INTER-REGIONAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT INQUIRY
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
18 May 2012
The Hon Andrew Gee
Chairman
State and Regional Development Committee
Parliament House
Macquarie St
Sydney NSW 2000
Dear Chair,
INTER-REGIONAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT INQUIRY
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (IPA) would like to thank the Legislative Assembly State and
Regional development Committee for the opportunity to comment on the important area of inter-
regional public transport in New South Wales.
A reliable and efficient regional transport network is essential for the economic and social viability of
New South Wales’ rural communities. In the context of a geographically dispersed population,
transport is critical for connecting rural communities; regional businesses rely on transport to gain
access to essential goods and services and individuals require transport connections to access
education and critical health services.
In the context of an increasingly constrained budget position and a requirement to enhance both the
quality and reliability of regional and interurban rail services, it is timely to consider how substantial
reforms might achieve these aims at better value for money to taxpayers and commuters.
IPA notes with interest the reforms recently announced by the NSW Government under the ‘Fixing
the Trains’ initiative. The restructuring of RailCorp to form two new entities – NSW Trains and Sydney
Trains – achieves a number of welcome structural reforms to improve the value and quality of
regional and inter-regional rail services. By structurally separating service provision and maintenance
from infrastructure ownership, which remains a separate government entity, NSW Trains and Sydney
Trains will be free to concentrate on service provision and customer services. Equally, by separating
NSW Trains and Sydney Trains into distinct entities, the two organisations will be able to bring a
renewed and dedicated focus to the improvement of urban and regional services.
The State and regional Development Committee’s inquiry into inter-regional public transport is an
important opportunity to understand the challenges facing the New South Wales regional rail
network and to establish what reforms are needed to provide regional communities with a safe,
reliable and efficient public transport network.
1
1. ABOUT INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERSHIPS AUSTRALIA
IPA is the nation’s peak infrastructure body. Our mission is to advocate the best solutions to
Australia’s infrastructure challenges, equipping the nation with the assets and services we need to
secure enduring and strong economic growth and importantly, to meet national social objectives.
Our Membership is comprised of the most senior industry leaders across the spectrum of the
infrastructure sector, including financiers, constructors, operators and advisors. Importantly, a
significant portion of our Membership is comprised of public sector agencies.
IPA draws together the public and private sectors in a genuine partnership to debate the policies and
priority projects that will build Australia for the challenges ahead.
2. THE NEED TO IMPROVE COUNTRYLINK SERVICES
CountryLink services have experienced a sustained decline in patronage over the past 15 years;
annual patronage levels have dropped from 2.5 million in 1996-97 to 1.8 million in 20101. Figure 1
indicates that CountryLink has experienced a decade of patronage decline before a recent upward
movement beginning in 2007-2008.
Figure 1: CountryLink Annual Patronage (1994-2010)
Source: RailCorp Annual Reports
1
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 2012, Franchising Passenger Rail Services in NSW: Options for Reform
2
CountryLink’s decline in patronage levels can be linked to the declining reliability and relatively slow
speed of the service provided. CountryLink aims to have 78 per cent of services arrive at their
destinations within 10 minutes of the scheduled time; this on-time running target has not been
reached since the 1st of August 20112. Figure 2 demonstrates that in the first three months of 2012
CountryLink have consistently performed 18 per cent below the on-time running target of 78 per
cent. That means a regional rail customer using CountryLink in the first three months of this year had
only a six out of 10 chance of reaching their destination within 10 minutes of their scheduled arrival.
Figure 2: On-time Running for 2012
Source: CountryLink
CountryLink journey times are also uncompetitive when compared with road based transport and air
services. For example the CountryLink service from Sydney to Brisbane takes approximately 14.5
hours. In comparison the same journey takes approximately 11 hours by car and 90 minutes with a
domestic airline.
There are significant cost subsidies associated with the provision of CountryLink services, however
services currently offered by CountryLink are unable to compete with the speed, reliability and
comfort provided by personal vehicle or plane trips. It is clear reform is needed to ensure New South
Wales taxpayers receive value for their money and regional travellers receive a reliable and efficient
transport service.
3. COMPETITION BASED REFORMS
IPA acknowledges the decision of the Committee not to consider the privatisation of existing
government owned transport assets. However, in the context of the Inquiry’s first term of reference -
how CountryLink services can be improved - IPA believes that the committee must explore how
competition based reforms, not privatisation, could be used to improve the quality and efficiency of
regional transport service delivery in New South Wales. The introduction of competitive tension has
consistently been shown to improve the efficiency and accountability of service delivery. Yet, despite
consistent empirical evidence of the advantages of contestability, relatively few public services in
NSW have been subject to competitive reforms.
Franchising of the CountryLink network would enable the NSW Government to introduce ‘off track’
competition, which would create incentives for the rail operator to reduce costs and improve the
2
CountryLink 2012, On-time running statistics, available at: http://www.countrylink.info/service_status/on-
time_running/2011 [18 May 2012]
3
quality of service. Franchising should not be confused with privatisation. Under a franchised model,
operational delivery of train services would be handed over to a private sector franchisee for a time-
limited concession period after a competitive tendering process – meaning government has the
opportunity to bid-up service levels whilst bidding down the cost of subsidy by the taxpayer.
The New South Wales Government would retain ownership of trains, stations and rail infrastructure
– and control of routes, timetables and pricing. These controls would enable the Government to
safeguard against a reduction in the number of services provided to regional New South Wales, as
government, under the franchisee’s operating contract, would be able to mandate the routes and
timetables offered.
Under the existing CountryLink model, (where only 56.3% of train reached their on-time running
target in March of this year), customers have no recourse when the train runs late or even fails to
arrive. Under a correctly structured franchise model, operators can be incentivised to continually
improve services and value for money, but crucially, they would also face sanctions for poor
performance.
Continual improvement conditions can be added at the end of a contracted concession, meaning that
Government over time is able to monitor and regulate the quality of the service that is provided by
the private sector. Should a franchise fail to meet strict performance criteria during a contract,
government would be able to exercise mechanisms to assume control of the franchise and re-tender
the service.
Franchising also offer opportunities to upgrade and refresh the tired rolling stock currently servicing
the CountryLink network. By bundling rolling stock replacement with franchise contracts in
Melbourne and the United Kingdom, governments in those jurisdictions were able to benefit from
private sector procurement innovation – providing rail users with new and upgraded trains and
carriages.
IPA recently released a major report into reform options of rail services in New South Wales.
‘Franchising Passenger Rail Services in New South Wales: Options for Reform’, undertaken in
partnership with Aegis Consulting, identified clear opportunities to significantly improve the service
level and value for money of rail services in New South Wales through the introduction of
competitive reforms. The report looked to international experience of rail reform processes, finding
the CountryLink network “bears a range of similarities to interurban networks in Europe, North
America and Asia which have been subject to successful franchising for many years.”
The paper ultimately recommended that the NSW Government swiftly “commence steps toward an
immediate franchising project for operation and maintenance of the CountryLink network.”
The paper also found that where franchised rail services reached the end of their contracted
concession, far from taking services back into public sector delivery, government’s sought to broaden
and deepen franchising – recognising the effectiveness of the models deployed in increasing service
quality for customers and value for money for taxpayers.
A copy of IPA’s ‘Franchising Passenger Rail Services in New South Wales: Options for Reform’ report is
attached as a annexure to this submission for the Committee’s convenience – the report is also
available from www.infrastructure.org.au
4
Should you require further information, I invite you to contact our office on (02) 9240 2050 anytime.
Yours sincerely,
BRENDAN LYON
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
5
FRANCHISING PASSENGER
RAIL SERVICES IN NSW:
Options for Reform
Copyright © Aegis Consulting Australia and Infrastructure Partnerships Australia Disclaimer Infrastructure Partnerships Australia and Aegis Consulting Australia provide no warranties and make no representations in relation to the information provided in this paper. They accept no liability for reliance on the information in this paper by any person or organisation. Any person or organisation using the information in this paper does so at its own risk and agrees to indemnify Infrastructure Partnerships Australia and Aegis Consulting Australia for any loss or damage arising from such use. Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 8th Floor 8-10 Loftus Street Sydney NSW 2000 T 02 9240 2050 F 02 9240 2055 W www.infrastructure.org.au Aegis Consulting Australia Pty Ltd 74/104 Miller Street Pyrmont NSW 2009 T 02 9660 1706 F 02 9660 1759 W www.aegisconsulting.com.au For more information about this report contact: Brendan Lyon Chief Executive Officer Infrastructure Partnerships Australia T 02 9240 2050 E brendan.lyon@infrastructure.org.au Adrian Dwyer National Manager, Policy Infrastructure Partnerships Australia T 02 9240 2056 E adrian.dwyer@infrastructure.org.au Vishal Beri Managing Director Aegis Consulting Australia T 02 9660 1706 E vberi@aegisconsulting.com.au Cover: © Courtesy of RailCorp
© Courtesy of RailCorp. Photographer: Kaine Treleaven
Contents
INTRODUCTION 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7
RECOMMENDATIONS 11
1 PREVIOUS NSW RAIL REFORM 14
1.1 1995 National Competition Policy Reform 15
1.1.1 Background 15
1.1.2 Application of NCP to NSW Rail Sector 15
1.2 2000-2001 Response to Glenbrook Rail Accident and the 2003 Waterfall Rail Accident 16
1.2.1 Appointment of Coordinator General of Rail 16
1.2.2 Policy Responses by Government 17
1.2.3 Strategic Plan for Rail 17
1.3 2004 Creation of Railcorp and Clearways Programme 18
1.4 2008 Review of Capital and Clearways Programmes 18
1.5 2009 Re-Constitution of RailCorp 19
2 OPERATION OF PASSENGER RAIL IN NSW 20
2.1 Sydney’s Suburban Rail System 21
2.1.1 CityRail Services by Sector and Line 24
2.1.2 CityRail Rolling Stock 24
2.2 Patronage Demand for CityRail and CountryLink Services 26
2.2.1 Current Operating Capacity on CityRail Network 28
2.2.2 Patronage Growth Forecasts in Suburban Sectors 32
2.3 Operational Performance 33
2.4 Financial Performance 36
2.4.1 RailCorp Staff Resources 38
2.5 Constraints on Service Delivery 38
4
3 MODELS TO PROMOTE RAIL SERVICE COMPETITION 40
3.1 On Track Competition 41
3.1.1 Open Market or Open Access Model (On Track Competition) 41
3.2 Off Track Competition 41
3.2.1 Network Franchise Model 42
3.2.2 Sector Franchise Model 42
3.3 Application of Models Internationally 44
4 CASE STUDIES IN RAIL SERVICE COMPETITION 48
4.1 United Kingdom Experience with Open Access and Tendered Franchises 49
4.1.1 History 49
4.1.2 Overview of Open Access and Franchising Take Up 51
4.1.3 Regulatory Structure 52
4.1.4 Franchising Benefits, Costs and Lessons 54
4.2 Swedish Experience with Tendered and Network Concessions 57
4.2.1 History 57
4.2.2 Franchising Benefits, Costs and Lessons 60
4.3 Victorian Experience with Rail and Tram Franchising 61
4.3.1 History 61
4.3.2 Patronage Growth 65
4.3.3 Franchising Benefits, Costs and Lessons 66
5 COULD FRANCHISING WORK IN NSW? 68
5.1 Is Franchising an Answer to Policy Problems? 69
5.1.1 The Public Versus Private Debate 69
5.2 How (and why) would Franchising be Applied in NSW? 70
5.3 What are the Best Ways for Government to Consider Franchising? 72
5INTRODUCTION
About the authors Aegis Consulting Australia
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia Aegis Consulting is an independent advisor to
government, corporate and non-government
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (IPA) is organisations on:
the nation’s peak infrastructure organisation.
• Public Policy Evaluation & Design
Our membership comprises Australia’s most senior
business leaders and public sector executives from • Cost Benefit, Economic & Social
across the infrastructure sector. IPA is the only body Impact Assessments
that brings together the public and private sectors in
a spirit of partnership, to build Australia together. • Strategy
Infrastructure is the lifeblood of the national economy. • Government Relations
It is the key to how Australia does business, how we
compete in the global economy and how we sustain • Stakeholder & Indigenous Relations
the quality of life of a growing population.
Aegis specialises in preparing business cases and
IPA’s mission is to develop and articulate the best options to shape government policy, regulation and
public policy solutions needed to deliver the assets funding. Our consultants are subject matter experts on
and services that will secure Australia’s productivity a range of policy areas including rail and road transport,
and prosperity. IPA is committed to ensure that ports and freight, network and social infrastructure,
governments retain all procurement options for the competition and regulation, energy and utilities, health,
delivery of infrastructure. We believe that procurement environment and conservation, sustainability, tourism,
models must be selected case by case, with a guiding welfare management, community services and
principle of sustainably delivering better value, indigenous affairs.
better quality infrastructure.
Aegis was established in 2002 and has a team
of consultants in Brisbane, Cairns, Canberra,
London, Perth and Sydney.
Vishal Beri, Managing Director of Aegis
Consulting Australia, who has authored this report
with Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, has been
involved in competition reforms since 1996 as an
adviser within government and as a consultant.
6EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Passenger rail is the heavy lifter of the New South The low (and declining) productivity of New South
Wales transport network. Wales railways mean that every man, woman and child
in New South Wales contributed $345 in taxation to
Under current arrangements, passenger rail services the operation of passenger rail services in 2009/10
in New South Wales are delivered by RailCorp, a and services are delivered at about twice the cost
vertically integrated public sector monopoly provider of per passenger as in Victoria (see Figure 1).
urban, interurban and regional passenger rail services.
Every day, passenger rail in NSW carries over 830,000 The falling productivity of the New South Wales
passenger journeys across 2,110 kilometres of track; passenger rail system can be explained largely by low
on 1,685 individual train carriages. efficiency and changes in staffing levels and types.
Between 2005/06 and 2009/10 overall headcount
In the past several years, large taxpayer investments at RailCorp, including headquarters and ‘corporate’
and good network management have seen substantial staff, grew by over 47 per cent. Over the same period,
improvements in the operational performance of the patronage grew by just 11 per cent; and the number of
passenger rail network. However, the quality of rail front-line station staff actually declined by 22 per cent.
services – and the cost at which those services are
delivered – continues to point to a significant case for reform. In the context of an increasingly challenging budget
and the requirement to substantially increase capital
In 2005/06, RailCorp received a subsidy investment in new transport infrastructure, this paper
of $6.77 per passenger journey. By 2009/10, explores opportunities to deliver enhanced service
levels, new innovations and greater cost efficiency
this subsidy had surged to $8.33 for every through competition based reforms.
passenger journey on the network; requiring
an annual taxpayer subsidy of more than
$2.3 billion per annum.
FIGURE 1 Comparison cost per passenger
100
Cost per passenger indexed to CityRail
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
CityRail Melbourne Brisbane International
Trains Trains Median
Source: L.E.K Consulting, Cost Review of CityRail’s Regular Passenger Services, 2008
7Reform would provide for a significant increase in There is now a long track record of competition
accountability for efficient, high quality mass transit. reforms in passenger transport, both in other Australian
The use of franchise delivery models removes the and global jurisdictions. New South Wales has the
current inconsistency where the public sector acts opportunity to learn from these jurisdictions, capturing
as both the regulator and sole service provider. best practice and avoiding pitfalls, to drive superior
efficiency and quality on passenger rail services.
The current system means that when a train runs
late or services fail, the best the public can expect In making its recommendations, this paper explores
is an apology. three case studies of rail reform:
Under a franchise, Government has an 1. United Kingdom rail franchising;
enforceable contract with clear expectations
2. Swedish rail reform; and
and outcomes, with financial sanctions for
poor or part performance. 3. Victorian rail franchising.
It is this introduction of accountability, incentives and These case studies have seen different approaches
sanctions that could lead to dramatic improvements in to the structure and design of the transport services
performance and efficiency in the State’s rail network. in each jurisdiction. But these structures are united by
their fundamental outcome of driving contestability,
accountability and efficiency into the delivery of
passenger rail services.
© Courtesy of RailCorp
8There are two core models for introducing contestability This paper argues that the structure adopted in
into passenger rail services: any reform of passenger rail services will be a key
determinant of success.
1. On track competition
Therefore this paper, argues that the
This sees open access arrangements adopted, New South Wales Government should
with different operators competing on the same
network. On-market competition is used in form a Special Commission of Inquiry,
Australia’s freight rail network, with government to investigate the application and ideal
regulating access and operating rail track through structure for the reform of passenger
the Australia Rail Track Corporation.
rail services in New South Wales.
However, it is unlikely that open access
arrangements would prove suitable in the context However, experience in New South Wales and
of New South Wales passenger rail services, due elsewhere has shown that inquiries alone often do
to the requirement for government to ensure regular not create sufficient public awareness or momentum
services throughout the day, including many that are toward meaningful reform.
sub economic. Therefore this paper will not consider
on-market competition models further. This paper therefore argues that ‘Sector One’ of the
network, the Eastern Suburbs Railway and Illawarra
2. Off track competition lines, should be immediately put to market on a short
term franchise agreement. Tendering Sector One
This model sees a private operator granted an services would provide a valuable ‘demonstration’
exclusive franchise to operate all services on a franchise of services in metropolitan Sydney, to
network – or a section of a network - for a defined inform the Commission of Inquiry.
period of time on behalf of government. Bidders
compete based on their ability to deliver the highest The CountryLink network could also provide a discrete
quality of public transport service, at the least cost franchising opportunity. The network bears similarities
to taxpayers. to European, North American and Asian interurban
networks that have benefited from franchising for many
Each of the models explored in this paper sees the years. Again, experiences on the CountryLink network
public sector retain full ownership of the rail network, would inform the Commission of Inquiry and build
stations and rolling stock. Indeed, fare prices, safety, knowledge should a wider franchising option
timetabling and scheduling, performance monitoring be pursued.
and other regulatory functions would continue to be
controlled by the public sector. Rather, it is the operation The experience of reform on Sydney’s ferry network
and maintenance of the passenger rail network that has also shown a much higher degree of public support
would be the subject of a new, contestable and when there is an operating example of better, more cost
competitive model of service delivery, which would efficient private services supporting the case for reform.
see the private sector compete down the cost and
bid up the quality of service under the reform models Decisions about the future shape and operational
explored in this paper. Those models can also bring a strategy on the New South Wales rail network should
renewed customer services focus to the operation not be delayed. Major capital investments, such as the
of the State's rail system. North West Rail Link, need to be considered within the
context of a long term operational strategy. That is not
In considering franchise models in Sydney, the to say, however, that these decisions should be rushed.
metropolitan passenger rail network could be structured Rather, a Special Commission of Inquiry and short term
to support either a single whole of network operator franchising of Sector One and the CountryLink network,
franchise, or alternatively, the network could be should be pursued in the short term to inform long-run
separated into several different concessions, decisions about the future strategy to drive down costs
supporting several alternative operators. and increase service quality.
9The success of franchising in other jurisdictions is clear, franchising unprofitable lines has reduced operating
though it is also evident that franchising has come costs on those routes by between 20 and 30 per cent.
with costs and hard lessons have been learned. The The broader network has benefitted from related
United Kingdom has experienced improvements in innovations in rolling stock provision, management,
service quality, customer satisfaction, on time running services and ticketing.
and the volume of services offered. It has also seen
considerable investment in new rolling stock and better The case studies in this paper point to both the
infrastructure. Franchising in the United Kingdom has successes and the lessons learned from franchising in
also driven innovation – customers can now routinely Australia and Europe. New South Wales is therefore in
access enhanced services including WiFi, power points, a strong position to learn from these experiences and
priority and reserved seating, boosted mobile phone provide an improved reform process with appropriate
signals, quiet zones, e-ticketing and customer lounges. risk sharing and enhanced accountability.
The Victorian experience, too, should be widely Competitive franchising of public transport is not
viewed as a success. Broadly modelled on the United a silver bullet. It still requires substantial taxpayer
Kingdom franchising template, Victoria’s reforms have investment and many of the challenges that present
delivered improvements in performance and significant under a traditional public monopoly model of delivery
investments in new and refurbished rolling stock. still remain. However, franchising has much to offer in
Like the United Kingdom, lessons have been learned terms of increased accountability, efficiency and quality.
through the three evolutions of franchising in Victoria,
with each evolution providing improved links between In the context of increasing network
infrastructure investment and demand. costs, declining productivity and service
Rail reform in Sweden differs in pace and style from quality shortfalls, franchising of passenger
the other case studies in this paper, but provides a rail services in New South Wales has much
strong example of how the introduction of competitive to offer in taking that State’s rail network
tension can drive improved service delivery. Placing
the public monopoly on a commercial footing and
into the 21st century.
10Recommendations
It is recommended that the 3. Commence steps toward an immediate
franchising project for operation and
NSW Government: maintenance of the CountryLink network.
1. Undertake a Special Commission of Inquiry
on improving quality and efficiency on the The CountryLink network also provides a discrete
passenger rail network, including a detailed system that is an early candidate for franchising.
investigation of the potential to franchise part It bears a range of similarities to interurban networks
or all of the NSW passenger rail system to in Europe, North America and Asia which have been
the private sector. subject to successful franchising for many years.
The performance of the CountryLink demonstration
The guiding objective of the Inquiry should be to project would inform the findings of the Inquiry
identify options to achieve increased rail customer and allow the public to consider the benefits of
satisfaction, at better value to government. The wider reform.
Commission of Inquiry should be led by a suitably
qualified individual or team of experts, and be able The Government should immediately commence
to draw on sufficient resources to fully examine the preparation and market soundings for the operation
necessary issues. The Commission of Inquiry should and maintenance of the CountryLink network, in
also investigate the governance and regulatory advance of any wider application that might be
framework that would need to be applied to recommended by the Special Commission
improve the quality and efficiency of the passenger of Inquiry.
rail network - including safety and contract
management. Consultation with, and submissions 4. Articulate the principles that will underpin
from, government agencies, industry, business, effective franchising and better quality and
unions, the community and regulators should be value rail services. These principles should
sought to ensure consideration of the full spectrum form the basis of the terms of reference of the
of issues and opportunities. Commission of Inquiry. Based on this report’s
examination of other franchising models,
2. Commence steps toward an immediate these principles should include:
demonstration project for rail franchising
on Sydney’s Sector One. • All existing rail assets, including below rail and above
rail infrastructure and rolling stock should remain
The Government should immediately commence in full public ownership and be provided to and
preparation and market soundings for a limited managed by the franchisee;
demonstration franchise of services on Sector One
(the Eastern Suburbs Illawarra line) timed to coincide • Passenger fares should continue to be regulated by
with the Special Commission of Inquiry findings, Government on a whole of network basis;
(see Figure 2). A short-term demonstration will leave
options open for either a whole of network franchise • Government should specify the standard operating
or sector franchise in the future. timetable, clearly specifying the minimum services
that are to be provided;
In our analysis, we have identified Sector One as the
most suitable for a demonstration project, because • Government should retain responsibility for network
this sector is already operationally separate from planning. Network planning should be informed
the wider CityRail network. The performance of the by an operating plan, demand analysis, customer
metropolitan demonstration project would inform requirements, economic analysis, engineering
the findings of the Inquiry and allow the public to analysis and risk assessment;
consider the benefits of wider reform.
• Rail maintenance should be bundled with passenger
service contracts, with franchisees to bid for public
funding for these projects. This would create
incentives for the operator to plan for and undertake
maintenance across the network;
• The franchise contract should run for a period of
between eight and ten years, with an option for a
further term at the end of the initial term; and
11• Franchise contracts should be clear and simple, with 5. Consider whether the NSW Government, as the
measurable objectives that provide for continuous infrastructure owner, should assume risk in the
improvement in the delivery of services. To ensure rail network and simplify the network to improve
this, contracts should: operating efficiency.
> Explicitly identify any government funded While franchising offers opportunities to attract
Community Service Obligations that the private sector innovation, investment and efficiency
franchisee is expected to deliver. into the rail network, government should at an
early stage determine its own investment levels.
> Include relevant, measurable and achievable Government or private investment would need to
performance indicators that: be linked to network planning to have the optimal
impact on operating efficiency.
– are linked to customer requirements;
– can be benchmarked;
– can be independently verified;
– support trend analysis; and
– form the basis of payments or penalties
to the franchisee.
FIGURE 2 Recommended pathway to franchising NSW passenger rail
Inform Investigate Action
(3 months) (1-2 years) (2-4 years)
Passenger Rail Franchising
Demonstration Project
Explain rationale
Hold Public Inquiry Act on Inquiry
for consideration
into franchising Recommendations
of franchising
Source: AEGIS Consulting and IPA
1213 © Courtesy of RailCorp
RAIL REFORM
14
PREVIOUS NSW
© Courtesy of RailCorp. Photographer: Bob Peters1 Previous NSW Rail Reform
Before 1996, the New South Wales rail system was 1.1.2 Application of NCP to
operated by a single, vertically integrated government
monopoly, the State Rail Authority (SRA). The SRA
NSW Rail Sector
owned all above and below rail infrastructure and The New South Wales Government moved in 1996
was the monopoly provider of freight and passenger to reform the structure of the New South Wales rail
services, all maintenance and all infrastructure system, in response to the National Competition Policy.
functions. This saw the vertically integrated State Rail Authority
structurally separated into four primary functions:
During the late 1990s, the State Rail Authority was
disaggregated, in line with the National Competition • State Rail Authority (SRA) to provide passenger
Policy, but has since come full circle. rail services and procure and operate rolling stock.
The SRA reported to the Minister for Transport, but
In 2004, RailCorp was re-aggregated as the monopoly uniquely for a state authority, the Authority’s Board
public sector rail corporation; and in 2009 it was could review Ministerial directions that were not in
reconstituted as a statutory authority, mirroring its its commercial interests. This review capacity was a
predecessor, the SRA. type of ‘shadow corporatisation’ and was intended
to enable the SRA to operate as commercially as
possible, within the constraints of public ownership.
The SRA also had responsibility for procuring and
1.1 1995 National Competition operating rolling stock.
Policy Reform • Rail Access Corporation (RAC) to own and
manage rail infrastructure, such as rail track,
1.1.1 Background stations, signals, communications and related
network functions. The RAC was created as a
In the early 1990s, Australia’s governments embarked corporation under the State Owned Corporations
on an exciting period of competition policy reform. (SOC) Act 1989 (NSW) meaning the RAC was not
These reforms were spurred by the increasing directly responsible to the Minister for Transport.
exposure of Australia’s economy to global competition, The Minister could direct RAC, but only with the
with a resulting need to increase the efficiency of consent of the Shareholder Ministers. As a result
infrastructure services. the RAC was guided first and foremost by the
priorities of NSW Treasury to extract reliable
Following a series of Special Premiers’ Conferences, dividends from government corporations.
a committee led by academic and businessman Fred
Hilmer was commissioned to undertake a major report • Rail Services Australia (RSA) to provide
to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) maintenance and related goods and services to
on a reform pathway for public monopolies. In 1993, the rail industry, including SRA and RAC. RSA
Hilmer’s committee produced its report, the National was created as a State Owned Corporation similar
Competition Policy. It recommended a raft of reforms to RAC. Although RSA was created with the
to public monopolies, including rail. responsibility of maintaining the NSW rail system
to safe and reliable standards, it was intended that
The underpinning principal of the National Competition over time, bundles of maintenance work would be
Policy was the need to reform the structure and contestable to encourage competitive tendering by
function of public monopolies to promote competitive both the RSA and the private sector. The RSA was
markets for infrastructure services. A key principal was also able to compete for maintenance contracts
the separation of natural monopoly infrastructure from in other Australian and international jurisdictions.
contestable service delivery and maintenance functions. The RSA’s participation in other markets was
encouraged by the need for it to deliver dividends
to the NSW Treasury.
• FreightCorp to provide safe, reliable and efficient
rail freight services. FreightCorp was created as
a State Owned Corporation. In 2002, the NSW
Government privatised FreightCorp in concert
with the Federal Government’s privatisation of the
National Rail Corporation, which formed the private
freight operator, Pacific National.
15In conjunction with these structural changes, the NSW 1.2.1 Appointment of Coordinator
Government developed an access regime to govern
third party passenger and freight rail providers access
General of Rail
to the State’s rail network. The NSW Rail Access In addition to the Special Commission of Inquiry, the
Regime covered above and below rail activities and NSW Government moved to immediately address
set benchmarks for access pricing. Third party access structural and management problems that contributed
arrangements were negotiated and managed by RAC to poor rail safety and service reliability. Accordingly,
and overseen by the NSW Independent Pricing and whilst the Commission of Inquiry was carrying out
Regulatory Tribunal (IPART). its investigation, in June 2000 the NSW Minister for
Transport appointed a Co-ordinator General of Rail to:
• Manage and co-ordinate the functions of the
1.2 2000-2001 Response to RAC, RSA and SRA; and
Glenbrook Rail Accident • Review the effectiveness of the existing
arrangements within the RAC, SRA and RSA.
and the 2003 Waterfall
In September 2000 the Coordinator General of Rail
Rail Accident reported a range of findings that were echoed in
subsequent reports by the Commission of Inquiry.
The December 1999 Glenbrook rail accident saw The Coordinator General’s report found overall rail
a fatal collision between an interurban and an system performance was poor because:
interstate passenger train. The accident resulted in
the appointment of a Special Commission of Inquiry • Significant growth in passenger demand had
to investigate the causes of the accident and six other placed the rail system under increased pressure;
incidents on the rail system. The Commission of Inquiry
released a series of interim reports, with the final report • Ongoing rail infrastructure maintenance spending
released in April 2001. and management by RAC and RSA had not
been adequate;
The report found that the rail accident was
caused by failures in a number of areas including • There were inferior performance standards for the
training, operational procedures, infrastructure rail industry in relation to safety and reliability and
management and maintenance. The Commission performance management systems within and
made recommendations about the restructuring of between RAC, RSA and SRA;
the rail system and new regulations to improve safety,
reliability and performance. Key recommendations • The contractual arrangements between RAC,
of the Inquiry included: RSA and SRA did not adequately identify and
create proper obligations and accountabilities;
• The RAC and RSA should be merged into a single
organisation that owns and controls infrastructure • There was poor co-ordination between RAC,
access and maintenance; RSA and SRA in relation to asset management,
network control and service delivery;
• An Office of Co-ordinator General of Rail should be
formally established to oversee the merger of RAC • Regulatory arrangements did not impose enough
and RSA and related issues; discipline on RAC, RSA and SRA, particularly
because RAC and RSA were not subject to the
• An Office of Rail Regulator should be established control of the Minister for Transport; and
to manage and enforce rail safety and related
legislation; and • There was an absence of long term strategic
planning by RAC, RSA and SRA in relation to capital
• The control and management of timetabling, and maintenance projects required to enhance rail
train movements and network control should be network performance to meet passenger growth.
transferred from RAC to the CityRail network area
within the SRA. In addition to maintenance and capital projects, the
Coordinator General of Rail recommended a range of
short, medium and long term structural and regulatory
changes to address these problems.
16In late January 2003 a train travelling from Sydney were essential to improve the safety and reliability
to Port Kembla derailed at high speed on a curved of the rail system.
section of track shortly after leaving the Waterfall
Station with the loss of seven lives and injuries to over • Vesting control and management of timetabling,
40 passengers1. The ‘Special Commission of Inquiry train movements and network control in the SRA.
into the Waterfall Rail Accident’ found the driver, while
incapacitated following a heart attack, engaged a
‘deadman’ emergency brake foot pedal, allowing the 1.2.3 Strategic Plan for Rail
four car Tangara train to accelerate to approximately
In June 2001 the Co-ordinator General of Rail, Ron
117 kilometres per hour on a curved section of track
Christie, delivered the Long-term Strategic Plan for Rail:
limited to 60 kilometres per hour.
Greater Sydney Metropolitan Region 3. The plan, known
as the Christie Report, considered the SRA to be sole
The ‘Special Commission of Inquiry into the
operator of suburban and intercity passenger services
Waterfall Rail Accident’ identified a series of failings
in the metropolitan region; and recognised that the SRA
in the SRA safety management systems and rolling
now had legal responsibility for timetabling and control
stock design and procurement. The report also
of passenger and freight movements in the greater
identified a number of cultural impediments to safe
Sydney metropolitan area.
operation of the rail network.
Accordingly, the plan recommended that the SRA take a
After the release of the ‘Special Commission of Inquiry proactive role in rail planning to ensure that RIC’s capital
into the Waterfall Rail Accident’ report two senior and maintenance project activities were based on
staff from the SRA (which had subsequently become SRA’s service needs. The plan also recommended that
RailCorp – see Section 1.3) had their employment the Government share long term planning objectives
terminated without benefits2. The subsequent absolute with the private sector, so that the private sector could
risk aversion and highly prescriptive approach to dedicate resources to developing proposals and ideas
procurement within RailCorp has been attributed that were best suited to deliver those objectives.
to the reaction to the Waterfall rail accident.
Key infrastructure concepts in the plan included
the need to:
1.2.2 Policy Responses by Government
• Consider metro style and other non-traditional
The NSW Government responded to the
approaches to rail service delivery;
recommendations of the Commission and the
Co-ordinator General of Rail by introducing a range
• Identify and secure transport corridors for future
of structural and regulatory changes including:
transport network augmentation, whether for
• Merging RAC and RSA into the Rail Infrastructure suburban rail or for other modes including roads,
Corporation (RIC). The RIC was created as a State buses and light rail – with ease of intermodal and
Owned Corporation with primary responsibility to inter-rail interchange a key consideration; and
the Shareholder Ministers. However, the Minister
of Transport had new powers to direct RIC. • Separate the rail system into sectors that could
operate individually from each other. This was
• Formally creating the Office of Co-ordinator General seen as necessary to reduce the system wide
of Rail and Office of Rail Regulator to oversee the impacts of service interruptions. In conjunction with
creation of RIC and manage structural and regulatory sectorisation, the plan recommended a range of
changes for a transitional period after which its infrastructure enhancements to improve reliability
powers would be transferred to the Rail Regulator. and safety within sectors, including line duplications,
passing loops, turn-backs and improved signalling
• Introducing new rail safety legislation and creating and communications.
a Rail Safety Inspectorate.
Some of these concepts, and projects to achieve
• Committing $1.2 billion over 4 years to above them, were included in the NSW Government’s 2003
and below rail capital and maintenance projects that Long Term Strategic Plan for Rail.
1 Special Commission of Inquiry into the Waterfall Rail Accident,Final Report, Volume 1, January 2005.
2 "Sacked Waterfall disaster boss Arthur Smith rehired” Joe Hildebrand, The Daily Telegraph May 20, 2008.
3 Office of the Co-ordinator General for Rail, Long-term Strategic Plan for Rail: Greater Sydney Metropolitan Region, June 2001.
171.3 2004 Creation of RailCorp 1.4 2008 Review of Capital and
and Clearways Programme Clearways Programmes
The NSW Government regarded the separation of RIC In 2008, the now defunct Office of the Co-ordinator
from the SRA as a continuing risk to the provision of General in the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet
reliable, safe services and infrastructure management. was asked to lead a whole of government review of
In response the Government merged RIC and the SRA the causes and impacts of delays in the delivery of rail
to create RailCorp in January 2004. This structure has capital programmes, including Clearways.
been maintained since then.
The review found that delays were caused by a range
The Government also developed the Clearways of factors including:
programme. Clearways involves separating the rail
system into distinct, standalone sectors that could • Skill shortages in critical resource areas in RailCorp;
operate independently, reducing the network wide
impacts of failures within individual sectors. • Changes and increases to the scope of
Clearways projects;
The Clearways programme involved 15
projects which were designed to achieve three
• Management and collaboration issues between
rail agencies;
separate sectors on the rail network.
• Competition for scarce resources with external
The Independent Transport Safety Regulator (ITSR) programs (such as Automatic Train Protection
was established in July 2004 as safety regulator for and RTA level crossings);
the State’s rail industry reporting directly to the Minister
for Transport4. The ITSR was established in response • The unprecedented levels of capital works
to findings from both the Glenbrook and Waterfall demand on the system and workforce; and
Special Commission of Inquiry that there were
insufficient regulatory resources in NSW to • Limited track possession time within an
properly regulate rail safety5. existing live rail operating environment.
The review recommended a series of solutions
to address these issues; these solutions have since
been implemented.
4 ITSR was renamed from the Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator (ITSRR) under the Transport Administration Amendment Bill 2010.
5 Transport for NSW: National Transport Reforms(http://www.transport.nsw.gov.au/national-transport-reforms - accessed 7/10/2011).
181.5 2009 Re-Constitution CRIA was established to assume the role and
functions previously undertaken by the RIC – with a
of RailCorp regional network covering 2,391 route kilometres of
operational passenger and freight rail lines and 3,134
In 2009 RailCorp was changed from a state owned route kilometres of non-operational lines6.
corporation to a statutory authority, similar to the
status of the State Rail Authority prior to 1996. As a Following the March 2011 State Election, the structure
result RailCorp now reports directly to the Minister was altered as the new NSW Government sought to
for Transport and Government, rather than to fully integrate transport planning. Individual transport
shareholding Ministers. agencies, including RailCorp, transferred planning and
strategic functions to the integrated transport agency,
In 2010, this structure was changed in line with a Transport for NSW. Transport line agencies, such as
whole of government reform, which saw RailCorp RailCorp, were freed up to focus purely on service
relocated to report through Transport NSW – one provision under the new structure. Under the changes
of several NSW Government ‘super agencies’. On 1 the Transport Construction Authority (TCA) – which has
July 2010 the Country Rail Infrastructure Authority responsibility for the Clearways programme and other
(CRIA) was constituted as a statutory corporation and major rail projects – was integrated into Transport for
as a NSW Government agency under the Transport NSW under the Transport Projects Division.
Administration Act 1988.
FIGURE 3 Rail in NSW has been disaggregated and re-aggregated over the last 15 years
2011 1996
2010
RailCorp is Pre 1996
monopoly provider SRA is monopoly
Clearways due for provider
completion in 2011
Vertically integrated rail providers
2004 1996-2000
RIC and StateRail SRA separated into RAC,
merged into Railcorp RSA and StateRail in
Clearways introduced to response to national
segregate rail lines 2001-2004 completition policy
RAC and RSA
merged into RIC
Seminal reports on long
term infrastructure
need and rail line
segregation
Source: AEGIS/IPA
6 CRIA is the NSW Government agency which owns the non-metropolitan rail networks in New South Wales, comprising: the Country Regional Network
(CRN), owned by CRIA and managed by the Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC); and the Leased Network (NSW Interstate and Hunter Valley
Networks), owned by CRIA and leased to and managed by ARTC. At the time of writing CRIA maintenance was being taken over from ARTC by a private
sector provider under a 10 year deal.
19OPERATION
OF PASSENGER
RAIL IN NSW
© Simon Freeman 2011
202 Operation of Passenger Rail in NSW
Under current arrangements, RailCorp is the and Strathfield. There is also overlap in the use of train
monopoly passenger rail provider in New South sets, which may travel between sectors. The majority
Wales. It operates 2,110 kilometres of track, with 830 of system intersections exist between Sectors Two and
kilometres in metropolitan areas and 1280 kilometres Three which have significant overlaps at key junction
in non-metropolitan areas, serving over 300 stations points and overlapping operations.
with 1,685 rail cars and nearly 15,000 staff, carrying in
excess of 300 million passengers a year7. Metropolitan Only Sector One, comprising of the Eastern
and interurban services are provided by CityRail, with Suburbs and Illawarra line, could be regarded as
non-metropolitan services provided by CountryLink. operating separately from the rest of the network.
Sector One enjoys minimal intersection, separate
infrastructure in terms of signalling, rolling stock and
other requirements – and a dedicated path through
2.1 Sydney’s Suburban the CBD, with dedicated platforms.
Rail System The three rail service sectors are illustrated in
Figure 4, together with planned and proposed
The suburban rail system is divided and operated in short and medium term expansions in the North West,
three sectors. In spite of the Clearways programme, South West and the Western Express/City Relief Line.
there remains significant overlap between these sectors Figure 5 shows the broader Sydney region rail and tram
at key system intersections where trains approach network including the South West Rail Link (under
the central business district and city circle. These key construction), North West Rail Link (planned) and
junctions include Sydenham, Redfern, North Sydney CDB Relief Line (proposed).
© Courtesy of RailCorp. All rights reserved. Photographer: Phil Carrick
7 RailCorp Annual Report 2009-10 and CityRail – A Compendium of CityRail Travel Statistics, Seventh Edition, June 2010.
21FIGURE 4 Sydney Rail System Showing Operating Sectors
To Central Coast
& Newcastle
CityRail Operating Sectors
Sector 1
Sector 2
Berowra
Sector 3
Hornsby
Richmond
North West rail link
Rouse Hill under construction
Epping Chatswood
To Blue Moutains
ith
nr
Pe
Blacktown
Wynyard
Town
Hall
Olympic Central Bondi
Park Junction
Redfern
Merrylands
ille
nv
ra
G
rn
bu
ld
n
d
d
w
oo
el
be
fie
Au
hfi
to
rw
om
th
ew
As
ra
Bu
Green Square
dc
St
N
Li
Fairfield
Cabramatta Sydenham
n
ie
ow
ps
m
st
Ca
nk
Liverpool Domestic
Ba
International
Leppington Wolli Creek
Glenfield
South West rail link
ve
y
sb
under construction
ro
ve
sg
Re
ng
Kogarah
Ki
Macquarie Fields
lla
nu
o
Cr
Sutherland
Campbelltown
Waterfall
To South Coast To South Coast
Source: AEGIS
TABLE 1 Suburban Rail System
Sector Rail Lines/Services Key Intersection Points with Other Sectors and Lines
1 • Illawarra suburban
• Redfern
• Eastern suburbs railway (Bondi Junction – Waterfall/Cronulla)
2 • South line (Circular Quay – Macarthur/Bankstown/Liverpool
• Strathfield and Sydenham
including Cumberland, Carlingford and Olympic Park)
3 • West/North and North Shore lines (Central – Emu Plains/
• Strathfield and North Sydney
Richmond/Berowra)
Source: AEGIS
22FIGURE 5 Standardised 2011 Map Source: Prepared for Infrastructure Partnerships Australia by The Tipping Point Institute, 2011
y)
Greater Metropolitan
s it
r
ve
ni
Th r d et
ah U
M son ek
d
at k (
an
fo re
ra a
da ba
e
M t
a l lla
la bb
s t ee
te Cr
et St
o
ig n d
ct itl
r r ld
re n
ar e
H rob
ir r g
W bro
W gu
Sa am
W gat
Ea Str
Be to
Ta fie
Te ari
a
M r ia
M le
Pa ins
go
h
a
Train Network in 2021
n
tl
la
a
s
a
r
d
o
h
o
t
nd
h
or
un
ai
ar
ar
in
ex
ill
W
M
Vi
D
H
H
Diesel
nd ek
service
le Cre
or n
ra l
e
Bo fer
Te agu
Lochinvar
al
Hunter Newcastle
Co ba
le
i
l
ck
ss
Fa
Including West Express, North-West Express,
G
Greta Awaba
Liverpool Express & SWRL with the City Relief Line,
K ff
Br m ra
ea n
am w
ic n
am
ca ic
le
Dora Creek
be e
en
ng k
Br on
on
dm ow
W lto
ew Civ
i
o
H do
on
da ota
st
rd
us rde
ro
kh
t
xt
le
Ca
oa st
i
Sc
an
lb
Morisset
el
Si
but before a Second Harbour Crossing
A
w
Blackalls
N
A
Wyee
Park
M
North Warnervale
Warnervale Toronto
Advance booking
Bathurst Wyong
required for travel Kelso
on this bus service Tuggerah
Raglan Ourimbah
Peak Peak
Yetholme Lisarow hours hours
only only
Central Meadow Flat Niagara Park
Tablelands Mount Lambie Narara Central
Wallerawang Coast
ne er
iv
Lithgow
da y R
Gosford
on ur
by
Zig Zag Point Clare
W esb
an
k
Tascott
aw
w
Bell
Co
d
H
Koolewong
on
d
Mount Victoria
on
m
m
Woy Woy
ch
ch
Blackheath
Ri
Ri
Berowra
n
st
Medlow Bath Hornsby Hawkesbury River
do
Ea
Mount Kuring-gai
en
Katoomba Mount Colah
ar
Normanhurst
or
Cl
Asquith
ds
Blue Leura
in
e
av
Thornleigh
W
Mountains Waitara
gr
Wentworth Falls
ul
Wahroonga
d
e
M
riv
ar
Bullaburra Pennant Hills
ey
Warrawee
D
ad
e
on
n
y
Ro
Vi
le
Turramurra
st
Lawson
Ri
k
ds
Beecroft
r
g
e
oo
ve
Pymble
on
tr
a
ill
ill
el
lle
th
br
Ri
en
t
H
H
Hazelbrook
fi
eg
es
Gordon
an
vi
ry
ho
sC
e
le
Cheltenham
w
dg
lly
us
er
m
st
ity e
ie
or
Killara
ill
Sc
rs ri
Woodford
Cu
Ro
Ke
Ch
Ca
ar
Sa
N
H
ve ua
ng
rk u
Lindfield
ni q
q
pi
North
U ac
Pa ac
Linden Roseville
Ep
M
M
NWRL Ryde
Falconbridge Extension
Chatswood
Springwood Quakers Hill Artarmon
Carlingford St Leonards
Valley Heights
Warrimoo Marayong Telopea
Blaxland Wollstonecraft Victoria Cross Sydney Harbour
Eastwood 2nd Harbour Crossing
Glenbrook Dundas Sydney Metropolitan Area
Lapstone Blacktown Waverton
Denistone
North Sydney Circular Quay
Rydalmere
West Ryde Milsons Point
P ins
sw h
d
rin S
M M n
D s
ot itt
oo ill
e
er UW
nt ry
id
oo
St gto
ng it
D yH
Ro ru
John St
Ki enr
ns
a
ou a
ss
Pl
Seven Hills Meadowbank Square
ro
iff
u
Parramatta River
on
sC
Em
nc di
Fish Market
cl
W
ge
Toongabbie
ti
ng
Ju on
Star City
Rhodes Wentworth Park Wynyard
Ed
Ki
B
Camellia Glebe Pyrmont Bay
Pendle Hill Convention
Jubilee Park
Wentworthville Concord West Rozelle Bay Exhibition Centre Town Martin
Hall
Key to Lines & Symbols Westmead North Strathfield
Lilyfield Paddy’s Markets
Capitol Square
Place
St James
Rosehill Leichhardt North
Parramatta Hawthorne Park
Sydney Suburban Train Lines Olympic Park
Harris Park Street
Marion
Eastern Suburbs & Illawarra Line Direct services operate Redfern
during special events only Taverners Hill
Waterfall or Cronulla to Bondi Junction
City
Liverpool via Bankstown Line Merrylands Circle
Liverpool to Museum via Sydenham
e
ill
Liverpool Express Peak Hours Only Guildford Central Museum
nv
e
Liverpool to Museum via Sydenham
ra
yd
G
Cl
n
on
Lidcombe via Bankstown Line Yennora
ur
be
h
rw ld
n
Cr od
Su sh n
m ld
is ll
Pe ham
an m
ac ew re
ld n
gt
us
ub
Lidcombe to Town Hall via Sydenham
w
w Hi
A o
na ow
Bu fie
om
m fie
St ha
M N mo
in
d
o
eb
to
A
oy
Le r
em
rs
do t
th
e
Green Square
m
dc
Inner West Line
te
Erskineville
ra
Fl
o
Li
Homebush to Museum via Strathfield
Pa iley l H
St
Se te ld
ll
Berala Waratah Mills St Peters
es fie
on i
w
ft r H
Cumberland Line
ig d
ba
lla r
W o
e
Ch ton
Le oo
Vi ma
Fairfield Arlington
or
hb
Campbelltown to Blacktown via Liverpool
m
w
lm
h
a
ke
nc
Regents Park
rk
rr
Dulwich Grove Mascot
Be
Station access
La
Pu
Ca
Airport Line
Revesby to Town Hall via Airport Canley Vale fee applies at
these stations
Macarthur & SWRL to CBD Relief Line Sydenham
Macarthur & SWRL to CBD via Sydenham Cabramatta
g
n
a
ie
ry
rk
ill
e
Warwick Farm
a ron
ow
Future Extensions
on
ill
bu
Domestic Airport
ps
Pa
H
kv
go
South West Rail Link Extension to Bringelly
st
h
r
m
er
y
e
ric
Liverpool
Bi
ic
th
on
nk
Ya
North West Rail Link Extension to Richmond Tempe
nt
Ca
s
w
ar
or
ill
Ca
lst
CBD Rail Link 2nd Harbour Crossing Extension
Ba
ni
ul
M
k
H
sw
Casula
ur
ee
na
D
st
So lly
e
South Line
ol
H
Cr
or
Ea
Pa
H
International Airport
ge
Leppington to Museum via Granville
m
h
ut
ss
in
Ro
Wolli Creek
Br
North Shore, Western & Richmond Line
Emu Plains or Richmond to Berowra
via Granville,CBD & Chatswood Glenfield Arncliffe
SWRL Stage 2
by
w
d
ee
s
ve
th
k
la
ill
ar
Extension
oo
Banksia
to
el
n
or
ro
Pa son
w
H
s
Western Express Line
lP
Ed gto
rr
ve
ds
rw
ar
N
sg
k
rly
Tu
Rockdale
el
r
d
Emu Plains to Central via Strathfield
Pa
N
Re
ey
ve
ng
on
ve
in
w
xl
Ri
Ki
rd
m
Kogarah
pp
Be
Be
Northern Line & NWRL
Ba
ds
Le
Northern Line & NWRL to Epping Carlton
el
Botany Bay
Fi
via Chatswood, Town Hall & Strathfield
Allawah
ie
ar
Peak Hours Only Hurstville
qu
rn
NWRL to Sydney Terminal via Strathfield
ac
bu
Penshurst
M
e
Georges River
gl
North West Express Peak Hours Only Mortdale
In
NWRL to CBD via Chatswood & North Sydney
to
Oatley
in
Peak Hours Only
M
e
ar
NWRL & Central Coast to North Shore
h
ow
Como
la
a
Leumeah
a
ee
gb
ul
nd
ea
lo
Carlingford Line Jannali
aw
rin
on
oo
ira
Some off-peak Southern Highlands
ym
Carlingford to Clyde via Rydalmere
rr
Ca
Cr
Sutherland
W
M
services terminate at Campbelltown
G
Ki
Olympic Park Sprint & Special Events Services Campbelltown
Direct services during special events only
Loftus
Engadine
Intercity Train Lines Macarthur Heathcote Port
Waterfall Hacking
Southern Highlands Line
Menangle Park
Goulburn to Central via East Hills Helensburgh
Diesel Menangle
South Coast Line service Otford
Bomaderry or Port Kembla to Central via Hurstville Stanwell Park
Douglas Park
Coalcliff South Pacific Ocean
Blue Mountains Line
Lithgow to Central via Strathfield Picton Scarborough
Wombarra
Newcastle & Central Coast Line Coledale
Newcastle to Central via Strathfield
Austinmer
Thirroul
Regional Train Lines Bulli
Woonona
Hunter Line
Scone or Dungog to Newcastle via Maitland
Thirlmere Tahmoor Bellambi
Corrimal
Rail Bus Services
Couridjah Towradgi
Bargo Fairy Meadow
South Coast to Southern Highlands Bus Buxton North Wollongong Illawarra
Bowral to Picton (Loop Line) Bus
Balmoral Wollongong
Bathurst to Lithgow Bus Yerrinbool Coniston
Toronto to Fassifern Bus Hill Top
Unanderra Lysaghts
Colo Vale Southern
Tram Line Kembla Grange Racecourse Cringila
Highlands Dapto
Dulwich Hill Line Port Kembla North
Central to Dulwich Hill via Lilyfield Albion Park
Port Kembla
Mittagong
Symbols
Burrawang Robertson Oak Flats Lake
Train Interchange Bowral Advance booking Dunmore (Shellharbour) Illawarra
Burradoo required for travel
Moss Vale on this bus service Minnamurra
Exeter
North
Bombo
Bundanoon
Penrose Kiama
Wingello Gerringong
Tallong Berry Diesel
Marulan
Goulburn 23 Bomaderry (Nowra)
service
Southern
Tablelands South
Coast
Copyright Netzplan October 2011You can also read
