Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance: Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
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Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance:
Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Mitigation in the United States—
Early, Targeted, Layered Use of Nonpharmaceutical Interventions
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Interim Pre-Pandemic Planning Guidance:
Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States—
Early, Targeted, Layered Use of Nonpharmaceutical Interventions
February 2007
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Contents
I Executive Summary ........................................................................ 07
II Introduction .................................................................................. 17
III Rationale for Proposed Nonpharmaceutical Interventions .......................... 23
IV Pre-pandemic Planning: the Pandemic Severity Index ............................. 31
V Use of Nonpharmaceutical Interventions by Severity Category ................... 35
VI Triggers for Initiating Use of Nonpharmaceutical Interventions ................... 41
VII Duration of Implementation of Nonpharmaceutical Interventions .......................... 45
VIII Critical Issues for the Use of Nonpharmaceutical Interventions ................... 47
IX Assessment of the Public on Feasibility of Implementation and Adherence ..... 49
X Planning to Minimize Consequences of Community Mitigation Strategy ....... 51
XI Testing and Exercising Community Mitigation Interventions ..................... 57
XII Research Needs ............................................................................. 59
XIII Conclusions ................................................................................. 63
XIV References ................................................................................... 65
XV Appendices .................................................................................. 71
Appendix 1. Glossary of Terms ........................................................... 71
Appendix 2. Interim Guidance Development Process..................................... 75
Appendix 3. WHO Phases of a Pandemic/U.S. Government Stages of a Pandemic ....... 77
Appendix 4. Pandemic Influenza Community Mitigation Interim
Planning Guide for Businesses and Other Employers ........................ 79
Appendix 5. Pandemic Influenza Community Mitigation Interim
Planning Guide for Childcare Programs ..................................... 83
Appendix 6. Pandemic Influenza Community Mitigation Interim
Planning Guide for Elementary and Secondary Schools ..................... 87
Appendix 7. Pandemic Influenza Community Mitigation Interim
Planning Guide for Colleges and Universities ............................... 93
Appendix 8. Pandemic Influenza Community Mitigation Interim
Planning Guide for Faith-based and Community Organizations ............. 99
Appendix 9. Pandemic Influenza Community Mitigation Interim Planning Guide ....... 105
for Individuals and Families
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I
Executive Summary
Purpose measures, and this interim guidance includes
initial discussion of a potential strategy for
This document provides interim planning combining the use of antiviral medications
guidance for State, territorial, tribal, and local with these interventions. This guidance will be
communities that focuses on several measures updated as new information becomes available
other than vaccination and drug treatment that that better defines the epidemiology of influenza
might be useful during an influenza pandemic transmission, the effectiveness of control
to reduce its harm. Communities, individuals measures, and the social, ethical, economic, and
and families, employers, schools, and other logistical costs of mitigation strategies. Over
organizations will be asked to plan for the use time, exercises at the local, State, regional, and
of these interventions to help limit the spread of Federal level will help define the feasibility of
a pandemic, prevent disease and death, lessen these recommendations and ways to overcome
the impact on the economy, and keep society barriers to successful implementation.
functioning. This interim guidance introduces
a Pandemic Severity Index to characterize The goals of the Federal Government’s response
the severity of a pandemic, provides planning to pandemic influenza are to limit the spread of a
recommendations for specific interventions pandemic; mitigate disease, suffering, and death;
that communities may use for a given level of and sustain infrastructure and lessen the impact
pandemic severity, and suggests when these on the economy and the functioning of society.
measures should be started and how long they Without mitigating interventions, even a less
should be used. The interim guidance will be severe pandemic would likely result in dramatic
updated when significant new information about increases in the number of hospitalizations
the usefulness and feasibility of these approaches and deaths. In addition, an unmitigated
emerges. severe pandemic would likely overwhelm
our nation’s critical healthcare services and
Introduction impose significant stress on our nation’s critical
infrastructure. This guidance introduces, for
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
the first time, a Pandemic Severity Index in
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
which the case fatality ratio (the proportion of
in collaboration with other Federal agencies and
deaths among clinically ill persons) serves as
partners in the public health, education, business,
the critical driver for categorizing the severity
healthcare, and private sectors, has developed
of a pandemic. The severity index is designed
this interim planning guidance on the use of
to enable better prediction of the impact of a
nonpharmaceutical interventions to mitigate
pandemic and to provide local decision-makers
an influenza pandemic. These measures may
with recommendations that are matched to the
serve as one component of a comprehensive
severity of future influenza pandemics.
community mitigation strategy that includes
both pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical
Community Mitigation Guidance
It is highly unlikely that the most effective tool influenza. Isolation may occur in the home or
for mitigating a pandemic (i.e., a well-matched healthcare setting, depending on the severity
pandemic strain vaccine) will be available of an individual’s illness and /or the current
when a pandemic begins. This means that we capacity of the healthcare infrastructure.
must be prepared to face the first wave of the
next pandemic without vaccine and potentially 2. Voluntary home quarantine of
without sufficient quantities of influenza antiviral members of households with confirmed or
medications. In addition, it is not known if probable influenza case(s) and consideration
influenza antiviral medications will be effective of combining this intervention with the
against a future pandemic strain. During a prophylactic use of antiviral medications,
pandemic, decisions about how to protect the providing sufficient quantities of effective
public before an effective vaccine is available medications exist and that a feasible means of
need to be based on scientific data, ethical distributing them is in place.
considerations, consideration of the public’s 3. Dismissal of students from school
perspective of the protective measures and (including public and private schools as well
their impact on society, and common sense. as colleges and universities) and school-based
Evidence to determine the best strategies for activities and closure of childcare programs,
protecting people during a pandemic is very coupled with protecting children and teenagers
limited. Retrospective data from past influenza through social distancing in the community
pandemics and the conclusions drawn from those to achieve reductions of out-of-school social
data need to be examined and analyzed within contacts and community mixing.
the context of modern society. Few of those
conclusions may be completely generalizable; 4. Use of social distancing measures
however, they can inform contemporary planning to reduce contact between adults in the
assumptions. When these assumptions are community and workplace, including, for
integrated into the current mathematical models, example, cancellation of large public gatherings
the limitations need to be recognized, as they and alteration of workplace environments
were in a recent Institute of Medicine report and schedules to decrease social density and
(Institute of Medicine. Modeling Community preserve a healthy workplace to the greatest
Containment for Pandemic Influenza. A extent possible without disrupting essential
Letter Report. Washington, DC.: The National services. Enable institution of workplace leave
Academies Press; 2006). policies that align incentives and facilitate
adherence with the nonpharmaceutical
The pandemic mitigation framework that is interventions (NPIs) outlined above.
proposed is based upon an early, targeted,
layered application of multiple partially All such community-based strategies should be
effective nonpharmaceutical measures. It is used in combination with individual infection
recommended that the measures be initiated control measures, such as hand washing and
early before explosive growth of the epidemic cough etiquette.
and, in the case of severe pandemics, that they
be maintained consistently during an epidemic Implementing these interventions in a timely
wave in a community. The pandemic mitigation and coordinated fashion will require advance
interventions described in this document include: planning. Communities must be prepared for the
cascading second- and third-order consequences
1. Isolation and treatment (as appropriate) of the interventions, such as increased
with influenza antiviral medications of all workplace absenteeism related to child-minding
persons with confirmed or probable pandemic responsibilities if schools dismiss students and
childcare programs close.
Community Mitigation Guidance
Decisions about what tools should be used health infrastructure by decreasing demand for
during a pandemic should be based on the medical services at the peak of the epidemic and
observed severity of the event, its impact on throughout the epidemic wave; by spreading the
specific subpopulations, the expected benefit aggregate demand over a longer time; and, to the
of the interventions, the feasibility of success extent possible, by reducing net demand through
in modern society, the direct and indirect costs, reduction in patient numbers and case severity.
and the consequences on critical infrastructure,
healthcare delivery, and society. The most No intervention short of mass vaccination of
controversial elements (e.g., prolonged dismissal the public will dramatically reduce transmission
of students from schools and closure of childcare when used in isolation. Mathematical modeling
programs) are not likely to be needed in less of pandemic influenza scenarios in the United
severe pandemics, but these steps may save lives States, however, suggests that pandemic
during severe pandemics. Just as communities mitigation strategies utilizing multiple NPIs
plan and prepare for mitigating the effect of may decrease transmission substantially and that
severe natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes), they even greater reductions may be achieved
should plan and prepare for mitigating the effect when such measures are combined with the
of a severe pandemic. targeted use of antiviral medications for
treatment and prophylaxis. Recent preliminary
Rationale for Proposed analyses of cities affected by the 1918 pandemic
Nonpharmaceutical Interventions show a highly significant association between the
early use of multiple NPIs and reductions in peak
The use of NPIs for mitigating a community- and overall death rates. The rational targeting
wide epidemic has three major goals: 1) delay and layering of interventions, especially if these
the exponential growth in incident cases and can be implemented before local epidemics
shift the epidemic curve to the right in order have demonstrated exponential growth, provide
to “buy time” for production and distribution hope that the effects of a severe pandemic can
of a well-matched pandemic strain vaccine, 2) be mitigated. It will be critical to target those at
decrease the epidemic peak, and 3) reduce the the nexus of transmission and to layer multiple
total number of incident cases, thus reducing interventions together to reduce transmission to
community morbidity and mortality. Ultimately, the greatest extent possible.
reducing the number of persons infected is a
primary goal of pandemic planning. NPIs may Pre-Pandemic Planning:
help reduce influenza transmission by reducing the Pandemic Severity Index
contact between sick and uninfected persons,
thereby reducing the number of infected persons. This guidance introduces, for the first time,
Reducing the number of persons infected will, a Pandemic Severity Index, which uses case
in turn, lessen the need for healthcare services fatality ratio as the critical driver for categorizing
and minimize the impact of a pandemic on the the severity of a pandemic (Figure A, abstracted
economy and society. The surge of need for and reprinted here from Figure 4 in the main
medical care that would occur following a poorly text). The index is designed to enable estimation
mitigated severe pandemic can be addressed of the severity of a pandemic on a population
only partially by increasing capacity within level to allow better forecasting of the impact of
hospitals and other care settings. Reshaping a pandemic and to enable recommendations to be
the demand for healthcare services by using made on the use of mitigation interventions that
NPIs is an important component of the overall are matched to the severity of future influenza
mitigation strategy. In practice, this means pandemics.
reducing the burdens on the medical and public
Community Mitigation Guidance
Future pandemics will be assigned to one of from schools and school-based activities and
five discrete categories of increasing severity closure of childcare programs, in combination
(Category 1 to Category 5). The Pandemic with means to reduce out-of-school social
Severity Index provides communities a tool contacts and community mixing for these
for scenario-based contingency planning to children, should encompass up to 12 weeks of
guide local pre-pandemic preparedness efforts. intervention in the most severe scenarios. This
Accordingly, communities facing the imminent approach to pre-pandemic planning will provide
arrival of pandemic disease will be able to use a baseline of readiness for community response.
the pandemic severity assessment to define which Recommendations for use of these measures
pandemic mitigation interventions are indicated for pandemics of lesser severity may include a
for implementation. subset of these same interventions and potentially
for shorter durations, as in the case of social
Use of Nonpharmaceutical distancing measures for children.
Interventions by Severity Category
Figure A. Pandemic Severity Index
This interim guidance proposes a
community mitigation strategy that matches
recommendations on planning for use of selected Case Projected
NPIs to categories of severity of an influenza Fatality Number of Deaths*
Ratio US Population, 2006
pandemic. These planning recommendations
are made on the basis of an assessment
of the possible benefit to be derived from
implementation of these measures weighed
against the cascading second- and third-order
consequences that may arise from their use.
Cascading second- and third-order consequences
are chains of effects that may arise because of the
intervention and may require additional planning
and intervention to mitigate. The term generally
≥ ≥
refers to foreseeable unintended consequences
of intervention. For example, dismissal of
students from school may lead to the second-
order effect of workplace absenteeism for child
minding. Subsequent workplace absenteeism
and loss of household income could be especially
problematic for individuals and families living
at or near subsistence levels. Workplace
absenteeism could also lead to disruption of the
delivery of goods and services essential to the
viability of the community.
For Category 4 or Category 5 pandemics, a
planning recommendation is made for use *Assumes 30% Illness Rate and Unmitigated
of all listed NPIs (Table A, abstracted and Pandemic Without Interventions
reprinted here from Table 2. in the main text).
In addition, planning for dismissal of students
10Community Mitigation Guidance
For Category 2 and Category 3 pandemics, for initiation of these interventions will be
planning for voluntary isolation of ill persons challenging because implementation needs to be
is recommended; however, other mitigation early enough to preclude the initial steep upslope
measures (e.g., voluntary quarantine of in case numbers and long enough to cover the
household members and social distancing peak of the anticipated epidemic curve while
measures for children and adults) should be avoiding intervention fatigue.
implemented only if local decision-makers
determine their use is warranted due to This guidance suggests that the primary
characteristics of the pandemic within their activation trigger for initiating interventions be
community. Pre-pandemic planning for the the arrival and transmission of pandemic virus.
use of mitigation strategies within these two This trigger is best defined by a laboratory-
Pandemic Severity Index categories should confirmed cluster of infection with a novel
be done with a focus on a duration of 4 weeks influenza virus and evidence of community
or less, distinct from the longer timeframe transmission (i.e., epidemiologically linked cases
recommended for the more severe Category from more than one household).
4 and Category 5 pandemics. For Category 1
pandemics, voluntary isolation of ill persons Defining the proper geospatial-temporal
is generally the only community-wide boundary for this cluster is complex and should
recommendation, although local communities recognize that our connectedness as communities
may choose to tailor their response to Category goes beyond spatial proximity and includes ease,
1-3 pandemics by applying NPIs on the speed, and volume of travel between geopolitical
basis of local epidemiologic parameters, risk jurisdictions (e.g., despite the physical distance,
assessment, availability of countermeasures, Hong Kong, London, and New York City may be
and consideration of local healthcare surge more epidemiologically linked to each other than
capacity. Thus, from a pre-pandemic planning they are to their proximate rural provinces/areas).
perspective for Category 1, 2, and 3 pandemics, In order to balance connectedness and optimal
capabilities for both assessing local public timing, it is proposed that the geopolitical trigger
health capacity and healthcare surge, delivering be defined as the cluster of cases occurring
countermeasures, and implementing these within a U.S. State or proximate epidemiological
measures in full and in combination should be region (e.g., a metropolitan area that spans more
assessed. than one State’s boundary). It is acknowledged
that this definition of “region” is open to
interpretation; however, it offers flexibility
Triggers for Initiating Use of
to State and local decision-makers while
Nonpharmaceutical Interventions underscoring the need for regional coordination
The timing of initiation of various NPIs will in pre-pandemic planning.
influence their effectiveness. Implementing
these measures prior to the pandemic may From a pre-pandemic planning perspective,
result in economic and social hardship without the steps between recognition of a pandemic
public health benefit and over time, may threat and the decision to activate a response are
result in “intervention fatigue” and erosion of critical to successful implementation. Thus, a
public adherence. Conversely, implementing key component is the development of scenario-
these interventions after extensive spread of specific contingency plans for pandemic
pandemic influenza illness in a community may response that identify key personnel, critical
limit the public health benefits of employing resources, and processes. To emphasize the
importance of this concept, the guidance section
these measures. Identifying the optimal time
on triggers introduces the terminology of Alert,
11Community Mitigation Guidance
Table A. Summary of the Community Mitigation Strategy by Pandemic Severity
¶
Generally Not Recommended = Unless there is a compelling rationale The contribution made by contact with asymptomatically infected
for specific populations or jurisdictions, measures are generally not individuals to disease transmission is unclear. Household members in
recommended for entire populations as the consequences may outweigh homes with ill persons may be at increased risk of contracting pandemic
the benefits. disease from an ill household member. These household members may
Consider = Important to consider these alternatives as part of a prudent have asymptomatic illness and may be able to shed influenza virus that
planning strategy, considering characteristics of the pandemic, such as age- promotes community disease transmission. Therefore, household members
specific illness rate, geographic distribution, and the magnitude of adverse of homes with sick individuals would be advised to stay home.
**
consequences. These factors may vary globally, nationally, and locally. To facilitate compliance and decrease risk of household transmission,
Recommended = Generally recommended as an important component of this intervention may be combined with provision of antiviral medications
the planning strategy. to household contacts, depending on drug availability, feasibility of
*
All these interventions should be used in combination with other infection distribution, and effectiveness; policy recommendations for antiviral
control measures, including hand hygiene, cough etiquette, and personal prophylaxis are addressed in a separate guidance document.
††
protective equipment such as face masks. Additional information on Consider short-term implementation of this measure—that is, less than 4
infection control measures is available at www.pandemicflu.gov. weeks.
† §§
This intervention may be combined with the treatment of sick individuals Plan for prolonged implementation of this measure—that is, 1 to 3
using antiviral medications and with vaccine campaigns, if supplies are months; actual duration may vary depending on transmission in the
available. community as the pandemic wave is expected to last 6-8 weeks.
§
Many sick individuals who are not critically ill may be managed safely at
home.
12Community Mitigation Guidance
Standby, and Activate, which reflect key steps of community transmission in their jurisdiction.
in escalation of response action. Alert includes
notification of critical systems and personnel Duration of Implementation of
of their impending activation, Standby includes Nonpharmaceutical Interventions
initiation of decision-making processes for
imminent activation, including mobilization It is important to emphasize that as long as
of resources and personnel, and Activate refers susceptible individuals are present in large
to implementation of the specified pandemic numbers, disease spread may continue.
mitigation measures. Pre-pandemic planning Immunity to infection with a pandemic
for use of these interventions should be directed strain can only occur after natural infection
to lessening the transition time between Alert, or immunization with an effective vaccine.
Standby, and Activate. The speed of transmission Preliminary analysis of historical data from
may drive the amount of time decision-makers selected U.S. cities during the 1918 pandemic
are allotted in each mode, as does the amount of suggests that duration of implementation is
time it takes to fully implement the intervention significantly associated with overall mortality
once a decision is made to Activate. rates. Stopping or limiting the intensity of
For the most severe pandemics (Categories 4 interventions while pandemic virus was still
and 5), Alert is implemented during WHO Phase circulating within the community was temporally
5/U.S. Government Stage 2 (confirmed human associated with increases in mortality due to
outbreak overseas), and Standby is initiated pneumonia and influenza in many communities.
during WHO Phase 6/ U.S. Government Stage It is recommended for planning purposes
3 (widespread human outbreaks in multiple that communities be prepared to maintain
locations overseas). Standby is maintained interventions for up to 12 weeks, especially
through Stage 4 (first human case in North in the case of Category 4 or Category 5
America), with the exception of the State or pandemics, where recrudescent epidemics may
region in which a cluster of laboratory-confirmed have significant impact. However, for less
human pandemic influenza cases with evidence severe pandemics (Category 2 or 3), a shorter
of community transmission is identified. The period of implementation may be adequate for
recommendation for that State or region is to achieving public health benefit. This planning
Activate the appropriate NPIs when identification recommendation acknowledges the uncertainty
of a cluster with community transmission around duration of circulation of pandemic
is made. Other States or regions Activate virus in a given community and the potential
appropriate interventions when they identify for recrudescent disease when use of NPIs is
laboratory-confirmed human pandemic influenza limited or stopped, unless population immunity is
case clusters with evidence of community achieved.
transmission in their jurisdictions.
Critical Issues for the Use of
For Category 1, 2, and 3 pandemics, Alert is Nonpharmaceutical Interventions
declared during U.S. Government Stage 3, with
step-wise progression by States and regions to A number of outstanding issues should be
Standby based on U.S. Government declaration addressed to optimize the planning for use
of Stage 4 and the identification of the first of these measures. These issues include
human pandemic influenza case(s) in the United the establishment of sensitive and timely
States. Progression to Activate by a given surveillance, the planning and conducting of
State or region occurs when that State or region multi-level exercises to evaluate the feasibility
identifies a cluster of laboratory-confirmed of implementation, and the identification
human pandemic influenza cases, with evidence and establishment of appropriate monitoring
13Community Mitigation Guidance
and evaluation systems. Policy guidance in Although the findings from the poll and public
development regarding the use of antiviral engagement project reported high levels of
medications for prophylaxis, community and willingness to follow pandemic mitigation
workplace-specific use of personal protective recommendations, it is uncertain how the public
equipment, and safe home management of ill might react when a pandemic occurs. These
persons must be prioritized as part of future results need to be interpreted with caution in
components of the overall community mitigation advance of a severe pandemic that could cause
strategy. In addition, generating appropriate prolonged disruption of daily life and widespread
risk communication content/materials and an illness in a community. Issues such as the ability
effective means for delivery, soliciting active to stay home if ill, job security, and income
community support and involvement in strategic protection were repeatedly cited as factors
planning decisions, and assisting individuals and critical to ensuring compliance with these NPI
families in addressing their own preparedness measures.
needs are critical factors in achieving success.
Planning to Minimize Consequences of
Assessment of the Public on Feasibility Community Mitigation Strategy
of Implementation and Compliance It is recognized that implementing certain NPIs
A Harvard School of Public Health public will have an impact on the daily activities and
opinion poll on community mitigation lives of individuals and society. For example,
interventions, conducted with a nationally some individuals will need to stay home to mind
representative sample of adults over the age children or because of exposure to ill family
of 18 years in the United States in September members, and for some children, there will
and October 2006, indicated that most be an interruption in their education or their
respondents were willing to follow public health access to school meal programs. These impacts
recommendations for the use of NPIs, but it also will arise in addition to the direct impacts of
uncovered financial and other concerns. More the pandemic itself. Communities should
information on “Pandemic Influenza and the undertake appropriate planning to address both
Public: Survey Findings” is available at www. the consequences of these interventions and
keystone.org/Public_Policy/Pandemic_control. direct effects of the pandemic. In addition,
html. communities should pre-identify those for
whom these measures may be most difficult
The Public Engagement Project on Community to implement, such as vulnerable populations
Control Measures for Pandemic Influenza and persons at risk (e.g., people who live alone
or are poor/working poor, elderly [particularly
(see link at www.keystone.org/Public_Policy/
those who are homebound], homeless, recent
Pandemic_control.html), carried out in October
immigrants, disabled, institutionalized, or
and November 2006, found that approximately
incarcerated). To facilitate preparedness and
two-thirds of both citizens and stakeholders
to reduce untoward consequences from these
supported all the nonpharmaceutical measures.
interventions, Pandemic Influenza Community
Nearly half of the citizens and stakeholders
Mitigation Interim Planning Guides have been
supported implementation when pandemic
included (see Appendices 4-9) to provide broad
influenza first strikes the United States, and
planning guidance tailored for businesses and
approximately one-third of the public supported
other employers, childcare programs, elementary
implementation when influenza first strikes in
and secondary schools, colleges and universities,
their State.
faith-based and community organizations,
and individuals and families. It is also critical
14Community Mitigation Guidance
for communities to begin planning their risk Research Needs
communication strategies. This includes public
engagement and messages to help individuals, It is recognized that additional research is
families, employers, and many other stakeholders needed to validate the proposed interventions,
to prepare. assess their effectiveness, and identify adverse
consequences. This research will be conducted
The U.S. Government recognizes the significant as soon as practicable and will be used in
challenges and social costs that would be providing updated guidance as required. A
imposed by the coordinated application of the proposed research agenda is outlined within this
measures described above. It is important to document.
bear in mind, however, that if the experience of
the 1918 pandemic is relevant, social distancing Conclusions
and other NPI strategies would, in all likelihood,
be implemented in most communities at some Planning and preparedness for implementing
point during a pandemic. The potential exists mitigation strategies during a pandemic are
for such interventions to be implemented in complex tasks requiring participation by all
an uncoordinated, untimely, and inconsistent levels of government and all segments of society.
manner that would impose economic and social Community-level intervention strategies will
costs similar to those imposed by strategically call for specific actions by individuals, families,
implemented interventions but with dramatically employers, schools, and other organizations.
reduced effectiveness. The development of clear Building a foundation of community and
interim pre-pandemic guidance for planning individual and family preparedness and
that outlines a coordinated strategy, based developing and delivering effective risk
upon the best scientific evidence available, communication for the public in advance of a
offers communities the best chance to secure pandemic are critical. If embraced earnestly,
the benefits that such strategies may provide. these efforts will result in enhanced ability to
As States and local communities exercise the respond not only to pandemic influenza but also
potential tools for responding to a pandemic, to multiple other hazards and threats. While
more will be learned about the practical the challenge is formidable, the consequences
realities of their implementation. Interim of facing a severe pandemic unprepared will be
recommendations will be updated accordingly. intolerable. This interim pre-pandemic planning
guidance is put forth as a step in our commitment
Testing and Exercising Community to address the challenge of mitigating a pandemic
by building and enhancing community resiliency.
Mitigation Interventions
Since few communities have experienced
disasters on the scale of a severe pandemic, drills
and exercises are critical in testing the efficacy
of plans. A severe pandemic would challenge
all facets of governmental and community
functions. Advance planning is necessary to
ensure a coordinated communications strategy
and the continuity of essential services. Realistic
exercises considering the effect of these proposed
interventions and the cascading second- and
third-order consequences will identify planning
and resource shortfalls.
15
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II
Introduction
A severe pandemic in a fully susceptible for healthcare services, including intensive
population, such as the 1918 pandemic or one of care unit (ICU) admissions and the number of
even greater severity, with limited quantities of individuals requiring mechanical ventilation,
antiviral medications and pre-pandemic vaccine would vastly exceed current inventories of
represents a worst-case scenario for pandemic physical assets (emergency services capacity,
planning and preparedness.1 However, because inpatient beds, ICU beds, and ventilators) and
pandemics are unpredictable in terms of timing, numbers of healthcare professionals (nurses
onset, and severity, communities must plan and and physicians). The most prudent approach,
prepare for the spectrum of pandemic severity therefore, would appear to be to expand medical
that could occur. The purpose of this document surge capacity as much as possible while
is to provide interim planning guidance for reducing the anticipated demand for services by
what are believed currently to be the most limiting disease transmission. Delaying a rapid
effective combinations of pharmaceutical and upswing of cases and lowering the epidemic peak
nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) for to the extent possible would allow a better match
mitigating the impact of an influenza pandemic between the number of ill persons requiring
across a wide range of severity scenarios. hospitalization and the nation’s capacity to
provide medical care for such people
The community strategy for pandemic influenza (see Figure 1).
mitigation supports the goals of the Federal
Government’s response to pandemic influenza to The primary strategies for combating influenza
limit the spread of a pandemic; mitigate disease, are 1) vaccination, 2) treatment of infected
suffering, and death; and sustain infrastructure individuals and prophylaxis of exposed
and lessen the impact to the economy and the individuals with influenza antiviral medications,
functioning of society.2 In a pandemic, the and 3) implementation of infection control
overarching public health imperative must be and social distancing measures.5, 7, 8, 13, 14 The
to reduce morbidity and mortality. From a single most effective intervention will be
public health perspective, if we fail to protect vaccination. However, it is highly unlikely that
human health we are likely to fail in our goals of a well-matched vaccine will be available when
preserving societal function and mitigating the a pandemic begins unless a vaccine with broad
social and economic consequences of a severe cross-protection is developed.15-18 With current
pandemic.3-8 vaccine technology, pandemic strain vaccine
would not become available for at least 4 to 6
A severe pandemic could overwhelm acute care months after the start of a pandemic, although
services in the United States and challenge our this lag time may be reduced in the future.
nation’s healthcare system.9-11 To preserve as Furthermore, once an effective pandemic vaccine
many lives as possible, it is essential to keep the is developed and being produced, it is likely that
healthcare system functioning and to deliver the amounts will be limited due to the production
best care possible.12 The projected peak demand process and will not be sufficient to cover the
17Community Mitigation Guidance
entire population. Pre-pandemic vaccine may public’s perspective of the protective measures
be available at the onset of a pandemic, but there and their impact on society, and common sense.
is no guarantee that it will be effective against Evidence to determine the best strategies for
the emerging pandemic strain. Even if a pre- protecting people during a pandemic is very
pandemic vaccine did prove to be effective, limited. Retrospective data from past epidemics
projected stockpiles of such a vaccine would and the conclusions drawn from those data need
be sufficient for only a fraction of the U.S. to be examined and analyzed within the context
population. of modern society. Few of those conclusions
may be completely generalizable; however, they
These realities mean that we must be prepared can inform contemporary planning assumptions.
to face the first wave of the next pandemic When these assumptions are integrated into the
without vaccine—the best countermeasure—and current mathematical models, the limitations
potentially without sufficient quantities of need to be recognized, as they were in a recent
influenza antiviral medications.19 In addition, it Institute of Medicine report.20
is not known if influenza antiviral medications
will be effective against a future pandemic This document provides interim pre-pandemic
strain. During a pandemic, decisions about how planning guidance for the selection and timing
to protect the public before an effective vaccine of selected NPIs and recommendations for their
is available need to be based on scientific data, use matched to the severity of a future influenza
ethical considerations, consideration of the pandemic. While it is not possible, prior to
Figure 1.
18Community Mitigation Guidance
emergence, to predict with certainty the severity 3. Dismissal of students from school
of a pandemic, early and rapid characterization (including public and private schools as well
of the pandemic virus and initial clusters of as colleges and universities) and school-based
human cases may give insight into its potential activities and closure of childcare programs,
severity and determine the initial public health coupled with protecting children and teenagers
response. The main determinant of a pandemic’s through social distancing in the community
severity is its associated mortality.21-27 This to achieve reductions of out-of-school social
may be defined by case fatality ratio or excess contacts and community mixing.
mortality rate—key epidemiological parameters
that may be available shortly after the emergence 4. Use of social distancing measures to
of a pandemic strain from investigations of initial reduce contact among adults in the community
outbreaks or from more routine surveillance data. and workplace, including, for example,
Other factors, such as efficiency of transmission, cancellation of large public gatherings and
are important for consideration as well. alteration of workplace environments and
schedules to decrease social density and preserve
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention a healthy workplace to the greatest extent
(CDC) developed this guidance with input from possible without disrupting essential services.
other Federal agencies, key stakeholders, and Enable institution of workplace leave policies
partners, including a working group of public that align incentives and facilitate adherence
health officials and other stakeholders (see with the nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)
Appendix 2, Interim Guidance Development outlined above.
Process). A community mitigation framework
is proposed that is based upon an early, targeted, The effectiveness of individual infection control
layered mitigation strategy involving the directed measures (e.g., cough etiquette, hand hygiene)
application of multiple partially effective and the role of surgical masks or respirators in
nonpharmaceutical measures initiated early and preventing the transmission of influenza are
maintained consistently during an epidemic currently unknown. However, cough etiquette
wave.20, 28-33 These interventions include the and hand hygiene will be recommended
following: universally, and the use of surgical masks and
respirators may be appropriate in certain settings
1. Isolation and treatment (as appropriate) (specific community face mask and respirator
with influenza antiviral medications of all use guidance is forthcoming as is guidance for
persons with confirmed or probable pandemic workplaces and will be available on
influenza. Isolation may occur in the home or www.pandemicflu.gov).
healthcare setting, depending on the severity
of an individual’s illness and /or the current Decisions about what tools should be used
capacity of the healthcare infrastructure. during a pandemic should be based on the
observed severity of the event, its impact on
2. Voluntary home quarantine of specific subpopulations, the expected benefit
members of households with confirmed or of the interventions, the feasibility of success
probable influenza case(s) and consideration in modern society, the direct and indirect costs,
of combining this intervention with the and the consequences on critical infrastructure,
prophylactic use of antiviral medications, healthcare delivery, and society. The most
providing sufficient quantities of effective controversial elements (e.g., prolonged dismissal
medications exist and that a feasible means of of students from schools and closure of childcare
distributing them is in place. programs) are not likely to be needed in less
severe pandemics, but these steps may save lives
19Community Mitigation Guidance
during severe pandemics. Just as communities appropriate, issue updates based on the results
plan and prepare for mitigating the effect of from various ongoing historical, epidemiological,
severe natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes), they and field studies. Response guidance will
should plan and prepare for mitigating the effect need to remain flexible and likely will require
of a severe pandemic. modification during a pandemic as information
becomes available and it can be determined
The U.S. Government recognizes the significant if ongoing pandemic mitigation measures are
challenges and social costs that would be useful for mitigating the impact of the pandemic.
imposed by the coordinated application of the Pandemic planners need to develop requirements
measures described above. 2, 10, 34 It is important for community-level data collection during a
to bear in mind, however, that if the experience pandemic and develop and test a tool or process
of the 1918 pandemic is relevant, social for accurate real-time and post-wave evaluation
distancing and other NPI strategies would, in all of pandemic mitigation measures, with
likelihood, be implemented in most communities guidelines for modifications.
at some point during a pandemic. The potential
exists for such interventions to be implemented Communities will need to prepare in advance if
in an uncoordinated, untimely, and inconsistent they are to accomplish the rapid and coordinated
manner that would impose economic and social introduction of the measures described while
costs similar to those imposed by strategically mitigating the potentially significant cascading
implemented interventions but with dramatically second- and third-order consequences of the
reduced effectiveness. The development of clear interventions themselves. Cascading second-
interim pre-pandemic guidance for planning and third-order consequences are chains of
that outlines a coordinated strategy, based effects that may arise because of the intervention
upon the best scientific evidence available, and may require additional planning and
offers communities the best chance to secure intervention to mitigate. The terms generally
the benefits that such strategies may provide. refer to foreseeable unintended consequences of
As States and local communities exercise the intervention. For example, dismissal of students
potential tools for responding to a pandemic, from school classrooms may lead to the second-
more will be learned about the practical order effect of workplace absenteeism for child
realities of their implementation. Interim minding. Subsequent workplace absenteeism
recommendations will be updated accordingly. and loss of household income could be especially
problematic for individuals and families living
This document serves as interim public health at or near subsistence levels. Workplace
planning guidance for State, local, territorial, absenteeism could also lead to disruption of
and tribal jurisdictions developing plans for the delivery of goods and services essential to
using community mitigation interventions in the viability of the community. If communities
response to a potential influenza pandemic in the are not prepared for these untoward effects, the
United States. Given the paucity of evidence for ability of the public to comply with the proposed
the effectiveness of some of the interventions measures and, thus, the ability of the measures to
and the potential socioeconomic implications, reduce suffering and death may be compromised.
some interventions may draw considerable
disagreement and criticism.20 Some interventions Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal
that may be highly useful tools in the framework governments and the private sector all have
of a disease control strategy will need to be important and interdependent roles in preparing
applied judiciously to balance socioeconomic for, responding to, and recovering from a
realities of community functioning. CDC pandemic. To maintain public confidence and to
will regularly review this document and, as enlist the support of private citizens in disease
20Community Mitigation Guidance
mitigation efforts, public officials at all levels circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses
of government must provide unambiguous a substantial risk of human disease.
and consistent guidance that is useful for
planning and can assist all segments of society Pandemic Alert Period
to recognize and understand the degree to
which their collective actions will shape the Phase 3: Human infection(s) with a new
course of a pandemic. The potential success of subtype, but no human-to-human spread, or at
community mitigation interventions is dependent most rare instances of spread to a close contact.
upon building a foundation of community and
individual and family preparedness. To facilitate Phase 4: Small cluster(s) with limited human-
preparedness, Pandemic Influenza Community to-human transmission but spread is highly
Mitigation Interim Planning Guides have been localized, suggesting that the virus is not well
included as appendices to provide broad but adapted to humans.
tailored planning guidance for businesses and
other employers, childcare programs, elementary Phase 5: Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human
and secondary schools, colleges and universities, spread still localized, suggesting that the virus
faith-based and community organizations, and is becoming increasingly better adapted to
individuals and families (see Appendices 4-9). humans, but may not yet be fully transmissible
See also the Department of Homeland Security’s (substantial pandemic risk).
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response and
Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Pandemic Period
Key Resources (available at www.pandemicflu. Phase 6: Pandemic phase: increased and
gov/plan/pdf/cikrpandemicinfluenzaguide.pdf). sustained transmission in general population.
U.S. and Global Preparedness Planning The WHO phases provide succinct statements
The suggested strategies contained in this about the global risk for a pandemic and provide
document are aligned with the World Health benchmarks against which to measure global
Organization (WHO) phases of a pandemic.35 response capabilities. However, to describe the
WHO has defined six phases, occurring before U.S. Government’s approach to the pandemic
and during a pandemic, that are linked to the response, it is more useful to characterize the
characteristics of a new influenza virus and its stages of an outbreak in terms of the immediate
spread through the population (see Appendix 2. and specific threat a pandemic virus poses to the
WHO Phases of a Pandemic/U.S. Government U.S. population.2 The following stages provide
Stages of a Pandemic). This document a framework for Federal Government actions:
specifically provides pre-pandemic planning
guidance for the use of NPIs in WHO Phase 6. Stage 0: New Domestic Animal Outbreak in At-
These phases are described below: Risk Country
Stage 1: Suspected Human Outbreak Overseas
Inter-Pandemic Period Stage 2: Confirmed Human Outbreak Overseas
Stage 3: Widespread Human Outbreaks in
Phase 1: No new influenza virus subtypes have Multiple Locations Overseas
been detected in humans. An influenza virus Stage 4: First Human Case in North America
subtype that has caused human infection may be Stage 5: Spread throughout United States
present in animals. If present in animals, the risk Stage 6: Recovery and Preparation for
of human disease is considered to be low. Subsequent Waves
Phase 2: No new influenza virus subtypes
have been detected in humans. However, a
21Community Mitigation Guidance
Using the Federal Government’s approach,
this document provides pre-pandemic planning
guidance from Stages 3 through 5 for step-wise
escalation of activity, from pre-implementation
preparedness, through active preparation for
initiation of NPIs, to actual use.
22III
Rationale for Proposed
Nonpharmaceutical Interventions
The three major goals of mitigating a of the agent acting within a specific host within
community-wide epidemic through NPIs are 1) a given milieu. For any given duration of
delay the exponential increase in incident cases infection and contact structure, R0 provides a
and shift the epidemic curve to the right in order measure of the transmissibility of an infectious
to “buy time” for production and distribution agent. Alterations in the pathogen, the host,
of a well-matched pandemic strain vaccine, 2) or the contact networks can result in changes
decrease the epidemic peak, and 3) reduce the in R0 and thus in the shape of the epidemic
total number of incident cases and, thus, reduce curve. Generally speaking, as R0 increases,
morbidity and mortality in the community epidemics have a sharper rise in the case curve,
(Figure 1). These three major goals of epidemic a higher peak illness rate (clinical attack rate),
mitigation may all be accomplished by focusing a shorter duration, and a higher percentage of
on the single goal of saving lives by reducing the population infected before the effects of
transmission. NPIs may help reduce influenza herd immunity begin to exert an influence (in
transmission by reducing contact between sick homogeneous contact networks, herd immunity
persons and uninfected persons, thereby reducing effects should dominate when the percentage of
the number of infected persons. Reducing the the population infected or otherwise rendered
number of persons infected will also lessen immune is equivalent to 1 – 1/ R0). Rt is the
the need for healthcare services and minimize change in the reproductive number at a given
the impact of a pandemic on the economy point in time. Thus, as shown in Figure 2,
and society. The surge of need for medical decreasing Rt by decreasing host susceptibility
care associated with a poorly mitigated severe (through vaccination or the implementation
pandemic can be only partially addressed by of individual infection control measures) or
increasing capacity within hospitals reducing transmission by diminishing the number
and other care settings. Thus, reshaping the of opportunities for exposure and transmission
demand for healthcare services by using NPIs is (through the implementation of community-
an important component of the overall strategy wide NPIs) will achieve the three major goals of
for mitigating a severe pandemic epidemic mitigation.39 Mathematical modeling
of pandemic influenza scenarios in the United
Principles of Disease Transmission States suggests that pandemic mitigation
strategies utilizing NPIs separately and in
Decreasing the Basic Reproductive number, R0 combination with medical countermeasures may
The basic reproductive number, R0, is the decrease the Rt.20, 28-31, 40 This potential to reduce
average number of new infections that a typical Rt is the rationale for employing early, targeted,
infectious person will produce during the and layered community-level NPIs as key
course of his/her infection in a fully susceptible components of the public health response.
population in the absence of interventions.36-38
R0 is not an intrinsic property of the infectious
agent but is rather an epidemic characteristic
23Community Mitigation Guidance
Figure 2.
Source: Lewis, 2006
Influenza: Infectiousness and Transmissibility shed virus prior to the onset of clinical symptoms
Assuming the pandemic influenza strain will and may be infectious on the day before illness
have transmission dynamics comparable onset. Most people infected with influenza
to those for seasonal influenza and recent develop symptomatic illness (temperature of
pandemic influenza strains, the infection control 100.4° F or greater, plus cough or sore throat),
challenges posed will be considerable. Factors and the amount of virus they shed correlates with
responsible for these challenges include 1) a their temperature; however, as many as one-third
short incubation period (average of 2 days, to one-half of those who are infected may either
range 1-4 days); 2) the onset of viral shedding have very mild or asymptomatic infection. This
(and presumably of infectiousness) prior to the possibility is important because even seemingly
onset of symptoms; and 3) the lack of specific healthy individuals with influenza infection
clinical signs and symptoms that can reliably as well as those with mild symptoms who are
discriminate influenza infections from other not recognized as having influenza could be
causes of respiratory illness.41, 42 Although the infectious to others.
hallmarks of a pandemic strain will not be known
until emergence, patients with influenza may
24Community Mitigation Guidance
Early, Targeted the greatest potential for an effective public
Implementation of Interventions health response.
The potential for significant transmission To summarize, isolation of ill individuals will
of pandemic influenza by asymptomatic reduce the onward transmission of disease
or minimally symptomatic individuals to after such individuals are identified. However,
their contacts suggests that efforts to limit influenza is a disease in which infected persons
community transmission that rely on targeting may shed virus prior to onset of symptoms and
only symptomatic individuals would result in thus are potentially infectious for approximately
diminished ability to mitigate the effects of a 1 day before becoming symptomatic. In
pandemic. Additionally, the short intergeneration addition, not all infected individuals will be
time of influenza disease suggests that household identified because mild or asymptomatic cases
members living with an ill individual (who are may be relatively common. Isolation strategies
thus at increased risk of infection with pandemic are thus, at best, a partial solution. Similarly,
virus) would need to be identified rapidly and voluntary quarantine of members of households
targeted for appropriate intervention to limit with ill persons will facilitate the termination of
community spread.20, 28-31, 40 Recent estimates transmission chains, but quarantine strategies
have suggested that while the reproductive are limited to the extent that they can be
number for most strains of influenza is less implemented only after cases are identified.
than 2, the intergeneration time may be as little Consequently, only a percentage of transmission
as 2.6 days. These parameters predict that in chains will be interrupted in this fashion. Given
the absence of disease mitigation measures, the very short generation times (time between
the number of cases of epidemic influenza a primary and secondary case) observed with
will double about every 3 days, or about a influenza and the fact that peak infectiousness
tenfold increase every 1-2 weeks. Given the occurs around the time of symptom onset,
potential for exponential growth of a pandemic, the identification of cases and simultaneous
it is reasonable to expect that the timing of implementation of isolation and quarantine
interventions will be critical. Planning for must occur very rapidly or the efficacy of these
community response that is predicated on strategies will erode significantly.
reactive implementation of these measures may
limit overall effectiveness. Measures instituted Antiviral Therapy/Prophylaxis
earlier in a pandemic would be expected to be
more effective than the same measures instituted Four approved influenza antiviral agents are
after a pandemic is well established. Although available in the United States: amantadine,
subject to many limitations, mathematical rimantadine, zanamivir, and oseltamivir. The
models that explored potential source mitigation role of influenza antiviral medications as therapy
strategies that make use of vaccine, antiviral for symptomatic individuals is primarily to
medications, and other infection control and improve individual outcomes not to limit the
social distancing measures for use in an influenza further transmission of disease; although, recent
outbreak identified critical time thresholds for clinical trials have demonstrated that prophylaxis
success.20, 28, 31 These results suggest that the of household contacts of symptomatic
effectiveness of pandemic mitigation strategies individuals with neuraminidase inhibitors can
will erode rapidly as the cumulative illness rate reduce household transmission. 43-48
prior to implementation climbs above 1 percent
of the population in an affected area. Thus, pre- Current antiviral medication stockpiles are
pandemic, scenario-based contingency planning thought to be inadequate to support antiviral
for the early, targeted use of NPIs likely provides prophylaxis of members of households with
ill individuals.49, 50 Moreover, the feasibility
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