read
